.)?b E842.9.A54 INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY HEARINGS Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy Pursuant to Executive Order 11130, an Executive order creating a Commission to ascertain, evaluate, and report upon the facts relating to the assassination of the late President John F. Kennedy and the subsequent violent death of the man charged with the assassination and S.J. Res. 137, 88th Congress, a concurrent resolution conferring upon the Commission the power to administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, receive evidence, and issue subpenas UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON. D.C. J.^fof- 5- ^1T\X>ACL U^^ ^^ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON: 1964 For sale in complete sets by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Oovenunent Printing Office Washington, D.C., 20402 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman Senator Richard B. Russell Representative Gerald R. Ford Senator John Sherman Cooper Mr. Allen W. Dulles Representative Hale Boggs Mr. John J. McCloy J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel Assistant Counsel Francis W. H. Adams Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Joseph A. Ball Wesley J. Liebeler David W. Belin Norman Redlich William T. Coleman, Jr. W. David Slawson Melvin Aron Eisenberg Arlen Specter Burt W. Griffin Samuel A. Stern Leon D. Hubert. Jr. Howard P. Willens* Staff Members Phillip Barson Edward A. Conroy John Hart Ely Alfred Goldberg Murray J. Laulicht Arthur Marmor Richard M. Mosk John J. O'Brien Stuart Pollak Alfeedda Scobey Charles N. Shaffer, Jr. Biographical information on the Commissioners and the staff can be found the Commission's Report. Mr. Willens also acted as liaison between the Commission and the Department of Justice. ;; Preface The testimony of the following witnesses is contained in volume V Alan H. : Belmont, assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Jack ; Revill and V. J. Brian of the Dallas ix>lice, who testified concerning conversations Revill had with James Patrick Hosty, Jr., a special agent of the FBI Robert A. ; Frazier, a firearms expert with the FBI Drs. Alfred Olivier, Arthur Dziemian, ; and Frederick W. Light, Jr., wound ballistics experts with the U.S. Army labora- tories at Edgewood Arsenal, Md. ; J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation John A. AlcCone, Director of the Central Intelligence ; Agency Richard M. Helms, Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence ; Agency Thomas J. Kelley, Leo J. Gauthier, and Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt, who testi- ; fied concerning efforts to reconstimct the facts of the assassination; Mrs. John F. Kennedy Jack Ruby Henry Wade, district attorney of Dallas Sgt. Patrick T. ; ; ; Dean, of the Dallas police, who testified concerning a conversation with Ruby Waggoner Carr, attorney general of Texas Richard Edward Snyder, John A. ; McVickar, Abram Chayes, Bernice Waterman, and Frances G. Knight, of the U.S. Department of State Secretary of State Dean Rusk Mrs. Lee Harvey Oswald ; ; Harris Coulter, an interpreter with the Department of State Robert Alan Surrey, ; a Dallas citizen who testified regarding his relationship with General Walker; James J. Rowley, Chief of the U.S. Secret Service Robert Carswell, special as- ; sistant to the Secretary of the Treasury Bernard William Weissman, who testi- ; fied concerning an advertisement signed by him which appeared in the Dallas Moi-ning News on November 22, 1963 Robert G. Klause, a Dallas citizen who testi- ; fied regarding a "Wantetl For Treason" handbill Mark Lane, a New York at- ; torney President Lyndon B. Johnson and Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson Llewellyn E. ; ; Thompson, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon. : — Contents Page Preface v Testimony of Alan H. Belmont 1 Jack Reviil 33 V. J. Brian 47 Robert A. Frazier 58, 165 Alfred Olivier 74 Arthur J. Dziemian 90 Frederick W. Light, Jr 94 J.Edgar Hoover 97 John A. McCone and Richard M. Helms 120 Thomas J. Kelley 129, 175 Leo J. Gauthier 135 Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt 138, 176 Mrs. John F. Kennedy 178 Jack Ruby 181 Henry Wade 213 Patrick T. Dean 254 Waggoner Carr 258 Richard Edvfard Snyder 260 John A. McVickar 299, 318 Abram Chayes 307, 327 Bernice Waterman 346 Hon. Dean Rusk 363 Frances G. Knight 371 Mrs. Lee Harvey Oswald (resumed) 387, 410 Harris Coulter 408 Robert Alan Surrey 420 James J. Rowley 449 Robert Carswell 486 Bernard William Weissman, accompanied by Thomas A. Flannery, Esq 487 Robert G. Klause 535 Mark Lane (resumed) 546 President LjTidon B. Johnson 561 Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson 564 Llewellyn E. Thompson 567 C. Douglas Dillon 573 COMMISSION EXHIBITS INTRODUCED Exhibit No. 825 : : Exhibit No. : Pa&e Exhibit No. Page Exhibit No. Page 844 88 904 178 965 362 845 88 905 178 966 362 846 88 906 178 967 362 847 88 907 178 968 362 848 88 908 299 969 362 849 88 909 299 970 362 850 88 910 299 971 362 851 88 911 325 973 362 852 88 912 299 974 362 853 88 913 299 975 362 854 88 914 299 . 976 362 855 88 915 299 977 362 856 88 916 299 978 362 857 88 917 299 979 362 858 88 918 299 980 362 859 88 919 299 981 362 860 88 920 299 982 362 861 89 921 299 983 362 862 89 922 299 984 371 863 Ill 923 299 985 371 864 115 924 299 986 371 865 115 925 299 987 404 866 120 926 299 988 404 867 120 927 299 989 371 868 123 928 299 990 403 869 123 929 299 991 403 870 121 930 299 992 404 871 130 931 299 993 410 872 131 932 299 994 413 873 131 933 299 995 421 874 131 934 299 996 448 875 134 935 299 997 448 876 135 936 299 998 448 877 135 937 299 999 448 878 136 938 299 . 1000 448 879 136 939 299 1002 448 880 136 940 299 1003 448 881 .136 941 325 1004 448 882 137 942 325 1005 448 883 137 943 326 1006 448 884 138 944 326 1007 448 885 171 945 326 1008 448 886 . 171 946 299 1009 448 887 171 947 299 1010 448 888 171 948 346 1011 448 889 171 949 346 1012 448 890 171 950 346 1013 448 891 171 951 336 1014 448 892 .171 952 335 1015 448 893 171 953 346 1016 448 171 954 345 ioi7 448 894 343 ioi8 454 895 171 9;^ ^56 345 1^19 461 896 171 1020 4^2 897 171 l^ 1% 898 171 1021 463 III l^ 900 171 362 1^23 465 961 901 171 962 362 1024 469 902 171 963 362 1025 469 903 171 964 362 1026 471 viii : : Exhibit No. : Page Exhibit No. Page Exhibit No. Page 1027 471 1037 532 1046 532 1028 476 1037-A 532 1047 532 1029 483 1037-B 532 1048 532 1030 483 1038 532 1049 532 1031 532 1038-A 532 1050 532 1032 532 1039 532 1051 532 1033 532 1040 532 1052 532 1033-A 532 1041 532 1053-A 576 1034 532 1042 532 1053-B 577 1035 532 1043 532 1053-C 582 1036 532 1044..; 532 1053-D 583 1036-A 532 1045 532 1053-E 585 ; Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy Wednesday, May 6, 1964 TESTIMONY OF ALAN H. BELMONT The President's Commission met at 9 :25 a.m. on May 6, 1964, at 200 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.O. Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman Representative Gerald R. ; Ford, John J. McCloy, and Allen W. Dulles, members. Also present were J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel David W. Be'lin, assistant ; counsel Norman Redlich, assistant counsel Samuel A. Stern, assistant counsel ; ; and Charles Murray, observer. The Chairman. Well, gentlemen, the Commission will come to order. Mr. Belin, you had something you wanted the record to show in connection with our testimony yesterday. Mr. Belin. Yes, sir. The Chairman. Would you present it to the Commission now, please. Mr. Belin. Yes, sir. We have a report from an FBI document that states that Roy Truly when interviewed on November 22, advised that "it is possible Oswald did see him with a rifle in his hands within the past few days," that is as of November 22, "as a Mr. Warren Caster, employed by Southwestern Publishing Co., which company has an ofiice in the same building, had come to his office with two rifles, one was a .22 caliber rifle which Caster said he had purchased for his son, and the other a larger more high-powered rifle which Caster said he had purchased with which to go deer hunting if he got a chance," and Truly said that he examined the high-powered rifle and raised it to his shoulder and sighted over it and then returned it to Caster and Caster left with both rifles. Then Truly went on to state that he does not own a rifle and has had no other rifle in his hands or in his possession for a long period of time. Now because of the problem that did arise, I believe the staff will promptly go down to Dallas to take the deposition of both Mr. Truly and Mr. Caster to fully get this in deposition form and find out where these rifles were as of November 22. The Chairman. And their caliber, and so forth. ' Mr. Belin. Yes, sir. The Chairman. Yes, sir ;I think that is desirable. You ought to do that. Mr. Belmont, the purpose of today's hearing is to take your testimony concern- ing the general procedures of the FBI and explain their relationship to the case of Lee Harvey Oswald. Would you please rise and raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this 'Commission will be* the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Belmont. I do. The Chairman. Will you be seated, please. Mr. Stern, will you conduct the examination, please? Mr. Stern. Thank you, sir. Would you state your full name for the record, please? Mr. Belmont. Alan H. Belmont. Mr. Stern. And your address, Mr. Belmont? Mr. Belmont. 2711 North Yucatan Street, Arlington, Va. Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, what was your education at the college level? Mr. Belmont. Graduate of Stanford University in California, with an A.B. degree, majoring in accounting. Mr. Stern. What year? Mr. Belmont. 1931. Mr. Stern. What was your employment briefly before joining the Federal Bureau of Investigation? Mr. Belmont. I joined the Bureau, the FBI, in 1936, and in the interim I worked for public accountants and as a public accountant myself in California. Mr. Stern. Would you describe, please, for the Commission briefly your ex- perience in the Federal Bureau of Investigation since 1936? Mr. Belmont. I entered the FBI November 30, 1936, and after the period of training, was assigned to Birmingham, Ala., as my first office. I transferred to Chicago in about August 1937, and remained there until the summer of 1938 when I was transferred to Washington, D.C., headquarters. In January of 1941 I was transferred to New York as supervisor of applicant and criminal investigative matters, remained there until the fall of 1942, when I was made assistant agent in charge of our Chicago oflSce. In January of 1943 I was made agent in charge of our Cincinnati oflBce and remained there until the summer of 1944 when I was transferred to New York as assistant agent in charge of criminal matters in New York. Subsequently, I was placed in charge of all security work in New York for a number of years and was transferred to Washington in charge of the domestic intelligence division in February 1950. I headed that division until about June of 1961 when I was made assistant to the director in charge of all investigative work of the FBI and that is my present position. Mr. Stern. Could you describe the organization of the FBI with two purposes in mind First, to fix your position in the organization. Second, to provide a : framework for describing the investigation of the case of Lee Harvey Oswald. Mr. Belmont. The headquarters of the FBI is, of course, or the FBI is headed by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover as Director. Directly under him is Mr. Clyde Tolson, Associate Director. There are 10 divisions broken down in particular types of administration. Mr. Dulles. May I say if any of this is classified, highly classified, you had better let us know because then we could go off the record. Mr. Belmont. There is nothing classified here. Mr. Dulles. Right. I know that you would have that in mind. Mr. Belmont. Thank you. Basically, the division of the 10 divisions at headquarters is between adminis- trative and investigative. The 10th division is the inspection division and re- ports directly to Mr. Hoover. I am in charge of the investigative divisions which are comprised of the general investigative divisions handling general criminal work, the special investigative division handling special inquiries of applicant nature, and our aggressive approach to organized crime. The laboratory division handles all examinations of a scientific nature, and the domestic intelligence division handles all types of security work. I am in charge of those four divisions, and thus am in charge and responsible for our investigative work. Our field oflices, numbering 55, are geographically located in accordance with the amount of work in a particular area. Each division in the field is headed by a special agent in charge, assisted by an assistant special agent in charge. They are responsible for the proper conduct of the work within their divisions. They are answerable to Mr. Hoover. They are also supervised, of course, in the particular area of the work concerned by the division at headquarters. Depending on Mr. Dulles. May I ask is that 55 in the United States? Mr. Belmont. United States and its possessions. Mr. Dulles. And Puerto Rico? Mr. Belmont. Yes. Mr. Dulles. It doesn't include your legal Mr. Belmont. Legal attaches abroad? Mr. Dulles. Yes. Mr. Belmont. No they are under the direct supervision of our headquarters. ; Depending on the size of the division in the field, we will have a supervisory staff in order to properly supervise the work of the agents in the field. Mr. Stern. Can you describe the establishment of a typical case, indicating the meaning of the tenns oflSee of origin and auxiliary office? Mr. Belmont. A case is opened by the FBI upon the receipt of information in- dicating a matter within the jurisdiction of the FBI. We restrict our investiga- tions to those matters which are within our jurisdiction. The office of origin is the office where the major part of the work is to be done. Thus it should be the controlling office of the investigation. Normally, if an individual is under investigation, it will be the oflBce where he resides. There will be in many cases investigation to be conducted by other offices. Those offices that have investigations in that case are considered auxiliary offices, and will cover the investigation sent to it, sent to them, by the office of origin or by another auxiliary office, if a lead develops within that area that requires attention elsewhere. I may say that the office of origin can be changed and is changed if during the investigation it becomes apparent that the focus of the investigation has shifted to another area. It is logical, therefore, that that office which bears the brunt of the investiga- tion should be in possession of all the material pertinent to the investigation and should be charged with the supervision and running of the investigation and the direction of it. In the event the office of origin is changed at any given time, the previous office of origin will forward to the new office of origin all material pertaining to the case so that it will have a complete file and the necessary knowledge to run the case. Mr. Stern. Can you tell us a bit more about how information is maintained and how it ffows through the system from headquarters to office of origin, to the auxiliary office or in the other directions that are possible? Mr. Belmont. Since the information is maintained in a standard and uniform filing system in both our field offices and our headquarters so that there is com- plete uniformity in the handling of information, our main filing system is at headquarters. Consequently, we need here all pertinent information in any case. Consequently, the reports and information developed during a case are sent to our headquarters for filing. It is pertinent to observe that we conduct close to 2 million name checks a year for other agencies and departments of the Federal Government. Conse- quently, we must have here all pertinent information so that a name check will reflect the information in possession of the Bureau. — When a report is prepared in our field office an investigation, and there are leads or investigation to be performed in another office, copies of this report are designated for that office, together with the lead or the investigation to be covered. Upon receipt of that the office gathers the background information from the report and proceeds with the investigation. Mr. Stern. This is the auxiliary office? Mr. Belmont. The auxiliary office. If there is a matter of urgency rather than wait for an investigative report, the information will be transmitted by more rapid means, such as teletype. All of our offices have teletypes; radio, our offices have a radio sys- tem telephone. ; Mr. Dulles. Is that teletype from the office to Washington only, or is there some interoffice teletypes? Mr. Belmont. Each office is connected with each other office by teletype. Mr. Dulles. It is; all over the country? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir permitting rapid communication. ; Mr. Dulles. That is. New Orleans and Dallas would have teletype between these two offices? Mr. Belmont. Yes. The Chairman. What kind of radio communication, Mr. Belmont, did you say? 3 Mr. Belmont. We have an emergency radio communication so that both for normal use, in the matter of exi)ense, to reduce expenses, and for an emer- gency, our oflSces can communicate with headquarters and with each other. The Chairman. On your own transmission system? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir that is correct. We feel that ; in any type of an emergency we must, because of our heavy responsibilities The Chairman. Yes. Mr. Belmont. Be able to communicate. As a matter of fact, during the recent disaster in Alaska, one of the few means of communication with the mainland was our radio system. The Chairman. Is that so? Mr. Belmont. And we assisted in passing messages down from Alaska. We have a communication called AIRTEL which is simply a communication in letter form on a particular form which upon receipt is regarded as a matter of urgency and requires special handling. So that you will understand that, in an effort to cut expenses, we determined that a matter which could not wait for a report or a letter was normally sent by teletype, which is a relatively expensive means of communication. By sending an AIRTEL which would be recognized for special handling, the office could receive the same information by mail with a delay of perhaps 12 hours and it would still receive the urgent handling that we require for that particular thing. That is the purpose of the AIRTEL. Mr. Stern. I think we might turn now to a description of your role in the investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald, both before and after the assassination. Mr. Belmont. As the individual in charge of all investigative operations, the Lee Harvey Oswald investigation is my responsibility, the same as any other investigative case in the Bureau. Mr. Stern. Did you have any particular involvement that you can recall — in the investigation of his case before November 22 'personally? Mr. Belmont. No this case was not of the importance or urgency that it was ; considered necessary to call to my personal attention for personal direction. You must bear in mind that during the fiscal year 1963 the FBI handled something in the nature of 636,000 investigative matters. Necessarily, then, those matters which would be called to my personal attention for personal handling would have to be on a selective basis. Mr. Stern. Have you been personally involved in the investigation since the assassination? Mr. Belmont. I have indeed. Mr. McCloy. Before we get to this, how many cases of defections to the Soviet Union would you be investigating in the course of a fiscal year? Mr. Belmont. I couldn't give you an exact figure on that. It is our system to investigate any individual where there is information or evidence that in- dicates a necessity for investigation within our jurisdiction. I do know that we have investigated, and currently are investigating, defectors not only to the Soviet Union but in other areas of the world. Mr. McCloy. They also would not come per se to your attention, your personal attention? Mr. Belmont. Depending on the case. If there is a matter which has some urgency or there is a question of policy, it would and does come to my attention, and indeed comes to the attention of Mr. Hoover. I would not seek to give you any impression that I am not advised of many cases, I am. I am kept daily advised, as is Mr. Hoover, of all matters of policy or urgency or where there is a question of procedure. That is inherent in our system of close supervision. Mr. McCloy. What I am getting at is, I think, is the matter of defection just out of its own character of such significance that it becomes a matter of out of the ordinary importance to the Bureau when you learn of it. Mr. Belmont. Again, Mr. McCloy, I have no way of knowing the extent to which those particular cases would be called to my attention. As shown in the Oswald case itself, we do take cognizance of these. Im- mediately upon the publicity on Oswald, there was a case opened. I do know that I see many such cases and where there is an indication of possible damage to the country through the leak of information, classified or in some other instance where there is a question of policy or urgency it is immediately called to my attention. I can only say in general I do see many such cases. Mr. McCloy. Well, we had testimony here yesterday that in a preassassina- tion investigation of Oswald that they learned he was a defector, they had inter- views with him, and then they marked the case closed. At one stage it was reoi)ened and then it was closed again because, as I gather it, there was no indication other than his defection that would lead to their, to the agents, feeling that this man was capable of violence or that he was a dangerous character in any sense. I gather that whether or not he was thought to be a dangerous character or whether he was capable of violence would be settled by the man in the field oflSce, in the office that had charge, the man who was in charge of the oflBce that was dealing with that case locally, is that right? Mr. Belmoxt. That is a judgment that he would render, but that judgment would be passed on by our headquarters staff. Mr. McCloy. Passed on by Washington? Mr. Belmont. Yes, indeed. In this instance by the domestic intelligence division. Mr. McCloy. In this case then the decision to clo'se that case, I am talking always about the preassassination business, was approved or tacitly approved by the Washington staff. Mr. Belmont. Not tacitly approved. Approved. Mr. McCloy. Approved. Well, you mark the paper approved or you just ac- cept it, accept the file with a notation "return for closing." Mr. Belmont. When the closing report comes to our headquarters, it is re- viewed by our supervisory staff, and if we do not agree with the action then the field office is notified to continue the investigation. That is a decision of substance. Mr. McCloy. Well, I can understand that but I gather when the report comes in you simply let the report lie unless you feel from your examination of it that it justified further action. You don't notify the field office, do you, that the closing of the case is approved? Mr. Belmont. No, Mr. McCloy. With the volume of work that we have that would be an unnecessary move. Mr. McCloy. I can imderstand that. Mr. Belmont. It is, however, thoroughly understood through our service, through the system that we follow, that if that report comes in and it is re- viewed and it is filed here, if there is disagreement as to the handling of the closing of the ease or any other matter pertaining to the investigation, the seat of government will then go out with instructions to the field. Mr. McCloy. All right. Mr. Dulles. Could I ask one question further on that point? The Chairman. Yes, indeed. Mr. Dulles. As I recall from the testimony of your people yesterday, with regard to the situation in Dallas and later in New Orleans, that after the case was marked closed in Dallas, there was this incident in New Orleans of the distribution of the Fair Play for Cuba pamphlets, and then a case there, a live case, an open case was started. Now, it wasn't quite clear to me yesterday from all the testimony, I missed a bit of it, unfortunately, as to whether the opening of a new case in New Orleans, because of the new incident, would operate to reopen it or change the closed status of the case in Dallas, and the case was then transferred from New Orleans to Dallas later. If you could clear that up for us I think it would be helpful. Mr. Belmont. The agent, Fain at the time, who handled the case, closed the case after two interviews with Oswald, arriving at the conclusion that the pur- pose of our investigation of Oswald which was to determine whether he had been given an assignment by Soviet intelligence, had been served. He closed the ease, as he felt there was no further action to be taken. The purpose had been satisfied. Headquarters agreed. In March 1063 Agent Hosty received informhtion in Dallas to the effect that Oswald had been in communication with The Worker, the east coast Communist newspaper. He therefore reinstituted the case, and sent out a lead to check Oswald's employment. He also received information, as I recall it, that Oswald had been in communication with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, so there were two incidents that aroused his interest. In June 1963 our New Orleans office likewise received information that Oswald had commimicated with The Worker or was on a subscription list for The Worker. So that the case was revived in Dallas by Hosty. Mr. Dulles. That was even before what we call the New Orleans incident? Mr. Belmont. Correct. Mr. Dulles. Yes. Mr. Belmont. And he learned that Oswald had left Dallas, the residence was then picked up in New Orleans, and the case was revived. So that actually there was a joint revival of the case. Then on August 9, 1963, Oswald was arrested by the New Orleans police in connection with a disturbance of the peace in passing out these pamphlets, which further aroused our interest. So that the reopening of the case after the clos- ing was due to these incidents that I have mentioned. Mr. Dulles. Thank you. So that at the time of the assassination, this was an open and not a closed case as regards the Dallas ofBce. Mr. Belmont. That is correct. At the time that Oswald was foiuid to be liv- ing in New Orleans, and this was definitely established that he was actually residing there, the Dallas office in accordance with the procedure that I men- tioned, transferred the case to New Orleans as office of origin. Subsequently, the ease was again transferred back to Dallas when it was de- termined that Oswald was again residing in the Dallas area. The Chairman. All right, Mr. Stern. Mr. Stern. We were getting, Mr. Belmont, to the question of whether you had been personally involved in the investigation since the assassination. Mr. Belmont. I said I have indeed. Mr. STEasN. Yes. As a part of that you have reviewed in detail the investigation made prior to the assassination? Mr. Belmont. Yes. Mr. Stern. Have you participated in or supervised the preparation of reports and other correspondence to the Commission in response to questions from the Commission? Mr. Belmont. Yes. Mr. Stern. I show you a letter with attached memorandum which has been marked for identification Commission Exhibit No. 833. Can you identify this document, Mr. Belmont? (The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 833 for identification.) Mr. Belmont. This is a letter transmitted on April 6, 1964, to Mr. Rankin by the FBI with enclosure answering a number of questions which the Com- mission posed to the FBI. Mr. Stern. Did you supervise the preparation of this letter? Mr. Belmont. Yes. Mr. Stern. And you have reviewed it and are familiar with it? Mr. Belmont. Yes. Mr. Stern. We have covered in your answers to Mr. Dulles and Mr. McCloy a good deal of the material in here. I would like briefly to touch upon several of the questions, the more important questions, regarding the nature of the FBI's interest in Lee Harvey Oswald at various times, and I would like you to refer to each question that I indicate tVut not read your answer. Paraphrase it. I think we have had a good deal of the si)ecific detail but what I am interested in is a description from your examination of the investigation as it was carried on, of the nature of the FBI interest in Oswald. I would like to turn to the first question in which we asked The Chairman. You mean by that that you could get, we could get. a better idea from parapi^rasing the answer than we could get from the exact answer itself? Mr. Stern. I think he might be able to highlight the answer. We have the exact answer on the record, and I thought it might The Chairman. Well, highlight it, if there is anything in addition I would think that would be relevant and pertinent. But to ask him to paraphrase that which he has done with great meticulousness would seem to me to be abortive and would take a lot of our time, and I don't see what it would prove. If yoti have anything in addition that you want to ask him, if you want to ask him if there is anything in addition he has not put in there, that is all right. But to just ask him to paraphrase answers that have been done with great care would seem to me to be confusing the record, and serve no purpose. Mr. Stern. I might ask, Mr. Belmont, whether there is anything you would like to add or amplify in these questions? Mr. Belmont. I believe the answers speak for themselves, although in view of Mr. McCloy's questions a little while ago, I would be very happy to make clear our approach to this matter. For example, the fact that our interest in defectors, in this case, is shown by the fact that in early November 1959 we opened a file on Oswald based on the newspaper publicity as to his defection. And the fact that he had applied to renounce his citizenship. We checked our files then to see was this a man we had a record on, and found that we had a fingerprint record solely based on his enlistment in the Marines. We had no other record on him but we placed a stop or a flash notice in our fingerprint files, at that time so that if he shotild come back into the country unbeknownst to us and get into some sort of trouble we would be immediately notified. That is our opening interest in the case with the thought in mind that should he come back to the country we would want to know from him whether he had been enlisted by Soviet intelligence in some manner. That is our procedure because of our experience that these things have hap- pened, and we consider it our responsibility to settle that issue whenever we can. Mr. Stern. Could you explain, Mr. Belmont, this procedure of placing a stop in the files that you just referred to? Mr. Belmont. We merely notify our identification division to place what we call a fiash notice in the man's fingerprint file, which means that should he be arrested and the fingerprints be sent to the FBI, that the appropriate division, in this case the domestic intelligence division, would be notified that the man had been arrested, for what and where he was arrested, thus enabling us to center our attention on him. Our next interest in this man aro.se as a result of the fact that his mother had sent, I believe, $25 to him in Moscow, so we went to her in April 1960 and we talked to her. At that time she told us that he had told her that he would possibly attend the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland. So as a foUowup, we had our legal attache in Paris make inquiry to see whether he had enrolled in this college. The resultant check showed that while they had expected him and a deposit had been placed that he did not show up at the college. Mr. Stern. I think that is all covered in quite adequate detail in the answer to the first question. Mr. Dulles. I have one question I would like to put to you on the first ques- tion and answer in your letter of April 6, in Exhibit 833 — the Bureau's letter of April 6. You refer, first, to the fact that the first news you got about Oswald was from a news service item, and then later on at the bottom of the second full paragraph you state, "A file concerning Oswald was prepared and as communications were received from other U.S. Government agencies those communications were placed in his file." The record may show the other communications, I guess our record does show, but do you feel that you adequately were advised by the State Department as this case developed or by the CIA or other agencies that might have known abotit it? Mr. Belmont. Yes. We received a number of communications from other agencies, and we set up a procedure whereby we periodically checked the State Department passport file to be kept advised of his activities or his dealings with the Embassy in Moscow so that on a periodic basis we were sure we had allinformation in the State Department file. 7 731-221 O—-64—vol. V 2 We received communications from the Navy, and from other agencies. Mr. Dulles. Is there any general procedure with respect to Americans abroad vpho get into trouble. Do you get informed so in case they come back you can take adequate precautionary measures? Is that established SOP? Mr. Belmont. Yes, Mr. Dulles. We do receive such information, and if we pick up the information initially as we did here, from press reports or otherwise, we go to the other agencies and ask them whether they have any information and establish an interest there so that if they have not voluntarily furnished us the information they will do so upon our request. Mr. Dulles. Thank you. Mr. Stern. On page 3, Mr. Belmont, in the answer to question No. 3, the second paragraph, could you tell us why the FBI preferred to interview Oswald after he had established residence and why it was not preferable to interview him upon his arrival in New York? Mr. Belmont. This is a matter of experience. Generally speaking when an individual such as Oswald arrives back in the country and the press is there, there is an unusual interest in him. Immigration and Naturalization Service has a function to perform, and we prefer, unless there is a matter of urgency, to let the individual become settled in residence. It is a much better atmosphere to conduct the interview, and to get the information that we seek. If it is a matter of urgency, we will interview him immediately upon arrival. Mr. Stern. On page 4, Mr. Belmont, in your answer to question No. 6, was it ordinary procedure for Agent Fain to re-interview Oswald so soon after his first interview underthe circumstances? Is there anything unusual about that? Mr. Belmont. There is nothing unusual whatsoever. Agent Fain interviewed Oswald on June 26, 1963—1962, I believe it was, was it not? The Chairman. Yes 1962. ; Mr. Belmont. And was not satisfied that he had received all the information he wanted nor that it was a matter that should be closed at that time. Therefore, he set out a lead to re-interview Oswald, and after an appropriate period he went back and re-interviewed him. This is within the prerogative of the investigative agent, and certainly if he was not satisfied with the first interview it was his duty and responsibility to pursue the matter until he was satisfied. Mr. Stern. In your answer to question No. 5, does the response of Oswald to the question why he went to Russia seem typical to you of the returned defector, or unusual? Mr. Belmont. There is no such thing as a typical response. Each case is an individual case, and is decided on its merits and on the background of the individual, and the circumstances .surrounding it. Mr. Stern. Would it be usual for the defector to agree to advise you if he got a contact? Are they generally that cooperative? Mr. Belmont. We ask them because we w^ant to know, and the purpose of our interview with him was to determine whether he had been recruited by the Soviet intelligence, and we asked him whether he would tell us if he was con- tacted here in this country. He replied he would. Whether he meant it is a question. However, you must bear in mind that this man, I believe it was when he was interviewed in July of 1961 in the American Embassy, the inter- viewing official there said it was apparent that he had learned his lesson the hard way, and that he had a new concept of the American way of life, and apparently had decided that Russia was not for him. When we interviewed him likewise he told us that he had not enjoyed his stay in Russia. He likewise commented that he had not enjoyed his stay in the Marines. So that in direct answer to your question, it is customary for us in such a case as this, to ask the man if he will report a contact, and it is customary for him to say yes, because frankly, he would be putting himself in a rather bad light if he didn't say yes. Mr. Stern. Turning to Mr. Dulles. Could I ask a question there: Do I correctly read your report and those of your agents to the general effect that you had no evidence that there was any attempt to recruit Oswald in the United States? Mr. Belmont. No evidence whatsoever. 8 Mr. Stern. Question 8, Mr. Belmont, on page 5, sets out the information from a reiM>rt by A^eut Hosty regarding alleged Fair Play for <'uba Conunittee activity by Oswald while he was still residing in Dallas. Have you found that an investi- gation was conducted to determine whether that was accurate and do you think it should have been investigated? Mr. Belmont. As to whether he was active vA'ith the Fair Play for Cuba Com- mittee in Dallas? We did check. We have rather excellent coverage of such activities. There is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that he was active with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Dallas. And, as a matter of fact, I can go a step further and say that following his dissemination of pamphlets and his activities in New Orleans, our inquiry of our sources who are competent to tell us what is going on in the organizations such as Fair I'lay for Cuba Com- mittee, advised that he was not known to them in New Orleans. So that his activities in New Orleans were of his own making, and not as a part of the organized activities of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Mr. McCloy. On that point, Mr. Belmont, where did he get his material, the printed material that he was distributing? Must he not have gotten that from some headquarters? Mr. Belmont. It is my recollection that he had that printed up himself. The Chairman. That is right. Mr. McCloy. All of it, so far as you know, was self-induced, so to speak? Mr. Belmont. Correct. Mr. Stern. Does your answer imply, Mr. Belmont, that there were Fair Play for Cuba activities in Dallas and New Orleans that you knew about? Mr. Belmont. No we do not have information of Fair Play for Cuba activities ; in Dallas nor any organized activity in New Orleans. So that this letter that you refer to, which was undated, was, as in so many things that Oswald wrote, not based on fact. Mr. Stern. On page 7 in the answer to question 12, you refer to the incon- sistencies and contradictions between the information Oswald gave to Agent Quigley wlien lie interviewed him in the New Orleans jail and the facts as they were known to the FBI before that, and say that "in the event the investigation of Oswald warranted a further interview, these discrepancies would have been discussed with him." Can you explain why the fact of the.se inconsistencies and contradictions and perhaps outright lies to Agent Quigley was not itself reason for a further interview? Mr. Belmont. Let me turn this just a little bit and say why should we re-inter- view him? Our interest in tliis man at this point was to determine whetlier his activities constituted a threat to the internal security of the country. It was apparent that he had made a self-serving .statement to Agent Quigley. It became a matter of record in our files as a part of the case, and if we determined that tlie course of the investigation required us to clarify or face him down with this infor- mation, we would do it at the appropriate time. In other words, he committed no violation of the law by telling us something that wasn't true, and unless this required further investigation at that time, we would handle it in due course, in accord with the whole context of the investigation. Mr. Stern. Do you know whether the fact of these contradictions was called to the attention of the Dallas office at the time of Oswald's return to Dallas? Mr. Belmont. The entire file, of course, or the pertinent serials were sent to Dallas at the time that the case was transferred back to Dallas so they would have that information. Mr. Stern. I gather what you are saying is they would note the contradictions from the reports? Mr. Belmont. Yes. Mr. Stern. In the answer to question 14 on page 8, again in connection with these inconsistencies, the letter reads "These inconsistencies were considered in subsequent investigation." Can you expand on that and tell us how they were considered? Mr. Belmont. That is right along the line of my previous explanation to you, 9 namely, that they were recorded in the file. In the event it was desired to talk to him further at a future date, they would be considered as to whether we desired to have him further explain. Mr. Stern. On page 12, in response to question 22, which asked for an explana- tion of the reason for the investigation to ascertain his whereabouts, the letter reads, "In view of Oswald's background and activities the FBI had a continuing interest in him." What was the nature of that continuing interest at that time? Mr. Belmont. On August 21, 1963, because of his activities in distributing these pamphlets, and his arrest in New Orleans, headquarters here in Washington sent a letter to the New Orleans and Dallas offices instructing them to pursue the investigation. In other words, in evaluating this information we felt it desirable that we further explore his activities to determine whether they were inimical to the internal security of the country. So that we had this continuing interest based on our evaluation, and so instructed our field offices. Mr. Stern. Mr. Chairman, I believe the answers to the other questions give us a complete enough record. The Chairman. Very well. Mr. Stern. May this exhibit which has been marked 833 for identification be admitted? The Chairman. It may be admitted in evidence under that number. (The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 833 for identification, was received in evidence.) Mr. McCloy. Is there anything else, Mr. Belmont, that you may want to add? You have already been asked this question as you went through all these ques- tions and answers, but is there anything else you would like to add in view of your answers this morning in further elaboration of the answers that have been given ? Mr. Belmont. No, sir; unless the Commission has further questions at this point, I believe that the questions are answered properly and sufficiently. Mr. McCloy. You think that if you are interviewing a defector which is some- thing that provokes your interest, and I guess the mere fact of defection and return to the United States would do so, and if you found that defector was lying to you, you think that without something in addition to that there would be no further necessity of examining him. Is that a fair question? Let me put it another way. Mr. Belmont. I have just a little difficulty following you. Mr. McCloy. Here is my point. Here was a defector who comes within the category of interesting cases naturally. Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. Mr. McCloy. And you question him and you find he is lying to you. At that stage, as I understand your testimony, you say without something more you don't necessarily go any further, is that right? Mr. Belmont. No that is not correct. We had talked to this man twice in ; detail concerning the question of possible recruitment by Soviet intelligence. We had checked his activities. He was settling down. He had a wife and a child. He had, according to what he had told us, in our interview with him, he had not enjoyed his stay in Russia. The State Department evaluation of him in Moscow was that he had learned his lesson and, as a matter of fact, he had made some statement to the effect that he now recognized the value of the American way of life, along those lines. So that we had pretty well settled that issue. At the time that we inter- viewed him in the jail in New Orleans, we had again been following his activ- ities because of his communications, his contacts with The Worker and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and our interest there was to determine whether he was a dangerous subversive. The interview in the jail was very apparently a self-serving interview in an attempt to explain his activities in the New Orleans area, and if I recall correctly, he took the position that the policy as directed against Cuba was not correct, and that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee was merely addressing itself to the complaints of Cuba, and was not in effect a subversive organization. 10 ) If, Mr. McCloy, during those two interviews where we were pursuing first this matter of him being a defector and his recruitment, he had lied to us, and the agent was we would have pursued it to the bitter end. Or if not satisfied during any other time information came to our attention which indicated a necessity to pur.sue that further we would have pursued it to the bitter end. Mr. McCloy. You speak of this as a self-serving interview. Do you think that he sought the interview with you, with Mr. Quigley eventually, because he had known of the prior contacts that he had had with the FBI, and he simply wanted to keep out of trouble? Mr. Belmont. I don't know why he asked to see an agent. I simply do not know why. Mr. McCloy. I think that is all. Mr. Stern. ]\Ir. Belmont, I show you a letter marked for identification Com- mission Exhibit No. 834. Can you identify that for the Commission, please? (The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 834 for identification. Mr. Belmont. This is a letter dated May 4, 1964, addressed to the Commis- sion which sets forth in summary the contents of the headquarters file on Oswald prior to the assassination. Mr. Stekn. Do you have that file with you? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. Mr. Stern. Would you explain generally to the Commission what materials there are in that file that for security reasons yoiu would prefer not to disclose? Mr. Belmont. The file contains the identity of some of our informants in subversive movements. It contains information as to some of the investigative techniques whereby we were able to receive some of the information which has been made available to the Commission. Mr. Stern. I think that is enough, Mr. Belmont, on that. Mr. McCloy. You didn't have anything further to add to that, did you? Mr. Belmont. No. The Chairman. I think as to those things if it is agreeable to the other mem- bers of the Commission, we will not pursue any questioning that will call for an answer that would divulge those matters that you have just spoken of. Mr. Belmont. I would like to make it clear, Mr. Chairman, that I think — — that is very kind of you I would like to make it clear that Mr. Hoover has expressed a desire to be of the utmost help to the Commission, and to make any information available that will be helpful to the Commission. I think your observation is very much worthwhile. Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, have you reviewed the actual file and this letter of May 4 which summarizes each document in the file? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. Mr. Stern. And to your knowledge, is this an accurate summary of each piece of information in the file? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. Mr. Stern. The file is available to the Commission? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. Mr. Stern. If they want to look at any item in it? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. The Chairman The file does not include that security matter that you men- tioned, or does it? Mr. Belmont. This file is as it is maintained at the Bureau with all informa- tion in it. The Chairman. With all information in it? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir ; this is the actual file. The Chairman. I see. Mr. Rankin. Mr. Belmont, are you willing to leave the file a reasonable time in case any of theCommissioners desire to examine it personally? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. Mr. Rankin. We will return it. The Chairman. I wonder if we do want it on those conditions. If we want to get anything from it don't you think, Mr. Rankin, that we ought to make 11 it known here while the witness is here. I personally don't care to have this information that involves our security unless it is necessary, and I don't want to have documents in my possession where it could be assumed that I had gotten that information and used it, so I would rather, I would rather myself confine our questions to this file to the testimony of Mr. Belmont. Then if we want it, if we want any of those things, it then becomes a matter to discuss here in the open, and not just in privacy. Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I felt it made a better record if the file is available only to the Commissioners in case they do want to examine it, and then it will be taken back and the staff will not examine it. The Chairman. I think he has stated that the file will be made available to us whenever we want it. Mr. Rankin. Yes. The Chairman. If we do want it to read it that is one thing. For myself, I think we can ^et what we want from examining the witness, and then if there is any portion of it that comes into play why we can determine the question here, but I really would prefer not to have a secret file, I mean a file that contains matters of that kind in our possession. Mr. Rankin. There is one factor that I wanted to get before the Commission and in the record, and that is that you had all the information that the FBI had in regard to this matter, and I thought that was important to your pro- ceedings, so that we would not retain such a file, and we had an accurate summary but that it is available so that the Commission can be satisfied that nothing was withheld from it in regard to this particular question. That was the purpose of the inquiry. Mr. Dulles. I assume, Mr. Belmont, if later other testimony arises that would make us desire to refer to this file we could consult it in your oflSces or you would make it available to us? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. The Chairman. I think I would personally rather have it done on that basis. What do you think, Mr. McCloy? Mr. McCloy. I was just glancing at the file, and it seems to have the regular, the usual type of reports that we have seen. But there is a good bit of elabora- tion in those, in that file of the summary which is here. This summary I don't think can purport to be a complete description of the documents that are in here, as I glance through them here. I just happened to see a good bit of detail in here which doesn't have anything to do with the security problem we talked about, but I would think that probably it would be wise for some member of the Commission or members of the Com- mission as a whole, to run through that file in order to be sure that we have seen the material elements of the file that we would not perhaps, might not, be able to get from this letter of May 4. The Chairman. Well, there are so many of these questions in here that are obviously matters that we would have no more concern with than just to know about them. Start from the very beginning, a news clipping from the Corpus Christi Times, dated October 2, 1959. Now if that excites any interest on the part of any member, why we could say, "Well, could you show us that?" Then the next is the United Press release, dated October 31 at Moscow, and a great many of these. Now, I wonder if it wouldn't be better for us to look over all of these various things, items that are in the file, and then if there are any that happen to excite our interest, we can ask Mr. Belmont about it. If it is a matter that involves security, we could then discuss it and make our determination as to whether we wanted to see it. I would think that when we are dealina: with things that are as sensitive as the FBI has to deal with in that respect, that that would be adequate that is my opinion of it. ; But if the rest of the Commission feel that they want to see it notwithstanding the security measure, I would, of course, have no objection. Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chief Justice, what I was trying to deal with was a claim by someone that the Commission never saw all there was in the hands of the 12 FBI about Lee Harvey Oswald, and we recognize that some of these items should not be considered important by anyone, as we look at the matter, but we wanted you to be able to satisfy the public and the country that whatever there was that the FBI had, the Commission had it, and we didn't think that in light of the security problems the whole file should l)e a part of the files of the Commission. And we tried to present here a summary, even of items that did not seem important, but we did want the record in such condition that the Commission could say in its report, "We have seen everything that they have." I think it is important to the case. Mr. McCloy. I notice, Mr. Belmont, in runninjr through this file, a note here that symbols are used in instances where the identities of the sources must be concealed. Mr. Belmont. That is correct, sir. Mr. McCloy. If that is so Mr. Belmont. In some instances. Mr. McCloy. Only in some instances. There are other cases where that is not the case. Mr. Belmont. Yes that is right. ; Mr. McCloy. There is a great deal of narrative in here about Oswald and his relations with the Embassy. Maybe it is elsewhere in the record. Mr. Belmont. I would presume that you have received that from the other agencies. Those are copies of communications that the other agencies sent to us. The Chairman. Well, why couldn't we go over this fist and see what items we would be interested in and then we can determine, can we not, whether we want Mr. McCloy. I am not so sure, you can look through this yourself, I am not so sure if from reading just that short summary you get the full impact of all the narrative that is in the various reports. There is a good bit here. For example, one page I have here about this business of beating his wife and the drinking. There is a good bit of detail. Mr. Belmont. Mr. McCloy, you have that jecord. The Chairman. We have the record, I have read the records myself. Mr. McCloy. Maybe we have that one. Mr. Belmont. Any investigative report you have. Mr. McCloy. Is there any investigative report in here that we have not got? Mr. Belmont. No, sir. Mr. Rankin. We are trying to develop, Mr. Chief Justice and Commissioners, that you have everything that the FBI had, this is their total file in regard to this matter of Lee Harvey Oswald so that there is nothing withheld from you as far as the FBI is concerned. Tliat is part of what we are trying to develop this morning, in addition to the items themselves. Mr. Dulles. I wonder if the staff, Mr. Rankin, could not go over this and check over those items we have from other sources and what the FBI has already furnished us so what we deal with with respect to this file are only items that are not in the Commission's records already. That would cut this down by half, I would imagine or more. Mr. Rankin. Yes we could do that for you. ; Mr. Dulles. Then we could have this available possibly at a later date just to check over the other items against your files to see if there is any information there that we really need. The Chairman. You could come back, couldn't you, Mr. Belmont? Mr. Belmont. I am at your disposal. The Chairman. I think that would be better. I think, Mr. Rankin, your purpose is entirely laudable here, but I think we do have to use some discretion in the matter, and you say that you want it so we can say we have seen every- thing. Well, the same people who would demand that we see everything of this kind would also dejnand that they be entitled to see it, and if it is security matters we can't let them see it. It has to go back to the FBI without their scrutiny. So unless, I would say, unless there is something that we think here is vital to this situation, that it isn't necessary for us to see the whole file, particularly 13 ) in — view of the fact that we have practically we have all the reports, he says we have all the reports that are in that file, and it just seems like thrashing old straw to go over it and over it again. Mr. McCloy. Do we have copies of all these telegrams that are in here from the Embassy? Mr. Belmont. You are looking at Mr. McCloy. Not Embassy ; here is one from Mexico. Do we have that? We don't have these in our files, for example. Mr. Belmont. This is subsequent to the assassination. You see your area of interest at this point is information, all information we had prior to the assassination. I did not remove from this file the items that started to come in subsequent to the assassination, you see. Mr. McCloy. My feeling is that somebody on the Commission should examine that file. I can't come to any other conclusion after reading it all, because I don't know what is in it, what is in our record, and what is in that file. There is a good bit of material there that is narrative, which I think would be relevant. Certainly, I don't believe we can be possibly criticized for deleting or not pro- ducing a file which contains the type of information that you are speaking of. We are just as interested in protecting the security of your investigative proc- esses as you are. But I don't think that when it is on the record that we have this file, that may contain material that was not in our files, and we are given the opportunity to examine it, without disclosing these confidential matters that we ought not to have somebody go through it., Mr. Dulles. I agree with that but I think we could save time if we checked off first what we have already and that would cut out about half of that file probably. Mr. McCloy. I think in a rapid glance through it, I think just about half of it. The Chairman. Well, suppose you do that then, get those and let's see. All right, proceed, Mr. Stern. Mr. Stern. I think perhaps we ought to leave the entire matter of the file then until we can give you the infermation. The Chairman. That is right. Mr. Stern. May we admit for the purposes of the record this list at this time, Mr. Chief Justice, which has been marked No. 834? The Chairman. Yes. There are no security matters in this? Mr. Belmont. No, sir. The Chairman. It may be admitted as Exhibit No. 834. (The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 834 for identification, was received in evidence.) Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, can you identify this letter dated February 6 with an attached affidavit which has been marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 835? (The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 835, for identification. Mr. Belmont. Yes this is a letter dated February 6, 1964, to the Commission ; from the FBI to which is attached an affidavit by Director J. Edgar Hoover. Mr. Stern. What is the subject? Mr. Belmont. Stating flatly that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an informant of the FBI. Mr. Dulles. Would you define informant. Obviously in the sense he knew some information as previously indicated from the previous interviews. I mean for the record, would you just define what you mean by an informant in this sense ? Mr. Belmont. An informant in this sense is an individual who has agreed to cooperate with the FBI and to furnish information to the FBI either for or with- out payment. Mr. Stern. Thank you. Mr. Belmont. This would not, of course, include the cooperative citizen to whom we go, and who frequently and frankly discloses any information in his possession, but rather someone who joins an organization or seeks out informa- tion at the direction and instance of the FBI relative to subversive or criminal 14 matters. In other words, I want to make it clear we do not regard patriotic citizens as informants. Mr. Stern. Itake it you also would not have regarded Ivce Oswald as an in- formant from the contacts with him that you have told us about and the other agents have told us about? Mr. Belmont. Indeed not; in no way could he be con.sidered an informant; in no way. Mr. Stern. Did you sui^ervise or assist in the preparation of the information contained here? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. Mr. Stern. And you are famdliar with it? Mr. Belmont. Yes; I am. Mr. Stern. And to your knowledge, does it accurately and completely state the Bureau's practice in recruiting a prospective informant? Mr. Belmont. That is correct. Mr. STEUiN. Is there anything you would like to add to the information covered in there with respect to your practices regarding informants? Mr. Belmont. No only in my personal knowledge tliis is a correct statement ; and Lee Harvey Oswald was not an informant of the FBI. Mr. Stern. Did you ever use the term "agent" to apply to anyone other than an employee, a special agent employee of the FBI? Mr. Belmont. No we do not. ; Mr. Dulles. Could I ask you, Mr. Belmont, whether Mr. Fain's separation from the FBI had anything whatever to do with the Oswald case or in* his handling of the Oswald case? Mr. Belmont. No indeed not. Mr. Fain came to the retirement age and de- ; cided he wanted to retire, which is his privilege, and he retiretl and is presently working in Texas and very happy, I understand. Mr. Dulles. Thank you. Mr. Belmont. He retired in good graces, good standing, so far as the FBI is concerned. The Chairman. And a year before the assassination. Mr. Belmont. Frankly, I don't recall. The Chairman. Yes; it was August 1962, he testified. Mr. Stern. You have already covered this, Mr. Belmont, but just so that the record is completely clear on this point, was Lee Oswald ever an agent of the FBI? Mr. Belmont. Lee Oswald was never an agent of the FBI. Mr. Stern. The letter of February 6, 1964, from Mr. Hoover, alludes to testi- mony furnished the Commission by District Attorney Wade. Have you subse- quently been advised that Mr. Wade had not testified before the Commission? Mr. Belmont. Yes we received a letter from the Commission advising us ; that the incident referred to was an informal discussion rather than actual testi- mony before the Commission. Mr. Stern. And also to complete the record, have you been advised that Mr. Wade was not suggesting that he believed the rumor about Oswald as an in- formant, but felt obliged to call it to the attention of the Commission? Mr. Belmont. The Commission's letter so advised us. Mr. Stern. Mr. Chairman, may this be admitted with No. 835? The Chairman. It may be admitted under that number. (The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 835 for identification, was received in evidence.) Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated February 12, 1964, a number of aflSdavits by si>ecial agents, attached to it. It was identifietl yester- day, parts of it were identified yesterday and it therefore carries the number for identification 825. Can you identify this letter for us? — Mr. Belmont. In order to be sure I beg your pardon. This is a letter dated February 12. 1964. to the Commission from the FBI. to which is attached affidavits of FBI i>ersonnel who had reason to contact Lee Harvey Oswald and who were in a supervisory capacity over the agents who contacted Oswald. Mr. Stern. Did you supervise the preparation of this material? Mr. Belmont. These aflSdavits were prepared, of course, by the men themselves. 15 ) I have read the aflSdavits, and they were compiled as an enclosure and sent over with this letter. Mr. Stern. You have reviewed them in preparation for your testimony before the Commission? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. Mr. Stern. To your knowledge, are they accurate? Mr. Belmont. They are accurate, to my knowledge, yes. Mr. Stern. Are they complete? Mr. Belmont. Yes. Mr. Stern. They do not omit any significant fact you know of? Mr. Belmont. No. Mr. Stern. In connection with the material they cover? Mr. Belmont. No. Mr. Stern. Unless there are any questions on that, Mr. Chairman, I suggest we admit this document. The Chairman. It may be admitted as No. 825. (The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 825 for identification, was received in evidence. Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated March 31, 1964, from Director Hoover to Mr. Rankin, the General Counsel of the Commission, with a series of attachments. Can you identify this which has been marked for identification as No. 836. Can you identify this for the Commission? (The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 836 for identification.) Mr. Belmont. This is a letter dated March 31, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI to which is attached the instructions contained in our manuals as to the type of information which should be disseminated to Secret Service and our relations or liaison with Secret Service. Mr. Stern. It was prepared in response to a request from the Commission? Mr. Belmont. That is correct. Mr. Stern. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation? Mr. Belmont. I did. Mr. Stern. Have you reviewed it recently? Mr. Belmont. Yes. Mr. Stern. Is it complete with respect to the matters covered? Mr. Belmont. Yes it is. ; Mr. Stern. Is there anything you would like to add to it with respect to the matters covered? Mr. Belmont. Well Mr. Dulles. May I just interrupt here a moment. Is this inquiry directed to the question of whether it is now adequate or whether this is complete as of the time of the assassination ? I think we have two questions there to consider. Mr. Belmont. Mr. Dulles, this letter outlines our relations with Secret Serv- ice and the material that is attached covers both the instructions to our agents prior to the assassination and the current instructions. Mr. Dulles. Subsequent to the assassination? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. Mr. Dulles. Yes. Mr. Stern. What were the criteria you employed and instructed your agents to employ before the assassination in determining what information should be reported to the Secret Service regarding threats against the President, members of his family, the President-elect, and the Vice President? Mr. Belmont. These are contained in detail in the attachments which repre- sent sections of our manual of instructions which are available to all of our personnel in the field as well as the seat of Government, and also in the FBI handbook which is in possession of the individual agent in the field. These instructions require that any information indicating the possibility of an at- tempt against the i)erson or safety of the persons mentioned by you must be referred immediately by the most expeditious means of communications to the nearest ofiice of the Secret Service. Further, that our headquarters in Wash- ington must be advised by teletype of the information and the fact that it has been furnished to Secret Service. 16 Mr. Stern. Specifically, the kind of information you were interested in, that is before the assassination? Mr. Belmont. Yes. Specifically the kind? Mr. Stern. Yes. Mr. BELAfONT. Any information indicating the possibility of a threat against the President and Vice President and members of the family. Mr. Stekn. Have you broadened Mr. Belmont. I may say, sir Mr. Stern. Yes. Mr. Belmont. That this practice was assiduously followed, and you will find that the files of the Secret Service are loaded with information over the years that we have furnished them. That was a practice religiously followed and a practice voluntarily followed without request. In other words, we do not have a written request for this type of information but rather considered it our re- sponsibility and duty to furnish this information. Mr. Stern. Did you ever participate in or do you know of any discussion with the Secret Service before the assassination regarding the kind of information they were interested in? Mr. Belmont. Wehad close liaison with Secret Service, and I have no doubt that in oral discussions that the question came up. I wasn't present but I would assume it has come up, particularly as we were constantly furnishing information. We have no written criteria, you might say, as to what should be furnished. Mr. Stern. That is, established by the Secret Service. Mr. Belmont. That is correct. Mr. Stern. And you yourself never participated in any discussion of Mr. Belmont. No I did not. ; Mr. Stern. This liaison function. Mr. Belmont. This is something we have done for years on the basis that we consider it our responsibility not only as far as the President goes. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have also followed the same policy relative to other high officials when it appears desirable. Mr. Stern. Have you subsequent to the assassination augmented your in- structions to special agents in this respect? Mr. Belmont. Yes. On December 26, 1963, we prepared additional instruc- tions reiterating those already in effect, and adding other dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the President. The Chairman. Where do those new ones appear in the exhibit, Mr. Belmont? — Mr. Belmont. They appear as an attachment working from the back. I think. Mr. Chairman, I can help you most. The Chairman. Yes. Mr. Belmont. Eight pages from the back it starts, it reads, "Manual of In- structions Section 83." The Chairman. Yes I have it. ; Mr. Belmont. The first page is the same information that we previously fur- nished to Secret Service involving threats. The Chairman. The first page is intact, as it was before. Mr. Belmont. There may be some slight changes in wording but essentially it is the same dealing with possible threats. The Chairman. Yes. Mr. Dulles. Mr. Belmont. I wonder if it would be possible for the Commis- sion's convenience to date each one of these papers as of a certain date. It is quite diflicult going through it now without referring to the letter in each case to determine whether the instructions are as of the date of the assassination or as of the present date? Mr. Belmont. We can do that without any difficulty. I would be glad to do it with the staff, or can I help you here? Mr. Dulles. Well, I think we can do that later but I think it would be useful when this goes into the record for our later reference in studying this to have those dates available to us on each one of the attachments. Mr. Belmont. Very good. 17 Mr, Dulles. Thank you. Mr. Belmont. Coming back to this item you inquired about, sir, the other dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the President is set forth on pages 2 and 3 of this inclusion in our manual, and it extends the dis- semination to "subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and fascists, (o) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (&) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal, State or local government or officials of a foreign government, (c) who express or have expressed strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb- making or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and (d) whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against organized government." That was prepared in an effort to provide additional, and a voluntary effort, without request, to provide additional information that might be helpful to avoid such an incident as happened November 22, 1963. Mr. Stern. This did not come about, this change did not come about, through any request from the Secret Service or discussion with the Secret Service? Mr. Belmont. No. We made these changes, as I say, in an effort to provide any additional information in the light of what happened that might be of assistance to Secret Service and might assist in protecting the President. Mr. Dulles. I wonder, Mr. Belmont, whether you would consider possibly changing in section (d) the word "and" to "or" whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence" and then it now reads "and hatred against organized government". There have been cases, I believe, where the propensity for violence had not been previously noted but the hatred of organized government has. Mr. Belmont. We will be happy to change that. Mr. Dulles. I just suggest for your consideration, I don't wish to rewrite it. Mr. Belmont. We would be happy to change it, Mr. Dulles. Mr. Stern. Following Mr. Dulles' thought, in the line above that, Mr Belmont, should that "and" before (d) be "and" or "or"? Do you mean these Mr. Belmont. We do not mean that all of these items must be coupled together if that is your thought. Mr. Stern. That is right. Mr. Belmont. We will be happy to change the "and" before (d) to an "or". Mr. Stern. This means any of the broad classifications of people, subversives, ultrarightists, racists or fascists who meet any of these four tests. Mr. Belmont. That is correct. Mr. Stern. Can you give the Commission some notion of the increase in volume which the broadening of your criteria has brought about? By volume, I mean the volume of your references to the Secret Service. Mr. Belmont. I do not have an exact figure, however, I do know that more than 5,000 additional names have gone over to Secret Service under these criteria. The Chairman. In what period of time? Mr. Belmont. Since we put them out. The Chairman. I see. Mr. Belmont. Which was December 26. The Chairman. Yes. Mr. McCloy. Have you included defectors in this list? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir we do include defectors. ; Mr. Stern. You mean as of December 26, 1963 ? Mr. Belmont. Correct. Mr. Stern. Has the expansion of your criteria led to any problem or difficulty for you or for individuals or do you anticipate any problem or difficulty under the expanded criteria? Mr. Belmont. It seems to me that there is a necessity to balance security against freedom of the individual. This is a country of laws and a government of law, and not a government of men. Inevitably the increase in security means an increase in the control of the individual and a diminishment, therefore, of his individual liberties. It is a simple matter to increase security. But every time you increase security you diminish the area of the rights of the individual. In some countries the problem of a visiting dignitary is met without much difficulty. 18 Persons who are suspect or may be considered dangerous are immediately rounded up and detained wliil'e the individual is in the country. The authorities have no problem because in those countries there is not a free society such as we enjoy, and the people who are detained have no redress. The FBI approaches this whole field of security— I am not boring you with this, am I ? The Chairman. No, indeed. This is tremendously important. Mr. Bexmont. The FBI approaches this whole field of security and its tre- mendous responsibilities to protect the internal security of the country as a sacred trust. In carrying out our investigations and our work in the security field, we do it in such a manner under the law that we strengthen rather than weaken the free society that we enjoy. It is for that reason that our men are trained carefully, thoroughly, and supervised carefully, to insure that their approach to the entire security field, which inevitably touches on control of thought, is handled with extreme care. Our activities are directed to meet the terrific responsibility we have for the internal security of the country, but to meet it under the law. We feel that to place security as such above the rights of the individual or to increase these controls beyond what is absolutely essential is the first step toward the destruction of this fre'e society that we enjoy. We have been asked many times why we don't pick up and jail all Commu- nists. The very people who ask those questions don't realize that if action, unrestrained action, is taken against a particular group of people, a precedent is set which can be seized on in the future by poxver-hungry or xmscrupulous authorities as a precedent, and which inevitably will gnaw away at this free society we have, and sooner or later will be applied to the very individuals who are seeking this action. Up until the time of the assassination we religiously and carefully and expeditiously furnished to Secret Service immediately on a local basis as well as on a national basis, headquarters basis, any and all infor- mation that in any way was indicated to be a possible threat against the President. This permitted Secret Service to take such action as was required against these individuals who had by their action set the stage for appropriate restraint or observation based on something they did. Therefore, they were not in a position to complain legitimately because they had by some word or deed set in motion a threat against the President of the United States. Since the assassination, as I have testified, we have broadened the area of dissemination in an effort to be helpful. It stands without question that we could have said, "iNo we won't go any further." But we felt that it was our responsibility to do ; whatever we could do and, hence, we have broadened these criteria, and we have distributed thousands of pieces of information on individuals to Secret Service. (At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford enters the hearing room.) We are not entirely comfortable about this, because under these broadened criteria after all we are furnishing names of people who have not made a threat against the President, people who have expressed beliefs, who have belonged or do belong to organizations which believe in violent revolution or taking things into their own hands. Unless such information is handled with judgment and care, it can be dangerous. For example, we know that in one city when the President recently visited, the police went to these people and told them, "You stay in the house while the President is here or if you go out, we will go with you." We know that these people have threatened to consult attorneys, have threatened to make a public issue of the matter on the theory that this is restraint that is not justified as they have made no threats against the President. Now, when you examine this a bit further, we give these names to Secret Service. Secret Service must do something with those names, and Secret Service solicits the assistance of the police, quite properly. But I don't need, I think, to paint this picture any further, that when you get away from a specific act or deed of threats against the Presi- dent, and you go into the broader area of what, perhaps, a man is thinking and, therefore, he may be a threat, and you take action against the man on the basis of that, there is a danger. That is why, despite the fact that we have given this additional information and will continue to do so, we are uneasy. Again, if I may be permitted to continue, this is inherent in the entire approach of the FBI to the security field. 19 We go as far in our investigations as is necessary. But we go no further. We do not harass people. We do not conduct an investigation of a man for what he may be thinking. We attempt to the very best of our ability to carry out this responsibility for internal security without adopting tactics of harassment or unwarranted investigation, and we will not pursue a security matter beyond that which is essential to carry out our responsibilities. Now, I say that because that is the broad field of our policy, and I say it with complete sincerity, because I know. I have been in this work with the FBI both in the actual investigative field and in the policymaking and supervisory field for 27 years, and I know the policies and the procedures that ar'e followed, and the care with which this problem is approached, and I agree with it fully. Mr. McCloy. You are going to impose a pretty heavy burden on the Secret Service when you dump them with the 5,000 more names than they have been used to having. Mr. Belmont. It will be more than 5,000, sir. This will continue. Mr. McCloy. From your knowledge of the situation, do you feel that the Secret Service is equipped to cope with this added burden? Is it something that you feel Mr. Belmont. The Secret Service, as it has in the past, is required to call on the police for assistance in this field when the President visits a city. I do not know the exact complement of personnel of Secret Service, but they are a relatively small organization. Mr. McCloy. It may be they will have to reorganize some of their procedures to cope with this, won't they? Mr. Belmont. I do not know. Mr. McCloy. You have got a pretty broad classification here. "All investiga- tive personnel should be alert for the identification of subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists (a) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior." That may include a good many people in the United States and maybe some mem- — bers of this Commission I am speaking for myself. There is irrational be- havior that I have been guilty of many times. [Laughter.] This doesn't mean — you are going to send everybody over there, but the names that all those under your classification, all of those in your opinion come under that classification unless you feel they have some, there is some, reason behind it. In other words, you are selective in this list. You purport to be selective in the numbers that you are going to convey to, the names you are going to convey to, the Secret Service. Mr. Belmont. We endeavor to use good judgment, sir. Now, as you indicate there are what, 190 million people in this country, and who knows when someone may adopt abnormal behavior. You cannot tell tomorrow who will pose a risk. This is an effort to be as helpful as possible and, as we have in the past, we will use our best .iudgment. But this will broaden considerably the type of people and the number of people who go to the Secret Service. Mr. McCloy. That is what I am getting at really, Mr. Belmont. You are not saying that all those people that you characterize here under this paragraph 2 will ipso facto be sent over to the Secret Service every time the President makes a move. This simply says that all investigative personnel should be alert in that situation; am I right in that? Mr. Belmont. No, sir. If you will follow in the next paragraph, we say, "If cases are developed falling within the above categories, promptly furnish Secret Service locally a letterhead memorandum" with the information. Mr. McCloy. So without any further ado all the people in your list who are in that category will be transferred over to the Secret Service when there is an occasion, when the President travels? Mr. Belmont. No. This is a continuing procedure. In other words, during our investigations we come across someone who is in this area or category, and this is a requirement that that man's name go to Secret Service with a brief description of him, and Secret Service then has that filed and is in a position to know that that individual has been referred to them. Mr. McCloy. Well, that brings up again the comment that I originally made. 20 This does put a big burden of investigation and judgement on the Secret Service, one which they have not heretofore presumably had placed on their shoulders. Mr. Belmont. I think you are correct. Mr. McCloy. The reason I am asking these questions is because by implica- tion, at least, one of our directives is to look into this situation for the future protection of the President, and we want to see that we have got something that is practical as well as cautious. Mr. Dulles. Do the memoranda attached, Mr. Belmont, to this exhibit indicate what classes were so identified for investigation under the procedures existing at the time of the assassination and what change has been made, how it has been extended ? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. If you Mr. Dulles. By the definitions under paragraph 2 of the Manual of Instruc- tions. Mr. Belmont. The previous page and the paragraph right above No. 2 sets forth the same information that we acted on prior to the assassination. Mr. Dulles. That is paragraph 1? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. Mr. Dulles. The Manual of Instructions, section 83. Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. Mr. Dulles. What are the various categories given now at the top of page 2 of this exhibit which have been added? Mr. Belmont. At the top of page 2, sir, that is the information that should be included in the notification to headquarters as to who the individual is and the background information that was furnished to Secret Service so that we, too, can disseminate to Secret Service here. Representative Ford. Under the new criteria would Oswald's name have gone to the Secret Service automatically? Mr. Bf.lmont. Well, Congressman, right now we are including all defectors automatically. Now. the question whether Oswald meets these criteria here as set forth is a question of .iudsment. As I say, right now we do furnish all defectors. Representative Ford. Defectors are for the time being at least a special cate- gory other than what is set forth here unless for some other reason they would fall into one of these categories. Mr. Belmont. Yes. Mr. McCloy. Do you under that categoi-y send forward all Communists? Mr. Belmont. Yes. Mr. McCloy. All Communists, yes. Mr. Dulles. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether or not it would be wise for the record at this point to read into the record, in view of the importance of this, this paragraph which we are now discussing and which, as I understand it, contains the new definition of investigative cases? The Chairman. Yes we can put it into the record. ; Mr. Dt'lles. Mr. Belmont, as I understand it. the new criteria are set forth in parai^raph 2 on page 2 of the Manual of Instructions, section 83 is that ; correct? Mr. Belmont. That is correct. Mr. McCloy. Which, as I counted, is the 12th page of the Commission's Exhibit No. 836 is that right, Mr. Stern? ; Mr. Stern. That is right number of the exhibit. Mr. McCloy. 836, and I think it is the 12th page. Mr. Dulles. For convenient reference I suggest that when this be included that we add the dates and the page numbers. Mr. Stern. I think the witness can do this immediately. The Chairman. We will give a copy of it to the reporter and he may copy it and incorporate it later in the record. (Paragraph 2 reads as follows :) "Other dissemination to Secret Service concerning security of the President. All investigative personnel should be alert for the identification of subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists (a) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (&) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials 21 or employees of Federal, State, or local government or oflScials of a foreign government, (c) who express or have expressed strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb making or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and (d) whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against organized government." Mr. DuxLES. Do I understand you, Mr. Belmont, to say, as drafted you would not consider that defectors automatically fell under this paragraph 2, but it is your practice to notify the Secret Service about defectors? Mr. Belmont. We do notify Secret Service of any defectors coming to our attention. Mr. Dulles. And by defectors, I guess we mean here maybe a redefector, meaning those who have gone to Russia and have come back or maybe those who have gone and not come back. Mr. Belmont. If they haven't come back Mr. Dulles. They are not a danger. Mr. Belmont. They are not within our cognizance and we don't notify Secret Service. Mr. Dulles. These would be defectors who have gone to the Soviet Union and who then come back to the United States and tried to defect while they were over there. Mr. McCloy. Not necessarily, not exclusively the Soviet Union, of course. Mr. Dulles. Communist countries, I would say. Representative Ford. Just to get an order of magnitude, how many are there? Is this a sizable number? Mr. Belmont. I don't have a figure, Mr. Ford. You have had defectors in Korea from the military. You have had defectors Mr. McCloy. Germany. Mr. Belmont. Berlin. When these are military personnel they are within the cognizance of the military, so that it is very difficult for me to give you a figure. When we become interested is when they return to this country and warrant action by us from an internal security standpoint. As in the Oswald case, we started our action based on newspaper publicity that he had attempted to or indicated his intention to, renounce his citizenship in Moscow. But I do not have a figure because many of these people are mem- bers of the armed services and I would hesitate to give you an estimate. Mr. Steen. Mr. Belmont, do these terms "subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists" have a particular meaning of art in FBI parlance? Can you tell us how you use these terms in this regulation or what these mean to you and to your agents. Mr. Belmont. I will have to refer you to the dictionary, I think, Mr. Stern. A subversive is an individual who is active in the Communist Party or front groups associated with it or one of the other groups that we term subversive, such as the Socialist Workers Party. The ultrarightists Mr. Dulles. Socialist Workers Party is a Trotskyite Party, is it not? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. The ultrarightists, I believe here we attempt to spell out those people who are so far to the right that they do not consider themselves subject to the law and the proper procedures, and take things into their own hands. — The racists, I think, are that speaks for itself, individuals who will go be- yond the bounds of propriety in seeking their goals, and who adopt violence. The Fascists Mr. McCloy. I was wondering how you were going to define that one. Mr. Belmont. Is to give you the opposite end of the spectrum of subversives. Mr. Dulles. Do we have anarchists in this country at the present time? There used to be an old anarchist society in the old days. Mr. Belmont. That used to be, but it is dissolved. There is no organization. I venture to say we have individual anarchists at this time. Mr. Dulles. No organized anarchist organization. Mr. Belmont. No. ; Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, in view of the quite imiK>rtant considerations you mentioned before, the danger of interfering with individual liberty, would it be possible within your organization to have the agents recommend to head- quarters here and have someone at a higher level examine the recommenda- tion before it is made to the Secret Service? This is, as I understand it, a con- tinuing program and not one that comes into effect only when the President schedules a trip. This would operate without respect to scheduled trips by the President. Would that be possible? Would it fit your operation? Do you think it might help any? Mr. Belmont. Well, what is your thought behind that, Mr. Stern? In other words, so that names of persons won't indiscriminately be sent on a local level? Mr. Stern. Precisely. These categories are, after all, fairly gross. They use large terms which can mean different things to different people. The considera- tions you mention. I think, are quite real and important. Would it help any to do something of the sort? Mr. Belmont. I think we will find that our agents are using good judgment in this matter. The danger involved in referring these matters to headquarters for a decision as to dissemination is the delay in time and, you will note, we stress the time element that when such information comes into the possession of our agents, immediate steps must be taken to transmit this information to Secret Service by the most expeditious means possible. This might be of assistance to you. This information which we send to Secret Service in the field is placed in a control file, a separate file in the field, and is subject, under instructions, to inspection by our inspectors as they visit our field offices to insure that this requirement is being carried out properly; and they will examine the type of material that is being sent over. Each field office is thoroughly inspected about once a year, and that is one of the requirements that they go through this to make sure this instruction is being properly carried out. Mr. McCloy. I have no further questions. I have some general questions I would like to get to at the end, but I have to leave early this afternoon. Mr. Rankin. I have one question I wanted to interject, Mr. Chairman, and that is as to statements, Mr. Belmont, about subversives, including persons who are members of Communist front groups. You mean to say that that includes any person who is a member of a Communist front group because, as you know, many leading citizens have been members of such groups. Mr. Belmont. Now, Mr. Rankin, I wouldn't carry it by any means that far. It would be dependent upon the front group, the extent of activity in it, and the activities of the individual. By no means would we classify someone as a subversive who was connected with a front group by name or Mr. Dulles. By front groups you mean tho'-e on the Attorney General's list you are taking that as a criterion of a front group? Mr. Belmont. No, sir not necessarily that, sir. There are other groups ; that we consider front groups. Mr. Dulles. I see. Mr. Belmont. I am glad you raised that because each case would have to be considered on its own individual merits as to what is the extent of the activity and the purpose and intent of the activity. Mr. Rankin. You recognize in the work in this field that there are many Americans who are interested in certain causes and purposes and front groups in connection with them who are loyal Americans, don't you? Mr. Belmont. I have no doubt of that whatsoever. Mr. Rankin. I just wanted to get that in the record. Mr. Belmont. I also know many loyal Americans, unfortunately, who don't look behind some of these groups to determine their intents and purposes, and allow their names to be used where they would not otherwise do so if they took the time and trouble to check into what the organization was. Mr. Rankin. So you don't lump them all under the term "subversive," that is what I was trying to get at. Mr. Belmont. Right. The Chairman. I suppose some join before an organization is infiltrated, too. 731-221 0—64— VOL V 3 ^ Mr. Belmont. That is correct, sir. The Chairman. They find themselve.s in a mousetrap then. Mr. Belmont. That is correct, sir that is right. ; Mr. McCloy. In other words, you would expect your agents to exert some selection before they would send these names over to the Secret Service. Mr. Belmont. Our agents use judgment in the pursuance of this work, and they would continue to use judgment in the selection of people who meet this criterion. Otherwise if you carried this to the extreme you would get out of hand completely. So that there is judgment applied here and our agents are capable of applying the judgment. Representative Ford. What has been the reaction of the Secret Service to this greater flow of information that they have received? Mr. Belmont. They have taken it. There has been no official reaction, to my knowledge. Representative Ford. Have they objected to the greater burden? Mr. Belmont. No, sir I would like to say, I don't know whether you are ; going to cover this, Mr. Stern, that our relations with the Secret Service are excellent.We work closely together. As a matter of fact, since the assassination, at the request of Mr. Rowley, we have furnished agents to assist on occasion in the protection of the Presi- dent, which is primarily a function of Secret Service, but as a cooperative gesture we have on a number of occasions made agents available at the request — of Mr. Rowley. I think the figure runs to something like 139 agents yes, 139 agents that we have made available. We do have a very close liaison with Secret Service both at the seat of Government and in our field offices. We have a supervisor here at the seat of Government whose duty it is to stay directly in touch with Secret Service, to cut redtape and produce results both for Secret Service and for the FBI ; to see that the problems are handled immediately. He has direct access to Mr. Rowley, and we have on a number of occasions at the request of Secret Service, sent one of our agents with the Secret Service when the President travels abroad, particularly where we have a representative in the countries being visited, because our relations with the law enforcement officials in those countries have been built up over the years, and we are thus in a position to assist Secret Service in establishing the necessary security measures and the flow of information to serve their purpose. In addition, when the President travels abroad we alert all of our oflSces to advise us of any information which may pertain to the travel of the President, and we set up a supervisor back here to receive that information and cable it or get it immediately to our man who is accompanying the President when he makes this trip. This is done, this agent going with Secret Service is done, at the invitation and request of Secret Service. Representative Ford. 169 agents of the FBI who have assisted since the assassination. Did Secret Service make a specific request for their help in these instances? Mr. Belmont. Yes Mr. Rowley advised that he needed help, it was offered ; to him by Mr. Hoover, and when the President is going to visit a city and Secret Service does not have sufficient per.sonnel in that particular city to cover what they consider is necessary, they need specialized help from us, they will make the request to us and we will authorize our local agent in charge to make those men, the designated number, available to the Secret Service representative, who then uses their services while the President is there. Representative Ford. I gather that prior to the assassination such requests, specific requests, had not come from Secret Service to the Bureau. Mr. Belmont. No. There were never any such requests before. Mr. Stern. At the level at which the requests have been made so far, have they proved to be a difficult burden for the FBI? Mr. Belmont. Mr. Stern, any time that we have a pending caseload of some- thing like 115,000 investigative matters, which is what we have, and our agents are assigned about 20 to 25 cases apiece across the country, ranging from matters of immediate urgency to matters which can be handled in due time, and whenever 24 our agents are putting in an average of over 2 hours overtime a day voluntarily, the loan of 139 men will be felt. Representative Ford. 169. Mr. Belmont. I believe it was 139, sir. I think the letter says 139. Mr. Stern. 139 on 16 separate occasions. Mr. Belmont. Yes. I do not wish to overplay this. We are not complaining. We do feel that at such time as Secret Service is able to increase its per- sonnel or meet this problem within the organization that it is properly their problem. But meanwhile we are following this procedure and we are not complaining. Mr. Dulles. I had hoped, Mr. Chairman, that at some time while Mr. Belmont was here, we could ask him to just briefly define for us, going back to the assassi- nation day, a clear definition of tJie respective functions of the FBI and the Secret Service prior to and immediately after the assassination. There seemed to have been at one time a little confusion there. Naturally in a .situation of this kind it always happens, but I am not absolutely clear in my mind as to Mr. Belmont. At the time of the assassination? Mr. Dulles. Yes. Just before, I mean what your responsibilities were just before the assassination, and just after as contrasted with the functions of the Secret Service. Mr. Belmont. The Secret Service has the responsibility for protecting the President and his family, and the Vice President and so on. That is a basic responsibility. Mr. Dulles. And you have no auxiliary function to that Mr. Belmont. No, sir. Mr. Dulles. Except to furnish names and suspects, as you have indicated. Mr. Belmont. That is correct. We have no function there. That is a primary responsibility and function of Secret Service. Now, we do have what we have considered our responsibility, to furnish to Secret Service any indication of a threat to the President, and that we have done religiously. After the assassination the President ordered us into an investigation of the assassination which changed the picture as far as this particular case was concerned. Mr. Dulles. You mean President Johnson, immediately after the assassina- tion? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. Mr. Dulles. And there was a period there, there was a period though, after — the assassination and before President Johnson took the oath of office did this order come to you during that period or after he had taken the oath of office? Mr. Belmont. It was very rapid, probably within a day. Mr. Dulles. I see. It wasn't immediately after. Mr. Belmont. No. Mr. Dulles. It wasn't this period I am speaking of. Mr. Belmont. You see, Mr. Dulles, the Federal Government still has no juris- diction over the assassination of the President. That was a murder and was within the province of the local police who immediately took hold of it and started the investigation. Mr. Dulles. I realize that. Mr. Belmont. And started the investigation and it was theirs. Mr. Dulles. You were only in there by courtesy. What you did was by courtesy of the local authorities. Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir we went to the Dallas Police Department and immedi- ; ately went into action because of what had happened, and there was no time for us to stand on priorities. But we felt we should be of the utmoi^t assistance, and we sent men to the police department to assist in the interview and do anything else we could. This wasn't a time, of course, to sit back and say, "This isn't our job." Mr. Dulles. I understand. Mr. Belmont. Yes. The Chairman. Mr. Belmont, just one question. Do you know of any legisla- 25 tion in recent years that might have been introduced in the Congress to make an attack upon the President a Federal offense? Mr. Belmont. I do know that there is legislation presently pending. The Chairman. Since the assassination? Mr. Belmont. Since the assassination. The Chairman. Yes. But had it been considered in recent years? I know it had at the time of other assassinations, but so far as you know were there any recent legislation to that effect? Mr. Belmont. Mr. Chairman, I must plead ignorance. I haven't done research on it, and I just don't know. The Chairman. Yes. Well, we can find that out very easily. Representative Ford. Mr. Chaii-man, just the other day in the House of Repre- sentatives a bill was approved giving Federal officials the right to take certain action when a chief of state from a foreign country was within the United States a broadening of their authority when they had a suspicion or they had ; some reason to believe that an attack was being made on a foreign dignitary. At the time it went through the House I thought of the same question you just raised, and I wondered whether there were any specific legislative matters pending before any committee on this particular point. Mr. Belmont. I am sure there is a pending bill because my recollection is — — that it was called to our attention I cannot pinpoint it for you but I think there is pending legislation now in this matter. Mr. McCloy. I noticed in some Law Review article recently reference to the fact that previous bills had been introduced but had gone into the wastebasket. The Chairman. That is true. Mr. McCloy. In respect of other incidents. The Chairman. When the emotion died down. Mr. McCloy. When the emotion died down, that is true. I have some further questions. The Chairman. Have you finished, Mr. Stem? Mr. Stern. I want to get one thing established that came up yesterday. Mr. Belmont, yesterday the Commission was interested in determining, if possible, when Agent Hosty recorded the interviews that he had taken on October 29, November 1, and November 5. He wasn't certain, except that he thought it had been done after the assassination. Have you caused a check to be made on that? Mr. Belmont. Yes we checked with our Dallas ofiice, and they do not have ; a specific record of when that information was recorded. Mr. Stisn. Was it recorded in substantially the same form in some con- temporaneous communication ? Mr. Belmont. Yes within a day or two, I think on November 4, if I recall ; correctly, the fact that Hosty had talked to the neighbor of Mrs. Paine and had located Marina Oswald, was sent in by AIRTEL. Mr. Stern. You might refer to Commission Exhibit 834, page 9, items 64 and 67, just so the record is straight. Mr. Belmont. Item 64 is an AIRTEL from the Dallas office to the head- quarters dated October 30, wherein Hosty reported this interview that he had had with the neighbor of Mrs. Paine. On November 4 the Dallas office reported by AIRTEL the results of his con- tact with Mrs. Paine on November 1, so that the results of his interviews were incorporated at that time, October 30, November 4, but the actual insert for the report was not prepared until some time later. To the best of Hosty's recollec- tion it was after the 22d and prior to December 2, but he was already on record by these AIRTELs. Mr. Stern. Thank you, Mr. Belmont. I have no further questions. The Chairman. Mr. McCloy. Mr. McCloy. I have one or two questions. Mr. Belmont, you do know the charge has been made by some that Oswald was what is called a secret agent. Do you have any information whatever that would cause you to believe that Oswald was or could have been an agent or an informant of the FBI? 26 Mr. Belmont. I have covered that in some considerable detail, Mr. McCloy, and I will make a positive statement that Oswald was not, never was, an agent or an informant of the FBI. Mr. McCloy. In the course of your investigation do you have any reason to make you believe that he was an agent of any other country? Mr. Belmont. No, sir we have no reason to believe that he was an agent of ; any other country. Mr. McCloy. Or any other agency of the United States? Mr. Belmont. Or any other agency of the United States. Mr. McCloy. You said this morning, I believe, or at least I guess Mr. Hosty said, that the assassination of the President and any leads in connection with it are still of constant concern to the FBI. Do you feel there are any areas as of the present time that you feel at the present time require or justify further investigation other than routine check- ups that have not already been undertaken? Mr. Belmont. No, sir frankly, I don't. I will say that from the requests we ; have received from the Commission, you have explored this most thoroughly. We do not have any unexplored areas in this investigation that should be explored. There are some pending requests that you have made, and we are running them out as rapidly as we can. Mr. McCloy. Maybe this isn't a fair question to ask you, but, after all, you have had a long record of criminal investigation, and you have had a long exposure to investigation in this case. As a result of your investigation do you feel that there is any credible evidence thus far which would support a conclusion or an opinion that the death of the President was the result of a conspiracy or anything other than the act of a single individual? Mr. Belmont. No, sir we have no evidence, and I could support no conclu- ; sion that this was other than an act of Oswald. Mr. McCloy. Now, the investigation does lead you to the conclusion that he was the President's assassin? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. Mr. McCloy. Did you ever at any time have any connection whatever you or— — the agency have anything to do with the Walker, General Walker, case? Mr. Belmont No. sir; that was a matter handled by the Dallas police. I am drawing on my recollection of it now, but, as I recall it, after the incident, we offered to examine the bullets that were recovered Mr. McCloy. Bullets. Mr. Belmont, And the police apparently wanted to retain them, so that we did not conduct the examination of the bvQlets until subsequent to the assassina- tion itself. Mr. McCloy. Until recently. Mr. Belmont. No; we had no connection with it. with that investigation. Mr. McCloy. In your investigation of the President's assassination, did you have occasion, after the event, to make an investigation of Ruby's background or Ruby's relationship to Oswald? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir we went into that very thoroughly. ; Mr. McCloy. Have we got all your reports on that? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. Mr. McCloy. Have you come to any conclusions or opinions in regard to Ruby and his connection with Oswald, if any? Mr. Belmont The reiwrts, of course, speak for themselves. But in summa- tion, we did not come up with anything of a solid nature, that is anything that would stand up to indicate that there was any association between Ruby and Oswald. We had numerous allegations which we ran out extensively and care- fully, but there is nothing, no information, that would stand up to show there was an association between them. — Mr. McCloy. Maybe this is in the record, but do you by reason of your very close association with this investigation, I venture to ask this question do — — you, from your knowledge of the investigation find was there any evidence in 27 ; regard to Ruby's propensity for violence before this shooting took place in the police headquarters in Dallas? Mr. Belmont. Did we have any information of that character and of that nature? Mr. McCloy. Yes I am not talking before it happened, but as a result of your ; investigation did you turn up any other indications of any violence on the part of Ruby? Mr. Belmont. I hesitate to attempt to evaluate the information that we gath- ered from hundreds and hundreds of people that we talketl to during the investi- gation of Ruby after the assassination. I just don't feel that I am in a position to render a judgment as to his character or his impulsiveness, the degree of im- pulsiveness, whether he was capable Mr. McCloy. Whether he was prone to violent action. Mr. Belmont. I just don't feel really competent. I have no doubt that a conclusion can be drawn from reports of course, that was one of the basic issues ; at the trial. Reprenstative Ford. Was there any evidence that the FBI found to the effect that Ruby was a Communist? Mr. Belmont. No, sir. Representative Ford. None whatsoever? Mr. Belmont. No, sir. Representative Ford. Was there any evidence found by the FBI to the effect that Ruby was connected with in any way whatsoever so-called rightist grouijs? Mr. Belmont. No, sir I do not recall anything of that nature. ; Mr. McCloy. No association that you know of as a result of the investigation of Ruby with any foreign government or agency of a foreign government? Mr. Belmont. No, sir you understand, you are asking me questions, and I am ; replying on the basis of my best recollection, but I am giving you an answer from my knowledge of the case. Mr. McCloy. That is what we were seeking, no more than that, because your impressions would be valuable. Mr. Belmont. The reason I say that there may be someone we interviewed who made a statement about Ruby and it was run out, and it was found to be false. Congressman Ford, you asked me if he was a Communist. I would say we have no evidence of that. Mr. McCloy. Do you feel that in view of the evidence that Oswald was a de- fector, that he engaged in this Fair Play for Cuba business, that he lied in his communications with the FBI, that Mr. Hosty should have been alerted by lo- cating Oswald in the School Book Depository early in November, that he should have been alerted to informing the Secret Service of that? Mr. Belmont. No, sir I do not. You must take this matter in its proper con- ; text. I pointed out to you previously that this man came back from Russia he indicated that he had learned his lesson, was disenchanted with Russia, and — — had a renewed concept I am paraphrasing, a renewed concept of the American free society. We talked to him twice. He likewise indicated he was disenchanted with Russia. We satisfied ourselves that we had met our requirement, namely to find out whether he had been recruited by Soviet intelligence. The case was closed. We again exhibited interest on the basis of these contacts with The Worker, Fair Play for Cuba Committee, which are relatively inconsequential. His activities for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans, we knew, were not of real comsequence as he was not connected with any organized activity there. The interview with him in jail is not significant from the standpoint of whether he had a propensity for violence. Mr. McCloy. That is the Quigley interview you are talking about? Mr. Bexmont. Y^es it was a self-serving interview. ; The visits with the Soviet Embassy were evidently for the purpose of securing a visa, and he had told us during one of the interviews that he would probably take his wife back to Soviet Russia some time in the future. He had come back 28 to Dallas. Hosty had established that he had a job, he was working, and had told Mrs. Paine that when he got the money he was going to take an apartment when the baby was old enough, he was going to take an apartment, and the family would live together. He gave evidence of settling down. Nowhere during the course of this investi- gation or the information that came to us from other agencies was there any indication of a potential for violence on his part. Consequently, there was no basis for Hosty to go to Secret Service and advise them of Oswald's presence. Hosty was alert, as was the Dallas office, to furnish informiition to Secret Service on the occasion of the President's visit. It is my recollection that Hosty actually participated in delivering some ma- terial to Secret Ser\ice himself, and helped prepare a memorandum on another matter that was sent over there. So that most certainly the office was alert. The agent in charge had alerted his agents, even on the morning of the visit, as he had previously done a week or 10 days before the visit. So that, in answer to your question, I cannot even through the process of going back and seeking to apply this against what happened, justifiably say that Hosty should have given this information under the existing conditions and with the history of this matter, that he was in a position to give it to the Secret Service. Now, most certainly Mr. McCloy. We wish he had. Mr. Belmont. Of course. Representative Ford. Mr. Chairman, I have a call from the floor of the House. I wonder if I could ask Mr. Belmont a question. The Chairman. Yes, indeed. Representative Ford. In response to a question by Mr. McCloy, you categori- cally said that Federal Bureau of Investigation under no circumstances had employed Oswald as an informant, as an agent or in any other way whatsoever. Mr. Bei.mont. Yes, sir. Representative Ford. You would be in a position to know specifically that information ? Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. Representative Ford. You also said, as I recall, that you had found no credible information or evidence thus far that Oswald was connected in any way whatsoever with another country as an agent. Is that about what you said or do you wish to reaffirm it in another way? Mr. Belmont. I will affirm what you said. Representative Ford. There is a difference, however, between your knowledge as to whether the FBI had hired Oswald, you can be very categorical about that. Mr. Belmont. That is correct. Representative Ford. You can only Mr. Belmont. Say based on the evidence that we have or which developed or all information that we received, there was no indication that Oswald was in any way connected or within the service of a foreign government. Representative Ford. But there is a difference in the way you can answer those two questions. Mr. Belmont. There is a difference, yes there is a difference because in the ; one case we know, in the other case we rely on all the information and evidence available. Representative Ford. But as far as a foreign government is concerned, you only know what you have been able to find out? Mr. Belmont. That is correct, sir. Representative Ford. There is always the possibility in the second case, in- volving a foreign government, that something might come up at some other time. Mr. Belmont. There is always the possibility. We have no indication of it. There is always the ix)ssibility yes, sir. ; Representative Ford. But you cannot be as categorical about the future in the second case as you were in the first case. Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir you are right. ; The Chairman. Are there any other questions? 29 ) Mr. Dulles. Do you have some more? Mr. McCloy. I think I have got all the questions I wanted to ask. (At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford leaves the hearing room. Mr. Dulles. I have two or three questions. As you know, Mr. Belmont, there have been a wide variety of rumors that have been spread abroad very particularly with regard to the assassination. I have before me, just received last night, a book just being published in England, it is coming out in the next day or 2, called "Who Killed Kennedy," by Thomas G. Buchanan, published in London by Seeker and Warburg. I have not had an opportunity yet to read the book. I have read a good deal of the background material on which it is based. I would like to ask though when this book is available to you, and we will make a copy available to you and see that you get one promptly, whether you would have the Bureau read this, an appropriate person in the Bureau familiar with the case or yourself, and possibly give us your views with regard to certain of the allegations here within your particular competence. Mr. Belmont. As I understand it, Mr. Dulles, this is probably a compilation of the articles that he wrote in the French press. Mr. Dulles. Express yes. ; Mr. Belmont. Which, I believe, we sent over to the Commission as we received them. Mr. Dulles. That is correct. Mr. Belmont. And from my recollection of perusing those articles, they are filled with false statements, innuendoes, incorrect conclusions, misinformation, and certainly what I would term false journalism. In other words, he has stated as fact or as a correct conclusion many things which the Ck>mmission's investigation has disproved completely. We will be glad to read the book and to furnish you with a general comment on it. But to take down each statement in there and go into it would probably result in a critique of 500 pages. Mr. Dulles. We do not want that. I don't think we need that. Mr. Belmont. Where actually many of these allegations have already been resolved by the Commission, I am sure. We will be glad to read it and give you a Mr. Dulles. I think that would be useful for the Commission to have, Mr. Chairman. Do you agree? The Chairman. Very well yes. If you find any factual matters in there that ; contradict your findings, we would expect you to call it to our attention. Mr. Belmont. Most certainly, sir. The Chairman. But otherwise I don't think we want a review of the book. That is your idea, is it? Mr. Dulles. Not a review of the book, but if there are allegations there, any evidence you can factually deny, that would be helpful to have it. Mr. McCloy. Do you have any record of Buchanan? Do you know anything about Buchanan's background? Mr. Belmont. No, sir I do not recall. ; Mr. Dulles. I wish you would check. Mr. Belmont. We can send you a letter. The Chairman. We have the record. Mr. McCloy. He seems to be very much Ivy League, Lawrenceville School and Yale. Mr. Dulles. He was at one time, I believe, he admitted to being a Communist at one time. He was at one time employed by the Washington Star, I am ad- vised, and I believe, according to the information I have, that he was terminated by the Star some years ago. Mr. Belmont. I thought he had been in touch with the Commission. The Chairman. He came in, he did come in here, and made a statement which we have recorded. His testimony wasn't taken. He just walked in off the street. Mr. Dulles. I have one or two more questions, Mr. Chairman. 30 I believe, Mr. Belmont, that you probably have furnished us already with in- formation with regard to any contacts that Oswald might have had, individuals whom he knew, persons who might have been accused of being accomplices of his, but if there is anybody there or any persons in your file whom Oswald knew who have not been communicated to us, we would certainly like to have them to be sure we have looked into that field exhaustively, anybody who, ac- cording to your records, Oswald knew. Mr. Belmont. I am sure we have explored that fully, and we have reported it to the Commission fully. Mr. Dulles. All right; good. Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. Mr. Dulles. In view of your deep study of the case, have you reached any views of your own or are there any views of the Bureau, as to Oswald's motivation in the act that he committed? Mr. Belmont. Again I don't feel competent to give you an answer. There is an indication from the exploration of his background that he wanted to be somebody. He wanted to be known as someone. Whether this caused him to do this terrible thing I don't know. I think if it were possible to peer into Oswald's mind, that would really be the only way you could get your question answered. Mr. Dulles. Have you and the Bureau made any comparative study of the various assassination attempts and assassinations of other Presidents and people in high authority in this Government to see whether any pattern at all runs through the.se various attempts other than attempts where there is clearly a plot, as in the case of the attack on President Truman, and probably also in the case of President Lincoln? I am thinking chiefly of the assassina- tion of President McKinley and the attempted assassination of President-elect Roosevelt in 1933. Mr. Belmont. No, sir; we have not made a study of that nature. I would imagine that Secret Service has made a study. Mr. Dulles. They have made a study. I didn't know whether yoti had made one also. Mr. Belmont. No, sir we have not. ; Mr. Dulles. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Mr. Belmont, I have here in my hand a sheet that appeared on the newsstands over the weekend. It is supposed to be the National Enquirer. I believe it is out of New York, and it contains a page and a third about the assassination of the President and certain actions of the FBI, and so forth, and for the record I should like to read a portion of it and merely ask you if, in your opinion Mr. Belmont. All right, sir. The Chairman. And with your knowledge there is any truth to any part of it. You, of course, are acquainted with that paper. Mr. Belmont. No, sir; I am not. In fact, someone told me it was, it came from, the Philadelphia Inquirer, and I was shocked that something like that would be in that paper. I found it was not the Philadelphia Inquirer. (Discussion off the record.) The Chairman. I think, in view of the relationship you have had in this whole matter, I would like to have yotir testimony in the record on it. Mr. Belmont. Very good, sir. The Chairman. There is no date on this paper, and I am told it appeared in three different days in three different formats with different headlines, but the same item. It is said to be by John Henshaw, Enquirer Washington Bureau Chief. — "Washington The hottest story making the rounds here is that the U.S. Justice Department prevented the arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby BEFORE the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Oswald and the man who killed him. Ruby, were suspected of being partners in crime 7 months before the President's death. 31 : ) "The incredible details of the story are so explosive that oflScials won't even answer 'no comment' when queried about it. But the story being discussed by top-level Government officials reveals "1. That the Justice Department deliberately kept Oswald and Ruby out of jail before the assassination. "2. That Dallas cops suspected Oswald of being the gunman and Ruby the paymaster in a plot to murder former Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker 7 months— before the President was assassinated. "3. That the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency was using Ruby to recruit commandoes for raids against Castro's Cuba. To prevent this explosive infor- mation from being disclosed, the CIA asked the Justice Department to step in and stop the Dallas police from arresting Jack Ruby, as well as Oswald. — "A top-secret document a letter signed by a high official of the Justice De- — partment was sent in April 1963 from the Dallas Police Department to Dallas Chief of Police Jesse E. Curry requesting the Dallas police NOT to arrest Oswald and Ruby in connection with the attempted slaying of General Walker. "After a sniper shot at, but missed, General Walker in Dallas, April 10, 1963, Dallas police suspected that Oswald was the sniper and Ruby the payoff man. "The cops were set to arrest the pair. But they never got the chance because of the heavy pressure brought to bear by the Justice Department. And so Oswald and Rlaby were allowed to remain free. And 7 months later, on last November 22 in Dallas, Oswald was able to kill the President of the United States. — "The top-secret document a copy of it is reportedly in the hands of the — Presidential Commission investigating the assassination bares a web of intrigue that involves the Federal Bureau of Investigation, along with the Justice De- partment and the Central Intelligence Agency. "It is so politically explosive that the Presidential Commission, headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, has even withheld it from one of its own members. Senator Richard Russell (D., Ga.). "It is feared that Senator Russell, who leads the South in the fight against the civil rights bill, might use the document as a weapon against the Justice Department and its chief. Attorney General Robert Kennedy, a leader in the fight for civil rights. "The document — requesting the cops not to arrest Ruby and Oswald- contradicts the FBI report on the assassination and the subsequent murder of Oswald." My question is, do you have any information that would lead you to believe that any of those allegations are true? Mr. Belmont. My answer, sir, is that that is utter fantastic nonsense, and I have no information to indicate that any of the allegations are true. The Chairman. I think we had better mark this and introduce it in evidence. There is much more to the article, but it is explanatory of this, but I thought that was sufficiently a direct allegation that we ought to note it in the testimony. So will you give that a number, Mr. Stern. Mr. Stern. It will be numbered 837. The Chairman. 837. It is introduced in evidence as No. 837. Mr. Stern. May we also have admitted, Mr. Chief Ju.stice, Exhibit No. 836, the letter of March 31, 1964, which Mr. Belmont has identified. The Chairman. It may be admitted under that number. (The documents referred to were marked for identification as Commission Exhibits Nos. 836 and 837 and were received in evidence. The Chairman. Is there anything further, gentlemen? Mr. McCloy. May I suggest that we get a copy of the paper which does have the date on it. I forget what date it was. Mr. Belmont. Mr. Rankin, I understand you have sent it over to us, so we will be glad to answer your letter. The Chairman. Well, Mr. Belmont, we appreciate your cooperation, and we thank you for your courtesy. (Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.) 32 Wednesday, May 13, 1964 TESTIMONY OF LT. JACK REVILL The President's (Commission met at 10 a.m. on May 13, 1964, at 200 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C. Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman Representative Gerald ; R. Ford and Allen W. Dulles, members. ; Also present were J. Lee Rankin. General Counsel Norman Redlich, assistant ; counsel Arlen Specter, assistant counsel and Charles Murray, observer. ; ; The Chairman. Lieutenant Revill, the purpose of today's hearing is to hear your testimony and that of Detective V. J. Brian with particular regard to alleged conversation with Special Agent James P. Hosty, Jr., of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, claimed to have occurred on November 22, 1963, in the afternoon, and also concerning the facts surrounding the discussion of Commission Exhibits 710 and 711. What are those — those are the affidavits? Mr. Rankin. That is his affidavit and Detective Brian's. The Chairman. Those are the affidavits that you made in that regard. -Would you please ri.se and raise your right hand and be sworn? Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you God? Lieutenant ReviLl. I do, sir. The Chairman. Mr. Rankin will conduct the examination. Mr. Rankin. Lieutenant Revill, will you state your name and place of residence for the record, please? Mr. Revill. My name is Jack Revill. I reside at 5617 Madowics, Dallas, Tex. Mr. Rankin. Do you have an official connection with the police department of Dallas? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir I do. ; Mr. Rankin. What is that? Mr. Revill. I am presently a lieutenant of police of the Dallas Police Depart- ment. Mr. Rankin. How long have you occupied that position? Mr. Revill. I was promoted to lieutenant June 26, 1958. Mr. Rankin. Do you have any particular area of responsibility? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir I am presently in charge of the criminal intelligence ; section. Mr. Rankin. Have you been in charge of that section since November 22 of 1963? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I have. Mr. Rankin. What are the functions of your work in that job? — Mr. Revill. My unit our primary responsibility is to investigate crimes of an organized nature, subversive activities, racial matters, labor racketeering, and to do anything that the chief might desire. We work for the chief of police. I report to a captain who is in charge of the special service bureau. Mr. Rankin. Who is that? Mr. Revill. Capt. Pat Gannaway. Mr. Rankin. How long have you reported to him ? Mr. Revill. In my present capacity? Mr. Rankin. Yes. Mr. Revill. Since I have been assigned to the criminal intelligence section. Mr. Rankin. So that was for all times since and on November 22, 1963? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir this is true. ; Mr. Rankin. Do you know James P. Hosty, Jr.? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir I do. ; Mr. Rankin. How long have you known him? Mr. Revill. I have known Jim, Mr. Hosty, since 1959, when I took over the intelligence section. Mr. Rankin. Did you see him on November 22? 33 Mr. Revill. Yes, sir I did. ; Mr. Rankin. Where. Mr. Revill. In the basement of the city hall. Mr. Rankin. Just before you saw Special Agent Hosty, where had you been? Mr. Revill. I had been at the Texas School Book Depository. Mr. Rankin. What did you do there? Mr. Revill. We conducted a systematic search of the building, evacuated the people working in the building, and took names, addresses, and phone numbers of all of these people before they were permitted to leave. Mr. Rankin. Was anyone working with you there? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Rankin. Who? Mr. Revill. Numerous people. Mr. Rankin. I see. Was Detective Brian w^ith you there? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. I had taken Detective Brian with me from the Trade Mart, Dallas Trade Mart, upon hearing of the shots being fired at Mr. Kennedy. I took Detective Brian and two other ofl3cers assigned to my unit, Detective R. W. Westphal and Detective Tarver, O. J. Tarver. Mr. Rankin. How did you come back to the police department? Mr. Revill. By automobile. Mr. Rankin. By car? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Rankin. Was anyone with you? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir, I had Detectives Brian, Tarver, and Westphal. Mr. Rankin. They were all in the car with you? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Rankin. And which way did you enter the building? Mr. Revill. The Main Street ramp into the basement of the city hall. Mr. Rankin. About what time of the day? Mr. Revill. It must have been about 2 :45, 2 :50. Mr. Rankin. All of these oflBcers were with you? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Rankin. Where did you see Special Agent Hosty? Mr. Revill. If I might explain that, I followed Mr. Hosty into the basement of the city hall. He drove into the basement, parked his car, I did the same, and Mr. Hosty departed from his car, ran over to where I was standing, Detective Brian and I. The other two oflScers, Westphal and Tarver, as well as I recall, had remained in the rear talking to some other oflBcers. I don't know who they were. At that time everything was mass confusion, and we were all upset. Mr. Rankin. Will you explain to the Commission where you parked the car with reference to the point where you saw Agent Hosty? Mr. Revill. I got out of my car, and we have two attendants assigned to the basement, two Negro attendants, and one of these individuals parked my vehicle for me, I don't know where he parked it. But as I got out of the car, Mr. Hosty ran toward me Mr. Rankin. Now, about the parking, excuse me. Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Rankin. Is that a part of the basement area of the police department? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir it is. ; Mr. Rankin. All right; proceed. — Mr. Revill. And Mr. Hosty ran over to me and he says, "Jack" now as I — recall these words "a Communist killed President Kennedy." I said, "What?" He said, "Lee Oswald killed President Kennedy." I said, "Who is Lee Oswald?" He said, "He is in our Communist file. We knew he was here in Dallas." At that time Hosty and I started walking off, and Brian, as well as I recall, sort of stayed back, and as we got onto the elevator or just prior to getting on the elevator Mr. Hosty related that they had information that this man was capable of this, and at this I blew up at him, and I said, "Jim" , Mr. Rankin. What did he say in regard to his being capable? 34 Mr. Revill. This was it. They had —"We had information that this man was capable" Mr. Rankin. Of what? Mr. Revill. Of committing this assassination. This is what I understood him to, say. Mr. Rankin. Are those his exact words? Mr. Revill. As well as I recall. Give him the benefit of the doubt I might ; have misunderstood him. But I don't believe I did, because the part about him being in Dallas, and the fact that he was a suspected Communist, I under- stand by the rules of the Attorney General they cannot tell us this, but the information about him being capable, I felt that we had taken a part in the security measures for Mr. Kennedy, and if such, if such information was avail- able to another law enforcement agency. 1 felt they should have made it known to all of us, and I asked Hosty where he was going at that time. By this time we were on the elevator and he said he was going up to homicide and robbery to tell Captain Fritz the same thing. I said, "Do you know Captain Fritz?" and he said he had never met him. I said, "All right, I will take you up and introduce you to Captain Fritz." So Detective Brian and I and Hosty went to the third floor of the city hall and went to Captain Fritz' office, the homicide and robbery bureau. We didn't see Captain Fritz, he may or may not have been thei-e. His office door was closed. Mr. Dulles. What time of the day, could you give me the approximate time? Mr. Revill. Between 2 :30 and 3 o'clock, and I have the reason for saying this because of the typing of this report here. Our secretary got off at 4 o'clock. Mr. Dulles. And Chief Curry had not yet returned, had he? Mr. Revill. I don't know where he was. Mr. Dulles. You didn't know about that? Mr. Revill. No, sir. Mr. Rankin. Did you say anything about this to Captain Fritz? Mr. Revill. I did not talk to Captain Fritz, as I said, I didn't see him. I introduced Mr. Hosty to Lieutenant Ted Wells, who is one of the lieutenants assigned to the homicide and robbery bureau and also present at that time was another special agent, Mr. Bookhout, and Hosty. there was confusion within this office, so Brian and I, after introducing Mr. Hosty to Wells, left and went back to the special service bureau office. Mr. Rankin. And you didn't say anything to the inspector about it? Mr. Revill. The inspector? Mr. Rankin. Lieutenant Wells. Mr. Revill. No. sir; I did not. Mr. Rankin. You didn't tell him this important information? Mr. Revill. Hosty was going up to tell him the same thing. Mr. Rankin. Did he tell you that? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir he told me that. ; Mr. Rankin. And Hosty told you then that he was going up to tell him that they knew he was capable of being the assassin? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir being at that time I was out of touch with everything, ; being in the building, I had put no connection between the shooting of Tippit and the President. Mr. Rankin. Did you know that Oswald had been arrested? Mr. Revill. No, sir at that time I did not. ; Mr. Rankin. You just knew about the someone by the name of Lee, didn't you? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir Lee. And this was told to me by a colored employee of ; the School Book Depository. Myself and Lieutenant Frank Dyson took charge of the search of the building and we must have had 75 or 80 men in the building assisting in this .search. I talked to a Negro Mr. Dulles. Were you in charge of that? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir I was in charge of that phase of the search. I talked ; to a Negro by the name of Givens, and we had handled this person in the past for marijuana violations and I recognized him and in talking to him I a.sked him if he had been on the sixth floor, and as well as I recall, and Detective Brian was present at this same time he said, yes, that he had observed Mr. Lee, over 35 by this window. Well, I asked him who Mr. Lee was, he said, "It is a white boy." He didn't know his full name. So, I turned this Givens individual over to one of our Negro detectives and told him to take him to Captain Fritz for interroga- tion, and while going to the city hall, or the police station I passed this detective and Givens, and they came into the homicide and robbery bureau shortly after Hosty and I did, so I am sure Captain Fritz did talk to Mr. Givens. Mr. Rankin. When did you learn that Oswald had been arrested? Mr. Revill. I really don't know, sir. Because time, we were all shocked that this thing had happened in our city and I personally felt that maybe a sense of responsibility, maybe we could have done more to prevent this thing. I just don't know when I heard that he had been arrested. Mr. Rankin. Did you know it by the time you went to Lieutenant Wells' office? Mr. Revill. No, sir I did not. He may have been in the office at that time. ; Mr. Rankin. You didn't know that Oswald was already in the police department? Mr. Revill. No, sir; I did not. I had been in this building since word came of the shots being fired until about 2 :30, 2 :35, and at that time I decided that my unit could possibly do more at our office where we kept all of our files, cataloging these people, the suspects that were running through my mind at that time. So, I was, I put out a call for all of the intelligence unit personnel to meet me at the office and I got no reply to this because they were all up in the special service bureau. We had been assigned to the Trade Mart, and two or three of my officers had taken into custody four or five of these picket carriers, and we did this more for protection than anything else because after the word came of the assassination, well, I am afraid they would have been mobbed, and they were all up in the special service bureau booking these prisoners at the time, and I decided we would stop by the si>ecial service bureau office, to report back to my captain and see if there was something we could do there. And as I pulled into the basement this conversation took place with Mr. Hosty. Mr. Rankin. And the particular words about Oswald being capable of being an assassin those were told you by Agent Hosty in the elevator? Mr. Revill. No, sir; either just outside the elevator and as we got on. He never mentioned this again because I guess I lost my temper at him for with- holding this type of information. Mr. Rankin. I see. Did you do anything about losing your temper, did you say anything? Mr. Revill. No; Jim Hosty and I are friends, and this has hurt me that I have involved Hosty into this thing, because he is a good agent, he is one of the agents there that we can work with that has been most cooperative in the ; past, and I worked with him just like he is one of us. Mr. Rankin. You went to the third floor on the elevator? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Rankin. Who else went with you? — Mr. Revill. Detective Brian and Hosty, the elevator was had several people on it. I don't recall who they were. Mr. Rankin. Was Detective Brian on that elevator? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir he was. ; Mr. Rankin. At that same time? Mr. Revill. He went to the third floor with me. Mr. Rankin. And you are sure Agent Hosty was on the elevator with you? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir he was. ; Mr. Rankin. And you are sure you were on the elevator? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Rankin. Now, will you tell us exactly what you said to Hosty and also what he said to you? Mr. Revill. After hearing about the information that they were purported to have had Mr. Rankin. Have you told us all the information that Hosty told you? Mr. Revill. As well as I recall yes, sir. ; Mr. Rankin. Now, did you say anything to him about it? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. 36 Mr. Rankin. What? Mr. Revill. I asked him why he had not told us this, and the best, my recol- lection is that he said he couldn't. Now, what he meant by that I don't know. Becau.se in the past our relations had been such that this type of information, it surprised me they had not, if they had such information he had not brought it or hadn't made it available to us. Mr. Rankin. And you are certain you went up there on the elevator together? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir took him to the third floor and introduced him to ; Lieutenant Wells. Mr. Rankin. Are you sure you didn't go up the stairs together. Mr. Revill. No, sir; we went to the third floor on the elevator. Mr. Rankin. You are positive? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; because we caught the elevator in the basement, and there would have been no reason to walk up the stairs. Mr. Rankin. If Agent Hosty said you went up the stairs rapidly together, that would be untrue? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir this would be untrue. ; Mr. Dulles. Did you go in that same driveway that the car went in that was to take Oswald out? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Dulles. That driveway and you took that elevator right to the left as ; you went in there? Mr. Revill. No, sir; we go straight into the doors into the elevator that goes up to the third floor. Mr. Dulles. Yes. Mr. Revill. Third and fourth floor. Representative Ford. May I ask a question to reconstruct this a bit? Both Detective Brian and yourself came in one car? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Representative Ford. And you had two other ofiicers with you? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Representative Ford. More or less the same time Mr. Hosty came in? Mr. Revill. We followed Mr. Hosty into the basement. Mr. Dulles. Each in a car? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir he was in a car and we were in mine. ; Representative Ford. Your first contact with Mr. Hosty was in the basement there? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Representative Ford. What did he say there? Mr. Revill. He come running up to me, and he said, "Jack, a Communist killed President Kennedy." I said, "What? What are you talking about?" He said, "Lee Harvey Oswald killed President Kennedy," and at that I said, "Who is Lee Harvey Oswald?" And then he told me about him having him in their security files, and then that, "We had information that he was capable of this." By "we" I assumed he meant the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Representative Ford. Then Brian, Hosty, and yourself walked to the elevator? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Representative Ford. And the three of you took the elevator up to the third floor? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Dulles. It is about 10 feet as I remember it. Mr. Revill. No, sir; it is more than that. Mr. Dulles. It is a different elevator. It is not the one that take prisoners down? Mr. Revill. No, sir; it is the .swinging doors, you go through the swinging doors. Mr. Dulles. It is another elevator? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Representative Ford. At what iwint in the sequence did you blow up, as you say? Mr. Revill. When he told me about the capability. By blowing up 37 Representative Ford. Was that standing in the basement near the car or was it over toward the elevator? Mr. Revill. We were walking over toward the elevator during this conversa- tion and as far as blowing up, this is semantics. I wanted to know why they had not given us this information. Representative Ford. What is his reaction to that? Mr. Revill. "We couldn't." I do not know what he meant by that. Representative Ford. When you use words like "We couldn't" that "Oswald was a Communist" this is what I am trying to find out. You mean these are the precise words he said or are these your interpretations of what he said? Mr. Revill. The time involved it could be my interpretation, to give him the benefit of the doubt, because as I said Hosty is a friend of mine, and the last thing I wanted to do was to cause this man any trouble, because of our relations in the past. Representative Ford. Have you ever had any doubt in the interval between that time and now that what your recollection is is accurate or inaccurate, fair or unfair? Mr. Revill. As far as I am concerned I have this report is honest, and it was ; made within an hour after he made the thing. And since this assassination I have gone over in my mind could I have misunderstood him. I sometimes wish or hoped that I have. But this is in essence what he said to me. It might not be exactly the "we's" the "I's" but in essence it is what Mr. Hosty said. Representative Ford. At one point as I recall your testimony, you said Hosty said that Oswald was a Communist. A few minutes after that testimony I think you said that Hosty suspected he was a Communist. Now, did you say that deliberately or did you just Mr. Revill. No, sir if I said that I was wrong. ; Representative Ford. Was that just confusion? Mr. Revill. As I mentioned earlier he come hurrying up to me and he said, "Jack, a Communist killed the President." I said, "What?" He said, "Lee Harvey Oswald, a Communist killed the President," and then he went into the fact that they had known he was there, and then at the conclusion of our, not the conclusion because we continued to discuss this thing going up on the elevator, he made the statement that they had information that he was capable of this. He might have said probably or possibly capable of it, I don't recall, because in Dallas that day, the town died, and I know I was sick that this thing happened in my city, and I felt that maybe we could have done something else to prevent it. Mr. Dulles. You stress the word "capable", that sticks in your mind, does it? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Dulles. He didn't say might have done it? Mr. Revill. No, sir capable. ; Mr. Dulles. Normally would information of this kind have passed to you di- rectly from the FBI or through the Secret Service in the event — of course, there hadn't been other Presidential visits, I guess, so there was no precedent but I was wondering in the case of a Presidential visit would it normally have come to you directly from the Secret Service rather than directly from the FBI? Mr. Revill. Well, in the past Mr. Kennedy had visited Mr. Rayburn there and this information had never been made known to us and usually the information we got from the FBI and you have got to realize the relations are good, was on a personal basis, working with Mr. Hosty and the other agent assigned to their security section and men assigned to their criminal section, it was a share and share alike thing because I have 11 men, and we just augmented their force really with the information we gathered. Mr. Dulles. Had you had a meeting with the FBI, a general meeting, to go over security problems prior to this time, prior to the President's visit? Mr. Revill. No, sir I personally had taken part in no meetings. ; Mr. Dulles. With the FBI? Mr. Revill. With the FBI. Mr. Dulles. Or Secret Service? Mr. Revill. Or Secret Service. Mr. Dulles. Why was this? Mr. Revill. This I do not know. This was handled at a higher level. It is 38 my understanding meetin.tjs were hold and my captain who is my immcdiarc suiHTvisor was involved in these meetings hut Air. Dn.i.Ks. You were not present at tliese nieetintrsV Mr. Rkvii.i.. No, sir; I was not. Mr. Dii IKS. I?ut the meetintis you think were held'.' Mr. Kiviii. Tliis is my understanding; yes, sir. Mr. K.WKi.x. Lie\itenant Hevill, have you seen the original of that Kxhibil TO'.lV Mr. Ki VII Yes, sir I have. 1,. ; Mr. K.\.NKi.\. Is that the report that you referred to when you were answering (juestionsV Mr. Kkvii.i.. Yes, sir; I hr(iUght a copy. .Mr. K.WKiN. And Congressman FordV .Mr. Ki;\ III Yes, sir there was Just one copy made of this and this is the copy . ; Iretained. Tiie original went to Chief Curry. And on this. Chief Curry c.-illed me and he would lii0 miiuites to an hour after tlie thing hapiieiied. Mr. Rankin. Neither one of you said anything about this being strange that Agent Hosty would say anytliing like this? Mr. Revill. I do not recall, sir. Mr. i{ANKiN. You didn't say anything like that? Mr. Revill. don't recall making such a statement. 1 Mr. Rankin. .Vnd he didn't say anything like that to you lliat you recalled? Mr. Revill. No. sir. Representative I'okd. lid you write this out in longhand I '.- Mr. Revill. Yes, sir: and then 1 dictated it to one of the steiios in the ollice. 39 731 221 O — (;4- -vol. V 4 And she was to, this is what I mentioned earlier the time element, she was to, she got off at 4 o'clock and this was before she went home for the day. Mr. Dulles. This is on November 22 you are talking about? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Dulles. Did you sign it on November 22 or at a later date? Mr. Revill. The same time. Mr. Dulles. But you swore to it on the 7th day of April 1964? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Dulles. You swore that was your signature? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir at the time I was hoping it would never come up. ; Mr. Rankin. Why? Mr. Revill. Because of the relations that we had with the Bureau. Mr. Rankin. You thought this was a bad thing for the Bureau? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir I did. ; Mr. Rankin. For them to admit to you that they knew Mr. Revill. Not the admitting but to withhold it. Mr. Rankin. To withhold the information? Mr. Revill. Yes. Mr. Rankin. They thought this man was capable of being an assassin? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Rankin. And yet you say that Agent Hosty just blurted that out? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir he did. ; Mr. Rankin. Have you told us all that you remember about it? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir all that I remember. ; Mr. Rankin. Did you make this Mr. Dulles. Could I ask a question that comes right along with that? Did he say anything to you about his having been in Russia and redef ected ? Mr. Revill. No, sir. Mr. Dulles. That did not come up in this conversation? Mr. Revill. No, sir. Mr. Rankin. Did you ask him how he knew he was a Communist? Mr. Revill. No, sir I did not. ; Mr. Dulles. Why not? Mr. Revill. I don't know. Representative Ford. In the statement that you gave on November 22 which you have signed, you say? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Representative Ford. "The subject was arrested for the murder of J. D. Tippit and is a prime suspect in the assassination of President Kennedy." Mr. Revill. This I found out after reporting to my office, I didn't know what time this happened. Representative Ford. In other words, you learned this subsequent to going with Hosty? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Representative Ford. And then coming back to your own office? Mr. Revill. Y^es, sir; some of the officers assigned to the Special Service — Bureau on were involved in the arrest, Detectives Carroll and I talked to Agent Bob Barrett, I ran into him in the hall and he had told me about the arrest of Oswald. I think he was present at the time. Representative Ford. That is how you learned about this? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Dulles. At what time of day did you make this actual statement and sign it approximately? Mr. Revill. Approximately 3 :30, 3 :35. Mr. Dulles. 3:35 on the 22d of November? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Dulles. This is the actual statement that you then signed and then you swore to it, and the notary's signature was put on on the 22d of April? Mr. Revill. No, sir the notary's was on April 7, I believe. ; Mr. Dulles. 7th day of April, I mean, 7th day of April. Mr. Revill. Yes, sir but this is the report that I signed on the 22d. ; Mr. Dulles. This is the actual report that you signed on the 22d? 40 Mr. Revill. On the 22d. This is a copy, I believe. Mr. Dulles. Yes this is a copy I have in my hand. ; Mr. RE\aLL. Yes, sir. Mr. Dulles. The original of this was made on November 22? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Dulles. And signed on November 22d? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir it was. ; Mr. Dulles. And later sworn to on April 7? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir this is correct. ; Mr. Dulles. April 7, 1964. Mr. Rankin. Is all the information on 709 given by you? Mr. Revill. Is this 709? Mr. Rankin. Yes. Mr. Revill. All of the information, what do you mean by this, sir? Mr. Rankin. All of the language and everything on that exhibit, did you give that to some stenographer to write? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir I wrote it out. ; My stenographer, she is a clerk typist, and— I roughed it out and then she typed it for me. Mr. Rankin. Now, the words "subject" Lee Harvey Oswald. Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Rankin. "Was that given by you on the slip of paper you wrote out? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir I wrote it out in longhand. ; Mr. Rankin. And the words 60.^ Elsbeth Street, was that given by you? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir this is the address we were given or I was given by ; some of the officers involved in the arrest. Mr. Rankin. Who gave that to you? Mr. Revill. I believe Detective Carroll, Carroll or Detective Taylor, they were both there. Mr. Rankin. And was that at the time you made this out that you were given that information? Mr. Revill. Shortly before I made this out. Mr. Rankin. You didn't even know where he lived then? Mr. Revill. No, sir I did not. I had never heard of him. ; Mr. Rankin. You know that is wrong, don't you? Mr. Revill. The 605? Mr. Rankin. Yes. Mr. Revill. I don't know. Mr. Rankin. Is it wrong? Mr. Revill. Yes it is. ; Mr. Dulles. As of the time. Mr. Revill. That is what they gave me. Mr. Rankin. You found that out? Mr. Dulles. This is an address he once lived at. Mr. Rankin. Do you know that? Mr. DiTXES. This is correct. I want to find out what he knows about it. — Mr. Revill. Is this a is this an incorrect address on Mr. Oswald where he was living at the time? — Mr. Rankin. If you check it up I think you will find it is an incorrect address at the time. I think you will also find that 602 Elsbeth Street is where he lived at one time. Mr. Revill. Now, where they got this address Mr. Rankin. You never checked that? Mr. Revill. I personally have not checked it but I am sure it has been checked. Mr. Rankin. I see. Mr. Revill. But this is the address I was given. Mr. Rankin. Now, you say here that you were told that the subject was a member of the Communist Party. Is that right? Mr. Revill. This might be my interpretation of Mr. Hosty saying a Com- munist killed the President and we had him in our security files. Mr. Rankin. You are an expert in this field, aren't you? You are working in the subversive field? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir ; but as far as an expert, I wouldn't say I am an expert. 41 Mr. Rankin. You know the difference between membership and a person being a Communisit, don't you? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Rankin. And you know it is a very real difference? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir there is a difference. ; Mr. Rankin. Do you know which Mr. Hosty told you? Mr. Revill. He did not say that he was a member. This was my connota- tion of what he said that a Communist, that "We had him in our security files." Mr. Dulles. Could I ask a question? Where did you get this address that you put on of 605 Elsbeth Street, do you recall? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir from Detective E. B. Carroll or Detective Taylor. ; Mr. Dulles. Are they subordinates? Mr. Revill. No; they are detectives assigned to the special service bureau. One of them works the narcotics squad and one of them is assigned to the vice unit. Mr. Dulles. You never ascertained where they got it? Mr. Revill. No, sir this might be the address that they got from Oswald, ; I do not know. I never even thought about it until you brought up the point that this is not the address. Mr. Dulles. Can you find out where they got this address? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I can. Mr. Dulles. I think that would be useful. I would like to know that. I would like to know where they got this address also. Mr. Revill. It would have been the same day because this was made within an hour Mr. Rankin. You didn't put down on this statement anything about what you said, did you? Mr. Revill. No, sir; I did not. Mr. Rankin. Why didn't you? Mr. Revill. All I was doing was reporting what Mr. Hosty said to me. Mr. Rankin. Is that the way you make all your reports just one side? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir yes, sir. ; Mr. Rankin. You never say what you said? Mr. Revill. No, sir; I do not put our opinions or our interpretation in the report. Mr. Rankin. You don't even say what you asked? Mr. Revill. No, sir. Mr. Rankin. You just put the answer down? Mr. Revill. Put what was given to me yes, sir. ; Mr. Rankin. And that is the way all the police department reports are made? Mr. Revill. No, sir I don't know whether this is the way they are all made. ; This is the way we do it in our unit. Mr. Rankin. After you made this report, do you know what happened to it? Mr. Revill. I gave it to the captain, my captain. Captain Gannaway. Mr. Rankin. Do you know whether it was given to the Commission when the police reports were furnished to the Commission? Mr. Revill. This I do not know, sir. Mr. Rankin. I will tell you that it was not given to the Commission. Do you know any reason why it was withheld? Mr. Revill. No, sir I do not. ; Mr. Rankin. Do you know any reason why it should have been withheld until Chief Curry came here? Mr. Revill. No, sir I do not. ; Mr. Rankin. Did you have anything to do with that being withheld? Mr. Revill. No, sir I gave it to my superior, and what he did with it, I do ; not know. Mr. Rankin. Did you ever have any discussions about withholding it? Mr. Retvill. No, sir. Mr. Rankin. You did want to protect Agent Hosty, you say? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Rankin. And you hoped the information would not get out? Mr. Revill. By hoping 42 The Chairman. He didn't say exactly that, Mr. Rankin. He said he hoped he wouldn't have to use it against Hosty as I understood him to say. Mr. Revill. les, sir; my opinion, and this was my personal opinion that it would not serve any purpose. In your sc()i>e of the investigation, yes, I can see where it would, but I hated to get involved in a controversy with the FBI, because of our past relations. Mr. Rankin. Did you recently have a conversation with Lieutenant Hopkins of Fort Worth? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Rankin. Where was that? Mr. Revill. IJeutenant Hopkins and I went to Sacramento, Calif., to a law enforcement intelligence unit conference and shared a room. Mr. Rankin. Did you discuss this matter with him? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir it broke in the papers while we were there. ; Mr. Rankin. What did you say to him about it? Mr. Revill. About the report? About this report? Mr. Rankin. Yes. Mr. Revill. I told him about the conversation with Mr. Hosty and about according to the news release, the news stories, this thing was released, and the newspaper reporters and television people in Sacramento made it impossible for me to remain at the conference so I returned to Dallas. I was there for 1 day and returned the next, the next evening. Mr. Rankin. Did you say anything about the report being inaccurate? Mr. Revill. Inaccurate? Mr. Rankin. Yes. Mr. Revill. No, sir. Representative Ford. What was the date of this conference in Sacramento? Mr. Revill. April 22, 23, and 24, I believe. It was on a Thursday, Friday, and Saturday. It could have been the 23d, 24th, and 25th but I returned on Friday evening. Mr. Rankin. Did you examine the newspaper report of your report, Exhibit 709? Mr. Revill. Did I examine it? Yes, sir; I read several newspaper reports of it. Mr. Rankin. Did you give the reports to the newspapers? Mr. Revill. No, sir; I did not. Mr. Rankin. Did you have anything to do with giving it to the newspapers? Mr. Revill. No, sir this would have been the last thing I would have done. ; Mr. Rankin. Do you know who did? Mr. Rbu'Ill. No, sir I do not. ; Representative Ford. What prompted you to discuss this information with the other officer from Fort W^orth? Mr. Revill. I started getting long-distance telephone calls on the evening, it must have been the 23d, it was Thursday night, I got two long-distance phone calls, and Lieutenant Hopkins and I were sharing a double room and, of course The Chairman. Lieutenant who? Mr. Revill. Lieutenant Hopkins of the Fort Worth Police Department. H. F. Hopkins. The Chairman. Yes. Mr. Revill. And I discussed it with him. Representative Ford. Who was calling you long distance, what relevance does that have to it? Mr. Revill. To my discussing it with him? Representative Ford. Yes. Mr. Revill. The long-distance phone calls were about this report, the Asso- ciated Press and the United Press. Representative Ford. I see. They had heard about it, they called you long distance and you discussed it with Hopkins who was in the room with you? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Mr. Rankin. That is all that I have, Mr. Chief Justice. 43 The Chairman. Have you anything further, or you? Mr. Dulles. Tippit was not under your jurisdiction, was he? Mr. Revill. No, sir he was not. ; The Chairman. Lieutenant, I am not familiar with the newspaper report that you are speaking of. What, in substance, did it say? Mr. Revill. There were several articles written. The Dallas papers carried articles on it and the Sacramento, Calif., paper carried an article on it. In essence it had to do with this conversation that Hosty and I had and about this report and somewhere, someplace some newspaper reporter must have seen a copy of this because he knew how many paragraphs they had in it and he quoted, I believe, the last paragraph of the report verbatim, and this is what concerned me, that a report such as thfs would fall into their hands. Now, who the reporter is, there were several reporters that were curious about the thing, and I don't even recall which newspaper carried the verbatim para- graph about Agent Hosty's conversation. The Chairman. And that is what caused you and Lieutenant Hopkins to have a discussion? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. The Chairman. Did he bring the matter up to you or did you bring it up to him? Mr. Revill. I might have brought it up to him because I was concerned that this thing had been released. The Chairman. What was your conversation concerning that? Mr. Revill. That I had received these calls, the first one must have been around 2 o'clock in the morning, California time, from the Associated Press. It was a lady writer, and she asked about this and I told her that any statement would have to be made by Chief Curry, and she trapped me really. She made a false statement that Hosty was supposed to have said something else and I said no, that is not so. He did not make a statement, and then there was my comment. From that it looked like I had written them out a press release. The Chairman. Looks like what? Mr. Revill. It appears as if I had written out a press release from the com- ment in the newspapers but that was the only statement I made that Hosty had not made such statement, it was a fabrication, he knew he was capable, but he did not make such a statement. Hosty did not make such a statement. The Chairman. Then you discussed that with Mr. Hopkins? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. The Chairman. Do you recall just what Mr. Hopkins asked you and what you told him about this report? Mr. Revill. Well, when I received the first call, I was in the coffee shop, it was 2 o'clock in the morning, we had been out with two of the Sacramento County Sheriff's ofiicers and I got the call and after getting the call I went to the room and Hopkins had been awakened by this phone call, and I told him about the call, and then from there on, I had numerous long-distance calls, and I answered the one with the UPI, and then I decided I would not talk to people. Because I couldn't see where it would help anything. The Chairman. Did he ask you if the substance of this report was true, I am speaking now of Exhibit 709, the one we have been talking about. Mr. Revill. Mr. Hopkins had never seen this report. I just told him what had transpired between Hosty and I and told him that a report had been made, and this is what they were calling on. The Chairman. Did you at any time in talking to him repudiate anything that was in this report? Mr. Revill. No, sir. The only thing I repudiated was the fact that this re- porter had said that Hosty had made a statement and I said no, this is not true, about them not believing that he would do it, and I think I told Hopkins that. The Chairman. Yes. Anything more? Mr. Dulles. I have nothing more. The Chairman. Lieutenant, thank you very much, sir, for your help here. Mr. Revill. Thank you, sir. I am just sorry it happened. 44 The Chairman. You havo (old us what the truth of the situati(jii is, you couhl do no more and no less. Mr. TIfa'ill. Yes, sir. (Discussion ofT the record.) The riiAiKMA.N. Lieutenant, just a (luestion or two. we forgot to ask. Mr. Rankin, would .vou ask them, pleaseV I\rr. Ranki.n. You said you made some handwritten notes about this 7<«) exhibit. .Mr. Ukvill. Yes, sir. Air. Rankix. \Vhen you ::ave them to the typist — do you know what haiipened to tho.se notes"/ Mr. Rkvim,. They were di'stroyed. I am sure. Mr. Rax KIN. Do you know what her name is who typed 70'.)V Mr. RiMi.i., Mary Jane Robertson. :VIr. Raxkin. Is she still with the i>olice department V :Mr. Ukvill. Yes, sir. Mr. Rankin. What position is she in now? Mr. Revill. She is a clerk-typist in the six'cial service bureatL :Mr. Rankin. Do you know where the original of TOO isV Mr. Rkvill. With Chief Curry, I assume. Well, let's see. You have a copy: I would assume he has got it. Mr. Dulles. Wasn't a copy made at the time'.'' :Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; I have it. Mr. r)T-LLES. The actual copy, you have? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir it is in my little briefca.se. ; Mr. Rankin. So that orijiinal would be available to us? Mr. DiLLES. Y'ou have it here now? jNIr. Revill. I have a copy. Mr. Dulles. A carbon copy? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. The Chairman. He showed us a copy of his testimony. Representative Ford. I>o you know how many coi)ies were made? Mr. Revill. Yes. sir one and one: an original and one. : Representative Fokd. And you kept t>ne copy and one went to Captain Caniui- way? Mr. Revill. No; Ixith copies went to Captain (Jannaway who is my immediate superior and he later gave me back the carbon and the original went to Chief Curry. Representative Ford. And you have had the one copy in your p()ssession since how long? Mr. Revill. Probably a week or two aftei- this thing happened, and I have had it iu the Lee Harvey Oswald tile. Representative Ford. You have had this copy in your liles in the police de- partment? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Representative Foun. Since about December 1 or thereabouts? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir; thereabouts. The Chairman. Do you iuiml)er tho.se items in the hie? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. The (jHAHtMA.x. And the order in which they come in? Mr. Revill. Yes, sir. Now, this particul.-ir report w,is i>ut in tlie I.ce Harvey Oswald file, and he was given an intelligence number, A T, it" i^: may get this 1 copy I will explain to you The CilAnniAX. Yes; would you do so, ]>lease? Mr. Ukvh.i,. Excuse me just a moment. Vou see. he was givtMi .\ T LMk;."), ^^; page ;M, as it ai)iK'ars in his tile. This is indexed with a rard wiiii ihis lile num- ber and page numbtu". The Chair.max. M;iy I ask, woul