INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY APPENDIX TO HEARINGS BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION VOLUME XI THE WARREN COMMISSION CIA SUPPORT TO THE WARREN COMMISSION THE MOTORCADE MILITARY INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION MARCH 1979 Priuted for the use of the Select Committee ou Assassmutious t ^ f 1/ BOSTON PUBLIC tlBl^RY INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY APPENDIX TO HEARINGS BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION VOLUME XI THE WARREN COMMISSION CIA SUPPORT TO THE WARREN COMMISSION THE MOTORCADE MILITARY INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION MARCH 1979 Printed for the use of the Select Committee ou Assassinations U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 43-S19 WASHINGTON : 1979 For sale by tbe Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 STOCK NO. 052-070-049S2-1 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS LOUIS STOKES, Ohio, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio WALTER E. FAUNTROY, STEWART B. McKINNEY, Connecticut District of Columbia CHARLES THONE, Nebraska YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, HAROLD S. SAWYER, Michigan California CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana ROBERT W. EDGAR, Pennsylvania Subcommittee on the Subcommittee on the Assassination of Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. John F. Kennedy WALTER E. FAUNTROY, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, Chairman HAROLD E. FORD YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE FLOYD J. FITHIAN CHRISTOPHER J. DODD ROBERT W. EDGAR CHARLES THONE STEWART B. McKINNEY HAROLD S. SAWYER LOUIS STOKES, ex officio LOUIS STOKES, ex officio SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio (ID CONTENTS Page Foreword V The Warren Commission 1 Analysis of the support provided to the Warren Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency 471 Politics and Presidential protection : The motorcade 505 Possible military investigation of the assassination 539 (III) :":*J Foreword (1)* During the course of its investigation, the committee con- ducted an extensive examination and evaluation of the Warren Com- mission's investigation of 1964 and final report. As the most authori- tative document ever produced on the assassination of President Ken- nedy, the "Warren Commission report stands as the account against Tvliich any serious examination of the evidence of the assassination must be weighed. (2) The committee carefully examined the work of the Warren Com- mission, its structure and operations, conclusion-drawing process, and production of a final report. This staff report is in two parts. The first addresses the operations and performance of the Commission. The sec- ond looks at the Commission's relationships with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency. (3) The Commission's report sets forth the testimony of various key members of the Warren Commission staff, as well as those membersof the Commission who were still living at the time of the committee's in- vestigation. The former members and staff of the Commission have, by and large, refrained from any substantive comment on their past work on the Commission, during the 15 years since their investigation took place. The following staff report, based primarily upon their testi- those most mony, sets familiar forth a review with it and at thenarrative time. of the Commission's work by *Arabic uumerals in parentheses at the beginning of paragraphs indicate the paragraph number for purposes of citation and referencing; italic numerals in parentheses in the middle or at the end of sentences Indicate references which can be found at the end of each report or section. (V) THE WARREN COMMISSION Staff Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations U.S. House of Representatives Ninety-fifth Congress Second Session March 1979 (1) CONTENTS Paragraph I. Operations and procednres (4) Creation of the Warren Commission (4) Purposes of the Warren Commission (22) Organization of the Warren Commission (44) Independent investigators (59) Communioation among tlie staff : (71) Interaction between the Warren Commission and the staff (74) II. Pressures Relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau '. of (88) Investigation : A. Perspective of the Warren Commission : Attitude of the Commission members (113) Attitude of the Commission staff (144) Predispositions regarding the agencies (144) Attitude of the staff toward the investigation (152) Initial staff impressions of the agencies (100) Attitude of the staff during the course of the investigation (163) Dependence on the agencies: Staff views (183) B. Attitude of the FBI and the ClA to',\ ard the Warreu Commission : General attitude (188) The FBI (188) The CIA (205) Examples of attitudes and relationships (216) Introduction (216) Inadequate follow-up — the Odio-Hall incident (218) Unreasonable delays (228) Misleading testimony (238) Withheld information (240) Attachment A : The Warren Commission (278) Att.achnH'nt B: MontJily progress of tlip Warren ro')iii)is-i. a tremendously important conclusion to know. If some foreign government was behind this, that may have presented major problems. It was of major importance to know that. I want to emphasize that both sides had a different set of problems. If there was a conspiracy, the problem was not rumors of conspiracy. The problem was conspiracy. If there Avas not conspiracy, the problem was rumors. Every- thing had to be gone into. (7) (9) On November 25, 1963— the same date as the Katzenbach memo- landum — President Johnson directed the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct a "prompt and thor- ough investigation of all the circumstances surrounding the brutal assassination of President Kennedy and the murder of his alleged assassin." (<§) (10) Then, 2 days later, Senator Everett M. Dirksen proposed m Congress that the" Senate Judiciary Committee conduct a full inves- tigation. Congressman Charles E. Goodell proposed that a joint com- mittee composed of seven Senators and seven Representatives conduct an inquiry. In addition to the proposed congressional investigations, Texas Attorney General Waggoner Carr announced that a court of inquiry, authorized by Texas law, would be established to investigate the assassination. In his oral history, Leon Jaworski described the creation of the Texas Court of Inquiry : I saw Lyndon Johnson within a few days after lie assumed the Presidency. Waggoner Carr had been * * * [interrup- tion] * * * heard was that naturally the President — Presi- dent Johnson — was tremendously concerned over what hap- pened in Dallas from the standpoint of people understand- ing what really happened. Here and in Europe were all kinds of speculations, you know, that this was an effort to get rid of Kennedy and put Johnson in, and a lot of other things. So he immediately called on Waggoner Carr who was attorney general of Texas to go ahead and conduct a court of inquiry in Texas. Waggoner Carr, following President Kennedy's funeral, appeared on all the networks and made an announce- ment to that effect. {9) (11) On November 29, 1963, Walter Jenkins wrote a memorandum to President Johnson, which stated : Abe [Fortas] has talked with Katzenbach and Katzenbach has talked with the Attorney General. They recommend a seven man commission — two Senators, two Congressmen, the Chief Justice, Allen Dulles, and a retired military man (gen- eral or admiral). Katzenbach is preparing a description of how the Commission would function * * *.(i(9) (12) This memorandum also included a list of possible members of the Commission and asked Johnson if they were satisfactory. This list was in fact apparently satisfactory since all of the people noted were appointed to the Commission. (13 ) Former Attorney General Katzenbach told the committee : I doubted that anybody in the Government, Mr. Hoover, or the FBI or myself or the President or anyone else, could satisfy a lot of foreign opinion that all facts were being re- vealed and that the in\'estigation would be complete and con- clusive and without any loose ends. So, from the beginning, I felt that some kind of commis- sion would be desirable for that purpose * * * that it would be desirable * * * for the President to appoint some com- mission ofpeople who had international and domestic public stature and reputation for integrity that would review all of the investigations and direct any further investigation, (ii) (14) On the same day, President Johnson told Hoover that, al- though he wanted to "get bj^" on just the FBI report, the only way to stop the "rash of investigations" was to appoint a high-level com- mittee to evaluate the report, (i^) That afternoon President Jolmson met with Chief Justice Earl Warren and persuaded him to be chair- man of a commission to investigate the assassination. Johnson ex- plained his choice of Warren by stating, "* * * I felt that we needed a Republican chairman whose judicial ability and fairness were un- questioned." (7-5) Although Warren had previously sent word through a third party that he opposed his appointment as chairman, (i^) President President Johnson Johnson stated pereuaded he toldhimWarren to serve. : In "The Vantage Point," When this country is confronted with threatening divi- sions and suspicions, I said, and its foundation is being rocked, and the President of the United States says that you are the onlv man who can handle the matter, you won't say "no" will you? (75) (15) In his and memoirs, Earl General on November stated that Cox "Warren Archibald 29, 1963, met with him and Katzenbach Solicitor attempted to persuade him to chair the Commission. Warren refused. He related : * * * about 3 :30 that same afternoon I received a call from the White House asking if I could come to see the President and saying- that it Avas quite urgent. I, of course, said I would do so, and very soon thereafter I went to his office. I was ushered in andj with only the two of us in the room, he told me of his proposal. He said he was concerned about the wild stories and rumors that were arousing not only our own people but people in other parts of the world. He said that because Oswald had been murdered, there could be no trial emanating from the assassination of President Kennedy, and that unless the facts were explored objectively and conclusions reached that would be respected by the public, it would always remain an open wound with ominous potential. He added that several congressional committees and Texas local and State authori- ties were contemplating public investigations with television coverage which would compete with each other for public at- tention, and in the end leave the people more bewildered and emotional tlian at present. He said he was satisfied that if he appointed a bipartisan Presidential Conmiission to investi- gate the facts impartially and report them to a troubled Nation that the people Avould accept its findings. He told me that he had made up his mind as to the other members, that he had connnunicated with them, and tliat they would serve if I would accept the chairmanship. He then named them to me. I then told the President my reasons for not being available for the chairmanship. He replied, "You were a soldiei" in World War I, but there was nothing you could do in that uniform comparable to what you can do for your country in this hour of trouble.'' He then told me how serious were the rumors floating around the world. The gravity of the situa- tion was such that it might lead us into war, he said, and, if so, it might be a nuclear war. He went on to tell me that he had just talked to Defense Secretary Robert McXamara, who had advised him that the first nuclear strike against us might cause the loss of 40 million people. I then said, "Mr. President, if the situation is that serious, my personal views do not count. I will do it." He thanked me, and I left the AVliite House. (16) (16) In his oral history, Warren related a similar version of the meeting. (i7) (17) In his appearance before the committee, former President and Commission member Gerald R. Ford, also recalled the appointment of Chief Justice Warren as chairman. He testified : I believe that Chief Justice Warren accepted the assign- ment from President Jolinson for precisely the same reason ' that the other six of us did. We were asked by tlie President \ to undertake this responsibility, as a public duty and service, 8, and despite the reluctance of all of us to add to our then burden or oi:)erations we accepted, and I am sure that was the personal reaction and feeling of the Chief Justice. (i5) (18) In "The Vantage Point", President Johnson presented two con- siderations hehad at the time. He believed the investigation of the assassination should not be done by an agency of the executive branch. He stated, "The Commission had to be composed of men who were beyond pressure and above suspicion." (i,9) His second consideration was that the investigation was too large an issue for the Texas author- ities to handle alone. (^6') (19) Apparently, Earl Warren also did not want Texas to conduct the court of inquiry that had been announced earlier by Texas At- torney General Waggoner Carr. In his oral history, Leon Jaworski discussed Warren's attitudes and actions regarding the court of inquiry : I came on to Houston, and then I began to ^et calls from Katzenbach and from Abe Fortas telling me that they were having a Presidential Commission appointed to go into this matter. This would be to keep Congress from setting up a bunch of committees and going in and maybe having a Mc- Carthy hearing or something like that. The next thing I knew they were telling me, "Leon, you've got to come up here." This was Katzenbach and Fortas both. "Because the Chief (Chief Justice Warren, who had accepted the appoint- ment from the President) doesn't want any part of the court of inquiry in Texas. And I said, "Well, as far as I can see it, there's no need in our doing anything that conflicts — let's work together." He said, "Well, he doesn't want any part of Waggoner Carr, the attorney general down there, because he said it would just be a political matter." He said, "He respects youIn and so * * * any event I then went up to Washington, and I had the problem of working this matter out. I must say that Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach was a great help; Solicitor General Archie Cox was of great help. Those two primarily and Waggoner Carr and I worked with them — Katzenbach saw the Chief Justice from time to lime, bringing proposals to him from me; the Chief Justice was willing to talk to me without Carr present — I couldn't do that. It finally evolved that — from all these discussions, there finally evolved a solu- tion that we would all meet. We did meet in the Chief's office, and the Chief addressed all his remarks to me and ignored Waggoner Carr, but I would in turn talk to Carr in his presence and direct the questions to him and so on. What we did is agree that we would not begin any court of inquiry, but that we would work with the Commission and have every- thing available to us that the Commission was doing; we would be invited into hearings; would have full access to everything. (.ii?i) (20) After this meeting, Leon Jaworski related to President John- son that the matter of the Texas court of inquiry had been resolved satisfactorily. The President appeared to have been pleased with the result. Jaworski stated : When we got through with that, I called Walter Jenkins and told him that we thought we had solved it properly, and that I thought I ought to have a word with the President. He said, "By all means. The President is waiting to hear from you." * * * I went on over there and he was in the pool ; he came immediately to the edge of the pool and shook hands with me. Then I told him what had happened, and that we had worked it out and had worked it out in great shape, and we were going to work together, and everybody was happy and shook hands and patted each other on the back and so on. And that even the Chief Justice had warmed up to Waggoner Carr before the conference broke up. Then Lyndon Johnson looked at me and he said, "Now, Leon, youVe done several things for me — many things in fact for me. Now, it's my time to do something for you." I said, Mr. President, there is nothing I want. I don't want you to do anything for me." And so he looked at me and he said, "All right, I'll just send you a Christmas card then."(i?^) (21) On the evening of November 29, 1963, President Johnson issued Executive Order No. 11130 that created the President's Commission on the Assassination of Pi-esident Kennedy, hereinafter the Warren Commission. The Commission Avas composed of seven people: Hale Boggs — Democratic Representative from Louisiana ; John Sherman Cooper — Republican Senator from Kentucky, for- mer Ambassador to India ; Allen W. Dulles — former Director of the CIA ; Gerald R. Ford — Republican RejJi'esentative from IVIichigan ; John J. McCloy — former U.S. High Commissioner for Germany and former president of the World Bank ; Richard B. Russell — Democratic Senator from Georgia, and Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. PURPOSES OF THE WARREN COMMISSION (22) The purposes of the Warren Commission, as stated in Execu- tive Order No. 11130, were : To examine the evidence developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and any additional evidence that may here- after come to light or be uncovered by Federal or State authorities; to make such further investigation as the Com- mission finds desirable ; to evaluate all the facts and circum- stances surroundiner such assassination, including the subsequent violent death of the man charged with the assassination, and to report to me its findings and conclusions. (23) Although this may be an accurate statement of some of the pur- poses of the Warren Commission, there were indications that there were additional tasks that it was to perform. (24) It is apparent from some of the statements previously quoted that many members of Government were concerned about convinc- 10 ing the public that Oswald was the assassin and that he acted alone, (^c^) In addition to the memoranda, referred to earlier, on December 9, 1963, Katzenbach wrote each member of the Warren Commission recommending that the Commission immediately issue a press release stating that the FBI report, which had been sub- mitted to the Warren Commission that same day, clearly showed there was no international conspiracy and that Oswald was a loner. (^^) (25) The Commission did not issue tlie requested press release. Al- though in their testimony several of the Warren Commission staff members indicated they were not aware of these memoranda, (25) it is a])parent that this purpose was clearly in the minds of some of the people who were in contact with the Warren Commission and the members of the Warren Commission could not have been unaware of the pressure. (26) Another purpose of the Warren Commission, which was at least apparent to Chief Justice Warren and to President Johnson, was the quashing rumors and speculation. President Johnson was concerned that the public might believe his home State of Texas was involved in the assassination. He was also aware of speculation about Castro's possible participation. President Johnson expressed his concern in "The Vantage Point": Xow, with Oswald dead, even a wounded Governor could not quell the doubts. In addition, we were aware of stories that Castro, still smarting over the Bay of Pigs and only lately accusing us of sending CIA agents into the country to assassinate him, was the perpetrator of the Oswald assassi- nation plot. These rumors were another compelling reason that a thorough study had to be made of the Dallas tragedy at once. Out of the iYatwn''s suspicions, out of the Nation''s need for facts, the Wari^en Commission teas horn. [Italic added] \26) (27) On January 20, 1964. at the first staff meeting of the Warren Commission, Chief Justice Warren discussed the role of the Commis- sion.ments : A memorandum about this meeting described Warren's state- He (Warren) placed emphasis on the importance of quenching rumors, and precluding further speculation such as that which has surrounded the death of Lincoln. He empha- sized that the Commission had to determine the truth, what- ever that might be. {27) (28) At this meeting, Warren also informed the staff of tlie dis- cussion he had had with President Johnson, including the fact that tlie rumors could lead to a nuclear war which would cost 40 million lives. {28) Both the Chief Justice and President Johnson were ob- viously concerned about the rumors and speculation, so concerned tho*- they were afraid of a nuclear war if the rumors were not quashed. (29) World reaction to the assassination, and its coverage in tlse media, may have reinforced this concern. An editorial on November 2:"), 196,^, in the Xew York Times stated tliat President Johnson "must convince the country that this bitter tragedy will not divert us from 11 our proclaimed purposes or check our forward movement." On Novem- ber 24, 1963, the New York Times reported that Pravda was charging right-wingers in the United States of trying to use the assassination of President Kennedy to stir up anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban hysteria. The same article stated : The ISIoscow radio said Oswald was charged with Mr. Ken- nedy's slaying after 10 hours of interrogation, but there was no evidence which could prove this accusation. (30) On November 25, 1963, Donald Wilson, acting director of the United States Information Agency, submitted a memorandum to Bill Moyers that discussed randum went through world each reaction to Oswald's major city slaying. This and summarized memo- newspaper articles that had appeared regarding Oswald's death, A Tass dispatch released after Osw^ald was killed concluded : All the circumstances of President Kennedy's tragic death allow one to assume that this murder was planned and carried out by the ultrarightwing, fascist, and racist circles, by those who cannot stomach any step aimed at the easing of international tensions, and the improvement of Soviet- Ameri- can relations. (29) (31) On the same day, the New York Times stated in an editorial: The full story of the assassination and its stunning sequel must be placed before the American people and the world in a responsible way by a responsible source of the U.S. Gov- ernment ** * The killing of the accused assassin does not close the books on the case. In fact, it raises questions which must be answered if we are ever to fathom the depths of the President's terrible death and its aftermath. An objective Federal commission, if necessary, with Members of Congress included, must be appraised of all and tell us all. Much as we would like to obliterate from memcrj- the most disgrace- ful weekend in our history, a clear explanation must be forth- coming. Not in a spirit of vengeance, not to cover up, but for the sake of information and justice to restore respect for law.(«^6') (32) An editorial in the "Washington Post stated : President Lyndon Johnson has widely recognized that energetic steps must be taken to preA^ent a repetition of the dreadful era of rumor and gossip that followed the assassina- tion of President Abraham Lincoln. A century has hardly sufficed to quiet the doubts that arose in the wake of that tragedy, (^i) (33) On November 27, 1963, the New York Times reported a Tass dispatch that severely criticized the Dallas police. On the same day the Washington Post reported thnt "dozen? of questions remain u.n- answered." On November 29, 1963, the Washington Post reported that Castro had accused American reactionaries of plotting the as- sas ination toimplicate Cuba. The Times also reported that the gen- eral feeling in India was that Oswald had been a "tool" and silenced 43-819 — 79—^2 12 by "enemies of peace." (32) Throughout the world, identical sentiments were being voiced, probably impressing Johnson with the fact that something had to be done. (34) The missiontestimony supported the of several staff conclusion that members of the the Warren "Warren Com- Commission had multiple purposes. Staff members testified that the purpose of the Warren Commission was to ascertain the facts of the assassination and to submit a report to the American people. (^J) The staff was however, sel David also Slawson awarestated of Chief : Justice Warren's feelings. Staff coun- His [Warren's] idea was that the principal function of the Warren Commission was to allay doubts, if possible. You know, possible in the sense of being honest. (J^^) Staff counsel Arlen Specter described his reaction to Warren's con- cern about rumors by stating : * * * that was a matter in our minds but we did not tailor our findings to accommodate any interest other than the truth. {36) . Staff counsel Norman Redlich believed that the objective of allaying public fears was "a byproduct of the principal objective which was to discover all the facts.'' (36) (35) While their statements reflected that staff members were con- cerned with getting at the truth, there was an additional motive for finding the truth. Staff counsel Bert Griffin stated: I think that it is fair to say, and certainly reflects my feel- ing, and it was certainly the feeling that I had of all of my colleagues that we were determined, if we could, to prove the FBI was wrong, to find a conspiracy if we possibly could. I think we thought we would be national heroes in a sense if we could find something that showed that there had been something sinister beyond what appeared to have gone on.* * *'~(37) Slawson stated : I think it is hard to remember 13 years ago what the tim- ing of all these things was but among the staff members themselves, like when I talked to Jim Liebeler and Dave Belin and Bert Griffin particularly we would sometimes speculate at to what would happen if Ave got firm evidence that pointed to some very hitrh official. It sounds perhaps silly in retro- spect to say it but there were even rumors at the time, of course, that President Johnson was involved. Of course, that would present a kind of frightening prospect, because if the President or anyone that his^h up was indeed involved, they clearly wei'e not going to allow someone like us to bring oiit the truth if they could stop us. The gist of it was that no one questioned the fact that we would still have to bring it out and would do our best to bring out just whatever the truth was. The only question in our mind was if we came upon such evidence that was at all credible how would we be able to protect it and bring it to the proper authorities? (38) 13 (36) Although the staff members' primary concern was the truth, the members of the Warren Commission, and not the members of its staff', were the final decisionmakers with regard to what exactly went into the report. There was some testimony tiiat indicated Earl Warren's concern about rumors did affect the writing of the report. When asked why some statements were made that were more definitive than tiie evidence, Slawson stated : I think because Earl W^arren was adamant almost that the Commission would make up its mind on what it thought was the truth and then they would state it as much without quali- fication as they could. He wanted to lay at rest, doubts. He made no secret of this on the staff*. It was consistent with his philosophy as a judge. (-55') Slawson also stated : I suppose he did not think that an official document like this ouglit to read at all, tentatively, it siiould not be a source of public speculation if he could possibly avoid it. {IfO) (37) Staff' counsel Wesley J. Liebeler, when asked about some of his critical memoranda that he wrote regarding the galley proof of the final report, stated : I think also part of the problem was, as I said before, a tendency, at least in the galleys of chapter IV, to try and downplay or not give equal emphasis to contrary evidence and just simply admit and state openly that there is a conflict in the testimony and the evidence about this question, but after reviewing the evidence the Commission could conclude whatever the Commission could conclude, (^i) Liebeler also stated : Once you conclude on the basis of the evidence we had that Oswald was the assassin, for example, taking that issue first, then obviously it is in the interest of the Commission, and I presume everyone else, to express that conclusion in a straight- forward and convincing way. * * * (^^) (38) Former President Ford stated that there were in fact differ- ences between the proposed language of the report's conclusions as drafted by recalled thatthe one staff'such and difference what the Commission pertained toAnally approved. ofFord the wording the Commission's conclusion about possible conspiracy : There was a recommendation, as I recall, from the staff that could be sunnnarized this way. No. 1, Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin. No. 2, there was no conspiracy, foreign or domestic. The Commission, after looking at this suggested language from the staff decided unanimously that the wording should be much like this, and I am not quoting precisely from the Commission staff', but I am quoting the substance : No. 1, that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin. No. 2, the Commission has found no evidence of a conspiracy, for- eign or domestic. 14 The second point is quite diffei-ont from the langiiao:e which was recommended by the staff. I think the Commission was light to make that revision and I stand by it today. (43) (39) In his appearance befoi'e the committee, former Commission member John J, McCloy stated that he had come to hold a different belief regarding the possibility of a conspiracy than he had at the time of thethere to believe Coinmission's was in fact probe some in 1964. lie evidence thatstated tendedthat he had in the come direction of conspiracy, although he did not believe that evidence outweighed the Commission's conclusions. McCloy said : Insofar as the conspiracy issue is concerned, there has been so much talk about that. 1 don't think I need to dwell on it any longer. I no longer feel we had no credible evidence or reliable evidence in regard to a conspiracy, but I rather think the weight of evidence was against the existence of a conspiracy {44-) (40) The late Senator Richard B. Russell, the senior member of the Warren Commission selected from the Congress, voiced much stronger feelings regarding the possibility of conspiracy before his death in early 1971. In a television interview reported by the Wash- ington Post on January 19. 1970, he stated th.at he had oome to believe that there had in fact been a conspiracy behind the President's murder. With respect to Lee Harvey Oswald, Senator Russell stated, "I think someone else worked with him." He also stated that there were "too many things" regarding such areas as Oswald's trip to IMexico City, as well as his associations, that "caused me to doubt that he planned it all by himself." Russell believed the Warren Commis- sion had been wrong in concluding that Oswald acted alone. (41) J. Lee Rankin, the Commission's general counsel, recalled that toward the end of the Commission's investigation, he encountered serious the report difficulty : in the process of coordinating the staff*'s writing of The one factor that I did not examine with regard to the staff as much as I would from my having had this experience was their ability to write and most of them had demon- strated a considerable ability to write in Law Review or other legal materials by their record but my experience taught me that some people are fluent in writing and others while they are skilled at it have great difficulty in getting started and finishing nnd getting the job completed. I don't know just how I would have tried to have anticipated that problem and worked it out but it became a serious difficulty for me in my work as general counsel. I^ooking back on it I would liave much preferred that I had not only all the skills thfit I did in the st^ff but the additional one thnt os soon as we hnd completed the investigation they would go right to work and write a fine piece in which they described their activities and the results. (4-5) (42) .Vhliougli th(> Kxcciitivf^ order authorised the Warroii Commis- sion to f'onduft fui'thfM- iuvestiirations if the Commission found it de- 15 sirable, Chief Justice Warren did not believe further investigation bej'ond He statedwhatat the the investigative first executive agencies session had provided of the Warren would be needed. Commission : Now I think our job here is essentially one for the evalua- tion of evidence as distinguished from being one of gathering evidence, and I believe at the outset at least we can start with the premise that we can rely upon the reports of the vari- ous agencies that have been engaged in investigation of the matter, the FBI, the Secret Service, and others that 1 may know about at the present time. (^) In fact, the Warren Commission did rely extensively on the investi- gative agencies rather than pursuing an independent investigation. (The effects of this reliance is discussed in another section of this report.) (43 ) The evidence indicated, therefore, that the Warren Commission not only had as its purposes those stated in the Executive order but it also had additional purposes that may have alfected the conduct of the investigation and the iinal conclusions. The desire to quash rumors and speculation in particular appeared to have influenced at least the writing of the Warren report. The desire to establish Oswald's guilt and thus to quash rumors of a conspiracy may have had additional effects on the functioning and conclusions of the Warren Commission. ORGANIZATION OF THE WAKKEN COMMISSION (44) The Warren Commission investigation Avas divided into six areas, with two attorneys assigned to each. Area I was "Basic Facts of the Assassination"; Francis Adams and Arlen Specter were the two lawyers assigned to it. Area II was "Identity of the Assassin"; the lawyers were Joseph Ball and David Bel in. Area III was "Lee Harvey Oswald's Background" to be handled by Albert Jcnner and Wesley J. Liebeler Area IV, "Possible Conspiratorial Eelationships" was given to William Coleman and W. David Slawson. Area V was "Oswald's Death," and Leon Hubert and Burt Griffin were assigned to it. Area VI was "Presidential Protection." Samuel Stern Avas assigned to this area. The General Counsel of the Commission, Lee J. Rankin, was to assist Stern. Norman Redlich worked on special projects. He drafted the procedural rules for the Commission, prepared for the Marina Oswald testimony, and worked with Ball, Belin, and Specter on the investigation of the assassination itself. He also attended as many Commission hearings as possible and reviewed and edited the drafts of the report. Howard Willens assisted Eankin in organizing the work, staffino; the Commission, reviewing the materials received from the investigative agencies, and requesting further information where necessary. (45) The organization of the Warren Commission staff is important because it, in fact, determined the focus of the investigation. Four of the areas (I. II, III, and IV) Avere concerned primarily with Oswald — his activities on NoA^ember 22, 1963, and his background. Only one area, representing one-sixth of the available personnel, was devoted to the investigation of Ruby's role. This area was also framed in terms 16 of Oswald — it was called "Lee Harvey Oswald's Death." No area si)ecifically focused on the investigation of pro- or anti-Castro Cuban involvement, organized crime participation, or even the investigative agencies' role in the assassination. The area of domestic conspiracy was considered as part of Area III, "Lee Harvey Oswald's Back- ground," which again focused the issue of conspiracy on Oswald. (46) Former President Ford testified that he had been critical of Chairman "Warren's of the other members selecting a general counsel the Commission. without that Ford stated firstheconsulting believed "Wiirren in his ownwashands attempting : to place too much control over the Commission After my appointment to the Commission, and following- several of the Commission's organizational meetings, I was disturbed that the chairman, in selecting a general counsel for the staff, appeared to be moving in the direction of a one-man commission. My views were shared by several other members of the Commission. The problem was resolved by an agreement that all top staff appointments would be approved by the Commission as a whole. (47) (47) In his testimony, Hioward Willens explained the rationale for the organization of the staff : I believe the rationale is readily stated. In order to begin and undertake a project of this dimension, there has to be some arbitrary allocation of responsibilities. There is no way to do it that eliminates overlap or possible confusion but this was an effort to try to organize the work in such a way that assignments would be reasonablv clear, overlaps could be readily identified, and coordination would be accomplished among the various members of the staff. (4-8) (48) The staff members who testified before the committee generally believed the organization was effective. Specter stated, "Yes. I think the categoiies were adequate to finding the ti'uth.'*(4'^) Redlich said, "The procedures and the organization were an important part in in- troducing the end result which I thought was a professional and thorough investigation of the assassination." (-5/9) Only Griffin ex- pi'essed dissatisfaction with the organizational structure : Griffin. As far as I Avas concerned, I did not feel that it operated in a way I felt comfortable. Staff Cofnsel. How would you have done it differently? Grtffix. Let me first of all preface it. Hubert and I began to feel after a couple of months that perhaps there was not a great deal of interest in what we were doing, that they looked upon the Ruby activity, based upon information that they saw as being lai'^xdv peripheral to the questions that they were concerned with. We did have a disagreement, pretty clear disao-reement, on how to go about conducting the investi- gation and I think that ao-ain was another reason why per- haps Iwould say the opei'ation was not as effective as I would have liked to have seen it. (ol) 17 (49) The pay records of the Warren Commission staff indicate that several of the senior attorneys did not spend much time working on Arlen Specter and fact. investigation, the the : testimony of staff' members supported this stated I would prefer not to ascribe reasons but simply to say some of the senior counsel did not participate as extensively as some of the junior counsel. (52) He added : It is more accurate to say I ended up as the only counsel in my area. (5J) (50) When asked if the senior counsels devoted much time to the investigation, Slawson stated : A few did not. The majority of them did — and I think con- tributed very valuably. They did not, with a couple of ex- ceptions, spend as much time as the younger men did, es- pecially as the investigation wore on. Some of them, I under- stand, were hired with the promise that only a few weeks' work would be required of them. Of course that turned out not to be the case. (5^) (51) Howard Willens stated, when asked about the accuracy of the chart describing the pay records : I think in the roughest terms this gives a fair picture of the days spent during the period by members of the staff. I think that with reference to my earlier comment you should note that several of the senior counsel felt that their primary responsibility was to work in the investigative stages of the Conunission's work. (55) (52) The failure of the senior attorneys to participate fully is at- tributed to the impressiion they had that their role on the Commission did not require their working full time and that their participation would only be needed for 3 to 6 months. Griffin supplied another reason for at least one senior counsel's leaving early : A third reason was, however, that Hubert was disenchanted with some of the things that were going on in that he didn't feel he was getting the kind of support that he wanted to get, and he expressed to me a certain amount of demoralization over what he felt was unresponsiveness that existed between himself and particularly Mr. Rankin. (5^) (53) Some of the staff members testified that the staff were qualified peo])le and that there were a sufficient number of lawyers to conduct the investigation. The testimony also indicates, however, that there was some dissatisfaction and that the failure to work full time on the part of the senior counsels probably affected the investigation, ^^^len Red- lich was asked if the staff, not participating full time affected the work, he stated : Any time someone is not able to spend full time it had that effect. It means that tliat work which might have been done during the course of that full-time work gets picked up by 18 others * * * I don't think on balance any of that had a per- manent harmful effect because I believe that the entire staff, taken as a whole, managed to conduct what I consider to be a thorough inquiry. Obviously, as anyone who has conducted an investigation knows, you always would like to have everj^- one there all the time. That was not possible during a sub- stantial portion of the Warren investigation. {57) (54) Sla wson responded to the same question : As I said before, I felt overworked and I think many of the staff' members felt the same way. I think the main problem was one of the great underestimation of the size of the task at the time. As I said, we were told, we were telephoned and asked to come in ; it would be 3 to 6 months. It is my recollection they said it would be only o to G months on the outside and of course v:e ended up taking about 8. There was a reluctance, once we were there, to admit — again this is a matter of once you have made a decision you don't like to admit you were wrong — but people did not like to admit that we probably needed more help and more time. (55) (55) The pay records indicated that from the middle of January to the end of September, Francis Adams, a Commission counsel, worked a total of 16 8-hour days and 5 additional hours. Adams held one of the single most important positions with the Commission, sei-v- ing as senior attorney in the area of basic facts of the assassination. Arlen Specter, when asked if this affected his performance, stated : I don't think it did although it would have been helpful if my senior counsel, Francis Adams, had an opportunity to participate more extensively. (59) (56) J. Lee Rankin told the committee : There is one member that you can see that did not attend hardly at all and I certainly should have gotten rid of him really. * * * That was Francis Adams ancl lie really didn't contribute anything. (^<9) (57) Liebeler also indicated he did not work closely with the senior attorney in his area, Albert Jenner. He stated : _]My recollection is that during the early part of the Com- mission's work that Mr. Jenner was concerned, I believe he was interested in becoming president of the American Bar Association and I believe he spent some time on that issue. (61 ) (58) beler"\^^iile stated : describing the organization of the work in his area, Lie- It was difficult for Mr. Jenner and me to work out a general relationship on that question at that time. Since I was a so- called junior staff member at that time, Mr. Jenner was not, I was quite unsure when I started as to how to handle the problem. I finally just decided to do my own thing and basi- ' cally went ahead and did most of that original work, myself. Mr. Jenner and I never actually worked very closely together. He worked on projects and I worked on projects. {6'£) ' 19 INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATORS (59) As stated earlier, the Warren Commission staff was primarily composed of attorneys, with a no agen- few assistants drawn from other relied cies of the Government. It had independent investigators, but primarily upon Government agencies to supply leads and perform a large majority of the field investigation. (60) The Commission's former general counsel, J. Lee Rankin, told the committee that he believed it would have been difficult to assemble an independent investigative staff. Rankin recalled : Well, I gave some thought to that and I finally concluded that I Avould lose more than I would gain, that the whole in- telligence community in the Government would feel that the Commission was indicating a lack of confidence in them and that from then on I would not have any cooperation from them ; they would universally be against the Commission and try to trip us up. {63) (61) J. Lee Rankin told the committee that the decision not to have the Commission employ its own investigators : * * * was a decision of the Commission, although I recom- mended that kind of a procedure because I described various possibilities of getting outside investigators and that it might take a long period of time to accumulate them, find out what their expertise was, and whether they could qualify to handle sensitive information in the Government, and it might be a very long could worktime before on the we could matter, even have let alone going that staff'progress get a any on it. (64) (62) Slawson stated : We had special people assigned from CIA, FBI, and Secret Service who were with us more or less full time, especially the Secret Service who were investigators. (65) (63) There was one indication tliat the Warren Commission used some independent experts for the examination of the physical evidence. Slawson stated : I think that some of the areas of investigation such as that headed by Dave Belin, which was the immediate circum- stances ofthe shooting in Dallas, employed private investiga- tors at various points to cross-check and give an independent evaluation. (^5) (64) Eedlich stated : IMy recollection is that in ballistics I believe we used some- one from the government of Illinois, either handwriting or York City PoliceI amDepartment. fingerprinting" (f>7) not someone from the New not sure it was (65) There was also some indication that the staff would have pre- ferred to have had independent investigators. Specter said : If [in] organizational structure you include the personnel available, I think that everyone would have much preferred to 20 have had a totally independent investigative arm to carry out the the investigative' Commission concluded functions early of the on, Commission, ancl I was but not Iprivy believe to any such position from my position as assistant counsel, that it would be impractical to organize an entire investigative staff from the start so that use was made of existing Federal inves- tigative facilities * * * there would be an observation [among the staff] from time to time how nice it would be if we had a totally independent staff. (6'(5) (6f)) When asked if any consideration was given to hiring independ- ent investigators, Kedlich replied : I have no clear recollection of that. Certainly during the time of the investigation from time to time staff members talked to Mr. Rankin about what it might have been like if we had had a completely independent staff. I think that we reached the conclusion then, with which I still agree, that while using the existing investigatory arms of the United States had certain disadvantages, on balance it was still the right decision to make. There were certain tradeoffs * * * I don't think there was any happy, completely happy solution to that dilemma. (69) (67) John :McCloy stated that he did not believe the Commission suffered from an insufficient investigative capacity : * * * it is not true we didn't have our own investigative pos- sibilities. There was a very distinguished group of litigating lawyersfon the staff] that we called on * * * We had a very im]]iressive list and they did great work. So it is not true we re- lied entirely on the agencies of the Government. (76>) (fiS) Former President Ford told the committee that he believed the Commission's decision not to employ an investigative staff was correct : It is my best judgment that the procedure and the policy the Warren Commission followed was the correct one and I Avoidd adA'Ocate any subsequent Commission to follow the same. For the Warren Commission to have gathered together an experienced [investigative] staff, to get them qualified to handle classified information, to establish the organization that would he necessary for a sizable number of investigators, would have been time-consuming and in my opinion would not have answered what we were mandated to do. It is my. it is my strong feelings that what we did was the right Avay. We were not captives of, but we utilized the infor- mation from the in-house agencies of the Federal Gov- ernment ***.( 7/) i (60) Ford also told the committee : The FBI, and I use that as an example, undertook a very extensive investigation. I don't recall how many ajrents but they had a massiA^e operation to iuA^estigate everything. The Commission with this group of 14 lawyers and some addi- 21 tional staff people, then drew upon all of this information which was available, and we, if my memory serves me accu- rately, insisted that the FBI give us evei-y thing they had. Now that is a comprehensive order from the Commission to the Di- rector and to the FBI. I assume, and I think the Commission assumed, that that order was so broad that if they had any- thing itwas their obligation to submit it. Now if they didn't, that is a failure on the part of the agencies, not on the part of the Commission. (7^) (70) In his testimony, Burt Griffin supplied another explanation for the Commission's decision to rely upon the investigative agencies : * * * there was a concern that this investigation not be con- ducted in such a way as to destroy any of the investigative agencies that then existed in the Government. There was a genuine fear expressed that this could be done. Second, it was important to keep the confidence of the existing investiga- tive agencies, and that if we had a staff that was conducting its own investigation, that it would generate a paranoia in. the FBI and the other investigative agencies which would not only perhaps be politically disadvantageous, it would be bad for the country because it might not be justified but it might also be counterproductive. I think there was a fear that we might be undermining * * * ]My impression is that there was genuine discussion of this at a higher level than mine. (73) COMMUNICATIOlSr AMONG THE STAFF (71) The testimony of the staff members indicated that there gen- erally was no problem of communication among the areas. Specter stated that the information was "funneled" by Rankin and he had no reason to believe the process was unsuccessful. (7^) Willens de- scribed the procedures for facilitating the exchange of information : One way of dealing with the separate areas within which the lawyei's were dealing was to make certain that all the ma- terials that came in the office were reviewed in one central place and that any material that bore even remotely or po- tentially on an area witliin the Commission's work was sent to that area. It was frequently the case that materials in our possession were sent to three or four areas so that each of the groups of lawyers could look at the same material from that group's perspective and decide whether it had any relevance in the part of the investigation for which those lawyers were responsible. I continued this function throughout the Com- mission and always erred on the side of multiple duplication so as to make certain that the members of the staff in a par- ticular area did get the papers which I thought they needed. Another way of coordinating among the staff was by the cir- culation of summary memoranda, which happened on a reg- ular basis throughout the Commission's work * * * The third way of coordinating among the staff was perhaps more in- formal and related primarily to the ease with which the mem- 22 bers of the staff could get together to discuss a problem in which more than one area had a particular interest. {75) (72) Griffin also commented the communication between the staff members : "VYe had very few staff meetings of a formal nature. "We did have two or three, maybe four or five. The bulk of the com- munication was on a person-to-person ad hoc basis. There were some memos, I believe, passed back and forth. {76) He expressed some dissatisfaction with the communication he and Hubert had with Rankin : I suppose that it would not be fair to say that we did not have direct access to Eankin. I camiot say at any point when we tried to see Eankin that we couldn't see him. I don't recall any situation where we were formally required to go through someone else to get there. There was no doorkeeper in a certain sense. All of those communications that were in writing that went to Rankin went through Howard Willens. but as a prac- tical matter, and I am not sure entirely what the reasons are, Hubert and I did not have a lot of communication with Ran- kin. "Wequently. reallyWe had communicated withof him a certain amount personally at communication infre- the beginning. I do remeniber at the outset Hubert and I had a meeting with Rankin in which we discussed the work of the mission that we had, but I would say that by the first of April we had relatively little communication with Rankin. That is, we might not speak to Rankin maybe more than once every 2 weeks. Mr. Rankin is a formal person. Hubert and I did not feel comfortable in our relationship with him. I point this out because I think our relationship with Rankin was different than some of the other staff' members. I think a number of them would genuinely say, and I would believe from what I saw, that they certainly had much better communication than we did.(77) know. "Whether thev would regard it as satisfactory I don't (73) The staff also indicated that they would communicate infor- mally inthe evenings. Specter stated : There was a very informal atmosphere on the staff so that there was constant contact among all the lawyers both during ih& working day and those of us v'ho were around the eve- nings.topic tual sole "We would customarily was of conversation havewhat dinner eachtogether, of us wasthedoing. vir- So there was a very extensive exchange albeit principally in- formal among members of the staff as to what each was doing. (75) IXTERACTION BETWEEX THE WARREX C0M:MIRSI0X AXD TirE STAFF (74) In his teftimony. Howard "Willens stated that the majority of the communication between the staff members and the "Warren Com- mission members was through Rankin. Direct contact with members- of the Warren Commission was minimal : 23 Apart from those occasional meetings with the Chief Jus- tice most of the staff's dealings with the members of the Com- mission occurred on a sporadic and limited basis. {79) (75) Norman Redlich stated : However, in terms of informal relationship between the staff and the Commission in the sense of the staff being pres- ent at the Commission meetings in a formal way, that did not exist. I was not present at any meeting of the Conmiission. I Avas not privy to any formal meetings of the Commission. ISIr. Rankin was the official line of communication between the Commission and the staff. {80) 1.{1S5) As will become apparent, the Conimission did not iro much beyond the agencies in investigating the anticipated "tender spots." The Commission had finally gotten in touch with the CIA. n24) The Agency had told them, as reported by Warren, that it did not have a big report to make, but did have some "communications'] to present to the Commission. (75(9) They would do this when Rankin lot them know that the Commission was ready. Dulles said that the CIA had 34 not seen the FBI report and that it would really help them in its work if it had access to it. {137) He also suggested that the CIA could be very helpful in certain areas, such as Oswald's sojourn in the Soviet Union, where it had expertise. (i.J<5) Essentially the Commission would hay the FBI]. I immediately reiwrted it to Mv. Rankin * * * "We wrote to the FBI a rather strong letter expressing our dis- may about the fact that the transcript was not complete and asking an explanation for it * * * On the same day m'c sent the letter to the FBI there then came to us an explanation saying that the reason they had not sent it was that they were sending us only the material that would be addressed to leads and their own agent would not be a lead * * * In any event the explanation still left me annoyed over the fact that it had been left out and I remain annoyed to this day. Q. Was it pursued further when you got a reply that they were only excepting that that they felt would be a lead? A. I think the decision was made at the time that, while we were really not very happy with the reply, we couldn't really disprove it. That was not, as I recall, pursued beyond that point. Q. Is it fair to say that the matter was then dropped? A. To the best of my recollection, yes, sir. (^^^) (160) Other evidence indicates that the omission of Special Agent Hostv's name from the transcript of Oswald's notebook affected the whole staff. Rankin called a staff meeting on February 11, 1964. to dis- cu?;s the allegations that Oswald had been an FBI informant and the Hosty incident. A memorandum for the record prepared by Howard P. "Willensproblem Hosty on February : 12, 1964, described the staff's reaction to the Some members of the staff thoui) (ITO) Burt Griffin testified about this incident before this committee : GRrFrT>r. I recall the Hosty incident * * * Q. What effect, if any. did that have on the relationship between the staff and the Bureau ? A. I think it established in our minds that we had to be worried about them * * * I think we never forgot the incident. We were always alert, we were concerned about tlie problem * * * There was a staff meeting about it, as I recall . One of the few staff meetings I have a general recollection of at this point seems to me was one tliat Rankin called in which we were all brought in on this, and we were all told about the problem and once it had been discovered there was a dis- cussion about whether our discovery should be revealed to the FBI and how should we proceed with it. Q. Would it be fair to rliaracterize the incident then as perhaps producing a more healthy skepticism on the part of the staff and less trust of the Bureau ? A. I think that is right * * * Q. Would it be fair to say that the incident, far from ad- versely affecting the quality of your investigation, may have heightened it ? A. Xo. I don't think that is true. Q. If it made you more skeptical and more probing would it help the investigation ? A. No, I don't think it did. The reason I say that is that I think it basically set the standard for the land of judgment that was going to be made about how we were going to deal with these problems, and the decision made there was that there was not going to be confrontation, they were to be given an opportunity to explain it. So the decision was really, as T recall, to go back and give them an opportunity to clean up their act rather than to carry on a secret investigation that might be desi.g-ned to lav a foundation for our further im- peachment ofthem. (302) ClTl) J. Lee Rankin, the former general counsel to the Warren Commission who headed the investigation, gave his perception of the Bureau's before the relationship committee : with the Commission during his testimony 49 Q. How would yoii characterize the Commission's relations with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ? A. Well, they were fairly and good at first and then as we be- came more critical at times the Hosty incident came up and the question about Oswald and the Director being re- (juired to swear personally about whether Oswald had any connection with the FBI and our asking the Secret Service from time to time to investigate things the FBI had already back over their tracks, it didn't warm up investigat much at least ed and on agofriendly basis. Q. Did it at any time become an adversary relationship ? A. Well, I went to see ^fr. Hoover before we finally put out our report and I had known him when I had been with the Department of Justice for 6 years and always had cordial relations but he was pretty feisty when I saw him, any friend- ship we had had in the past was not very apparent then. 0. Did you think at that time that you were getting the full cooiieration of the Bureau? A. Well, I thought so to this extent. I thought they would never lie about anything and that if we had any difficulty it might be that they would not bore in as hard as we would like to have them but I thought we could tell that and insist on either following it up which we did a great many times by sending them back to do it again and to do it more thoroughly, or putting the Secret Service to do it, and they resented that so much that they were a little more careful after that about trying to be more thorough and so forth. But to have them just lie to us, I never anticipated that. The things that have ha]:)pened in tlie Bureau in the last few years have been revealed in the i^ress and so forth. I never thought the Bureau was capable of that. ^V]\en I was with the Department of Justice I never thought they were capable of it and I didn't think agents would do such things. So I was rather sanguine about that and I don't think the country be- lieved the FBI would do such things. (£03) (172) Recalling the climate of government in 1963 and 1964, Rankin went on to state that he then firmly believed that any information that Director Hoover and the FBI provided to the Commission was corn- pletely accurate and truthful, a belief he no longer maintains. Rankin recalled : It was a time when I am sure all the Commissioners and T certainly believed that Mr. Hoover would not do that unless it was the truth and all of the things that have come out in these later years about Mr. Hoover and the Bureau and various per- sonnel had not been made known to me or the public or the Commissioners so it is ouite different looking at it from this day than from then. (W^) (173) Recalling FBI Director Hoover's seeminglv imchallenffeable power in 1964, and occasional FBI actions that irritated the Warren Commission, J. Lee Rankin told the committee. "Wio could protest against what Mr. Hoover did back in those days?" (205) 50 (174) Rankin told of his feelings upon discovering several years ago that FBI personnel in Dallas had secretly destroyed a letter that Lee Oswald had sent to FBI Agent James Hosty shortly before the assassination, a destruction of evidence which occurred several hours after the accused assassin was shot to death by Jack Ruby. Recalling the disclosure of this incident and its coverup by FBI personnel, Rankin stated : I think there is considerable significance. In the fii^t place, Hosty was doing quite a bit of work on the inquiries that the Commission made and if we had known that he had de- stroyed any kind of materials relating to the investigation or his activities we would not have allowed him to do anvthing more that we knew of in connection with work for the Com- mission. There is an implication from that note and its de- struction that there might have been more to it and that the Bureau was unwilling to investigate whatever more there was and never would get the information to us. Now that is just a guess. There is, of course, no credible proof and so we really don't know how much more there was to the incident and especially what could have been found out about it if it had been examined closely upon the event.{206) (175) Slawson's initial predisposition toward the CIA was rein- forced byhis experiences on the Warren Commission staff : Q. After working with the CIA your initial impression remains substantially the same, you thought you could trust them and rely on them ? A. Yes. I came to know one man particularly well, Ray- man Rocca, and I came to like him and trust him both * * * INIy impression o^-erall was very favorable of him. I thought he was verv intelligent and tried in every way to be honest and helpful with me. (207) Slawson testified that, if anj'thing, Rocca was overzealous in trying to be helpful : The only drawback T caii think of — not really a drawback T suppose for someone in CIA — is that he was a little overly suspicious. He obviously disliked Castro immensely. He was very emotional on the subject. (^{?<5) (176) On June 6, 1964, Slawson wrote a memo to Rankin regarding a telephone conversation that he had had with Rocca. The memoran- dum relates that Rocca had pointed out that a book had been pub- lished in England approximately 2 months before the assassination of President Kennedy. (309) It contained the allegation that right- wing grouns in the United States were planning to kill President Kennedy. The memorandum goes on to relate : He — Rocca — drew to my attention the fact that the pub- lishing time of this particular book appears to have been al- most exactly when Cnstro was supposed to have made his remark in the Cuban Embassy in Brazil * * * to the effect that "Two can play at this game."(.!?16>) 51 (177) When asked about this memorandum, Slawson testified that: My only recollection at this time is that Rocca was drawing my attention to the fact that Castro might well have been in- volved. Of course he had presumably drawn my attention to this before but he was just doing what he did with me a lot, trying to work with me to put two and two together, (^ii ) (178) Slawson also testified that Rocca had informed him of the CIA's involvement with anti-Castro Cuban exiles : My best recollection at this time is that I did in several con- versations with Rocca discuss the CIA involvement in anti- Cuban activities. I was presumably told that they had been involved of course in the Bay of Pigs invasion. I remember discussing informally that involvement with a CIA opera- tive in Mexico City. Also their involvement with anti-Castro Cuban groups in the United States. {212) (179) Slawson said further that he considered it his job to suspect everyone, including the CIA and ¥B1.{213) He also testified that he was very suspicious of the anti-Castro Cuban exiles : My theory was that perhaps, one, the anti-Castro Cubans we knew were very angry with Kennedy because they felt they had been betrayed with the Bay of Pigs. Oswald on the other hand was identified publicly with Castro, he was pro-Castro. So, we felt that if somehow the anti-Castro Cubans could have got Oswald to do it or done it themselves but framed Oswald, either way, somehow put the blame on Oswald that they would achieve two objectives that they presumably wanted. One was revenge on Kennedy and the second would be to trigger American public opinion strongly against Castro and possibly cause an invasion of Cuba and overthrow of Castro, and of course these people would be able to go back to their homes in Cuba and not have to live under the Castro government. As I say, this made a lot of sense to me and I think it was a hypothesis held in mind for quite a while to see if the facts would fit it. Ultimately they didn't. {iiH) (180) When asked whether he had ever questioned the reliability of the information he received from the CIA because of its involvement with the anti-Castro Cubans, or Rocca's bias against Castro, Slawson responded : No. In a sense everything I tried to take into considera- tion, so everything was a cause for questioning. But in terms of coming to a conclusion in my own mind about the reliabil- ity of the information supplied us. no, I concluded that Rocca's strong anti-Castro feeling did not bias or did not prevent him from being an honest investigator. I think he was and I am still convinced that he was. On the other hand of course it affected his judgment. {215) (181) When asked whether he had ever considered the possibility of CIA involvement as part of his anti-Castro Cuban theory, Slawson responded : 52 No. I don't think that I entertained ven^ long the possibil- ity that Kocca or anybody else I had known in the CIA was involved in anyway in killing Kennedy * * *. The possibili- ity that the anti-Castro Cnbans contained people who were rnthless or desperate enongh to kill Kennedy in order to serve their all I knew they I contained own end lot ofreal felt was "aa very one. Apparently desperate from ruthless people. I did not have that feeling about the CIA. Now I tried to keep an open mind so that any place I came upon evidence that would point toward somebody I would investigate it and that included the CIA as a possible nest of assassins. My judgment of their character and so forth was far differ- ent ithink from the judgment I made of the anti-Castro Cuban conspiracy groups in the United States. {216) <182) Slawson also testified before this committee that he was not aware of the CIA attempts to kill Castro (-^17) that the CIA had plotted with underworld figures to assassinate Castro from lOGO to 1963. He was also not aware that the CIA was plotting, at the time of Kennedy's assassination in 1963, with an official in the Cuban Government to assassinate Castro. Dependence on the agencies: staff vieios (183) Slawson testified that the Warren Commission was "inescapa- bly dependent upon the CIA especially for some aspects of the investi- gation." (^75) While this bothered him somewhat, there was nothing that could be done about it : There is really no way I can imagine and certainly there is no way at the time I could imagine that anyone could carry on an investigation of foreign intelligence operations other than through the CIA. That simply is the body of expert opinion on that sort of thing and capability that exists in the United States. So, if a major suspect is the CIA itself * * * an investi- gation like the Warren Commission would find it very, very difficult to ascertain that. That is just inevitable. This T think occurred to me at tlie time, too, i3ut there wasn't much that could be done about it. {219) (184) Slawson said that the staff tried to overcome this dependence as best it could : We would talk about how we might escape from the depen- dency * * *. One was occasionally hiring an outside expert to give an independent evaluation or assessment or some- thing * * *. Second was cross-chcckirg the papers passed back and forth between jurisdictions. The third would be just keeping an eye and ear out for any odd bits of information that would come in not through the agencies. (£^2/9) (185) Liebeler testified before this committee that he did not believe the Warren Commission was dependent on the agencies : I never had the feeling that we relied on the Government agencies for our information. When we started with a bunch of FBI files, but we reviewed those so that we could conduct 53 our own investigation. We did take the testimony of many, many witnesses. We had the reports of the examination of the physical evidence verified by outside sources, we did not rely on the FBI. So as to the basic facts of what happened in Dallas on that day not only did we not rely on the FBI work but the fact is that the Commission came to assume somewhat dif- ferent conclusions that the FBI came to. There was a preliminary FBI report that solved the prob- lem as to what happened. Our conclusions were somewhat dif- ferent from that. I don't think we relied on the FBI to the extent that people think we did. {221) (186) Eedlich testified that "The Commission used as its principal investigatory arm the Federal Bureau of Investigation." {222) (187) James Malley, who served as the FBI's liaison to the War- ren Commission, recalled tliat the amount of assistance being rendered to the Conmiission declined during the latter stage of the investiga- tion: The majority of reports that were being sent to the Warren Commission, after probably the middle of the summer, 1964, was rather innocuous reports of miscellaneous allegations and so on that were continuing to come in. {223) B. ATTITUDE OF THE FBI AND THE CIA TOWARD THE AVARREN COMMISSION General att'iiiide The FBI (188) Once the Warren Commission was created,* J. Edgar Hoover, the Director of the FBI, accepted his responsibility to respond to the Commission's requests for information or investigations. Hoover desig- nated Inspector James J. Malley as liaison with the Commission. Hoover also informed Assistant Director Alan Belmont that he would be "personally responsible for every piece of paper that went to the Warren Commission." (^^-5) During the course of the Warren Com- mission's existence, Belmont briefed Hoover daily on the various aspects of the Commission's work. {226) (190) The evidence indicates that Hoover view^ed the Warren Com- mission more as an adversary than a partner in a search for the facts of the assassination. Hoover often expressed his belief that the Commis- sion was director assistant "seeking ofto the criticize FBI, Hoover was afraidAccording the YJM.''-{227) to a former that the Commission would discover gaps in the FBI's investigation : Hoover did not want tlie Warren Commission to conduct an exhaustive investigation for fear that it wo^ild discover important and relevant facts that we in the FBI had not dis- covered in our investigation, therefore, it would be greatly embarrassing to him and damaging to his career and the FBI as a whole. (£^5) *The FBI's response to the assassination and the creation of the Warren Com- mission is detailed in another section of this report. (22-}) The discussion here focuses on its attitude after the Commission was set up. 54 (191)notThe committee's investigation indicated that Hoover's fears were entirely unfounded. It had evidence suggesting that Hoover reports on the Commission's activities from one of the ■was receivingmembers. Commission * * * Our President (Gerald R. Ford) was one of our (FBI) members of the Congressional stable when he was in Congress. It is to him and others we would go when we want Congressional support for anything or when we want special favors handled, and, of course, we were always willing to reciprocate. All right, he became a member of the Warren Commission and he was "our man" on the Warren Commis- sion and it was to him that we looked to protect our interest and keep us fully advised of any development that we would not like, that mitigated against us, and he did. All this I know.{229) (192) Hoover's fears evidently led him to attempt to limit the War- ren Commission's investigation : (Hoover) did show marked interest in limiting the scope or circumventing the scope of (the Warren Commission inves- tigation) and taking action that might result in neutralizing it.{230) (194) According to Sullivan. Hoover's principal method in attempt- ing to limit the Warren Commission's investigation was leaking infor- mation to the press : The main action * * * was to leak to the press the FBI investigation believing that this would tend to satisfv everv- body and perhaps the authorities would conclude that an investigation of great depth and scope would not be necessary. (^-57) (195) Hoover also circumvented an independent investigation of a specific allegation by the Warren Commission by another means : * * * this then is how the FBI reacts to this allegation before the Commission began investigating it. IIoo^'er covered himself by starting an "investigation" of the reports that Oswald had been an FBI informant, attempting to dis- credit the sources, and he made it clear to the Commission that he would prefer, thank you, to be approached directly in the unlikely event that any question remained. (233) (WC)) James Malley, the FBI official assigned by Director Hoover to serve as liaison to the Warren Commission, told the committee that he was not aware of any negative feelings Hoover had toward the Commission : I could only give you my reaction wlien I was called into his office after I returned from Dallas and what he told me that time. There was certainly no criticism. I was told that the Warren Commission had been established. I was the liaison representative, and he wanted full and complete cooperation with them and no information whatsoever withheld from them. Give them everything. (333) 55 relationship with the Warren as : described the FBI's (197) Malley Commission Strictly a business relationship. No friendliness, no unfriendliness. Just strictly, you have your work to do, we have ours. If we want something from you, we will call you and ask for it. If we want further explanations, we will get them from you. There was never any animosity shown, that I am aware of. {2S4-) (198) Malley further stated that he had : No knowledge of what Mr. Sullivan was talking about when he says the Director was opposed to the creation (of the Com- mission) and so on * * * . And I never personally heard him object to the Warren Commission in any way, shape, or form. (235) (199) Malley further stated that he would not necessarily trust any statements that former assistant FBI director William Sullivan made about the assassination investigation and Director Hoover's role in it. (£36) Speaking of Sullivan, the man in charge of the FBI's investi- gation into the question of a possible conspii'acy, as well as Lee Os- wald's background and association, jNIalley stat-ed, "I would not trust him." (237) Malley told the committee that he believed that former Assistant Director Sullivan, who died in 1977, might lie about the Bureau's Avork on the assassination investigation, portraying it in a false light or negative fashion. {23S) ^Malley suggested that Sullivan may have fabricated various recollections about the assassination in- vestigation and Hoover's direction of it and further stated that he believed Sullivan was capable of conunitting perjury about these mat- ters. (239) Malley stated that he would "not necessarily" believe any Sullivan statements made under oath. (240) (200) Hoover's fear of criticism also lead, in at least one instance, thosea divergence to between to the Warren the Bureau's Commission, and the public beliefs statements, of their own including officials : The Bureau by letter to the Commission indicated that the facts did not warrant placing a stop on (Oswald's) passport as our investigation disclosed no evidence that Oswald was acting under the instructions or on behalf of any foreign government or instrumentality thereof. Inspector feels it was proper at that time to take this "public" position. However, it is felt that with Oswald's background we should have had a stop on his passport, particularly since we did not know definitely whether or not he had any intelligence assignments at that time. (24.1) (201) Former Attorney General Katzenbach stated that FBI Direc- tor Hoover refused to send a Bureau official to the first meeting of the Warren Commission, despite Katzenbach's specific request that an offi- cial ac .£^ § £ ^ —GO Ll_ g>. So -> c« "K ^ CO -all (O 2 DC. Ui (B to CD c ^ CJ ^ ^= -^ • CO' >- CO (/) - o is -J :S o ^ CD c Q. '-a ■4—» » O) W a. cc *^o E 15 .o sen E +-* s cu 4— ' oS O) 'E E03 E w o a. CD o ■ ^^ CD to > CO Q. 3 CJ CO CO CO o CO 3 CD 3= to 03 o 3 o Ll_ o X LU (O o CO CM OJ c» ■=: -^ fo Oi 5° ^ O J;^ 03 .a CO nj c= 03 03 -a C_3 CD ^ B tD fe ^ * CO © ^ CO CO -^ CO ^ CO 03 ^ Sg .E « ^ CJ> tj c 03 09 "I ■«s_ E .E S jl -§ " .Ei_ S "g^ g .1' t;^i ■l-CDO :2^ OQCD -i§ CDO z:£ CQ^ lEQCCJ u_-a CCC_3 Li_eD CD O Od u) oa (o o CO CO c CO CO '^ CO k_ 09 55 52 tn S >^ 2 "1 CO ■* " '53 LL. QQ 09 a CM ^ •a ■a 76 . o (U 3 CJ CO a. CO 00 39 -a > CO O ^ 1 Jo o c £2 o r ^I a. c o u CO c ^3 3 3 (U (5 CO c £CO E i£ >> (U u eio (U CO 03 E o .a cu .a O) c C/) c ^^3 E u (U 3 to c 3 3 o c O ~ o o -a CO CO o c: CO "co o 3} g 03 !ti CO o CC o o > a E CO o CO a. 3 O) O) CO 't CB .o C o 1 CO O) 03 CO 4-^ eS C3. CC 03 -a ro ?Si ^ -a CM +-» .o *© oe *■" IrS -a ■a -a -a tj 1 *> -a s 5 - -a > "i 03 CO S o CO O) 1 .^ CJ o ■♦-* 03 ,p CO ■ c ^^^ g CO CO 03 E C33 c 03 c c= 03 CO CD V CO S J3 03 CO CO CO cu CO .a O) CO O c c O) CO c ^ > o u- 13 i cu CO .a CQ o ^ 3 QC en CO CO ^ « CM to 77 .2 . CO E " o oCJ S CO c O) CNI 53 • "^ O CD 03 CQ CD o ECD t^ CD CO ^^^ 03 ^ CD 03 O 03 O) CO **— CD ^ o g oa> .c« .a o o o "cD 3 E ;5 m" 3 00 -^ 'C CJ c3 j ,-1 (3 >, -U 10 en CM uv »- o \ rA CO orH •^r rH ^fl 00 .H in rH rH V. 0 rH rH CM ^^ in in \o \m u -* to cn>-. ro tvj CO n r- j: en \ to •» \ ^V rH rH rA rH •* CO rH r-\ •^ CM 1 3 rH CO rH ro •^ •<«• va •^ CO rH ■-I rH ;^i rH (0 CO^ rH U •-{ CM 1 o 1^ w •sr -3- •s)- rH CM CO ^s rH rA ro 00 rA rH S-^ <-{ CO CM tn •-I •C rH "T rH •T (0 •-^ Pl 1 TT rH CO rH r^ rH en rH rH ■ r-l ro V v.i in n o 1 CO ■sr rH > f rH rH CM u> c^^u CM 3-^ u- CO "a* r-{ r- r-i cn 1 in 3 rH rH ^ vo rH •* 00 U ■a- ^ CM CM -t:\ 1 CM CM rH r- rH rH ^ "' rH rH r-i rH tn o CM :.^ ■^ "* tr.'. r^1 CM O o ^F ■^ rH tn ■«• w-i CM rH rH rH \o rH rH rH rH .H in \ CM 1 CM en CM CM CM CM CM vo in rH rH rH rH i-l en CM + in to m 1 •o- •-i ;^^ CM rH CM rH en rH rH ^ ^■ vf in rH rH r-l •o r- cy* ^-i iH m 1 CM rH r~ CO CO CM rH CO rH C^ rH 00 ^^ rH cn^ -• rH rH r-l rH to in rH rH ^ ij' ^ ■>T . t~- CM rH n c^ ^ \ ti i3 C7\ rl rH en j=: (0 ^ ^ Ot CO CI) CM rH •H -• rH rH r-i ^ii ^3* rH CO CM 0) CM en C^ en CO CO rH rH in CM in rH rH t-l rH rH J. r-l0 -) Couns •H o n CM o en CM CM en CM 1 r-i M IArea rH rH r-l rH Coun r. .^ rH to rH rH r-l U) H 0) ■^U) .Mi! r-t U> H to ^. a O "■• a-| rii U) tn O M B Pi ^s": rjO COLEMAN CJ Cn i? u g§: « in g H 1-3 tj Q) t^ O.^0) 1 M 0) ^ ,Q ^ UU C) Ko n M < O i3 a 3 uO iGthin<> fhat I am not miife sure 1 understand the thr'-ict of. I can tell you what my conclusion is as precisely as I just did. If somebody found that bullet on President Kennedy's stretcher I would have to start to look to see where it came from, what happened. Obviously if that "pristine bullet" only went through President Kennedy, then it would be at variance with the conclusion that I 126 just described to you. But that is because I believe that the two men were alined and based upon wliat that bullet had to jro through, hit President Kennedy's back, the absence of bone tissue, the fact that it was probably emerging at almost the speed as when it entered, leads me to the conclusion that it had nowhere else to go other than to hit Governor Connally. Mr. Klein. Moving on, the second area that you testified you were involved in was the investigation of Marina Oswald — is that correct ? Mr. Redlich. Yes, sir. Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would ask that these two documents be marked as exhibits. Mr. Preyer. The documents will be marked as JFK exhibit No. 13. Without objection it will be entered into the record at this time. TJFK exifiibition No. 13 was received; entered in the record, and ^follows :] JFK Exhibition No. 13 Febrttary 28, 1964. [^femoranduia] To: J. Lee Rankin, From : Norman Eedlich. Subject : Questioning oi: James H. Martin and others concerning Marina Oswald's character. During the course of yesterday's questioning of James H. Martin many ques- tions were asked relating to the character and personal life of Marina Oswald. Since some members of the Commission may doubt the relevancy of these ques- tions, and since the issue may arise again when other witnesses are called before the Commission, I am herewith setting forth my reasons for pursuing this line of inquiry. James H. Martin stated that he had consciously attempted to create a pub- lic image of Marina Oswald as a simple, devoted housewife who had suffered at the hands of her husband and who was now filled with remorse for her hus- band's actions and deeply grateful for the generosity and understanding of the American people. As Martin's testimony indicates, there is a strong probability that Marina Oswald is in fact a very different person — cold, calculating, avari- cious, scornful of generosity, and capable of an extreme lack of sympathy in personal relationships. This Commission has undertaken not only to determine who fired the shots that killed President Kennedy but to study all evidence which might lead to an explanation for why the crime was committed. If Lee Oswald was the assassin, the character and personality of his wife must be considered relevant in our de- termination ofmotive. There are many possible explan.-itions for the assassina- tion— a foreign or domestic plot. Oswald's insanity or Oswald's political motiva- tion. Another possible explanation is that Oswald was a mentally disturbed person with delusions of grandeur who was driven on to commit this act by a wife who married him for selfish motives, degraded him in public, taunted him about his inadequacies, and drove him to prove to her that he was the "big man" he aspired to be. To the extent that we ignore any one po.ssible explanation for the crime we are focusing the attention of the Commission and history on other motives which may not be as sound as the one we ignore. This would be a disserv- ice to the cause of truth which, in your words, is our only client. Neither you nor I have any desire to smear the reputation of any individual. We cannot ignore, however, that Marina Oswald has repeatedly lied to the Service, the FBL and this Commission on matters which are of vital concern to the people of this country and the world. As you know, I was not in favor of plac- ing on the record the story of her actions in Washington because we already have statements which provide us with all that we need to know on this matter and formal testimony could have added very little. But If a witness who has had close association with Marina Oswald is prepared to offer certain Insights into her character, including those of a derogatory nature, I feel that the mandate of the Commission's inquiry compels us to consider this testimony. 127 In the near future we will be questioning Ruth and Michael Paine, and possibly re-examining Marina Oswald. I feel that the issues raised in this memorandu m should be carefully considered by the Commission prior to the calling of these witnesses. Mr. Klein. [Handing this document, which is a memorandum dated February orandum28, ? 1964, to Dean Redlich.j Do you recognize that mem- Mr. Redlich. I do recall it ; yes, sir. Mr. Klein. Have you had an opportunity to review tliat memoran- dum earlier today in my office ? Mr. Redlicii. Yes, sir. Mr. Klein. Do you recall writing that memorandum ? Mr. Redlich. I believe I wrote that. I am not denying that I wrote it. Mr. Klein. I would direct your attention to page 2 of the memoran- dum, the second paragraph, the second sentence. I quote : We cannot ignore, however, that Marina Oswald has repeatedly lied to the Secret Service, the FBI, and this Commission on matters which are of vital con- cern to the people of this country and the world. Will you explain what you were referring to in that sentence please ? Mr. Redlich. I have been thinking about that, Mr. Klein. This memorandum was written in February 1964, shortly after Mr. INIartin testified. As the committee will notice, the purpose of this memoran- dum was to explain to the Commission why I had pursued a line of inquiry with regard to Mr. Martin, a line of inquiry which presented Mrs. Oswald in a less than favorable light. My explanation was that we had an obligation to pursue all possible motives. One of the mo- tives could have been that Mrs. Oswald, through the kind of person that she was, drove Lee Harvey Oswald to the assassination. I am not saying that was the motive. I am saying that was a possibility. Therefore, I took the position in this memorandum that Mrs. Oswald, that the nature of her character, the kind of person that she was, was relevant to the scope of the inquiry. In the course of that, I wrote this sentence. Now I have tried to recollect any specific matter that I may have had in mind, and I have to say that I do not recollect anything specific. It may have been, and one would have to go back into the investiga- tory report, it may have been at first she may not have told the truth in connection with the attempted killing of General Walker. It may have been. I am really just surmising she may have been asked if Oswald had ever engaged in violence, and she may have at first said "No" and then brought out the fact about the General Walker shooting. I can only recall that I prepared a lengthy memorandum, and I hope it is in the files because if I had that I could answer your questions, that it was a lengthy memorandum that I prepared which was the basis for her questioning. As I say, I worked for about 5 or 6 weeks to develop a series of questions. Now I gave to Mr. Rankin a lengthy document which had a proposed series of questions, and to each one of those questions I indicated the testimony that she had given at various times, because she had been interviewed many times. I indicated the testimony that she had given, the instances where it was in conflict, and indicated the kind of questions that I thought should be asked when she came before the Commission. This, of course, 128 refers to the Secret Service and to the FBI. I believe that most of what I was referrin*.^ to in this sentence would have related to the answers that she would have given to those agencies. If you can find that document, I will be happy, if you called it to my attention, to try to be specific on the answer. As of now I have no clear recollection of any particular event other than the possibility of the Walker one, and there was also the possibility that she may have originally denied that there was any other act of violence or any threat of vio'cnce whereas he liad in fact at one point told her that he was going to kill Mr. Nixon, which came out later. Mr. Kleii-t. Unfortunately, we have not been able to locate many documents which should be in the Archives. I do not have and have not read the document to which you are referring, but let me ask you this. As you sit here today, is it your recollection of your investigation of Marina Oswald that this sentence is basically correct, or was there any kind of change in your attitude toward her credibility ? iSIr. Redlich. I would say that at the time I wrote this letter on February 28, this statement is correct. I would not have written it if I did not think it was correct. Now I also say that at the time our investigation was over, I was satisfied that whatever light she could throw on the assassination that was relevant to our inquiry she had given us, and tha.t there was no need to pursue any further question- ing of her. She was questioned again, I believe; I believe in Dallas. It is possible that some of the areas might have been cleared up at that point or cleared up in subsequent interviews that we may have asked the FBI to conduct with her. So that this statement at the time I wrote it I must have believed was correct, and if I could find that document, it would give you the details of it. At the time we concluded our investigation, I did not feel that Marina Oswald could have cast any additional light on the critical questions that were before the Commission. Can I just amend that answer slightly, Mr. Klein? Let me say that I felt that any additional questioning of Marina Oswald was not going to cast additional light. No one can really be sure whether someone possesses inform.ation. I think the only thing I felt reason- ably sure of, and still do, was that any further questioning of her was not going to produce anything more than we knew. Mr. Kletn. I am just trying to understand your last statement. Is it your belief that with proper time and investigative resources that Marina Oswald could shed further light on the investigation? Mr. Redlich. I have no way of judging that. Fortunately, we live in a pociety where there arc limj'ts on the extent to which one tries to pry information from the mind of a human being. There may have been aspects about Mrs. Oswald's life, of what she perceived to be of a personal nature, which she would not have wanted to have discussed. Whether those could cast light on his motives one can only speculate. As you know, the Warren Commission reached the conclusion that ther'^ was no evidence of a conspiracy. We tried to indicate several possible motives. Proving negatives is always a very difficult thing to do. WHiether Mrs. Oswald has information in her mind that might be useful to this Commission I would doubt, but I would not cate- 129 gorically say what that any porsoii does not have information in one's mind except I say about myself. I do not. Mr. Fauntroy. Will counsel yield, Mr. Chainnan? Mr. Preyer. Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Fauntroy. I earlier indicated the fact that Mr. Oswald was dead dictated what structures and procedures you had to follow, and that, while the absence of any verbatim account of what he had to say did not disturb you unduly, obviously, from your statement here, you did have some specific things in mind which, of course, you obviously, after 13 years, can't recall specifically, and counsel has advised us that we don't have access to the memorandum or writing that might have refreshed your memory on those, I just wondered, inasmuch as Mrs. Oswald is still available to us, if it would jog your memory to think a minute about what we might ask her, that you might have asked her had you had the affirmative response to your memo ? Mr. Kedlich. The reason I find it difficult to answer that is that you must understand that that sentence would have been completely consistent with Mrs. Oswald's having told certain things to the FBI on one occasion, and then saying, "I didn't tell you the truth that time, this is the truth." It would have been consistent with her hav- ing told the FBI something on one occasion and then coming before the Warren Commission, saying, "This is now the truth, that was not." So, at the time I wrote this sentence it should not be inter- preted as meaning that I thought there were then a great many unanswered questions about her. I did think there were some because I did state later in the memo- randum that "We will be questioning Ruth and Michael Paine and possibly be reexamining Marina Oswald." To my best recollection I did feel that we should reexamine Marina Oswald and that hap- pened I believe in July of the investigation. Wliat I am not sure of at this moment is whether after her testimony before the Com- mission and whether after her subsequent questioning by the Com- mission staff and whether after subsequent questioning by agents of the FBI, if in fact we asked them to do it and I am not sure about it, whether after all of that, I still feel that I have doubts about what she told us. That is why I find it hard to answer your question in the affirmative. She is obviously a very important person in underetanding Lee Harvey Oswald and possibly his motives. She was with him a great deal of the time. Her testimony is very relevant as to whom he knew, whom he spoke to. I simply am unable to tell you now whether I felt that we had anything less than the truth from her at the time we finished in December 1964. I must have felt that we did at the time I wrote this mxcmorandum in February 1964. Mr. Fauntroy. But it is accurate to say that at the conclusion of the Con"! mission's work yon wore satipfied that j'oiir questions about the possible motives for Oswald having their origin in the charac- ter of Marina Oswald, his wife, were satisfied? Mr. Redlich. The Commission reached no conclusion on motive. My own personal opinion is that I could not reach a conclusion on motives. 130 I think it is possible that the personal, and this is my own personal judgment on this, sir, that the personal relationship between the twa of them could have been a factor. I am a lawyer and not a psychiatrist and I don't know whether someone with psychiatric trainmg would have a different view of this. The most I would say is that that could have been a factor. But there could have been other factors. It could have been a man who wanted to demonstrate that he was really an important person, quite apart from his wife. He could have been a man who had an intense dislike of authority. He could have been a man who, based on his Marxist writings, had an intense dislike of anything in the capitalistic system. It could have been any one of a multiplicity of motives. I think that is some- thing that people will speculate about for a long time to come. Mr. Preyee. Mr. Klein. Mr. Klein. Dean Redlich, in the area of autopsy you have given ex- tensive testimony already ; are you aware that the FBI report issued on December 9, 1963, and the supplementary FBI report issued on Janu- ary 13, 1964, both stated that the first bullet to hit the President did not exit from his body ? Are you aware of that ? Mr. Redlich. Yes, sir, I do recall that. Mr. Klein. During the course of the investigation were you able to account for the discrepancy between the FBI report and the autopsy report, considering that the autopsy report was written before the FBI report was written ? ]\Ir. Redlich. I believe that we satisfied ourselves that what hap- pened was that the FBI agents who were present at the autopsy were recalling their recollection of what was being said and the doctors were examining various hypotheses during the time of the autopsy, and that accounted for the FBI report saying one thing and the doc- tors saying another. I thought the FBI report was a grossly inadequate document. In fairness to the Bureau they apparently decided to produce something very quickly, but based upon what I feel I know and remember about the facts of the assassination, I think it was a grossly inadequate document. Mr.inKlein. that "Wlien oryou all respects are say youit just was talking a grosslyabout inadequate document the auto]:>sy ? is Mr. Redlich. I think the way it handled the autopsy, I believe — let me put it to you this way, Mr. Klein. If all we had before us was the FBI report about the assassination, the unanswered questions about the assassination would have been legion and they would have come from very responsible sources, because the thing that we were talking about earlier, the single-bullet theory, the explanation of the totality of the facts of what happened, was simply not in the FBI report. It took us a long time to work it up. I don't want to be critical in terms of the time they had available to them but I think that tliis Government owed much more to the American people than the FBI report that was presented to the Commission, and we certainly did not usp thnt as any tvne of basis for our investi ffation. ^fr. Devtne. If the gentleman will yield at that point, was not that FBI roport a preliminary report? Had it been a complete report there would have \)vn\ no need for an examination ? 131 :Mr. Kedlicii. What I was suggesting was that if that had been the final word, that FBI report had been the final word, I think perhaps long before 1977 there would have been a need for this committee, sir, because a great many questions that I believe we answered were left unanswered by the Bureau's report. That may have simply been a TIT ^i" I PI* Oi Mr. Devine. Is it your understanding that was a final report from the FBI or a preliminary report ? Mr. Kedlich. I am not sure of that. That was a report that I believe may have been done for the President at the time and then given to us. Then I would have to look at the report. I think you have raised a very good question. I would have liked to look at the report again to see what they said about it. I would say that report, just standing on its four corners, was in my opinion not an adequate explanation of the assassination. In fairness to the Bureau, it may well never have been intended to be a definitive report of the assassination and if that is true, then my comments have to be judged in that light. Mr. Devine. Then it was less than a month following the assassina- tion, was it not ? ]\Ir. Redlich. I think so. Mr. Devine. Thank you. Mr. Klein. Mr. Redlich, what present predispositions did you have toward the intelligence agencies, such as the FBI and the CIA, prior to working for the Warren Commission ? Mr. Redlich. As a professor of constitutional law I regarded myself as a civil libertarian. I had regarded the FBI and its activities during the 1950's in the cold war period as being one which had been repres- sive of free speech. So I did not come to Washington with the view that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was a model that I should choose to follow. I had had no direct experience with it. I had felt that the Bureau had been part of what I perceived to be a most unfortunate period in the history of civil liberties in the United States. I had no particular feeling about the CIA or the Secret Service. Mr. Klein. Will you describe the relationship of the Warren Com- mission to each of the intelligence agencies. How in your opinion did the Warren Commission view the agencies and how did the agencies view the Warren Commission ? jSIr. Redlich. I can say very little about the CIA because I had virtually no contact with it, perhaps no contact with it. That was han- dled by IMr. William Coleman and David Slawson, to some extent Willens. Now as far as the FBI is concerned, I thought that we had a good relationship notwithstanding my extreme annoyance over the Hosty matter. As I look at the totality of the work they did over this 9 or 10 month period there is nothing that we asked them to do that they didn't do and do promptly. While there were certain instances where I thought they made mistakes, that was cur problem to evaluate their work. But as far as cooperation was concerned, while, as you know, the Bureau had fairly rigid rules about who wrote letters to whom, and the letter that came from the Bureau was signed by Mr. Hoover, the Bureau I found to be a very cooperative agency. Tlie Secret Service we did not ask to do that much. Whatever we asked them to do, mainly in connection with some work in connection 132 with the reconstruction of the assassination in Dallas, I found them to be cooperative. I would say that notwithstanding my predisposition, which I already mentioned to you, before I came to Washington, I left Washington with the feeling which I incorporated in letters that I wrote to ISIr. Hoover, with the feeling of respect for the FBI, I came with a feeling that maybe there v/ere two FBI's. Maybe there is the FBI that works as a professional law enforcement level ; that was the group I dealt with, that was the group for which I came away with a very healthy respect. Maybe there was another FBI which dealt with political matters, which I had nothing to do with, and whicli undoubtedly accounted for my prior negative feelings about their work. Time after time as I worked with their experts I found they were fair, cautious, and did not try to overstate the case. They were not trying to convict Lee Harvey Oswald ex post facto, they were a very professional organization. Mr. Ki.EiN. You testified as to the Hosty notebook. Other than that to your knowledge did any of the intelligence agencies ever inten- tionally witlihold any information from the Warren Commission ? Mr. Kedlich. To my knowledge as of September 1964 or my knowl- edge now ? Mr. Klein. As of September 1964. Mr. Redlich. As of September 1964 my best recollection is that it was onlv the Hosty matter. Mr. Klein. As you sit here today do you know of any such information ? Mr. Redt.ich. As I sit here today I have read reports that Lee Hnrvev Oswald delivered a letter to Agent Hosty in Dallas which Agent Hosty destroyed. I think that is inexcusable. Now the question of what blame one attributes to the Bureau depends on what your committee discovers about who else in the Bureau Imew what Agent Hosty did. T\lioever in the Bureau was responsible for that, that was inexcusable. If it were to turn out that people in high positions of authority in the Bureau Imew about that and didn't tell us, then I would be very chagrined about that and it would certainly lead me to qualify my statement that they had cooperated in every way. If it was only Agent Hosty or some immediate superior I think that is a subject of condemnation but I would not condemn the entire Bureau. Now the other aspect that I have read in the press is that the CIA and the FBI and Mr. Dulles are supposed to have known of a plot to assassinate Premier Castro. I think that should have been brought to the attention of the Commission. Mr. Klein. The information that you just testified to relating to the note that was not received and the attem.pt to assassinate Premier Cas- tro, in your opinion Imd this information been given to the Warren Commission would it have affected the investigation? Mr. Eedlicii. Let us take them one at a time. The note to Hosty. How it would have affected the investigation would have depended — perhaps I don't understand your question. Do you mean the existence of the note or the fact that Hosty destroyed it ? Mr. Klein. I mean if you had laiown that the note existed would the investigation have proceeded along different avenues than it ultimately went? 133 Mr. Redlich. That one I think would not have had too great affect on the inquiry for this reason. As I recall, at some point in the inves- tigation, perhaps in the questioning of Ruth Paine, it was brought out that Lee Harvey Oswald had gone down to the Dallas Police Department [sic] and had threatened to blow the headquarters up or words to that effect. At least that is my recollection. To the extent that the letter would have confirmed that fact it would have been additional evidence. But the revelant fact that Lee Harvey Oswald was capable of vio- lence issomething that the Bureau, if my recollection is correct about the Ruth Paine testimony, would have known about, because she testi- fied that Oswald had gone to the FBI headquarters in Dallas and threatened to blow it up. So that that would have only been relevant in evaluating name to the Secret the performance Service. of the FBI in not turning over Oswald's If I am right that the Bureau had that information, then I think the fact that they would have had the information in the form of a letter would not have materially affected the investigation. Mr. Klein. On that point your answer is based on the testimony that 3^ou read in the newspapers that was given by agent Hosty saying that the letter was a threat by Oswald to blow up the FBI bliilding. Is it fair to say that your answer is predicated on accepting agent Hosty's explanation of what was in the letter and that the Warren Commis- sion might have been able to further investigate the letter and affirm whether or not that was in fact what the letter said ? Was that an ave- nue of investigation that might have been open to the Warren Commission ? Mr. Redlich. Yes ; we would have had the letter. We would have been able to compare the letter with what I recall was Mrs. Paine's testimony. That would have been relevant to the question of Oswald's propensity to violence which would have been relevant in terms of the FBI failure to report it to the Secret Service because we had a lot of other evidence of Oswald's propensity to violence at the time the investigation was made. Mr. Kleix. When you say that the letter that was destroyed — would not have affected your investigation you are accepting Agent Hosty's 1976 testimony as to what the letter said. I am saying that had you known at the time of the investigation that a letter existed then do 3'ou think that that might have led to an investigation and who knows what would have been found as to what the letter actually said ? ]Mr. Redlich. I am sorry, Mr. Klein. I did not understand your ques- tion. You are quite right. Not having the letter we don't know what the letter said. If the letter had said something different from what Agent Hosty said in 1977, then we might have had a different investigation. Mr. Klein. Further along that line, had you known the letter existed in 1964 when you investigated this case, then there would have been a lot of avenues that you might have gone to, to try to find out what this relationship was. Again, not necessarily accepting what Agent Hosty said the letter said. Mr. Redlich. That would depend entirely on what the letter said. I can only speculate on tliat. 134 Mr. Klein". To your knowledge, did any of the intelligence agencies ever intentially delay providing the Warren Commission with any information ? Mr. Eedlicti. If they did it was not something that I recall. Mr. Kletn. To your knowledge did any of the intelligence agencies 'Cver intentionally provide the Warren Commission with false or mis- leading information ? Mr. Redltch. Again I would say that as of September 1964 I would answer to my knowledge no. If the alleged facts are true that there was a plot to assassinate Premier Castro, and Mr. Hoover and Mr. IMcCone said that the}^ had given us all the information that was relevant to this assassination, then sitting here todaj^ I would saj^ that those statements were not accurate. Mr. Klein. As you sit here today do you have an opinion as to what might have motivated the intelligence agencies to either withhold information or provide false information? ^Ir. Redlich. You are asking a general question. The only informa- tion that I have any knowledge about, which is what I learned through the press, relates to the Hosty letter and the assassination plot in regard to Castro. I can only speculate about that. Mr. Klein. What would your speculation be? ]Mr. Redlich. Do you want my speculation ? ;Mr. Klein. Yes. "]Mr. Redlioh. My speculation might be that the FBI could conceiv- ably have been — not the FBI but Agent Hosty or someone in the Bureau might have felt that a letter in their possession threatening to blow up the Dallas headquarters of the Bureau would have been con- strued as, and put the Bureau on notice that Lee Harvey Oswald was a person who was dangerous and therefore they should have reported 'Jiim to the Secret Service. In fact you will recall that the Warren iCommission did criticize the FBI in its report for not reporting Oswald to the Secret Service. Now I think that a possible reason is that they may have felt that in a badthat theyOn^the light. question of the this would put assassination can Bureau one the only speculate may have had reasons that they perceived to be national security in mind. They may have felt tliat if this were brought to the Commission it might have led to cer- tain areas of investigation which they perceived to be matters of great national security. I can only guess about that and I really have no knowledge. Mr. Klein. In your opinion did the fact that prior to the formation of the Warren Commission the FBI had issued its December 9 report and January !?> report which concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin, did that fact in any way affect the investigation of the Warren Commission? :Mr. Redlich. No. We did not accept that conclusion. We started witli a completely clean slate. j\Ir. Klein. In your opinion while working for the Warren Com- mission, were the FBI a<2:ents who worked for you adverse to, or were they onen to, the proposition that the Bureau might have been wrong when it concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin. Mr. Redlich. I can't really analyze what was in the minds of the individual agents. It is rare for people in or out of Government to be 135 happy with the thought that something they worked on was wrong. I think that the Bureau personnel was probably no exception to that. On the other hand I found that in my working with them on questions of film analysis, I didn't have a sense of working with a group of people Yv-ho were resisting what the Commission was done. I had a sense of a group of people who were trying to help us with what we were doing. Mr. Klein. Is it possible that the FBI, having already conducted its own investigation and reached a conclusion, wanted to tailor the Warren Commission investigation to conform to that conclusion? Mr, Redlich. I don't believe that is possible. Mr. Klein. To your knowledge was any consideration given to hiring independent investigators ? Mr. Redlich. I have clear recollection of that. Certainly during the time of the investigation from time to time staff members talked to Mr. Rankin about what it might have been like if we had had a com- pletely independent staff. I think that we reached the conclusion then, with which I still agree, that while using the existing investigatory arms of the United States had certain disadvantages, that on balance There were certain tradeoff's. was got it We still the of whatto Imake. right decision the benefit still believe to be a highly efficient, cooperative, vast investigative apparatus which cooperated. The trade- off was that it could be said that we were using the very agencies of the United States who might have some stake in a preordained result. Idilemma. don't think there was any happy, completely happy, solution to that I am satisfied that it was the right decision. Mr. Klein. As you sit here today, if you had to make that decision at this time you would make the same decision ? I am saying if this were 1963, knowing what you know, would you make the same deci- sion to use FBI agents as investigators ? Mr. Redlich. I still think I would make the same decision. The only qualification I would give to that would involve information that this committee may know that I don't know and that is what one has learned about the extent to which the FBI may have withheld informa- tion. Now based upon what I now know, which is limited to the Hosty matter, I am not prepared to conclude that that decision was erroneous. ]\Ir. Klein. Just one other question in this area which I had asked before but we did not actually get to it. If the Warren Commission had loiown about the CIA plot to assassinate Premier Castro would that have affected the investigation and, if so, how ? Mr. Redlich. I think it would have affected it, ISIr. Klein. How I am not completely sure. I think that an important fact like that might perhaps have led to additional inquiry as to whether the Cuban Gov- ernment might have known about it, whether in some way the Cul3an Government might have tried to retaliate. Although I am cognizant of (he fact that the Warren Commission, at least to the best of my recol- lection, did look into every Cuban connection that Oswald had, it is possible that this additional fact might have led to further inquiry. I also think that it might have affected Oswald's motive or at least af- fected our conclusion with regard to Oswald's motive quite apart from conspiracy. For example, if it could be shown that Oswald knew about 136 the proposed plot to assassinate Castro, then the Commission could have conchided that this was an additional motive that Oswald might have had. I would doubt that the Commission would have concluded this was the sole motive, but this could have been an additional motive. From my investigatory experience with the Warren Commission, I think that we would have started an investigation. "VVIiere Mr. that would Klein. have led I Icouldn't Mr. Chairman, tell ayou. have only few more questions which are of a conclusory type, so I would now yield if anybody else has any questions in the areas we have covered. jMr. Preyer. I think Mr. Blakey has a few questions. Mr. Blaket. Dean Kedlich, I would like to see if I could pin down for the record a couple of matters or at least one general matter that has been raised here by a number of questions. I wonder if you will bear with me if I ask you a couple of related questions. .Let me direct your attention to the period of time during which you worked on the Warren Commission and ask you to your knowledge did the Chief Justice have any information while he was serving with the Warren Commission concerning any involvement of any of the U.S. intelligence agencies in alleged plots or attempts against Cuba or to assassina.te Fidel Castro? Mr. Redltch. To my knowledge, the Chief Justice had no such knowledge. I knew of no such knowledge that the Chief Justice may have possessed. Mr. Blaket. To your knowledge, did any other Commissioner have any such information while he was serving on the Warren Commis- sion ? Mr. Redltch. To my direct knowledge, Mr. Blakey, no. I, of course, have read about Mr. Dulles, but I have no direct knowledge. Mr. Blaket. At the time you were serving on the Commission ? Mr. Redltch. While I was serving I had no such knowledge. Mr. Blaket. To your knowledge, did any staff members have any such inf ormiation while he was serving with the Warren Commission ? INIr. Redltch. To my knowledge ; no, sir. Mr. Blaket. In retrospect was there any conduct on the part of the Chief Justice from which you could have or which you in fact did infer that he did have such knowledge ? Mr. Redltch. No, sir. ]Mr. Blakkt. In retrospect was there anv conduct on the rmvt of any other Commissioner from which you could have or you did infer that he had such knowledge ? Mr. Redltctt. No, sir. Mr. Blaket. In retrospect, was there any conduct on the part of the staff members from which you could have or did infer that he had such knowledge! Mr. Redltch. To the best of my knowledge, no, sir. Mr. Blaket. Did you see any document while you were serving on the Commission from which you could have or did infer that the Chief Justice, any other Commissioner, or any staff member had such knowledge? Mr. Redltch. I recall no such document. 137 IMr. Blakey. Were you ever present at any discussions from which you could have or did infer that the Chief Justice, any Commissioner, or any staff member had such knowledge ? JSir. Redlich. I recall no such conversation. Mr. Blakey. Were you ever instructed by anyone while you were serving on the Warren Commission not to pursue any line of inquiry ? Mr. Redlich. No ; except I think that the Chief Justice was unhappy about the questions I was asking Mr. Martin which led to that docu- ment which had nothing to do with Cuba. Mr. Blakey. Is that the only instance where either the Chief Justice or a Commissioner or a staff member superior to you directed you or expressed disapproval of a line of inquiry that you were pursuing? Mr. Redlich. To the best of my recollection ; yes, sir. Mr. Blakey. Were you ever instructed by anyone, the Chief Justice, a Commissioner, or superior staff members or anyone else, not to pur- sue any line of inquiry because the inquiry might endanger national security ? Mr. Redlich. No, sir. Mr. Blakey. Did anyone ever suggest to you while you were serving with the Commission that such matters should not be explored ? Mr. Redlich. No, sir, just to be completely on the record, and I know this is irrelevant but I assume in answering all your questions we are making an exception to my questioning of Mr. Martin. That re- bated to some incident that occurred between Marina Oswald and some- body in Moscow before she met Lee Harvey Oswald, which, as I recall, involved a diplomat, but it was a purely personal encounter. That was really a matter of taste and a feeling that this might cause embarrass- ment between the United States and that government relating to this personal encounter. But it was a purely private matter and quite unrelated. The only reason I was pursuing the line of inquiry was for the rea- son Istated ; namely, to find out what we could about Marina Oswald as a person. Mr. Blakey. You have no knowledge that anyone associated with the Commission knew or had reason to know of the assassination plot ? Mr. Redlich. That is correct. That is my testimony. Mr. Blakey. To your knowledge the existence of those assassination plots was never used by any member associated or any person associated with the Commission to limit your investigation in any way ? Mr. Redlich. Not to my knowledge. IMr. Preyer. Mr. Blakey. Mr. Thank you. I appreciate 3^our testimony. Stokes. Mr. Stokes. Thank you, Mr. Chairm.an. Dean Redlich, I am quite concerned about the memorandum that you wrote to Mr. Rankin. Tt was obviously written to him as a result of some very strong feelings you had regarding the matters contained in the memorandum. Is that true ? Mr. Redlich. With regard to that memorandum, I felt that it was important to examine everything that we could about the kind of person Marina Oswald was. I did feel strongly that we should do that. That is why I wrote the memorandum in February of 1964, which was shortly after she testified. 138 Mr, Stokes. Let me for a moment refer to this specific lans^iage in the memorandum. You say, "This Commission has undertaken not only to determine who fired the shots that killed President Kennedy but to study all evidence which might lead to an explanation for why the crime was committed." Now, to the l^est of your recollection when the final report was prepared, did you then feel that the report that was prepared and issued as a Warren Commission report had complied with that part of the mandate as you understood it? Mr. Kedltch. Yes, sir, I do, understanding my answer does not mean that I ever felt in this memorandum that the mandate of the Commission report was to reach a single conclusion with regard to plot. It was always possible to reach an alternative conclusion once we had negatized the evidence of conspiracy. Mr. Stokes. As to that aspect of it in which you referred to studying all evidence and that which had prompted you to write this memoran- dum, did you feel that the final report then contained all e\adence so that you could feel with sureness that the report did reflect those con- cerns you had ? Mr. Redltch. Yes, sir. Mr. Stokes. Has anything occurred or transpired in this interim period which would now make you feel any differently ? Mr. Redlich, I would like to answer that question with a little bit of elaboration. There is nothing that I know of, sir, which leads me to question the Warren Commission's conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald fired all the shots that killed President Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally. Based upon anything I have read, and I am not privy to anything other than that, it is still my best opinion that the conclusion of the Commission that there is no evidence Lee Harvey Oswald conspired with any group, either foreign or domestic, in the performance of those acts is still a valid conclusion. Based upon any- thing else that I know I believe that the conclusion of the Warren Commission that it could not ascribe a particular motive to the assas- sination isstill one which I support. ]Nfr. Stokes. Obviously. Marina Oswald was your area, you spent a great deal of time preparing for her examination, and on this par- ticular occasion it was your concern about the Commission having full and complete and incisive data relative to her so that they might come to a proper conclusion relative to her testimony. I am concerned then about that part of your memorandum where you say, "We cannot ignore, however, that Marina Oswald has repeatedly lied to the Secret Service, the FBI and this Commission on matters that are of vital concern to the people of thiscountry." You told us earlier today that she testified heiove the Commission on many occasions. You refer in here to some further reexamination of her. Is that cor- rect and did I quote you correctly ? INIr. Redlich. She testified for I believe 4 or 5 davs in February of 1964. Then she was questioned again by a staff member, I believe Mr. Liebeler. She was questioned both before Februarv and after by FBI agents. This memorandum was written basically at the con- clusion ofher Commission testimony in Februaiy. 139 Mr. S'roivES. Did she ever reappear before the Commission for further reexamination '^ Mr. Redi.tcii. I don't believe that she did. I have no recollection of her appearing before the Commission. I do recall that Mr. Liebeler, I think it was, questioned her in Dallas. I believe that on other occa- sions we may have asked the FBI to interview her on specific matters as further leads came to light. Mr. Stokes. In terms of the Commission's fmal report how would you characterize their reliance upon JMaiina Oswald's testimony? Would you say that they relied upon it not at all or slightly or they relied upon it heavily ? Mr. Redlich. I think on balance when all of the evidence is — the testimony of INIarina Oswald by itself was in my judgment not strongly submitted to the Commission's basic conclusions, because with regard to all of the physical evidence, the ownership of the rifle, the ownership of the revolver, that was developed quite apart from Marina Oswald's testimony. Marina Oswald knew of no contacts that Oswald might have had with other people. She told us, for example, that the Fair Play For Cuba Committee was one person. We have no evidence at all that it was anything other than one person. Everything that one looked into, the event in New Orleans, confirms that. A great deal of Marina Oswald's life with Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas was confirmed by Ruth Hyde Paine with whom she lived. So that I think that on balance Marina Oswald's testimony was less significant by the time we were through than might have appeared at the time we started our investigation when she was of course a very important factor. Now once one gets into the question of negatives, it is always possible that Oswald could have met someone and Marina might have known about it and ]\Iarina did not tell us. That is possible. But there has been no other evidence of any such contact. I don't believe that the Commission really relied on Marina Oswald for its conclusion or for its two basic conclusions, the identity of the assassin and the nonexistence of evidence of a conspiracy. I do not believe that Marina Oswald was the basis for those conclusions. Mr. Stokes. But you did feel, and you did feel very strongly, that knowledge of the real character of Marina Oswald was important to the Commission if they were to be able to properly understand and to construe the motives that possibly lay behind Lee Harvey Oswald's assassinating the President, did you not ? Mr. Redlicii. Yes, sir, and I still believe that. Mr. Stokes. Let me ask you this. Knowing all that you know about Marina Oswald, from all that you studied and prepared and from all the testimony that she gave all the agencies and to the Commis- sion, would you believe her oath ? Mr. Redlich. I would regard INIarina Oswald, based upon every- thing that I loiew at the time we were finished with our investigation, I would find her a credible witness. Now whether I would believe everything she would testify about the intimacies of her personal rela- tionship with her husband. I don't know how to answer that. I think that it is very hard for me to form my judgment about that, ask a woman about the relationship with her husband of a purely personal nature. 43-819—79 10 140 I think that any commission, and this committee also, that relied entirely on the testimony of a person without corroborating testimony of other witnesses or other facts is running the risk that that person might not have been a credible witness. But I am not prepared to say on balance that Mrs. Oswald is not a credible witness. Mr. Stokes. Thank you. Mr. Preyer. Mr. Devine. Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have one question that follows what our staff director and chief counsel asked you. Do you have any knowledge that the Kennedy fam- ily requested the Chief Justice not to go into the X-ray and photo- graphic a,nd other related medical e\ddence, that that was the reason that was not pursued avidly by the staff and by the Commission? Mr. Redlich. Mr. Devine, at this point it is hard for me to differ- entiate what effect that might have had or a variety of things that one has read in the past 14 years. I also notice that there is reference to the Kennedy family in the Specter memorandum which has been placed in the record. My impression, and I cannot be more precise than that, my impression was that the Kennedy family was concerned about the publicity, about a public display of the President's skull in those pictures. The Chief Justice was very sensitive to that. He felt that that family had undergone just tremendous trauma, and he was very sensitive to that, perhaps by retrospect overly sensitive. But he was very sensitive to it. Now, I don't believe that it would be fair to the Kennedys, at least on the basis of anything I know of, to conclude that it was because of their directly saying to the Chief Justice that we wanted it this way, that it was done this way. I have no information of that kind. I believed that the Chief Justice shouldered the responsibility for it. I think one reason that he made the decision, perhaps a main reason, was his concern about their sensitivity. I believe it would not be fair to the Kennedy family to conclude that they were in any way directing him, telling him that this was the course of action. Mr. Devine. You have no personal knowledge that such a request was made by the family to him, is that correct ? Mr. Redlich. I have no personal knowledge of it. Mr. Devine. I want to thank you for your very candid testimony. It must be strange for a dean of a law school to be in such a position. I notice also from your biography we should wish you a happy birthday next Saturday. Mr. Redlich. Thank you very much. You must be good investiga- tors. Mr. Preyer. Mr. Sawyer. Mr. Sawyer. I just have one question. It seems more from your curiosity than the search for relevant information, but in your memo- randum you allude to the actions of Marina Oswald in Washington. I am not aware of what that was. Can you enlighten me at all? Mr. Redlich. Do you wish to be enlightened on the record? I will be pleased to answer. Mr. Sawyer. I have the disabilitv of not knowing that about which I am asking. I am not aware of it. Maybe counsel will enlighten me. 141 Mr. Kedlich. I would like the record to show that I am prepared to answer the question. [Counsel consults with Mr. Sawyer.] Mr. Sawyer. I find out that it is nothing biologically unusual. I withdraw the question. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kedlich. With regard to the transcript, do I understand that I will be given an opportunity to look at my testimony to see whether, with all due respect to the expert transcriber, he has recorded accu- rately what I have said ? Mr. Preyer. You may have that privilege. May I ask you two unrelated questions, one following up Mr. Stokes. Have you read Marina Oswald's new book or the book about her ? Mr. Redlich. No. I have managed to ffo on to do a lot of interesting things in my life since 1964 by avoiding those things. Mr. Preyer. So you would not know whether it is consistent with what she might have testified before you. Were you or any member of the stall that you know of aware of the letter which Deputy Attorney Katzenbach wrote to all the mem- bers of the Commission on December 9, I believe it was, urging them to issue a press release to the effect that Oswald was the lone assassin and showing that there was no international conspiracy involved? Did you know anything about that ? Mr. Kedlich. This is the first I have heard about that. Mr, Preyer. You did not send a copy of that letter to any member of the staff? Mr. Kedlich. No. At that time I don't think there was a staff, Mr. Preyer. I guess that is right, December 9. Mr. Kedlich. I think Mr. Kankin was just appointed that day. Mr. Devine. You were not on board that day ? Mr. Kedlich. I was not on board. I was called by Mr. Rankin a day or two after his appointment was mentioned. Mr. Preyer. On January 20, was Mr. Katzenbach present at that meeting ? Mr. Kedlich. No, sir. Mr. Preyer. Thank you. Do you have a few conclusory questions ? Mr. Klein. Yes ; I do, Mr. Chairman. Dean Redlich, can you describe what pressures, if any, existed to complete this investigation before the election ? Mr. Redlich. We didn't want to be there forever. I think there were the normal pressures to try to finish the job. But we did not sense any pressure in terms of the elections other than I do recall discus- sions to the effect that if the Warren report was not done, tlie whole assassination could have become an election issue, I do want to be firm on one point, as I come to the end of my testimony, and I feel strongly that the committee should understand this. It is my firm judgment that if at any time the members of the staff had come to Mr. Kankin or to the Chief Justice and said. "We re There is a statement that the mother told him attrihnted to Oswald's sometime between Aprilmother's doctor. Dr. Morton N. Goldberg, 4, 1957, and January 30, 1959, that her son (unnamed) intended to defect to Russia. This is wholly at variance with her testimony, however, and is also Inconsistent with Oswald's letters to her from the period before he entered Russia and just before he disappeared into vindicate the affair had never been disclosed to her previously.the Soviet world, which letters 155 cerned that both the trip itself and his purpose In going be kept strictly secret and cautioned Marina accordingly. Marina never admitted she had prior knowl- edge of the trip until almost 3 months after the assassination, when she testified to the Commission that, as just related, Oswald had told her that he was going and why. The few witnesses we have who spoke with Oswald while he was on a bus going to Mexico City confirm what Marina has stated, that Oswald's intent was to evade the travel ban by reaching Cuba by way of Mexico. The Mexican law-enforcement authorities and the CIA and FBI have all car- ried on extensive investigations within Mexico of I^ee Harvey Osv/ald's activities there. These three groups have produced evidence which appears quite firm that when Oswald appeared at the Cuban and Soviet Embassies he told them that his destination was Russia, not Cuba, and that he only wanted an "in transit"' visa for Cuba in order that he might visit that country on his way to the Soviet Union. When he visited these embassies he carried with him newspaper clippings, letters, and various documents (some forged by himself) purporting to show that he was a "friend of Cuba." With these papers, and with his i)rcven record of previous residence in the Soviet Union and marriage to a Soviet national, he tried to curry favor with both embassies, but the attempt seemingly failed. [Deleted] and Marina has testified that when she first saw him after his return to the United States he was discouraged and convinced that he would never reach Cuba. When questioned en the discrepancy between his telling her that he wanted to get to Cuba and his telling the Cuban and Russian Embassies that his ultimate destination was Russia, Marina answered that his statements to the embassies were deceptions, and she added that he had told her after he returned something about his attempts to fool the officials in Mexico City. Apparently, his real intent was that if he could reach Cuba "on the way to Russia" he would simply stop there, prove his "friendship" for the Castro regime and then go through sub- stantially the same kind of defection and shift of allegiance to a foreign power he had performed in Mo?cow in 1959. Marina's testimony on this point is some- what confused, however. She is not clear on details. la any event, among the documents turned over to the United States by the Soviet Union after the assassination of the President, included in the file pur- porting to be the entire correspondence between the Oswalds and the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., was the following letter dated November 9, 1963 : "Dear Sirs : This is to inform you of recent events since my meetings with comrade Kostin in the Embassy of the Soviet Union, Mexico City, Mexico. "I was unable to remain in Mexico indefinitely because of my Mexican visa restrictions which was for 15 days only. I could not take a chance on requesting a new visa unless I used my real name, so I returned to the United States. "I had not planned to contact the Soviet Embassy in Mexico so they were unprepared, had I been able to reach the Soviet Embassy in Havana as planned, the erabassy there would have had time to complete our business. "Of course the Soviet Embassy was not at fault, they were, as I say unpre- pared, the Cuban consulate was guilty of a gross breach of regulations, I am glad he has since been replaced. "The Federal Bureau of Investigation is not now interested in my activities in the progressive organization 'Fair Play for Cuba Committee,' of which I was secretary in New Orleans (State Louisiana) since I no longer reside in that State. However, the FBI has visited us here in Dallas, Tex., on November 1, Aerent James P. Hasty [sic] warned me that if I engaged in FPCC activities in Texas the FBI will again take an 'interest' in me. "This agent also 'suggested' to Marina Nichilayeva that she could remain in the United States under FBI 'protection,' that is, she could defect from the Soviet Union, of course, I and my wife strongly protested these tactics by the notorious FBI. "Please inform us of the arrival of our Soviet entrance visas's [sic] as soon as they come. '•Also, this is to inform you of the birth on October 20, 1963, of a daughter, Audrey Marina Oswald in Dallas, Tex., to my wife. "Respectfully, (s) Lee H. Oswald" The envelope bears a postmark which soeras to be November 12. Marina has testified that Oswald made many drafts of this letter before it was finally sent. A piece of paper which was probably one of these drafts was found among Oswald's effects and reads as follows: (Words crossed out by Os^vald have been put in parentheses.) 43-819 — 79—11 156 ["Draft] "Dear Sirs: This is to inform you of (re) events since my interviews with comrade Kostine in the Embassy of the Soviet Union, Mexico City, Mexico. "I v\'as unable to remain in Mexico City (because I considered useless) in- defmity because of my (visa) Mexican visa restrictions which was for 15 days only. (I had a) I could not take a chance applying for an extension (si) unless I used my real name so I returne.'l to the United States. "I and Marina Nicholeyeva are now living in Dallas, Tex., (you already ha) "The FBI is not now interested in my activities in the progressive organiza- tion FFCC of which I was secretary in (New Orleans (La) Louisiana since (mn) no longer (connected with) that State. (However the however) the FBI has visited us here in Texas on November 1. agent of the FBI James P. Hasty [sic] warned me that if I attempt to engage in FPCC activities in Texas the FBI will again take an "Interest" in me. This agent also "suggested'' that my wife could "remain in the United States under FBI protection," that is, she could defect from the (refuse to return to the) Soviet Union. Of course I and my wife strongly protested these tactics by the notorious F.B.I. "(It was unfortunate thai: the Soviet Embassy was unable to aid me in Mexico City but) I had not planned to contact the Mexican City Embassy at all so of course they were iinprepared for me. Had I been able to reach Havana as I)lanned (I could have contacted the Soviet Embassy there for the completion of rapid Iiave been able to help me get the neceary [sic] documents I required assist me.) would have had time to assist me but of course the (stuip) stuip Cuban Consule was at fault here, I'm glad he had since been replaced by another." Information produced for the Commission by the CIA is to the effect that the person referred to by Oswald as "comrade Kostin" was probably a man named "Kostikov" employed ostensibly as a member of the Consular staff of the Soviet Union in Mexico City. He is actually a KGB agent, however, as are many of such employees. We liave also identified the Cuban Consul referred to in Os- wald's letter as probably Senor Busebio Asque. This man was in fact replaced. We asked the CIA to look into this and their response reads : "We surmise that the references in Oswalds November 9 letter to a man who had since been replaced must refer to Cuban Consul Eusibio Azque, who left Mexico for Cuba on permanent transfer on November 18, 1963, 4 days before the assassination. Azque had been in Mexico for 18 years and it was known to us as early as September 1963 that Azque was to be replaced. His replacement did arrive in September. Azque was scheduled to leave in October but did not leave until November 1 8. "We do not know who might have told Oswald that Azque or any other Cuban had been or was to be replaced, but we speculate that Silvia Duran or some Soviet official might have mentioned it if Oswald complained about Azque's altercation with him." Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, the recent Soviet defector from the KGB, has stated that the first word which the Moscow KGB had of Oswald's actions or where- abouts after he Ipft the Soviet I'nion was when the Soviet Embas.sy in ISIexico City telegrammed that Oswald lias appeared there and requested a visa to the Soviet Union. Nosenko did not so testify, but probably such a telegram would have gone from Mexico City to Washington, D.C.. and from there to Moscow. Oswald himself mentioned several times that the Soviet Embassy had promised to send a telegram containing his request for a visa, so this checks out. When Nosenko was asked why the KGB had received no notice of Oswald's and Marina's prior contacts with the Soviet Embassy in Washington, he answered that he did not actually know, but from his knowledge of the routine followed in such cases he suggested that the Soviet Embassy itself may simply have turned down the Oswalds' visa application and not bothered Moscow with questions about the matter. Presumably, therefore, the Mexican Embassy sent a wire to Washington iecaijse it did not have the file on Oswald, as did Washington, and so did not have a basis for immediately turning his application down or, what could also be possible, the Mexican Embassy was subservient in these matters to the AVashing- ton Embassy and therefore would routinely have asked for the decision of the latter on such a point. Possibly also, Oswald's personal appearance was deemed a matter fit sone importnufe and thcrpfore worthy of being communicated to Moscow, whereas his and Marina's simply writing letters to Washington v^•as con- sidered routine. Nosenko also opined that Oswald would never have been re- Id/ admitted to the Soviet Union, no matter how long he had persisted in trying. He j-aid that prior to the assassination, Marina and her children probably would have been permitted to come back alone; the assassination, of course, has made this less clear. The principal question raised by all this is, of course. What is the meaninjv of Oswald's apparently garbled letter to the Embassy of November 9, 1063? Marina was asked to explain the letter and, after a few attempts, gave up with the remark that it was "crazy." Some light on its possible meaning can perhaps be slied by comparing it with the early draft. To the extent that the draft differs irom the final document, and especially when crossed-out words are taken into account, one gets the in)})res,siou that Oswald was intentionally obfuscating the true state of affairs in order to make his trip to Mexico sound as mysterious and important as possible. For example, the first sentence in the second paragrapli of the letter itself reads : "I was una bit- to remain in Mexico indefinitely because of my Mexican visa restriction.s which was for 15 days only." Tiie same sentence in the draft begins, before the words were crossed out, "I was unable to remain in Mexico City because I considered useless . . ." As already mentioned, we have fairly good evidence that Oswald's trip to iMexico was indeed "useless" and that he returned to Texas with the conviction that it liad l>een so. Simiiarly, in tlie last para.ijraph Oswald says that an FBI asent suggested to Marina that she "could defect from the Soviet Union." In tbe draft, this was first written that the agent suggested that she could "refuse to returii to the Soviet Union." The word, '"defect," was probably inserted to give emotional impact. It might be argued that the Russians would not have turned this letter over to us voluntarily if they had any reason to believe that it could be used as evi- dence against them. However, we have Nosenko's own testimony that in Russia it is standard procedure for the secret police to intercept all mail addressed to the American Embassy, and it therefore does not seem unlikely that the Soviets assumed the same thing was being done in the United States. With this in mind, tJ'oy probably believed that the FBI had already read this letter \^ ben it was sent, and so they gave it to us "voluntarily" to earn whatever credit they could for having done so. We believe that the letter should be judged without reference to the fact that it was "voluntarily" turned over to the Commission. The letter undoubtedly constitutes a disturbing i)it of evidence and will prob- ably never be fully explained. In our opinion, based upon what we have learned of Oswald's character in general and, in particular, upon what we believe to have been his mounting desperation to escape the complexities of life in the United States by going to Cuba or, faiUng that, back to Russia, we think that the letter constitutes no more than a desperate, somewhat illiterate and deranged attempt to facilitate his family's return to the Soviet Union. He seems to have written it in the hope that by inferring that he had somehow been "in on" some secret and mysterious dealings involving the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, some benefit, however small, could be salvaged from the otherwise total failure of that trip. U. Yuri IvanovicU Nosenko In February 1964, Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko asked for asylum in the United States. His position in the Soviet Union was that of a high official with the KGB, and he was attending a conference in Geneva at the time of his escape. In the course of his interrogation by the CIA, it turned out that he had knowletlae of Oswald. Hia testimony in respect to Oswald was given to representatives of the FBI and passed on by the Bureau to us. A copy of the Bureau's final report on Nosenko is attached to this memorandum. Nosenko's reference to Oswald's lutour- ist guide and "his" impressions and evaluations of Oswald should probably be to "her" impressions and evaluations, since we knew from other sources that the guide v.^aa probably a woman, Eima Shirokova. The FBI summary of the statements of Nosenko. if true, would certainly go long way towards shosving that the Soviet Union hnd no part in the assassination.a However, one cannot but be struck by the rare coincidence between the sudden notoriety of Lee Harvey Oswald and the fact that a Soviet official who defects turns out to be a man with primary knowledge about Oswald. If. after the CIA opinion has been formed. dou])ts .still exist with respect to the authenticitv and sincerity of Nosenko, then the Commission must face the vexing question of whv the Soviet Union chose this method to place this "information'' in the hands of 158 the United States. In our opinion, Nosenko should be asked to testify to the Com- mission as soon as the CIA has completed its evaluation of him. [Deleted.] His sense of the practical seems to have been deficient. For example, he always fashioned himself a potential leader and resented the fact that circumstances compelled him to do menial work. Yet he never took the necessary steps to com- plete his high school educatioon and obtain a diploma, so that he might be hired for a better job and utilize the normal skills possessed by a high school graduate. Lil^ewise, he never made any serious attempts to acquire any kind of post-high school education. He made one or two tries at setting himself up as a Russian interpreter or translator but apparently never pursued the matter very far. So far as we know he never earned a penny in either capacity. For several weeks in the late summer of 1983 he occupied himself with an elaborate scheme for hijack- ing an airplane to Cuba, and at one time he was trying to work Marina and the baby into the plan as well. Some time during 1963 he told Marina he would one day be the "Premier" of Cuba and became angry when she chided him for such an impractical ambition. In sum, we believe that Oswald did aot have any subtleness of mind, that he lacked a good understanding of human nature and that he had an unstable and ii6urotic character. We do not believe that such a man could have lived out a "legend" so successfully that the combined resources of the Commission, the Secret Service, CIA and the FBI could not have uncovered major discrepancies in it. III. Involvement ty Cuta Our suspicion that the Cuban Government might have been involved In th* assassination is based upon four facts. First, Lee Harvey Oswald publicly identi- fied himself with the Fair Play For Cuba Committee and was an avowed admirer of the Castro Government. Second, shortly before the assassination, between September 26 and October 3, 1963, he traveled to Mexico City and while there made frequent contact with the Cuban Consulate. Third, the Cuban Government had ample reason to dislike and distrust the Government of the United States and the late President in particular. Fourth, the Commission itself and the various Federal investigatory agencies which has assisted it in its work have received many letters and been approached by several persons who claim to have seen or heard acts which directly or indirectly link the a?sassination to the Castro gov- ernment. We will touch upon all but the third of these four factors in this section of the memorandum. The antipathy of the Cuban Government needs no elaboration. Oswald's Fair Play for Cuba activities and his contacts with Mr. Vincent T. Lee, the former head of that committee, have been thoroughly investigated. The results of these investigations are that Oswald's so-called "organizational activi- ties" on behalf of the committee in and around New Orleans were almost entirely a fiction, which he himself created. He carried a card which showed him to be a member of the New Orleans chapter of the Fair Play For Cuba Committee, the President of which was "A. J. Hidell." No such man as "A. J. Hidell" has been located nor is there any evidence that he exists. Marina testifies that the name was made up by her husband and that he probably chose it because it rhymed with his hero, "Fidel" (Castro). The little bit of correspondence between Oswald and the national headquarters for the Fair Play For Cuba Committee in New- York City, headed by Vincent T. Lee, discloses that Oswald applied for member- ship, was welcomed, later informed Lee that he intended to create an active orga- nization in New Orleans and asked for advice in doing so, Lee replied with cau- tious encouragement, pointing out the difficulties, Oswald wrote another letter saying he was going to go ahead anyway, and that was about all. We have no evidence that any money ever went from New York or anywhere else to Oswald for his use in these activities nor was any representative of national headquarters or any place else ever sent down to guide him. Further, he apparently never cre- ated an organization and was never even given a charter authorizing him to do so. Marina testifies that much of Osv/nld's Fair Pl.-iy for Cuba Committee activi- ties, at least late in the summer of 1963, seemed to have been performed with the intent of proving to the Cuban Government that he [Oswald] was "a friend of Cuba," in the belief that he would thereby further his chances of reaching that country and being accepted by it. In other words, Lee Oswald was probably try- ing to reenact the defection to and acceptance by Russia which he had so success- fully accomplished in 1959, only this time shifting the scene of action to Cuba. 159 The trip to Mexico is not so easily disposed of. Oswald departed New Orleans, in great secrecy, probably about noon on September 25 and perhaps a day earlier, and he crossed the Mexican border at Nuevo Laredo on September 26. His bus arrived in Mexico City at about 10 a.m. on September 27. We have rather firm information that he set out immediately on a series of visits to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in that city, spending almost his entire first 2 days at one or another of these two places or in making arrangements to visit one or the other. (One arrangement he made, for example, was to have passport photographs taken, for use in his application for a Cuban visa.) By late Saturday afternoon, September 28, however, he had pretty much hit a blank wall at both embassies. [Deleted.] The Cuban Embassy had even more firmly informed him that he could not get an "in-transit" visa to visit Cuba unless he could first show them a visa to visit Russia, so he was left with very little to do with either Embassy [deleted]. At the Cuban Embassy he even got into a fight with the Consul, Eusebio Asque, because he insisted so strongly that as a "friend of Cuba's," he ought to be given a visa. So from Sunday through Wednesday morning, October 2, when he left Mex- ico City on a bus bound for the United States, apparently about all he did — or all that we know about what he did — was to make his travel arrangements, see the sights of the city and [deleted]. Our evidence that the events set out in the foregoing paragraph occurred is solid. It is obtained from several sources, the most important being the direct testimony of Senora Silvia Duran, the Mexican clerk at the Cuban Embassy who dealt with Oswald, [deleted]. The question is not whether these events occurred, but whether they were perhaps only a coverup for other, more sinister activities going on at the same time. This is where the various rumors and claims of con- spiracy come into consideration. Some of them will be considered in detail later, but at this point it is enough to say that they almost all boil down to some sort of allegation that the Cubans passed money to Oswald while he was in Mexico City, as payment for assassinating the President. We have been informed by the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency that rumors focxising around a large amount of money having been handed to Oswald while he was in Mexico City — the most commonly mentioned sum was $5.000 — were current in Mexico City almost immediately after the assassination. The fact that these rumors were current should be kept in mind in asse.ssing the information which follows. In order that the Commission may directly assess some of the important bits of evidence bearing upon Oswald's contacts with the Cuban and Russian Embassies, we have attached hereto two documents. [Deleted.] We have also recopied the essentials of the statement made by Silvia Duran, the Mexican employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City who dealt with Oswald, when she was questioned by the Mexican police shortly after the assassination. [Deleted.] Her statement, as forwarded to us by the Mexican Government, is as follows : "That as the speaker has already stated, she has been a sympathizer of social- ism and Marxist doctrine for several years, having studied pliilosophy and exis- tentialism, and particularly she has sympathized since its inception and sympa- thizes with the Cuban revolution. That approximately 3 months ago she began to occupy the position of Secretary to the Cuban Consul in this city, Mr. Eusebio Ascue . . . having had under her responsibility the administrative operation and preparing the visas which are issued, as well as handling the applications for such visas which invariably are sent to the Ministry of Foreign Relations, Government of Cuba, for its approval, . . . That the speaker does not belong to any political party and never has attended manifestations or meetings, nor has she given lec- tures or speeches, which her husband has done, since he has written several articles for the newspaper 'El Dia' (The Day) (pro-Communist, Spanish-language newspaper published in Mexico City) ; that she has never been arrested for any reason, not even on the occasion of the visit to Mexico of Mr. John F. Kennedy, which caused her a great deal of personal satisfaction because of the benefits which it would represent to the country . . . ". . . its having been only that night that they [she and her husband] read in the extra (edition) the news relating thereto, and subsequently on the radio at her residence she heard the name of Lee Harvey Oswald, which caused her to remember that this name refers to a North American who in the last days of September or the first days of the month of October of the present year appeared at the Cuban Consulate and applied for a visa to Cuba in transit to Russia and based his application on his presentation of his passport in which it was recorded 160 that he had l-een living in the latter country for a period of 3 years, his ^Tork -l^erinit from that same country written in the Russian language and letters in the same language, as well as proof of his being married to a vvoman of Paissian 't}ationality and being the apparent Director in the city of New Orleans of the •organization called 'Fair Play for Cuba' with the desire that he should be ac- ■cepted as a 'friend' of the Cuban Revolution, as a result of which the speaker, in compliance with her duties, received all of his dnta and filled out the appropriate application, and he left to return in the afternoon, this time M'ith his photographs, and the speaker, recognizing that she exceeded her duties, semiofficially called the 'Russian Consulate by telephone because of her interest in facilitating the handling of the Russian visa for Lee Harvey Oswald, but from there they answered her that the operation would require approximately 4 months, which nnnoyed the applicant, since as he affirmed he was in a great hurry to obtain the visas which would permit him to travel to Russia, insisting that he was en- titled to them because of his background and his partisanship and personal ac- tivities in favor of the Cuban movement, the declarant's not being able to specify because she does not remember whether or not he said that he was a member of the Communist Party, but that his wife, of Russian nationality, was at that time in the city of New York from where she would follov/ him, although his place of origin was the aforementioned city of New Orleans; that as soon as Oswald understood that it was not possible to give him a Cuban visa without his pre- viously obtaining a Russian one, because the former was for transit, he became highly agitated and angry, as a result of which the speaker called Consul Ascue, who. at that time, was In his private office in company of his ultimate replace- ment, Miraval, but came out and began to argue in English with Oswald in a very angry manner and Ascue concluded by saying to him that, 'As far as he was conce'-ned, he would not give him a visa,' and that 'A person like him, in place of aiding the Cuban Revolution, was doing it harm,' its being noted that in their discussion they had been referring to the Russian socialist revolution and not tlie Cuban, its being stated by Oswald that be had two reasons to request the visa with urgency, which were, one, that his permit to be in Mexico was expiring and the other that he had urgent necessity of reaching Russia ; that in spite of the argument the speaker handed to Oswald a piece of paper similar to that v/hich she writes at this time in which she recorded her name, 'Silvia Duran,' and the telephone number of the Consulate, which is '11-28-47,' and. at any rate, she in- itiated the handling of his visa application sending it to the Cuban Ministry of (Foreign) Affairs, from which a reply was received in the normal manner some 15 to 30 days later approving the issuance of a visa, but conditioning it on his previously obtaining the Russian (one), although she does not recall whether Oswald subsequently calledher or not on the telephone for the Consulate which she had given him ; that all of the conversation which the f^psaker had with •Oswald, as well as that of Consul 'Ascue' with him, was in tlie English language since he did not speak any Spanish, and that upon seeing his photograph which :flppears in today's newspapers, specifically in the newspaper "El Dia,' she im- mediately recognized and Identified it as being the same person that she has been referring to as T.ee Harvey Oswn Id. . . ." It should not be noted that Senora Duran testified that Oswald made formal application for a visa, that he furnished her with photographs taken of himself in Mexico City, that she filled out the visa application on the basis of documents Oswald has in his possession, and that authorization to issue a visa, conditional upon his first obtaining a Russian visa, was in fact obtained by her office some- time late in October. We have forwarded a request to the Cuban Government to docum.ent Senora Duran's claims. If the Cuban Government does furnish us with documents purporting to fulfill Senora Duran's claims, we have excellent means at our disposal for authenticating them. For example. Oswald's hand- writing and his photographs are two obvious methods of authentication. In addition, we have what we believe are some of the documents he had in his pospossion when he was in Mexico City, presumably the documents from which Senora Duran took the information to fill out his visa application, so this too should constitute an excellent method of authentication. For about 1% months prior to the assassination Lee Harvey Oswald had a room of hi« own in a rooming house at 1026 North Beckley Street in Dallas-. He or- dinarily stayed there during the week and visited Marina on weekends at the home of Mr. and Mrs. Michael Paine in Irving, Tex., where she was staying with the children. The resident manager of the rooming house at North Beckley 161 street, Mrs. Earline Roberts, has testified to representatives of the FBI that on one or two occasions Oswald ended teleplione conversations witli the word, "Adios." Mrs. Roberts' statements on this subject infer that these conversations were carried on in some foreign language described by her as "German or Russian." From tliis it in turn can be inferred that tlie conversations alluded to were with Marina, becaiise they would have been in Russian, and we have other evidence, which is quite firm, that he telephoned Marina almost every night. If this is the case, then the fact that he signed off with the word "Adios" has no par- ticular significance. When Marina testified to the Commission she said that she does remember her husband occasionally using that term. If, however, the word "Adios" was used during an English-language conversation, we have, perhaps, an important unexplained piece of evidence. Mrs. Roberts is scheduled to be requestioned on this point. The top local ofEcials of both the CIA and the FBI in Mexico stated to repre- sentatives ofthe Commission during their visit to that city in April 1964 that, in their professional opinion, there was no conspiracy involving Lee Harvey Oswald or the assassination which had contacts in Mexico. Both men based their opinions upon their belief tliat if there had been any such conspiracy, altliough they might not by this time have been able to solve it, their sources of information and investi- gatory capabilities were suflBciently good so that they would at least have received some firm indication or "hard" evidence of its existence. The absence of any such evidence has convinced them that Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico was in all probability nothing more than it purportee believed and would cause the United States to "take action" against Castro. In the meantime, American intelligence agencies in Mexico had checked back with Washington and learned that on the 17th and 19th of September informa- tion we had indicated that Oswald was in New Orleans. Although still theoreti- cally possible, this of course, made it unlikely that he was in Mexico City on the 18th. Still later, American authorities reinterrogated Alvarado. Alverado at first claimed that he had been pressured into retracting his statement by the Mexi- can police and that the retraction, rather than his statement, was false. He said that he did, in fact, see the things he claimed to have seen. American inter- rogation of him continued, and part of it was carried on in connection with a polygraph machine. When told that the polygraph indicated that he was probably lying, Alvarado said words to the effect, "I know such machines are accurate, and, therefore, I suppose I must be mistaken." He then added that he was uncertain as to the date when he saw someone "who looked like Oswald" at the Cuban Embassy, and perhaps it was on a Tuesday, September 17, rather than September 18. (Alvarado did not know it at the time, but the 17th would make it even more unlikely than the 18th. On September 17 Osv/ald appeared at the Louisiana State Unemployment Commission in New Orleans and also caslied a check from the Texas Employment Commission at the Winn- Dixie Store No. 1425 in New Orleans.) On the basis of the polygranh results and the qualified retractions made by Alvarado when he saw the results, and on the basis of discrepancies which appeared in his story, the CIA in Mexico City concluded that in all probability he was lying, and that the reasons [deleted] for lying were probably sincere. No further investigation of the Alvarado in- cident was carried on subsequent to the foregoing. 164 IV. Anti-Castro Cuian Involvement In early August 1963, while lie was still living in New Orleans, Oswald ap- proached Mr. Carlos Bringuier, a man who is active in anti-Castro activities in that city and who was a lawyer in Cuba prior to Castro's overthrow of the Batista regime, and volunteered his services in the training of anti-Castro guerrillas. Oswald claimed that he had received guerrilla-type training in the Marine Corps and offered to pass on his expertise to Bringuier's group. Brin- accepted Oswald's display guier was, in of interest manner. in friendlyinterested of acourse, However, veryandshortly the offer thereafter a member of Bringuier's organization observed Oswald passing out Fair Play For Cuba Committee literature, told Bringuier, and as a result there was a minor riot on the streets of New Orleans. The altercation led to the arrest of Oswald, Bringuier and Bringuier's friend, and Oswald was ultimately convicted and fined $10. Soon thereafter, in the middle of August, Bringuier sent one of his men to Oswald's home, the address of which he had observed on some of the Fair Play literature, under orders to pose as a pro-Castro Cuban interested in working for Oswald. Oswald received Bringuier's plant courteously and dis- cussed Cuban politics with him in the evening on his [Oswald's] porch, but Marina has testified that after the conversation Oswald told her that he strongly suspected that the man who had come was an anti-Castro Cuban pretending that he was pro-Castro. Consequently, both Bringuier and Oswald failed in rheir attempts to infiltrate the other's organization. Later, the two men were to meet and debate each other on Radio Station WDSU in New Orleans. Bringuier has also testified to the Commission that a bartender acquaintance of his observed Oswald in the "Havana Bar" in New Orleans in the company of a Mexican for whom the FBI was allegedly search- ing because of his Communist activities and that the FBI was duly informed of these facts. No trace of this information is in the FBI files, however. Mrs. Silvia Odio of Dallas, Tex., a 26-year-old refugee from the Castro regime whose parents are still in a Cuban prison on the orders of Fidel Castro told a representative of the FBI shortly after the assassination that in late September or early October 1963 two anti-Castro Cuban leaders from out of town came to her home in the company of a third man to ask her help in raising funds for their cause. She turned down their request, as she has turned down all similar requests, because she feared retaliation by Castro against her parents. Mrs. Odio has fur- nished the following facts about the two Cuban leaders : One of them referred to himself as "Leopoldo," the other was probably "Rogelio Cisneros," and both of them were from Puerto Rico or Miami. She also gave the FBI their physical descriptions. The third man accompanying them, M'ho said very little, she first told the FBI was introduced to her as "Leon Oswald." Now she" is saying it was simply "Leon." When Mrs. Odie first spoke to representatives of the FBI, the physical description she gave of "Leon Oswald" roughly fitted Lee Harvey Oswald. She is now reported to be saying the "Leon Oswald" had a mustache or at least was unshaved, and that he had a dark, Cuban-type com- plexion. According to her first story, "Leopoldo" called her back a few days later to say that "they" — presumably he and the other Cuban leader — had checked back on "Leon Oswald" in New Orleans and were told that he was "loco," and they were, therefore, dropping him. "Leopoldo" is also reported to have said "Leon" would do anything, saying that Leon had "laughed at" the Cubans, claim- ing they had told he allegedly "no guts." "It would be easy to kill Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs," Leopoldo. Mrs. Odio is reported to have suffered a severe psychological reaction at her place of employment when she first saw Lee Harvey Oswald's picture on tele- vision after the assassination, presumably because she was struck by the fear that her own group was somehow involved in the killing of the President. On November 1, 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald mailed a letter to the Communist Party in New York City. Among other things he mentioned that he had attended a meeting in Dallas on October 23, 1903, of a group headed by General Walker : investigation has led to the conclusion that this must have been au anti-Castro meeting. With the sole exception of Mx-s. Odio — and even she is now apparently changing her story — every member of the Dallas anti-Castro Cuban community who has been questioned on Lee Harvey Oswald denies ever having observed him or hav- ing had any contacts with him whatever prior to the assassination. Nor has any 165 member of that community come forward to volunteer any information as to contacts with Oswald. However, Mrs. Odio has been checked out thoroughly through her psychiatrist and friends, and, with one exception— a layman who speculates that she may have subconscious tendencies to overdramatize or exag- gerate— the evidence is unanimously favorable, both as to her character and reliability and as to her intelligence. She is under psychiatric treatment for a disease rare in American vromen but apparently common among European women, known as "grand hysteria," the primary symptom of which is occasional black- outs. According to her psychiatrist, the symptoms definitely do not include hal- lucinations. Itwas one of these blackouts that she had when she first observed Oswald on television after the assassination. Moreover, some of the details of Mrs. Odio's story, as it was first related to the FBI after the assassination— unfortunately, in a rather brief interview — check with what we now know about Oswald. For example: he was described as quiet and reticent, an impression Oswald usually gave; "Leopoldo" later told Mrs. Odio they had checked back on him in New Orleans, which is where Oswald, in fact, had come from ; Leopoldo said he was told by New Orleans that "Leon" was "loco," a term Carlos Bringuier may very well have used to describe him ; and most importantly, of course, the name "Leon Oswald" is so close to "Lee Oswald" as to raise the strongest sus- picions. Even if it was only "Leon," there is a similarity. We contemplate taking Mrs. Odio's deposition at the earliest opportunity, in an effort to follow this lead. The evidence here could lead to an anti-Castro Cuban involvement in the as- sas ination on .some sort of basis as this : Oswald could have become known to the Cubans as being strongly pro-Castro. He made no secret of his sympathies, and so the anti-Castro Cubans must have realized the the law-enforcement authorities were also aware of Oswald's feelings and that, therefore, if he got into trouble, the public would also learn of them. The anti-Cuban group may even have believed the fiction Oswald tried to create that he had organized some sort of large active Fair Play For Cuba group in New Orleans. Second, someone in the anti-Castro organization might have been keen enough to sense that Oswald had a penchant for violence that might easily be aroused. This was evident, for example, when he laughed at the Cubans and told them it would be easy to kill Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs. On these facts, it is possible that some sort of deception was used to encourage^Osw ald agents" were even toused kill tothepersuade PresidentOswald when that he came to Dallas.Cubans pro-Castro Perhaps "double would help in the assassination or in the getaway afterward. The motive on this would, of course, be the expectation that after the President was killed Oswald would be caught or at least his identity ascertained, the law-enforcement authorities and the public would then blame the assassination on the Castro government, and the call for its forceful overthrow would be irresistable. A "second Bay of Pigs Invasion" would begin, this time, hopefully, to end successfully. The foregoing is probably only a wild speculation, but the facts tliat we already know are certainly suflBcient to warrant additional investigation. Mr. CoRXAVELL. First, when was the clocnment written? yiv. Slawsox. I can't remember exactly but my guess would bo ear] V June but that is just a guess. Mr. CoRxwELL. I might simply 7iote that the document does have X's in it which apparently occurred in connection with declassifica- tion of tlie document. Would it be fair to state that as of June l^CA you had done a considerable amount of work in the area of determin- ing whether there was a foreign conspiracy ? On page 1 of the memo you describe the fact tliat firm evidence of a foreign conspiracy is obviou.sly very hard to come by, and go on to note that at least one of the principal investigative avenues would be information acquired from the various foreign countries that might be suspected of heirs: involved and that such information would obvious- ly not be veiw helpful because a foreign governiuGTit will trv to furnish only that evidence which it believes to be nonincriminating, at least that was a substantial possibility. Is that correct? Mv. Slawsox. That is correct although I think that the emphasis in the introduction you are quoting from was only explaining why 166 that kind of evidence could not be relied upon as your primary evi- dence. We did have other kinds of evidence. I was trying to explain at this point in the memo that we would not be relying upon evidence furnished by the country itself insofar as we could possibly avoid doing so. Mr. CoRNWELL. You go on in that vein to note fTirther on page 2 that one way to test the accuracy of the information which would be pro- vided by the foreign government would be through the CIA and its facilities. Is that correct ? Mr. Slay^son. That is correct. Incidentally that reminds me that in response to an earlier question of yours, one way we had of checking the a-ccuracy of information American organizations like the CIA or the FBI was to check them against each other. The jurisdictions of the various investigatory agencies at the time would have fairly firm limits. For example, the CIx\ would do mostly overseas things, the FBI would do mostly domestic criminal activities. The State Depart- ment and Immigration and Maturali/^ation Service had their respec- tive jurisdictions. So, when a person like Oswald or Marina would pass from, one jurisdiction to another, come from a foreign country or vice versa, the agencies would pass inform^ation back and forth, notifi- cations accompanied by documents. In our getting the records of these in every case possible I would match them up to make sure that the dis- closure to the Warren Commission from a particular agency included everything it should, judged by what the other agencies had given us. having heard from that agency in times past. Mr. McKiNNET. You spoke earlier of their defensiveness of the fact that they might be accused of not having done a good job. Was there any particular conversation or discussion on their defensiveness for not roally having told the Secret Service or for just sort of letting the President come into Dallas with this guy wandering around? That is the most amazing thing to me. They were tracking him and yet with the President coming into Dallas, here is this guy. Isfv. Slawson. There was no discussion of that, or rather no aspect of this defensiveness that I could see in the docum-ents that were passed prior to the assassination. The,y were all official bureaucratic type documents, vqtj impersonal. Mr. CoRNWELL. There was no suggestion in any of those documents, say from the CIA, when Oswald would come in from a foreign coun- try, that the Secret Service perhaps should watch this guy or the FBI wntch him ? Mr. Slawson. I can't really rem.ember that, Mr. McKinney, whether there was or not. The usual notification would have no suggestion as to whnt the agencv ought to do at all. It would simply be that "Notifica- tion is hereby given that such and such, Lee Harvey Oswald or some- borly, had contacted the Cuban Fmbassy in Mexico City, et cetera, and presum.ably returned to the TTnitcd States shortly thereafter." Then it would be left up to the FBI to do what they would with that. Mr. McKinney. Thank you very much. Thank vou, counsel. Mr. ConNWEi.L. In your m.ind would there have been a pnrticularly severe problem with your area of international consniracy because of the fact that there was really onlv one asrency, the CIA, that had any access to information which would reveal that ? 167 Mr. Slawson. Yes. There is really no way I can imagine and cer- tainly there was no way at the time I could imagine that anyone could carry on an investigation of foreign intelligence operations other than through the CIA. That simply is the body of expert opinion on that sort of thing and capability that esists in the United States. So, if a major suspect is the CIA itself in some kind of foreign involvement, it might be, say, taken over or infiltrated by the Cuban or Russian Gov- ernment, an investigation like the Warren Commission would find it very, very difScult to ascertain that. That is just inevitable. I think occurred to me at the time too but there wasn't much thatThis could be done about it. Let me add there I think there are two major defenses there : One, I think and I still think that the likelihood of any large number of people in a major Governm.ent organization trying to kill their own President is very small. I think m^ost people are loyal. The other is that anything that large would almost certainly spill over someplace in the public view. We had all sorts of people of course looking into this. I think the chances of its ever being successfully hidden for a long time were infinitesimally small. Mr. CoRNWELLr. Nevertheless it was still your impression, I gather from your memo and your previous statements, that there were really only two primary sources of possible information in your field of responsibility, and that is, what a foreign government might supply, iirhich obviously had its drawbacks and what the CIA provided you. Mr. Sl/Iwson. That is right. Mr. Cornwell, remember, I did talk and hear about the question- ableness of any information supplied by a foreign government, about the possibility of its being involved, but we did have information from foreign governments that might lead you to suspect other foreign gov- ernments were involved. There is no more reason why that would be suspect than any information generally. For example, we had a com- munication from the West Germ^an Government intelligence service, I remember, which we investigated. As I recollect, if it had worked out, it would have implicated the Soviet Union. There is no reason why we should suspect that. Mr. Cornwell. Mr. Chairman, may I have an exhibit marked for identification as No. 23. It is a memorandum dated September 6, 1964. 1 show it to the witness and ask you, Mr. Slawson, if you recall that document ? Mn Slawson. I read this last night when your staff supplied it to me. I in a very general way recollect it, that is all. Mr. Cornwell. It deals generally with the question of the type of information that had been supplied to the Warren Commission by the CIA. Is that correct ? Mr. Slawson. Yes. Mr. Cornwell. May we have this document entered into the record so that we may ask questions concerning it ? Mr. pREYER. Without objection exhibit 23 is entered into the record. [The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 23 and received for the record, follows :] 168 JFK Exhibit No. 23 [Memorandum] September 6, 1964. To : J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel. From : W. David Slavvson. Subject : Footnotes supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency. Throughout our investigation, the CIA has been sending us memoranda. The CIA made no attempt to withhold any information from the Commission vehat it believed was pertinent. Consequently, many of the memoranda we received con- tained references to secret sources and procedures. During the last few weeks, we have been working with the CIA to establish guidelines for what we will and will not publish in our report. These guidelines will, of course, be consistent witii the statement of them in the report itself. Generally speaking, we will publish all infox-mation on which the Commission relied in coming to its conclusions and ail information which tends to counteract these conclusions. Sources of information will frequently be withheld, but the information supplied by these sources will in .almost all cases be published. The CIA is now in the process of supplying us with new memoranda designed to replace previous memoranda. The memoranda will contain the information which we can publish, and only that information. The plan is that the Commis- sion will put the old memoranda in a file at Archives marked "SECRET" and use the new memoranda as exhibits in the report. Mr. CoEX^vELL. The first two sentences in tlie memorandum read, "Throughout our investigation the CIA has been sending us memo- randa. The CIA made no attempt to withhold any information from the Commission that it believed was peitinent." Not meaning to be facetious but just for clarification, the ''it" that is referred to, in other words, "that it believes was pertinent," does that refer to the CIA or to the Commission ? ^Iv. Slawson. I suppose it meant the CIA. I am just trying to inter- pret my own Avriting the same as you are but I think that is what I woidd have meant. JNIr. CoRXWELL. The way it reads then in substance is that it was your impression as of September 6, 19G4, near the end of the investigation, that the CIA had made no attempt to withhold any information from the Commission that the CIA believed was pertinent ? Mr. Slawson. That is right. Mr. Corn WELL. Did the CIA or anyone, say, between the CIA and you ever tell the Warren Commission members about tlie CIA assassi- nation plots on Castro? Mr. Slawson. Mo, not to my knowledge. Mr. CoRNw^ELL. Do you believe that would have been pertinent to your work? !Mr. Srx.4LWS0N. Yes. Mr. CoRNWELL. Wliat would you have done in respect to your area if you had been provided that information ? Mr. Slawson. That is hard to recollect at this point. It certainly would have increased my suspicion of the possibility that the Cuban Government was involved, for obvious reasons. I cannot, however, think of anything that I would have done any differently. The reason for my conclusion is that I think I followed up every lead as thor- oughly asI could in any event. I already had reasons for suspecting the Cuban Government as I had reasons for suspecting the anti-Castro Cubans. So I would have been, I thinlr. doing the same things I did with perhaps a greater suspicion in my mind. Nevertheless it was pertinent. 169 ]Mr. CoRXWELL. Would you have had with that information any cause to request records which you did not otherwise seek? 'My. Slawson. No, not tliat I can think of. That is a difficult question for me to answer now because I can't remember in any kind of detail at all what my request for records was and what records I got. ]Mr. CoRXWELL. Did you ever seek records concerning the general issue of assassination plots ? Ur. Slawsox. By the CIA ? ]Mr. CoRXWELi>. Against Castro or anyone ? Mr. Slawsox. No, I can't recollect that I did. Our requests for infor- mation from the CIA were rarely specific. The request was made ini- tially that they give us all information in any way pertinent to the assassination investigation. Mr. CoEXWELL. Leaving to their discretion the decision as to what was pertinent ? Mr. Slawsox. Well, I suppose inevitably, yes, because there are mountains of information in the CIA and a request like that has to leave it to some extent to their discretion as to what is pertinent. Any- thing that came out I would talk to th.o CIA about it and if I had any specific requests those of course would be forwarded. yir. CoRXWELL. Would it be fair to state tliat if you had received that information you at least might have altered your willingness to rely upon their judgments as to what was pertinent? jklr. Slawsox. I don't know how to answer that. You see, I never received a "no" from the CIA to any request for information. I mean a no in the sense of not a willingness. Lots of times of course they would say "We don't know anything about that" or "We can't find out for ferent. you." would 1 So haveI don't had think my attitude a different set of would have beenin any considerations mind.dif-I probably almost certainly would have talked to them more thoroughly about, well, did Castro know that you were trying to kill him? And when did he know ? Things like that, trying to work out some possible link between Lee Harvey Oswald and Cuba or anybody else who might have been implicated in the killing. Mr. CoRXWELL. May we have a memorandum dated June 4, 1964 from Mr. Slawson to Mr. Rankin marked for identification as exhibit No. 24, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Preter. All right. Mr. Corxwell. You have had a chance to review tha.t prior to com- ing here ? Mr. Slawsox. Yes. Mr. CoRXWELL. Do you recall that document ? INIr. Slawsox. Again in a general way, yes. Mr. Corxwell. Basically the document concerns a telephone con- servation between you and Mr. Rocca of the CIA and among other things discusses the general subject matter of assassination plots on page 2, is that correct ? ^Ir. Slawsox. Yes. Mr. Corxwell. May we have that document entered into the record, Mr. Chairman, so that we may ask the witness specific questions? Mr. Preter. Without objection it is so ordered and will be entered into the record. 170 [The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 24 and re- ceived for the record, follows :] JFK Exhibit No. 24 June 4, 1964. To : J. Lee Rankin, Howard P. Willens, Norman Redlich. From : W. David Slawson. Subject : Telephone conference with Mr. Rocca of Central Intelligence Agency. About a week or two ago I telephoned Mr. Rocca and drew his attention to the fact that my examination of the documents furnished to us by the Rus-sian Government, excluding the medical documents, which had not arrived at that time, showed that a high percentage of the signatures other than the Oswalds' was said to be illegible by tho State Department translators. I asked Mr. Rocca that the CIA examination of these documents specifically take this observation into account and comment on it. I said that my opinion, as a layman, was that the high percentage of illegible signatures might have been intentional, in order to prevent the CIA from checking hack on actual persons and places when it sought to authenticate these documents. However, I also wondered whether the alleged toillegibility reluctance work too was hard.in Mr. someRocca casessaid simply that ahereflection of the would bring thistranslators' matter to the attention of those who were analyzing the documents. Commission document No. 1011, which is the CIA report on the Soviet docu- ments, came to my desk today. It does not comment on the matter mentioned above. I telephoned Mr. Rocca to ask him about this. His reply was that he had interpreted my request as simply that the CIA translators do their best to read and translate all signatures. I repeated that we were not so interested in that as we were in the general analysis of what if any significance could be attributed to the high percentage of illegible signatures. I told him that since talking to him the first time I had made a personal check and found that out of the 9 signatures app?aring on the non-medical documents 8 were illegible or at least stated to be illegible by the translators. (Actually the percentage is even higher. Two of the documents which contain^^d illegible signatures contain two illegible signatures each, so the ratio is actually 10 to 1 rather than 8 to 1.) Rocca said that he now fully understood my concern and would bring it to the attention of the "higher ups." I told him that we would be happy to make a formal request if this was desirable, and he said that perhaps it would be, but he did not think so. He said that he would ask for a formal request from us later if he or others at CIA thought it was necessary. He told me that the CIA translators had commented that the illegibility of the signatures was the usual thing in Russian documents. He said that he got the impression from talking to them that this is a recurring problem. Apparently the average Russian official has so many documents to sign that his signature soon becomes a scrawl. How- ever, Rocca did not purport to be an expert on this, and he agreed with me that a more formal analysis is called for. (I note here for the record that the following documents contain at least one illegible signature each: lA, 3A(1), 3A(2), 5A(3). 6A. 7A, 9A, and IB, 3A(1) and 5A(3) contain two illegible signatures each. The following documents con- tain no siffnatures at all other than Marina's or Lee Oswald's : 2A, 4A, 5A, 2B, SB, 4B. The single legible signature other than an Oswald signature is con- tained on document 8A. The foregoing includes only the nonmedical documents. There are so many signatures in the medical documents that I have not tried to itemize them, but it can he seen by a glance through them that they also contain a high percentage of illegible ones.) While on the telephone with Rocca he brought up the New York Times article on conspiracy theories contained in the Times of June 1, 1964. He made specific reference to the book by a London newspaper man by the name of Den- nis Fisenberg mentioned in the Austrian newspapers. This book was published about 2 months before the assassination and contained an assertion that the richt wing elements in America were at that time planning the assassination of Kennedy. He said that the CIA has already put procedures in motion to get the book and to obtain further information about the author. The New York Times, rs you are probably already aware, describes this as a "striking coinci- dence." Rocca believes that this may be correct but, of course, cannot be sure. He drew to my attention the fact that the publishing time of this particular book appears to have been almost exactly when Castro was supposed to have made 171 his remark in the Cuban Embassy in Brazil (or to the Brazilian Embassy in Cuba, I have forgotten at this point) to the effect that "Two can play at this game." According to the Miami newspaper which published this allegation, Cas- tro was referring to the Bay of Pigs invasion and subsequent guerrilla activities financed by the CIA which had resulted in the deaths of many Cuban citizens. Roeca said that either he or Mr. [deleted] could report to us on the results of the inquiry on Eisenberg, either formally or informally. He asked me whether we wanted to make a formal request for such a report. I replied that 1 did not think it was necessary in view of the fact that I now know that CIA was looking into the matter and would give us a report. I told him that I would make a memo of our conversation and might remind him of it at a later time if we had not yet heard from him or [deleted]. Mr. CcRNWELL. On page 2 the last paragraph reflects that while on the telephone Rocca brought up a New York Times article on conspiracy theories contained in the Times of June 1, and made specific reference to a book by a Dennis Eisenberg published about 2 months before the assassination and containing an assertion that the right wing element in America were at that time planning the assassination of Kennedy. The particular part of that paragraph I would like to ask yen about is a couple of sentences further down. There it reads that Mr. Rocca drew your attention to the fact that the publishing time of this particular bock appears to have been almost exactly when Castro was supposed to have made his remark in the Cuban Embassy in Brazil to the effect that, ''Two can play at this game." Would it be fair to say that simply on the face of that, one possible inference was that Rocca was deliberately suggesting to you that it was right wing plots to assassinate him that had perhaps come to his attention and prompted his statements about two being able to play at the game? Mr. Slawson. I have no such remarks. My only recollection at this time is that Rocca was drawing my attention to the fact that Castro might well have been involved. Of course he had presumably drawn my attention to this before but he was just doing what he did with me a lot, trying to work with me to put two and two together. Mr. CoRNWELL. Specifically with respect to your notation that he draw attention to the coincidence of the dates between this book and Castro's statement, would it have been possible that he was attempting to mislead you and suggest that it was right wing plots as opposed to CIA plots that had prompted Castro's statements ? to Mr. me atSlawson. the time. I Itdon't know. is hard for That me to suspicion I don't characterize that think now. occurred Mr. CoRNWELL. If you and Mr. Rocca had conversations such as this concerning assassination plots, Castro's statements, can you tell us, based upon your experience there at the time, any reason why the CIA would have withheld from you information concerning their intimate knowledge and association with these plots ? Mr. Slawson. Based on my experience at the time why the CIA might have withheld information from me of their involvement in plots against Castro ? Mr. CoBNWELL. Yes. Mr. Slawson. If your question is directed toward my putting myself 'back in 1964, my answer is that I had no inkling that the CIA was in- volved inthose plots and therefore that speculation never entered my tnind. If your question is directed toward my thinking now, the answer 43-819—79 12 172 •would be that, yes, they would have an interest in not disclosint^ it be- cause they were ashamed of it. They must have felt that it was not Otherwise, I don't see why they propernotthing awould have for them toit to disclosed the done. have members of the Warren Commission. Of course it would have been highly secret but they disclosed other information to us which they felt was also highly secret. For example, +he Nosenko affair was highly secret information. To a limited extent I was given information about sources abroad by sources which were highly secret. I was permitted to follow out that information insofar as I felt I needed to in order to assess the credibility of information obtained. As I say, that was very secret stuff too. I think the fact that they did not trust us would not have been a reason because they did trust us with highly confidential information. Mr. CoRN^VELL. The very last sentence of the memo reads, "Accord- ing to the Miami newspaper which published this allegation Castro was referring to the Bay of Pigs invasion and subsequent guerrilla activity financed by the CIA which resulted in the death of many Cuban citizens." Mr, Slawson. Yes. Mr. CoRNWELL. Did you discuss in light of that report with Mr. Rocca whether or not the CIA had been involved ? Did you ask him if or more information ? Mr. Slawsox. My best recollection at this time is that I did in several conversations with Rocca discuss the CIA involvemv^nt in anti-Cuban activities. I was presumably told that they had been involved of course in the Bay of Pigs invasion. I remember discuss- ing informally that involvement with a CIA operative in Mexico City. Also their involvement with anti-Castro Cuban groups in the United States. I don't know how you exactly draw the line between ■that and an attempt to kill Castro personally. Anyway I never in my own mind crossed over that line and no one ever crossed over it voluntarily in talking to me. Mr. Corn WELL. Were there any other areas that, since termination of your work, have now come to light which you would consider pertinent to the job you had and yet apparently at the time the CIA did not consider pertinent or otherwise withheld? Mr. Slawson. No, I don't think so, except tliis one. Mr. McKiNNEY. Could I ask a question about the way you were •thinking? If you had known then of the attempts by the CIA to encourage people to kill Castro and probably their actual involve- ment would it not have been a legitimate thought that that might have triggered the assassination of the President? Mr. Slawson. Sure, that would have been the immediate suspicion. Mr. McKiNNEY. And probably the immediate suspicion of many of the other members, not that tlie CIA did it but they had triggered it by their involvement. So it would really have changed their thinking ? Mr. Slawsox. Yes; I tliink I should have added that. That was involved in what I did say, they were ashamed of it and particularly they might have been very fearful that they would be blamed for the assassination of Kennedy even though they of course had not ordered it but they had triggered it in the sense that they instigated ithe Cubaij Government to do it. 173 Also, and I don't think I thought of this at the time, but in retro- .spect an agency that sanctions an attempt to kill somebody else's head of state is not in a very good position to be outraged when ours is killed. Mr. McKiNXEY. I was going to go there but you went there on your own. ]Mr. CoRNV/ELL. Do you recall tlie information that the CIA provided you concerning Kostikov, the man that Oswald perhaps misdescribed in the Kussian Embassy? Mr. Slawson. Yes. ^Ir. CoRXWELL. An employee of the KGB in ^lexico City ? ■JMr. SLiVWsoN. That is right. Mr. CoRNWELL. Did the possibility that Kostikov was a member of ^division 13, among other tilings apparently at least including assassi- notion, ever came to your attention ? Mr. Slawsox. My recollection is that I was told that Kostikov iwas probably a very, certainly a very high ranking official in the KGB and perhaps the highest ranking such official in the Western Hemisphere. I don't ticular division which remember whether would include he %vas placed assassinations in any or not. But par- my recollection is that his job would include that among other things. In other words, he was high enough up that he might not even have been within a particular division but had several divisions under his control insofar as they operated in the Western Hemisphere, the Western Hemisphere being the northern part of the Western Hemi- sphere including the Caribl)can. The CIA told me that Mexico City was a kind of spy headquarters so to speak for lots of countries, like Istanbul used to be in detective thrillers, the spies always met at Istanbul. Supposedly Mexico City was somewhat in truth like that in the early 1960's and late 1950's. Mr. CoRNWELL. What was your understanding based on what the CIA told you at the time concerning the nature of the contacts between Kostikov and Oswald? Mr. Seawson. This was not a matter of the CIA telling me so much as it was a ]:)rime objective of our joint investigation. Obviously tills was a crucial thing. I mean if we could be certain that we knew ever3'thing that went on between Kostikov and Oswald we could .have disposed one way or another of the Russian involvement it seems to me, almost certainly. We had some highly reliable sources of information about what was said. The CIA had some background information on Kostikov, not a lot. I mean they had what I just told you about him, and we had .other + bits of circumstantial information as to who w^as probably in the Russian Embassy on or about the same time as Oswald was. We tried to put it all together and I worked with the CIA on that. We came up basically with the conclusions that are in this report includ- ing parts of the report, which are not here which I don't remember either but there are obviously many, many pages that are out of this, which presumably had things giving in more detail the back- giound of my conclusions. I\Ir. Cornwell. As I understand, your best memory is that the CIA did not mention division 13 in connection with Kostikov? 174 Mr. Slawson. Yes ; that is my recollection. As I say I don't think it bears the significance of any withholding of information because they certainly made clear to me that Kostikov was a very important man and that his importance was such that it probably would include as- sas inations iany f were being carried on through the KGB in this part of the world and the CIA had taken great care in educating me in the general technique of the KGB in carrying out foreign assassinations. I spent a long time studying a file that the CIA gave me on a KGB foreign assassin who had defected in Western Europe in the 1950's. I have forgotten his name but the CIA had a big file on him which, as far as I know, I read everj^thing they gave me, trying to educate myself on what kind of patterns of conduct to look for, how would the Eussians carry on an assassination abroad, if they had done so here. Mr. CoRNWELL. Directing your attention back to exhibit 22, one of the things which you discuss in there as I understand it is the question of what type of relationship Oswald may have had with a foreign gov- ernment. In other words, distinguishing between a relationship which might have involved the distribution of propaganda, on the other hand an active role as an assassin for them, that sort of thing. I take it from that that it would have been deemed relevant by you if you had received the information, it would have been a relevant fact of his con- trol or work in division 13, in other words, his relationship to possible assassination work by the Russian Government. Is that correct? Mr. Slawson. Yes. Mr. CoRNWELL. I did not see this in the part of the memo, exhibit 22, but can you tell me whether there exists any indication tha^t Kostikov had responsibility for assassinations ? Mr. Slawson. No; in my reviewing it last night I did not come across anything of that nature either although I think that the parts of the memo that are shown here do include my statement that he was a KGB official, KGB employee. Mr. CoRNWELL. We may not have all of your memos but will you tell us, to the best of your memory, did the fact that Kostikov may have worked with or had responsibility for assassinations appear any- where in the Warren Commission report ? Mr. Slawson. I don't remember this either. I think the Warren Commission report does reflect that Kostikov was a KGB employee and I think, but I am not sure at this point, certainly not sure, that the Warren report also reflects the fact that of course the KGB had car- ried out assassinations elsewhere in the world. In Western Europe I think we attributed one at least to them. So, to me that presumably was sufficient. Mr. CoRNWELL. If the possibility that Kostikov was associated with assassinations appears neither in your memos nor in the Warren Com- mission report is your memory still the same that the CIA neverthe- less gave you that information ? Mr. Stawson, Yes ; but I want to repeat myself for emphasis. My recollection or impression of Kostikov was that he was more important than that. He was high enough up so that he was the central director so to speak for KGB activities in the Caribbean area which as I say was a very important area because it was a kind of spy clearinghouse and presumably an assassination clearinghouse too. 175 The principal objective of my work in Mexico was to find out what had gone on between Oswald and this very important KGB operative. Obviously it was a suspicious circumstance. Mr CoRNWELL. Mr. Chairman, may we mark two memoranda, dated February 21 and March 27, 1964, for identification as exhibits 25 and 26. Mr. Preyer. Those documents may be marked for identification. Mr Slawson. I should add that as far as I was able to ascertain with the help of the CIA the fact that Kostikov was called down to see Oswald when Oswald showed up at the Russian Embassy was prob- ably not as significant as one might think because apparently he would have been called down to see any out-of-the-ordinary person, anyone that might have intelligence significance, any secret significance to the Mr. CoRNWELL. If I could direct your attention to exhibits 25 and 26, you have had a chance to review prior to coming here, is that correct ? Mr. Slawson. Yes. . i. . . Mr. Corn WELL. Basically both memos refer to a similar subject matter and that is the possibility of obtaining some information con- a man named Al Tarabochia . Oswald's contact in Mexico City through cerning Mr. Slawson. That is correct. Mr. Cornwell. May we enter both of those exhibits in the record so that we may ask the witness specific questions concerning them. theMr. Preyer. Without objection exhibits 25 and 26 are admitted into record. [The documents referred to, marked JFK exhibits 25 and 26 and received for the record, follow :] JFK Exhibit No. 25 [Memorandum] February 21, 1964. To: Howard Willens. From : David Siawson, Subject : The possibility of a new informant in Mexico City. During the conference in your office on Thursday, February 20, we discussed the use of sources of information in Mexico City other than the CIA and the FBI. We decided that rather than attempting piecemeal utilization of such other sources, we would first gather information as to the existence of such other sources and then try to use them in a coordinated manner, with full consultation among all the agencies concerned. I therefore am bringing to your attention the existence of a possible informant for this purpose. On pages 4-5 of Commission No. 351, which appears to be a portion of a memo- randum of a telephone call from Alan Schwartz of the State Department to William McManus, of the Senate Internal Security Committee, it is stated that a man named "Al Tarabochia" claims to have a good contact who has connec- tions at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Mr. Tarabochia wants to know if the contact should inquire about Oswald's true purpose while at the Embassy there. The context indicates that this Tarabochia is an anti-Castro Cuban. Otherwise, I know nothing about him. If we want to explore the possibilities of using this informant, we should probably contact Mr. William McManus and get more detail from him. I mentioned all this to you a few days ago, and you told me that you believed our files contained a letter from Senator Eastland or his staff on the general subject. The best efforts of Ruth Shirley have been unable to locate such a letter. 176 JFK Exhibit No. 26 [Memorandum] Mabch 27, 1864; To : J. Lee Rankin, From : W. David Slawson. ISubject : Senate Internal Security Subcommittee ; Possible Use of Their Mexicans Informant. On Tuesday, March 17, 19G4 I called Mr. J. G. Sourwine, counsel for the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. I referred to a memorandum in a file which Mr. William McManus, formerly with Mr. Sourwine's staff, had sent to the Com- mission on January 28. 1964, in which there was a reference to an '"Al Tara- bochia," a man known to the subcommittee who, in turn, claims to know someone who has access to confidential information about the Cuban Embassy in Mexico • City. I told Mr. Sourwine that the Commission would like to utilize this in- formant and that for this purpose we would like either to be told his name or given other means by which we could make contact with him. Mr. Sourwine asked me why we wanted to use the informant. This question struck me as strange, -since the rea.sons must have been obvious, but my reply was that we of course had knowledge that Oswald had been in Mexico not too long ago before the assassina- tion and that he had made contacts with the Cuban Embassy, so we naturally wanted to find out as much as possible about these contacts. Mr. Sourwine said he would take the matter up with Senator Eastland. That afternoon Mr. Sourwine called back and asked that I send him copies- of the memorandum from Mr. McManus, since he could not find this memorandum in his files. He said he would like the memorandum if possible by the following morning because he was having a conference with Senator Eastland around noon time and could then present the whole problem to him for an early solution. I therefore sent Mr. Sourwine a letter dated March 18, enclosing a copy of the memorandum in question, and had it hand delivered to him on the morning of March IS. I heard nothing further from Mr. Sourwine and therefore I telephoned hin office on Thursday morning, March 26. He was not there. He returned my call that afternoon and the conversation went roughly as follows : He apologized for the delay, saying that he had been imable to reach Senator Eastland about this matter because the Senator had been so busy and sometimes out of town. However, he had .iust seen Senator Eastland and their decision was That although they wanted to cooperate in every way with the Commission, they did not feel that they could disclose their informant to us. He said that they would be happy to give us a letter to this effect, signed by the Senator. Mr. Sourwine ■ added that they would be happy to convey to the informant any specific questions we had and convey back his answers to those questions. Mr. Sourwine also added that Mr. Tarabochia's reluctance to disclose the identity of his informant was ■'understandable." I agreed and said words to the effect, "Am I to understand, then, that it is Mr. Tarabochia's reluctance to disclose the identity of the in- formant which is the basis for Senator Eastland's refu.sal to do so?" Mr. Sourwine replied, "No; the decision is the Senator's, not Mr. Tarabochia's." I said that I was not authorized to give a decision at the present time, that the decision on something of this importance would have to be made by Mr. Rankin or the Commission itself. I added that it was my opinion that if we did decide to forward questions through Mr. Sourwine that they would be of the most gen- eral nature, ratlier than specific. Mr. Sourwine replied that general questions- might be hard to handle. I asked Mr. Sourwine whether his informant could liandle a question such as, "Give us all the information you have on what the Cuban i:mbassy knows about Oswald, his visits to the Embassy, and anything ekse which might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy." Mr. Sour- wine's reply was that although such a question was very broad, it probably could be handled. He then repeated his willingness to give us a signed letter from Sen- ator Eastland. We closed off the conversation i)y my saying that he should do- nothing whatever on this matter until hearing further from me or Mr. Rankia. Mr. Sourwine agreed. In view of the subcommittee's reluctance to give us direct access to tliinr in- formant, Irecommend that we convey to Mr. Soun\dne the very general kind of (juestions that I mentioned during the telephone conversation and hope that we • get as much information as possible from the informant. Forwarding specific 177 questions to the informant would carry the strong disadvantage of disclosing to the informant and to everyone who worked with him, the particular problems that were worrying us and the particular areas in whicli we felt we were deficient in our knowledge. Mr. CoRNWELL. First, would it be accurate to state that the sub- stance of the two memos is that the Senate Internal Security Subcom- mittee contacted the Warren Commission with respect to offering information through an informant ? Mr. Slawson. I cannot remember whether they contacted us or whether I came upon the reference in a memorandum — well, it says here in exhibit 25, page 1, "A memo of a telephone call from Abba Schwartz to William McManus." You see, I had copies of every Gov- ernment agency's memorandum and correspondence of every kind that had anything to do with the assassination. So, the State Depart- ment presumably would have sent us a copy of this. So, in going through that I may have noticed the statement and, of course, then wanted to get in touch with this contact, myself. I don't remember how it first came to our attention. Mr. CoRNWELL. Wliatever became of the possibility of using this informant ? Mr. Slawson. Nothing. The contacts to the best of my recollection were made as stated in these two memorandums. I talked to Mr. Sourwine. I think but I am not sure that I followed up a telephone call with a personal conference with him in his office. But he and Senator Eastland were not willing to give us access to the claimed contact they had, and nothing came of the request that we gave them for informa- tion from that. There was no further communication. Mr. CoRNWELL. What was your final opinion about this incident? Mr. Slawson. Mj^ final opinion and to my recollection, it was also J. Lee Rankin's, was that Sourwine and Eastland were trying to use this alleged contact as a way of finding out inside information about the Warren investigation which they could use for their own political purposes. Mr. CoRNWELL. Did you discuss the Taraboclna and Sourwine contacts with Rocca or anyone else in the CIA ? Mr. Slawson. I don't remember the occasion of doing so. but I cer- tainlv must have. I would probably have discussed this with both the CIAand the FBI. Mr. CoRNWELL. "V^Hiat, if any, information did the CIA provide you concei'ning Tarabocliia and Sourwine? !Mr. Slawson. I am sure it was to the effect that they didn't know anything about the contacts. That was probably just the end of it. Their standard procedure would be not to make any comment on a Congressman or his motive. They would have said, "We don't know anvtiiiug of it. about this Tarabocliia" and that would have been the end Mr. CoRNWELL. In the course of consideration of raids and that sort of thing in Cuba, did the subject matter of one raid, which I guess is popularly known as the Bayo-Pawley raid, come to your attention? Mr. Slaw^son. That name does not mean anj^thing to me; no. It does not mean anything to me now. 178 Mr. CoRNWELL. Do you recall whether or not the CIA provided you any information about Tarabochia or Sourwine concerning raids in Cuba? Mr. Slawson. I understood the question as whether the CIA sup- plied me with any information about raids in Cuba in connection with Sourwine and Tarabochia. My answer is no. Mr. CoRNWELL. Directing your attention again to exhibit 22, on page 3 you discuss not only the problem that we asked you questions about earlier, and to what extent you could conduct an effective investiga- tion, but on the bottom of page 3 you note that there are also problems with the fact that a good deal of the information cannot be disclosed to the American public and you note that there are two reasons for that. One, that much of what CIA might provide could come from particularly sensitive methods or sources which would be impossible to disclose; and second, that in fact in some cases the information it- self could not even be disclosed, and you cite as an example on page 4 the fact that a Russian MVD employee may secretly have tried to warn Oswald not to come to Russia, if disclosed, might result in the employee being severely punished or executed. Will you provide to the committee any examples where those types of considerations ulti- mately restricted your ability to tell the American public why you reached certain findings or to provide it in the information you had acquired ? Mr. SiAWSON. I can recollect several situations like that, but even to this day some of them, so far as I know, are still sensitive. There was a highly placed source, a source highly placed in a particular foreign government, from which we got information indicating the noninvolvement of that government. The information was in the na- ture of the surprise expressed by members of that government and apparently genuine shock at the news of Kennedy's assassination, which would of course tend to show they were not involved. But even to state what that government was and any information in great detail would lead to possible identification of the course because there were only apparently so many people present when these things were observed. So that would be one such situation. Other ones were, while the other one I have in mind was similar, we were not able to use other information which again tended to exonerate the government involved because the information was spoken by certain foreign officials at a time and place where, if they knew we had it, they could tell pretty well how we got it. Then the comment I made riglit here in the memo on page 4 or someplace further on, about the Russian MVD employee, there the reasons would be to avoid retaliation against an individual they might have harmed him and still might. One thing that has bothered me about the public disclosure of some of this information is thf?t these people are presumably still alive in Russia. Mr. CoRNWELiL. At least there were a number of examples where thcvse lands of concerns did result in exactly what you predicted, in other words, failure to disclose the information to support your conclusion ? Mr. Slawson. That is right. 179 Mr. CoRNWELL. What about the Nosenko example ? What were the reasons for ultimately not disclosing the information that Nosenko had provided? Mr. Slawson. There were two basic ones. One, I never did under- stand thoroughly ; but to get to the first one we did not disclose it be- cause itseemed so very self-serving by the Russians, that to even appear to rely upon it in our conclusion that was basically exonerating the Russian involvement in the assassination we thought would be bad because we in fact were not relying upon it. As I said in the memo, the coincidence was too much, the first major defector in many years should come across after the assassination and have information that tended to show that the Russians were not at all involved. I am still suspicious of it. I still think that Nosenko was probably a plant, which does not go to say it was not true, but it means that you can't rely upon it. The second reason was that the CIA told me and told Bill Coleman, it is my recollection, and other people on the Commission staff, that their procedures to test the authenticity of Nosenko would be com- promised ifthe Russians were to know what Nosenko told us. They said that authenticating and evaluating Nosenko was of extreme im- portance to them. He was the most important potential source of information they had obtained in years about the Russians. So, we didn't want to hurt their investigation. Mr. CoRNWELL. May we mark for identification a memorandum dated July 17, 1984, as exhibit 28, Mr. Chairman ? Mr. Preyer. We will mark that for identification. Mr. Corn WELL. Do you recall that memo, Mr. Slawson ? Mr. Slawson. I recall it from reading the file last night. Except in a very central way I assume it is the one I wrote. I don't recall any details. Mr. Cornv/ell. I am sorry that I don't have a copy of it here but apparently there was a memo dated July 15, shortly before this one, from you to Mr. Rankin, explaining a list of your proposed references to what would be quoted as "A confidential Soviet Union source, the reliability of which has not been established." In the foreign conspiracy, in the Russian section of the report, in detailing about five areas which you had planned to discuss and following that memo I take it was the July memo 2 days later, would it be fair to state that at the point in time when this memo was written the Warren Commission was go- ing through the process of determining whether or not they could disclose the information that Nosenko had provided ? Mr. Slawson. Yes, that would be my recollection. Mr. Cornwell. May we have this exhibit admitted as part of the record, Mr. Chairman ? Mr. Preyer. Without obiection the exhibit is entered into the record. [The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit 28 and received for the record, follows :] 180 JFK Exhibit No. 28 [Memorandum] JXTLT 17, 1964. To: William T. Coleman. From : W. David Slawson. Attached is Howard Willens' re-draft of our Foreign Conspiracy draft. I have not had time to read it in detail yet, but with a few exceptions he seems to have accepted our arguments and our plan of organization. There are three major exceptions omitted. I :attended First, alla references conference towith the the "secret CIA Soviet on thisUnion source" and now agreehave thatbeen we should not question this source. AVillens can till you in on the reasons v.-hy. In- deed, the argument been omitted becausebased uponclaims the CIA Oswald's it hasbeing permittedof tomany information marrycases Marina has in which spies eral were character marriedand histo way nonspies. of life Third, in the the argument United basedbeenupon States has Oswald's omitted here gen- and will be reinserted at a point where it will apply to not only the foreign conspiracy but also the [deleted] conspiracy and a tie-in with Ruby. In case I do not get to talk to you on the telephone before I leave, I have read your IMexican draft. It is very good. If you get a chance, speak to Willens and see whether he wants a xerox copy now or whether he wants to wait for foot- noting. Imade a very few changes while I was reading it, but have not attempted as yet a real editing job. I am in full agreement with the substance and the con- flicling evidence. These, so far as I am concerned, require change. Mr. CoRNWELL. Directing your attention to the memo, would it be fair to state that in the third sentence in the first paragraph we have a, record of the fact that a decision as of July 17 had been made that all references to the secret Soviet Union source have been omitted, which then coincides with Mr. Willen's redraft of your foreign conspiracy draft ? In other words, is this the point in time when the Warren Com- mission made the decision not to- Mr. Slawson. I am not sure. There were several levels, of course. This would be a reflection at this point, July 17, that Howard Willens, who of course is not the Commission itself, had made this decision tenta- tively that we were to take out references to a secret Soviet Union source. This was my informing Coleman of it but this, like all decisions of importance, presumably would have gone up. In other words, Wil- lens would have sent in his redraft of the foreign conspiracy portion of the report which I had written with his explanation of any changes. This would have to go to Lee Rankin and Lee Ranldn would have made any comments or whatever that he might have had and that in turn might have gone to the full Warren Commission for decisipn. Mr. CoRNWELL. Then the answer is, ultimately, the initial decision, which at this point had been made by Mr. Willens, was finally adopted by the Commission ? Mr. Slawson. Yes. Mr. CoRNWELL. Now in addition to the problems we have already discussed concerning the sheer difficulty of conducting an investiga- tion in the foreign conspiracy field and the problems with writin.g a final report wliich could describe fully the results of your investi- gation, were there any other obstacles in connection with your assign- ment ?For instance, start with the question of time. Was there enough timo to adequately conduct the investigation ? Mr. Si-Awsox. Yes, there was, although at times I wasafraid that vrouldn't be. There was time pressure on all of us. I thinlv that all •members of tlie staff were bothered and somewhat resented the fact tlnit we wore beiiig pushed to work at such a rapid pace but we 181 resisted any attempts to nicake us finish before wc felt we were ready to be finished. When the report came out neither I, and I don't think anybody else, felt that there was anything significant that we had not been able to do in tlie time, 3Ir. CoENv/ELL. When we discussed the same subject matters in- formally as I recall 3'ou made statements to the general effect that everyone had too much to do. Mr. Slawsox. That is right. the]Mr. CoRKWELL. Yv^ould you explain the sense in which you made statement? Mv. Slawson. Well. T have since learned I think that this is the 'nature of any kind of special progi-am. You probably feel overworked yourself in this. Bvit the amount of paper tliat we had to go through to do our job well vras tremendous. I spent I think about the first month simply absorbing information. I don't think I issued a single significant request the first month I was back there. I had so many documents to get through and try to understand and try to put them together. They continued pouring in from the ongoing investigation .after that. Tliere weren't that many of us. So we had more than enough to do I would say. Mt. Cornwell. One reason T ask the question, if I could direct your attention again to exhibit 22, at page T you discuss the possi- bility of tlie Soviet Union having assassins abroad to carry out work for them. Near the bottom of the main paragraph on that page you note that once you accept tliis fact, the possibility that their network, if it exists, included Lee Harvey Oswald, must be fully explored, indicating that at least at tliat point you felt additional investigation was warranted. Is that correct ? ]Mr. Si.Awsoisr. Not necessarily. My recollection is that I was stating hei'e — well, the m.emo tends to confirm my recollection that I was here speaking of what on page 6 I call the "overall relevance of political motive" whicli wasandthegiving the background members to the readers of the Commission of this that when memorandum I said that must be fully explored I meant that I was going to explore them as fully as I could in this memo and that they as members of the Warren Commiission should fully explore them in their own minds in order to come to a conclusion. In addition, I would have meant tha-t insofar as that exploration on my side was not complete, I was going to continue pursuing it. We did have i3ortio!is of that kind of exploration which went up almost to the last minute before publication. been'Mr.completed CoRNWELL. At point, at this least the investigation is that correct ? had not anywhere near IMr. S1.AWS0N. Not quite, no. I would say a great deal of it had been done. This was written in early June I think. I suppose some thing like two-tliirds or three-fourths of this investigation had been completed by that time. Mr. CoRNWELL. The initial employment arrangement that you de- : scribed contemplated 3 to 6 months, is that correct? ]Mr. Slawson. That is right. Mr. Corn WELL. Is it also true that you understood Earl Warren • wanted a final draft of everything by June ? 182 Mr. Slawson. Yes. At one point I remember he was expecting us to be completed by the following Monday, whatever date that would be, some time in June or May. Lee Rankin was on his way home for the weekend and turned to Howard Willens and said, "you had better tell the chief it won't be done next Monday." Mr. CoRNWELL. Do you know what his reaction was ? Mr. Slawson. No, except he didn't like it. His main motivation in wanting the work done, and which he repeated several times to dif- ferent members of the staff, was that he wanted the truth known and stated to the public before the Presidential election of 1964 because he didn't want the assassination in any way to affect the elections. I am not sure at all how he thought it would but he didn't want any possibility of it. That was his principal reason for having it all finished. Mr. Corn WELL. Whom did you get this information from ? Mr. Slawson. About Warren? Mr. Cornwell. Yes, sir. Mr. Slawson. From my recollection right from the Chief Justice himself. He did not deal with us on an individual basis frequently but enough so that everybody I think who had a significant role on the staff had conferences with Earl Warren. Mr. Cornwell. Again with respect to the same memorandum, exhibit 22, the very last page of it concludes that, "The facts that we already know are certainly sufficient to warrant additional investi- gation," again in the same context, is that correct ? Mr. Slawson. Yes. Let me back up and see what this was in con- nection with. This is the anti-Castro Cuban movement I am. com- menting on, yes. We had done a good deal of investigation by this time but on that one we were still going forward insofar as we could. Mr. Cornwell. So, the investigation in fact as you suggested was not complete by June and in fact it continued throughout the summer, is that correct? Mr. Slawson. That is rig'ht. Mr. Cornwell. Sylvia Odio, one of the more publicized issues in the last 15 years, was interviewed in July after you wrote this memo. Isn't that accurate ? Mr. Slawson. That is right. Mr. Cornwell. In fact, as I recall, jou had some information about the investigation in your field, even going up to within 36 hours of the publication date of the report, isn't that accurate? Mr. Slawson. Thirty-six or 72 or something. It was a matter of fractions of a day. That is correct. Mr. Cornwell. Will you tell the committee what that incident related to? Mr. Slawson. That is another one that I cannot get into detail but we had — well, to go back to the beginning, as I said earlier, a major part of our investigation into the Mexico trip by Oswald was as to what transpired between him and Kostikov at the Russian Embassy and what transpired between him and the people he spoke to in the Cuban Embassy, I can't pronounce the name, Asque or somebody in the Cuban Embassy that he apparently spoke to and also Sylvia Turado de Duran. 1S3 This information we had and were able to obtain by further in- vestigation led us to the conclusion that if Oswald had done only what ho apparently had done at the Cuban Embassy, which was to apply for an intransit visa to Cuba so that he could visit Cuba in transit to the Soviet Union, that certain kinds of documents would have been made out that would have borne certain people's signatures including Oswald's. We did not have those documents. We thought if we could get them or copies of them and if we could authenticate them that would be good evidence that in fact Oswald's contact with the Cuban Em- bassy was indeed innocent as far as the assassination is concerned. It did concern these other things. So, some time in the spring of 1964: we put through a request to the Swiss Government which had diplo- matic relations with Cuba for all the Cuban documents relating to Oswald although I don't think we named anyone in particular. Eventually copies did come back but they did not get back to us until fairly late in the summer. My recollection is that the reason was that there was a lot of friction between Castro and us at that tim.e. I think they turned off the water at Guantanamo Naval Base or something like that and they were not in the mood to cooperate. Nevertheless, they finally got them through the Swiss. When they came in, although they appeared to be authentic I would like to have had some additional information as to whether certain peoples' signa- tures were really their signatures. I told this to the CIA, probably to Rocca, I can't remember who exactly. He said, "Well, we may be able to get that for you. We will try." They did finally get it within a fraction of a day or so before publication deadline. I was able to say in the Warren report then that this particular bit of information had been reasonably well authenticated but without saying how it was. Mr. CoRNWELL. This particular routine was very important to you, was it not? Mr. Slawson. The working out of what Oswald had done in Mexico and trying to authenticate as far as we could ? Mr. CoRNWELL. Yes. Mr. Slawson". Yes. li'Ir, CoRNWELL. In fact when you first were telling me earlier when you first focused on that issue there were conversations concerning whether or not you would be permitted to go forward with the investi- gation inthat area, isn't that true ? Mr. Slawson. Yes. Tlie request to the Castro government, request to the Cuban Government through the Swiss went up through chan- nels to Earl Warren and his first response was no. The reason he gave was that he did not want to rely upon any information from a govern- ment which was itself one of the principal suspects. The CIA and I nevertheless came to the conclusion that any infor- mation that we could get we ought to get. We would worry about trying to authenticate it after we got it. As I told you, I simply dis- obeyed orders and went ahead and made the request through the State I)epai"tm£nt — it had to come from Dean Rusk, I remember we got his signature — to the Swiss Government and we got the information. Then of course I had to tell the Chief Justice that we got it and I pretended 1S4 that I had misunderstood his lorevious statement. I think that is the only time I disobeyed orders. Mr. CoRNAVELL. It was not only his first impression, it was his only impression that you should not have pursued this particular information ? Mr. Sl-awson. Once we got the information he was angry and said something to the effect "I thought I told you we didn't want'it." I said, "I am sorry, I didn't understand it that way." But he accepted the fact that we had it. I would never have thought he wouldn't. He did not make any attempt to suppress it. Mr. CoRNWEi.L. Would it be fair to state then that this particular transaction was a matter that you felt strongly enough about to in fact disobey Earl Warren's orders and pursued and finally the information came in within hours before the final x:)ublication on September 28 of the report. Mr. Slawson. Yes. Mr. CoRNWELL. Were there any other areas like this where maybe you just didn't make the deadline, you wanted to very badly to investi- gate, and you were not able to get within hours of the final publication ? Mr. Slawson. No. Air. CoRNWELL. With respect to the question of whether or not the investigation was adequate, would you tell us what the composition of the statf was, the Warren Commission staff, and whether or not there were enough lawyers whether or not they all produced ? ]\Ir. Slawsox. As I said before, I felt overworked and I think many of the staff members felt the same way. I think that the main problem was one of the great underestimations of the size of the task at the time. As I said, we were told, we were telephoned and asked to come in, it would be 3 to G months. It is my recollection they said it would be only8. 3 to G months on the outside and of coui-se we ended up taking about There was a reluctance, once we were there, to admit — again this is a matter of once you have made a decision you don't like to admit j^ou were wrong— but people did not like to admit that we probably needed more help and more time. The following incidents will illustrate this. Yv^hen we first got there it turned out the secretarial help we had was mostly incompetent. Also we had one fewer typewriter for our own use than there were stall' members. That struck a lot of people as silly. In any event I made a complaint. We eventually got enough typewriters. Several of us complained about the secretarial help. I was in Lee Rankin's office talking to him at the time. He had previously put through a call to JMcGeorge Bundy at the White House and Bmidy's call back came while I was there. Bundy said "What do you want." Lee Rankin told him about the secretaries. Bundy said, "just hold." Apparently picked up another phone and called the Defense Depart- ment and he got back on the line, "I just told the Defense Department to have — I have forgotten the number — but 20 of the best secretaries over there tomorrow morning," and they did. From that point on we had good secretaries. But it took, you know, pressure that high up to get us the resources we needed. There were things all along the line we had to complain we want more of this or we want somcthinji: done here and there. 185 Ml'. CoKNWELT,. With respect to the investigation of the basic num- ber of people who did the investigation for the Warren Commission, have tliero was anv investigativ staff ? huvyers there to do the work? Did yon 'anybody ebesides ]SIr. Si-AWSON.^We had special people assigned from CIA. FBI, and Secret Service who were v,-ith us more or less full time, especially the Secret Service who were investigators. I think that pome of the areas of investigation such as that headed by Da\'e Belin, which was the immediate circumstances of the shooting in Dallas employed private investigators at various points to crosscheck and give an independent evaluation. In other words, people who were not themselves FBI agents. Mr. CoRXWELL. Did Dave Belin employ those people ? ]Mr. Slaw^son. Not with his ovrn money but he chose them. He and Bill Ball worked together had chosen them. In my area we did not because of the difficulties, as I told you_ earlier. There is no place in the world vou can go and buy a spy investigator. Mr. CoRXWELL. Were there any problems with the selection of senior lawvers ? Mr. Slaw^son. I am not quite sure of the thrust of your question. I of course was not privy to the selection of staff counsel. I was one of those who was selected. Mr. CoRNWELL. I mean who did not do the work ? Mr. Slawson. A few did not. The majority of them did and I think contributed very valuably, they did not, with a couple of exceptions, spend as much time as the younger men did, especially as the investi- gation wore on. Some of them I understand were hired with the prom- ise that only a few weeks work would be required of them. Of course that turned out not to be the case. Bill Coleman, who was the one I worked most closely with, I have forgotten the exact amount but it was in the weeks was all that he was told he had to contribute. He ended up contributing much, much more than that. Even then in the middle part of the investigation he was coming down only 1 day a week. But then toward the end he came down again and stayed for a long period of time. Of course in the beginning he stayed permanent time. Mr. McKiNNET. May I ask a question here. As the investigation went on, at the dinners among senior counsel or anyone else did you ever discuss or feel uncomfortable about your tremendous dependence on existing governmental agencies ? You were really sort of processing papers, did that bother you ? Mr. Slawson. Yes, it did. We would talk about how we might escape from the dependency. Apart from the things that I have already mentioned in three different categories, one was_ occasionally hiring an outside expert to give an independent evaluation or assessment of something. I was not able to do it in my particular area but Dave Berlin, for example, did do it. Second was cross-checking the papers passing back and forth be- tween the jurisdictions. The third would be just keeping an eye and ear out for any odd bit of information that would come in not through the agencies. Mt. McKinney. The CIA had been somewhat discredited by the time this investigation started by a sort of bumbling with the Bay of 186 Pigs. It seems to me there was a large question of their intelligence gathering capability after that particular disaster. We also had the Cuban missile crisis and so forth. There was a very strong cry in Washington that perhaps our intelligence gathering forces were not as good as they should be. I wonder if this disturbed you any ? Mr. Slawson. My recollection Is that it did not. I did not view the Bay of Pigs as reflecting so badly upon the CIA's intelligence gather- ing operations as it did upon their judgment as to what kind of opera- tion might be successful. Mr. McKjnney. That is a fine line you are drawing. Mr. Slawson. It is. I will admit it is. To illustrate what I mean, not to tell you that I am right, I think there is no question but that had President Kennedy been willing to back up an invasion of Cuba, then of course we were much stronger than Cuba, we could have toppled the Cuban Government. The bad judgment came in thinking that the United States would be willing to go that far overtly. Mr. McKiNNEY. One last question. We have since learned that an organization which I find hard to pin down, called Army Intelligence, had its muddy little Mngers in a great many things from inside, actu- ally spying on American citizens within the continental bordors of this country as well as being involved in covert and overt activities outside. Has Army Intelligence ever been contacted by the Warren Commission ? Mr. Slawson. My recollection would be yes because we contacted every armed service and that would include specifically their in- telligence operations. Mr. McKtnney. Did they ever admit to any Cuban activities that yen know of? ]Mr. vSlawson. Not that I remember, no. My recollection of the Army Intelligence — I think it was called Army Security Agency in those days — was that we got information from them about Oswald's record and activities in the Marine Corps. I take that back, it could not have been Army Security. It could have been Navy Security. In any event it was an Armed Forces security. Mr. McKtnnet. But not on the subject matter of Cuba ? Mr. Slawson. Not to my recollection, no. Mr.CoRNWELL. I have a couple of additional areas but would the committor like to ask questions on what we have been over so far? Mr. Preter. I might ask one or two questions. Incidentally, Mr. Slawson, I see among your qualifications that you are a summa cum Inude from Amherst, 'maflrri a cum laude from Harvard jM^Kinney I.nw here. School, which should impress a^ Yale man like Mr. You montionod that you spent a considerable nmount of time with Mr. Dulles nnd that you worked with him. Of course he was one mom her of the Commission that had more expertise in this area. mnt wns the. nature of your m.eetings with him? Did vou have any of thosp mformal late evening sessions after dinner and a few drinks and talk about the state of the world as you mentioned you had with the other lawyers ? 187 Mr. Slawson. No. The discussions were some of them informal but they all occurred right in my office at the Warren Commission build- ino- and during the afternoon or morning. He, as I mentioned, %yas somewhat a sick person at the time. I don't recollect his ever bemg there past 6 or Y o'clock in the evening, somethmg like that. He would become too tired generally to stay on any longer. Mr. Preter. Do you happen to nknow whether he was able to at- tend most of the Warren Commissio meetings or not? Did his illness prevent him from being active on the Commission ? Mr. Slawson. No, 1 think liis illness did not prevent him. In fact, I think the record will show that he probably had the best attendance record of anyone. We had a rule that testimony that just was to be pre- sented to the Commission, as opposed to testimony to a staff member, could only be given if at least one Commission member was present. Of course there had to be someone there. I think more of those sessions that member was Allen Dulles than anybody else. Mr. Preter. Did you talk over with him your theory or the hypo- thetical example of the anti-Castro Cuban involvement in the as- sas ination ? Mr. Slawson. Presumably I did, yes. I don't remember the exact conversations but that would have been the kind of things I talked over with him. Mr. Preyer. Did he ever at any time during those conversations mention anything about the assassination plots on Castro that the CIA wasMr.undertaking 'i Slav/son. No. Mr. Preyer. He had been a Director of the CIA of course. Do you know when he was last Director of the CIA ? Mr. SlxUvson. No, I don't. I believe he was the immediate past Di- rector at the time but I am not even sure of that. ]\Ir. Preyer. Perhaps you are going to get into this area, Mr. Corn- well. I want to get the witness' view about the possibility of Oswald being an FBI informant. Are you planning to go into that 'i ]Mr, Cornwell. You can go right ahead if you would like. Mr. Preyer. Since you dealt with Oswald's actions in Russia I would just like to get your views on the f)0ssibility of his being an FBI in- formant. He did seem to be able, he and his wife, to move back and forth in Russia with a minimum of bureaucratic delay in getting pass- ports and that sort of thing. I wondered if you looked into that or had any suspicions in that area or came to any conclusions in that area ? Mr. Slawson. I did look into the possibility that his moving into Russia, getting a passport to travel abroad and his coming back out of Russia with Marina when he decided to come back to the United States, had been suspiciously quick or anything else suspicious about how they were handled and ultimately concluded that they were not suspicious, that the obtaining of the passport in particular to go abroad was well within the normal time for obtaining a passport from the place he obtained it which I think was New Orleans. All these places are foggy in my mind now. In any event, we got the statement of procedures from the particular passport office concerned and also from Washington passport office. We followed up the timing. We did not just accept the State Depart- 43-819—79—13 188 ment's word but we got a list of how long it had taken other people, just a random selection of citizens, about the same time for the same passport application, places to get their passports, and compared them, and his obtaining his, as I said, was just routine in terms of time. Coming back, it was more difficult to assess whether there was any- thing improperly quick or otherwise improper alx)ut Oswald's re- turn because there you are not dealing with a routine thing. Of course it is not routine for someone to defect and then come back from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, my recollection was that there had been something like 20 people that that had happened to, a surprising number at the time. Insofar as I could, I studied all those other cases to make com- parisons. The conclusion there was that there was nothing odd about the Oswald case. As I say, that is a soft conclusion because they were all unique cases in a sense. You could not make any statistical study out of the 20. Mr. Preter, I have just one other question. Do you know at this time whether or not Raymond Rocca knew of the assassination plot against Castro at the time you were dealing with him? Mr. Slawson. I certainly did not know at the time because I did not know there were such plots. Even to this day I don't laiow whether he did know. I either read or had someone tell me, and I can't remem- ber which, in the last couple of years that in their opinion, Rocca did not know it, that the CIA had deliberately chosen people to work with the Warren Commission staff who were not aware of these plots in order that they could pick people who could be sincerely ignorant of it. Mr. Preyer. Thank you. I have no further questions. Mr. Devine. Mr. Devine. No questions, Mr. Chairman. INIr. Preytcr. Any further questions, Mr. McKinney? Mr. McKinney. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Preyer. Mr. Cornwell, how much longer do you think vou will need to question the witness? The question is whether we should recess for lunch at this time or try to finish? Mr. Cornwell. I would say at least 30 minutes, perhaps a little longer. Mr. Preyer. Perhaps we had better break for lunch and resume at 2 o'clock. Will that be all right. Mr. Slawson? Mr. Slawson. Yes; that will be OK. I have plane reservations at 5:30. Mr. CoRNAVELL. "Wliich airport? Slawson. Dulles. Mr. Preyer. I don't anticipate there will be any problem making that plane. Mr. Cornwell. Not for Mr. Slawson. There are two witnesses from California today both of whom are tryinc: to catch that same plane. For Mr. Slawson at least there is no problem. Mr. Preyer. We will recess until 1 :30 today. [Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed until 1:30 p.m.] 189 Afteknoon Session Staff members present: G. Robert Blakey, G. Cornwell, W. Wizel- man, D. Hardman, R. Genzman, E. Berning, M. Wills, W. Cross, J. Facter, J. Wolf, K. Klein, and L. Matthews. Mt. Preyer. The Chair recognizes Mr. Cornwell. TESTIMONY OF W. DAVID SLAWSON RESUMED Mr. Cornwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Slawson, we have discussed up to this point many of the papers that you wrote while you were a Warren Commission staff attorney and the problems that you faced which in large part are reflected on the face of these memoranda. What happened to the fruits of your investigation and particularly the fruits as they were reflected in such memoranda at the time that the final Warren Commission report was written ? Mr. Slawson. To the best of my knowledge, I never destroyed any- thing and they were left either in my desk or in files at the Warren Commission building and were subsequently put in some kind of security classification and sent off to the Archives. Mr. CoRN^vELL. What I really had in mind, although I appreciate the answer, was what transition occurred in putting the results of your investigation into a final report, the public report ? Mr. Slawson. My recollection of that, and the memos that I have refreshed my recollection on tend to confirm this, is that Bill Coleman and I handed in our reports to Howard Willens, not reports but our drafts for inclusion in the Warren report to Howard Willens, and Howard redrafted to some extent, made comments and would send us back a copy. We would either approve or state our objections. Then when we reached agreement, it would go fi-om Howard to J. Lee Rankin and from him, usually with very little further change, to the Commission itself. But this whole process took considerably more than a month toward the end and the Commission might frequently send things back for redrafting or shortening or more elaboration and so on. Of course it was their job to put the whole report together in a meaningful and clear fashion. In other words, we might see something again or it might come down and somebody else would be given the task of putting it together with two or three other staff members' input. Mr. Cornwell. I would like to ask you some questions about what type of changes, if any, Vv^ere made in the rewrite processes. Perhaps^ again because there has been some period of time, we might proceed t© do that by looking at your papers and, if you would, let us begin look- ing at exhibit 22 which is basically a large document. For purposes of comparison. I will hand you a copy of the Warre.H Commission report so that we will know what page we are talking to. It is the official version as opposed to the McGraw-Hill publication. I believe the only changes are in page numbering between those tw« versions. As a reference we will refer to that one and those pages in the official report. 190 With respect to pages 1 and 2 of your memo, pa^^e 1 is the concept that : "Firm evidence of foreign conspiracy is obviously very hard to <;ome by", the kind of concepts you discussed earlier. The concept on page 2 that one method which you could use was the CIA but in essence there weren't really too many additional sources for comparison of what you got from foreign governments other than the CIA. I would like to ask you to compare those concepts with what appears in the Warren Commission report at page 243, which would be 225 in the McGraw-Hill publication. Near the top of that page we of course do lind the statement in the first full — I am looking at the McGraw- Hill version, it is at the top of my page statement that "The Commis- sion faced substantial difficulties in determining whether anyone con- spired with or assisted the person who conmiitted the assassination." However, on the following page the concept is somewhat different or at least I ask you whether or not it is. Mr. Slawson. Which part ? Mr. CoRNWELL. Pages 244 and 245 of the official version. Mr. Slawson. At the very bottom of 244 "In considering the ques- tion of foreign involvement" ? Mr. CoRNWELL. Yes, sir. The language : In considering the question of foreign involvement, the Commission has re- ceived valuabie assistance from the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other Federal agencies vi'ith special competence in the field of foreign investigation. Mr. Slawson". Yes. Mr. CoRNWELL. Taking those passages, would it be fair to state that the nature of the difficulties that you faced in the foreign investigative field were substantially minimized by comparison in the Warren Com- mission report from the way you described them in your internal memos ? Mr. Slawson. No ; I don't think they were minimized. I think the right words would be just simply "not discussed." The report, as I read it, is giving a kind of "thank you" to these various agencies for their help and then just saying we are not going to disclose anything that is from a confidential source of information, but aside from that, the Commission will disclose everything that it relied upon, and I think that needs to be emphasized, that Earl Warren in particular tried to be scrupulously honest that way. He would not in his own mind and in the deliberations of the Com- mission that I heard about, rely on anything that he felt he could not disclose to the public, for example, the ISTosenko stuff. Mr. CoRNWELL. Directing your attention to page 374 wliich is page 350 in the McGraw-Hill version, the concluding paragraph reads : Eased upon the investigation reviewed in this chapter, the Commission con- cluded that there is no credible evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald was part of a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. Examination of the facts of the assassination itself revealed no indication that Oswald was aided in the plan- ning or execution of hia scheme. Review of Oswald's life and activities since 1959, althoxigh productive in illuminating the character of Lee Harvey Oswald (v.-hich is discussed in the next chapter), did not produce any dpnce of a conspiracy. The Commission discovered no evidence meaningful evi- that the Soviet Union or Cuba were involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. Nor did the Commission's investigation of Jack Ruby produce any grounds for believing that Ruby's killing of Oswald was part of the conspiracy. 191 Would you agree with that ? Mr. Slawson. Yes. Mr. CoRNWELL. It states the conclusion with considerably less doubt than the view that you expressed in your memos. Mr. Slawson. There is an emphasis gained in the official report by repetition. This goes on and on essentially saying everything in the first sentence and then repeating it in detail thereafter and that makes it sound more positive than it would otherwise literally be. No ; I think I agree that this is accurate in that I, too, concluded that there was no credible evidence. In other words, there is lots of evidence if we count as evidence, as we had to in the processes of investigation, everything that came in that if true would point toward a conspiracy. But our investigation in no case has led to the conclusion that that evidence was accurate. So, I think the flat statement there was no credible evidence, is absolutely accurate. Mr. CoRNWELT.. The first statement then in your view, "no credible evidence" is accurate. What about the remaining repetitious con- cepts, "no indication" ? Mr. Slawson. Literally of course that is not true. There was some indication. is no credibleI would read that as implicit in the word "credible," there indication. Mr. CoRNWELL. The next concept, "no evidence," in the concept of that, "nor any grounds," in the final statement, "no evidence" again. As repeated the sentence would be a slight overstatement ? Mr. Slawson. I would put it differently. If you interpret the word "evidence" as meaning something that points toward the involvement of these people, if you conclude that the thing is true, then of course these statements are flatly wrong. It all has to go back to the credibility of the weight of the evidence. Mr. Cornwell. Directing your attention to page 98 of the large doc- ument, exhibit 22, 1 would like you to compare the language at the top :; Unfortunately, however, although the means of Investigation at our disposal; in Mexico have in our opinion been stretched to the utmost, there still remain gaps in our knowledge of what Oswald did while he was there. The paragraph concludes : The final answer to the meaning of the Mexico trip therefore will probably never be given. I would like you to compare that language, if you would, to the report at page 3*05, Mr. Slav/son. 305 which in my is page ?282 in the McGraw-Hill version. version Mr. Cornwell. 305. Particularly the language that — The investigation of the Commission has produced considerable testimonial and documentary evidence establishing the precise time of Oswald's journey, his means of transportation, the hotel at which he stayed in Mexico, and a restaurant at which he often ate. All known persons whom Oswald may have met while in Mexico, including passengers on the buses he rode, and the employees and guests of the hotel where he stayed, were interviewed. No credible witness has been located who saw Oswald with any unidentified person while in Mexico City. There is perhaps no flat statement that there were no gaps, as you indicated in your memo and your knowledge of that trip, but there is no statement- Mr. Slawson. There I would have to say, I would not have written the report that way, frankly. I think it would have been better to make 192 frank recofrnition that we could not account for every hour of Oswald's time by any means in Mexico. Mr. CoRNWELL. On the same subject, if I could, I would like you to compare your perhaps more candid statement that "the final answer to the meaning of the Mexican trip will probably report never be given", with the language in the final Warren Commission which appeared on official version of the reflects : pageand2999 which and 279 of the McGraw-Hill version, or 278 The Commission undertook an intensive investigation to determine Oswald's purpose and activities on his journey, with specific reference to reports that Oswald was an agent of the Cuban or Soviet Governments. As a result of its investigation, the Commission believes it has been able to reconstruct and ex- plain most of Oswald's actions during this time. That again at least in tone is different from your concept of the evidence in that field, is that correct ? Mr. Slawson. Yes ; in tone. I don't feel as strongly about this one as I did the one before. The statement in the report "as a result of this investigation, the Commission believes that it has been able to recon- struct and explain most of Oswald's actions during the time," if you mean "most" in terms of most of the time that is wrong. If you mean most in terms of probable actions, I think we did. Although that is somewhat question begging because you never know what is significant unless vou know what it is. Mr. CoRNWELL. With respect to page 83 of your original memo, there you discuss the meaning of Oswald's letter to the Russian Embassy. Your characterization of it near the bottom of page 83 is that "the let- ter undoubtedly constitutes a disturbing bit of evidence and will prob- ablv never be fully explained." Then you conclude by stating that "We think that the letter constitutes no rnore than a desoerate, somewhat illiterate and deranged attempt to facilitate his family's return to the Soviet Russia." I would like you to compare that with page 287 of the McGraw-Hill reprint or page 310 of the official version, particularly the last half of the paragraph concerning what Marina Oswald could add to that problem, which concludes bv stating. « * * * it becomes apparent that Oswald was intentionally beclouding the true state of affairs in order to make his trip to Mexico sound as mysterious and important as possible." In other words, the lanffuaire "It becomes appare-pt." or let m*^ ask you, would that be different from vour concept that the import of this ietter probably never will be fully explained? Mr. Slawson. Again. I would not have chosen the word "apparent." 'T would have put in there "probable." I think that is in effect my 'conclusion but I wouldn't have stated it that strongly. I think some place in my memo I make a statement to that effect, T think T used the word "obfuscate." Anyway it is the same thing. Mr. CoRNWELT,. I would like to ask you to look at the concept at the bottom of page 3 and top of pa.Q:e 4 of your main memo, exhibit 22, and also perhaps in the same lifrht, the memo of vours which we have hnd admitted as exhibit 28 which discusses in the first instance frf^n- erallv the problems with reporting everythin.er was a number that had not yet been taken by anythino-, so that when the presumed report came in thev could give us that number and then have the FBI report in- cbided in the final volume, assuming it came in in time. This was apparently done by me because I had to leave before it could come in. 197 Mr. CoRNWELL. There have been public criticisms of the Warren Commission which concern the general subject matter of the accuracy of footnotes and the suggestion that the text did not always coincide with the footnotes. Does your experience, being there at the time this process was being undertaken, indicate that those criticisms were correct, and if so, to what extent ? Mr. Slawson. I took, and I think everyone else did, as much care as we could. But the time pressure was severe. With the mass of mate- rial that we have I am sure that errors of numbering, and perhaps what footnote A should have had, footnote B did, and vice versa, occurred. I don't think that the kind of crosschecking that normally goes into a good professional publication, for example, ever went into this. Mr. CoRNWELL. Wliat is your impression as to why there were the kinds of changes in tone in the statements? ^Vliy did those occur? Mr. Slawson. I think because Earl Warren was adamant almost that the Commission would make up its mind on what it thought was the truth and then they would state it as much without qualification as they could. He wanted to lay at rest doubts. He made no secret of this on the staff. It was consistent with his philosophy as a Judge. The Broivn v. Board of ^Education decision you remember was unanimous. I think he was at great pains to make sure it was. At one point in the report — it didn't have anything to do with foreign conspiracy so I only was tangentially involved in it— but the question of whether two shots out of the probable three that were fired hit Kennedy, the question was whether or not the first shot came before the first two or between these two or afterward. A great deal of time was spent on that, getting a unanimous opinion from all the Commissioners, I remember that one in particular, and all because Earl Warren felt it was best that they make up their mind as to what they thought the truth was and then try to settle it. Mr. CoRNWELL. Apart from, I guess what you basically are describ- ing as a personality trait of Earl Warren and what you have previously told us concerning his desire not to have the question of the assassina- tion become an issue in the national election and therefore keying his time schedule to accomplish that, was there any other motive that you perceived being in existence at the time coming perhaps from Earl Warren or even from a higher level which would have caused the kind of changes in tones that we are viewing here, particularly with respect to your area of expertise, the foreign area ? Mr. Slawson. No; I think that was it. You characterized it as a personality trait of Earl Warren. It was. I think it was almost a very consciously adopted philosophy of his. His idea was that the prin- cipal function of the Warren Commission was to allay doubt, if possible. You know, possible in the sense of being honest. He thought that it was. I suppose he did not think that an official document like this ought to read at all tentatively, it should not be a source of public speculation if he could possibly avoid it. On the other hand, he always assumed that we would publish the background information on which we drew our conclusions so that if anybody wanted to check our conclusions they could. Of course people have. r 198 ]\Ir. CoRNWEix. If I could ask you to look at exliiljit 27. ]\Ir. Chair- man, may we have marked for identification exhibit 27 which is a document reading at the top "February 19^4" and is a memorandum from Mr. Slawson to Mr. "VVillens styled "Letter to the Kussian Government". INIr. Preyer. We will mark that for identification. ]\Ir. Cornwall. You have previously reviewed that memo overnight is tliat correct? ]Mr. Slawson. Yes. Mr. Cornwall. Would it be fair to state that that memo concerns the subject matter of how to seek, and what extent information should be sought, from the Russian Government ? Mi\ Slawson. Yes. Mr. CoRNWELL. May we have that document admitted as part of the record, Mr. Chairman ? ]Mr. Preyer. Without objection the exhibit is admitted in the record. [The above referred to document, JFK exhibit No. 27, was received in the record.] JFK Exhibit No. 27 [Memorandum] To : :\Ir. Howard P. Willens. Febkuart 1964. From : Mr. W. David Slawson. Subject : Letter to the Russian Government. BACKGROUND Lee Oswald spent almost three years lu Russia. Almost our sole sources of information on these years are his own writings and correspondence and Marina's testimony. We are therefore preparing a letter to lie sent to the Russian Govern- ment asking for additional information. On 21 January 1964 the CIA sent us a draft of such a letter. The State Depart- ment has commented that in its opinion the CIA draft would probably have seri- ous adverse diplomatic efifects. The State Department feels that the CIA draft carries an inference that we suspect that Oswald might have l)een an agent for the Soviet Government and that we are asking the Russian Government to docu- ment our suspicions. The State Department feels that the Russians will not answer a letter of this kind, at least not truthfully, and that it will also do posi- tive harm in that they will take offense at our sending it to them. The State De- partment proposes instead that we send a very short and simple request for whatever information the Russians may have. RECOMMENDATIONS My inclination at the present time is that the State Department's recommended a])pro;ich is probably preferable to the CIA's. However, I would modify the State Department approach slightly by following the general request with a few — very few — specific questions. These questions would be restricted to areas that were both important to us and not such as to give material offense to the Russians. I think that including a few specific questions might even be beneficial in that, if we were careful in the choice of and drafting of these questions, we might suc- cessfully convey to the Russian Government the impression that at the present time at least we were inclined to regard Oswald as neurotically and personally motivated in killing the President rather than being motivated by anything connected M'ith the Russian Government. In other words, pi'operly chosen and drafted specific questions might serve to allay suspicion rather than arouse it. With the foregoing general criteria in mind, I would propose including specific questions such as the following: Wg would like to have : 1. Copies of nil documents and records in connection with any hosintalizations and other medical examinations and treatments of Lee Harvey Oswald and of Mrs. Marina Oswald during her adult life, including: 199 (1) His treatment in October 1959 in Moscow wlien, according to liis own diary, he was found unconscious in liis hotel room by lutourist Guide Rima Shiroliova after an attempted suicide. (2) Any examinations or treatments made of Marina Oswald on or about October was treated1961forwhen, nervous according to Lee Harvey Oswald's diary, Marina Oswald exhaustion. 2. The results of any physical examinations, psychological tests or psycho- logical examinations made at any time on Lee Harvey Oswald or Marina Oswald. 3. Copies of all communications to and from Lee Harvey Oswald with any organ or commission of the Russian Government in relation to his entering Russia and seeking permission to reside there and in relation to his seeking Russian citizenship during late 1959 and tliereafter. 4. Copies of ail correspondence to and from Lee Harvey Oswald with any Organ efforts toor leave commission Russia and of return the Russian Government to the United States. in reference to Oswald's 5. Copies of all correspondence to and from ]\Iarina Oswald in reference to her attempts to leave Russia and accompany her husband to the United States. 6. Copies of the tile on Lee Harvey Oswald kept by the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City. 7. Copies of any records showing drunkenness, violence, disorderly conduct or other abnormal behavior on the part of Oswald, whether or not criminal. You will note that I have not asked in the foregoing questions (except for No. 6 and No. 7) for copies of internal memoranda minutes, etc., as does the CIA draft. The following questions might be asked, but I am inclined to think that they are not important enough to warrant probably offending the Soviet Government by including them : 1. In the tile furnished to the United States Government by the Soviet Gov- ernment covering tlie correspondence between the Russian Eml)assy in Wash- ington, D.C., and Lee Harvey Oswald and Marina Oswald, there is a letter dated •July 9, 1952 from N. Reznichenko, Chief of the Consular Section, to 3Iarir.a Oswald and a letter dated August 15, 1962 to N. Raznicbenko from Marina Oswald. Both letters refer to a "Form Card No. 118," and the letter dated August 15, 1962 states that the Form Card has been filled out and is enclosed. If possible, we request that a copy of this Form Card be furnished to us at this time. 2. A description of Oswald's job in the Minsk Radio and Television factory, plus copies of all employment records, union records and other job-related activities of Lee Harvey Oswald. 3. A statement as to why Lee Harvey Oswald was not granted Russian citizenship status by the Russian Government. Or, if Oswald was offered such citizenship and he refused, copies of all correspondence to and from Oswald in\ this subject. inquiries on Oswald's ownership of weapons in CIA Union. theTheSoviet The CIA certain draft includes draft does not go on to ask about his membership in the Minsk gun club, which would seem logically to follow in this context. David Belin has told me that he no longer regards the issue of Oswald's marksman- ship as of primary importance and that therefore, although he would welcome whatever additional evidence we might obtain from the Russian Government as to Oswald's skill with firearms, he does not feel that this is a high-priority item. In my opinion, the only other reason we might want to ask questions in regard to Oswald's firearms and/or hunting activities in the Soviet Union is to find out whether the gun club and these activities were some sort of cover-up for sabotage or espionage training. Certainly, if such was the case, the Russians will not admit it nor will they furnish us any evidence from which we can document such a conclusion on our part. Consequently, because trying to get information as to a "cover-up" is hopeless and because the marksmanship angle is not cn;- cial. I recommend that we not question the Russian Government on the subject of Oswald's firearms and/or hunting activities in Russia. Mr. CoRXWELL. Let me ask you. in connection with the preparation of this document, do you recall a roughly contemporaneous meeting be- tween yourself and ^Ir. Dulles concerning the subject matter ? 200 Mr. means Tliat Slawson. No, Ithere I recollect don't.wasThat doesn't mean I don't recollect it. not one. Mr. Corn WELL. The subject matter, I suppose, in the memo concerns a balancino; of your desire, and apparently the CIA's desire, to request specific information from the Russian Government, with the State Department's them. apprehension Is that correct ? about the possibility of antagonizing Mr. Slawsox. No. I would state the balance slightly differently. The attempt on my part and the CIA's, I think, was simply to obtain in- formation ina way that would be most likely to get true information and complete information. The State Department, I think, was also concerned with that, but in addition concerned with not giving great offense to the Russians. As I say on page 1 of the document, No. 27, "The State Department feels that the Russians will not answer a let- ter of this kind, at least not truthfully, and it will also do positive harm in that they will take offense at our sending it to them." I apparently read the State Department's response as saying, "You people are not going to help yourselves by this kind of letter as well as do some harm by creating a minor international incident." INIr. CoRNWELL. Lot me direct your attention to the very last page, page 5. That page seems to concern a very specific request which the CIA had suggested and that was with respect to Oswald's ownership of weapons in the Soviet Union. Mr. Slawson. Yes. Mr. Cornwell. The request was dropped, is that accurate ? Mr. Slawsox. My only recollection is what I read here but certainly that is what I seem to be saying in this memo. Mr. Cornwell. It was dropped in part because, I gather, David Belin had told you that he no longer regarded the issue of Oswald's marksmanship as of prime importance, is that correct ? Mr. Slawson. That is correct. Mr. Cornwell. This memo was prepared in February 1964? Mr. Slawson. That is correct. I know it was fairly early on and that is what it says, February 1964. So presumably that is right. INIr. Cornwell.' You conclude based upon that information from Mr. Belin that "consequently, I recommend that we not question the Russian Government on the subject of Oswald's firearms and/or hunt- ing activities in Russia". Is that correct ? Mr. Slawson. I think so, yes. That seems to come throuirh here. INIr. Cornwell. Did David Belin speak to you or Mr. Dulles about the problems in this area? Mr. Slawson. I don't know. I would guess that probablv what happened here is that Dave Belin did not speak to Dulles directly, but Belin and T probably spoke, or Belin and Coleman or Joe Ball, who was also working with Dave Belin, and it was on the basis of those conversations that this memo was written. Mr. CoRNWELT>. I am sorry, I don't have it to show you, but our rosearch reflects that there was another memo in the files reflecting the fact that you had a conversation with Mr. Dulles on or about Januarv 31, shortly prior to the preparation of this memo, concerning the subiect matter of the memo. But you don't recall the conversation? Mr. SivAwsoN. I don't recall the conversation. Presumably of course there was one. 201 Mr. Corn WELL. Did Mr. Belin ever change his view as to the relevance or necessity of obtaining this type of information? Mr. Slawson. Not to my recollection, no. There is possibly a mis- . understanding between us on this point. My recollection of what I meant when I said Dave Belin is telling me he no longer regards the issue of Oswald's marksmanship as of primary importance is not whether Oswald's good or bad marksmanship is not important but he had apparently found other evidence indicating that Oswald could have become a sufficiently good marksman by what happened in this country, or what had happened in the jMarine Corps before he went to Russia, so that it was no longer of primary importance whether or not he had gim training in Russia. Mr. Corn^vell. In other words, your understanding was that he was willing to forego any inferences that could be derived from getting details about Oswald's handling of guns in Russia ? Mr. Slawson. For his purposes, which is Oswald's marksmanship, yes. Mr. CoRNWELL. It is your memory that he never changed that view ? Mr. Slawson. I have no memory on it one way or another. Mr. Cornwell. Did you ever secure the information about the Minsk Gim Club? Mr. Slawson. I don't remember. We of course did get a reply from Russia with quite a few documents in it. My recollection now is that they were mostly medical documents. We had a lot of stuff from the Botkinskaya Hospital and various communications between Oswald from IMinsk and the Russian Government and the American— no, just the Russian Government in Moscow in connection with his seeking permission to leave and taking JNIarina with him and that was about all. My recollection is that there would have been nothing on this Minsk stuff, the gun club stuff. Mr. Cornwell. In the INIcGraw-Hill edition on page 180 there is a section styled "Oswald's Rifle Practice Outside the Marines". One of the sentences under that reads, "While in Russia Oswald obtained a hunting license, joined a hunting club and went hunting about six times, as discussed more fully in Chapter VI." On page 182 in the con- clusion part of that chapter there is a sentence that reads, "Oswald's jNIarine training in marksmanship, his other rifle experience, and his established familiarity with this particular weapon show he possessed ample capability to commit the assassination." At pages 251 and 252 there are statements that "Oswald's member- ship in the hunting club while he was in the Soviet Union has been a matter of special interest to the Commission." It appears I assume from that that the Commission did draw inferences from the Minsk Gun Club routine in connection with the question of Oswald's marksman- ship. Would that be correct ? Mr. Slawson. No, I don't think so. There was certainly nothing in his being in a gun club in Russia that would detract from his marks- manship. As I recollect it, Dave Belin felt that you didn't need to posit any special training by Oswald in Russia in order to account for the fact that he was probably a good enough marksman to have hit Kennedy from the position, et cetera. 202 :Mr. CoRNWFXL. Do YOU recall :Mr. Licbeler earlier raising tlie issue near the publication date that in fact the ]Minsk Gun Club data in- dicated use of shotguns and not rifles at all ? Mr. Slawson. No, I don't recollect that. Now that j^ou mentioned it, that would seem to me probably, even at the time. I have hunted, myself, a little. I have always used a shotgun. I never have gone after deer. My recollection of the sort of hunting that he probal^ly did in Eussia was for birds. Mr. CoRNWELL. What inference do you think is appropriate to draw from this chain of events ? The fact that the possible inference from the ]Minsk Gun Club event could relate to the issue of marksmanship, the fact that the information was not sought because of international rela- tions considerations, and the fact that nevertheless the Warren Com- mission makes statements on the subject matter and draws the inference which was initially contemplated? Mr. Slawsox. I don't draw the chain of conclusions I think you are there. The first two parts of what you read me from the ]McGraw-Hill edition of the report I think were f roni the rumor section, weren't they ? Mr. CoRNWELL. Let me hand you the JNIcGraw-Hill volume and let you look at the same pages. I read from page 180. ]Mr. Slawson. Right, OK. While in Eussia Oswald went hunting six times and discussed chapter 6. ]Mr. CoRxwELL. The next page I read from was 182. Mr. Slawson. "OK Oswald's marine training in marksmanship, his other rifle experience and his established familiarity with this partic- ular weapon show that he possessed ample capability to commit the assassination." The first one I read obviously does refer to his hunting in Russia. 182 doesn't. ]Mr. CoRxwELL. And the final one I i-ead from was 251-252. IMr. Seawsox. "Once he was accepted as a resident alien in the Soviet Union, Oswaldin Avas given considerable benefits" — excuse me, "Oswald's membership the hunting club while he was in the Soviet Union has been a matter of special interest to the Commission." I don't know, what can I say ? They did at one point, the first of those tliree things I read, include his experience, his presumed experience as a hunter in Russia, as something that would help to explain his being an adequate marksman to kill the President, yes. I mean I don't think tliat that is being inconsistent even if you assume that the Commission at the time they wrote that had in mind my statements back in this memo which is, of course, a lot to assume. This memo to Howard Willens about tlie letter to the Russian Gov- ernment was a pi-oredural matter to wliich the Commission members had access and probably saw ])ut I doubt that they saw it when the final time came to write the report. ]Mr. CoRXWELL. One inference which might be drawn for purposes of discussion from the chain of events is that the Warren Commission would, if necessary, have opted for the alternative of writing up its preconceived or initially conceived inference, which in this case would be David Belin's conclusions on the marksmanship issue, rather than take a chance on disrupting delicate foreign relations. What I want to ask you is, is that a ]no])er inference, as to something that you experienced more widely than this one instance or is it an example of an abnormal situation at that time ? 203 Mr. Slawsox. Let me try to reconstruct what I assume to be the Commission's thinking j^rocess goino- into that. We had pretty good evidence that Oswald had been a member of a hunting club at some time in Kussia. The best evidence we had was simply Marina's statement he was. I think we had a statement from other people testifying before the Commission that when he came back at some point or other he might have mentioned to them he was in a gun club in Eussia. There wasn't really much doubt about that. Therefore, it seems to me it is perfectly fair to mention that when someone says, was this man a good enough marksman, among other things you could mention is that he enjoyed limiting, he was familiar with guns. Even if it was only a shotgun, nevertheless there is some correlation, I assume, be- tween how good you were with a shotgun and with a rifle on a moving target. Now what we presumably would have gotten, what we hope we would get from the Russians on the gun club or hunting club was more than that. This is why finally we decided there is no way to get it. What we were most suspicious about or the worst possibility that might have happened was that this was some kind of coverup for train- ing of assassins. I think that is why the State Department thought the Russians would take offense at it. If that is so, you can be certain the Russians would not have come back with a document of "Yes, here is the method of training assassins here." So it would have been an exercise in futility to ask the Russians to come across with that kind of information. Mr. CoRXWELL. So, the short answer I guess is that you don't draw the inference that I suggest might be possible because you felt it was an explainable chain of events based upon what evidence was neces- sary, isthat correct ? Mr. Slaw^son. Yes. For marksmanship purposes I think it was perfectly proper and honest for the Warren report to refer to the Minsk Gun Club. But at the beginning of the investigation I was in- terested init not primarily for that reason but for the reason that it might have been a coverup for something more sinister. Mr. Corxwp:ll. Are there any other examples whore the possibility of wanting to avoid sensitive areas of international relations, diplo- matic relationships, prevented you from securing the kind of evidence that yon would have liked or that you felt was necessaiy ? Mr. Slawsox. There was one other area that may have involved that among other things, Sylvia Turada de Duran, who was the clerk at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, was taken into custody by the IMexican police very soon after the assassination and questioned, my recollec- tion is, for about 3 days. All this happened before the Warren Com- mission was formed. We got a report from the Russian police and that report is in this memo, No. 22. W^e would member have staff, of the liked Coleman to questioned her further. and myself '\"\nien I Willens and Howard say we, thought it would be a good idea too. But when I talked to the CTA about it and later when we went down to Mexico City I remember talking to officials. I believe we even talked to the Mexican officials at the time, one of them being Echevarria who later became President. He was Minister of Security when we went down there. The upshot of 43-819—79 14 204 all those conversations was that she had suffered a nervous breakdown, possibly because of the arrest and questioning, and that she was in hiding and only her husband knew where she was and he would not let her speak to anyone in connection with this. Nevertheless, the CIA told me that they might be able to persuade her husband to permit us to question her, even including possibly flying her back to Washington. But it would be very difficult^well, Earl Warren decided not to follow up on that if she was not willing to come willingly. He did not want to apply pressure on her. Insofar as I understood his reasons for that, they were partly feeling that we ought not to put pressure on her, the American Government did not want to involve itself further at that point. But primarily he just felt he did not want to put severe pressure on an individual and I think he was ashamed that already interroga- tion had caused her to have a nervous breakdown. He did not want to get involved in anything remotely like torture. Mr. CoRxwELL. I am sorry I don't have a copy of it to show you. We have ordered it but not yet received it. But it has been reported to us by our research staff that in the L.B.J. Library in Austin there is a memo prepared by, or reflecting a conversation between, Mr. Hoover and the White House. Walter Jenkins. The conversation reflects that Hoover made the following statement: "The thing I am most con- cerned about, and Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so that they can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin," the conversation occurring November 24, 1963, 2 days after the as- sassination. Furthermore, Mr. Hoover also stated, "Mr. Katzenbach thinks the President might appoint a Presidential Commission of three outstanding citizens to make a determination. I countered with the suggestion that we make an investigative report to the Attorney General with pictures, laboratory work, et cetera. And then the At- torney General can make the report to the President and the Presi- dent can decide whether to make it public." The final sentence in the memo reads, the final statement by Mr. Hoover : "I felt that, in other words, the investigation by the FBI was better because there are several aspects which would complicate our foreign relations if we followed the Presidential Commission route." First, let me ask you, would this concern, that apparently was dis- cussed between the head of the FBI and the A^Hiite House 2 days after the assassination, of convincing the public that "Oswald is the real assassin" and "avoiding complicating our foreign relations," would that, was that concept known to you at the time ? Mr. Slawsox. No; not other than as it is reflected in memos like this number 27. Mr. Corn-v\t:ll. Would that type of concern at those levels have been consistent with the obstacles you encountered in attempting to secure various types of evidence in the foreign conspiracy field ? Mr. Slawsox. No; I suppose it would not be. There is an obvious conflict. You are following evidence wherever it leads logically. Oc- casionally you are going to ruffle people and that obviously includes foreign heads of state and diplomats and so on. Mr. CoRxwELL. I am not sure I phrased the question or you under- stood the way I meant it, but that concern, would it have been con- 205 sistent with the obstacles you encountered, of Earl Warren's desire not to have Duran come back, not to go to the Swiss to get informa- tion from the Cubans, the other examples we discussed ? Mr. Slawson. Yes; that may have played a larger role in the con- sideration than I thought at the time. Mr. CoKNWELL. Finally, let me ask you, do you know specifically what was meant by the words ''several aspects," in other words, the concept, "*I felt this Avas better because there are several aspects [in other words] of a potential investigation which would complicate our foreign relations?" Specifically what areas were they concerned about? Mr. Slawsox. That was Hoover speaking, is that right ? I can only guess of course but presumably Hoover had information even at that early date that Oswald had been down to Mexico and spoken to the Cuban and Russian Embassies. Of course he laiew that Oswald had been a defector to Russia and would return. I assume therefore that lie was thinking of the Cuban and Russian Govern- ments but probably in particular the Cuban Government. Obviously Cuba would have known about Oswald's Fair Play for Cuba activities. We have FBI leports on that. So I would guess we had in mind espe- cially Cuba but also Russia. He thought that probably this evidence indicated some possible involvement with those countries and that it would be bad public relations, bad international diplomatic relations, to arouse suspicion. Mr. CoRNAVELL. To what extent, if any, do you believe it would have been possible if the CIA, and of course from the memo we can assume the FBI, were aware of these considerations — to what extent could they have tailored their report to you to be sure that even though the Presidential Conunission was formed, that you did not "tip whatever boat" it was that they Avere worried about? Mr. Slawsox. Well, if the two agencies worked together on that, their ability would have been considerable. If they worked separately they still would have had some ability to do that. I testified this morning we were inescapably dependent upon the CIA especially for some aspects of the investigation. Looking back though, remember the CIA was on my side in getting that authenticating information from Russia. They wanted me to do it. My recollection is that I did not discuss with them the fact that Earl Warren had told me not to, but the CIA was also willing to help us persuade INIrs, Duran's husband to get her to come back. They were on the side, in other words, of going ahead in spite of ruffling international relations. Mr. CoRXAATxi.. You testified earlier that you and Mr. Rocca had had conversations concerning CIA's iuA^olvement with anti-Castro groups, is that correct ? Mr, Slaavsox. Yes. ISIr. CoRXAVELL. I believe jou told us that your understanding of his personality was that he was very much opposed to Castro? INIr. SlxVavsox. Yes. Mr. Corxaat:ll. What inference do you draw or did you draw if you compared those facts Avith your considerations of the anti-Castro Cuban motive matter that you also told us about? In other words, you considered as part of your investigation that the anti-Castro Cubans Avould have had a motive for the assassination ? You told us that Mr. 206 'Rocca admitted the CIA's close connection with the anti-Castro Cubans. You told us that Mr. Rocca himself had personally the same typo of feeling the anti-Castro Cubans would have. Mr. Slawsox. Against Castro, right. Mr. Cornwp:ll. Did that cause you to question the reliability of the information you were receiving from the CIA ? Mr. Slawson. No. In a sense everything I tried to take into consid- eration, so everything was a cause for questioning. But in terms of coming to a conclusion in m}^ own mind about the reliability of the information supplied us, no, I concluded that Rocca's strong anti- Castro feeling did not bias or did not prevent him from being an honest investigator. I think he was and I am still convinced that he was. On the other hand of course it affected his judgment. I think he would probal^ly to this day thinlc that ma3'be there is a substantial possibility at least that Castro had something to do with it. Mr. CoRNWELL. But you did not draw the inference that because of similiarity of motives that the CIA may have been wittingly or other- wise involved in tlie type of activity you hypnotized, the anti-Castro setup of Oswald, and therefore would be tailoring the information that he was providing to you on those subject matters ? Mr. Slawsox. No. I don't think that I entertained very long the possibility that Rocca or anybody else I had known in the CIA was in- volved in any way in killing Kennedy. Mr. CoRNWELL. Perhaps I overphrased the question. I did not mean Rocca, as much as information coming from CIA on the subject matter which was f unneled to you. Mr. Slawson. I guess I am having trouble getting the crux of your question because the possibility that the anti-Castro Cubans con- tained people who were ruthless or desperate enough to kill Kennedy in order to serve tlieir own end I felt was a very real one. Apparently, from all I knew they contained a lot of desperate ruthless people. I did not have that feeling about the CIA. Now I tried to keep an open mnid so that any place I came upon evidence that would ]:)oint toward somebody I would investigate it and that included the CIA as a possible nest of assassins. My judgment of their character and so on was far different, I think, from the judgment I made of the anti-Castro Cuban conspiracy- groups in the United States. Mr. CoRNWELL. I have one final question. Do you have any knowl- edge of the use of any electronic surveillance after the assassination in order to acquire information concerning what caused it in the first instance? ]Mr. Slawson. '\Yait. Use of electronic surveillance after the assassination in order to Mr. CoRXWELL. Secure evidence of the manner in which the assassi- nation may liave been planned and carried out. Mr. Slawsox. Here or abroad ? ]\Ir. CoRxwELL. Here. >rr. Slawsox. No. Mr. CoRXAVELL. What about abroad? I take it by your answer you do not feel free to discuss that ? 207 ]\Ir. Slawsox. No; I don't. That is one ofI those areas that I was cautioned very strongly not to disclose and have not been released from it. Mr. CoRNWELL. I have no further questions. Mr. Preyt:r. Thank you. Are there any questions from the panel ? Mr. Devine. I^Ir. Devine. No questions, ISIr. Chairman. Mr. Preyer. Mr. Dodd. Mr. DoDD. No questions, Mr. Chairman. :Mr. McKinney. I have one brief question. It interests me as to how we got from what you did and what everyone else did to what you have sitting in front of you. Wlio dictated or put it together or typed it or ^vhat? . , , . . -, Mr. Slawson. It was obviously a group project but the prnicipai authors I think were Howard Willens, Norman Eedlich and Al Gold- berg, all of them staff members. That is my recollection. Mr. McKiNNEY. If I were working with you and you and I were working with Coleman and we do our affidavit and we sent it off some- where and you are back in Denver at that point, you don't even see the final result. ]Mr. Slawson. That is right. I^Ir. McKiNNEY. From what I know of the Commission they met sporadically as a full group. From having tried to wade through what counsel has given us on these reports and the "Warrendocument Commission report itself, what I have taken as a very objective his- torically from my point of view, has suddenly become a very sub- Dave Slawson's tookjudgment stuff' and rewrote it and said jective it is. IsSomeone here document. that a fair on my part ? Mr. Slawson. I don't know how to assess how subjective. In matters of tone it obviously is, I still think an attempt was made to keep it objectively accurate. Yet, I did cut loose at a certain point and figure I have done all I can and I just hope that everything comes out the wav it should, and come back to private life. ih\ lilcKiNNEY. Let me ask you a personal question. You practice law in Colorado and pick up and read this thing. You spent 16-hour days and were living from a hotel in Washington, I assume, and working for a greater cause. Did you read this with a sense of disap- pointment, satisfaction, questioning, or just what the hell can you expect ? Mr. Slaw^sox. Generally one of satisfaction. First, it may soimd odd to say so but to this day I have never read it from cover to cover. Mr. McKixNEY. researchers liere I think Fine"^ cut I don't it up think anyone really has. Some of our in sections. Mr. Slaavson. I read parts of it in the beginning. Then I turned to parts which were my own particular expertise to see what happened to them. My recollection is that my first reaction was a sense of dis- ap ointment.think I mostly egotistical, they were shorter than they sliould have been. I thought my sections were more important. I did not see anything inaccurate in them, Mr. Corn well pointed out this one thing about the $5,000, for example. That slipped by me until you pointed it out a few minutes ago. That is a minor inaccuracy but it is an inaccuracy. I just did not see it at the time. So my answer is gen- erally Iwas quite satisfied. 208 Mr. McKiNNEY. I think it is a general historical opinion among 200' million Americans that this is something that was very objectively done by a group of our most distinguished leaders. That is why I ask the question about what they had done to your work. Mr. Slawson. This was a somewhat new experience to me too. I had been on a student law review and seen my work edited by someone else and not come out exactly the way I put it in but I never had been on a thing approaching this with the number of people involved and tlie emotional and personal pressures that everyone felt. At first I was sur- prised at how little control all of us on the staff had over what was finally going in. Then I quickly realized this is the way it had to be, what 'we would expect, and to my knowledge nothing was falsified, but the general shape and tone of the document was going to be something that others did. Mr. McKtnney. One last personal opinion since you have been so kind. One of the reasons that I argued for this committee being estab- lished was that I felt thnt the Warren Commission was under ex- tremely undue pressure— No. 1, one of the most politically popular leaders as- sassinated. Because assassinations are extremely motivated in Europe, historically they have been aimed at starting something or doing something. There was good historical information that the Eii- ropeans were concerned we might be becoming a bit of a banana re- public, all of those pressures plus the election and everything else. Do you feel we have a better chance of getting at the truth now than you did under pressure ? Mr. Stawson. No. To be truthful, I think the historical moment has passed. For good or bad history is not going to get much more than we have risfht there. Mr. McKiNNEY. Thank you very much. Mr. Peeyer. Mr. Slawson, we certainly appreciate your being here today and your very straightforward testimony. We will excuse you at this time. I hor>e you have amnle time to avoid the rush hour traffic to r>ulles and will make your flight without any problem. Thank you again. Mr. Slawson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad to have been of help. Mr. Preyek. Mr. Liebeler, if you are ready to proceed we will swear you at this time. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to frive will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you God? Mr. Ltebeler. T do. Mr. Preyer. Thank you. Mr. Liebeler. I understand that the com- mittee rules have been siven to you and a copy of those are before you. Mr. TjTebeler. That is correct, yes. Mv. Preyer. At this time T will make a brief statement concerning the subiect of the investigation. PTouse resolution 222 mandates the committee "to conduct a f'lll and complete investigation and studv of the circumstances surround- ing the assassination and death of President .Tohn F. Kennedv, in- cludin.o; determininqr whether existin.cr laws of the United States^ coii- cerning the pro'^ection of the President and the investigatory juris- diction and capability of agencies and departments are adequate in 209 their provisions and enforcement, and whether there was full disclo- sure of evidence and information among agencies and departments of the U.S. Government, and whether any evidence or information not in the possession of an agency or department would have been of assistance in investigating the assassination, and why such informa- tion was not provided or collected by that agency or department, and to make' recommendations to the House if the select committee deems appropriate for amendment of existing legislation or enactment of new legislation." Cornwell is recognized to begin the questioning of the witness- MV. time. at this TESTIMONY OF WESLEY LIEBELER, ASSISTANT COUNSEL, WARREN COMMISSION Mr. CoRXWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Leibeler, basically what we want to do is ask you some questions about the manner in which the Warren Commission's investigation was conducted, the state of mind you and your fellow staff attorneys may have had in pur- suing your work and the nature of any problems which you encoun- tered in the process. Before I do that, as a matter of background will you tell the com- mittee what your professional experience was prior to joining the "Warren Commission ? Mr. LiEBELER. I graduated from the University of Chicago Law School in 1957 and went immediately thereafter to the New York firm of Kater, Ledger & Milburn where I worked primarily in corporate litigation time I joined the stall' of the Warren Commission. until theWho Mr. CoRxwELL. first contacted you with respect to employment as staff counsel for the Warren Commission ? i\Ir. LiEBELER. You uicau from the Commission ? Mr. Cornwell. Yes, sir. Mr. LiEBELER. My recollection is that it was either Mr. Rankin or Howard Willens. I am not sure which. I think it was Willens who called me first. Mr. Cornwell. Had anyone contacted you prior to that ? Mr. LiEBELER. Yes. Mr. Cornwell. "WHio was that ? Mr. LiEBELER. Kenneth Damm of the University of Chicago law firm. Mr. CoRNAx-ELL. What was the nature of the discussion with him ? Mr. LiEBELER. He told me I might expect a call from either Mr. Willens or Mr. Rankin and told me that Mr. Willens had called his colleague Mr. Oakes asking for a recommendation for someone for Commission staff and that Mr. Oakes and IMr. Damm, both of whom were classmates of mine, decided they should recommend that Mr. Willens contact me. I did receive a call from Mr. Rankin as they sug- gested might. I Mr. Cornwell. Will you describe for us in whatever sense you now recall it the nature of your first conversation with either Mr. Willens or IMr. Rankin, whoever it was that called you. ]Mr. LiEBELER. I was simply asked if I would be interested in working on the staff of the Warren Commission. I said I would be. Mr. Rankin 210 or ;Mr. Willens asked mo if I would come to Washington the next day or the that. I did daj' after and talk to them about it, and I agreed to do that and yir. CoRNWTSLL. Upon arriving in Washington, whom did you speak totliere? ^Mr. LiEBELER. Mr. Willens and Mr. Rankin. Mr. CoRxwELL. What conversation occurred at that time ? ]Mr. Leebeler. After talking with me and meeting me and observing me, ]Mr. Rankin asked mc if I vrould be willing to join the Com- mission staff. I told him I would think about it and let him know in a few days. I did that, and I agreed subsequently to join the staff. iSIr. CoRNWELL. Were you told anything at that time about the pur- poses of the investigation ? Mr. LiEBELER. I don't recall. ^h\ CoRNWELL. Either through those conversations or through some other public or other source of information, Avhat was your understand- ing as to the reason that a Presidential Commission had been formed as opposed to perhaps some other manner of dealing with the fact of the assassination ? ]Mr. LiEBELER. I don't have any recollection of my thoughts on that at that time except that my general notion was at that time and throughout the time I worked with the Commission that we were to ascertain the facts suiTOuncling the assassination to the extent that was possible and to report on them to the American people in the form of a report of some kind. ]Mr. Corn WELL. Do you recall any conversations on that subject mat- ter with any particular pei-sons in the very early stages of your work? Mr. LiEBELER. No ; not specifically on that subject. ^h\ Corn WELL. Do you recall any staff meetings at which the sub- ject matter of the Commission's objectives were set forth and provided to you ? ]Mr. LiEBELER. I do not. I am under the impression there had been a staff meeting when that question was discussed but that occurred, as I recall, prior to the time I came to Washington. Mr. CoRNWELL. When appro.vimately did you begin work? Mr. LiEBELER, Some time near the end of January 1964. ilr. CoRNWELL. Had you prior to going to work for the Warren Commission had any experience with any of the Federal agencies, in- vestigative agencies, FBI, CIA? ]Mr. LiEBELER. I was interviewed by a CIA agent once when I was much younger. Mr. CoRNWELL. Did you form any impressions about them ? Mr. LiEBELER. I was impressed with them. Mr. CoRNWELL. Apart from that ? !Mr. LiEBELER. Xo : no contact. ^Ir. CoRNWELL. When you first went with the Warren Commission to begin work, what was the nature of the assignment that was given to you as far as subject matter ? yiv. LiEBELER. I was assigned to work in the area of possible moti- vation that Lee Oswald might have had for ha vine; been involved in the assassination, and there was an outline of the work assignments that existed at the time that I came to work which I recall discussing Avith Mr. Willens at the time I received that assignment. 211 ]Mr. Cokxv>'i:ll. To what extent if any did your assignment involve questions of conspiracy or possible conspiracy 'i Mr. LiEBELER. Well, it did involve botii that question and the ques- tion of possible psychological condition of Oswald. My basic respon- sibility and that of Mr. Jenner, who was working also in this area, was to determine to the extent we could anyone with whom Oswald had contact in any way in the United ^States prior to the tune of the assassination. That did involve, of course, the question of whether or not he had been involved with anyone in a possible conspiracy to assassinate the President. The question of conspiracy which involved persons out of the coun- try was outside of our area. Mr. CoRN\VELL. Was there anyone else besides you and Mr. Jenner who were assigned responsibility with respect to investigating pos- sible involvement of persons in a conspiracy within the United IStates? Mr. LiEBELER. I think that the whole Ruby issue would be involved in that also. Mr. Griffin and Mr. Hubert were assigned to that area, the Ruby area. Of course, the question came up during their work as to whether there had -been any prior contact between Oswald and Ruby or contact with either of them, between them either directly or indirectly. Mr. Slawson was also involved to some extent in this ques- tion of domestic conspiracy because the domestic contacts and at least the Cuban and possible Mexican contacts ran into each other in the sense that we were trying to run down the possible contacts that had been alleged between Oswald and the Cuban groups, both in New Orleans and in Dallas, and that related at some point in time to Oswald's trip to Mexico which Mr. Slawson was primarily responsi- ble for because Slawson was involved to some extent but not primarily. Other than that, I don't recall anybody was specifically assigned to that question. Mr. CoRNWELL. What contribution did Mr. Jenner make with re- spect to the investigation of Oswald's background and his conspira- torial relationships ? Mr. LiEBELER. The record will show that Mr. Jenner conducted testimony before the Commission, itself. He took a large number of depositions in Dallas and New Orleans. And subsequently my recol- lection isthat he worked on a draft of some material that related to the Oswald involvement with the so-called Russian community in Dallas. My impression was that he worked primarily on this in the drafting process. Mr. CoRNWELL. When did you leave the Warren Commission? Mr. LiEBELER. After the work was finished, some time I believe in October 1964, Mr. CoRNWELL. Wlien did Mr. Jenner leave ? Mr. LiEBLER. He stayed until the end also I believe, close to the end. Mr. CoRNWELL. Did you consider your assignment there a full-time job? Mr. LiEBELER. Yes, sir. ]Vf r. CoRNWELL. How many hours a week did you work ? Mr. LiEBELER. The pay records will show what I charged the Gov- ernment for. INIr. Rankin sometimes didn't believe there were that 212 many hours worked. There were in fact many more. It was a 7-day- a-week job for large periods of time. Mr. Corn WELL. Was that also true with respect to Jenner? Mr. LiEBELER. In the latter part of the work of the Commission Mr. Jenner put in a lot of hours working on Commission matters. During the early stage of the investigation his participation was somewhat less. Mr. CoRxwELL. During what period of time was it somewhat less? Mr. LiEBELER. My recollection is that when I started to work the first thing I had to do was read a very large number of basically FBI reports and trying to organize the material within my general area in such a way that I could decide what additional evidence had to be developed and whose depositions had to be taken._ It was difficult for Mr. Jenner and I to work out a general relationship on that ques- tion at the time. Since I was a so-called junior staff member at that time, Mr. Jenner was not, I was quite unsure when I started as to how to handle the problem. I finally just decided to do my own thing and basically went ahead and did most of that original work, myself. Mr. Jenner worked "^and I and on projects neverI worked actuallyon worked projects. very closely together. He Mr. CoRxwELL. I don't think you actually ever answered the last question which was when was it that tlie changeover occurred between Mr. Jenner's part-time activity and his full-time. Mr. LiEBELER. My recollection is that during the early part of the Commission's work that Mr. Jenner was concerned, I believe he was interested in becoming president of the American Bar Association and I believe he spent some time on that issue. I suppose that the record will show when the Bar Association convention was held which is usually in the summer sometime. His interest rose sharply after the convention and he participated to a greater extent in the work of the Commission, Mr. DoDD. I presume he was not elected then ? Mr. LiEBELER. Xo. Mr. CoRxwELL. Mr. Chairman, may we mark for identification a memorandum dated Ausfust 27, 1964 from Mr. Liebeler to :Mr. AYillens and Mr. Redlich as exhibit 31 ? Mr. Preyer. Exhibit 31 will be marked for identification. Mr. Cornwell. I show you that exhibit and ask you if you have had a chance to review that prior to coming here ? Mr. Liebeler. Yes. I have, Mr. CoRxwELL. Would it be fair to state that memorandum deals generally with the subject matter of the adequacy of the work in the field of conspiracv as of iVugust 27, 1964 ? Mr. Liebeler. This memo was written following a particular con- ference between ]\Ir. Willens and Mr. Redlich and myself in which some very specific questions were discussed. It talks in general terms about the conspiracy question. It was motivated or it was a function of reallv a couple of particular issues that had arisen at that time. Mr. CoRXWELL, Conspiracy and what else ? question in theMr. sense that thevWell, Liebeler. involved werewayparts they" the the FBI andconspiracv of the, the staff had handled the fact of at that time a large number of unidentified palm prints 213 and fingerprints on the cartons found in the School Book Depository. Mr. CoRNWF.LL. With that statement, Mr. Chairman, may we admit •exhibit 31 in evidence and may I ask specific questions ? Mr. Preyer. Without objection, exhibit 31 is admitted into the record. [The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 31 and received for the record, follovvS :] JFK Exhibit No. 31 [Memorandum] August 27, 1964. To : Hovrard P. Willens. Norman Redlich. Fi-om : Wesjle.v .T. Liebeler. Subject : Conspiracy. It lias not been my practice to write memoranda for the record. I am con- strained, however, by remarks made to me by botli of you within the last two days concerning my responsibilities in respect of the investigation of a possible conspiracy, to state tlie following : 1. Both of you have recently made statements, in response to my criticism of the present state of affairs concerning conspiracy which indicate your belief that I am somehow responsible for same. 2. Those remarks are apparently based on tlie proposition that the question of a domestic conspiracy at least (ex-Ruby) was to be handled by those responsible for the so-called area III outlined in the "Tentative Outline of the Work of the President's Commission." While that has also been my general understanding for some time, examination of that outline indicates that the responsibility for the question of conspiracy is fragmented into several areas. 3. As I advised you both this morning, however, I personally cannot be held re'iponsible for the present condition of the work on conspiracy. Both of you, Mr. .Tenner and I conferred in my office sometime late in .Tune at which time it was agreed by all of us I would assume responsibility for the section on personal motive (Chapter 7) and that Mr. Jenner would devote himself to certain ques- tions relating to the possible existence of a domestic conspiracy. I understand he has been working on that since our conference. 4. By the middle of .Tuly it was thought that Chapter 7 was in such condition that I could work on other things. I was sent to New Orleans and Dallas to take depositions which, together with preparation and editing, took more than two weeks of my time. Since then I have been i-evising Chapter 7 and working on footnotes for it. I also wrote the section in Chapter 4 relating to the Irving Sports story and footnoted it. the5."work I am of morethisthan willing, staff. if able, I cannot, to accept however, my myself leave full share of responsibility in the for position implied by the above-described oral statements made by both of you which I hope you both will admit, upon reflection, are false and unfair. 6. You have asked me what I think should be done at the present time in reference to our work on conspiracy. I gave you some of those suggestions orally this morning. After conference with INIr. Griffin. Mr. Slawson and I spoke with Mr. Rankin about that subject this afternoon. Mr. Rankin has asked me to set up a conference with representatives of the FBI to discuss the fingerprints on the cartons and the palmprint problems. I will cover both subjects in memoranda to Mr. Rankin tomorrow. My comments on Marina Oswald will follow. Wesley J. Liebeleb. Mr. CoRNWELL. Paragraph 1 of the memo states that, "Both of you liave recently made statements, in response to my criticism of the pres- ent state of affairs concerning conspiracy which indicate your belief tJmt I am somehow responsible for same." In paragraph 3, "As I advised you both this morning, however, I personally cannot be held responsible for the present condition of the work on conspiracy." What was the problem with the state of the work and the present condition of the work on conspiracy ? What it was as of August 27, 19&i? 214 Mr. LiEBELER. My recollection of that is that no one, no one person, had taken the responsibility of drafting a chapter of the report or a portion of the report dealing with that question separately from the ways in which it was more tangentially treated in the other work in the report. Part of the reason for that was that I had spent a fair amount of time, as this memo indicates, drafting what eventually be- came chapter 7 of the report which, while it looked at the question of the contacts that Oswald had had in the United States and his part in the assassination, it was really more of a psychological profile of Oswald rather than the kind of work it became clear that we did have to do which became chapter 6 of the report and which as I recall at that time was lagging behind the other work. It was not in the same condition of development as the other work was. Chapter 7 was done and it had been done for some time, "WHiat eventually condition itbecame was in chapter 6 was it not but I know was that not far along. as far I don't asrecall advanced what the other work of the staff. May I add that that question, if it becomes really jiertinent, could be dealt with to some extent by looking through the files and finding the draft and noting the development of what became cliapter 6. Mr. CoRNWELL. In a couple of places in the memo you phrase your criticism of the present state of affairs in terms of the work on con- spiracy, both in paragraph 3 and again in paragraph 6. Does that refer- ence refer only to the work in drafting the conspiracy chapter, or in fact were you dissatisfied on that date with the general work in un- scrambling the facts and determining whether there had been a conspiracy ? Mr. LiEBELER, I think the basic thrust of the memo was addressed to the problem of pulling the material together in a draft more suit- able for inclusion in the report. There were, however, at that time still Fonie open questions that had not been satisfactorily dealt with in my mind. There was some question at that point in time as to whether or not we were going to be able to get additional investigations conducted that would satisfy myself as to the problems that existed in my mind at that time. As I say, that question was the question that was discussed at this meeting and that is what led to this, if I may characterize it, somewhat intemperate memo. Mr. CoRNWEEL. Can you now recall any of the specifics of the types of investigative work found lacking as of August 27? ]\rr. LiEBEEER. The two specific questions that were discussed in the meeting with Mr. Willens and Mr. Tvedlich I believe, if I have the se- quence straight in my mind, were the questions I referred to before, about the existence of unidentified fingerprints and palm jirints on the l)oxes in the window in the School Book Depositorv and the question of the treatment of the palm print that had allegedly been lifted f i-om the underside of the rifle barrel and identified as Oswald's. I have no independent recollection of the sequence of events but I know that it was about that time that this meeting occurred. By looking at some of the other memoranda I can refresh my recollection that it was almost exactly at that time, I believe it was that meeting I referred to in my memo of August 27. During the course of the conversation I had argued to INIr. Redlich that the record could not be left in the condition it was in. There 215 had been no serious attempt to identify these other prints, as to the prints on the carton, and there was a serious question as to the chani ot evidence as regards the palm print on the rifle barrel which I thought should be resolved. Mr. Eedlich did not want to conduct anybetween investiga- tion into those matters. That led to a vigorous exchange us. ]Mr. Rankin was later informed of that exchange and he, after discuss- ing the matter with me, agreed to bring the FBI people back and dis- cuss with them the continuance of the investigation, and it was done. Mr. CoRNWELL. May we mark for identification, Mr. Chairman, a memorandum dated September 4 from Mr. Liebeler to Mr. Rankin? ^Ir. Preyer. That may be marked for identification. Mr. CoRXWELL. Mr. Liebeler, have you had a chance to review that document prior to coming here today? Mr. Liebeler. Yes, I have. Mr. CoRXWELL. Would it be fair to state that that document relates senerally to the subject matter of an attached first draft of a proposed conspiracy chapter and also certain recommendations concerning Marina Oswald ? Mr. Liebeler. Yes. It appears that I attached to this memo a first draft of a proposed section for the conspiracy chapter dealing with cer- tain specific questions. Mr. Corxwell. May we at this time admit that document in evidence, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Preyer. Without objection it is admitted into evidence. [The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 32 and received for the record, follows :] JFK Exhibit No. 32 [Memorandum] Septembee 4, 1964. To : Mr. Rankin. From : Mr. Liebeler. I attach a first draft of a proposed section for the Conspiracy Chapter dealing with the testimony of Sylvia Odio, Evaristo Rodriguez, Dean Andrews and with the fact tliat one of the persons who helped Oswald distribute FPCC literature in New Orleans on August 16, 1963 has never been identified. Perhaps this draft can serve as a guide in questioning Marina Oswald, which I understand that you and Senators Cooper and Russell plan to do this coming weekend. While I have recommended that Marina Oswald be deposed at length concerning certain con- flicts which have appeared in her testimony and otlier matters of interest to vari- ous members of the staff, in the absence of such an examination I recommend that ^Marina Oswald be questioned about the following : 1. All the circumstances surrounding her departure from New Orleans on Sep- tember 23. 1963 with Mrs. Ruth Paine. As I have previously advised you, I spoke with Marina Oswald on the telephone on August 26, 1963 concerning, in part, that subject. Marina Oswald told me then that her husband had told her that he planned to leave New Orleans on the day immediately following the departure of :Marina and Mrs. Paine. Oswald also told her, Marina said, that she should expect to receive an unemployment compensation check at Mrs. Paine's address. He said that check would be sent from Texas to his post office box in New Orleans and forwarded from there to Mrs. Paine's address. That w^ould indicate that Oswald did not intend to remain in New Orleans until he received the check himself. It would also indicate that he had sufficient funds to go to Mexico City without wait- ing for the check. All and the of this,time ofhe course, crossedrelates to Oswald's the border activities into Mexico between inSeptember sometime 23, 1963 the afternoon of September 26, 1963. I have previously discussed with you the apparent pattern of his movements in New Orleans which is indicated by the fact that he apparently traveled a total of approximately six miles through the city of New Orleans to 216 cash his unemployment compensation check when he could have done so byattached travel- ing only ten blocks. The details of that situation are set forth in the draft. Marina Oswald should be questioned about all asi^ects of that situation. 2. In connection with the above Marina Oswald should be asked questions designed to elicit anv information or suspicions that she might have concerning the possibilitv that Oswald was in Dallas in late September, 19G3 after he left New Orleans'aud before he went to Mexico. This subject, of course, involves the possibility that he may have made the acquaintance of some Mexicans or Cubans in New Orleans prior to the time Marina Oswald left that city. In that connection it should be noted that Sylvia Odio testified that the men that came to her apart- ment said they had just come from New Orleans and that they were on a trip. 3. Odio's testimony relates to some extent to that of Evaristo Rodriguez in that both persons described the unidentified person accompanying the person they thought to be Oswald as having a bald spot on the forepart of his hairline. Rod- riguez testified that Oswald [was] in the Habana Bar in New Orleans sometime during August 1963, near the time Oswald was involved with his fracas with Bringuier, i.e., August 9, 1963. Marina Oswald should be questioned closely as to how her husband used his time during that period. For example, he was kept in jail for the night of August 9-10. 1963. Was Marina surprised when he did not come home or did she know where he was? Did he stay out late on other occa- sions? Did she see any indications that he was associating with other people? Did she see any evidence that he was drinking at all during this period? I think Marina Oswald should be told upon her deposition that we have evidence that Oswald was associating with Cubans and Mexican type individuals and that she should be pressed vigorously on these points. 4. Marina Oswald should be questioned concerning the unidentified individual who helped Oswald distribute FPCC literature on August 16. 1963. Oswald may have told her, for example, that he had paid one or more individuals to help him distribute that literature. Marina may also have seen pictures of these other people helping him. 5. In connection with the testimony given by Dean Andrews. :Marina should be questioned closely as to whether or not Oswald even consulted an attorney in New Orleans. She should be questioned what he told her about what he was doing to obtain a reconsideration of his undesirable discharge. She should be questioned what, if any, conversations they had about her becoming an American citizen. She should also be asked whether Oswald ever expressed any concerns over his own citizenship status. You might even ask her if she has ever heard of Clay Bertrand. 6. In short, I would like to have you question Marina Oswald, in detail, con- cerning any knowledge that she might have of any Cuban or Mexican couta'^ts that Oswald may have had in the United States prior to the time he left for Mexico City. In that connection ]\Iarina should be asked what she knows about Oswald's apparent attempt to infiltrate Bringuier's organization in New Orleans. She has already testified that a Cuban came to their apartment in August of 1903 seeking information about Oswald's FPCC activities. My recollection is that Oswald was suspicious of that person and thought him to be either an anti-Castro individual or a representative of some intelligence agency. Oswald may have told Marina about his contacts with Bringuier in connection with the visit of the above mentioned Cul>an. She should also be questioned about any contacts of that sort that Oswald may have had after his return from Alexico City as well as any conversations she might- have had with Oswald concerning a possible renewal of his FPCC activities. In connection witli the possibility that Marina may be familiar with the person who helped Oswald distribute FPCC literature on August 1963, I attach' Pizzo Exhibits 4,'i3A and 453B. The unidentified individual is marked with an inked arrow in Pizzo Exhibit 4.')3A. He is located in the center of the picture and' appears to have some leaflets in his hand. That individual is marked with an inkod numeral 3 in Pizzo Exhil)it 4.'>.3B in which he appears in the far left hand rorner of the picture. These photographs should be shown to Marina Oswald to see if vShe can identify any of the individuals depicted therein. Mr. : CoRNWELL. Does the very first sentence of that memo wliicli- reads I attach a first draft of a proposed section for the conspiracy chapter dealinc with the testimony of Sylvia Odio, Evaristo Rodriguez, Dean Andrews ancP 217 with the fact that one of the persons who helped Oswald distribute FPCC literature in New Orleans on August 16, 1963 has never been identified. Does that indicate that it was your draft of the chapter Avhich was attached ? Mr. LiEBELER. Yes. Mr. CoRNWELL. That means that you ended up writing the con- spiracy chapter which was at issue in the earlier memo, now exhibit 31. is that correct? Mr. LiEBELER. No ; it means that I prepared the first draft dealing- with the questions that I described in that first sentence. Mr. CoRNWELL. The conspiracy work then that was at issue in exliibit 31 was broader than that or difTerent than that ? ]Mr. LiEBELER. Yes; it was a broader issue than that but it included tlie problems that I discussed in the first sentence of exhil^it 32. The discussion related to the question of drafting: the entire chapter. I refer to the fact that on September 4 I produced a draft of i^art of the section, it was agreed that I should go ahead and draft some of that chapter, which I did. Mr. CoRNWELL. Why was it at this relatively late date — the report was finally published on September 28, is that correct? Mr. LiEBELER. I don't remember. Mr. CoRNWELL. At any rate, why was it at this late date you were ultimately given the assignment to write the chapter when it was not an issue in your field of responsibility ? ^ Mr. LiEBELER. I think there are two reasons for that. One, I had finished the chapter that became chapter 7 and that I was the person in the best position to draft this section of the conspiracy report be- cause Ihad taken these questions the intestimony listed of the people the first sentence Avho 32 of exhibit were' and,involved in of course, before taking that testimony had prepared myself to do so and was more familiar with that area than probably anyone else on the staff. ^Ir. CoRNWELL. By this time at least, however, Mr. Jenner was free fi-om his campaign and was able to work on drafting the conspiracy chapter too, is that correct? Mr. LiEBELER. Yes : that is true. Mv. CoRNWELL. May we mark for identification, Mr. Chairman, one page out of a book marked "Inquest," as exhibit 33. I show you what has been marked as exhibit 33, being a photocopy of one page of the book "Inquest." That publication purports to quote you m connection with the work of the Warren Commission. I might state that that particular segment of the book relates to the Com- mission members work as opposed to staff work. It states, "Wesley Liebeler, when asked what the Commission did, replied in one word 'nothing.' " Let me ask you two questions. Does the book quote you accurately and if so what was the meanino- of the statement? '^ Mr. LiEBELER. I have no recollection making the statement to Mr. E]:»stein but I don't deny that I made it. ^Ir. CoRNWELL. What was the nature of the Wan^en Commission's work as you perceived it and viewed it during your tenure as staff counsel? Mr. LiEBELER. I think Mr. Willen's characterization on this same page IS a more accurate characterization. What I had intended to o convey to Mr. Epstein was the idea that in terms of developing the investigation, the direction in particular1 <^ of the investigation, and in drafting the report, the Commissioners themselves were not directly involved, and they were not. Mr. CoRNWELL. So, your general view then would be that similar to what is reported in the document Mr. Willens said and that is that the Commissioners were not in touch with the investigation at all times ? Mr. LiEBELER. As further explained in my previous testimony, yes. Mr. CoRN^vELL. Mr. Chairman, with respect to that last exhibit I think the testimony perhaps speaks better than the exhibit, so I will not offer it, myself, into evidence. I would ask that we mark exhibit 34 for identification, which is an August 28, 1964 memorandum from Mr. Liebeler to Mr. Rankin, Mr. Preter. It may be so marked. Mr. CoRNWELL. Have you had a chance to review exhibit 34 prior to coming here, JNIr. Liebeler? Mr. Liebeler. Yes, sir. Mr. CoRNWELL. Is it accurate to state that that is a memorandum written in connection with issues which were pending in August of 1964 concerning the palm print about which you have previously testified ? Mr, Liebeler. Yes, ]Mr. CoRNWELL. ]May we admit exhibit 34 in the record, Mr. Chairman ? Mr. Preyer. Without objection, exhibit 34 is entered into the record. [The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 34 and re- ceived for the record, follows:] JFK Exhibit No. 34 [Memorandum] August 28, 1964. To : J. Lee Rankin. From : Wesley J. Liebeler, Messrs. Griffin and Slawsou and I raise questions covering the palmprint which Lt. Day of the Dallas Police Department testified he lifted from the under- side of the barrel of the K-1 ritle on November 22, 1963. That story is set forth on pages 7-10 of the proposed final draft of Chapter IV of the Report, copies of which are attached. We suggest that additional investigation be conducted to determine with greater certainty that the palmprint was actually lifted from the rifle as Lt. Day has testified. The only evidence we presently have on that print is the testimony of Lt. Day himself. He has stated that although he lifted the palmprint on Novem- ber 22, 1963, he did not provide a copy of the lift to the FBI until November 26, 1903 (9 R 2(50-61). He also testified that after the lift he "could still see traces of the print under the barrel and was going to try to use photography to bring oft" or bring out a better print." Mr. Latona of the FBI testified with respect to the lift of the palmprint, that "evidently the lifting had been so complete that there was nothing left to show any marking on the gun itself as to the existence of such — even an attempt on the part of anyone else to process the rifle" {Id. at 24). Additional problems are raised by the fact that : (1) Mr. Latona testified that the poor finish of the K-1 rifle made it absorbent and not conducive to getting a good print ; (2) None of the other prints on the rifle could be identified because they were of such poor quality ; (3) The other prints on the rifle were protected by cellophane while the area where the palmprint Iiad been lifted was not, even though Lt. Day testified that after the lift the "([palm] print on gun was their best bet, still remained on there," when he was asked why he had not released the lift to the FBI on No- vember 22, 1963. 219 We should review the above circumstances at our conference vpith Agent Latona and Inspector aialley. The configuration of the palmprint should be re- viewed to determine, if possible, whether or not it was removed from a cylin- drical surface. The possibility that the palmpiint or evidence of the lift was destroyed while the rifle was in transit should be reviewed with them. The exact condition of the rifle at the time it was turned over to the FBI Dallas office shou-d be ascertained. Agent Latona should be asked if he can think of any explanation for the apparent conflict in the above testimony. We should also : (1) Determine whether or not Lt. Day had assistance when he worked with the prints on the rifle. If he did, we should obtain statements from those who assisted him. (2) Lt. Day should be asked why he preserved the fingerprints on the rifle, which were sufficiently clear to make positive identification, and yet did not pre- serve the palmprint, which was clear enough for that purpose. (3) Lt. Day should also be asked why he removed only the palmprint and should be requestioned covering his recollection that he saw the palmprint still on the rifle after he made the lift. (4) Lt. Day should be asked if he took any photgraphs of the palmprint on the rifle after the lift. He may have done so. .since lie did photograph the less valu- able fingerprints, and the palmprint on the rifle, according to his testimony, was still the "best bet" for identification. It is also significant that Lt. Day stated that he was going to attempt to get a better print through use of photography. Mr. CoRNWELL. This was a inemorandiim, is it correct, ]\Ir. Liebeler, that you wrote in connection with the consideration by staff, particu- larly Mr. Rankin, of whether additional investijjation should be con- ducted on the palm print about which you previously provided some information? Mr. Liebeler. Yes, sir. INIr. CoRXAVELL. Why was a memo like this written ? "What was tlie purpose of it ? Mr. Liebeler. The purpose was to outline the kind of investijration that Mr. Griffin and Mr. Slawson and I thought should ))e conducted into this question. Mr. Rankin requested us to indicate to him, since vre had pressed for an additional investigation, the kind of investigation that we thought should be conducted. ]\Ir. CoRNWELL. So this was in response to a specific request from l\Ir. Rankin for this memo ? ]Mr. Liebeler. Yes. ]\[r. Rankin requested this memo but he requested the memo only after Mr. Griffin and Mr. Slawson and I had raised this question about tlie condition of the record as regards the palm print. Mr. Corna\t:T;L. That had become a rather heated subject matter, is that correct, at that point ? ]Mr. Liebeler. Yes, it certainly had. Mr. CoRxwELL. Were there generally problems of this nature en- countered bythe staff concerning matters which they felt required investigation and ]Mr. Rankin and Mr. Redlich did not ? IMr. Liebeler, No. ]Mr. CoRxwELL. This is a veiy unusual event in your experience, is that correct ? Mr. Liebeler. My recollection is that it was only these two items that this question ever came to a head on. IMr. Corxwell. The rest of the time such matters would be handled orally, is that correct ? Mr. Liebeler. For the most part it wasn't a question. For the most part the individual staff members were free to take the deposition of 43-819—79 15 220 to Mr. Kankin's approval, wliicli anyone was never tliey wanted and withheld there subject to take, was never any question raised about it, or to ask the FBI or other agencies to conduct additional investigation and that would be done by drafting a letter for Mr. Kankin's signature and forwarding it to Mr. Willens who would then presumably advise Mr. Kankin on the question. I do not recall any case in which any previous recommendations that I had made in the form of requests to the FBI or other agencies were ever questioned or resisted and in fact since both in this case and in the palm print case I did eventually prevail on this issue I am able to state there is not a single case that any of my recoimnendations as to investigation were denied, that I can recall. Mr. CoRNWELL. Was that, to your understanding and within your ability to observe the workings of the Warren Commission, true with respect to other staff counsel '^ Mr. LiEBELER. As a general proposition, yes. The only issue in which the question came up in another context, as I recall it, was when Griffin and Hubert were trying to establish how Ruby got in the basement of the police station, and there was also another issue involved with Griffin in which I believe he was advised to move on to other questions, only because, as I understand it, of the fact that there were other ques- tions that had to be dealt with and it did not seem likely that these issues could be clearly resolved. ]Mr. CoRxwELE. In other words, your testimony as I understand it is basically that there was no atmosphere of restriction upon the in- vestigation asthe people who were actually doing the work saw it, in other word.':, people at your level were across the board given relatively free rein to follow the investigation where it led them in an attempt to secure the necessary evidence? Mr. Ltebeler. Yes, sir. Mr. CoRNWELL. Miij we mark for identification, ]\Ir. Chainnan, a memorandum dated September 2, 1964, from Mr. Liebeler to Mr. Wil- lens as exhibit 35. ]Mr. DoDD. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt at this point? Are we get- ting copies of these or should we have them ? ]Mr. Corn WELL. You should have copies of all of these. Have you had a chance to review that memorandum prior to coming here ? ]Mr. Liebeler. Yes, sir. Mv. CoRxwELL. Would it be fair to state that the subject matter of that memorandum is the discovery of property remaining in the pos- session ofMarina Oswald as of August 26, 1964 ? Mr. Liebeler. Yes, sir. Mr. CoRNWELL. JMay we admit that exhibit as part of the record, Mr. Chairman ? Mr. Preyer. Without objection, the exhibit is admitted into the record. [The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 35 and received for the record, follows :] 221 JFK Exhibit No. 35 [Memorandum] September 2, 1964. To : Mr. Willens. From : Mr. Liebeler. Re : Relevant property remaining in possession of Marina Oswald as of August 26, 1964. I forward a proposed letter to the FBI along lines which I suggested in a con- ference with you and Mr. Redlich on August 27, 1964 and generally in accord with conversations l)etween Inspector Malley, Mr. Rankin, Mr. Griffin and myself held on August 2S, 1964. I have previously expressed my opinion that it reflects adversely in the thor- oughness of this investigation that Marina Oswald still had in her possession on August 26, 1964, material pertinent to our work, the existence of which material was not known to the FBI, this Commission, or any other investigative agency. As indicated in the report of Special Agent Heitman dated August 27, 1964, at Dallas, Tex., Marina Oswald discovered the materials mentioned in that report on or about August 17 or IS, 1964. They had been in a small brown suitcase that had been in her possession at Ruth Paine's residence. Marina Oswald told Agent Heitman that she remembered that she had the materials in question when I asked her in a telephone conversation on August 26, 1964, about Oswald's plans following her departure for Irving. Tex., with Ruth Paine on September 23, 1963. The proposed letter seems indicated under the circumstances. Mr. CoKNWELL. The first sentence in the second paragraph reads: I have previously expressed my opinion that it reflects adversely in the thoroughness of this investigation that Marina Oswald still had in her posses- sion on August 26, 1964, material pertinent to our work, the existence of which material was not known to the FBI, this Commission, or any other investigative agency. What type of material was that, or was at issue there ? Mr. Liebeler. My recollection is that there was a map of Mexico City on which had been made marks and notations of various kinds, a stub of a bus ticket covering transportation, I believe from Mexico City to Dallas, Tex., and a television guide in Spanish relating to the broadcast of television stations in jSIexico City during the period of time, as I recall, that Oswald was in Mexico City. Mr. CoRNWELL. Would it be fair to state that this material then would have had an obvious relevance to many of the issues that the Warren Commission was in the process of considering? ]Mr. Liebeler. I think so. Mr. Cornwell. It was not obtained by you, the FBI apparently or the Warren Commission until approximately 30 days prior to the dateMr.theLiebeler. Warren That Commission's is correct.report became public ? Mr. Cornwell. Was this in your view, based on j'our knowledge of what transpired at the time and your ability to reflect back on those events, typical or atypical of the FBI's investigation of this matter ? I am talking about the assassination. -Mr. Liebeler. I don't think it was typical of the FBI's work as a general proposition. It certainly was not typical of the work that the FBI did in response to the request that we made that they conduct their own investigation. I have no direct Imowledge of the quality of the Bureau's work prior to the time that the Commission began to operate although that is reflected to a considerable extent of course in the reports that we did receive from the Bureau. 222 Obviously those reports cannot reflect sins of omission on tlie part of the Bureau. Mr. CoRNWELL. What explanation did you receive in connection with this discovery ? Mr. LiEBELER. From the FBI ? Mr. CoRNWELL. Yes, sir. Mr. LiEBELER. I did not ask the FBI for an explanation and they never offered me one. ]Mr. CoRNWELL. The reason I aslv the question is I suppose there miijht be some chance that the evidence had been fabricated and did not even exist in November 1963. Is that correct ? Did you even ask to see if they had checked this location earlier and found nothing? Mr. LiEBELER. I don't recall making that request. I have a problem here to some extent because this memorandum says that I am forward- ing a proposed letter to the FBI and I don't have that letter in front of me and I don't know what I said, I have no recollection of what it said. ]My recollection of my position at this time was that, I believe I had the feeling at that time that this whole question of the property in- ventory, ifany, and the question of the way the Bureau handled the obtaining and forwarding of this property to the Commission should be looked at l)ut it is not a strong recollection and I would like to see the letter if we have it. Mr. CoRNWELL. I apologize for the fact that we don't ha^-e it here today. Mr. LiEBEi>ER. If I may say, if this information or piece of paper had been in the possession of the Commission or the FBI prior to the time that they were obtained, it would have made the investigation into Oswald's trip to Mexico a great deal easier. But I don't believe there was anything in this information which was inconsistent with the con- clusions that had been reached on that issue independeiit of the papers. Mr. CoRNWELL. I did not mean to suggest necessarily that the FBI had fabricated the evidence. I meant to ask you whether or not the possibility had occurred to you that INIarina Oswald had fabricated the evidence and decided to give it to the FBI at this late date? Mr. LiEBELER. My recollection is that these papers had notes on them that were tain of that written but I inthink Lee Plarvey Oswald's that is the hanrlwriting. case and tliat would I handle am not that cer- question. Mr. CoRKWELL. complete the investigation "Was there, in your in your fieldview, enough time ?to adequately of responsibility Mr. LiEBELER. I would have to answer yes to tliat question with one exception that I can think of. I did not have any other investigation or line of investigation that I wanted to pursue and I don't know that anyone else on the staff did either by tlie time we finished drafting our rei~»ort except for the fact that tlie FBI was still trying to either cor- roborate or discredit, to detennine the truth or falsity of some testi- mony that had been given by Svl via Odio to the effect that Oswald had heen in her apartment in iDallas some time in either September or October 1963. Mr.of CoRXWELL. field Was? Sylvia Odio's testimony initially within your responsibility 223 Mr. LiEBELER. It is hard to answer that question. Her FBI reports were there and we all knew about them and they were the subject of continued discussion between ]Mr. Griffin and Mr. Slawson and myself because they related to work that all three of us were doing. It was really never decided who would take the primary responsibility for developing; that problem until it finally fell on me because I happened to be in Dallas to take other testimony and so the three of us agreed that I would take her testimony. Mr. CoRNWELL. Essentially because you were there ? Mr. LiEBELER. Yes, and the fact that it was a question that was within this whole general area and one that I was familiar with and I had discussed with these other two gentlemen. Ml-. CoRNWELL. The Sylvia Odio incident was never resolved to your satisfaction, was it? ]Mr. LiEBELER. No, not really. . . ]Mr. CoRxwELL. Directing your attention again to exhibit 32, the memo written on September i, which we have previously admitted into evidence, would it be fair to state that as of that late date there were still in your mind a long list of areas about which more information was needed for Marina Oswald ? Mr. LiEBELER. ^ly recommendation in this letter was that she be asked about these questions, ves. Mr. CoRXWELL. In fact the staff has been rather conceraed with M'hat thev thought was the superficial questioning of her from the very beginning, as far back as February, is that not true ? Mr. LiEBELER. Yes, that is true. Mr. CoRxwELL. In addition to the pressures I guess we would say to complete the investigation and (j^et the report out in the matters that at least you felt required further attention even in September 1964, was there any problem with the rewrite processes, the processes of prepar- inp: the final repoi't as of that date ? ]Mr. LiEBELER. I certainly thought so for a number of reasons. Mr. CoRX"v/ELL. Mr. Chairman, may I mark for identification exhibit 86, a memorandum dated September 6, 1964, by Mr. Liebeler reading "]\Iemoraiidum Regarding Gallev Proofs of Chapter IV of the Re- port." ]Mr. Preyer. The exhibit may be marked for identification. ISIr. Corxwell. Have you had a chance to review that document prior to coming here ? ]Mr. LiEBELER. Yes, sir. IMr. Corxwell. Would that in part at least reflect your concern with the rewrite processes ? IVIr, Liebeler. Yes. IMr. Corxw^ell. May we admit that document into the record, ]\Ir. Chairman ? Mr. Preyer. Without objection the exhibit is admitted into the record. FThe document referred to. marked JFK exhibit No. 36 and re- ceived for the record, follows :] 224 JFK Exhibit No. 36 [Memorandum re Galley Proofs of Chapter IV of the Report] iSeptembeb 6, 1964. From : Wesley J. Liebeler. I set forth below comments on the galley proofs of chapter IV of the report, a copy of which I obtained from Mr. Redlich on September 4, 1964. Other com- ments and suggestions are set forth in the margin of the galley itself. PURCHASE OF THE EIFLE BY OSWALD 1. On galley page 30, query if the name "Hidell" was stamped on the member- ship application blanks of the New Orleans branch, FPCC. 2. The text near the top of page 30 gives the impression that the name Hidell was stamped Oswald stamped on his all own of thename New on Orleans some of Chapter's it. printed literature. It was not. OSWALD'S PALMPRINT ON THE RIFLE BARREL 1. Query if the palmprint provides additional evidence of ownership of the rifle as is stated. The most it does is show that Oswald had possession of the rifle at some time. It does not show that he owned it. 2. Second paragraph states that Lt. Day determined the wood, SR wooden stock was too rough to take prints "from visual examination." Day does not say that in his testimony. While it is a minor point, he .iust said that he noted it was too rough. For all I know he may have reached that conclusion by feeling the stock. 3. It may be noted here that the conclusion for the section on rifle ownership, that appears on galley page 32, states that the presence of the palmprint on the rifle shows that Oswald "had disassembled it." That conclusion is not warranted from the existence of the palmprint on the rifle. The conclusion that Oswald handled the rifle while it was disassembled is justified. 4. The palmprint section must be changed to reflect the latest findings of the FBI that the palmprint had to have been lifted from the barrel because of the marks that appear on the lift that correspond to those on the rifie barrel itself. FIBERS ON THE RIFLE 1. I think this section is written a little too strongly considering the record. For example, there is no footnote after the statement that the Commission found no credible evidence that Oswald used the rifle between September 23 and the assassination. Furthermore, even if he did not "use" it, he might very well have handled it at some time during that period. Also, Stombaugh was not able to estimate the period of time within which the fibers were placed on the rifle, but much of the language in the section is designed to bring one to the conclusion that they were put there on the day of the assassination, even though that is not said. 2. In the last sentence of the section, it is not the Commission's conclusion that provides proof, it is the fact that the flbers most probably came from Oswald's shirt. Also, does that show that he "owned" the rifle, or just that he or someone that wore the shirt had handled the rifle at some time? PHOTOGRAPH OF OSWALD WITH EIFLE 1. It is interesting to note that the conclusion to the ownership section, on page 32, states that "a photograph taken in the yard of Oswald's apartment showed him holding this rifle." That statement appears in the conclusion in spite of the fact that Shaneyfelt specifically testified that he could not make a positive identification of the rifle that Oswald was holding in the picture, and in spite of the fact that the Commission was not able to conclude, in the discussion of this subject on page 31, that Oswald was holding the assassination weapon in the picture. RIFLE AMONG OSWALD'S POSSESSIONS 1. I do not believe there is any real authority for the proposition that Oswald sighted through the telescopic sight on the porch in New Orleans. Marina Oswald first said she did not know what he did with the rifle out on the jrorch, and then 225 a statement which might be thought to support the instant proposi- was ledtion. It isintonot very convincing. 2. On the top of page 32 it is stated that Ruth and Michael Paine "both noticed the rolled-np blanket in the garage throughout the time that Marina Oswald was living in their home." I am sure the record will not support that statement, a rather important one, too. I recall that there was a period of time before the assassination that neither of them saw the blanket. I have always had the opinion that there was a gap in the proof as to the rifle being continuously iii the garage, one that probably could not be filled. It cannot be filled by ignoring it. The conclusion is even worse when it states that "the rifle was kept among Oswald's possesisions from the time of its purchase until the todaysupport of the assassina- tion." Ido not think the record provides any real evidence that broad statement. The fact is that not one person alive today ever saw that rifle in the Paine garage in such a way that it could be identified as that rifie. THE CURTAIN EOD STOEY 1. The report states that Frazier was surprised when Oswald asked for a ride on November 21, 1963. I am not aWe to find anything in the record to support that statement. 2. The last paragraph of this section is misleading when it attempts to show the falsity of the curtain rod story by stating that Oswald's room at 1026 specif- North Beckley had curtains, and does not take account of the fact thatinFrazier an apartment. ically testified that Oswald said he wanted the curtain rods to put This takes on added significance when we remember that Oswald was talking about renting an apartment so that his family could live in Dallas with him. That aspect of the problem should be specifically treated if we are going to mention the fact that his roominghouse had curtains. THE LONG AND BULKY PACKAGE 1. The last sentence states : "Frazier covdd easily have been mistaken when he stated that Oswald held the bottom of the bag cupped in his hand, or when he said that the upper end was tucked under the armpit." On the very next page of the galleys, in the discussion of the prints that appeared on the paper bag, it is stated that the palmprint was "found on the closed end of the bag. It was from Oswald's right hand in which he carried the long package as he walked from Frazier's car to the building." I am advised that the palmprint is right on the end of the bag, just where it would be if Oswald had carried it cupped in his hand. If we say in the discussion of prints that that print was put on the bag when he carried it to the TSBD (which we don't quite do) and if the print is where it would be if he carried it cupped in his hand, then we must face up on the preceding page and admit that Frazier was right when he said that that is the way Oswald carried it. If the print story is right and the implication left there as to when the print was put on the bag is valid, Frazier could not have been mistaken when he said Oswald carried the bottom of the bag cupped in his hand. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE LINKING RIFLE AND OSWALD TO PAPER BAG 1. The section on fibers in the bag is very thin. The most that can be said is that there was a possibility that the fibers came from the blanket. The FBI expert would not even state that such was probable. CONCLUSION 1. I am at a loss to know why the fact that Oswald apparently failed to turn out Ruth Paine's garage light is mentioned in the conclusion. PALMPRINTS AND FINGERPRINTS ON CARTONS AND PAPER BAG 1. The problem of all the unidentified prints has already been discussed. The FBI has been requesited to conduct additional Investigation to attempt to identify those prints. The results of that investigation must be incorporated in the report. 2. This section emphasized the freshness of one palmprint on one carton. That palmprint was the only one of 28 prints that could be developed by powder as opposed to a chemical process. As a result it was held to have been placed on the carton recently, within from 1 to 3 days prior to the time it was developed. The 226 inference may be drawn from the present language of this section that all of the other prints, which could be developed only through a chemical process because the cartons had already absorbed them, must have been older than the palmprint. Thus, it could be argued that Oswald's other prints had to have been placed on the cartons at least a day before they were developed and perhaps as much as 3 days before. While there may be some reason within the realm of fingerprint technology why that is not so, it does not appear in the report. Under those circumstances, the presence of Oswald's other prints, which must be treated pari passu with the prints of others ou the cartons, seems to have very little significance indeed. This relates to the prints on one of the Rolliny- Readers cartons near the window, the existence of which is emphasized by stating that they "take on added significance" because of the work being done on the sixth floor. The report also srates that the Commission placed "great weight on the fingerprint and palmprint idemtifications." I don't think we should say that in any event. We certainly should not until we deal with the problem of the ai>parent age of Oswald's other prints and the presence of all those unidentified prints. 3. The report states that it is "significant that none of the prints on the cartons could be identified as the prints of a warehouse employee." It also states that those employees "like Oswald, might have handled the cartons" — presumably in the or- dinary course of business. It is significant. But not necessarily to the point that the report tries to make. The fact that only Oswald's prints appeared on the car- tons could show that be was the sole wareaouse employee that handled them — in the ordinary course of business. The fact that Oswald was the only employee whose prints appeared on the cartons does not help to convince me that he moved them in connection with the assassination. It shows the opposite just as well. 4. It is also difiicult to tell just what happened to all of the cartons or who de- veloped what prints. While it appears that all four cartons were forwarded to the FBI, some confusion is created by the later statement that the right palmprint on the box on the floor next to the three near the window was also sent to the FBI. Why was that necessary if the carton had already been sent? The use of the passive voice in the second sentence of the second full paragraph on page 35 of the galleys leaves open the question of who developed the prints. EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION OF ASSASSIN 1. There is a duplication of a long quote from Brennan's testimony that also appears at page 15 of the galleys, the first page of chapter 3. It does not seem to be needed in both places. If left the way it is, the form as to omitted material should be standardized. 2. Following that quote it says that Brennan's description "most probably" letl to the radio alert sent out to police in which the assassin was described. Can't this be more definite? One of the questions that has been raised is the speed with which the assassin was described, the implication being that Oswald had been picked out as a patsy before the event. The Dallas police must know what led to the radio alert and the description. If they do we should be able to find out. If tliey do not know, the circumstances of their not knowing should be discussed briefly. 3. On page 36 it says that at 1 :29 p.m. the police radio reported that the description of the suspect in the Tii>pit shooting was similar to the description which had been given by Brennan in connection with the assassination. On page 46 it is stated that it was unlikely that any ofliicer said anything like "Kill the President, will you?" The reason given is that the officers did not know "that Oswald was a suspect in the killing of the President." But they very likely had heard the police radio note that the description of the two were similar and they may have drawn their own conclusions. The statement on page 46 should be taken out or qualified. 4. There should be a picture of the inside of the Texas School Book Depository sixth floor showing the low window sills and a reference to that picture in connection with the discussion of Brennan's testimony that he saw the mau standing. 5. Query if we need such a long paragraph on Euins' testimony merely to conclude that it is inconclusive as to the identity of the man in the window. 6. In the last sentence of the second to the last paragraph in tlie section it says tliat Altgens picture was taken about 2 seconds "after tlie shot which entered the back of the President's neck." AVe should say after that shot was fired or heard or .something. The sentence is not a good one as it now stands. 227 OSWALD'S ACTIONS IN BUILDING AFTER ASSASSINATION 1. I do not think the description of the Baker^Oswald sequence is sufficiently clear. I am confused as to how many entrance doors there are to the vestibule, even though after a close reading there appear to be only two, the one connect- ing to the second floor landing and the one connecting to the lunch room. It is also not clear whether Baker saw Oswald through the window in the vestihule/ was still open door previously, as is implies by Baker's implied Baker landing door, testimony. Mention of thethat or whether window however, saw Oswald through the window. It does not seem likely that Oswald would still have heen visible through the window if the door had already closed, although that depends on how fast the door closes, which is something I would like to know. What kind of a stairway is it that someone coming up can see nothing at the top of the landing? Truly may in fact have seen Oswald if the latter had just come down the stairs from the third floor as Truly was coming up from the second. I think additional effort should be made with the writing and a picture of the view coming up to the second floor and a diagram or other pictures of the landing and vestibule area would be a good idea. 2. The first sentence in the third from the last paragraph on galley page 38 leaves a false inference concerning Oswald's presence on the sixth floor. It should be rewritten along the following lines : "The fact that Oswald could not have come down in the elevators, the only other possible means of descent, is shown by their movements after the time Baker and Truly tried to use them to go up in the building." 3. In the same paragraph, the statement that both elevators occupy the same shaft is not clear. It would be better to say : "both elevators, which operate adjacently in the same shaft," 4. Last paragraph on page 38 (galley), the testimony of the employees as set forth in that paragraph is also consistent with Oswald having been in Ethiopia at the time of the assassination, or with his having used the elevators to get down from the sixth floor. Since those employees did not see either Oswald or Dougherty, their testimony says nothing on the point under discussion. The whole paragraph should be cut. 5. The next two paragraphs, the first two on galley page 39, are a complete mystery to me. When I left the bottom of page 38 I was looking for additional testimony showing that Oswald came down the stairs and not the elevator. After two paragraphs of excellent analysis I am convinced that Victoria Adams either came down the stairs before or after Oswald did and it is clear that that is so because we know that Oswald came down the stairs and not the elevator. I still do not understand, however, how the fact that Victoria Adams came down the stairs before or after Oswald did shows that Oswald came down the stairs. If the idea is to show that Adams was not on the stairway when Oswald was, I am not convinced by the analysis or speculation in these two paragraphs. Furthermore, if that is the idea it is not clearly set forth. How about a first sentence like: "Victoria Adams testified that she came down the stairway, within about 1 minute after the shots, from the fonrth fioor to the first floor where she encountered two depository employees— Bill Shelley and Billy Lovelady. If Miss Adams was on rhe stairway at that time, the question is raised as to why she did not see Oswald '• fl. In the conclusion : I do not see how the Commission can possibly state that "fingerprint and palmprint evidence establishes that Oswald arranged the car- tons in the window." That evidence establishes that at some time Oswald handled one of the three cartons in the window, as snsrgested above, probably prior to the assassination by at lenst 1-3 days. That evidence establishes with equal validity that perhaps about 20 other persons "arranged the cartons in the window." nSWALn'S :srOVKMENTS after leaving DEPOSITORT BUILDING 1. The descrintion of Osv^^ald's bus umWe to stand by itself without a map.ride sequence is very confusing and wholly Even if we include a man. which I assnine we will, the text should bp cl^ar enough to stand by itself. The basic problem i^: that there is no indication of the relationsbin of various intersections to each other. It should be simple enough to set forth the relationships between St. Paul and Elm, Field and Elm, and Poydras and Lamar. 228 2. There also seems to be a mistake in description of directions. I don't see how Oswald could walk west on Elm and board a bus that was heading back in the direction of the depository and which was also traveling west. Somebody- had to have gone east. (Oswald.) 3. The second to the last full paragraph on galley page 40- is not very clear as to what all those buses actually do and what they are supposed to do. I have set forth suggested clarifying changes in the margin of the galley. 4. On galley page 41 the terms "lineup" and "showup" are used interchangeably. It should be one or the other throughout. I have always thought it was lineup. 5. There are direct quotes in the first paragraph on galley page 42 for which there are no footnotes. It is my understanding that there are to be footnotes for each direct quote and that there is to be uniformity on this point throughout the report. DESCRIPTION OF THE SHOOTING 1. References here to what the Dallas police radio ordered Tippit to do should be qualified to indicate that a transcript of a recording of the radio communi- cations indicates the material being set forth. This should be done at least until we have cleared up the problems with the transcript and recordings, if we have not already done so. 2. There are no footnotes at all in the last paragraph of this section. • EYEWITNESSES 1. There is more confusion between lineups and showups at the top of galley page 43. 2. As to any attempt to explain Mrs. Markham's description (so-called) of Os- wald as having bushy hair by showing the world a picture of Oswald "taken at the time of his arrest." I suggest that even the slowest of readers would imagine that their hair might be in an uncombed state — which is the suggested explana- tion of the bushy condition — after they had fought with a dozen policemen in an attempt to resist arrest. In fact Pizzo exhibit 453-C, the evidence for this proposi- tion, shows Oswald with cuts and bruises on his face. I don't think Mrs. Mark- ham's testimony needs much comment and neither does her statement to Lane. Any attempt and make the such as is presently Commission in the report will merely play into Lane's hands look naive. 3. Query statement that Markham's identification was mostly from his face. I think she was all over the lot on that one. MITEDEK WEAPON 1. Why don't we take a sentence or two and explain why the bullets fired from the revolver were smaller than the barrel? There is no way to tell from this report now and an obvious question is raised as to why. 2. There is an unclear sentence in the middle of the third paragraph of this heading which states: "Also, the bullets were mutilated." Which ones? 3. The paragraph dealing with the number of shots fired and the manufacture of the cases and the slugs seems to me to be an exercise in pedantry, and possibly subject to error. Is it not possible that a Winchester-Western slug could have been fired from a Eemington-Peters case? Even if not, why leave ourselves open to question when it does not really matter how many shots were fired, as between four or five. 4. The last paragraph of this heading needs some footnotes, either in or out. OWNERSHIP OP THE REVOLVER 1. The first sentence refers to "this tyi>e of revolver." I think it would be better to say "the type of revolver that was used to kill Patrolman Tippit." OSWALD'S JACKET 1. The second paragraph of this heading needs some footnotes. 2. There are inconsistencies in the description of Commission exhibit 102. The same proldem occurred above, when an exhibit was described sometimes as "exhibit — " and at others as "Commission exhibit — ." A little thing, but why not do it right, r 229 3. This conclusion to this heading reaches the crushing result that "Oswald disposed of his jacket as he fled from the scene of the Tippit killing." I submit that that is really not the conclusion we worked toward. Why not : "Those facts strongly support the finding that it was Lee Harvey Oswald who killed Patrol- man Tippit and then fled through the parking lot adjoining Jefferson Boulevard, disposing of his jacket as he did so." OSWALD'S AKREST 1. At first I was surprised to learn that Johnny Calvin Brewer knew that a patrolman had been shot when Oswald walked by his place of business, less than eight blocks from the point of the Tippit killing which Oswald apparently left as fast as he could. 2. Then I was surprised to learn that the police radio did not send out informa- tion about the suspect being in the Texas Theater until 1 :45, about 30 minutes after the police first learned of the Tippit killing from Beuavides over Tippit's radio. What were Oswald and Brewer doing during this 30 minutes? Oswald was strangely inactive during this period, considering all that he had done in the 45 minutes following the assassination. 3. While I know that I will be thought mad to suggest that some editing be done on this chapter, consider the following sentence that appears on galley page 46: "As Oswald, handcuffed, was led from the theatre, he was, according to McDonald, 'cursing a little bit and hollering police brutality.' " There are only 5 commas in that sentence. How about : "McDonald testified that Oswald was 'cursing a little bit and hollering police brutality' as he was led handcuffed from the theatre." 4. Here compare the note above concerning page 36 that the police radio had noted the similarity of the descriptions between the man wanted for the assassi- nation and the man wanted for the Tippit killing, by the time Oswald was ar- rested at the theater. It could be, therefore, that some of the officers suspected that the man they were arresting was wanted in connection with the assassination. STATEMENTS OF OSWALD DXJKING DETENTION 1. There are entirely too many subheadings under this general heading. None are really necessary. We reach the sublime when we have one whole heading for one short, four sentence paragraph. They should all be cut out and the whole discussion comprehended under the above general title. 2. In the paragraph on denial of rifle ownership appears the statement "small bore .22 rifle." That is redundant, since I presume we do not mean to distinguish from large bore .22 rifles. It should probably just read : ".22 caliber rifle." 3. The second to last sentence in that paragraph needs a footnote. SHOOTING OF MAJ. GEN. EDWIN A. WALKER 1. There is no footnote after the sentence concerning the 15-year-oId boy who saw two men leave the area. 2. Same after the statement that a friend of Walker gave information to the police about the two men snooping around. Also that statement is not correct. Walker gave the information to the police. 3. No footnote after statement re results of private investigation. 4. No footnote after statement that the note was in the "Book of Useful Advice." 5. The second full paragraph on page 48 assumes a lot of knowledge about Oswald's movements and about the Paines that the reader had not gotten any- where yet, except in the flrst chapter narrative. A few extra words as suggested in the margin of the galley might improve things considerably. Furthermore, the first sentence needs a footnote, as does the entire next paragraph, which has not one footnote to its name. 6. In the paragraph on photographs, a footnote is needed after the first sentence. The second sentence must be changed because at present it implies that Oswald told ^larina about the notebook or rather showed it to her when he returned the nisrht after the attack. She stated in her testimony in July that she did not see what was in the notebook until 3 days after the attack and there is nothing in her early testimony that T know about to support the proposition now in the report. 7. Statement that Oswald apparently destroyed the notebook should be changed in order to reflect fact that he did destroy it, and at the suggestion of his wife. 230 8. Second to last sentence in photographs section must be changed to indicate that Oswald did not bury his rifle in some bushes, but rather that he may have hidden it there. Sameusage 9. Query section. first paragraph of "Firearms Identification" paragraph inthereof. as to oflast"ballistics" 10. Under "Corroboration by Marina Oswald" we learn for the first time about a postponement of the attempt to kill Walker. There is no mention of from when, what the circumstances of the postponement were, what happened to the rifle in the meantime, et cetera. It should be set forth, since there is no mention of it above, as I recall. Oswald's rifle capability 1. The purpose of this section is to determine Oswald's ability to fire a rifle. The third word at the top of page 50 of the galleys, which is apparently meant to describe Oswald, is "marksman." A marksman is one skilled at shooting at a mark ; one who slioots well. Not only do we beg the question a little, but the sen- tence is inexact in that the shot, which it describes, would be the same for a marksman as it would for one who was not a marksman. How about: "The assassin's shots from the easternmost window of the south side of the Texas School Book Depository were at a slow-moving target proceeding on a downgrade virtually straight away from the assassin, at a range of 177 to 266 feet." ■2. The last sentence in the first paragraph on galley page 50 should indicate that the slope of Elm Street is downward. 3. The section on the nature of the shots deals basically with the range and the effect of a telescopic sight. Several experts conclude that the shots were easy. There is, however, no consideration given here to the time allowed for the shots. I do not see how someone can conclude that a shot is easy or hard unless he knows something about how long the firer has to shoot, that is, how much time is allotted for the shots. 4. On nature of the shots — Frazier testified that one would have no diificulty In hitting a target with a telescopic »sight. since all you have to do is put the ^crosshairs on tlie target. On page 51 of the galleys, however, he testified that shots fired by FBI agents with the assassination weapon were "a few inches high and to the right of the target * * * because of a defect in the scope." Apparently no one knows when that defect appeared, or if it was in the scope at the time .ol the assassination. If it was, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary one may assume that it was, putting the crosshairs on the tai-get would clearly have resulted in a mis';, or it very likely would, in any event. I have raised this question before. There is a great deal of testimony in the record that a telescopic sight is a sensitive proposition. You can't leave a rifle and scope laying around in a garage underfoot for almost 3 months, just having brought it back from New Orleans in the liack of a station wagon, and expect to hit anything with it, unless you take the trouble to fire it and sight the scope in. This would have been a problem that should have been dealt with in any event, and now that it turns out that there actually was a defect in the scope, it is perfectly clear that the question must be considered. The present draft leaves the Commission open to severe criticism. Furthermore, to the extent that it leaves testimony sugges*"- Ing that the shots might not have been so easy out of the discussion, thereby giving only a part of the story, it is simply dishonest. 5. Why do we have a statement concerning the fact that Oswald's Marine records show that he was familiar with the Browning automatic rifle, .4o-cali))er pistol and 12-gage riot gun? That is completely irrelevant to the question of his ability to fire a rifle, unless there is evidence that the same skills are involved. It is, furthermore, prejudicial to some extent. 6. Under the heading "Oswald's Rifle Practice Outside the Marines" we have a statement concerning his hunting activities in Russia. It snys that he joined a hunting club, obtained a license and went hunting about six times. It does not say what kind of a weapon he used. While I am not completely familiar with the record on tliis point. I do know for a fact that there is some indication that he used a shotgun. Tender what theory do we include activities concerning a shotgun under a heading relating to rifle practice, and then presume not to advise the reader of the fact? 7. The statements concerning Oswald's practice with the assassination wenpon are misleading. They tend to give the impression that he did more practicing than the record suggests that he did. My recollection is tb.at there is only one specific time when he might have practiced. We should be more precise in this 231 area, because the Commission is going to liave its worli in tliis area examined very closely. S. On the top of galley page 51 we have that statement about Oswald sighting the telescopic sight at night on the porch in New Orleans. I think the support for that proposition is thin indeed. Marina Oswald tirst testiiied that she did not know what he was doing out there and then she was clearly led into the only answer that gives any support t(i this proposition. 9. I think the level of reaching that is going on in this whole discussion of rifle capability is nicely shown by the fact that under the heading of rifle practice outside the inMarine Corps appears the damning statement that "Oswald showed an interest rifles by discussing that subject with others (in fact only one10.person I do asnotI remember think the it)record and reading gun magazines." will support the statement that Oswald did not leave his Beckley Avenue roominghouse on one of the weekends that he was supposedly seen at the Sports Urome Rifle Range. 11. There is a misstatement in the third paragraph under rapid fire tests when it says that firers missed the second shot." The preceding paragraph "Four of the only states there were three firers. 12. There are no footnotes whatsoever in the fifth paragraph under rapid fire tests and some rather important statements are made which require some sup- port from someplace. 13. A minor point as to the next paragraph— bullets are better said to strike rather than land. ^ -.c- ^-^^ *. 14. As I read through the section on rifle capability it appears that 15 dmerent isets of three shots were fired by supposedly expert riflemen of the FBI and other places According to my calculations those 15 sets of shots took a total of 93.8 seconds to be fired. The average of all 15 is a little over 6.2 seconds. Assuming: that time is calculated commencing with the firing of the first shot, that means the average time it took to fire the two remaining shots was about 6.2 seconds. That comes to about 3.1 seconds for each shot, not counting the time consumed by the actual firing, which would not be very much. I recall that chapter 3 said that the minimum time that had to elapse between shots was 2.25 seconds, which is pretty close to the one set of fast shots fired by Frazier of the FBI. The conclusion indicates that Oswald had the capability to fire three shots with two hits in from 4..S to 5.6 seconds. Of the 15 sets of 3 shots described above, only 3 were fired within 4.8 seconds. A total of five sets, including the three just mentioned w^ere fired within a total of 5.6 seconds. The conclusion at its most ;extreme states that Oswald could fire faster than the Commission experts fired in .12 of their 15 tries and that in any event he could fire faster than the experts ,did in 10 of their 15 tries. If we are going to set forth material such as this, I .think we should set forth some information on how much training and how much nShooting the experts had and did as a whole. The readers could then have some- ;thing on which to base their judgments concerning the relative abilities of the apparently slow firing experts used by the Commission and the ability of Lee Harvey Oswald. 15. The problems raised by the above analyses should be met at some point in the text of the report. The figure of 2.25 as a minimum firing time for each shot is used throughout chapter 3. The present discussion of rifle capability shows that expert riflemen could not fire the assassination weapon that fast. Only one of the ^experts managed to do so, and his shots, like those of the other FBI experts, were high and to the right of the target. The fact is that most of the experts were much more proficient with a rifle than Oswald could ever be expected to be, and the record indicates that fact, according to my recollection of the response of •one of the experts to a question by Mr. McCloy asking for a comparison of an NRA master marksman to a Marine Corps sharpshooter. 16. The present section on rifle capability fails to set forth material in the Tecord tending to indicate that Oswald was not a good shot and that he was not interested in his rifle while in the Marine Corps. It does not set forth material indicating that a telescopic sight must be tested and sighted in after a period of nonuse before it can be expected to be accurate. That problem i,s emnhasized hy the fact that the FBI actually found that there was a defect in the scope •which caused the rifle to fire high and to the right. In spite of the above the nresent :section takes only part of the material in the record to show that Oswald w.ns a good shot and tliat he was interested in rifles. I submit that the testimony of Delgado that Oswald was not interested in his rifle while in the Marines is at r 232 least as probative as Alba's testimony that Oswald came into his garage to read trifle — and hunting — magazines. To put it bluntly that sort of selection from the record could seriously affect the integrity and credibility of the entire report. 17. It seems to me that the most honest and the most sensible thing to do given the present state of the record on Oswald's rifle capability would be to write a very short section indicating that there is testimony on both sides of several issues. The Commission could then conclude that the best evidence that Oswald could fire his rifle as fast as he did and hit the target is the fact that he did so. It may have been pure luck. It probably was to a very great extent. But it hap- pened. He would have had to have been lucky to hit as he did if he had only 4.8 seconds to fire the shots. Why don't we admit instead of reaching and using only part of the record to support the propositions presently set forth in the galleys. Those conclusions will never be accepted by critical persons anyway. :, GENERAL COMMENT 1. The above was written without having the footnotes to the chapter, a con- siderable disadvantage when one would like to check the accuracy and precision of statements made in the text. 2. The placement of footnotes is not consistent within the chapter, nor with the general rule that there are to be footnotes after all direct quotes, aiany times there are no footnotes where it appears to me that there should be. 3. Form as to omitted material should be checked. The form of citations to the appendix is not consistent with chapter 3 or internally. 4. I forgot to mention that some question might be raised when the public dis- covers that there was only one eyewitness to the Tippit killing, that is, one per- son who saw Oswald kill him. All the rest only saw subsequent events. Mrs. Markham is nicely buried there, but I predict not for long. Mr. CoRNWELL. drafted that ? Who prepared chapter IV initially? 'WTio first Mr. LiEBELER. Mr. Ball and Mr. Belin. Mr. CoRNWELL. Did you at the time work closely enough with Mr. Ball and Mr. Belin where you would have both become familiar with the facts within their area and also the quality of their work ? Mr. LiEBELER. That question has two parts. I was certainly familiar with the facts of their area because I had read most or all of the same FBI reports that they had read in outlining their area of investigation in my own efforts to prepare my own investigation. I think I can say I had been able to form a judgment as to certain kinds of their work. But I was not in a position to judge the quality of their written work because I had never looked at it closely or ex- amined it. Mr. CoRNWELL. Based on that last answer you would not be able to tell us whether or not their rough draft of this chapter in and of itself was a competent professional polished piece of work ? Mr. LiEBELER. No, I would not. I don't recall that I even ever read it. Mr. CoRNWELL. What basically, however, was the nature of the problems that you found with the galley proofs, the rewrite of chapter IV ? Mr. LiEBELER. Well, my memo of September 6 speaks to that ques- tion. It involves problems ranging from matters of form and location of footnotes to the problem that I thought was important at the time and that was that I thought that the text of that chapter was over- written inthe sense that it made statements that could not really be supported by the nature of the underlying evidence. Mr. CoRNWELL. Let us simply very briefly go through that memo. I would like to ask you if you believe today your criticisms were ac- 233 curate ? For instance on page 3 you veiy cryptically note near the bot- tom that a gap in the proof cannot be filled by ignoring it with respect to certain portions of the galley proof. On page 21 Mr. LiEBELER. Do you want to take these one by one or do you want to lump them? Mr. CoENWELL. We can simply look at them in bulk if you would like, whichever way you prefer. Mr. LiEBELER. The reference on page 3 as to the question of whether or not it could be definitively established that the rifle that Oswald had ordered and received and was used to assassinate the President had actually been in the Paine garage the entire period of time after the Oswald return from New Orleans until the time of the assassination. I took the position that that could not be directly proved and I think that that position was correct. I still think that it is correct. Mr. CoRNWELL. On page 21 you note at the top : "The present draft leaves the Commission open to severe criticism. Furthermore, to the extent that it leaves testimony suggesting that the shots might not have been so easy out of the discussion, thereby giving only a part of the story, it is simply dishonest." Was that your view of the report in its galley proof form ? Mr. LiEBELER. Yes, that was my view of the galley proofs as they existed at that time on this issue of the Oswald capability as a rifle- man and the accuracy of the rifle. Mr. CoRNWELL. Also on page 21, bottom of paragraph 6, did you con- clude that it was misleading to place information concerning the shot- gun, possible and then use of the not advise the shotgun, readers ofunder the heading the true facts of of the"Rifle practice" distinction? JNIr. LiEBELER. Yes, I did. Mr. CoRNWELL. You note on page 23 near the bottom of the page that there was insufficient material provided on which the readers could base their judgment. Was that also a criticism that you felt was justified with respect to that final report? Mr. LiEBELER. On that specific issue, yes, from the speed and the way the rifle could be fired. ]Mr. CoRXWELL. In paragraph 16, on page 24, at the very bottom, did you feel that the process of selecting what facts and information to rely upon seriously affected the integrity and credibility of the entire report ? Mr. LiEBELER. I used the words that it could do that. I believed that then as to the galleys, and I think that was a problem that we had in writing it and difficulties we had about that. The problem became ap- I)arent to me when I went through my own chapter after I had drafted it and wrote the footnotes for it. After I drafted my chapter, it had been rewritten and gone through several drafts, other people had changed it and things had been changed around over a period of time. It is absolutely impossible for a process like that to occur without ending up with sentences and statements in the report that simply you camiot find support for in the footnotes, in the testimony and the underlying evidence. It was an extremely painful process to go through all that evidence and try to conform as closely as possible the state- ments in the text to the actual evidence that was in the record. That was part of the problem. I think also part of the problem was, as I said before, a tendency, at least in the galleys of chapter IV, to 234 try to downplay or not give eqnal emphasis to contrary evidence and just simply admit and state openly that there is a conflict in the testi- mony and the evidence about this question, but after reviewing the evi- dence the Commission could conclude whatever the Commission could conclude. I thought that would have been a better way to do it. ]Mr. CoRxwELL, What was done with all of your comments, the work product that 3'ou obviously spent a good deal of time preparing here Avhich we have noAV marked as exhibit 36 ? Mr. LiEBELER. I typed this memo, myself, so it was not distributed throughout the Commission files in the ordinary form, with different colored copies going to different phices. INIy recollection is that I put a copy of it on Mr. Redlich's desk when I came back from Vermont that weekend and gave Mr. Willens a copy and I believe gave Mr. Eankin a copy. There was really no response to it for a considerable period of time. Then after the cha])ter had come back in page proof I reviewed it again. Mr. Redlich had already returned to New York. I was dis- satisfied with the condition of the chapter even at that point. I went into Mr. Rankin's office and told Mr. Rankin that I thought there were problems. So ]\Ir. Rankin said, I believe, get the memo and the galley proofs and the page proofs, and we sat down, the two of us. and started going through the chapter. Mr. Willens came in and observed what was going on and, it is mv surmise, as a result of subsequent events he Avent out and called Mr. Redlich in New Yorl^: and in the time it took ]Mr. Redlich to get from N.Y.U, to the airport and down to Washing- ton. Mr. Redlich a]ipeared in Mr. Rankin's ofRce. thatMr.correct CoEx-\\Ti:LL. ? It was Mr. Redlich's rewrite you were criticizing, is Mr. LiERELER. Yes. So, Mr. Redlich and Mr. Rankin and Mr. Willens and I then spent the rest of that day and long into the night going over this memorandum and the page proofs and my recollection is that we considered and discussed all the issues that were raised here, and prob- ably more as well. Mr. CoRxwELL. Apart from considering what action was taken. Mr. Ltebeler. The record will show that. I don't recall. My general recollection, my general impression was that my performance against ]Mr. Redlich was like UCLA's football team usually is against USC. But it really was not quite that bad. I won some and some of the changes were made. And some were not. There is a difference between the page proofs and final report and galley proofs, there is no question about that. Mr. CoRxwELL. There is some difference? Mr. TiTEBEEER. Some difference, yes. Mr. CoRxwEEL. May we mark for identification. Mv. Chairman, as exhibits 37, 38, 39, 40, and 41, memos respectively dated Se])tember 14, from, Mr. Liebeler to Mr. Willens, concerninjsr chapter YT; memo dated September 15, Mv. Liebeler to Mr. Willens concerning sug- gestions ^et forth in a letter ft-oui David A. Rothstein : memo of Sep- tember 15. from Liebeler to Willens regardino: a letter from Dr. Rome ; a memo of September regarding chapter VL and a memo dated Sep- tember 16 regarding chapter VT. Mr. Preter. All of these exhibits are marked for identification only. 235 Mr. Corn WELL. Have you had a chance to review each of those ex- hibits prior to coming liere today ? Mr. LiEBELER. Yes. Mr. CoRNWELL, AVould it be fair to state that each of those exhibits relates also to your hndings with respect to errors and overstatements, incorrect statements, which existed m the galley proofs and that you discovered during the rewrite process ? jMr. LiEBELER. No. Mr. CuRxwELL. Or suggested additions to the report? Mr. LiEBELER. Yes, 1 tliink that is correct. But of course they will speak for themselves. But that is a generally correct characterization of them. Mr. CoRX^^^ELL. May we then submit each of those exhibits into the record, Mr. Chairman. Mr. PitEYER. Without objection the exhibits are admitted into the record. [The documents referred to, marked JFK exhibits Xo. 37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 and received for the record, follow :] JFK Exhibit No. 37 [Memoraudum] September 14, 1964. To : Mr. Willens. From : Mr. Liebeler. The following are some general comments on that portion of chapter VI dealing with conspiracy beginning with "Investigation of Otlier Activities ' on galley 237. 1. We have not conducted sufficient investigation to state that there is no evidence that FFCC and AGLU were aware that they were authorized to receive mail at P.O. Box 6225, or that mail was ever addressed to them there. 2. Hame as to statement re three post office boxes being used for surreptitious receipts of messages. 1 would delete the whole idea. 3. The sentence re investigation of aliases preceding footnote 714 in the galleys is much too broad. 4. Query statement at top of page 238 that Oswald "commonly" used Hidell as name of others — he also Uised that name to get the ritle and revolver. 5. What investigation has been conducted "with regard to persons using the name of "Lee.' " I think the statement following note 727 is too broad. 6. The sentence relating to chapter VII at the close of the discussion of aliases should read "Oswald's creation of false names and fictitious personalties is also treated in the discussion of possible motives set forth in chapter VII." 7. Ownership of second rifle : a. We cannot say that all of Oswald's transactions in connection with firearms were undertaken under an assumed name, only his known transactions. b. I think the degree of doubt about the authenticity of the repair tag is over- stated. c. First sentence in first full paragraph on page 259 is too strong and should be changed along the lines indicated in my copy oi the galley. d. The third sentence should also be qualified. The underlying report is not that strong. e. The last sentence in that paragraph is not supported by the TV films we got from CBS. It should be deleted. f. The second full paragraph has only one footnote. Furthermore, the last statement is incorrect. Whitworth and Hunter do not now say Oswald drove down the street and only Mrs. Whitworth said so before. g. The statement that neither Mrs. Hunter nor Mrs. Whitworth could identify a picture of L-ee Harvey Oswald is not so. Mrs. Whitworth did do so at 11 H 272. My draft stated that they could not "identify Lee Harvey Oswald standing with a small group of other different looking people." 8. Rifle practice : 43-819—79 16 236 a. Query if all the witnesses agree that the barrel had been shortened. (See note 775. ) b. Do fire. ( Seewenote have777.evidence ) on the question of whether or not Oswald's rifle spouts c. Wliat is our authority for the nonexistence of the Cedar Hills gunshop. ( See note 781.) d. At note 794 — Oswald could have been at Paine's and still have gone to the rifle range. Add : "and did not leave there to go to the rifle range." 9. Automobile demonstration : I think it is Stemmons Freeway, not "Express- way." 10. Alleged activities with Cuban underground organizations : a. The title is inappropriate because Andrews and Pena do not talk about underground activities. b. The title and the introduction are inappropriate because they strongly suggest that Oswald was an anti-Castro. The implication runs through Odio's testimony that he was an infiltrator. It would be better to start with a neutral sentence like : "The Commission has also considered testimony of certain persons that claim to have seen Oswald in the company of unidentified persons of Cuban or Mexican background." c. What is the authority for the statement that Mrs. Odio claims that both of her parents are political prisoners of the Castro regime? To go back for a moment to the second rifle section : In the third full para- graph it states, "On November 24, Ryder and Greener discussed at length the possibility" that Oswald had been there, but "Ryder did not mention the tag to his employer." I know of no evidence that Ryder and Greener talked on the 24th. If they did not, the next sentence must be changed or cut. The next sentence is a good example of what happens in the "rewrite" process. It says, incorrectly, that on November 25 Ryder told the FBI that Greener did not remember the tag, although he had not called the tag to Greener's attention. The original sentence said, correctly, that Greener "did not remember the transaction represented by the repair tag. . . ." The next sentence says the FBI was directed to Ryder by anonymous phone calls. Not so. They were directed to the Irving Sports Shop and would very likely have talked to Greener, but he could not be found by the agent on Novem- ber 25, 196.3, when he went to the shop. Back to Odio: d. Check correct name of JURE. e. The paragraph on bus transportation starting "There is no firm evidence" should be completely rewritten. I do not think there is "convincing evidence" that Oswald was on the buses as stated. One sentence says he was apparently one of four passengers bound for a point beyond Texas. The next suggests that he bought a ticket in Houston for Laredo, which is in Texas. The McFarland testimony is given too much weight. I don't think Mexican immigration records show the time of day he crossed the border. Slawson told me he got the time of crossing from the scheduled arrival of the bus. Now we are using it to show that since he crossed at that time he had to be on the bus. f. Since we have no direct evidence that Oswald boarded bus 5133 in Houston, the first sentence of the next paragraph ("Hence, the only time . . .") should be changed. That also obviates the necessity that he had to go from New Orleans to Dallas and thence too Houston. There really is almost no evidence at all that he left Houston on that bus — and there is really no reason why we should suggest there is. The point can be made without saying that and to seem to rely on really weak evidence is to invite trouble. g. Again — later in the same paragraph — more reliance on the McFarlands. Their affidavit is very weak — we should not fight it. h. Then the single ticket from Houston to Laredo again — ^which probably could not have been Oswald if he were one of the four heading for points beyond Laredo. i. Also the assumption that the Twiford call was a local call. Why speculate— make the arguments — he probably would not have called at all if he were not in Houston or going to be in Houston. j. The conflusion that the evidence is persuasive that Oswald was not In Dallas on September 25 is too strong. 237 k. The story of Father McGhann (sp. ?) is overemphasized. We should state that Odio never told anyone else that Eugenio had been one of the men with Oswald. How can we conclude that McGhann would not have become confused when he was apparently in a rest home of some sort and we have never seen or spoken to him V I. Since we have never taken testimony from Odio's other two friends on which people could base judgment as to their veracity, we should not rely too heavily on their statements, about which they have never been cross-examined. m. The first two full paragraphs on galley 242 should come out. The "incon- sistencies", ifany, are minor. Furthermore, Sylvia's testimony is actually mis- represented when it is stated that she and her sister felt Oswald "looked famil- iar"' when they was sure it was Oswald. saw his picture after the assassination. Sylvia testified that she The paragraph about the psychiatrist is quite unfair. It states that Odio "came forward"' with her story, whereas she did not come forward at all and was quite reluctant to get involved at all. Her story came to the attention of the FBI through a third person. The hearsay statements of "friends," concerning their personal opinion of a witness are thin stuff indeed. The whole paragraph is poor and should come out. The Odio analyses should be based primarily on the apparent likelihood that LHO was elsewhere. These are problems. Odio may well be right. The Com- mission will look bad if it turns out that she is. There is no need to look foolish by grasping at straws to avoid admitting that there is a problem. II. Oswald not U.S. agent: a. Did CIA note his FPCC activities in New Orleans? to b.chapter "Why mention VIII. fact that LHO's name was not given to Secret Service — leave c. Should not say ^Irs. O. did not give any basis for her belief LHO was a U.S. agent — better to say any reasonable or credible basis. "We should also add that the Commission has thoroughly considered all of her statements ; that she was not foreclosed from giving any evidence she had and the Commission con- cluded that there was no real basis for her position. d. "Wliy being a U.S.doagent? we mention the Ruby deal here — how does that relate to LHO's e. Have we really seen the full CIA file on Oswald?— Do we need a footnote to the last sentence in the first full paragraph on galley 243? f. "Whowith dealing is going to attest the Oswald that they have reviewed the complete Bureau files investigation? 12. Osivald's finances: a. The second paragraph is a little expansive. It certainly needs more than one footnote in any event. b. Last sentence in fourth paragraph is ungrammatical. c. Please let's take out "cheap aud shabbily furnished" and other stuff of that sort ! See galley and my previous comments on the draft for my suggestions. d. I think we should cut the description of Oswald's wardrobe to the statement that it was also very modest. e. The first full paragraph on galley 244 should be rewritten and shortened, I think the discussion of finances is too long and detailed. It is also too apparently precise to be readily believable. f . To be somewhat facetious : If we are going to explain the other assistant in the FPCC distribution as a hired hand, we had better provide for him in the third full paragraph on 244. g. "We fall back into the first name treatment for Marina Oswald again. h. "Where do we get the hotel expenses of $1.28 per day on the Mexican trip? we i.mention If Oswald it? Idid not itcash think was his unemployment cashed check at Hutch's Market, why do at an A&P store. j. The whole discussion of Huchison's testimony should be limited to one paragraph in the rumors section. k. Whyemployees Union do we fail saidto mention was with thethe Cuban man orHambian Mexican thought that one was of theOswald? "Western 1. We should be more specific about the "other cities' in which WU has searched their records. 238 JFK Exhibit No. 38 [Memorandum] September 15, 1964. To : Mr. Willens. From : Mr. Liebeler. Pursuant to suggestions set forth in a letter dated September 13, 1964. from Dr. David A. Rothstein of tlie Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, I suggest the f ollovving following additions to chapter VII. 1. The second sentence in the second full paragraph on galley 67 should be omitted and the following should be substituted : "Irving Sokolow, a Youth House psychologist, reported that : 'The Human Figure Drawings are empty, poor characterizations of persons approximately the same age as the subject. They reflect a considerable amount of impoverishment in the social and emotional areas. He appears to be a somewhat insecure youngster exhibiting much inclination for warm and satisfying re- lationships to others. There is some indication that he may relate to men more easily than to women in view of the more mature conceptualization. He appears slightly withdrawn and in view of the lack of detail within the drawings this may assume a more significant characteristic. He exhilnts some difficulty in relationship to the maternal figure suggesting more anxiety in this area than in any other." The footnote remains the same except for the deletion of an indication that the quote appears at page 1. Since CE 1339 is a short document no page num- bers need be indicated. The third sentence of the paragraph under discussion should then commence a new paragraph which otherwise would remain the same. 2. On galley 71 a new paragraph should be inserted immediately following the first full quoted paragraph at the top of that galley. Since the material tliat Dr. Rothstein recommends that we add continues right on from the present para- graph at the top of galley 71, no indication of omitted material is necessary. The material to be added is as follows : "This should answer your question, and also give you a glimpse of my way of thinking. "So you speak of advantages. Do you think that is why I am here? For per- sonal, material advantage? Happiness is not based on oneself, it does not consist of a small home, of taking and getting. Happiness is taking part in tlie struggle, where there is no borderline between one's own personal world, and the world in general. I never believed I would find more material advantages at this stage of development in the Soviet Union than I might of had in the U.S." The asterisks should then be left in as tliey are in the galley because there is omitted material following the above quote and the quote starting "I have been a pro-Communist. . . ." The footnote remains the same. 3. Dr. Rothstein thinks we should indicate the approximate date of Marina's "liberation" by de Mohrenschildt. That could be done very simply by adding the words "sometime in early November 1963" following the word "apartment" in the sentence following footnote 2.50 in galley 74. 4. Dr. Rothstein thinks it is an overstatement to say that Oswald had never been able to obtain from his wife that respect, etc. He suggests, and I agree, that the second sentence in the paragraph following footnote 410 read : "Oswald had difliculty in ol)taining from his wife. . . ." 5. The doctor thinks that the fourth sentence in the paragraph following foot- note 477 is too strongly worded. The sentence should I)e changed to read : "He had not been able to establish lasting, meaningful relations. . . ." While Dr. Rothstein has also made other worthwliile suggestions. I do not think they can be included at this point without seriously disrupting the present state of our galleys on chapter A^I. I think the ones set forth above should be included however since they are worthwhile changes and can be readily made- without disrupting the galley. 239 JFK Exhibit No. 39 [Memorandum] September 15, 1964. To: Howard J. Willens. From : Wesley J. Liebeler. .„ ^^^^ .Subject: Letter of Dr. Howard P. Rome, dated September 13, 1964. Dr. Rome lias sent a 12-page aual.vsis of Oswald's reading disability which I leeommeud be included in the report as a Commission exhibit. I also recommend that reference to the disability be set forth in the text by inserting the following as a new paragraph following the second full paragraph on galley 68: ,..,.. .^ , , "This misspelling of names, apparently on a phonetic basis, is cited by a psvchiatrist consulted bv the Commission as an example of a reading-spelling disability from which Oswald appeared to suffer. Other evidence of the existence of such a disability is provided by the many other misspellings that appear m Oswald's writings,' portions of which are quoted below. The psychiatrist who has suggested the existence of this disability also stated his opinion that the frustration which may have resulted from it gave an added impetus to his [Oswald's] need to prove to the world that he was an unrecognized 'great man.' " If the above is agreeable, it can be added by shifting only two footnote numbers. JFK Exhibit No. 40 [Memorandum] September 15, 1964. To: Howard P. Willens. From : Wesley J. Liebeler. Subject: Chapter VI. I set forth below my comments on the first part of chapter VI : 1. I do not think we should speak of "Proving a negative conclusion" as we now do in the second full paragraph on galley 1S9 since that might be thought to imply a prejudgment of the issue. It would be better, I think, to speak of the difficulties in developing evidence of any well executed conspiracy. 2. The last sentence in the third paragraph says that all of Oswald's known writings or other possessions which might have been used for code or other espionage purposes have l)een examined either by the FBI or the National Security Agency of both. The sentenre does not indicate the purpose for whicli those writings were examined by those agencies. Even though it may be clearer by implication that they were examined to discover any code messages that niiglit be in them, if that is the case I think it should be so stated. .3. The last sentence in the fifth paragraph of galley 189 says that theOswald Com- mission has also considered whether niiy connections existed between and "those groups which, shortly before the assassination, were responsible for the propagation of hostile criticism of President Kennedy." I would assume that reference to right-wing group is intended, but that is not entirely clear since there were certain other groups that propagated hostile criticism of President Kennedy both shortly before the assassination and at other times. The Militant, the Journal of the Socialist Workei-s I'arty. was extremely critical of the Kennedy administration. I think that if riglit wing groups are intended by the sentence, that should lie specifically stated and there should be no inference that other groups such as the Socialist Workers Party did not propagate hostile criticism of President Kennedy. While that inference is, I am sure, not intended, it might be drawn from present sentence. 4. The next paragraph, relating to the Ruby discussion, should indicate that the Commission has considered f^he possiliility that Jack Ruby was part of a conspiracy to kill Lee Harvey Oswald. That is not mentioned in the present paragraph and is or at least shoukl be a part of the discussion on Ruby. 5. It is a minor point, but we always refer to the window from which the shots were fired as the southeast corner window or a window in the s- if it can be stated that "a (luarrel" led to the November separation of the Oswalds, in view of George De INIohrenschildfs testimony about how he went and took Marina avray. It would be simpler to state that the Oswalds were separated again in early November. 11)62 during which time Marina Oswald spent approximately 2 weeks with Anna :Meller and Mrs. Ford. 43. T would not be prepared to state that the severing of the relationship between the Oswalds and members of the Russian-speaking community was caused primarily "by personal animosity engendered by Oswald." I think it can be just as clearly said that the animosity was "engendered"' by George Bouhe and other people who tried to take INIarina Oswald away from her husband and -who thrust their "help" on Oswald wlien he had clearly indicated that he did not want it. This subject is actually more appropriate for treatment in chapter VII where it has in fact been treated. It would be sufficient to say that relation- ships between the Oswalds and other members of the Russian-speaking com- munity were terminated for personal reasons and let it go at that. 44. At the bottom of the paragraph that ends with footnote 327, Marina Oswald is referred to by her first name and Mrs. Ford's first name is incorrectly used, it is not "Kairina" but it is Katherine or "Kstya." Also the stars should be taken out of footnote 327 in accordance with policy not to use them in material quoted in the text itself. The next paragraph that ends with footnote 327 may be re- duced to one sentence which would state that for all practical purposes there was no further contact between the Oswalds and the Russian community following Oswald's departure for New Orleans in the spring of 1963. The material that is now set forth is repetitive of material in chapter VIT and greatly repetitive of material in the api)endix. It is not necessary for the support of the conclusions of the conspiracy chapter. 45. The last full paragraph on galley 227 now starts to reiieat materials that have been set forth in the first paragraph of that section. It has already been stated that Oswald came to Fort Worth on his return from Russia for reasons thnt had nothing to do with tlie presence of the Russian community in that city and there is no reason is repeat it now. Additionally, Marina Oswald is again referred to by her first name as she is also at footnote 337. 46. The wliole section of the Russian-speaking community could be tightened very much and should be severely edited and rewritten. The accuracy and' precision of the statements set forth should also be improved considerably. 244 47. Marina Oswald is again referred to by her first name only at footnote 341 and at several other places throughout the discussion that follows. 48. Query whether we have evidence to support the proposition that "particu- larly Marina" visited the de Mohrenschildts. I am not aware of the fact that Marina Oswald visited them on any great number of occasions without her husband being present. 49. After reading the remaining section on de Mohrenschildt I am constrained to remark that it really is essential that this material be substantially shortened and cleared up in every sense. It is very bad as it now stands and there is really no reason for all this to be in the text. 50. The first sentence in the second full paragraph states that the opening of the closet door "inadvertently" exposed Oswald's Mannliclier-Carcano rifle. Point 1 : There is no footnote at the end of the sentence. Point 2 : I do not know what evidence there is that the exposure of the rifle was inadvertent. Point 3 : I do not know what evidence there is that that which was exposed, inadvertently or otherwise, was Oswald's Mannlicher-Carcano rifle. 51. The two paragraphs dealing with the rifle episode do not indicate the conflict in the testimony as to when the remark was made. My recollection is that someone testified that de Mohrenschildt made the remark as soon as he walked- in the door. That does not appear in the discussion presently in the galley. 52. The paragraph AA'hich includes footnotes 391 and 392 is unnecessary. It is personally offensive to de Mohrenschildt. I do not think it is at all necessary to e«stablishing the fact that de Mohrenschildt was not involved with the assassi- nation, to describe him as '"immature" and an "admirer of the opposite sex," "eccentric" or anything else. I think the discussion of de Mohrenschildt and also of Paine should be rewritten and substantially shortened if not altogether deleted from chapter VI. I am unable to understand why such extensive time and space is devoted to de Mohren- schildt and Paine when "]Marina Oswald herself, the most obvious place to look for possible co-conspirator, is not discussed at all. 53. I'm not setting forth comments on the Paine material in the hope that it will be substantially rewritten or deleted from chapter VI. I cannot resist, however, noting the paragraph which includes footnotes 431^33. I am particu- larly struck by the sentence that "Oswald obtained a room in Dallas, where he found employment, but spent weekends with his family at the Paine home." I wall always have visions of Oswald and the other TSBD employees packing their books in that long, narrow room at 1926 North Beckley. More seriously, however, the last sentence of the paragraph includes the statement "by the time the agents again came to Mrs. Paine's home." That clearly implies that there was more than one agent present at both interviews. My recollection is that Hasty was by himself on one of the occasions. * M. So far I have not found anything in chapter VI concerning "William Kirk Coleman's story of two men who drove out of the area behind Vi'alter's house immediately after the shot was fired at the general. 55. I have given all of my galleys to Stuart Pollack together with copies of this and other memoranda which I have given to you on chapter VI. JFK Exhibit No. 41 [Memorandum] September 16, 1964. To : Howard P. VTillens. From : Wesley .7. Liebeler. Sul).iect : Chapter VI. The following comments relate to the discussion of Oswald's political ac- tivities upon his return to the United States which starts at about the middle of galley 230. 1. In the first paragraph of the discussion of the Communist Party, et cetera, the T on the word "the" in The Worker should be capitalized. 2. The term "as a matter of course" at footnote 505 implies the existence of evidence beyond that which exists in the rer-ord. In order to support that we would have to have evidence as to what the ordinary course of action would 245 ■be on the part of the Communist Party in response to a letter such as that sent by Oswald. Since we do not have that evidence I do not see how we can say that their response was "as a matter of course." 3. The same point might be made about the statement in the next paragraph that the organization was not especially responsive. In order to state that we would have to know how responsive they generally were in other situations. Since we do not, I do not see how we can make the statement. 4. In the sentence following footnote 510 it would be better to say that John- son testified that he did not receive the letter until after the assassination, in- stead of making the flat statement, since the only evidence we have on that question is Johnson's testimony. This same point was raised in a discussion concerning chapter VII with Mr. Rankin and Mr. Redlich and it was agreed by all that the qualified statement would be preferable. 5. The next sentence says that Oswald wrote the Communist Party and the Hall Davis Defense Committee enclosing samples of his photographic work. He did write the Hall Davis Defense Committee but I believe the other let- ter enclosing samples of his photographic work was to The Worker and not to the Communist Party, although my recollection is not precise on that point. 6. The first sentence in the last paragraph on galley 230 should be qualified by stating "Johnson testified that the files of the Communist Party * * *." Once again Johnson's testimony is the only evidence we have and the qualified statement would be preferable. 7. The sentence preceding the sentence covered by footnote 518 should have a footnote. In any event the nature of the evidence indicating that the files of the Young Socialist Alliance contain no reference to Oswald should be indi- cated. If it is somebody's testimony we should state that so-and-so testified that the files contained no such reference. 8. The Militant sliould have an initial capital T on the article in its name. 9. The sentence following footnote 523 says that the Commission has ques- tioned persons who knew Oswald during every phase of his adult life and that none of them gave any indication that Oswald maintained a surreptitious rela- tionship with any organization. There is no footnote in support of that sentence and the next sentence goes on to an entirely different subject. Obviously a footnote is needed. 10. The last sentence in the discussion of Communist Party, et cetera, activi- ties says that there is no reason to believe that any material has been withheld by any of the organizations under discussion. I would omit that last clause ending tlie last sentence as follows : "The material that has been disclosed is in all cases consistent with other data in the possession of the Commission." There is no reason for the Commission to go on and mals;e a statement that could very well arouse political controversy, especially when it does not contribute in any material way to the discussion. 11. The first sentence in the discussion on Fair Play for Cuba Committee indi- cates that Oswald "purportedly" acted on behalf of the FPCC. I do not know why that qualification should be stated. He obviously acted on behalf of FPCC in the sense that he was encouraged by the national organization in many of the activities in which he engaged. 12. The sentence preceding footnote 527 should be omitted since it simply does not seem to fit here. 13. The sentence preceding 529 is incorrect since Oswald did not ask the national organization for the circulars as described nor did he distribute them on at least three occasions. He had his "Hands off Cuba" materials printed in Xew Orleans at his own expense. 14. I would say that the FPCC chapter in New Orleans appeared to have been ■entirely fictitious. 15. The sentence following footnote 533 states "when the national ofiice learned of Oswald's unauthorized activities, it terminated its correspondence with him." Technically they terminated correspondence with him with their last letter, at vihich time they did not know of his "unauthorized activities." In any event the sentence implies a causal connection between the two events which cannot under any circumstances be justified by the testimony presently in the record. The most that can be said is that V. T. Lee later testified that he was disap- pointed with Oswald, even though there is really no reason I see why he should have been at that time, and that Lee did not write any letters after a certain date. I know of no way in which a causal connection may be established between 246 those propositions. In any event a footnote for the sentence or the thoughts he expressed differently is necessai-y. 10. The reference to chapter VII in parentheses following footnote 534 should he moved up to the preceding sentence which should read "in fact these letters, which are discussed in greater detail in chapter VII, contained * * *." 17. At the very bottom of galley 231 a f(70tnote is needed for a reference to Mr. Steele's testimony that he never saw Oswald before and never saw him again after the distribution of FPCC leaflets on August 16, 1963. 18. I would add language at the top of galley 232 to indicate that a search had been made for the individual who helped Oswald and Steele distribute literature but that he has not yet been found. A parenthetical expression preceding the word "but" at the top" of that page as follows would be appropriate : "in spite of an extensive search for him,". 19. While the discussion of groups hostile to President Kennedy is generally well written, it is too long and contains material that has not the slightest con- ceivable relevance to the possible existence of a conspiracy to assassinate the President or to any other possible issue in this investigation. In addition. I sug- gest that the quote from Oswald's setundated letter of November 19{i3 to the Com- munist Party be omitted, as it is forth in chapter VII. If it is left in the two quotes should be made identical in form, which they are not now. 20. Some footnotes are needed in the second paragraph following the Walkei quote. Mr. CoRN^vELL. Ag-ain, ]Mr. Liebeler, what we have now admitted into the record is a rather vokiminous quantity of additional com- ments concernino; the fralley proofs and the nature of tlie final report. What, if anything, was done with your comments in all of these memos ? Mr. Liebeler. I am not able to answer that question from my own recollection. I have not gone through all of the memos to see which of the suggestions were adopted and vrhich were not. But I have done that with respect to two of them. Exhibit 39 and exhibit 38, I find that for the most part the recommendations made in these memos are reflected in the final report. ]Mr. CoRNW^Eij,. Which two memos again were those ? Mr. Liebeler. Exhibits 38 and 39. Mr. Cornwell. Again did the implementation of vour suggestions in those cases require lengthy discussions or were they inaccurate based on the memorandum itself ? Mr. Liebeler. Since I don"t have any recollection of them I assume were adopted they there without any difficulty. I don't have any recollection that was any difliculty with any of these suggestions^ Mr. CoRNWEix. You implied earlier by your analogy to UCLA and LTSC that you lost more of those suggestions than were adopted, is that correct ? office Liebeler. Mr. with I only and yir. Redlicli about that thatWillens said Mr. on chapter IV. in ]Mr. Eankin's conference Mr. CoRxwELL. Does that analogy apply to the rest of the memos ? Mr. Liebeler. I don't think so. I have not had time to go through these other memos and see whether the changes were reflected in the report or not. I have no recollection whether they were or not, but that can easily be done if somebody wants to do it. Mr. Cornwell. Let me ask you this. "WHiat if any motive was there for the general tone of the galley proofs that you found repeated fault simply "Wliyit was these memos? Was with in inadvertence? it written pressure in an attempt was? "the way toitget reportit the Was together mider a too restrictive deadline, or was there some other rea- son, the kinds of problems you found ? 247 Mr. LiEBFXER. I think there are different reasons in different cases. I have the impression from looking at these memos that the problem that I am addressing here in chapter VI and chapter VII are a little ditferent than the problems I addressed in exhibit 36 which related to chapter IV. It appears to me that the kinds of problems raised in exhibits 37 through 41, 1 believe are more of the kinds of problems that "will just come up on reviewing a draft or a set of galleys that will just creep into the work for the most part, whereas chapter IV was a little different question. I did say I thought there was overwriting to a great extent. ]\Ir. CoRNWELL. The overwriting concept, of overstating the degree of proof, was one of the problems discussed with respect to chapter IV; is that correct? ]\Ir. LiEBELER. Yes. Mr. CoRNWELL. Let us look at the September 14 memo which I be- lieve isexhibit 37. On page 2 do you not state that : We undertaken were cannot say under that all an of Oswald's assumed transactions name, In connection only his known with firearms transactions. b. I think the degree of doubt about the authenticity of the repair tag is overstated. d. The third sentence should also be qualified. Tlie underlying report is not that strong. e. The last sentence in that paragraph is not supported by the TV films we got from CBS. On the next page 3. under item 10, b., "The title and the introduc- tion are inappropriate because they strongly suggest that Oswald was an anti-Castro." On page 4 under "Odio," item e., "The paragraph on bus transporta- tion starting 'There is no firm evidence' should be completely rewritten. I do not think there is 'convincing evidence.' " On page 5, "The McFarland item is given too much weight." Down there further, under paragraph f., "The point can be made v.'ithout saying that and to seem to rely on really weak evidence is to invite trouble." Item J. "The conclusion that the evidence is persuasive that Oswald was not in Dallas on September 25 is too strong." Mr. LrEBELER. Yes ; all these things are here, that is correct. Mr. CoRNWELL. The same kind of comments in chapter VI then that we found in chapter IV ? Mr. LiEBELER. There are some of them in here. This memo has many of them in here. My impression as I said before is I still have that impression that there was not the severe problem in these other chap- ters that there was in chapter IV. Obviously, that problem I thought was there in all of them, and I raised these questions about it. Mr. Corn WELL. Did you receive any imT:»ression that the reason for writing the report, as you found it, overly strong, and of course in context that means I guess that the sole assassin in theory was stronger, the lack of a conspiracy may have been overstated ? In that sense was it prompted by any consideration of the national or possible interna- tional repercussions of this report? ]Mr. LiEBELER. I have no way of knowing that or answering that question. I think that the kind of thing that we observe here as much as anything else reflects a basic difi'erence in judgment between some 248 of the other people on the staff who drafted these portions of the report about which I am commenting and myself. In some cases I think that the memos indicate that simply mistakes were made and that they should be corrected and I assumed that they were. I am almost certain that they were. But that could be probed by looking at the report. I don't think there is any "explanation" for it other than the difference in attitude and approach between different people. Mr. CoRNw^ELL. May we mark for identification as exhibit 42, ^Ir. Chairman, a memo dated September 16 f roin Mr. Liebeler to Mr. Kan- kin, subject matter: "Quote from New Orleans Times-Picayune of September 19, 1963 concerning Fidel Castro's speech." Mr. Preyer. That may be marked for identification only. Mr. CoRNWELL. Have you had a chance to review that mem.o prior to coming here ? Mr. Liebeler. Yes, sir. Mr. CoRN^VELL. Would it be fair to state that that is one additional memo concerning the same general subject matter of what should and should not be included in the final report? Mr. Liebeler. Yes. Mr. CoRNWELL. May we admit that document into the record ? Mr. Preyer. Without objection, it is admitted into the record. [The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 42 and received for the record, follows :] JFK Exhibit No. 42 [Memorandum] September 16, 1964. To : Mr. Rankin. From : Mr. Liebeler. Ee : Quote from New Orleans Times-Picayune of September 19, 1963, concerning Fidel Castro's speech. We previously discussed the possible inclusion in chapter VII of the quote from the New Orleans Times-Picayune of September 19, 1963, concerning Fidel Castro to the effect that U.S. leaders would not be safe themselves if U.S. promoted attack on Cuba continued. You and :Mr. Redlich took the position that we could not include the quote unless there was some evidence that Oswald had actually read that particular newspaper. I stated that the material was relevant and the possibility that Oswald had read it should be discussed. I was not, however, at that time able to indicate any other situation in which materials had been dis- cussed on the possibility that Oswald had read it, in the absence of any specific proof that he had. I now note, however, in reviewing the galleys of chapter VI, that an extensive discussion of the "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" advertisement and the "Wanted for Treason" handbill are included. The following statement appears in connection : "There is no evidence that he [Oswald] became aware of either the 'Welcome Mr. Kennedy' advertisement or the 'Wanted for Treason' handbill, though neither possibility can be precluded." Our discussion of the possible inclusion of the Castro quote had obvious politi- cal overtones. The discussion set forth in chapter VI concerning the "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" advertisement and the "Wanted for Treason" handbill have simi- lar overtones. One of the basic positions that you have taken throughout this in- vestigation isthat the groups on both ends of the political spectrum must be treated fairly. I have agreed with that proposition in general, even though we have disagreed at times on specific applications of it. It appears clear to me, however, that if we are precluded from including tlie quote from the New Orleans newspaper concerning Castro's speech on the grounds that we have no evidence that Oswald actually read it, even though we do know 249 he read a great deal, the same must be true of the "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" advertisement and the "Wanted for Treason" handbill. The discussion in chap- ter VI actually admits that the "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" advertisement in the November 22, 1963, Dallas Morning Ne^YS probably did not come to Oswald's attention. Under those circumstances, it would seem to me that fairness indi- cates either the deletion of the discussion of the advertisement and the handbill that is now set forth in chapter VI or the inclusion of the Castro statement in chapter VII. Mr. CoRNWELL. Would it be fair to state, Mr. Liebeler, that on the first page of that document you outline to Mr. Rankin two different types of newspaper articles, one of which would reflect a possible threat against the President by Mr. Castro, and another set of articles which would indicate possible threats by rightwing groups in the United States? Mr. Liebeler. Yes, sir. Mr. CoRNWELL. Would it be fair to state that on page 2 you go on to state that : Our discussion of the possible inclusion of the Castro quote had obvious politi- cal overtones. The discussion set forth in chapter VI concerning the "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" advertisement and the "Wanted for Treason" handbill have similar overtones. One of the basic positions that you have taken throughout this in- vestigation isthat the groups on both sides of the political spectrum must be treated fairly. I have agreed with that proposition in general although we have disagreed at times on the specific application of it. In other words, would it be fair to state that in substance you had found an example where the report was to allow the inclusion of evi- dence if it reflected a possible right wing conspiracy, but it would be more sensitive to the problem if you included evidence concerning a possible Castro conspiracy ? Mr. Liebeler. Yes ; I think that is a correct statement, and I am pre- pared to offer, if you wish it, an explanation as to why that sort of thing occurred. Mr. Cornwell. Yes, sir. Mr. Liebeler. I have the very definite impression that the Chief Justice was extremely sensitive about some of the things people in Texas and in Dallas particularly had said about him. There was a considerable discussion about putting anything in the report or conducting any kind of uivestigation into the newspaper ads that had been taken in Dallas prior to the time that President Kennedy went to Dallas and about some handbills that had been distributed down there. I took the position that there was no conceivable relevance between that activity and President Kennedy's assassination. As this memo reflects, one of the legal formulations of that issue became a part of the question of whether there was any evidence to suggest that Oswald had ever seen these newspaper stories or Imew about the handbill, and if he had not, of course, there would not be any foundation at all for saying anything about it. This memo is an attempt to quite frankly either get the rightwing stuff out or put the Castro stuff in but not put the rightwing stuff in and keep the Castro stuff out. In fact, this particular article from the Times-Picayune I do not believe was discussed in the report, but I may be wrong about that. I have not been able to find any reference to it. There is a consider- able discussion, however, on pages 414 and 415 of the report about 250 tlie possibility that Oswald was motivated by sympathy for the Castro regime and other Communist materials that he read and was familiar with, so that that question was discussed in the report even though the specific article was not. The other material about these rightwing people was also included in the report. Both of them went in although not the specific Castro thing as near as I can tell. The referenceto the New Orleans ai'ticle was not included in the report. Mr. CoRNWELL. I wonder if part of your last answer inferred a particularly close relationship betw^een Mr. Redlich and Mr. Rankin on the one hand and Cliief Justice Earl Warren on the other. In other words, you seem to be suggest that Earl Warren's feeling about the rightwing attitude in Texas may have had an effect upon the decision or at least the nreliminary decision to include the rightwing articles and omit the Castro articles. Mr. LiEBELER. I don't have the impression that it had anything to do with omitting the Castro article. I have the rather clear impres- sion that the Chief Justice requested that the investigation into the rightwing activities bo conducted. I know that for a fact because they asked me to do it. I didn't do it. I wouldn't do it. ISIr. CoRXWELL. Do you believe based on your experiences there that this type of selection process, and the process by which many of the ]:>oints of evidence were overstated, was the result of Rankin's and Redlich's views of what Earl Warren wanted? Did this last exhibit represent a typical occui'rence or an isolated occurrence? Mr. LrEBELER. It wasn't the only time the question came up. That is certainly true. It seems to me there are two questions here though. Tliis business of overwj-iting, as I characterized it, I don't have any reason to believe that that had any relationship to the Chief Justice's views on any of the issues. I don't have any reason to believe that. I have no knowledge that would lead me to believe that, Mr. Redlich and I have quite orofoundly different views of the world on political ques- tions, and that led to disagreements over this matter on several occasions. Mr. CoRNWELL. I am sorry I don't have it here to show you, but I would like to read for vou what our research department says is the contents of a memorandum they have reviewed in the L.B.J. Library in Austin. Tex. Tlie memo pur])orts to reflect J. Edgar Hoover's state- ments to Wliite House aide Walter Jenkins on November 24, 1963. It states Mr. Hoover's apparent thinking. The thing I am most concernefl about and so is ^Ir. Kat^enbarh. is having something issued so that we can <"onvince the public that Oswald is the real assassin. Mr. Katzenbach thinks that the President might appoint a Presidential Commission of three outstanding citizens to make a determination. I conntered with the suggestion that we make an investigative report to the Attorney r4eneral with pictures, laboratory work, et cetera, and the Attorne.v General can make the report to the President and the President can decide whether to make it public. I felt this was better because there are several aspects which would complicate our foreign relations if we followed the Presidential Commission route. Were you aware of any belief at the level of the FBI, the head of the FBI, the Justice Depai-fmeiit, the White House, perhaps Earl Wan-en, during the operation of the W;^'"ren Conunission that the public needed to be convinced that Oswald was the real assassin and 251 that there were sensitive areas that had to be avoided in connection with foreign relations ? Mr. LiEBELER. No. I did not get that impression. I don't think any- body on the staff of the Commission thought it was their job to con- vince anybody that Oswald was the assassin. I think they felt their job was to find out who was the assassin. For better or worse we came to the conclusion, which I felt was correct, that Oswald was the assassin and that is what the report said. I don't have the feeling that there was ever any constraint placed on any investigation that I was involved in or anyone else that I know of on the Commission staff, either for rea- sons of the kind to which you now allude or for any other reason that didn't Commission.make sense in the context of the development of the work of the I want to put that exception in because there were persons who felt that Griffin was spending too much time trying to find out how Jack Ruby got in the basement and things like that. On this other issue there was no such thing involved. Mr. CoRNWELL. In other words, your answer, as I understood it, is that you observed no restrictions upon your investigation or that of your fellow staff attorneys which you then or now would construe as being the product of this type of attitude ? Mr. LiEBELER. That is correct. Mr. Corn WELL. Let me ask you, however, whether or not in your view it would have been possible for the facts to have been supplied to the Warren Commission by the investigative agencies in a manner to accomplish this type of constraint ? Could they have tailored what they provided you in your view to accomplish that ? Mr. LiEBELER. In my view that could have been done by the Central Intelligence Agency. I do not believe that could have been done by the FBI. . Mr. CoRNWELL. On what basis do you make the distinction ? Mr. LiEBELER. The FBI provided us with a piece of information and interview, the FBI reports. Those witnesses, those persons who were interviewed by the FBI were available to us. We took their depositions ourselves. The work the FBI did on the physical evidence, the ballistics work, the fingerprint work, the fair and fibers work, that sort of thing, in many, if not in all cases, were checked by independent criminal lab- oratories. We did not rely solely on the statement of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in that regard. I do not believe because of those considerations that the Bureau could have essentially done that. It is true that apparently there were things that some people in the Bureau knew that they did not tell us but I don't of facts tliink the that any of those things had anything to do with the basic assassination. As to the CIA, however, it is much more difficult. It was much more difficult for us to verify statements received from them. So, I think as a result of those factors it might have been possible in the case of the CIA. I want to emphasize, however, that I do not believe that was the case. But I think it might have been possible. I think the basic prob- lem, the basic area where it could have been a possibility is that if the — we were faced with a number of leads that led to various kinds of Cuban individuals and Cuban groups that Oswald was claimed to have 1+3-819 0-79-17 252 associated with or been seen with. The Odio thing and a series of con- tacts in New Orleans, several in New Orleans. In those cases it was very difficult or impossible to follow them down in the sense you could say absolutely with a high degree of certainty that there was nothing to them. It is possible I suppose that the CIA may have had information in its files reflecting its own activity and concerns with Cuba that, if provided to us, might have helped us keep up with some of these other things that we were pursuing on our own and with the help of the FBI. As I say, I have no reason to believe that is the case. Mr. CoRNWELL. Would that attitude, which would appear on the face of that one memorandum which I just read, have been consistent with what you observed to have happened during the rewrite process ? Mr. LiEBELER. Are we referring to exhibit 42 ? Mr. CoRNWELL. No. I am referring to the memorandum I read you a moment ago concerning what appears to have been Mr. Hoover's feel- ing that they needed to convince the American public that Oswald was the assassin and to avoid several aspects which might complicate foreign relations. Was that consistent with what was happening in the rewrite process? Mr. LiEBELER. I don't know. Once you conclude on the basis of the evidence we had that Oswald was the assassin, for example, taking that issue first, then obviously it is in the interest of the Commission, and I presume everyone else, to express that conclusion in a straight- forward and convincing way. Now the question, I think, that perhaps Mr. Redlich and I differed on from time to time was what was the most convincing way ? Do you write the thing in a conclusionary sense or do you say: Well, here are the problems. And after looking at all this evidence and taking account of the conflicting evidence and differences, the Commission has concluded that this is the result. If you were just going to publish the report and get rid of all the other evidence obviously you can state it in any kind of conclusionary fashion you want. But if you know that people are going to be looking at this work for years and years to come, as it has turned out they are, then it seemed to me the most convincing way to do it was to lay every- thing right out there and say, "Here are the problems, you don't have to look for them, the Commission looked at them and after considering them this is the conclusion we came to." Mr. CoRNWELL. One final exhibit, Mr. Chairman. May I have marked for identification a document or a memorandum dated April 15, 1964, from Mr. Goldberg to Mr. Kankin as exhibit 43? Mr. Preyer. It may be marked as exhibit 43 for identification purposes. Mr. CoRNWELL. Did you have a chance to review that document prior to coming here? Mr. LiEBELER. Yes, sir. Mr. Corn WELL. Is it fair to say that the subject of that memo con- cerns a possible request from all the members of the staff for a histor- ical memoranda outlining the nature of their work, the major problems they encountered, and soliciting their evaluation of the work of the Commission from various standpoints ? Mr. LiEBELER. That is what it says. 253 Mr. CoRNWELL. May we admit that for the record, Mr. Chairman ? Mr. Preyer. Without objection, it is admitted into evidence. [The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 43 and received for the record, follows :] JFK Exhibit No. 43 April 15, 1964. Memorandum for : Mr. J. Lee Rankin. From : Mr. Alfred Goldberg. Subject : Historical memoranda by staff members. Pursuant to our conversation of yesterday, I suggest that the members of the Commission staff be asked to prepare, prior to their departure from here, an ac- count of their experiences with the Commission. Attached is a suggested draft ol a memorandum to the staff. April 15, 1964. Memorandum to : All members of the staff. From : J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel. Subject : Historical memoranda by staff members. It is more than likely that this Commission will be the subject of future his- torical, legal, and political studies. We have an opportunity, and also an obliga- tion, to help create as complete a record as possible of the work of the Commis- sion. At some time, shortly before your departure from here, will you please prepare an account of your contribution to the work of the Commission. It would be helpful if you would also analyze and evaluate the work of the staff and the Commission in general. Please be as specific and comprehensive as possible. You may find the check list below of some assistance in preparing your memoranda. 1. How did you become associated vpith the Commission? 2. How were your fimctions and area of activity decided? 3. What actions did you take to carry out your assignment? 4. What were the major problems you encountered in carrying out your assignment? 5. What is your evaluation of the work of the Commission from the following standpoints? a. Organization ; b. Administration ; c. Planning of work ; d. Policies ; e. Investigative support ; f. Hearings and depositions ; g. Organization and preparation of reports ; h. Validity of findings. Mr. CoRNWELL. Prior to the time that I showed you that document in anticipation of your testimony here had you seen it ? Mr. LiEBELER. Not to my recollection. Mr. CoRNWELL. Was it to your knowledge, circulated among the staff and were those requests ever made ? Mr. LiEBELER. I don't believe so. I don't believe they were ever made. Mr, CoRNWELL. Did you ever write any memorandum of that nature, in other words, a memorandum giving your views on those subject matters ? Mr. LiEBELER. Not directly. Mr. CoRNWELL. Do you have any information which could give us an insight into why that memorandum was never distributed among the staff, if it was not ? Mr. LiEBELER. Well, I think if I had been in Mr. Rankin's posi- tion Iwould probably not have sent it out either. Mr. CoRNWELL. I have no further questions. Mr. Preyer. Are there questions by members ? Mr. Fauntroy. 254 Mr. Fauntroy. Not at this time. Mr. Preyer. Mr. Devine. Mr. Devine. No questions. Mr. Preyer. Mr. Dodd. Mr. Dodd. I have just two questions really. You stated in regard to the rifle, the palm print, and I think on the boxes as well you had a bit of disagreement over whether or not those prints ought to be — was it verified or checked out ? I wasn't sure what you meant. They had actually been run already once. There was some question of the absorption because of the wood. Had there already been a test on them ? Mr. Liebeler. If I may, I will explain exactly what happened in both of those cases, it won't take very long. I think particularly the point on the rifle barrel may be worthwhile. The Dallas Police Department had gotten to the rifle. Very shortly thereafter they sent it to the FBI for fingerprint analysis. The FBI reported there were no prints on the rifle. Four days later the Dallas Police Department forwarded to the FBI a lift of a palm print that they said had been taken from the underside of the rifle barrel. When they were asked, as they were, why they had waited 4 days to send this lift to the FBI or had not told the FBI that they had made this lift from the rifle, their reply was that even though the print had been lifted, that that lift had not removed the latent print from the under- side of the rifle barrel and it was still there. Well, the problem was that the FBI never found it there. It oc- curred to us that it was possible that in fact the palm print never came from the rifle. We only had the say-so of the Dallas Police De- partment to that effect and we weren't satisfied with that. We wanted the FBI to establish, if they could, whether that palm print in fact came from that rifle or not. At the time this question was raised no attempt whatever had been made to deal with that problem. Now after the discussion that Mr. Willens and Redlich and I had that was re- ferred to in the testimony Mr. Rankin invited to his office the chief FBI fingerprint expert. Inspector Mally of the FBI, who was liaison with the Commission and I think Mr. Slawson and Mr. Griffin and Mr. Willens and Mr. Redlich and Mr. Rankin met with them. I suggested to Mr. Latona, their fingerprint expert, that there miffht be some dis- tortion inthe lift because it had been taken from a cylindrical surface, sort of a Mercator projection is here, put your hand on a light bulb and take the lift and lay it flat, it might distort the lift from what it might have been on the surface. Latona went back and looked at the lift. He found that there were indications in the lift itself of pits and scores and marks and rust spots that had been on the surface from which the print had been lifted, and happily they conformed precisely to a portion of the unrlerside of the rifle barrel and the FBI so reported to us. As far as I was concerned that conclusively established the proposition that that lift had come from that rifle. Mr. Dodd. To your knowledge why would not the FBI have teen able to detect it ? Mr. Liebeler. I have no explanation of that. Mr. Dodd. There have been all sorts of allegations about the numbers of va.rious weapons kicking around. I don't know, this has been one of 255 the pieces of evidence they have used to corroborate the critics that allege Mr. LiEBELER. Not any more. There is nothing you can say about it It clearly came from that rifle. Mr. DoDD. Why did Mr. Rankin object so strongly to going through that anfairly simple process to make that determination'^ Did he ever give explanation why ? Mr. LiEBELER. It wasn't clear that it was going to be that simple when we started out. That was an idea that sort of occurred to us as we went along. Our first approach was to think of how we could question the Dallas Police Department about what happened, why they had not forwarded the print with the rifle. This being late in the day, whenever it was, late August or September, Mr. Rankin was not terribly enthusi- astic about having a couple of Commission lawyers go down to Dallas and start questioning the Dallas Police Department quite frankly be- cause itwould have raised all kinds of questions at that time as to what in the hell was going on, what are we doing going down and taking depositions from the Dallas Police Department 2 months after the report was supposed to be out ? I had some sympathy with that view and halfway thought we would have pushed that, we would have done that bad it not been for the Bureau's ability to deal with that problem in another way and much more effective way. Now on the cartons the problem there was that Oswald's prints had been identified on those cartons, they were cartons containing books that were in the corner of the window from which the shot had been fired and there were, I don't know, 20 or 25 or 28 other prints on the cartons that had never been identified. No serious attempt in my mind had ever been made to identify them. I first was troubled by the fact that at one point the draft of the report said that the Commission placed great weight on the fact that Oswald's prints were on those cartons. I had some ditficulty with that proposition in view of the fact that we had not identified these other prints and really had not made any attempt to do so. Mr. DoDD. What eventually happened to that ? Mr. LiEBELER. What eventually happened was at that same confer- ence— I was given the gift of tongues or something. As I walked out of the conference I heard someone say to Inspector Mally, "By the way, Inspector Mally, you might consider the possibility that those prints were put on those boxes by FBI agents." I looked around the room to see who had the temerity to suggest that and I found I said it myself. Unconsciously, I didn't realize I was saying that. Inspector Mally did consider that possibility and it turned out to be correct. Mr. DoDD. All those prints did come from the FBI people? Mr. LiEBELER. They came from an FBI clerk in the Dallas office and from a detective in the Dallas Police Department except for one print that was never identified. Mr. DoDD. Also the palm prints on the gun that was FBI ? Mr. LiEBELER. That was Oswald's, yes. Mr. DoDD. I did want to ask you why you thought Gerald Ford was the best Commission member but I thought that was irrelevant. Mr. McKiNNEY. It is irrelevant now. 256 Mr. Preter. Mr. McKinney. Mr. McKiNNEY. Just a question I have asked everybody appearing before the committee. It concerns the lack of communication between the CIA and the FBI over Oswald, the fact Oswald was a known de- fector from the United States. The CIA's debacle of the Bay of Pigs which we discussed with Mr. Slawson, none of our agencies at that particular time were in very good repute. There was a question as to our intelligence-gathering ability after the Bay of Pigs and after the Cuban missile crisis and one thing or another. The FBI had problems. Do you feel as a junior counsel on this a little nervous about the fact that you had to depend, for all your in- formation to essentially come from governmental agencies that had somewhat clearly goofed at least as far as keeping each other apprised of what Lee Harvey Oswald was at ? Mr. LiEBELER. I never had the feeling that we relied on Government agencies for our information. When we started we started with a bunch of FBI files, but we reviewed those so that we could conduct our own investigation. We did take the testimony of many, many witnesses. We had the reports of the examination of the physical evidence verified by outside sources, we did not rely on the FBI. So as to the basic facts of what happened in Dallas on that day not only did we not rely on the FBI work but the fact is that the Commission came to assume some- what different conclusions than the FBI came to. There was a preliminary FBI report that solved the problem as to what happened. Our conclusions were somewhat different from that. I don't think we relied on the FBI to the extent that people think we did. Mr. McKinney. Do you feel there was not enough time ? Mr. LiEBELER. Yes, to write the report. What we had planned to do originally — Mr. Rankin spoke to me about this in June or July — was that after the report was drafted, put into the condition it was even- tually released in, he wanted two or three people and I was quite flat- tered by the fact that he asked me to be one of them to stay on and rewrite the whole report and polish it up. We simply never had time to do that. I was unhappy about that. In terms of the investigation with the one exception that I men- tioned Idid not think that time was a particular problem. Mr. Preyer. I have a couple of questions. One of the most troubling incidents is the Sylvia Odio incident where apparently there was so much unanimous agreement that she is a credible witness. Yet, some of her testimony seems rather improbable, measured against some of the other known facts. Do you have any suggestion, calling on your gift of tongues, that would give us any thoughts on how we might cor- roborate her testimony or challenge it ? I assume one thing, if we could find out whether Oswald was in Dallas on that date it would be an important fact. But do you have any thoughts on how, if you had the time now and an opportunity — you mentioned you did not think you had gotten at the bottom of that — what would you do now to try to get to the bottom of it ? What could we do ? Mr. LiEBELER. The first thing I would do is review the FBI on that question that I understand came into existence subsequent to the publi- cation ofthe report and then I think I would want to find out, if I knew how to do it, whether the CIA has any information or had any informa- 257 tion about any of the people who were involved in that sequence of events. I don't believe that the committee will be able to eliminate the possibility that Oswald was in Dallas at that time any better than we did. We tried to do that. We had his location pinpointed rather well. The FBI conducted an extensive investigation quite late in the game to see if they could produce any additional information about his whereabouts in New Orleans before he went to Mexico, unsuccessfully. While it would have involved travel by automobile or by airplane I think he could have been in Dallas at that time. I personally do not believe he was but he could have been. Mr. Preyer. Did you ever talk to Ms. Odio personally ? Mr. LiEBELER. Yes, sir, I took her testimony. Mr. Preyer. What is your impression of her credibility after you subjected her to questioning ? Mr. LiEBELER. I think she believes that Oswald was there. I do not think she would lie about something like that. But I also have the impression both from my own observations of the woman and from some knowledge of her background obtained from the FBI, that I would not regard her as a reliable witness on this question. I will be happy to discuss that at greater length. The staff I am sure will follow up on that matter. She was having certain psychological and other problems at the time. I just don't think she accurately reported on what happened. Mr. Preyer. I might ask one other question in another area. I under- stand that several of the Warren Commission members had a long day session with a number of psychiatrists and psychologists dealing in your area of what were the motives of Oswald and there has been some criticism that the Warren Commission report treated that day's find- ings in a somewhat selective manner. Do you have any comment about that ? Were you at that all-day meeting ? Mr. Liebeler. Yes, I was. My understanding and recollection of that was that that session was sort of a working session and a transcript was made of it and it was not published in the underlying hearings. I think it is available in the archives. I have seen a copy of it since then. I know it is available somewhere. I think that some people at the time thought we were getting a little too far into this business of trying to psychoanalyze a man who none of us had even seen. In the 13 years that have passed since that time I think that too now. I did not think it then but I do now. Mr. Preyer. There was more question of the weight of the evidence as to why you didn't come down very hard on that. Mr. LiEBELER. That is right. Unlike some people we are not able to observe Members of the United States Senate at a distance and char- acterize the nature of their psychology. Mr. Fauntroy. I have two questions, Mr. Chairman. That is that there has recently been published a book called "The Making of an Assassin" by Ms. McMillan, referring to a 13-year-long writing of an account of the man through interviews with his wife Marina. I have not had an opportunity to read it, only reviews of the book. It suggests motives that may have emerged from that rather exclusive interview- ing of Mrs. Oswald. Are you familiar at all with that work ? Mr. LiEBELER. No; I haven't seen it. I have not read the reviews of it or anything. 258 Mr. Fauntroy. My second question is, is it not your testimony that the reservations that you had about the character of the Commission report, the language, the writing, additional questions that have been raised since, new information has come to light since, all these things notwithstanding, you feel that the Warren Commission was accurate beyond question ? Mr. LiEBELER. I think that the Commission's conclusion as to the identity of the assassin and as to the facts that occurred in Dallas on that day, that is to say there was only one person killing the President and it was Oswald and he used that rifle and so on, are correct beyond any doubt, beyond any plausible doubt. It is not possible to reach the conclusion that Oswald did not have contacts with other people, the knowledge of which would be relevant to this matter, about which the Commission did not learn, and the Commission of course never stated that there was no conspiracy. It only stated that it had not been able to develop evidence that suggested the existence of a conspiracy. I debated this issue with Mark Lane at UCLA and many other critics. I don't have any reason to doubt the basic conclusions in the report including the conspiracy question, and even this business of the FBI supposedly destroying a note that Oswald left at the office and that sort of thing does not cause me to have any questions about that. To me it is perfectly clear what was going on in the Bureau at that time. It was clear to most of us at the time. Mr. Fauntroy. So that your view is that he acting alone killed Kennedy ? Mr. LiEBELER. Yes, sir. Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McKiNNEY. Was it ever discussed by you or by others that there was a possibility that Lee Harvey Oswald could have been a CIA agent or informant or FBI informant? Mr. LiEBELER. Yes, sir. Mr. McKiNNEY. Did you think it would have been possible for the CIA and the FBI to keep this information away from the Commis- sion? Mr. LiEBELER. No. Mr. McKiNNEY. Why ? Mr. LiEBELER. I think that that is the kind of issue on which it is quite conceivable that the only persons who would have knowledge of it if that were true would be Oswald who is dead and a very few, pre- sumably as many as only one, but very few people within these organi- zations and I think that it is quite conceivable that if they wanted to withhold that information they could do so and we would not have any direct way of finding out. One of the ways that the Commission did approach that question was to examine Oswald's financial history and do a financial audit of it which hopefully would have, if there had been unaccounted revenues that he had spent, that would have lent credibility to the proposition that he had been in the employ of these agencicvS on the assumption that he was not doing it for nothing. The Internal Revenue Service people that worked for the Commission were able to account for all of the expenditures out of the income that he received or was known to have received during this period of time. 259 Mr. McKiNNEY. Thank you, Mr. Ghairman. Mr. CoRNWELL. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one additional question? Mr. Preyer. Yes. Mr. CoRNWELL. What is your view with respect to the question of whether or not the withholding by the CIA from the Conmiission of information concerning the assassination plots did or did not substan- tially affect the factfinding process ? Mr. LiEBELER. I don't understand the question. Mr. CoRNWELL. Do you think it was significant ? Would there have been things that the Commission would have done had it possessed that information ? Mr. LiEBELER. What information ? Mr. CoRNWELL. About the CIA assassination plots against Castro. Mr. LiEBELER. Fidel Castro ? Mr. CoRNWELL. Yes. Mr. LiEBELER. I think that if I had known that at the time that I would have been concerned to find out more directly whether the CIA had any information that might provide the Commission with leads on these other issues that we were looking at or issues that we never turned up. In my mind the fact, if it is a fact, and I don't have direct knowledge of that but I take it to be a fact, that the CIA was trying to arrange the assassination of Mr. Castro at the time, the withholding of that fact by itself I don't think is particularly significant to any- thing that the Commission did. What I am saying is the fact that the CIA was attempting, if it was, to assassinate Castro, I don't understand what that has to do with Oswald or the Warren Commission investigation or anything of that sort. I think that the question of whether the CIA withheld evidence that would have provided leads to the Commission that might have connected Oswald to presumably Cuban contacts that we were not able to connect him with ourselves, that clearly would have been significant. The fact that the CIA was apparently attempting to assassinate Cas- tro, might have provided a motive for them to withhold information if indeed they did, but the fact they were trying to assassinate Castro had nothing to do with the issue. It seems to me that relates to the motivation of the CIA in a sepa- rate matter. Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one more question? Throughout the course of your testimony you indicated there were some leads that you would like to have pursued had you had more time and that there were still some questions, albeit minor, apparently in your mind about those leads. I wonder if you could identify for me any outstanding question that you now have that you would like to have pursued although that pursuit would have led you, as you have con- cluded, to the same conclusion which the Commission reached, that Oswald, acting alone, without conspirators, killed Mr. Kennedy? Mr. LiEBELER. I think the only question that would satisfy that de- scription isthe one that the chairman has already referred to and that is the Odio mission staffincident, would have least from the standpoint of what the Com- at done. Because on these other questions we did all we could think of to do, to try to connect these allegations up to Oswald, and were not able to. 260 So in terms of the feeling that I had at the time that we didn't have time enough to follow these leads up that would only have been true with respect to the Odio incident. Now as far as what this committee might do or would want to do, I wouldn't think that would be confined simply to the Odio thing. I think if you obtain CIA materials that we did not get, for example, if that could occur, that it could be that material in the files could relate to others than Ms. Odio. Mr. Fauntrot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Pkeyer. Thank you. We appreciate very much your testimony. You were just about the last man off the beach here, weren't you? Were there three of you left that mostly did the final writing? Mr. LiEBELER. I don't know. There were more than that. Mr. Griffin and Mr. Slawson but Eedlich was there almost to the very end and did an enormous amount of work on the report. Mr. Preyer. The senior members began to drop off before the end ? Mr. Llebeler. Many of them did. Mr. Jenner stayed on until the end. Mr. Ball did a large amount of work. Mr. Hubert also. I under- stand the fact that many of those senior members had advised Mr. Rankin asked to that comethey really to the couldn't work full time when they were Commission. Mr. Adams was the most prominent amongst those. Mr. Preyer. Your testimony has been very helpful. We appreciate very much your being here with us. Mr. LiEBELER. Tha^ you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Preyer. Pursuant to our rules the witness is offered 5 min- utes at the conclusion of the questioning to make any statement that he cares to make about the case or to amplify any of his remarks in any way. The Chair would like to offer you your 5 minutes. Mr. Liebeler. Unfortunately I am going to accept part of that time. My testimony and I am sure the testimony of other staff members and the files of the Commission obviously show the existence of very strongly held views on various issues and vigorous exchanges on those views. As I tried to indicate, however, all of the investigation that I wanted conducted was conducted. Much of the disagreement was about how the report should be written and, as I have said, my views on that issue prevailed sometimes and sometimes they did not and that is exactly what one would expect in that kind of situation. As to the basic facts of the assassination relating to questions of the President's wounds, source of the shots and identity of the assassin, the physical evidence alone shows without doubt that Oswald was the assassin and that he fired from the sixth floor of the school book depository. The Commission pursued to the extent that it could all plausible leads suggesting the involvement of per- sons other than Oswald and it could not establish any facts that would seriously suggest the existence of a conspiracy to assassinate the President. The staff was highly motivated and competent with no inclina- tion or motive not to pursure the issues to the truth. The work of the staff of the Commission was not perfect. 261 When compared to the criticisms that have been made of our work or compared to the product of ot,her human institutions and not to some ideal of perfection, we might ask ourselves, or you might ask yourselves whether you would have been likely to have done better at the time and when thought of in that way and when compared to those standards I think the Commission's work will pass muster very well. As I have said, I have never doubted the nature of the conclusions of the report and I do not doubt them now. In spite of what has happened since the publication of the report I think that eventually it will stand the test of time. Thank you very much. Mr. Preyer. Thank you. We appreciate your comments and testimony. The committee will recess until 10 o'clock in the morning. [Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to recon- vene at 10 a.m. on Wednesday, November 16, 1977.] (283) Attachment F : Executive session testimony of Judge Burt W. Griffin and Howard P. Willens. SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1977 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on the Assassination OF John F. Kennedy of the Select Committee on Assassinations, Washington^ B.C. The subcommittee met at 10:40 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room 2359, Eayburn House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the Select Committee on Assassinations) presiding. Present: Representative Stokes, Fauntroy, Dodd, and McKinney. Professional staff members present : G. Robert Blakey, chief coun- sel J. ; Facter, J. Wolf, K. Klein, E. Berning, L. Wizelman, D. Hard- way, M. Mars, R. Genzman, A. Hausman, R. Morrison, D. Kuhn, and J. Hess. Chairman Stokes. The meeting will come to order. At this time the Chair will recognize Ms. Elizabeth Berning, clerk of the committee, to read for the record those members officially des- ignated tobe on the subcommittee today pursuant to committee rule 12.13 Ms. Berning. Mr. Preyer and Mr. Dodd are regular members. Mr. Stokes will be substituting for Mr. Sawyer. Mr. McKinney will be substituting for Mr. Thone. Mr. Fauntroy will be substituting for Mrs. Burke. Chairman Stokes. At this time I will recognize Mr. Fauntroy as the chairman of the subcommittee in the absence of the designated chairman, Mr. Preyer. Prior to recognizing Mr. Fauntroy for that purpose, we should have a motion that the subcommittee go into executive session for today's hearing and one subsequent day of hearing since, on the basis of information obtained by the committee, the committee believes the evidence or testimony may tend to either defame or degrade people, and consequently section 2(k) (5) of rule 11 of the rules of the House and committee rule 3.3(5) require such hearings to be in executive session. Mr. McKinney. I so move. Chairman Stokes. It has been properly moved that the committee go into executive session. The clerk will call the roll. Ms. Berning. Mr. Stokes. Chairman Stokes. Aye. (263) 264 Ms. Berning. Mr. Sawyer. [No response.] Ms. Berning. Mr. McKinney. Mr. McKinney. Aye. Ms. Berning. Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Fauntroy. Aye. Ms. Berning. Mr. Dodd. [No response.] Ms. Berning. Three "ayes," Mr. Chairman. Chairman Stokes. Then at this time the subcommittee is officially in executive session and members of the public are asked to remove them- selves. The Chair at this time will recognize Mr. Fauntroy for the purpose of acting as subcommittee chairman. Mr. Fauntroy [presiding]. The Chair welcomes as our first witness today Mr. Burt W. Griffin. Mr. Griffin, if you will stand we will swear you at this time. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? Judge Griffin. I do. TESTIMONY OF BURT W. GRIPFIN Mr. Fauntroy. I understand, Mr. Griffin, that the committee rules have been given to you prior to your appearance today. Judge Griffin. That is correct. Mr. Fauntroy. Let me begin by saying that the House Resolution 222 mandates the committee "to conduct a full and complete investiga- tion and study of the circumstances surrounding the assassination and death of President John F. Kennedy, including determining whether the existing laws of the United States concerning the protection of the President and the investigatory jurisdiction and capability of agencies and departments are adequate in their provisions and enforcement, and whether there was full disclosure of evidence and information among agencies and departments of the U.S. Government, and whether any evidence or information not in the possession of an agency or depart- ment would have been of assistance in investigating the assassination, and why such information was not provided or collected by that agency or department . . . and to make recommendations to the House ... if the select committee deems it appropriate for the amendment of existing legislation or the enactment of new legislation." To begin our questioning the Chair will yield now to our Chief Counsel, Mr. Blakey. Mr. Blakey. Judge Griffin, I would like to extend my thanks to you for coming today and also the thanks of the staff. It is a pleasure to see you again. We appreciate your taking time from your very busy trial schedule to come here and share with us your thoughts and observa- tions. We would also like to thank you on the record for taking time to talk with Ms. Jacqueline Hess and myself on November 4 in Cleveland. 2^5 The Ghairman of the full committee, Mr. Stokes, whom I am sure you know quite well, also asked me to express to you his regrets. He apparently came a little earlier and had to leave because of a previous commitment. Mr. Chairman, I thought it might be appropriate at this point to insert in the record and also for the benefit of the committee some of the background and biography material on Judge Griffin. Judge, I wonder if you would let me read several things for you and indicate whether they are correct. You were bom in Cleveland in 1932, received your B.A. degree with honors from Amherst College in 1954, your L.L.B. degree from Yale Law School in 1959 where you were the co-editor of the Law Journal. In 1959 and 1960 you were a law clerk to Judge George T. Washing- ton of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and from 1960 through 1962 you were Assistant U.S. Attorney in the northern district of Ohio. You joined the law firm in Cleveland of McDonald, Hopkins & Hardy. Is that all correct? Judge Griffin. That is correct. Mr. Blakey. Then in 1964 you were Assistant Counsel to the War- ren Commission. Is that correct ? Judge Griffin. That is correct. Mr. Blakey. After your term of duty with the Warren Commission ended you returned to be associated with the firm of McDonald, Hop- kins & Hardy. Subsequently you served as the director of the Legal Aid Society in Cleveland and of the Office of Economic Opportunity legal service program, and finally, on January 3, 1975, you were ap- pointed judge of the Court of Common Pleas for the County of Cuya- hoga, Cleveland, Ohio. Judge Griffin. That is correct, except that I was elected. Mr, Blakey. Turning then to your assignment with the Warren Commission in 1964, would you tell the committee how you were hired ? Judge Griffin. I was first contacted by a man named David Fil- varoff, a staff member of the Justice Department. I believe he worked, but I am not certain, in the Deputy Attorney General's office. He is a man I had known when I was practicing law in Cleveland, Ohio. He had been contacted by others in Washington to suggest names of people who might be appropriate to serve as counsel to the Commission. He contacted me and asked me if I would be interested in serving. I told him that I would be. He suggested I send a resume to J. Lee Rankin with some kind of cover indicating that I talked with Mr. Vilaroff. I did that. My recol- lection isat that point I received a telegram back from Mr. Rankin. I may have had a brief telephone conversation with him, but I can't be sure about that. My contacts were primarily with Mr. Filvaroff. Mr. Blakey. What were you told about the goals of the Warren Commission ? Judge Griffin. I was told that our goal was to attempt to determine what the facts were behind the assassination of President Kennedy. Mr. Blakey. Did you have any conversations with Chief Justice Warren ? 266 Judge Griffin. Prior to being hired ? Mr. Blakey. Yes. Judge Griffin. No. Mr. Blakey. Did you have any conversation with Mr. Rankin ? Judge Griffin. Prior to being hired ? Mr. Blakey. Yes. Judge Griffin. I can't recall whether I had a brief telephone con- versation with him or not. If so, it wasn't a matter of any substance. Mr. Blakey. Did you have any conversations with Mr. Willens ? Judge Griffin. I never met Mr. Willens until I actually joined the staff. Mr. Blakey. After you came on the staff, what were you told about the goals of the Warren Commission ? Judge Griffin. I should correct this. I have no recollection of con- versation with Mr. Willens. It is possible I did but I certainly don't remember at this point. Mr. Blakey. After you came with the Commission what were you told about the goal of the Warren Commission ? Judge Griffin. Essentially what I have just said. I was assigned a particular area to investigate. Mr. Blakey. Who specifically talked with you? Do you recall any conversations with the Chief Justice ? Judge Griffin. Not at the outset. I have really no distinct recol- lection of the particular individual I talked with. I have a general recollection at the time I arrived I simply met Rankin, and having had the bulk of my all accurate about conversations that. with Howard Willens. I really can't be at Mr. Blakey. Did the Chief Justice actually express to you or the other members of the staff as far as you know what he wanted the Commission to do ? Judge Griffin. We had a staff meeting at some point relatively early in our work. It wasn't in the sense of a formal opening session at wliich the Chief Justice appeared and said, "Here is your mission." My recol- lection isthat we appeared and we, the staff members, began working at different times and we were given instructions through Howard Willens and perhaps directly from Lee Rankin, I don't recall. We were into our work by the time we first met the Chief Justice. But we did at one point, it is my recollection, have a staff meeting at which the Chief Justice made an appearance. My most vivid recollection is occasions when I had lunch with the Chief Justice which was simply more of a social- working basis. Mr. Blakey. Did he express at that time to you the hopes of the Commission ? Judge Griffin. I don't recall these discussions as being much beyond the normal kind of chit-chat that would take place at lunch. Mr. Blakey. When did you go to work here in Washington ? Judge Griffin. When did I first begin? Your records would be more accurate than my recollection. We discussed this in Cleveland. I was under the impression that I began the 8th of December. That date sticks in my mind. Your record seems to indicate it was the latter part of January when I actually began working. I would defer to the record. 267 Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I might note that the material prepared by the staff does indicate that Judge Griffin worked, based on the pay records, from February 1, 1964 through September 26, 1964, and that he worked 225 days out of a possible 308, which makes him, next to Mr. Kankin, probably the hardest working single attorney. The average attorney worked only 159 days. The chart on which those figures are based will be introduced in the record this afternoon. Judge Griffin, I wonder if you would give us some idea of the scope of your assignment. Judge Griffin. 1 was assigned with Leon Hubert, who recently died, to investigate what I think we called at that point area 5, which had to do with Jack Ruby and the means and method and motivation for the killing of Lee Oswald, and the question of whether Jack Ruby was involved in any kind of conspiracy to assassinate the President. Mr. Hubert had the title of Senior Counsel, and I had the title of Junior Counsel. I think the committee is probably familiar with the organization format that was used. Mr. Blakey. Can you give us some indication of how the Commis- sion was organized ? Judge Griffin. Well, on a staff basis Lee Rankin was the General Counsel of the Commission. Howard Willens was his Chief Adminis- trative Assistant. There were 12 of us who were divided up in six areas. We had two lawyer teams consisting of what was conceived of as being a senior lawyer and a junior lawyer. I might mention the one thing I do remember at the outset was a little bit about what was anticipated would be the length of time that we would serve. It was indicated to all of us that we would serve from 3 to 5 months. It was also indicated at the outset that the hope was that the report would be completed prior to the Democratic National Con- vention, and that was a target, it was my understanding, that essen- tially had been indicated by the White House, that it was the Presi- on this. dent's feeling. Obviously, I had no conversations with the President As time went on other staff' people came on, but initially it was organized in this format I just outlined. Various people came on, in- cluding Norman Redlick, and it may be true that Norman Redlick was already at work when I arrived, functioning in a kind of special capacity in which he was not responsible for any exclusive area but was involved in helping out on various aspects, particularly the Oswald investigation. He really played no role of any substance that I can recall in the Ruby end. Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I might indicate for the record that the pay idea indicates that Mr. Hubert worked 115 days out of a pos- sible 308. What was your relationship with Mr. Hubert ? Judge Griffin. Mr. Hubert and I had a very good relationship. The reason for the difference in the amount of time Mr. Hubert worked and the amount of time I worked had to do with three things : one was that he was given the expectation that he would not have to give up more than 5 months out of his private practice. I believe at the time he had both a private practice and he was on the faculty of Tulane Law School. 43-819 0-79 268 There also developed a personal situation that it became important for many family reasons for hilm to go back early. A third reason was, however, that Hubert was disenchanted with some of the things that were going on in that he didn't feel he was getting the kind of support that he wanted to get, and he expressed to me a certain amount of demoralization over what he felt was unresponsiveness that existed between himself and particularly Mr. Rankin. Of course the fourth factor was that Hubert basically felt that when he left that we had gone as far as we could go. He stayed through the period when the investigation was completed but the writing portion and the drawing together portion was really left in my hands after he left. Mr. Blakey. You have given us some indication of what your re- sponsibilities were. I wonder if you could outline in general terms what the responsibilities of the areas were. Judge Griffin. You want me to enumerate just the labels that were put on those areas as I recall them ? Mr. Blakey. Yes. Judge Griffin. My recollection is not going to be as good as the written record. My recollection is that Arlen Specter and Frank Adams were to be responsible for the rather narrow question of the shots that were fired at the President. But I think it was actually la- beled in a different way, that Joe Ball and Dave Bellin were respon- sible for tracing Oswald's conduct in the period immediately surround- ing the assassination, although I am not sure whether their work was separated from Specter's in such a way that Specter took the few hours leading up to the assassination and Belin and Ball took the period from the point of the assassination until Oswald was shot. Jim Lebeler and Albert Jenner had responsibility for trying to determine what Oswald's motive was which involved them heavily in developing a live history of Oswald. Dave Slawson and Mr. Coleman were responsible for the question of whether or not Oswald was in- volved in a conspiracy, I believe the limited question of whether they were involved in a foreign conspiracy. It may be that Belin and Ball were concerned with whether he was concerned in a domestic conspiracy. Again my recollection is not good on this. Mr. Stern, Sam Stem, was responsible for the question of Presiden- tial protection. I don't recall whether he had a senior lawyer working with him. My recollection is that he did not, he was the only one that did not. Mr. Blakey. What was the relationship or interrelationship among the various areas? Were there staff meetings, interchange of memos? Judge Griffin. We had vei*v few staff meetings of a formal nature. We did have two or three, maybe four or five. The bulk of the communi- cation was on a person-to-person, ad hoc basis. There were some memos, I believe, passed back and forth. Again, I think the records would be more accurate on that than my memory. Mr. Blakey. What was your relationship with Mr. Willens and Mr. Rankin and the Commission ? Did you have direct access, for example, to Mr. Rankin ? Judge Griffin. I suppose that it would not be fair to say that we did not have direct access to Rankin. I cannot say at any point when we 269 tried to see Rankin that we couldn't see him. I don't recall any situation where we were formally required to ^o through someone else to get there. There was no doorkeeper in a certain sense. All of those communications that were in writing that went to Rankin went through Howard Willens, but as a practical matter, and I am not sure entirely what the reasons are, Hubert and I did not have a lot of communication with Rankin. We really communi- amount catedofwithcommunication him personallyat very infrequently. the beginninsr. I do"VVeremember had a certain at the outset Hubert and I had a meeting with Rankin in which we dis- cussed the work of the mission that we had, but I would say that by the first of April we had relatively little communication with Rankin. That is, we might not speak to Rankin maybe more than once every 2 weeks. Mr. Rankin is a formal person. Hubert and I did not feel comfort- able in our relationship with him. I point this out because I think our relationship with Rankin was different than some of the other staff members. I think a number of them would genuinely say, and I would believe from what I saw, that they certainly had much better communication than we did. Whether they would regard it as satis- factoiy I don't know. Mr. Blakey. What was your relationship to the Commission itself? Judge Griffin. I don't recall other than sitting in on the taking of testimony once in which Norman Redlick was involved. We never had any direct contact or formal appearance before the Commission. Mr. Blakey. Looking back, would you say that the organizational structure of the Commission was effective to achieve its goals? Judge Griffin. Are you asking me a question about structure or are you asking me a question about operation? Mr. Blakey. I would say how it actually operated. 270 PncsiDENT's Commission ON THE Assassination of President Kennedy 200 Mnrylond Ave., N. E. Earl WAtiREN. Chairman WASHINGTON. D. C. 20002 J. Ltt Counsel Rankin, RiCKARO B. Russell General John SHERr^N Cooper Hale Bogcs Gerald R. Ford John J. McCloy Allen w. Dulles Mr\Richard Helms Deputy Director for Plans Centra\ Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. Dear Mr. He EnclosedNls a memorandum providing tackgrpfind material and leads in connection vkth possible associations bet/een Jack Ruby and persons vho might have h6d a political motive for/rfssassinating President John F. Kennedy. 1 would appreciaXe your forwarding to this Commission copies of all records in your files which contain Information about Jack Ruby or the persons mentioned inNPart cXf the enclosed memorandum. In addition, we would y^e to confer with you or a knowledgeable member of you staff concerrungxpossible fruitful areas of investigation, both by the Central Inte;kligencXAgency and other agencies, which may appear from an examination of that^meraorandum and information now possessed by your ag^^y. Hopefull^ such a meeting can be held in the near future. kncerely, J. Lee Ran\in General Counsel Enclosure 271 Judge GRirriN. As far as I was concerned, I did not feel that it operated in a way I felt comfortable. Mr. Blakey. How would you have done it differently ? Judge Griffin. Let me first of all preface it. Hubert and I began to feel after a couple of months that perhaps there was not a great deal of interest in what we were doing, that they looked upon the Ruby ac- tivity, based upon information that they saw as being largely pe- ripheral to the questions that they were most concerned with. We did have a disagreement, pretty clear disagreement, on how to go about conducting the investigation, and I think that again was an- tive asother reason why I would wouldseensayit.the operation was not as effec- liked toI have haveperhaps Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my questions in the area of his assignment and the organization. I do have some other questions but I thought it might be useful, if the committee wants to ask any- thing at this point, to yield. Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you. Mr. Dodd, do you have a question ? Mr. DoDD. I want to be careful I don't get into something you are going to go into. How did you characterize your first set of questions ? Mr. Blakey. Basically his assignment and the organization. Mr. DoDD. There has always been some debate as to exactly what the purpose of the Warren Commission was, what was in the minds of the Chief Justice, the President, in regard to the various memos that went back and forth. You stated earlier that you cannot recall having any meetings ahead of time with any people. Judge Griffin. Yes. Mr. DoDD. Wliat was your feeling, to the best of your recollection, as to what the purpose of the Warren Commission was ? Judge Griffin. I felt then, and I still feel, despite a lot of misgivings that I had, that the purpose was a genuine purpose, to find out the truth behind the assassination. I do think, however, that there were major political considerations that dictated how this work was con- ducted. The time frame that was set initially for the work was a polit- ical consideration. This investigation was carried on during a period when everyone was vividly aware of the results of the 1950's whendealSen- of ator McCarthy held a prominent position. There was a great concern that we not conduct an investigation that would have overtones of what people called McCarthyism. So that a lot of the decisions that were made in terms of how we proceeded I think were made against that kind of background. Mr. DoDD. That was your impression from speaking to the various people who were in charge ? Judge Griffin. I have no question about that. Mr. DoDD. I notice the Chief Justice's opening remarks to the Com- mission referred to their job as not one of collecting evidence but one of evaluating evidence. That is a vast distinction in terms of a Commis- sion that is investigating an assassination. Judge Griffin. I think that as a sta'ff member we saw our role as collecting evidence, that is. that wherever there appeared to be gaps m 272 information that had been provided to us by the investigative agen- cies we had an obligation to try to get beyond those gaps. And where there were contradictions, then to find further evidence that would re- solve those contradictions. However, we did not have an investigative staff. We had lawyers who were taking testimony and functionmg as lawyers, but we did not have people on our own who were out conducting initial interviews with witnesses. That was done, and I think both Mr. Rankin and Mr. Willens could speak much more authoritatively on this than I can, but it was my understanding that that was done because there was also a concern that this investigation not be conducted in such a way as to destroy any of the investigative agencies that then existed in the Gov- ernment. There was a genuine fear expressed that this could be done. Second, that it was important to keep the confidence of the existing investigative agencies, and that if we had a staff' that was conducting its own investigation that it would generate a paranoia in the FBI and the other investigative agencies which would not only perhaps be po- litically disadvantageous, it would be bad for the country because it might not be justified but it might also be counterproductive. I think there was a fear that we might be undermining. Again, I think you should talk to Willens and Rankin about this. My impres- sion is that there was genuine discussion of this at a higher level than mine. I am trying to get a flavor for the atmosphere of the Commission as you walked in on February 2 in terms of presumptions and per- ceptions. Judge Griffin. I think that it is fair to say, and certainly reflects, my feeling, and it was certainly the feeling that I had of all of my col- leagues that we were determined, if we could, to prove that the FBI was wrong, to find a conspiracy if we possibly could. I think we thought we would be national heroes in a sense if we could find something that showed that there had been something sinis- ter beyond what appeared to have gone on. I think that everyone that worked on the staff level that I was working at, and I think Howard Willens, with whom I had enough communication, I think, to be able to pass a judgment on him, and the only reason I did not mention others is I did not have the communication. Mr. DoDD. Was that junior counsel concept because of your being the younger guys there ? Did you sense there was a different attitude at the top ? I appreciate your candor. I can get a sense of what you are saying. Did you believe that that feeling you had about going out to maybe un- cover something far more sinister was in contradiction to what the senior counsel and the meml>ers of the Commission themselves felt ? Judge Griffin. No; first of all, as far as the senior counsel, Hubert Ball, Jenner, I don't think there was any difference in perspective. I think that designation that was originally set forth vanished very quickly as working relationships developed among people, and it turned out who was doing the work, senior and junior did not mean a thing. In fact, they abolished the label. It does not show up in the report in the final listing of people, and they recognized that. I think that a number of us, I have no doubt the people I had close communication with, who were essentially Belin, Slawson, to some 273 extent Lebeler, Norman Redlich for a substantial period of time, were determined to prove that the FBI was wrong, and determined to root out Mr. DoDD. Wrong in what way ? By the way, if I am getting into something you will be inquiring into, I will hold up. Mr. Blakey. You are going into it very well. Don't let me stop you. Mr. DoDD. Is it fair to say from your perceptions that the FBI and agencies of Government at that period of time were convinced that Lee Harvey Oswald was a lone assassin ? Judge Griffin. Right. Mr. DoDD. That was clearly coming from the FBI and the agencies? Judge Griffin. I think at that point my recollection of conversa- tions, for example, with Norman Redlich were that he took a political view of the FBI. He saw them as a conservative agency which was determined to pin this on someone who was of a different political persuasion. I think he started out with a strong motivation along that line, to prove that they were wrong. I had worked with the FBI for 2 years when I was an assistant U.S. attorney. I didn't have a political view of them but I frankly didn't think they were very competent. I felt then, and I still feel, that they have a great myth about their ability but that they are not capable by their investigative means of ever uncovering a serious and well-planned conspiracy. They would only stumble upon it. I think their investigative means themselves may be self-defeating. I never found them very creative, very imaginative. My attitude toward them was that I thought they were honest. I didn't think in a sticky situation that I would have great faith in them. Mr. DoDD. I don't want to editorialize, but you have these feelings : Redlich is suspicious of them for political reasons ; you are suspicious of them because of their inability to cope with a situation of this magnitude. Judge Griffin. Rankin did not trust the FBI, either. Mr. DoDD. Yet you are sitting here and you are evaluating, all you are really doing is evaluating the evidence that they are handing you, with all of your suspicions. Judge Griffin. We did have other agencies. We had a countercheck on them. We were getting to a certain extent parallel investigations from the Secret Service. We were also getting information back from the Dallas Police Department. A lot of people who were being interro- gated by the FBI were being interrogated by other agencies, even the Post Office Department. So i hat in a lot of things there were ways of having checks. I think in terms of the scientific information there was a definite effort not to rely on the FBI. As I recall, the Commission did utilize in the ballistics — I don't want to be held to what fields, but it may be in the fingerprint and ballistic areas that they did rely and deliberately went to find people independent of the Federal Government. I think there were some experts from Illinois, as I recall, involved. Mr. DoDD. I am trying (o develop the relationship between what is listed as junior counsel and senior counsel in terms of perceptions as you go into this. Again I realize you did not have time to contact them 274 on a day-to-day basis to draw concrete conclusions, but you may have. I may prejudice your response by my questions. In terms of i he Commission members themselves, the Chief Justice, President Ford and so forth, how did you relate their perceptions in starting out as opposed to what you told me the reactions were from Redlich, Rankin, yourself, and others ? Judge Griffin. I had almost a total lack of contact with the Commission members. I have some thoughts in retrospect now about some of the perceptions, total conjecture but based on other things that have happened, but at the time I did feel that Senator Russell was genuinely concerned about conducting an investigation. Mr. DoDD. Concerned about what ? Judge GRimisr. Genuinely wanted to conduct an investigation. Sen- ator Russell genuinely wanted to conduct an investigation as distin- guished from simply an evaluation. I may be overstating that, and T say this because he hired a woman named Alfredda Scobey after a couple of months of Commission work to come in and actually do a countercheck on the staff. I"" would be difficult for me to reconstruct exactly what was happen- ing that motivated him to do that, but after a while there became within the staff some differences of opinion and some feeling that we were not going far enough. I do recall that at the time Scobey came on, there was expressed through her communications with others that Russell really wanted to make sure that there weren't going to be any stones unturned. Mr. DoDD. I am just talking about that initial period as you come into this position and your feeling and perceptions about what the Commission members actually felt, the Katzenbach memo. Judge Griffin. I am not familiar wi^h the Katzenbach memo. Mr, DoDD. The memo that Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach sent to Lyndon Johnson on November 26, or so I think it was, some 4 or 5 days after the assassination, saying he thinks it is important that there be an investigation to determine that in fact Lee Harvey Oswald was — the clear implication of the memo was to set aside the uneasy feelings that everyone had and let us establish once and for all that Lee Harvey Oswald did this thing. Mr. McKiNNEY. He also sent a similar letter to each Commission member at a later date. Mr. DoDD.You have from the Justice Department a clear perception that the President seemed to agree with it. Judge Griffin. Maybe I can in part answer it in this way, in addi- tion to saying I have no idea what was in their minds, but I think it is important to say that if they had a point of view about this difference from the one I expressed that was a staff point of view, it was never communicated to the staff. We had no knowledge that we were being restrained in any way from conducting the kind of investigation that we wanted to conduct. If the investigation began to be limited in the method in which we proceeded beyond the staff limitations that we had — that is, the areas we went into and how far we went — I think it may have reflected the point of view that I did hear attributed to the Chief Justice, that in his 20 years as district attorney in Alameda County, he never had seen 275, a criminal homicide investigation that was as thorough as this; and if we had not found anything that would show any more than already seemed to be the conclusions, there was not anything there to be found. I recall as pressures began to be put on to move away from investiga- tion and into drafting the report, it was really based on this concept, that what we had going here was a classical investigation into murder, and we had gone far beyond what anybody who had ever had any experience would do, and we had not found anything. Mr. DoDD. I have taken more time than I should have. I thank the chairman. Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. McKinney. Mr. McKinney. You have covered most of my ground anyway. Judge, I was interested and was going to follow through on the Commission item. No. 1, I would agree with you on Senator Kussell because he expressed his outrage several times at the lack of com- munication between Federal agencies. It seems to me that we have two factors here. I just want to get your interpretation on whether I am correct or not. In reading the tran- script of the Commission's meetings, time, let's get it over with, Kat- zenbach letters, we have to put the Nation to rest, so on and so forth, your statement that this has been the most complete investigation, let us get it over with, we have to get the report out, then we have all of you coming in. It seems to me that there is a great disparity between the Com- mission and the junior staff, but you did not actually feel that? Judge Griffin. Let me say it was never communicated to us that it was the Commission that wanted to curtail things. There were two communications that were made as to where this pressure was coming from. The most prominent one was the White House, that there was a general, unspecified reference to the fact that the White House wanted this report out before the convention. That was said to us many, many times. I think the convention was in June. Second, just by way of human interest, color, perhaps, another date began to be set because the Chief Justice had a trip scheduled to go to Europe, and the hope was that it could be completed before he went on his trip to Europe. Mr. McKinney. I may have to leave before you finish because I have a trip to Boston. Judge Griffin. Mr. McKinney, it is difficult for the general public to understand that these human factors play a major role in a lot of these decisions. Mr. McKinney. Let me ask j^ou a question I have asked each witness on the subject, Wlien you arrived here, the CIA was not what you would call in the best of repute; it had fallen apart on the Bay of Pigs, it had fallen apart on the Cuban missile crisis, it had fallen apart on the Berlin Wall. The FBI was going through its personality problems in severe fashion at that time. When you got here, did you become appalled with the amount of work you had to do in the time you were given, and the fact that you were really going to review Agency material ? Judge Griffin, Yes. I don't know whether I would say appalled, but we were very concerned about it, very anxious about it. 276 Mr. McKiNNEY. For instance, I am appalled that we have to do what we are supposed to do in 2 years. My question is probability or possibility after the slow start we had. Judge Griffin. Let me answer that, however, from the standpoint of what Hubert and I were doing. I don't know how the others felt. I think Arlen Specter, for example, may have felt comfortable with the time period. But Hubert and I, we had a completely, we had a scope of investigation that was as great as all the other people put together, because we were investigating a different murder. We had two people who were investigating a conspiracy from one man's point of view, and we had a security question, how did he get into the basement, and so forth. Hubert and I particularly felt that way. It may not have been valid for everybody else. Mr. McKiNNEY. I think Mr. Dodd has covered most of my material so I have no further questions. Mr. Fauntroy. Counsel may continue. Mr. Blakey. I would like to continue with the relationship be- tween the Warren Commission and both the CIA and FBI. Mr. Griffin, you have given us some indication of what the relation- ship between the Commission and the Bureau was, and an indication of what the attitude was betwfeen the Commission staff and the Bureau. What did you perceive the attitude to be between the FBI and the Warren Commission ? Judge Griffin. I didn't have any real factual basis for making any judgments about it. My perception just grew out of my past experi- ences. Ifelt that it is a big bureaucracy and most of the people I felt within the FBI functioned like a clerk in any other big organization, and they try to do their job and they try to not get in hot water with the boss and get egg over their face, and sometimes they have a couple of bosses, we being one and somebody else being another. Mr. Blakey. Did you have any day-to-day contacts with field agents ? Judge Griffin. Very limited. Day to day, I did not. I think, in fact I know, that Norman Kedlich worked closely with a couple of agents, but I did not. Mr. Blakey. Did you have any day-to-day contact with seat of government agencies ? Judge Gmffin. What do you mean by seat of government ? Mr. Blakey. Here in Washington, as opposed to field agents in Dallas or New Orleans. Judge Griffin. Did I personally ? Mr. Blakey. Yes. . Judge Griffin. No. Everything basically went out from us by way of written memorandum. Mr. Blakey. I would like to outline for you an incident that oc- curred that may be illustrative of the relationship between the Warren Commission and the Bureau, and ask you if you recall it and then comment on it. Kobert B. Gimberling, who was a special agent of the FBI, acted as coordinator of the FBI's investigation in Dallas. Gimberling's report dated December 23, 1963, which was submitted to the War- 277 ren Commission on January 13, 1964 and labeled as CD205, con- tained atranscription of Oswald's address book but omitted the name, address, telephone number, and car license number of Special Agent James B. Hosty. This is Gimberling's report dated February 11, 1964 submitted to the Warren Commission on February 24, 1964 and labeled CD385, which, however, contained the remaining contents of the ad- dress book including the Hosty entry. Judge Griffin. Kight. Mr. Blakey. Gimberling submitted the Commission an affidavit dated February 25, 1964, explaining the original omission. Special Agent John T. Hosty, who reviewed the similar transcript submitted a similar affidavit. Both affidavits explained that the omission re- flected Gimberling's instructions to the effect that Kesler was to ex- tract all names and telephone numbers the identity of which were unknown together with any other lead information. On this basis Special Agent Hosty's name was said to have been excluded because it was neither unknown nor lead information. Do you recall that incident ? Judge memorandum. Griffin. I recall the Hosty incident. I don't recall that Mr. Blakey. What effect, if any, did that incident have on the rela- tionship between the staff and the Bureau ? Judge Griffin. I think it established in our minds that we always had to be worried about them. Mr. Blakey. Do you think it led to any increased or decreased, or about the same, skepticism toward the investigation ? Judge Griffin. 1 think it increased. I think we never forgot that incident. We were always alert, we were concerned about the problem. Mr. Blakey. Was it discussed at the time among the staff attorneys? Judge Griffin. Yes, it was. There was a staff' meeting about it, as I recall. One of the few staff meetings I have a general recollection of at this point seems to me was one that Rankin called in which we were all brought in on this, and we were all told about the problem and once it had been discovered there was a discussion about whether our discovery should be revealed to the FBI and how should we proceed with it. Mr. Blakey. Would it be fair to characterize the incident then as perhaps producing a more healthy skepticism on the part of the staff and less trust of the Bureau ? Judge Griffin. I think that is right. Are you trying to contrast it to my earlier statement ? Mr. Blakey. Not necessarily. Would it be fair to say that the in- cident far from adversely affecting the quality of your investigation may have heightened it? Judge Griffin. No, I don't think that is true. Mr. Blakey. If it made you more skeptical and more probing would it help the investigation ? Judge Griffin. No, I don't think it did. The reason I say that is that I think it basically set the standard for the kind of judgment that was going to be made about how we were going to deal with these prob- lems, and the decision made there was that there was not going to be confrontation, they were going to be given an opportunity to explain 278 it. So the decision was really, as I recall, to go back and give them an opportunity to clean up their act rather than to carry on a secret in- vestigation that might be designed to lay a foundation for our fur- ther impeachment of them. Mr. Blakey. Let me outline for you another incident and ask you to comment on it. Sometime approximately 2 weeks before the assassination it is said that Lee Harvey Oswald left a note at the Dallas office of the FBI for Agent James B. Hosty. The receptionist who took the note has testi- fied that its contents were as follows : "Let this be a warning. I will blow up the FBI and the Dallas Police Department if you do not stop bothering my wife." Agent Hosty acknowledges, or has acknowledged, in testimony re- ceiving the note on the same day. He remembers it, however, as saying, ''If you have anything you want to learn about me come talk to me directly. If you don't cease bothering my wife I will take appropriate action and report this to proper authorities." Hosty put the note in his workbox and that on the evening of November 24, 1963, he was instructed by his superior, Gordon Shank- lin, who was the SAC in Dallas, to destroy the note and the memoran- dum he wrote discussing the note and his contact with Lee Harvey Oswald. Hosty destroyed both of them. When Hosty testified before the Warren Commission on May 5, 1964, at that time he made no mention of the note or its destruction because, he said, he had been instructed by the FBI, the seat of government personnel, not to volunteer any information. Were you aware of that incident in 1964 ? Judge Griffin. No. Mr. Blakey. Had you known of it in 1964 do you think it would have made any difference in how you conducted the investigation ? Judge Griffin. I don't know. I don't know how committed those who made policy were to the idea of avoiding confrontation. Mr. Blakey. Let me ask you one further matter in this regard. Judge Griffin. Let me say this : I think that the dynamics of the Commission, if there had been a second incident involving Hosty, the dynamics of the staff would have brought tremendous pressure out of the staff not to give Hosty a second chance and the Bureau a second chance on this. I don't know how it would have been resolved. Mr. Blakey. Mr. Griffin, you have indicated that you had general jurisdiction over Oswald's death and therefore Jack Ruby. Judge Griffin. Don't put it that way. It makes me sound like a conspirator. Mr. Blakey. Were you aware that the Bureau had administratively designated Ruby as a PCI — by PCI I mean a potential criminal in- formant— during the period March to October 1959 ? Judge Griffin. We were aware, it is my recollection at this point, and documents would be more accurate than my recollection — my recollection is that we were aware that Ruby had been contacted by the FBI and it had been hoped that he could provide them with infor- mation, that there were as many as six or seven contacts with him that produced any information. I can't say I had any familiarity with the label PCI. 279 Mr. Blakey. If you had known that administrative designation had been placed on liuby would it have made any dilierence on how you handled your investigation of him and his activities ? Judge Griffin. I don't Imow whether we would have then looked upon this as some— I don't know whether that would have given heightened aimportanc e to it or not. I don't know that labeling might have made dilterence. It might or might not have. Mr. Blakey. Let me turn now and ask you some questions about the relationship between the Warren Commission and the CIA. How would you characterize the general relationship between the Commission and the Agency? How would you characterize it? Judge Griffin. I don't know that I am in a position to say that. The only direct contact I ever remember with the CIA was at a meeting. It is my recollection that Helms and another person who was desig- nated as the liaison person were at a meeting with us. They were introduced and the discussion took place about what the formal rela- municatedought tionship with the or the nature of the relationship, how we com- to beCIA. After that I never spoke, to my recollection, with anyone from the CIA. Mr. Blakey. You indicated what the attitude of the staff was to- ward the FBI. Would you characterize for us what the attitude of the staff was toward the CIA ? Judge Griffin. You know, this is a very impressionistic thing I am going to say. If anybody on the staff has a different view their view is more accurate than mine, but my impression is that I for one trusted them. I guess I for one trusted them, I think. Mr. Blakey. Did you have much contact with agency personnel other than this one meeting where you met with Mr. Helms and Mr. LaRocca? Judge Griffin. After their failure to respond to us m the inquiry that Hubert and I directed toward them, and after they finally did respond with basically an answer that they didn't have any informa- tion that we didn't have already, I was skeptical but I won't go so far as to say I distrusted them. Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could have the Clerk mark four specific items, a note of March 14, 1964 with the initials HPW on it; a memo of February 24, 1964, Hubert and Griffin to Helms, re Ruby background ; three, a letter from Rankin of May 19, 1964 to Helms, re Ruby, and a memo from Mr. Karamessines of September 15, 1964 to Mr. Rankin, re Ruby, as JFK exhibit No. 62. Will the Clerk show the exhibit to the witness ? Mr. Griffin, are you familiar with these materials ? Judge Griffin. Yes, I am. Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we can incorporate the material in the record at this point so I can ask some questions of the witness. Mr. Fauntroy. Without objection it is so ordered. [The documents referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 62 and re- ceived for the record, follow :] 280 JFK Exhibit No. 62 y\^ ^- 'v GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION ROUTING SLIP RIO TO I CO Rl R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 Q AllOTMENT SYMftOV n HANDLE DIREa Q READ AND DESTROY Q APPROVAL O IMMEDIATE ACTION Q RECOAAMENDATION D AS REQUESTED □ INniAlS D CONCURRENCE D NECESSARY ACTION D SEE ME O SIGNATURE Q CORREOION Q NOTE AND RETURN O YOUR COMMENT □ FILING □ PER OUR CONVERSATION O YOUR INFORMATION O FULL REPORT D PER TELEPHONE CONVERSATION D □ ANSV/ER OR ACKNOWl- EDGE ON OR BEFORE _ D THE PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF . REMARKS juu^ R5 RIO R2 R3 FROM CO Rl R6 R7 R8 R4 NAME AND/OR SYMBOL BUILDING, ROOM. ETC. DATE R9 , / TELEPHONE fro : ttti o— •SSI4S GSA FEB FORM62 14 281 [Memorandum] Febkuaby 24, 1964. To : Richard Helms, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency. From : Leon D. Hubert and Burt W. Griflin, Staff Members, President's Commis- sion on the Assassination of President Kennedy. Subject : Jack Ruby — Bacliground, Friends and other Pertinent Information. A. BACKGBOUND ON JACK RUBY Jack Ruby was born on about March 25, 1911, in the United States, the fifth of eight living children of Joseph and Fannie Rubenstein. Three other children are : Hyman Rubenstein, born December 1911, in Poland ; Ann Rubenstein Vol- port, born June 1904, Poland; Marion, a.k.a. Marian, Rubenstein Carroll, born June 1906, in United States; Eva Rubenstein (Magid) Grant, born in United States, 1909; Sam Rubenstein) Ruby, born December 1912 in United States; Earl (Rubenstein) Ruby, born April 1916 in the United States ; and Eileen Ruben- stein Keminsky, born July 1917 in United States. Jack and his brothers, Sam and Earl, were known by the name Rubenstein until that name was legally changed by each of them in approximately 1947 or 1948. Ruby's father, Joseph, was born in Sokolov, Sedlits Province, Poland on Feb- ruary 2, 1871. He served in the Russian Army Artillery from 1893 to 1898. He married Fannie (Turrell) Rutkowski in 1901. Fannie was bom in 1875, one of seven children of a reportedly prosperous Polish physician. At least two of Fannies sisters together with her parents remained in Poland. One brother reportedly came to the United States. Joseph also had at least one brother who came to the United States. We have no evidence as to any other family members of either Joseph or Fannie who remained in Europe. Mor have we any information concerning family ties maintained with relatives or friends in Europe. Jack Ruby spent his early life in Chicago, quitting school at approximately sixteen, and beginning to work thereafter as a ticket scalper and peddler of cheap merchandise. In 1933, he traveled to Los Angeles and remained there and in San Francisco until sometime in 1937. His sister, Eva, accompanied him to San Francisco, and lived with him for most of the time that he was there. Both worked as sellers of subscriptions for daily newspapers in San Francisco. Jack also had employment selling a horse race "tip sheet" and linoleum. Jack was known both by his Chicago and west coast friends as "Sparky" Rubenstein. Jack Ruby returned to Chicagio sometime in 1937 and was employed for un- determined periods of time by the Stanley Oliver Co. and the Spartan Co. We have no further information concerning those companies. He also continued to engage in ticket scalping, the sale of cheap merchandise, and the sale of punch boards. The punch board operation involved traveling throughout New England and the Eastern Seaboard including Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. Sometime between 1937 and mid-1940, Ruby was employed as an organizer and in other undisclosed capacities for the Waste and Material Handlers Federal Union in Chicago. Paul Dorman later became head of this union. At the time of Ruby's association with the union, the President was Jack Martin, another prin- cipal figure was an attorney, Leon Cooke. Cooke was shot by Martin in an argu- ment in December 1939, and died as a result thereof in January 1940. Shortly thereafter, Ruby left the union. Jack Ruby served in the United States Army Air Force from May 1943 to Feb- ruary 1946. He was stationed the entire time in the United States, obtained the rank of Private First Class, and had Army Serial Number 36666107. After leaving military service, he was Employed for approximately one year with Earl Products Co., a Chicago based business jointly owned with his brothers. Earl and Sam Ruby. His brothers became dissatisfied with him because he allegedly was not devoting full time to that business. As a result, they bought out his interest in 1947. We do not have precise information as to what Jack Ruby was doing while he was also employed with Earl Products ; however, he is rumored to have frequented and been employed at various Chicago area night clubs in the capacity of a bouncer or other minor functionary. In early 1947, he went to Dallas, Texas, to manage the Singapore Supper Club, a business in which his sister, Eva Grant, was engaged. He returned to Chicago sometime in the late summer or early fall of 1947. At about this same time, he became the subject of a narcotics investigation along with his brother, Hyman, 282 and Paul Roland Jones. Both Hyman and Jack disclaimed any knowledge of Jones' activity in narcotics and were not prosecuted. Jones was prosecuted and convicted by federal authorities. Sometime in late 1947, after having been interrogated by Narcotics Agents, Ruby returned to Dallas and established permanent residence. He continued to operate the Singapore Supper Club with Eva until sometime in 1948 when she moved to Caiiioiuia ana aiune lor an unuisciosed period thereafter. At some undisclosed point, Ruby changed the name of the Singapore Supper Club to the Silver Spur. He no longer operates that club. He eventually purchased the Vegas Club and operated it with Eva after early 1959. In 1960, he purchased the Sovereign Club, changed the name to the Carousel Club, and continued to operatfe it and the Vegas Club until his arrest on November 24, 1963. Both the Vegas Club and the Carousel Club have been put under management other than the Ruby family since Ruby's arrest. Ruby is considered to be a highly emotional person. He speaks with a lisp, has been described as soft spoken, is generally well mannered and w^ell dressed, but is given to sudden and extreme displays of temper and violence. He is known to hav"e brutally beaten at least 25 different persons either as a result of a personal encounter or because they were causing disturbances in his club. The normal pattern is for Ruby to attack his victims without warning, and few of the beatings of which we have knowledge seem to be the result of prolonged argu- ments. After many of these assaults, Ruby is known to have apologized to the victim. Ruby is known to have a strong affection for dogs and a great pride in physical fitness. He has owned as many as seven dogs at one time, and one person has stated that he cared more for his dogs then he cared for people. At various times during his life, he is known to have worked out regularly at the YMCA or other gymnasiums, and he is reported to have owned and kept in his apartment a ^t of barbells during recent years. He neither smokes, nor drinks, and curses rarely. He is said to have effeminate mannerisms and is alleged by some to be homo- sexual. However, there is no direct evidence of any homosexual behavior. Al- though he has never been married, he is known to have dated and at one time was known as a "ladies man." In recent years, some of the women toward whom he has shown interest have indicated that he had perverted attitudes toward sex. One male witness describes an occasion when he masturbated one of his dogs and apparently derived great pleasure from it. Ruby's friends and close associates are detailed more fully in a subsequent section. To generalize, it can be said that, while living in Dallas, Ruby has very carefully cultivated friendships with police officers and other public officials. At the same time, he was, peripherally, if not directly connected with members of the underworld. The narcotics episode mentioned above concerning Paul Roland Jones is representative. Ruby is also rumored to have been the tip-off man be- tween the Dallas police and the Dallas underworld, especially in regard to en- forcement ofthe local liquor laws. Ruby is said to have been given advance notice of prospective police raids on his own club and other clubs. However, it must be emphasized that such allegations are in the rumor category. Ruby apparently did not permit prostitution to be carried on in his clubs ; nonetheless, his associations with stripteasers and cheap entertainers brought him into constant contact with people of questionable reputation. Ruby operated his business on a cash basis, keeping no record whatsoever — a strong indication that Ruby himself was in- volved in illicit operations of some sort. When it suited his own purposes, he did not hesitate to call on underworld characters for assistance. For example, shortly prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, Ruby was involved in a dispute with the American Guild of Variety Artists (AGVA) concerning the use of amateur stripteasers in Dallas. Ruby claimed that AGVA was permitting his competitor to use amateurs but denying him that privilege. When he was unable to get satisfaction from AGVA, Ruby called Barney Baker, a Chicago hoodlum who was reputedly a muscle man for Jimmy Hoffa and had been released from prison in June 1963, to ask Baker to give him assistance in his dispute with AGVA. For the same purpose, Ruby also called Frank Goldstein, a San Francisco gambler, who was a friend of his sister, Eva Grant. Ruby is not known to have been politically active. He is reported to have been a Democrat and an admirer of President Kennedy and President Roosevelt, how- ever, the evidence on this is not sufficiently reliable to warrant a firm conclusion. 283 Prior to "World War II, lie was a member of a vigilante group which, physically interfered with meetings of the German-American Bund in an area of Chicago known as White City. Ruby's group was known as the Dave Miller gang, but we have no evidence to indicate whether this group was simply made up of aggres- sive young men who were looking for trouble and were from the Jewish neigh- borhood in which Ruby lived or whether it was an organized group with a strong political basis. He is not known to have engaged in any political activities in Dallas. At the time of his arrest, Ruby was found in possession of various radio scripts issued by H. L. Hunt, a prominent American right wing extremist. There is insufficient evidence as to how these radio scripts came into Ruby's possession, their content and Ruby's reaction to them to be able to pass judgment on the relationship of Ruby to any right wing groups. In about 1959, Ruby became interested in the possibility of selling war mate- rials to Cubans and in the possibility of opening a gambling casino in Havana. He was in contact at that time with a friend, Lewis .J. McWillie. Insufficient evidence is available on that episode to evaluate Ruby's connection with any Cuban (anti-Castro or pro-Castro) groups. Ruby is also rumored to have met in Dallas with an American Army Colonel (LXU) and some Cubans concerning the sale of arms. A Government informant in Chicago connected with the sale of arms to anti-Castro Cubans has reported that such Cubans were behind the Kennedy assassination and was financed by Jewish interests. Religiously. Ruby is Jewish. He was not a I'egular attender at the Synagogue, although he did attend the services on high holidays. We have no information as to whether or not Ruby observed any particular Jewish customs in his home or was active in Jewish lay organizations. Nonetheless, it is established that Ruby was very sensitive to anti-Semitism and to his position in Dallas as a Jew. On balance, it may be said that Ruby's primary interest in life was making money. He does not seem to have had any great scruples concerning the manner in which he might do soj howt'ver, he has usually been careful to avoid prosecu- tion by law enforcement authorities. This care did not necessarily involve avoid- ing violations of the law although there is no evidence that he did commit any flagrant legal violations. His primary technique in avoiding prosecution was the maintenance of friendship with police officers, public officials, and other in- fluential persons in the Dallas community. Ruby appears to be the kind of person who could be persuaded by another person whom he respected (either because of that person's friendship, influence, power, prestige or wealth) to become involved in any activity which was not obviously contrary to the interest of the United States. No one who knows Ruby has indicated that he was politically sophisticated, and some have commented that he was devoid of political ideas to the point of naivete. It is possible that Ruby could have been utilized by a politically motivated group either upon the promise of money or because of the influential character of the individual approaching Ruby. If he is a deviate, blackmail is also possible. B. The Following Groups axd Places Were Signific.\nt in Looking for Ties Between Ruby and Others Who IVIight Have Been Interested in the Assassination of President Kennedy 1. The Teamsters Union. Ruby's old union, the Waste Handlers in Chicago, is now a part of the Teamsters. Ruby had a contact with Barney Baker, reputed to be close to Hoffa. Ruby also frequented the Cabana Motel in Dallas, alleged to have been built with Teamster money. 2. The Las Vegas gambling community. Ruby was particularly close to Lewis J. McWillie of Las Vegas. 3. Persons involved in the promotion of fad items. Ruby himself was at- tempting to sell an item known as a "twist board." in the fall of 19G3 and has often been involved in the sale of gimmick-type items. 4. Persons connected with cheap nightclub entertainment. 5. The Dallas Police Department. 6. The Dallas news media, with particular emphasis on entertainment column- ists and persons employed at radio station KLIF. 7. The following geographical areas : a. Chicago b. Denver c. Milwaukee 43-819—79 19 2S4 d. Minneapolis e. New York f. Los Angeles g. San Francisco ii. New Orleans 1. Gulf Coast areas (Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida) S. Places frequented by Ruby in Dallas : a. Adelphus Hotel b. Cabana Motel c. Egyptian Lounge d. Sol's Turf Bar. e. Bull Pen Drive-in. f. Vegas Club. g. Carousel Club. C. The Following Peksons Seem, at This Writing, To Be the Most Promising Sources of Contact Between Ruby and Politically Motivated Groups Interested in Securing the Assassination of President Kennedy 1. Family members a. Eva Grant, born and reared in Chicago, 1900 to 1933. Lived in San Francisco 1!>,33 to 1937 and 1948 to 1959. Known to be in Chicago August 1937 and January 1938. Lived in Dallas approximately 1942 to 1948 and 1959 to present. Married aliout 1930 to Hyman Magid, divorced about 1932. One son. Ronald Dennis Magid, l)orn 1931. Married Frank Grant, aka Frank Granovsky, in San Francisco, 1930. Lived with him about six months, divorced about 1940. Friendships with Frank Goldstein, San Francisco gambler and Paul Roland Jones, convicted in Dallas about 1948 for narcotics violations. While living in Dallas, engaged in exiwrt and import of raw materials and managed night clubs. b. Earl Ruby, born, Chicago, about April 1916, lived in Chicago until 1961. U.S. Navy 1942 to 1944. Sold punch boards on East Coast with brother Jack in early 1940's. Owner and manager of Earl Products, 1944 to 1961. Nervous breakdown 1961. Moved to Detroit and opened Cobo Cleaners in 1961. Telephone records show telegram of undisclosed nature to Havana, Cuba, April 1. 1962. telephone call to Ansan Tool Manufacturing Company, 4750 North Ronald, Chicago, Illinois, owned by Anrei and Mario Umberto, and to Dominico Scorta, 102 West Grant, Chicago," in all casesIllinois. Also nocalls unknown, to Welsh further Candy Company. investigation of the call Nature of telephone as yet has calls been initiated. o. A)ma Volperf, sister of Jack Ruby, born June 1904 in Poland. Remained in Chicago until early 1930's. Sometime after 1937 hut before 1939 moved to Youngs- town, Ohio. Resided in Youngstown, with husband until 1959. Husband was en- gaged in a company known as National Home Improvement Company. 2. Clone friends a. Andrew Armstrong, Ruby's Man Friday at the Carousel Club. Resident of Dallas, background unknown, Negro. b. Ralph Paul. Resident of Arlington, Texas, bom New York City. About .55 years old, came to Dallas about 1948. Owns Bull Pen Drive-in Restaurant in Fort Worth. Co-owner with Ruby of the Carousel Club. c. George Senator, roommate of Jack Ruby. Background unknown. ,'?. Other associates and employees a. Barney Baker, Chicago hoodlum. Reported muscle man for Jimmy Hoffa. Re- quested by Ruby in mid-November of 1963 to assist him in dispute with AGVA. b. Karen Bennett Carlin. employed by Ruby as strip-teaser under name of Little Lynn. Borrowed .$5 from Ruby on Saturday night. November 23, telephoned Kuliy Sunday morning, November 24, and says she requested him to send her .$25. Mrs." Marguerite Bennett when sheOswald (Mrs. (mother Oswald) ofwas I^ee employed Oswald) believes that shein knew as a waitress a Carol Dallas. Mrs. Oswald claims that Carol Bennett was the daughter of a Dallas hoodlum who was murdered in a gangland slaying. No information as to whether or not Karen BeuHf^tt Carlin and Carol Bennett are the same person or are related. c. Brtice Carlin, husband of Karen Bennett Carlin. '1. Curtis Lavcrne Craford, aka Larry Craford. About 22 years old. itinerant laborer. Worked for Ruby at the Carousel Club from about October 31. 1903 to Xoveiiiber 23. 1963. Became close confidant of Ruby. Fled Dallas area Saturday, November 23. Located in rural part of Michigan, November 28. 2So e. Robert Cravens, age uukuown. Resident of Los Angeles. Friend of Ruby's. Came to Dallas about October 1, 19C3, to operate a show at the Dallas State Fair called How Hollywood Makes Movies. Called Ruby In November 1963 with i-espect to the sale of some lumber. No other information concerning Cravens. f. Leopold Ramon Duces, life was threatened by a person suggesting that the same group that would kill Duces had been responsible for getting rid of Kennedy, Name "Leopoldo"' has been mentioned by others who claim that Ruby was associated with an anti-Castro group in the procurement of arms. Name "Leo- poldo" also mentioned by a woman in Dallas who claims she was introduced to a "Leon Oswald," description fitting Lee Harvey Oswald, in October 1963 by anti- Castro Cuban leaders. g. Frank Goldstein, age unknown. San Francisco gambler. Friend of Evn. Grant. Requested by Ruby in November 1963 to assist him in his difiiculties with AGVA. h. Sam Gordon, west coast resident. Friend of Ruby from childhood in Chicago. Reportedly purchased sixty-first home run ball from Mickey Mantle. General background and connections unknown. i. Alex Gruier, resident of Los Angeles. Friend of Ruby. Visited him in Dallas in November 1963. Received telephone call from Ruby on Friday after the assas- sination of President Kennedy. j. Thomas Resides Hill, name found in Ruby's notebook. Official of John Birch Society. in Massachusetts. k. H. L. Hunt and Lamar Hunt, may be same person. Name Lamar Hunt found in notebook of Ruby. Ruby visited his office on November 21. Hunt denies 'knowing Ruby. Ruby gives innocent explanation. Ruby found with literature of H. L. Hunt after shooting Oswald. 1. Lewis J. McWilUc. operates Las Vegas gambling casino. Formerly employed lat gambling casino in Havana. Ruby visited him in Havana. Ruby also purchased aWillie gun forgiveMcWillie innocent and had it mailed explanations to McWillie of their in Las Vegas. Ruby and 'Mc- relationship. m. Barney Ross, former professional prize fighter. Former narcotics addict. Long itinie friend of Rul)y from Chicago days. Ruby visited him at least once a year and telephones him two or three times a year. n. Amesi and Mario Umherto, owners of Ansen Tool Manufacturing Company in Chicago. In telephone communication with Earl Ruby. 0. Billy Joe Willis, musician employed by Ruby at Carousel Club. Lives in Irving, Texas, across the street from Mrs. Ruth Paine (Friend at whose home Marina Oswald resided). May Id, 1964. Mr. Richard Helms, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, Wasliington, D.C. Dear Mr. Helms : At a meeting on March 12, 1964, between representatives of your Agency and this Commission, a memorandum prepared by members of the Commission staff was handed to you which related to the background of Jack L. Ruby and alleged associates and/or activities in Cuba. At that time we requested that you review this memorandum and submit to the Commission any informa- tion contained in your files regarding the matters covered in the memorandum, as well be usefulastoany the other analysis by your I'epresenta fives which you believed might Commission. As you know, this Commission is nearing the end of its investigation. We would appreciate hearing from you as soon as possible whether you are in a position to comply with this request in the near future. Sincerely, J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel. Memorandum for : Mr. J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel, President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. Subject: Information Concerning Jack Ruby (aka Jack Rubenstein) and his Associates. 1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 19 May 1964, requesting that this Agency and furnish any information in its files relative to Jack Ruby, his^activities his associates. 286 2. Tliis memorandum will coufirm our earlier statement to the Commission to the effect that au examination of Central Intelligence Agency tiles has produced no information on Jack Ruby or his activities. The Central Intelligence Agency has no indication that Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald ever knew each other, were associated, or might have been connected in any manner. 3. The records of this Agency were reviewed for information about the rela- tives, friends and associates of Ruby named in your summary of his background. Our records do not reflect any information pertaining to these persons. Thomas H. Kakamessines, Acting Deputy Director for Flans. Mr. Blakey. Jud^e Griffin, let me direct your attention to the date on the memorandum prepared by yourself and Mr. Hubert, February 24, 1!JG4, and the date and the routing slip that has Mr. Willens' ini- tials, March 12, 1964. Do you know why there was a 16-day delay in Mr. Willens' com- municating this material to the CIA 'i ;Mr. Ulakey. .Was Judge Griffin No, it.1 don't. usual or unusual for him to do something by direct communication as o]3posed to mail^ The note, of course, indi- cates that the proposed letter which accompanied tlie memorandum was not sent, rattier that it was pliysically handed to the agency representative. J udge Griffin. I don't know what their procedure was or, indeed, whether they used couriers rather than mail. I really don't know how things went out. ]Mr. Bi^vKEY. Let me direct your attention as well to the fourth item, the memo of JNIr. Karamessines of ^September 15, 1964, to Mr. Kankin. 1 take it this is the answer to the oral request of Mr. Willens of March 12, 1964. Do you know why it took from March to September, some 7 months, to answer the questions raised in your memorandum of November 24^ Judge Griffin. I can only speculate. Mr. Blakey. Were you ever told why it took that long ? Judge Griffin. Never. ^Ir. Blakey. VV^as this kind of delay typical in getting a response from a Government agency ^ Judge Griffin. I don't believe we ever had a delay of this magnitude about anything else. ^Ir. Blakey. Could it have been that kind of delay that would have been a factor contributing to your inability to make the deadlines that were being set for you by the Chief Justice and others in your investigation oi Jack Kuby ^ Judge Griffin. No. You are really asking me the question that goes back to some other memos that aren't in the record at this point, and what liax)pened to the investigations that Hubert and I had suggested be Mr. conducted, Blakey.andWewhywillthey get weren't to some conducted. of that later on. I am wondering now about the relationship between the Agency and your own concerns. Judge Griffin. The reason it took us so long to do the job was that it was a tremendous amount of work. That was the starting point. The other question about why we weren't allowed — I won't say we w^eren't allowed — why we got the reaction we did get with respect to certain of our suggested investigations, whatever underlies the delay 287 in this memorandum mayia underlie— may, I ani not certain— may un- derlie some of tl t. . . . , I suspect that within the whole vast apparatus of mvestigation that was g-oing on it went far beyond the Commission, but even within the Commission different considerations may have affected different peo- ple who made decisions. What affected Howard Willens might be very different from what affected Lee Eankin or what affected the Chief Justice. - ^ . Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn from the relation- ship between the Warren Commission and the Bureau and Agency and ask some specific questions about the character of the investigation itself. . 1 ^ Judge, you previously testified in response to questions by Congress- man Dodd and Congressman McKinney that you were undercertain political pressures, and I don't mean political pressure in a pejorative desire to allay public sense,tion ain national fears, perhaps to work at a smooth transi- leadership. Certainly this would be in the context of the political conventions. Let me asli you some specific questions in regard to a perhaps less at- tractive motivation, for limiting your investigation. I hope you wiH bear with me if I ask you a series of questions which may sound like a strike force attorney asking hard questions of a witness. To your knowledge did the Chief Justice have any information while iie was serving with the Warren Commission against concerning any in- volvement of U.S. intelligence agencies in plots Cuba or to assassinate Fidel Castro ? Judge GmFriN. I have no direct knowledge on that. Mr. Blakey. That he had knowledge ? Judge Griffin. I have no direct information. ; ]\Ir. Blakey. Do you have any indirect information ? Judge Griffin. Nothing that would be information. I only have my speculations. Mr. Blakey. To your knowledge did any other commissioner liave such information while he was serving with the Warren Commission? Judge Griffin. I have no knowledge that anj^body would have. All I have is speculations. Mr. Blakey. The point of time that I am directing your attention to is while you were serving on the Warren Commission. Judge Griffin. Right. Mr. Blakey. To your knowledge did any stn.ff member have any such information while he was serving with the Warren Commission ? Judge Griffin. Not to my knowledge. IMr. Blakey. In retrospect was there any conduct on the part of the Chief Justice from which you could or did infer that he had such information ? Judge Griffin. Tell me again what information you are asking me about. Mr. Blakey. This goes to wliether the Chief Justice or other people in leadership capacity were aware of any involvement of U.S. inteh ligence agencies in plots against Cuba or to assassinate Fidel Castro. The question now is whether in retrospect there was any conduct on the part of the Chief Justice from whicli you could have or did infer that he had such information. 2SS Judge Griffix. The only statement that he made in retrospect from which any inference — there are two statements from which one could make any kind of inference about what he knew about national secu- rity problems. One was his statement to us that we did not handle this in a responsible way, and I think my characterization has to be against the background of the fear of McCarthyism; that we didn't handle what we found in a responsible wa}^, we could trigger a thermonuclear war. I remember that pliraseologj', thermonuclear war, being used. I don't know whether I heard the Chief Justice say that directly or was told it by Mr. Kankin he had said that. Mr. Blakey. Did he ever explain to you or did anyone else explain to you what he meant b}' "handle in a responsible way"? Judge Griffin. I am certain this all came up in the context of pro- tecting confidences, not leaking things to the press and maintaining tlie internal security of our own investigation. That is the area in wliich you have to review that. The other thing was the statement that I was quoted in the press as making, that there might be materials that the Commission had which couldn't be revealed for some extended period of time. I don't remember whether it was 50 years or what the period of time was. Frankly, that statement also surprised me, even at the time, because there was nothing that I saw in my judgment that couldn't have been revealed the minute we concluded our report, with one exception, which I always understood, which had to do with the autopsy photographs, had nothing to do with national security but had to do with personal factors surrounding the Kennedy family. But I never saw any investi- gative information that in my view justified any secrecy whatsoever. ]\rr. Blakey. In retrospect was there any conduct on the part of any other Commissioner, that is, other than Chief Justice Warren, from which you could have or did infer that that Commissioner had such information ? Judge Griffin-. Not at the time. ZJr. Blakey. In retrospect was there any conduct on the part of any staff member from which you could have or did infer that he had such information or she had such information ? Judge Griffix. No, not at the time, nor is there any conduct that I can think of that would fall in that category.* ]Mr. Blakey. ^^^lile you served with the Commission did you see any document from which you could have or did infer that the Chief Justice or any other Commissioner or any staff member had such information ? Judge Griffix. Never. IMr. Blakey. Were you ever present during a discussion from which you could have or did infer that the Chief Justice or any other Com- mis ioner, or any staff member, had such information ? Judge Griffix. No. INIr. Blakey. Were you ever instructed by ajiyone, including the Chief Justice or any other Commissioner or any staff member, while you were serving on the Warren Commission, not to pursue any ai'ea of inquiry? Judge Grifftx. I was never instructed not to pursue an area of in- qniry. Some of the ways we went about opening up areas of inquiry, 289 since we had limited resources and were under time pressures, required permission, pennission to subpena witnesses to travel, and we needed to clear all requests for information to an agency through the adminis- trative hierarchy of the Commission. I don't recall, I can't at this point remember if any specific inquiry that we ever sent to an agency was blocked within the Commission. But there were areas of investigation and methods of investigation that we wanted to pursue that were turned down. ^Ir. BlakjEY. Did anyone ever suggest to you that certain matters should not be explored as opposed to instructing you not to do it ? Judge GRirriN. In a substantive sense, no, that was never done. It all had to do with the method of investigation. ]Mr. Blakey. Let me turn now from the general question of political pressure and talk to you a little bit about the time pressures that you were under at that time. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could have the clerk mark the memo of Hubert and Griffin, dated May 14, 1964, re the adequacy of the Euby investigation, as JFK exhibit No. 63. Mr. Fauntroy. Without objection. Mr. Blakey. Would the clerk show the memo to the witness. Judge Grifein". I have a copy of it. ]Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we can have that memo incorporated in the record at this point in order that I can ask some questions based on it. Mr. Fauntroy. Without objection it is so ordered. [The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 63 and received for the record, follows :] JFK Exhibit No. 63 [Memorandum] May 14, 1964. To : J. Lee Rankin. From : Leon D. Hubert. .Jr., Burt W. Griffin. Subject : Adequacy of Ruby Investigation. 1. Past EecommendaUons. — In memoranda data February 19, February 24, February 27, and March 11, we made various suggestions for extending the in- vestigation initiated by the FBI in connection with the Oswald homicide. Shortly after March 11, 1964. we began preparation for the nearly 60 depositions taken in Dallas during the period March 21-April 2 ; after we returned from Dallas we took the deposition of C. L. Crafard (two days) and George Senator (two days) worked on editing the depositions taken in Dallas, and prepared for another series of 30 other depositions taken in Dallas during the period April 13-17. On our return from Dallas we continued the editing of the Dallas depositions, pre- pared the Dallas deposition exhibits for publication, and began working on a draft of the report in Area V. As a consequence of all of this activity during the period March 11-May 13, we did not press for the conferences and discussions referred to in the attached memoranda. The following represents our view at this time with respect to appropriate further investigation. 2. General {Statement of Areas Not Adequately Investigated. — In reporting on the murder of Lee Oswald by Jack Ruby we must answer or at least advert to these questions : (a) Why did Ruby kill Oswald ; (b) Was Ruby associated with the assassin of President Kennedy; (c) Did Ruby have any confederates in the murder of Oswald? It is our belief that although the evidence gathered so far does not show a conspiratorial link between Ruby and Oswald or between Ruby and others, nevertheless evidence should be secured, if possible, to affirmatively exclude that: 290 (a) Ruby was indirectly linked through others to Oswald ; (b) Ruby killed Oswald, because of fear ; or (c) Ruby killed Oswald at the suggestion of others. 3, Summary of Evidence Suggesting Further Investigation.— The following facts suggest the necessity of further investigation : a. Ruby had time to engage in substantial activities in addition to the man- agement of his Clubs. Ruby's night club business usually occupied no more than five hours of a normal working day which began at about 10 :00 a.m. and ended at 2 :00 a.m. It was his practice to spend an average of only one hour a day at his Clubs between 10 :00 a.m. and 9 :00 p.m. Our depositions were confined primarily to persons familiar with Ruby's Club activities. The FBI has thoroughly inves- tigated Ruby's night club operations but does not seem to have pinned down his other business or social activities. The basic materials do make reference to such other activities (see p. 27 of our report of February 18), but these are casual and collateral and were not explored to determine whether they involved any underlying sinister purposes. Nor were they probed in such a manner as to per- mit a determination as to how much of Ruby's time they occupied. has always been a person who looked for money-making "sidelines." In &.theRuby two months prior to November 22, Ruby supposedly spent considerable time promoting an exercise device known as a "twist board." The "twist board"' was purportedly manufactured by Plastellite Engineering, a Fort Worth manufac- turer of oil field equipment which has poor credit references and was the subject of an FBI investigation in 1952. We know of no sales of this item by Ruby; nor do we know if any "twist boards" were manufactured for sale. The possibil- ity remains that the "twist board" was a front for some other illegal enterprise. c. Ruby has long been close to persons pursuing illegal activities. Although Ruby had no known ideological or political interests (see p. 35 of our report of February 18), there is much evidence that he was interested in Cuban matters. In early 1959, Ruby inquired concerning the smuggling of persons out of Cuba. He has admitted that, at that time, he negotiated for the sale of jeeps to Castro. In September 1959. Ruby visited Havana at the invitation of Las Vegas rack- eteer, Louis J. McWillie, who paid Ruby's expenses for the trip and who was later expelled from Cuba by Castro. McWillie is described by Ralph Paul, Ruby's business partner, as one of Ruby's closest friends. Ruby mailed a gun to Mc- Willie in early 1963. In 1961. it is reported that Ruby attended three meetings in Dallas in comiection with the sale of arms to Cubans and the smuggling out of refugees. The informant identifies an Ed Brunner as Ruby's associate in this endeavor. Shortly after his arrest on November 24, Ruby named Fred Brenner as one of his expected attorneys. Brunner did not represent Ruby, however. Insufficient investigation has been conducted to confirm or deny the report about meetings in 1961. When Henry Wade announced to the Press on Novemlier 22. 1963 that Oswald was a member of the Free Cuba Committee, Ruby corrected Wade by stating "Not the Free Cuba Committee ; The Fair Play for Cuba Com- mittee. There is a difference." The Free Cuba Committee is an existing anti- Castro organization. Earl Ruby, brother of Jack Ruby, sent an unexplained telegram to Havana in April 1962. We believe that a reasonable possibility exists that Ruby has maintained a close interest in Cuban affairs to the extent necessary to participate in gun sales or smuggling. d. Bits of evidence link Ruby to others who may have been interested in Cuban affairs. When Ruby's car was seized on November 24, it contained various right-wing radio scripts issued by H. L. Hunt and a copy of the Wall Street Journal bearing the mailing address of a man who has not yet been identified. In May 1963, Earl Ruby, operator of a dry cleaning business, is known to have telephoned the Welch Candy Company (owned by the founder of John Birch Society). The purpose of the call is unknown. Jack Ruby's personal notebook contained the Massachusetts telephone number and address of Thomas Hill, former Dallas resident, working at the Boston headquarters of the John Birch Society. Although it is most likely that all of those bits of circumstantial evi- dence have innocent explanations, none has yet been explained. e. Although Ruby did not witness the motorcade through Dallas, he may have had a prior interest in the President's visit. A November 20 edition of the Fort AVorth Telegram showing the President's proposed route through Fort Worth, and the November 20 edition of the Dallas Morning News showing the Presi- dent's route through Dallas, were found in Ruby's car on November 24. 291 /. On November 16 Jack Ruby met at the Carousel Club with Bertha Cheek, sister of Mrs. Earleiie Roberts, manager of Lee Oswald's rooming house. Mrs. Cheek said that she and Ruby discussed her lending Ruby money to open a new night club. Ruby was not questioned about this mattei-. On November 20, 1963, a woman who may be identical to Earlene Roberts, was reported to be in San Antonio at the intime Mvft. Roberts San ofAntonio President has Kennedy's not been visit. checkedThe out. possible identification In addition, of the link formed by Mrs. Roberts between Oswald and Ruby is buttressed in some measure by the fact that one of Ruby's strippers dated a tenant of the Beckley Street rooming house during the tenancy of Lee Oswald. We have previously sug- gested the theory that Ruby and Mrs. Cheek could have been involved in Cuban arms sales of which Oswald gained knowledge through his efforts to infiltrate the anti-Castro Cubans. Our doubts concerning the real interest of Mrs. Cheek in Jack Ruby stem from the fact that one of her four husbands was a convicted felon and one of her friends was a police ofKcer v.ho married one of Ruby's strip-tease dancers. We have suggested that Ruby might have killed Oswald out of fear that Oswald might implicate Ruby and his friends falsely or not in an effort to save his own life. We think that neither Oswald's Cuban interests in Dallas nor Ruby's Cuban activities have been adequately explored. ff. Ruby made or attempted to make contacts on November 22 and 23 with persons, known and unknown, who could have been co-cons-pirators. Ruby w^as visited in Dallas from November 21 to November 24, 1963 by Lawrence Meyers of Chicago. Meyers had visited Ruby two weeks previously. Ruby also made a long distance call shortly after the President's death to Alex Gruber in Los Angeles. Gruber had visited Ruby about the same time as Meyers in early November. Both Gruber and Meyers give innocent explanations. Meyers claims he was in Dallas enjoying life with a '"dumb but accommodating broad." Gruber claims Ruby called to say he would not mail a dog that day, as he had promised to do. Finally between 11 :35 p.m. and 12 midnight, Saturday, November 23. Ruby made a series of brief long distance phone calls culminating with a call to entertainer Breck Wall at a friend's house in Galveston. Wall claims Ruby called to compliment him for calling off his (Wall's) act at the Adolphus Hotel in Dallas. Background checks have not been made on these persons. 7(. In short, we believe tliat the possibility exists, based on evidence already available, that Ruby was involved in illegal dealings with Cuban elements who might have had contact with Oswald. The existence of such dealings can only be surmised since the present investigation has not focused on that area. (. We suggest that these matters cannot be left "hanging in the air." They must either be explored further or a firm decision must be made not to do so supported by stated reasons for the decision. As a general matter, we think the investigation deficient in these respects : (1) Substantial November time-segments 22 have not in Ruby's been accounted for. daily routine from September 26 to (2) About 46 persons who saw Ruby from November 22 to November 24 have not been questioned by stafC members, although there are FBI reports of inter- views with all these people. (3) Persons who have been interviewed because of known associations with Ruby generally have not been investigated themselves so that their truthful- ness can be evaluated. The FBI reports specifically do not attempt evaluation. The exception has been that where the FBI has been given incriminating evi- dence against Ruby, it has made further investigation to determine whether others might also be implicated with Ruby. In every case where there was some evidence implicating others, those other persons were interviewed and denied the incriminating allegations. Further investigation has not been undertaken to resolve the conflicts. (4) Much of our knowledge of Ruby comes from his friends Andrew Arm- strong. Ralph Paul, George Senator, and Larry Crafard. Investigations have not been undertaken to corroborate their claims. 4. Specific Investigative Recommendations. a. We should obtain photos of all property found on Ruby's person, in his car, or at his home or clubs, now in possession of the Dallas District Attorney. We already have photos of Ruby's address books, but no other items have been photographed or delivered to the Commission. These items include the H. L. Hunt literature and newspapers mentioned in paragraphs Sd and 3e. 6. We should conduct staff interviews or take depositions with respect to Ruby's Cuban activities of the following persons : 292 i. Rohcrt Ray McKeown. — Ruby contacted McKeowu in 1959 in connection with the sale of jeeps to Cuba. The objective of an interview or deposition of McKeown would be to obtain information on possible contacts Ruby would have made after 1959 if his interest in armament sales continued. ii. Nancy Perrin. — Perrin claims she met with Ruby three times in 1961 con- cerning refugee smuggling and arms sales. She says she can identify the house in Dallas where meetings took place. Perrin now lives in Boston. Ruby admits he was once interested in the sale of jeeps, at least, to Cuba. Thec. "WeCIA should has beenobtain reports tofrom requested the CIA provide concerning a report based Ruby's associations. on a memorandum delivered to them March 12, 1964 covering Ruby's background including his possible Cuban activities, but a reply has not been received as yet. d. We should obtain reports from the FBI based on requested investigation of allegations suggesting that Earlene Roberts was in San Antonio on November 21. e. The Commission should take the testimony of the following persons for the reasons stated : i. Hyman Rubenstein, Eva Grant, Earl Ruby. All are siblings of Jack Ruby. Hyman is the oldest child and presumably •will be the best witness as to family history. He talked to Jack on November 22, reportedly visited Jack the week before the assassination, and participated in Ruby's twist board venture. Eva lived with Jack for 3 years in California prior to World War II, induced Jack to come to Dallas in 1947, and managed the Vegas Club for Jack in Dallas from 1959 to 1963. Earl was a travelling salesman with Jack from 1941-1943, a business partner 1946-1947, and made phone calls before November 22, 1963 and afterwards which require explanations. ii. Henry Wade. — This person can testify to the development of the testimony by Sgt. Dean and Det. Archer against Ruby and of seeing Ruby on November 22 in the Police Department building. iii. .Jack Ruby. f. We should take the depositions of the following persons for the reasons stated : i. Tom Howard. — This person is one of Ruby's original attorneys, and is reported to have been in the police basement a few minutes before Oswald was shot and to have inquired if Oswald had been moved. He filed a writ of habeas corpus for Ruby about one hour after the shooting of Oswald. He could explain these activities and possibly tell us about the Ruby trial. We should have these explanations. ii. FBI Agent Hall. — This person interviewed Ruby for 2% hours on November 24 beginning at approximately 12 noon. His report is contradictory to Sgt. Dean's trial testimony. He also interviewed Ruby on December 21. 1963. iii. Seth Kantor. — This jierson was interviewed twice by the FBI and persists in his claim that he saw Ruby at Parkland Hospital shortly before or after the President's death was announced. Ruby denies that he was ever at Parkland Hospital. We must decide who is telling the truth, for there would be consider- able significance if it were concluded that Ruby is lying. Should we make an evaluation without seeing Kantor ourselves? iv. BUI DeMar. — This person claims to have seen Oswald at the Carousel Club prior to November 22, and this rumor perhaps more than any other has been given wide circulation. Should we evaluate DeMar's credibility solely on the basis of FBI reports? g. The FBI should re-interview the following persons for the purposes stated : i. Alex Gruber.- — To obtain personal history to establish original meeting and subsequent contacts with Ruby : to obtain details of visit to Dallas in November 1965, including where he stayed, how long, who saw him, etc. The FBI should also check its own files on Gruber. ii. Lawrence Meyers. (Same as Griiber.) iii. Ken Dowe. — (KLIF reporter). To ascertain how he happened to first con- tact Ruby on November 22 or 23; (Ruby provided information to KLIF concern- ing the location of Chief Curry), and whether KLIF gave any inducements to Ruby to work for it on the weekend of November 22-24. iv. Rabbi Silverman. — To establish when Silverman saw Ruby at the Syna- gogue and obtain names of other persons who may have seen Ruby at the Synagogue on November 22 and 23. Silverman states that he saw Ruby at the 8 p.m. service on November 22 and at the 9 a.m. service on November 23 ; but 293 both of these services lasted at least two hours and we do not know whether Ruby was present for the entire services. Silverman (and others) could "place" Ruby, or fail to do so, during crucial hours. V. Mickey Ryan. — (Same as Gruber plus employment in Dallas.) vi. Brcck Wall. — This person was an entertainer at the Adolphus Hotel, Dallas, at the time of President Kennedy's assassination. Ruby called him in Galveston at 11 :47 p.m. Saturday, November 23, 1963. He also visited Ruby at the County jail. A background check should be conducted as to this person. vii. Andrew Armstrong, Bruce Carlin, Karen Bennett Carlln, Curtis LaVerne Crafard, Ralph Paul, George Senator. These six persons were deposed at length because of their friendship with Ruby, familiarity with Ruby's personal and business life, and contacts with Ruby on November 22, 23, and 24. In general, each has presumed to have had no knowledge of Ruby's activities during those three days. Andrew Armstrong was very active in the operation of the Carousel and worked closely with Ruby for 18 months. His deposition covers Ruby's activities and emotional state generally and particularly several hours on November 22 and 23. A background check should be conducted as to this person and selected parts of his testimony should be checked out to test his veracity. Karen and Bruce Carlin were the recipients of a $25 money order bought by Ruby approximately 5 minutes before Ruby shot Oswald. Marguerite Oswald testified that she believed she knew Karen Carlin. Background checks should be conducted on the Carlins. Crafard fled Dallas unexpectedly on Saturday morning November 23. Although we tend to believe his explanation, we believe a background check on him pli;s verification of some of his activities on November 23 are warranted. Paul is Ruby's business partner. A background check should be conducted as to him and his telephone calls during November should be checked out. George Senator, Ruby's roommate, alleged by Crafard to be a homosexual, claims not to have seen Ruby except at their apartment Sunday morning and for a few hours early Saturday morning. Senator's background and own admitted activities on November 22, 23, and 24 should be verified. 5. Other areas of Rudy Investigation ichich are not complete. a. Various rumors link Ruby and Oswald which do not appear to be true; however, the materials we have are not suflScient to discredit them satisfactorily. Such rumors include : i. Communist associations of Ruby ; ii. Oswald's use of a Cadillac believed to belong to Ruby ; iii. After the depositions of Nancy Parrin, Robert McKeown, and Sylvia Odio- have Cuban been taken, further investigation may be necessary with respect to Rui)y's associations. 6. Ruby's notebooks contain numerous names, addresses, and telephone num- bers. Many of these persons have either not been located or deny knowing Ruby. We believe further investigation is appropriate in some instances ; however, we have not yet evaluated the reports now on hand. c. obtain will "We have no expertof evidence transcripts as to Ruby's the psychiatric mental testimony condition at the ; however, we Ruby trial. 6. Other Investigatitie Suggestions. — We have suggested in earlier memoranda that two sources of evidentiary material have been virtually ignored : o. Radio, TV and Movie Recordings. Two Dallas radio stations tape recorded every minute of air time on November 22. 23, and 24. We have obtained these radio tapes for all except a portion of November 24, and the tapes include a num- ber of interviews with key witnesses in the Oswald area. In addition, the tapes shed considerable light on the manner in which Dallas public ofiicials and federal agents conducted the investigations and performed in public view. We believe that similar video tapes and movie films should be obtained from NBC, CBS, IBC, UPI, and Movietone News, and relevant portions should be reviewed by staff members. Wherever witnesses appear on these films who have been con- sidered by the Commission in preparing its report, a copy of such witnesses' appearance should be made a part of the Commission records by introducing them in evidence. If one person were directed to superintend and organize this effort, we believe it could be done without unreasonable expenditures of Commission time and money. 1). Hotel and motel registrations, airline passenger manifests, and Emigration and Immigration records. 294 Copies of Dallas hotel and motel registrations and airline manifests to and from Dallas should be obtained for the period September 2(> to December 1, 1963. Similarly, Emigration and Immigration records should be obtained for the period October 1, 1963 to January 1, 1964. We believe that these records may provide a useful tool as new evidence develops after the Commission submits its report. We do not suggest that these records necessarily be examined by the Commission staff at the present time. But, for example, it is likely that in the future, persons will come forward who will claim to have been in Dallas during the critical period and who will claim to have important information. These records may serve to confirm or refute their claims. ]Mr. Blakey. ]Mr. GrifFin, do you recall the circumstances that led you and Mr. Hubert to prepare this memorandum ? Judge Griffin. In a general sense I do ; yes. I don't remember the siiecilic catalytic event but I remember where we were. Mr. Blakey. Were you asked sometime in ]May to finish your work by June 1 ? Judge Griffin. I don't remember the date but we were given a deadline which we felt we couldn't meet, whatever that date was. ]Mr. Blakey. Was this memorandum prepared in response to that request ? Judge Griffin. At the same time as that kind of ]Dressure was coming, whether it was specifically in direct response to a request I dou't Mr. know, Blakey. but Iforwonder, practical purposes Judge Griffin,that if Iiscould right.direct your attention to page 2 of the memorandum and ask you to focus on paragraph Ba. In general terms you indicate that there was a need for further investigation and vou observe that the FBI has thoroughly investi- gated i\Ir. Ruby's night club operations but does not seem to have pinned down his other business or social activity. Is that correct ? Judge Griffin. Yes. ]\rr. Blakey. In the period of time after this memorandum was written, that is, between May and July and August when the investi- gation wound down, did the Bureau suibsequently pin down these other activities ? Judge Grtfftn. I don't tJiink thev did. The question in part is whether they did any more as a result. What was Mr. Eankin's response to this memo ? I don't know whether we got a written response to this or not. I don't have any recollection of really pursuing this. I have a gejiornl recollection of a conversation, I don't remember who it was with, in which we were not told we could not do anv of these things but we were told not to go off the deep end, and so forth, and we were in a sense given a light to go ahead but they still made clear to us that we had these deadlines. So I don't know what we did to follow that up. Mr. Blakey. Let me direct your attention now to page 2 of the memorandum, to paragraph c, which then continues over on page B and also paragraph f, on page 3, which continues over on page 4. Judge Griffin. Eight. Mr. Blakey. In which you generallv indicate tliat IVfr. Euby had been close to persons pursuing various illegal activities. You note, for examiJe, in September ] 050. Mr. Euby visited Havana at the invitation of a man named Louis J. McWillie, whom you characterized as a Las Veo-as racketeer. that Eubv You also considerod Mr. indicate McWilliethatoneMr.' of Ealph Paul friends. his closest had indicated Judge Griffin. Eight. 295 Mr. Blaket. You comment : In addition we believe tliat a reasonable possibility exists that Ruby has maintained a close interest in Cuban affairs to the extent necessary to partici- pate in gun sales or smuggling. Now reading over page 4, paragraph f : We think activities havethatbeenneither Oswald's adequately Cuban interests in Dallas nor Ruby's Cuban explored. This of course was written as of May 14. In the period of time after May 14 in your judgment did the Bureau subsequently adequately explore these Cuban matters ? Judge Griffin. In fairness to the Bureau I don't think they had much of a request to explore them. There were some requests made to them for investigation. We did not pursue these matters in a manner I felt at the time, or ever have felt, was satisfactory. Mr. Blakey. Let me direct your attention now to page 3 of the memorandum, specifically paragraph d, in which you generally indi- cate that there is some possible connection between Ruby and various rightwing groups. Particularly you mention H. L. Hunt, and raise the possibility of some connection between Mr. Ruby and the John Birch Society. Judge Griffin. Yes. Mr. Blakey. In your judgment in the period of time following- May did the Bureau adequately explore these possible rightwing connections ? Judge Griffin. Again, I have to answer that in terms of what we requested them to do. At this point I don't recall what we requested with respect to II. L. Hunt. With respect to Earl Ruby, Hubert and I explored Earl Ruby's connection with Ruby to a very limited extent but we never requested any followup. We took his deposition on May 14, 1964, and asked him some ques- tions about the Welch Candy Co. We did push a request for infor- mation on Thomas Hill. My recollection on that is that the Bureau did everything we asked them to do. Whether they could have done more; about it and didn't, that I don't know. Mr. Blakey. I call your attention to page 4, specifically paragraph g, and note that you indicate that Mr. Ruby had a visit from one Lawrence Meyers from Chicago. You comment on the relationship between Mr. Meyers and Mr. Alex Gruber of Los Angeles and con- clude: "Background checks have not been made on these persons." Subsequently did the Bureau do background checks to your knowl- edge of Mr. Meyers and Mr. Gruber ? Judge Griffin. I don't know. Again I am not certain whether Ave requested that. I will say that I don't know whether there Avas any- thing put in writing, any written response to this memo. Your rec- ords Ithink Avould reveal that. It is quite possible that based on your conversations Avith those who received this n.iemo that Hubert and I decided that Ave had to mr.ke — in fact. I knoAv Ave did this — after Ave had talked about tliis we decided aa-c Jiad to make some choices about AvLere Ave could go, because we had a lot of resistance to these things. We felt that Ave couhhi't expose ourselves to too manv dead ends on things tliat looked like Avild goose chases. ^ 296 I am fairly confident tliat altliougli we may never have been told not to do certain things, that we made the decision probably our- selves that we should go for the things that we thought might have the best chance of a payoff and avoid any further hassle witli others in the Commission over our view on how to conduct the investigation. Mr. Blakey. Let me last direct your attention to page 4 and spe- cifically to paragraph h, and quoting from the record: 111 short, we believe that the possibility exists, based on evidence already available, that Ruby was involved in illegal dealings with Cuban elements who might have had contact with Oswald. The existence of such dealings can only be surmised since the present investigation has not focused on that area. In your judgment did the investigation in succeeding months ade- quately focus on that area ? Judge Griffin. No. Mr. Blakey. Judge Griffin, I wonder if I could direct your atten- tion to the final report of the Commission, a copy of which is on the desk in front of you, to your right, and ask you to look at page o65 in the official report, and page 340 in the New York Times edition. Lookmg now at page 365, the Commission discusses at page 365 in the official report and page 340 of the New York Times report, Ruby's background and associates and it says : In addition to examining in detail Jack Ruby's activities from November 21 to November 24, and his possible acquaintanceship with Lee Harvey Oswald, the Commission has considered whether or not Ruby had ties with individuals or groups that might have obviated the need for any direct contact near the time of the assassination. Study of Jack Ruby's background, which is set out more fully in appendix XVI, leads to the final conclusion that he had no such ties. Judge Griffix. Let me understand what that first sentence is there. "The Commission has considered whether or not Ruby had tics with individuals or groups that might have obviated the need for any direct contact near the time of the assassination." Ties to some intermediate group that might have wanted to assas- sinate the President? Mr. Blakey. In the context of your memorandum of May were you raising the question whether Ruby had illegal dealings with Cuban elements who might have had contact with Oswald? Do you believe that the succeeding months of investigation from ISIay through Sep- tember adequately explored those dealings so that this conclusion ^'leads to the final conclusion that he had no such ties," could have been justified? Judge Griffin. If this phrase "individual or groups that might have obviated the need," if that is read to mean any Cuban groups or any people interested in dealing with Cuba, I would say no, I would not agree with that last sentence that you read. I must say I don't know what the first sentence means. Mr. INIcKiXNEY. Does that not simply mean that there could have beoi contact between Ruby and Oswald without physical contact? Judge Griffin. I know it means that. The question is whether some- one had in mind some group that v^-e knew had contact with Oswald. If that is meant to say that we could reach a conclusion that someone that we knew had direct contact with Oswald also had direct contact with Ruby, then this sentence about the firm conclusion is probably 297 correct, that we could conclude that based upon someone that we know at that time that had a direct contact, we could say yes, he didn't have any direct know about contact ? we knew about, but how about the people we don't Mr. Blakey. I would like to know your feeling in May that there might be a relationship between Oswald and Euby through Cuban elements, and your suggestion in May that that possible connection should be adequately explored. Judge Griffin. Right. Mr. Blakey. I am raising the question that I understand that you thought it was not adequately explored. If it was not, I am wondering how the Commission could have con« eluded on page 365 in the official report and on page 340 in the New York Times report that there were no such ties. Judge Griffin. Because I think that this report throughout was really written from a very narrow perspective when general terms were used and they really meant someone we already knew, a group we already knew had contact with Oswald. The question was could we find that Ruby had contact with any of those specific individuals or groups, groups not meaning every Cuban in the country but a specific known group that Oswald had made contact with. ]Mr. Blakey. In the context of that answer, let me direct your at- tention to page 370 of tlie official report and the New York Times report on page 346. Reading now from page 340 of the official report and page 348 of the New York Times report, there is an indication of infoniiation on a relationship between Ruby and Louis J. McWillie, who you mentioned in your memorandum of May 5 ; and then in the next designated paragraph, paragraph designated "Possible Under- world: Connections," let me direct your attention to the two concluding sentences Ruby has disclaimed that he was associated with organized crime activities, and law enforcement agencies have confirmed that denial. Judge Griffin. I suppose that statement on its face is true, that Ruby has said that he didn't have organized criminal activity and law enforcement agencies have said yes ; he is not associated with organized criminal activities. ]Mr. Fauntroy. The law enforcement agencies said that ? Judge Griffin. That is right. I think that is a true statement. Mr. McKiNNEY. Counsel, I would like to apologize to the witness that I have to leave. Mr. Blakey. On page 801 of the official report and page 707 of the New York Times edition, I quote now from the last paragraph, headed "Underworld Ties." This is from the appendix generally dealing with iNIr. Ruby's background : Based on its evaluation of the record, however, the Commission believes that the evidence does not establish a significant link between Ruby and organized crime. Both State and Federal officials have indicated that Ruby was not affiliated with organized criminal activities, and numerous persons have reported that Ruby was not connected with such activity. Judge Griffin. Right. I thinlv the key words are "significant link" and that hierarchy? criminal question was: Was 'VYliere he a bigdidfish, Ruby littlestand in was fish, or the organized lie on the 298 peripliery? It is not an attempt to say that lie did not have lots of friends and associates and couldn't perhaps get things done and that they might not call npon him. Mr. DoDD. Counsel, that is clearly what it saj^s. I don't know how you can possibly reach any other conclusion from that statement that he was not associated or affiliated. To say that that statement indicates he was not significantly involved, I think, is not a fair appraisal of it. Judge Griffin. The question is what you mean by "significant." Mr. Blakey. Do you think a normal person, an average American lay reader to whom this report was directed, in reading that, would have led to believe that Ruby was not associated in any way with or- ganized crime? Judge Griffin. Let me say this : If anybody who reads the whole appendix there, which lays out all what his associations were — if you just read the last sentence, if you don't read all the other associations that are laid out but if you read one or two pages we have on this and you look at the footnotes, you will see — it is actually one page, I guess — it goes in his past history, so this entire appendix covers a good many pages of laying out what his specific associations were, going all the way back to the 1930's and early 1940's in Chicago. I don't think anybody who could read this and have all of this in- formation that is in here would have any doubt that there were lots and lots of associations that he had with underworld types and that one could fairly characterize him in a kind of way as a fringe person in the underworld. Unfortunately, for various reasons, this report is loaded with code words such as "the Commission foimd no evidence" and this one : "a significant link." It is an attempt by the Commission to say to the pub- lic that : "Yes ; the average person would read this and, if you read it in the newspapers, you would think there is a lot of stuff here, but we are exercising cant. a professional evaluation and we don't think this is sicrnifi- Mr. Blakey. In your professional judgment, did you adequately explore the relationship between Ruby and McWillie, and possible connections with organized crime figures ? Judge Griffin. If we were conducting an investigation that reallv was a no-time-limit, no-stops investigation into whether there could have been a cons})iracy to assassinate the President that involved the iniderworld. and if we had had one bit of information at that point that was significant that would show that the underworld might have had a motive or mieht have been connected with someone else who had a motive to assassinate tlie President, my answer would be that this was not adequate. But at the point that we stopped this investigation, we didn't know anything about the so-called Mafia connections with the CIA, we knew nothing about the assassination attempts in the Caribbean. The only tiling we could see in the underworld types were that they were trying to justify to make some money selling guns to Cuba, and that did not seem to u's the next conclusion, that they therefore wanted to assassinate the President. Mr. Blakey. Did you know in 1064 that it was at least alleged that ;Mc Willie was manager of the Tropicana Casino ? 299 Judge Griffin. I think that is all in the record. Mr. DoDD. Did you say earlier you were familiar with this memo- randum from the Central Intelligence Agency dated, I think, Septem- ber 17, 1964, in which the CIA states emphatically that they have no information on Jack Ruby or his activities ? Judge Griffix. Including Louis McWillie, for example. His name was in a memo that they were responding to. Louis INIcWillie's name was given to them by us along with a lot of other people. Understand that we got that memo 8 or 9 days before the report was published. That report was already in galley proof, and the galleys— probably the page proofs — were being read at the time this report came back from the CIA. Mr. DoDD. In your memo of May 14, 2 or 3 months before that, you clearly raise questions about Euby's possibly becoming involved in purchasing jeeps for Castro, which is a political activity on which the CIA would have some information or they would be derelict in their duty ? Judge Griffix. Absolutely. at Mr. Blakey. the casino that "Were you also owned was allegedly aware byafter MeyerMayLansky 1960 ?he took a job Judge Griffin. I don't know whether we knew that. Mr. Blakey. Would you have known the name INIever Lanskv in 1964? Judge Griffin. Yes. That kind of information would not have significantly affected our decision unless we knew two things, at least unless we knew that the Mafia, the underworld types, were being used bv the CIA in connection with international Cuban activ- ities. If we had known that the CIA m any way was utilizing under- world people in connection with am^ kind of Cuban activity, that might have said more for us — most particularly if we had, of course, known there was an effort on some part of the people in our Govern- ment to assassinate Castro. Mr. Blakey. You know it ? Judge Griffin. We did not know it. ]Mr. Blakey. You knew that liuby had some connection with the underworld ? Judge Griffin. That is all we knew. Mr. Blakey. You knew he was trying to sell jeeps to Castro? Judge Griffin. In 1959 — incidentally, we had rumors on that which we could never confirm from an}' one. Mr. Blakey. You were suspicious enough ? Judge Griffin. We were suspicious. ]Mr. Blakey. You knew the guy had underworld connections, joii knew he had political activities in a foreign country ? Judge Griffin. We took the depositions of all of the people who gave us that information. We requested further information from the CIA. We got their September 15 memo. We got nothing to start with furtherfrom them. We were being told to write the report. Yv^e got no information. I can't tell you in any kind of detail what we requested of the FBI. I feel fairly certain that we Vv^ere making requests to the FBI up to the point that we got nothing back. xYt that point we had nothing to link it in with. 43-819—79 20 300 ]SIr. Blakey. Would any of these other names be familiar with you: Jake Lansky? Would that name mean anything to you? Judge Griffix. Sure. Mr. Blakey. Gerald Catena. Would that name mean anjthing to you in 1963 ? Judge Griffix. Yes ; that would not have told us anything that we did not already believe about Lansky anyhow. jNIr. Blakey. Would the name David Cellini mean anything to you ? Judge Griffin. No ; it would not mean anything to us. ^Ir. Blakey. Eddie Levinson, who was alleged to own the Riveria Casino ? Judge Griffix. No. ]Mr. Judge "Blakey. Griffix.Does Xo. the name Trafficante mean anything to you ? ]Mr. Blakey. Raoul Gonzales or Benny Fernandez ? Judge Griffix. I think the answer would have to be no ; it did not mean anything to us. ^h\ Blakey. The reason I raise this with you, Judge Griffin, to move off tlio question of a possible CIA or Mafia connection as a motive: Were you aware in the 1960's the Department of Justice, under Robert Kennedy, had what some people say was a vigorous organized crime drive ? Judge Griffix. Yes. ]\Ir. Blakey. Would the death of the President have possible under- mined Robert Kennedy's political support in the Government ? Judge Griffix. You are asking me to speculate now on that ? Or did we think about that question? I don't think we thought about it. I didn't think about it. ]Mr. Blakey. As a matter of fact, did Robert Kennedy remain in the Department ident Johnsonof ? Justice after the President's assassination, under Pres- Judge Griffix, He was elected Senator from New York. ]Mr. Blakey. In point of fact, he left the Department of Justice, did he not ? Judge Griffix. I will say categorically that by Hubert and me that possibility was not seriously explored. I think what you are saying is the possibility that someone associated with the underworld would have wanted to assassinate the President; isn't that right? ]\[r. Blakey. To undermine the organized crime program. Judge Griffix. You see, the difficulty with makina: that leap was that — I am satisfied everyone who investigates this will have the same conclusion — that Oswald was the person who assassinated the Presi- dent. There was no showing that Oswald had any coimection with or- ganized crime. Therefore, there was no reason to think that, simply because Ruby was involved in organized crime, that that would have boon linked to the assassination of the President. We needed to fill that in, in some way, but that is wliy the Cuban link is so important. If we had known that the CIA wanted to assassinate Castro, then all of the Cuban motivations that we were exploring about this made much, much more sense. If we had further known that tlie CIA was involved with organized criminal figures in an assassi- nation attempt in the Caribbean, then we would have had a completely ditTorent perspective on this thing. 301 But, because we did not have those links at this point, there was noth- ing to tie the underworld in with Cuba and thus nothing to tie them in wi'th Oswald, nothing to tie them in with the assasshiation of the Pres:ident. Mr. Blakey. Let me direct your attention back to what has been marked as JFK exhibit No. 63, your memorandum of May 14. Begin- ning on page 5 and following, there are the names of a number of people that you suggest either should be interviewed by the staff or from whom depositions should be taken or that the Bureau should rein- terview in the field. Judge Griffin. Right. Mr. Blakey. I don't find JNIc Willie among those people. Is there any reason why he was omitted that you can recall now ? Judge Griffin. It may be that we had pursued — tliis is a request mostly for background information on these people. We identified McWillie very early as a somebody who might be a key link. It may be that at the time we wrote this memo, we had gotten everything we felt we could get out of the FBI, that we could not make a productive request to the FBI, so that we were now focusing on other people in an effort to see if they somehow linked back in. I think that is probably why ]SIcWillie was left out. Mr. Blakey. If you knew then what you laiow today about the rela- tionship between McWillie and such figures as Meyer and Jake Lansky and Trafficante and other organized crime figures who apparently were heavily involved in Cuban gambling and the fact that those Cuban gambling syndicates had a relationship with the CIA in an effort to overthrow Premier Castro, do you think you would have more vigor- ously pursued McWillie ? Judge Griffin. It is not simply McWillie. ]\Ir. Blakey. And all organized crime, the Cuban connection? Judge Griffin. I frankly think that if anybody on the staff level that I dealt with had had this information, the memos that Hubert and I were generating — which I exj^ressed my unhappiness about the response to — I don't think they would have been handled in that way. Xow, whether above the staff level that I was dealing with, other people had information which produced a much higher-up decision not to go forward in this area, I don't Imow. I have said to Mr. Blakey in our private conversation in Cleveland that it frankly is not conceivable to me that Allen Dulles did not know about everything we are talking about here. I personally would not believe it if he came here and denied it to my face. I also don't believe the President didn't know about this. Now, how much was then communicated on to the Chief Justice, how specific the communications might have been, my own speculation, like any other citizen's, reflecting my own involvement in this, is that I think the Chief Justice had to be told something pretty convincing in order to get him to take this job. I don't know how much detail must have genuinely believed that they would have given him there was a national security but lie ques- tion involved here, not simply a McCarthyism kind of question. From my own out any more perspective at this point,"l have a strono; belief, with- information than I have already expressed, that at least 302 Allen Dulles, if not one or two other people somewhere in the Commis- sion hierarchy, had some information about the importance of the Cuban problem that wasn't communicated to us. Mr. DoDD. Given that fact, would it not be fair, then, to assume — given the fact you had a group of energetic, young attorneys who were anxious to uncover this tiling and, by your own statement earlier, to prove the FBI wrong^ — that you would have to conclude that some of the key staff people then would also have to be privy to that information ? Judge Griffin. No ; I don't know Avliere the "key" goes. Mr. DoDD. What happened to this memo of yours ^ This is a damn good memo. May 14. Hell, these are exactly the kind of questions we are wrestling with. Had someone asked those questions, talked to people Avho are no longer with us at this point, we would not be sitting here possibly today. You had 2 to 3 weeks, less than that, before the Commission folded its tent ? Judge Griffin. No; this was in jNIay and the report came out in September. Mr. DoDD. Your last hearings were held in June ? Judge Griffin. Right. Mr. DoDD. June 3 was the date. You had ISIay 14 to June 3, less than 3 weeks ? Mr. Fauntroy. They responded in September. Judge Griffin. You see, in order to understand their response, you have to take into account what they were learning outside of the Oswald area Mr. DoDD. You have touched on some pretty sensitive points in this memo by fluke or otherwise. I think you scared some people. Judge Griffin. I don't think they were by fluke. I am trying to be totally straightforward with you because I have strong feelings about this in terms of the possibilities that we had in this area. I didn't write this memo for flimsy reasons. ]\Ir. DoDD. I know that. Judge Griffin. Nothing that has happened since I wrote this memo substantially changes my view about this. So I obviously feel that somewhere along the line somebody pulled the rug out from under us. ]5ut I am not willing to jump to the conclusion that it knowingly took place witliin the staff. Some of this relates to the field. You see people on a day-to-day basis. It is hard for me to believe that Howard Willens and Dnve Slawson and the other people whom 1 worked with on this thing knew anything significant that I didn't know. I am strongly inclined to believe at that level they didn't know any more than I did. \h'. DoDD. What happened to this memo? Yon asked the question. On page 4 you say: ''We think neither Oswald's Cuban interests in Dallas nor Ruby's Cuban activities have been adequately ex])lored.'' I can see people at the CIA just flipping out. knowing now what they knew then. Judge Griffin. CIA never saw this memo, but they saw another one. ]Mr. I)o!>D. How do you know the}' didn't see it ? Judge Griffin. That is true; they may have. 303 Mr. DoDD. Wliat I am c^etting at is that these arc some pretty good questions and, knowing what we know now, I can see where this could have caused some serious — what happened to the memo? What hap- pened to the response ? Judge Griffin. I don't Imow wlicther we got a written response back. I can only answer that in a kind of general way. I am trying to recall lo years ago. I made some notes on my memo, my copy of this, as to what I recall happening. In some cases we went ahead and took testimony. In other cases my notes reflect — at some point I will be happy to share my notes on all of these ; these are my personal recol- lections Imade on this — that I think we did what I indicated to Mr. ]McKinney we did. ^ye were told, in response to this memo, basically that we still had to start to write, that we had certain deadlines to meet, but w^e knew they kept getting put back, given the list of people that we wanted to depose ancl we could do it. "If you ^ant to get some other stuff out to the FBI, okay, but remember they are getting pretty sick of this investigation at the FBI." It was this kind of quality of dialog that was taking place over this memo. I believe that what happened was that, against that context of things, Hubert and I went back and we looked at this memo and we decided : What do wo have in here that we could get something on in a reasonable period of time and let us try to get that, let us put our energies in that direction because we know we have to start producing copy for them at some point ; we have to start writing. We made deci- sions based on that kind of thing. ^Ir. DoDD. I can see that. ]\Ir. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could turn to a slightly different area and inquire of Judge Griffin whether there were pres- sures other than time, for example, resource pressures. I wonder if, in that context, I could ask the clerk to mark a Hubert-Griffin memo of April 4, 1961, to Howard Willens as JFK exhibit No. 64. I wonder if the clerk will show it to the witness. Are you familiar with that? Judge Griffin. Yes, I am. ^Ir. Blakey. I wonder. ]\Ir. Chairman, if I can have that document placed in the record so that we can ask some questions of the witness based on it. ]Mr. Fauxtroy. Without objection, it is so ordered. [The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 64 and received for the record, follows :] JFK Exhibit No. 64 [Memorandum] April 4, 1964. To : Mr. Howard Willens. From : Leon D. Hubert and Burt W. Griffin. 1. You will recall that after the staff meeting on Friday, we stayed on with Mr. Rankin to discuss the matter of giving us assistance in area V. Three subareas are involved : a. A checkout of names, telephone numbers, addresses, et cetera found in Ruby's papers. (See area '"E") b. A checkout of all rumors relative to possible associations between Ruby and Oswald ; and between Ruby and the gangster element. (See area "F") 304 c. An analysis of telephone calls by Jack, Eva, and Earl Ruby and by Ralph Paul. 2. Mr. Rankin told us to get Mr. Lenbrandt (Chief Justice Warren's guard) to do this work. Because of the press of time and because we did not really put our minds to it at the moment, we failed to say to Mr. Rankin that each subarea will require a man working full time for a month. There is no possibility that this work can be properly done so as to be useful in writing a report even if it had a deadline date of June 15. 3. In connection with the above and for the other reasons stated below, we do not think the Ruby aspect of the case should be included in the Commission's report. a. To do an acceptable job on Ruby, it would be necessary to make pul)lic statements concerning his character, his background, the possibility that he was lying about his entry into the basement, his motivation and state of mind, et cetera. b. If Ruby's conviction is refused and our report is in any way hostile to Ruby, the Commission could be justly criticized for issuing a report which im- paired his right to a fair trial. On the other hand, if the report gave support to Ruby's already stated version, the prosecution would be justified in criticizing us. c. Aside from this, is it proper for a Commission of the high rank and pres- tige of this Commission to comment extensively about a person whose case is on appeal and will surely get to the U.S. Supreme Court? 2. We think that the Commission's report could very properly state that conclusions relative to any aspect of Ruby or his activities are considered im- proper because of his pending appeal and that a report will be made later. Mr. Blakey. Let me direct your attention to paragraph 2 and note that ,yoii are referring in that paragraph to a previous request for as- sistance inchecking the names and telephone numbers and addresses found in Ruby's papers and your comment that — * * * because of the press of time and because we did not really put our minds to it at the moment, we failed to say to Mr. Rankin that each subarea will require a man working full time for a month. There is no possibility that this work can be propei-ly date of Junedone15.so as to be useful in writing a report even if it had a deadline I tliink that that was written in the context of April, where j'ou were speaking of a INIay deadline. Is that an accurate reflection of your feeling at that time that you were on the staff ? Judge Griffix. This is more than that. It was also a statement tliat this fellow Lenbrandt, who was the guard for the Chief Justice, did not strike us as the kind of person we needed for this job. Not only numbers ; we didn't want somebody who had a regular job guarding the Chief Justice and part time would go out and gather information for us. ]Mr. Blakey. Let me ask you, then, a general point. As you know, the conclusion of the Warren Commission was that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin of the President. Are you satisfied with that con- clusion? Judge GRirrrx. Yes, I ani. There is no doubt alwut that. Mr. Blakey. The central conclusion from many people's point of view was that there was no evidence foimd of a conspiracy to assassi- nate the President. Are you satisfied with that conclusion ? Judge Griffin. I am satisfied that that statement is true. Mr. Blakey. Are you satisfied with the investigation that led to that conclusion ? Judge Griffin. T am not. Mr. Blakey. '\^niat would you have done differently in the area of pursuing the conspiracy allegation or the conspiracy possibility? And, in the context of asking you that question, I wonder, Mr. Cliair- 305 man, if I could ask the clerk to mark a memo dated February 24, 1964, from Hubert and Griffin to Willens in connection with the suggested collection of phone data as JFK exhibit No. 65 and I wonder if the clerk will show it to the witness. Are you familiar with that memo ? Judge Griftfin. Yes, I am. Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that that memorandum l3e incorporated in the record at this point in order that I can ask some questions about it. Mr. Fauntroy. Without objection, it is so ordered. [Theceiveddocument referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 65 and re- for the record, follows :] JFK Exhibit No. 65 [Memorandum] Tebkuaky 24, 1964. To : Mr. Howard P. Willens. From : Mr. Leon D. Hubert and Mr. Burt W. Griffin. Subject : Further Telephone Records to be Obtained for the Commission. In furtherance of your conversation with Mr. Griffin on February 20 and our joint memorandum of February 19, the following steps are suggested to be taken as besoon pertinent as possible to the work for ofobtaining and preserving telephone records which may- this Commission. Some of the suggestions may impose burdens upon private parties which are not justified by the possible results to be obtained. If so, they should be rejected and the reason for such rejection recorded in order to assure future critics that such efforts were carefully considered. Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 seek telephone numbers of phones "reasonably available" to Ruby plus records of calls placed from phones under Ruby's direct control. Paragraph 4 seeks telephone numbers of all phones reasonably available to certain persons. Paragraph 5 seeks only phones listed to or under the control of certain people. Paragraphs 6 to 10 are designed to lay a basis for further investigation. 1. The FBI should immediately obtain the telephone numbers, names of sub- scriber, location and type of service of all phones reasonably available to Jack Ruby. "Reasonably available" should include, but not be limited to, subscriber and pay telephones at the All Right Parking Garage, Adolphus Hotel, the Egyptian Lounge, Phil's Delicatessen, Cabana Motel, Sol's Turf Bar, Dallas City Hall and Jail, Dallas Morning News. Radio Station KLIF, together with any pay phones within reasonable walking distance of said places or any other places which Ruby frequented. Numbers and information concerning phones "reasonably available" to Ruby in Dallas may be obtained by i>ersonal contact with subscribers or the telephone company. Information as to phones available outside Dallas should not involve contact with nonresidents of Dallas. 2. The FBI should immediately obtain with respect to Jack Ruby, for the period August 1 to November 25, 1963, copies of all original telephone company records bearing upon the dates, time, length of call, calling number, billing num- ber, person calling and number called with respect to all telephone calls (includinc: local calls) utilizing any telephone listed to Jack Ruby or any of his Clubs, includ- ing pay phones on or near the premises. If the telephone company has no records which would provide information concerning local calls, the FBI should so state. It is unnecessary at this point to obtain call records from all phones "reason- ably available to Ruby" since analysis of calls from such phones would be impos- sible without further information. Howevei', we contemplate that if we establish a list of suspected intermediaries between Ruby and Oswald, it would be valuable to check telephones "available" to Ruby against calls to the "intermediaries." In addition, it may be valuable to examine records of telephones listed to or used regularly by suspected "intermediaries" for calls to phones "available" to Ruby. 3. "With respect to all records requested in paragraph 2, the FBI should indi- cate in its report what telephone company personnel were questioned, the qiies- 306 tions asked aud the aus\Yers received, in all investigations which were conducted, so that it may be determined that the records obtained are complete and accu- rate. We believe that the method of searching for records must be detailed since telephone information forwarded so far has been spotty and inaccurate. 4. To the extent not already provided, the FBI should be requested to obtain for the Commission a list of all telephones (but not call records) reasonably available to the following persons since March 1, 1963 : Andrew Armstrong, 3821 Dickson Circle, Apartment C, Dallas, Tex. Karen Bennett Carlin. aka Karen Bennett Karlin, aka "Little Lynn," 3609 Meadowbrook, Fort Worth, Tex. Bruce Carlin, aka Brue Karlin, 3809 Meadowbrook, Fort Worth, Tex. Marion (aka Marian) Rubenstein Carroll, 1044 W. Loyola, Chicago, 111. Eileen Rubenstein Kaminsky, 6724 N. Talman, Chicago, 111. Lewis J. McWillie, Las Vegas, Nev. Hyman Rubenstein, 1044 W. Loyola, Chicago, 111. Sam (Rubenstein) Ruby, 11616 Jamestown Road, Dallas, Tex. Earl (Rubenstein) Ruby, 2992.5 Woodland Drive, Southfield, Mich. Eva Rubenstein (Magid) Grant, 3929 Rollins, Dallas, Tex. Ralph Paul. Arlington, Tex., c/o Bert Bowman, Copeland Road, Arlington Road, Arlington, Tex. (home) ; Podnuh's Restaurant, Arlington, Tex. (access) ; John W. Jackson, 1602 Browning, Arlington, Tex. (access) ; Bull Pen Drive-In, 1936 East Abram, Arlington, Tex. ( business ) . Anna Rubenstein Volpert, 1044 W. Loyola, Chicago, 111. The date March 1 is chosen because it establishes a safe margin for inquiry prior to Oswald's trip to New Orleans. With respect to each of the above persons, the FBI should provide numbers, to the extent possible, not only of home tele- phones but nearby pay phones, telephones of any businesses in which the indi- vidual is employed, telephones of business partners or other similar close business associates, telephones of friends and relatives visited frequently, and telephones at restaurants and other businesses which the individual is known to frequent. For each telephone the FBI should indicate the type of service (pay phone, sub- scriber phone, limited service telephone), name of subscriber, location of phone, and reason for concluding the phone was accessible to the individual under Inves- tigation. This information should be obtained primarily by examining records which will not involve personal contact with persons outside of the telephone com- panies and without communicating the names of suspects to persons outside the FBI. We realize that such a means of investigation will not provide a complete answer to questions, but we believe other modes of inquiry would be unwise at this time. As to each individual under investigation, the FBI report should indi- cate what sources were checked and what other information as to possibly acces- sible phones might be available by direct contact with individuals. .5. The FBI should obtain from a telephone company records check the personal, family and business phones of the following persons during the period March 1, 1963 to present : Barney Baker, 5900 Sheridan Road. Chicago. 111. (home) : Chicago Loop Auto Refinishing Co., Inc., 3216 South Shields Ave.. Chicago. 111. (business). Curtis La Verne Crafard, aka Larry Crafard (including phones available to him on his "flight from Dallas to Michigan"). Sam Gordon, 755 Crescent Drive. Palm Springs, Calif. Alex Gruber, 5222 W. Olympic, Los Angeles, Calif. (AVE. 5-10S2). Frank Goldstein, 640 Teresita Boulevard, San Francisco, Calif. (JU 7-7674) (SU 1-7343). Lawrence Meyers, 39.50 N. Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, 111. (home) ; Ero Mfg. Co.. 714 West Monroe, Chicago, 111. (Vmsiness). Roy William Pike, aka Mickey Ryan, 2344 Connecticut Lane, Apt. C, Dallas, Ane.-^i TTmberto. Chicago. 111. Tex." Mario Umberto. Chicago, 111. Abe Weinstein. 11028 Westmore Circle. Dallas. Tex. 6. The FBI should confer with the appropriate officials of telephone companies in Chicago, Dallas, Detroit. New York, San Francisco, for Los Angeles, and New Or- leans to determine what means, if any, are available obtaining information as to incoming long distance telephone calls to any particular number if the name of the caller is unknown. It is conceivable, for example, that connecting or trunk- line telephone carriers may have automatic recording devices which record the 307 calling exchange and the dialed number with respect to calLs which they trans- mit. Or, it may be tliat most telephone companies in large cities are now so fully automated that such information is contained on their IBM cards and these IBM cards could be run through a computer or other device for every telephone sub- scriber in the area so that such information could be derived mechanically with- out undue expense or personal effort. Information as to city or telephone company from which a long distance call originated could conceivably be meaningful in light of other data which we have. 7. The FBI should confer with telephone company officials of each company serving Jack Ruby and the persons listed in paragraph four and five to ascertain if that company has any means of providing information, concerning local calls to or from the phones of those persons. Even if no records are maintained by such companies in the ordinary course of business, it may be that certain elec- tronic, mechanical or other entries are routinely made either by telephone trans- mitting equipment or in connection with business records ordinarily maintained )>y the telephone company so that by careful examination of such data informa- tion concerning local telephone activity on a particular telephone could be ob- tained. To whatever extent information can be obtained concerning local tele- phone activity, the Agent should report to the Commission the nature of the infor- mation which can be obtained and the means by which it would be obtained. This data should be secured without mentioning particular names or telephone numbers. 8. The FBI should obtain a list of all telephone companies and the chief execu- tive officer serving the following areas : Texas ; Nevada ; Los Angeles, Calif. ; San Francisco, Calif. ; Chicago, 111. : De- troit, Mich.; and adjacent suburbs in the Detroit metropolitan area, including Southfield, Mich. ; Boston, Mass., and adjacent suburbs, including Belmont, Mass. ; New York metropolitan area, including suburban Long Island, Connecticut and New Jersey ; Miami, Fla. ; Washington, D.C. and adjacent suburbs ; New Orleans, La. 9. Mr. Rankin should address a letter to the chief executive of each of the tele- phone companies mentioned in paragraph eight requesting that such companies not destroy until June 1, 1964 any records they may have with respect to tele- phone service of all subscribers. The letter should request that the source of this policy not be disclosed. Retention of records on a blanket basis would preserve security as to the think- ing of the Commission and will afford the maximum assurance that telephone records will be preserved with resr^ect to persons not yet suspect. We realize that blanket retention may be so burdensome or expensive as to make oiir request seem unreasonable. If there is any suggestion along these lines, a conference to work out a reasonable system should be suggested. 10. As soon as possible after the Ruby trial and after consultation with the Commission, the FBI should obtain copies of original telephone records uncov- ered as a result of the investigations requested in paragraphs four and five. These records should be analyzed to determine possible links to Ruby or Oswald. Tliere- after, if deemed advisable, records of phones "reasonably available" to Ruby would be analyzed for possible calls to phones reasonably available to suspected intermediaries between Ruby and Oswald. Mr. Blaket. Judge Griffin, as I look over this memorandum, basi- cally what it suggests is that the Commission obtained telephone toll records of a number of phones to which Mr. Kuby had access and a number of people, including, for example, Barney Baker of Chicago, Lawrence Meyers of Chicago, with an effort, I take it, to see if there had been communication between these people. Judge Griffin. Right. Mr. Blaket. I notice, for example, on page 2 of the memo we have Lewis J. McWillie of Las Vegas, Nev. You comment in the second paragraph of the memo that "Some of the suggestions may impose burdens upon private parties which are not justified by the possible 7*esults to be obtained. If so, they sliould be rejected and the reason for such rejection recorded in order to assure future critics that such efforts were carefully considered." 308 Mr. Fauntroy. Will counsel yield for a moment ? I am looking at exhibit No. 65 and its length. I wonder what your recommendations would be with respect to a break. Mr. Blakey. I tliink I have only about three or four questions and I would suspect we can conclude in the next 10 minutes. ^Ir. Fauntroy. Fine. don't have a pressing engagement ; I can stay if Judge there is any desire I for that. Grlffin. Mr. Blakey. There is a necessity for a lunch break. We have a witness due at 2, Judge Griffin. If you will bear with us I think we can finish it. ]\Ir. Fauntroy. Proceed. ]\Ir. Blakey. Do you recall what happened as a result of this memo- randum ? Judge Griffin. I generally recall. I made some notes on my copy. In the numbered paragraphs that follow from here with paragraph 1, which relates to simply obtaining telephone numbers and locations of telephones without the actual underlymg calls that were made from it, a request was made for what with respect to Jack Euby. I can tell you the extent to which we got returns on it. We got some of that information. I also think, with respect to paragraph 2, we did get that. That was the original telephone company records for telephones that were listed to Jack Ruby or any of his clubs. We got that. With respect to the request in paragraph 3, whether the FBI re- ported to us in the fashion that we requested I don't know or even if we made a f ollowthrough on that request. With respect to paragraph 4, my recollection is that much of that, tliat infomiation on the specific telephones of the individuals named there, telephone listings to their names, I believe that was given to us. We were suggesting here going beyond simply their names and getting numbers reasonably available, which required some thought and investigation. I don't believe that was done but I am not certain. In paragraph 5, I am not certain in paragraph 5 whether we got those telephone company records. In paragraph 6, I think this is the one requesting a freeze on tele- phone company records; I will have to read that again. My notes re- flect, as I read it prior to coming here, that I concluded that that was not done, paragraph 6. In paragraph 7, I don't recall — I do remember internal conversa- tions with other staff members about whether that kind of thing was feasible — hi other words, getting information on local calls as opposed to long-distance calls that might somehow be utilized by us. I know we never directly had a conversation with telephone company people to find out whether there was anything that we might use that could trigger some information for us. With respect to No. 8, it is my recollection that that was not done but I am not entirelv positive on that. With respect to No. 9, 1 would definitely state that that was not done. Although the records could prove me wrong, I am virtually certain no request to freeze records was made to telephone companies. No. 10, certain about my that. rpcollection is that it probably wasn't done but I am not 309 :Mr. Blakey. You testified that you were not satisfied witli the ade- quacy of the investigation of conspiracy. Would your failure to fol- io av through on this telephone toll call records request be an example of an area where you were not satisfied with the conduct of the investi- gation ? Judge Geiffin. That is right. Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my questions. I would like to express my gratitude to Judge Griffin for coming and spending so much of his time with us, taking precious time away from his trial calendar, and my own personal thanks. I appreciate it, Judge. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. JNIr. Fauntkoy. I would like to add to your thanks that of myself and that of the committee for your kindness in giving us so much time, Mr. Griffin. Are there any concluding questions, ISIr. Dodd ? Mr. Dodd. I really have found your testimony most interesting, Judge. I hope by some of my questions you did not glean anything more than my really trying to determine exactly the frame of mind in which you dealt with it at that particular time. I am sympathetic to outside influence, schedules, all kinds of things that came to bear on it at that time. Judge Griffin. May I also say to you, Mr. Dodd, and the commit- tee, that I do not feel any sense of purpose in trying to defend what we did for the sake of defending it. To defend it against inaccuracies, yes. For approximately 2 years now I have been mytrying to communi- cate with various people in the Congress about personal feelings which have gone back almost 2 years, that an investigation of the sort that your committee is conducting should be conducted. I simply want to say to the committee that I am happy to cooperate and assist the committee in any way they think I can be useful. ^Mr. Dodd. I appreciate that. I am sure we will probably be in more from us on some of the informa- have. you than you care to hear tion we with contact I have one question in my own mind and my ignorance is really re- sponsible for the question. AVhat was Ruby's motivation that came out of the trial for killing Oswald ? I had heard he had great affection for the President and so forth. Was that carried through in the trial ? Judge Griffin. That was his defense. Are you also asking me to comment on what I think his motive was ? Mr. Dodd. You got to know this fellow pretty well after poring back over his life. I wondered if you had turned up any kind of evidence that he had a deep affection for Kennedy. Judge Griffin. I don't think his motivation had anything to do with that. Strangely enough, I do think it was tied in with his feelings about anti-Semitism. Mr. Dodd. Would you explain that ? Judge Griffin. I only say this based on the assumption that we don't link him into some kind of a conspiracy. That is an open question as far as I am concerned. But based on the evidence that we have, that, I think, seems to be the most reliable ; at the time that the President was assassinated, he w^as already very much upset about the fact that someone had placed a black-bordered advertisement in the Dallas 310 IMorning News suggesting that the President was a traitor and it was signed by a man whose name was listed as Bernard Weissman. As we trace Ruby's activities from that point when he was in the Dallas Morning News office and learned that the President had been shot and the reactions of people there and following this on through, it did seem to me that there was a very consistent pattern that showed that Ruby was emotionally involved in the possibility that the assassi- nation of the President was an attempt to discredit the Jews, that this ad which had a Jewish name on it was somehow linked in Ruby's mind to a group, unknown group, that might have wanted to assassinate the President and pin it on the Jews. He tried to search for Weissman. He found there was no "Weissman listed in the Dallas phone book. Ho checked with his rabbi and found that there was no Weissman in the small Jewish community by this name in Dallas. He virtually did not sleep. He was on a drug, which was really a reducing pill but has a narcotic effect, called Preludin. Put this to- gether with Ruby's personality and his penchant to be in the limelight and all these other things ; Ruby was in a frame of mind by Sunday morning that in some way, as he said to an arresting officer immediately after the arrest, "I want to show the world a Jew had guts." Now, that does not preclude that someone might not have utilized him in that frame of mind but to me that explains what happened to him. I have left out a lot of details on this but I feel that was the basic thread behind his emotional state at this time. Mr. DoDD. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fauxtroy. You have made reference, in response to questions fromto comisel, has conduct ontheinstructions investigationwhich in a were given you responsible way that and the that staff^ the consequences of irresponsible investigating might be that a thermonu- clear war might be precipitated. Judge Griffin. Right. Mr. Fauxtroy. Do you recall what your reaction to that formulation was? Judge Griffin. My reaction basically was that if unsubstantiated or only suspicious but not really solid evidence were developed that this was motivated by a foreign government, whether it be the Russians or Cubans or anybody else, that then political forces Avould be set afoot in the United States, much as heard in Spanish- American War, that could have forced the coimtry into some kind of retaliatory attack upon someone. I did not understand this as a statement that we should not find the information or that we should conceal the information if we found it. I always understood it in the. context that we should try to get what we could possibly find out. If it led to these kinds of consequences, then we had to be very careful about how it was handled within the Commission. That was the reason that tlie Commission was stnictured the way it was, with important Members from both Houses of Congress. The hope was tliat if this kind of information which could trigger a demasoe: such as we were concerned with, the kind of McCarthyism 311 of the 1950"s, tliat it could he handled, in a responsible way within the political process. That is what I always felt it to mean. I still feel it was intended to mean that. Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Griffin, pursuant to our rules, at the conclusion of the questioning, we offer the witness 5 minutes to explain or amplify his testimony. That offer is made to you at this time. Judge Griffin. I would like to decline the offer. I would like to have the privilege to reflect on what has happened here and perhaps send you something in writing in lieu of any kind of oral statement to you. Mr. Fauntroy. I would be very happy to accede to that request. Judge Griffin. I again want to compliment the committee for con- ducting this investigation. I have read your rules. I feelthat if these rules are adliered to, that this will be a responsible investigation. Con- ceivably you could be in the same situation that we were in and you will have to wrestle with the same problems. I wish you good luck if you do. Mr. DoDD. We might find ourselves on that side of the table 10 years from now. Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you for that wish and for that compliment. The committee will recess until 2 o'clock. [A\^ereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m.] Afternoon Session [The subcommittee reconvened at 2:40 p.m., Hon. Walter E. Fauntroy presiding,] Professional staff members present: Chief Counsel G. Robei't Blakey, E. Berning, M. Wills, R. Genzman, M. Mars, D. Hardway, L. Wizelman, J. Hess, K. Klein, W. Cross, J. AVolf, and A. Purdy. Mr. Fauntroy. The committee will come to order. Pursuant to our meeting of this morning, the executive session will continue. At this time I will swear our witness. Ek) you solemnlv swear that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 3'ou God? ISIr. WiLLENS. I do. TESTIMONY OF HOWARD P. WILLENS ]Mr. Fauntroy. Will the witness state his name and address for the record, please? Mr. WiLLENs. Howard P. Willens, W-i-1-l-e-n-s, 4242 Mathewson Drive NW., Washington, D.C. 20011. Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you. We are very pleased to have you before the committee. I do understand that you have the committee rules provided you, and you had them prior to your appearance today. Mr. Willens. Yes, I have, Congressman. ]Mr. Fauntroy. The Chair would like to state for the record and for the witness that House Eesolution 222 mandates the committee "to conduct a full and complete investigation and study the circum- stanf^es surrounding the assassination of John F. Kennedv, includ- ing determining whether the existing laws of the United States con- cerning protection of the President and the investigatory jurisdiction 312 and capability of agencies and departments are adequate in their pro- visions and enforcement, and whether there was full disclosure of evi- dence and information among agencies and departments of the U.S. Government, and whether any evidence or information not in the pos- session of an agency or department would have been of assistance in investigating the assassination and why such information was not pro- vided or collected by that agency or departmenl^-and to make recom- mendations tothe House— if the select committee deems it appropriate for the amendment of existing legislation or the enactment of new legislation." The questioning of the witness may now proceed. Mr. Blaket. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. WiLLENS, I would like to thank you on behalf of myself and the staff for taking time from your very busy practice to come and share with the committee your thoughts and observations about the work of the Warren Commission, and also to thank you for taking time on October 31 to sit and talk with me in your office for several hours about these issues. Please be assured that the committee appreciates your giving up your time, which is obviously not chargeable to a client except perhaps the public interest. Mr. Chairman, I thought it might be appropriate at this time to put some biographical data of the witness in the record. I wonder, JNIr. Willens, if I could read some of it and you could indicate whether it substantially is accurate. You were born in 1931 ; you received a bachelor of arts degree from the University of JNIich- igan, an LL. B. from the Yale Law School in 1956. After a short tour in the Army, you became associated with Kirk- land, Ellis, Hodson, Chaffetz & Masters in Washington, D.C., mitil 1961, when you went with the Criminal Division of the U.S. General. Depart- ment of Justice as second assistant to the Assistant Attorney Following your service with the Warren Commission, you have served as Executive Director of the President's Commission on Crime in Washington, D.C., and I understand that you are now a member of the firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C. Is that substantially correct? Mr. Willens. Yes, Mr. Blakey. Mr. Blakey. Mr. Willens, I wonder if you would indicate to the com- mittee how you came to be associated with the Warren Commission? Mr. Willens. On December 17, 1963, the Deputy Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Katzenbach, inquired of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, Herbert J. Miller, Jr., whether I would be available to_ assist the Chief Justice and jNIr. Rankin with respect to their Commission responsibility. Mr. INIiller reported that request to me and, after some discussion, we reached the only conclusion that seemed appropriate^ under the circumstances, which is that I would be available to assist in any way that the Chief Justice and Mr. Rankin desired. Accordingly, I called Mr. Rankin and had an appointment with him on December 17 and, following that, a short meeting with the Chief Justice. After those conversations, it was decided that I would assist the Commission as liaison with the Department of Justice and in doing 313 the other work that was necessary to begin the Commission's work ; and on approximately December 20, 1963, 1 began to worlv, on a full- time basis, to assist Mr. Rankin with the work of the Warren Commis- sion. Iremained in that capacity until late September 1964, when the report was completed. Mr. Blakey. Mr. Willens, what were you told by those who asked you to come with the Commission what the goals of the Commission would be ? Mr. Willens. It was made very clear to me, in personal conversa- tions with both Mr. Rankin and the Chief Justice, that they saw the Commission's responsibility as being solely to obtain all the facts that were relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy and to report those facts fully to the President and to the people of the United States. I\Ir. Blakey. Did you have any discussions with Mr. Katzenbach over what the Commission ought to do ? Mr. Willens. I talked with ISIr. Katzenbach at the outset of this assignment and I had occasional conversations with him during the course of my duties with the Warren Commission. JSIr. Katzenbach gave me no instructions except to perform to the best of my abilitv and to help the Commission to do the best possible job that it could. There were, at the time the Commission was formed, as you know from the record, some differing views as to how to handle the report of the FBI investigation that had been produced in early December and was going to be transmitted to the Commission. This was one of the many issues that developed in December 1963 ; I was aware that Mr. Katzenbach had views as to whether the Warren Commission should or should not issue a press release summarizing the conclusions reached by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with respect to the assassination. This is an issue which had been discussed within the Department of Justice to my knowledge before I went witli the Warren Commis- sion and was an issue that was addressed in the early days by the Com- mission itself. Mr. Blakey. ^Y\\at did Mr. Katzenbach want done ? Mr. Willens. I believe it was the view of Mr. Katzenbach at the time that it would be in the public interest to make some sort of public statement summarizing the conclusions of the Federal Bureau of In- vestigation. Itis hard to recapture 14 years later the sense of bewil- derment and trauma that prevailed at the time, but there was a very substantial feeling held by very responsible people that there was an important public interest that could be served by making public at the earliest possible date some of the conclusions that had resulted from the investigation conducted to that point l)y tlie FBI. The Commission, as you know from the public record, reached a contrary conclusion and decided that its mission and the public interest did not warrant a premature press release with respect to the con- clusions ofthe FBI. The Commission decided that it should conduct its owii investiga- tion, that it should review the underlying materials and that it should not make fied as to what any public the facts statement regarding its findings until it was satis- did disclose. 314 Mr. Blakey. Mr. Willens, let me shift our discussion somewhat from your assignment and the goals of the Commission to the organization of the Commission itself. To your knowledge, was the organizational chart of the Commission ever prepared by the Commission? Mr. WiLLExs. I do not recall any organizational chart being pre- pared of the kind you have made available to me. Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if it would be possible to have the clerk mark as JFK exhibit No. C6 an organizational chart pre- pared bythe staff. Mr. Fauxtroy. Without objection. ]\Ir. Blakey. I wonder if the clerk could show JFK exhibit No. 66 to the witness. INIr. Chairman, I wonder if we can incorporate that chart into the record at this point in order that I may ask the witness some questions about it. INIr. Faunteoy. Without objection, is so ordered. [The document referred to, marked JFK exhibit No. 66 and received for the record, follows :] 315 O o CO c ►J. o u x: u tA o 0) ^ *JCO o o o C-H 10 (1) ^ O p"H 0) _ 3 W U U uId ui op: «) c »4 PtO. E H 0) QM O. tJi 4> ;t: c •a 4) U(d -P 4J O C E0) Id O *> t) M 2 CO *> Vl C -H EH • C iJ CO a CI > 4J Id •p tH D CO a CI E u u 0, r-l O •d E Id to 4J o Id CI 0 3 vi CO ao < a) i-J" CO H 4J 0 Id ,n: c -H u ' 0} Id to Z M D>U J: to 1 CO < -U 3 4J ht Id U eg Id •H S S C M CO 1^ 10 CI >i 1 U to +jo Id Vi ti ^^ H - 0) O «_ M -3 M U 1-5 to j: 1 , 1 •H C D rH 0) 0) J< Id « 1 > <0CI 1 SId rH Id 0) rH O >lld Vj 0) (h CO 4J C 41 U Id rH •HrHfl)>, .SiSOXU Ov 3 n>; ►i p:o Id to 0 to to >i Q to -H to Id • e O oi-H a rH 0> E 13 Id to , i rH ^ 4J ■r1 n) to Vl O -H J3 IS ■p CO iJ -Id E ■rt ^j -a e E o 0) C Id J3 • J3 Id f < >r> t< o: < f£, HE COD m Id C o W z •M W O- -QId tn S- to O 4J 0)o. ^ H (0 Id > o 4J P< 10 41 (0 ^ z z • c^ O-H-H Id Id o o s f) .H W p. a-u 30 +J -r< 3 H-< CQ PH M C) H £rt hoc; > O 0) & CO 10 H to a WId < « — 3 H C E iH X>i S O X ■J) 01 - c 0^ — ►J O Id 4J rH H Id-rl in H (S < Id j:; H •r1t> •O 3 s tn -o a" S- f-i W •PS-'H no 4) O fcij hi • :< <« c Oai-H> ■rl fe 15 K O O 3 u H 4J p: .-I W U v^ »4 O to >.w ^3 C 3 D>id rH>M M M o ll) u v ■H 4) cq «: h> ij tn Z lU X o >. •-< to o oid M Id ~JQ Z^ IJ oc w u o . 10 C C (9 M (m -rl OJ J5 >-*> 4110 >t 4> W >O -M-M E •rl ^•- rH c x: H-H Id H Id O" - c- •o S Hz CO ta- X)-r| E h> o iJ OJ 0 0) O-H o z •H>,c01 ■MoE; (1) u u *J C > U Id Id Id M Id O (U C •rl l^to u K a ■o ►3 o n >J< 0. «n oO • a) to h> d ro •H E H Id -rl *J rH rH Id -O Id n C CJ 4) • Id to 10 Id CO C3 O-H H 41 u -a to o o: 10 o >» 10 M C -H to IIH .rl o3 P 0 «w C 41 ►^1 »rH 1 Id p: 1 O "M o c 3 h> 4J I 41 •» U 1 o 1 1 1 u U Id XJ 1 5S o c O X O -H 4J to o 0) o o JJI n 3 0) CO Ti -H s to tJ< O Ji! C (J A ►J M C -H Id vi H >1 -^1 t7> 4J-H >1,10 O "O 4) 3 "O to IH o Id m CO Id < C (4 •o O 3-H • U • 01 a: > H 1.1 j:: 41 -H CO -x: s O H •H O •O rH U If) Id u> . Cu -H o «< rHto tO-rlc Id> c Q ■u Id WCI u >Au3 u o: n10 u x: £X oc Id IH Vi U M U rHx: Id Id to VI < P< a= H JC: rH «: j:: « "o w3 O4) oId U H CI iH VI Id" rl 4J z *> p: ox: ■4OH >irH O. 41 e- 79 1+3-819 0 21 316 Mr. Blakey. Mr. Willens, I have in the past shown you a copy of this chart. I wonder if now you would look at it and indicate whether, in your judgment, it accurately reflects the organization of the Warren Commission. Mr. Willens. There are several errors on this chart, none of which perhaps amounts to matters of substance. If it would be of assistance, I will point out some of those errors. Mr. Blakey. It will be of help. Mr. Willens. First I think it is incorrect to have Messrs. Ely, Lau- licht, and Pollak listed as junior counsel. They were employed by the Commission for limited periods of time and did have specialized as- signments, some of which fell into the areas indicated. Nonetheless, the title of "junior counsel" was reserved to those on the line above their names and they should properly be included under the category of "Others " assisting the Commission. Second, the description of Arthur K. Marmor as a historian from the Air Force is incorrect. Mr. Marmor, as the report makes clear, was on loan from the State Department. It was Mr. Groldberg who was a historian from the Air Force and that characterization should be prop- erly assigned to him. The third name on this list, as on others, is misspelled. It must be Mosk. There are references in the materials to Overholser which would make clear what his anticipated function was to be. He was at that time associated with St. Elizabeths Hospital. Mr. Shaffer, who was a former associate of mine, would probably take issue with the characterization of his duties as clerical and administrative. Mr. Blakey. Where would you place him in the general organization chart? Mr. Willens. Mr. Shaffer belongs where you put him ; as a matter of fact, he did assist me with a wide variety of investigative and supervisory responsibilities. Mr. Barson, who is described as a CPA, is from the IRS and was an agent from the Philadelphia office of the Internal Revenue Service who was made available to us on a loan basis in order to conduct the project of a reconciliation of Oswald's expenditures and income. Under the column entitled "Liaisons," this is the first occasion I have ever heard of a Mr. Davis, but that is not to say that he didn't do the job that is mentioned here. The liaison with the State Department was the Legal Adviser's Office, as indicated further on the list. The name of Yrmlisky is most certainly a misspelling and is prob- ably incorrect. It may be a reference to Mr. Yrmalisky. Our principal liaison with the Department of Defense was Mr. Nederlander. With respect to the CIA, I think it is more accurate to describe Richard Helms as the liaison with the Warren Commission. Mr. Rocca and Mr. Karamessines served as his deputies and assistants in that capacity. With respect to the Justice Department, I believe the record will show that Mr. Katzenbach designated Herbert J. Miller, Jr., to serve as liaison with the Commission and there is correspondence to that effect. Apart from those comments, Mr. Blakey, I think that the chart is essentially correct. 317 I should point out that technically Mr. Redlich, Mr. Goldberg, and myself did not exercise any line responsibility over other members of the staff. We were each serving as an assistant to Mr. Rankin and fulfilled those missions that Mr. Kankin assigned us. From an orga- nizational chart standpoint, therefore, the three of us should be in- dicated as coming out sideways from Mr. Rankm so as to make clear that we did not have and do not claim to have had a supervisory re- sponsibility over other members of the staff. Mr. Blakey. The basic division of the work of the Warren ICom- mission in the five substantive areas, and subsequently a sixth, take it, was as a result of a memorandum that you wrote. Is that correct? Mr. WiLLENS. One of the assignments 1 undertook in my first few weeks with the Commission was to make a recommendation to Mr. Rankin as to how the work of the Commission might be organized. I did write a memorandum in either late December or early January that proposed an organization very close to that reflected on this chart. That was reviewed by Mr. Rankin and presented subsequently to the Commission and did serve, with some amendment, as the organization through which the Commission staff performed its duties. Mr. Blakey. I wonder if you could share with us at this time your rationale in dividing the basic work of the Commission into five areas as designated on this chart. Mr. WiLLENS. I keep thinking of six areas, as is reflected on the chart. I believe the rationale is readily stated. In order to begin and undertake a project of this dimension, there has to be some arbitrary allocation of responsibilities. There is no way to do it that eliminates overlap or possible confusion but this was an effort to try to organize the work in such a way that assignments would be reasonably clear, overlaps could be readily identified and coordination would be accom- plished among the various members of the staff. It did seem to me and others who reviewed this chart that the various areas here did lend themselves to separate treatment, at least at the outset, when our principal task was to marshal the investigative materials that were made available to the Commission, try to identify those areas that needed additional investigation and to outline those questions that had to be addressed by the staff and the members of the Commission. Area No. 1 with respect to the basic facts of the assassination seemed to carve out an analytical and descriptive area that related to the trip to Texas, the planning for that trip, the security precautions involved on that trip, the facts of tlie assassination in Dallas, and the subsequent treatment of the President at the hospital. With respect to the identity of the assassin, it seemed that one of to iden- was that the principal tify the assassin or assassinsof*and undertakings examine all ofthecourse, the toCommission, evidence bore on that issue. It did seem to be an acceptable issue that would require separate staff attention. Area No. 3 was to deal with Lee Harvey Oswald's background. There has been some question raised as to how the Commission could assign staff members to investigate Lee Harvey Oswald's background at a time when it had not yet decided who the assassin or assassins were and whether Lee Harvey Oswald was one of the assassins. 318 I find that a fairly naive criticism of the work. We were not operat- ing on a blank tablet. We did have in front of us not only a summary report of the FBI but very extensive evidence, including physical evidence, indicating that X/ee Harvey Oswald was, at the very least, a prime suspect in the matter. We did feel that some initial investi- gation into his background and into possible relationships of interest and relevance to the Commission's work was warranted. The fourth area, as reflected on this chart, deals with the possible conspiracy. This was, of course, the second principal question that the Commission had to wrestle with, just as your committee may have to wrestle with it. Originally this area was defined more precisely as involving the foreign affiliations or possible involvement of foreign countries in the assassination. It was that area that Mr. Coleman and Mr. Slawson were primarily responsible for. As we proceeded into the investigation toward the writing of the report, we included in this area those findings that related to the possibility of domestic conspiracy involving Oswald, domestic con- spiracy involving Ruby, as well as the possibility involving foreign conspiracy. Area No. 5 was to deal with the detention and death of Lee Harvey Oswald. That again seemed, at the outset, to be, on the whole, a sep- arate area that warranted immediate and thorough attention by staff members with that as a prime responsibility. We did feel, in terms of the sixth area, of course, that the Presiden- tial protection area was perhaps one of the Commission's most im- portant undertakings because it was perhaps the only area where the Commission could make some contribution to the future so as to pre- vent future assassinations. As the chart indicated, Mr. Stern was assigned to that area. It was contemplated that Mr. Eankin himself would serve the function of senior counsel in that area. Mr. Blakey. I wonder if you could comment, Mr. Willens, on the process of communication between these areas as they were broken up. How did it facilitate the sharing of information and ideas? Mr. Willens. I mentioned that one of my responsibilities in the early weeks was to assist in organizing the work of the Commission. Another responsibility was to assist Mr. Rankin in the staffing of the Commission. A third responsibility bears directly on your question, Mr. Blakey. It was my responsibility to review the materials that had been received from the investigative agencies, particularly the FBI and the CIA, and to request all further information that would be relevant to the Commission's inquiry from those two agencies plus a dozen or more other Federal agencies that might have some informa- tion of relevance to the investigation. One way of dealing with the separate areas within which the lawyers were dealing was to make certain that all the materials that came in the office were reviewed in one central place and that any materials that bore even remotely or potentially on an area within the Commis- sion's work were sent to that area. It was frequently the case that materials in our possession were sent to three or four areas so that each of the groups of lawyers could look at the same material from that group's own perspective and decide 319 whether it had any relevance in the part of the investigation for which those lawyers were responsible. I continued that function throughout the Commission and always erred on the side of multiple duplication so as to make certain that the members of the staff in a particular area did get the papers which I thought they needed. Another way of coordinating among the staff was by the circulation of summary memoranda, which happened on a regular basis through- out the Commission's work. One of the early work products that was requested of the members of the staff was a summary memorandum that attempted to assess the investigative materials in their area, to identify investigative leads that should be pursued, to identify any policy or other issues that should be addressed by Mr. Eankin or the Commission and to make proposals for the taking of testimony by the Commission or staff. As those memoranda were produced in February and subsequently, they were circulated and available to the members of the staff so that the investigation could, in each area, take advantage of what the other lawyers had discovered and were proposing to do. A third way of coordina'^ing among the staff was perhaps more informal and related primarily to the ease with which the members of the staff could get together to discuss a problem in which more than one area had a particular interest. There was rarely a day that went by that we did not have lawyers from more than one area sitting down with respect to an investigative request, a list of proposed witnesses, or a i^roposed line of questioning, to decide what should be pursued in order to further the area's interest that each lawyer or lawyer group might have. This was subsequently formalized, of course, when we did have witnesses appearing before the Commission when the members of the staff would be canvassed for their suggestions as to what questions should be addressed to the particular witness. So those are several of the ways we developed to try to coordinate our work and to make as certain as we could that nothing of importance be swept between the cracks. Mr. Blakey. What was the relationship between the junior and senior s'^affs? Mr. WiLLENs. The relationship was one of professional collegiality. The designations of senior and junior may seem overly formal and hierarchial. In most areas there quickly developed a close personal relationship between the senior counsel and junior counsel and they worked together as a team. That was obviously more successful in some areas than in others as you would anticipate. Mr. Blakey. What was the relationship between the staff and the Commission ? Mr. WiLLENs. By this time you have probably heard a fair amount on that subject and I am sure you have had your own personal experi- ence here on this committee that can serve as a benchmark. No staff ever feels that the commission or committee for which it works is as knowledgeable as the staff. At the same time members of the Commission staff I think were sufficiently sophisticated and experi- enced to realize that the members of the Commission had multiple 320 responsibilities and were men of considerable experience in public life and could bring to the work of the Commission a perspective that some of the members of the staff might not share. The principal liaison between the Commission and the staff was i hrough Mr. Rankin. Mr. Rankin was the General Counsel of the staff and was the person to whom the Commission looked with respect to the work of the staff. He was the principal staff member who attended all the sessions of the Commission although there were other members of < he staff who did participate in the taking of the testimony before the Commission on a fairly regular basis. Apart from those occasional meetings with the Chief Justice most of the staff's dealings with the members of the Commission occurred on a sporadic and limited basis. There were several members of the Commis- sion, for example, Mr. McCloy and Mr. Dulles, who took a very active interest in the work of the Commission and frequently did have the opportunity to meet with individual members of the staff to discuss a particular problem or area in which the Commission member was interested. Otherwise the interaction was primarily through Mr. Rankin and by the flow of paper between the staff and the Commission. The flow of paper is best demonstrated by the records that I am sure you have reviewed and I think will demonstrate the effort of the staff to keep the Commission fully informed of the progress of the investigation as it was being handled by the staff. Mr. Blakey. Did Chief Justice Warren come around the office and discuss the investigation with the staff ? Mr. WiLLENS. That happened on occasion, yes. The Chief Justice, though, was carrying an enormous burden with respect to full partici- pation inthe work of the Court at the same time that he was serving as Chairman of the Commission. Some members of the staff, including myself, did have occasional meetings with the Chief Justice and he did participate in some meetings with other agencies that were of par- ticular interest to him and of importance to the Commission. I do not want to mislead you and suggest that he was constantly available for consultation by the staff because he certainly was not. He did deal on a very regular basis though, to my knowledge, with Mr. Rankin and Mr. Rankin was very conscientious in making certain that members of the staff knew precisely what the Chief Justice did want to have done. Mr. Blakey. You have indicated that Mr. Dulles was around the staff offices on some occasions ? Mr. WiLLENs. Yes. Mr. Blakey. Would you share with us what he indicated he thought the Commission ought to do in those conversations ? Mr. WiLLENs. I don't remember any general conversations with Mr. Dulles that are responsive to that question. Mr. Dulles did have a par- ticular interest in the possibility of a foreign involvement in the matter and was available for consultation with me or with other members of the staff who had some responsibility for pursuing the allegations and materials on that issue. As the record will reflect he did participate in some of the meetings and the Central Intelligence Agency in con- nection with that Agency's assistance to the Commission. Mr. Blakey. Did he have any ]:)articular area of foreign involvement in which he showed particular interest? 321 Mr. WiLLENS. No. M 1 o • 4. Mr. Blakey. Did he ever express any concern about possible Soviet involvement ? Mr. WiLLENS. The question of Soviet involvement was, ot course, one that was squarely before the Warren Commission. Certainly the fact that the assassin of President Kennedy was someone who had ex- patriated or tried to expatriate himself in the Soviet Union and spent several years there could only be a matter of the greatest suspicion and require the Commission's best attention. It is an area that is very difficult to investigate. Mr. Dulles and the other members of the Com- mission were very sensitive at the outset of the Commission's work to Oswald's Soviet residence and his marriage to a citizen of the Soviet Union and they were very interested in all facets of the investigation bearing on this and exploring it as fully as possible. Mr. Blakey. Did he ever express any concern about possible Cuban involvement? Mr. WiLLENS. There also was a similar interest in exploring that, particularly with the Mexico trip coming so shortly before the assassi- nation. There were from the beginning of the Commission's investiga- tion allegations before the Commission and staff that Oswald had been motivated in one way or another in the assassination by his dealings with respect to Cuba. Our record will indicate that several investiga- tive leads were pursued with respect to Oswald's relationships with pro-Castro groups and anti-Castro groups and various theories were advanced as to what his motivation might have been. One of these theories was that he was prompted by the desire to retaliate against the United States for its attempted invasion of Castro's Cuba in 1961. Mr. Blakey. Let me shift the focus of our concern, Mr. Willens, from the organization of the Warren Commission to the question of staff of the other mem- staff ?Did you participate in the selection bers of the itself. selection, Mr. WiLLENS. I participated in the selection of several members of the staff to the extent that Mr. Kankin asked me to canvass the avail- able applicants, to develop other applications for positions with the Commission and to make him a series of recommendations on the subject. I did do that during late December or early January. Mr. Blakey. What criteria were employed in the selection of staff members ? Mr. WiLLENS. It is particularly with respect to the senior staff that I have fairly limited knowledge. Some of the members of the senior staff were selected before I became associated with the Commission. I know that there was an interest to have among the senior staff men of considerable legal experience, some record of public service and dem- onstrated independence of judgment. The Commission was interested in having as senior coimsel men who, although they might not be able to work on a full-time basis, nevertheless would bring to the work of the Commission a seniority, a wisdom and a demonstrated experience that would help to advise the Commission with respect to its mission and provide support in gaining public respect for the product of the Warren Commission. I think that in many respects the senior members of the staff have been unfairly criticized over the years for not devoting themselves 322 full time to the work of the Commission. If I could just make two points on that issue I will make the following : First, several of the senior counsel did work very hard, specifically Messrs. Ball, Jenner, and Hubert. I know you have some work rec- ords with respect to those. I want to state with respect to those three men that they did at various times during the work of the Commission work every bit as hard as the younger members of the staff. Second, and perhaps more importantly is the fact that none of the senior counsel had been asked in my view to work on a full-time basis with the Commission. Each of them did have many responsibilities and I think in those cases with which I am familiar they made that fact known to Mr. Rankin and the Chief Justice. So it is I think somewhat unfair in retrospect to state that they should be faulted for doing only what they were asked to do, namely make available as much time as they oould to the work of the Commission. That may have been a mistake but it is not a mistake that I think can be fairly assigned to the senior lawyers themselves. Mr. Blakey. What criteria were used in the selection of the junior counsel ? Mr. WiLLENS. In respect to the junior counsel we were concerned with some diversity of experience in practice and in the criminal field in particular. We were interested in lawyers of some considerable intel- lectual attainment as could be measured by their academic achieve- ments and by their early years in practice. We were also interested in some diversity of views and some geographical representation. It seems clear from the hindsight of 14 years that we erred seriously in uot having several women among the staff. I think with those criteria in mind that we did find a group of lawyers who had the characteristics that I emphasized, independence of mind, some considerable experience, including some with extensive trial experience, diversity of views, and some modicum of geographi- cal diversity. Mr. Blakey. What accounts for the heavy predominance of Yale backgrounds ? As a teacher at Cornell, I am compelled by my academic associations to ask that question. Mr. DoDD. As a Congressman from Connecticut, I may object to the question. Mr. Willens. I am glad to find some support from members of the committee before I invoke any privileges on that point. They always told us when I was at law school that Yale produced more law pro- fessors than any other single law school. In this case several of the people to whom I turned for recommendations and to see whether they would be themselves available for work with the Commission were people I knew through the Yale Law School affiliation. I did turn in some instances to people who graduated from Harvard. At least in one case I recall he reciprocated by recommending someone from the Yale Law School. I do concede that there is here a predominance of lawyers from Yale sion. Harvard in the hope that that won't be held against the Commis- and Mr. Blakey. At least not by those on the committee associated with Yale. 323 You raised, INIr. Willens, the question of the time devoted to the work of the Commission by the staff. I think it might be appropriate at this time to ask the Chairman if he will have the clerk mark as JFK exhibit No. 67 a chart prepared by the staff based on the pay record of the Commission. Mr. Chairman, would you ask the clerk to mark that as JFK exhibit No. 67? Mr. Fauntroy. Without objection, that may be done. Mr. Blakey. I will ask that the clerk also show the chart to the witness. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if it would not be appropriate at this time to incorporate the chart in the record in order that I may ask the wit- ness some questions with reference to the chart? Mr. Fauntroy. Without objection, it is so ordered. [The document referred to, JFK exhibit No. 67 and received for the record, follows :] 3 'tn ■tr 324 ■^ ■<3 VD Si rH 00 CM rH •-\ rH in fO CM A in u ■* CO r-i SI CM O oST rH S in CM in %- rH nrH CM \ Ml ■a- in rH CM ;^^in CM CO \ tn >i U CO w rH rH CT> rH rH <-\ n ^ CO ^ ^rH r^ CM «a> (M m rH 3^rH 1 CM CM rH rH en -a- rH r- vr o sr in CM O o cr> CM rH rH H r-\ cy ^ t H CM rH ^rH \CM ^rH •^ CM CM CM o s VD in in rH rH rH %r i-{ § rH + rH in in ^ in CM rH •a* rH CM rH CM 2 cn rH P5 w « en r-\ rH ^ t- .-1 n cn , CM cn rH CM rH CO CM r~ <3 y. H in rH rH rH rH rH rH rH in in rH rH n a\ CO i-l oo •-S 1 rH rH rH r- •i Q -^f (0 rH rH rH. ■-1 'a- V) r- cn CO en cn 00 rH rH CM o CM rH rH ^ rH ^1 rH rH CO CM cn C7> en cn CM in CO to CM CM rH < rH rH rH P in o M CM rH ^ rH rH ^ rH n cr> rH rH rH 3 o m CM O cn o\ M- CO CM CNJ rH rH rH CM rH CM ro CM rH in rH rH cn o n ^1 cy> VD o i in rH CM rH rH CM rH rH •7. ' rH r-< .-1 rH rH ■a- 1 0) in >- 5 h ^ O • i 3 < •H 3 C -H 0) 10 (0 -rt 10 -P (0 Id ^ 10 (1) 'h u r Id ^ 0) 0) iH i-H I to iH OrH (u CO x: E u (0 Id w tn •d Eh o u •O Eh ua) e o0) +J 4J o X « ►o u M u 0) o CO 2 a: (0 o o10 W ■H •o z H Eh c •H M g •H >i to c — — > J ■P-H . x: Id w c; o c 01 J +J CO > -O to H < ai-5 Q CO u id -H 0 m (U H s 0) 10 lU W 10 •rH •H o c o X (0 Id Id CO O (0 : (0 c (0 en n w fc< Id < c UHw 0) M to W u ■o <- •H o « D m C Q m M n>< 4J 1b 4J WILLENS EXHIBIT NO. 1 398 Q. I show you what has now been marked Willens exhibit No. 1. It is a retyped version as you can see of JFK exhibit No. 66. Does that chart now accurately reflect the broad organizational outlines of the Commission ? A. Yes; I believe this chart is a generally accurate portrayal of the organization of the Commission. Q. Thank you. Mr. Willens, at page 8-108 of your testimony on November 17 I asked you about the various possible pressures that operated on the work of the Commission. Specifically I talked about the need perhaps to allay public fear, to bring about a smooth transition in the National Government, issues of international concern and the concern perhaps that the work of the Commission might become a McCarthy type of witch hunt. You commented at that tinie generally on the pressures that operated to shape the Commission's work. I wonder if I could ask you specifically to comment on each of these four elements. Did any outside source in any way put any pressure on you, and by you I mean the Commission and the Commission staff, to allay public fear ? A. I am not sure I understand the question. Professor Blakey. The concerns you have listed were indeed concerns that were in the minds of many persons following the assassination of President Kennedy. The question, it seems to me, is not whether any one of these concerns in fact existed but whether it operated in any significant way to influ- ence the Commission and its staff to conduct an investigation or reach conclusions differently than would be the case in the absence of such a concern. Although I acknowledge the existence of this con- cern, therefore, I do not believe that it operated to circumscribe our efforts in any way that affected either the scope of the investigation or the substance of our findings. Perhaps if you want to ask me a further more specific question regarding this particular concern, I can be more responsive. Q. Let me see if I understand your answer. Are you indicating that each of these four concerns were at least present in 1963-64 in the gen- eral atmosphere in which the Commission operated ? A. Yes; I believe so although I think your approach proceeding with them individually is sound and it may be useful to continue doing that. Q. Well, let me ask you specifically then. Can you recall any inci- dent involving an outside source in which an effort was made to pres- sure the work of the Commission, and I don't use that in a pejora- tive sense, to act in such a way as its work and its final report would allay public fear ? Can you recall any specific incidents in which that pressure was put on you ? A. No ; I do not recall any incident involving an outside source that operated in the way you have described. Q. How about from inside the Commission, either the Commission itself or the Commission staff ? Can you recall any incident in which staff members or Commission members expressed this concern and based work? on that concern made an effort to shape the Commission's 399 A. No; I do not recall any such incident. There was a discussion widely in the media at the time regarding this and the other concerns you have identified. Speaking from my own knowledge alone I recall some occasional discussion among members of the staff with respect to these widely publicized concerns. We recognize these concerns and we respected their legitimacy. We did not, however, believe that our investigation or findings should be influenced by them other than try- ing to do the most conscientious and thorough investigation whose con- clusions hopefully would serve to allay some of the concerns you have identified. Q. What about the concern of effecting a smooth transfer of na- tional power ? Was there any pressure outside the Commission on this question or based on this consideration ? For example, did the White House or anyone associated with the White House ever convey to the Commission a concern that its work go smoothly in order that the transfer of power from President Ken- nedy to President Johnson would go smoothly ? A. I am not aware of any such a communication from the White House to representatives of the Commission. I believe by the time the Commission in fact was in the process of conducting its investi- gation that much of the earlier concern regarding a smooth transition had been allayed by the developments of the months of December and January. I am sure you recall, however, that there were some allegations involving President Johnson that were before the Com- mission and there was understandably among all persons associated with this effort of a desire to investigate those allegations and satisfy the public, if possible, that these allegations were without merit. Q. Were you aware of any inside pressures stemming from thi^ concern ? A. No. ... Q. Were yourelations aware of any on issues m inter- pressures dealing nwithfrom national that bore the Commissio an outside source? . , A. Of the various concerns you have mentioned, this is the one about which I have the sharpest recollection. I do remember from discussions preceding my designation to assist the Commission and subsequent to my beginning work with the Commission involving this particular concern. As I mentioned in my testimony before the subcommittee, there was considerable speculation and apprehension arising from the fact that the apparent assassin of President Kennedy had lived for several years in the Soviet Union and had married a citizen of the Soviet Union. As a result of these and other facts there was considerable concern whether the assassination was organized or promoted by any foreign power and even if it had not been a part of a foreign conspiracy whether allegations to that effect would have a detrimental impact on the relationships between the United States and certain important foreign powers. Having said that, however, I believe that this particular concern did not deter us from trying to conduct such limited investigation as we could into the possibility of a foreign conspiracy. ,, ^ i j, ^ Q. In addition to the concerns stemmin g from Mr. Oswald s rela- tionship to the Soviet Union, was there any concern expressed from 400 any outside for admiration source dealingGovernment? the Cuban with Mr. Oswald's at least expressed A. Yes. I would say really that there was almost an equal attention being given to the hypothesis that Oswald's participation in the assassination was prompted by or a part of a conspiracy originating in Cuba or with supporters of Cuba. Q. Can you recall any specific incident involving an outside source bringing to the Commission either the Soviet concern or the Cuban concern ? A. Well, these concerns were being pressed upon the Commission from several different sources. First the investigative agencies and certain executive departments, in particular the Department of State, were bringing to the Commission their concerns with respect to these possible foreign entanglements in the assassination. In addition, the media were full of allegations and speculations regarding these pos- sible foreign relationships with Oswald. Apart from these as sources, I don't recall any more specific or pointed source that either was nec- essary or did in fact serve to present these allegations or concerns to the Commission. Q. I believe the record would show that the two principal agencies that you dealt with in an investigative capacity would be both the FBI and the CIA, is that correct ? A. Yes. Q. In general, how did the Commission perceive pressures from the FBI on the question of international concerns? Was it to find a ■Soviet conspiracy or to find a Cuban conspiracy or in the national interests to be careful in investigating that an international incident occurred? I don't want to put words in your mouth but you under- stand my question. A. I do not remember any pressure from the FBI tending in either of those two directions. For the most part I believe the record will reflect that the investigation of the Commission directed at possible 'foreign entanglements was conducted through the CIA rather than the FBI. On the other hand, the FBI carried the major burden with respect to investigating, as I remember, Oswald's affiliations with 'various Cuban groups to the extent those occurred within the United 'States. So the FBI did have a substantial investigative commitment in exploring that particular possibility of foreign enanglement. I do not remember the FBI treating this particular area of investigative concern with any greater or lesser concern or aggressiveness than characterized other areas in which the Bureau carried the major investigative responsibility. Q. What about the CIA, did they pull or tug you in any direction in this area ? A. It is hard to speak about the activities of the CIA now in view of the disclosures that have been made during the past several years. Q. I am really asking you from the perspective of one who was centrally involved with the investigative agency or of putting re- quests to them and receiving them, did vou perceive at that time that the Afirency was pulling or pushing the Commission in any one partic- ular direction? A. I recall two reactions at the time. First, I remember that the Agency was especially sensitive with respect to its investigative tech- 401 niques and sources and that they certainly wanted to encourage us not to make requests or more importantly make disclosures in the report that might hamper the further utilization of their investigative sources and methods. Second, my recollection is that some of the responsible officials at the CIA were very experienced and aggressive investigators with a very, substantial interest in satisfying themselves whether there was any illicit or conspiratorial involvement by a foreign government in the assassination of President Kennedy. In essence, my judgment at the time was that they were thoroughly motivated to apply their best efforts to learn what the true facts were regarding foreign involvement in the assassination although they recognized that their ability to satisfy anyone on this score was rather limited. Q. Specifically, did you perceive at any time on the basis of those people you came in contact with at the agency that they were pressing or advocating a Cuban based conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy ? A. No ; I did not have an impression based on my contacts that they favored any particular explanation of a foreign entanglement. I had rather the sense that they considered almost every possibility of suffi- cient seriousness to be explored by them if not by us. Q. In your judgment had they had that pet theory, do you think you would have felt the pressure ? A. I think that they would have felt free to set forth their hypothesis to us if they thought it might influence us or if they felt it was not being given sufficient consideration by us. In retrospect though it is hard to recall any very likely substantive discussions with CIA of- ficials regarding their hypotheses or the investigative avenues that we at the Commission would most profitably pursue. I have the feeling now, and this is probably based on more recent things, that the Agency was largely conducting its own inquiries separate from those of the Commission and sharing with the Commission only such results as they felt were absolutely required. Q. You were the person on the Commission who had the greatest contact with the investigative agencies, both in receiving and trans- mitting investigative requests, weren't you ? A. I did have major responsibility in preparing and submitting investigative requests to the investigative agencies. As I indicated earlier, I did typically review proposed investigative requests, dis- cuss them with the responsible staff members and pursue any differ- ences of views on the subject by presenting the proposed request to Mr. Rankin for his final disposition. I did also meet at regular in- tervals with representatives of the investigative agencies. Other mem- bers of the staff, however, did have very substantial exposure and con- tact with members of the investigative agencies, especially those mem- bers of the staff engaged in some of the more technical work focusing on the physical evidence. Q. But apart from Mr. Rankin himself you would have been the only had a perspective as broad as the Commission's man- staff date in dealingwho member with the various agencies, is that correct ? A. I think that is generally correct. My only caveat arises from my imcertainty as to what Mr. Rankin and the Commission might have 402 been doing independently with the agencies that I was not aware of. Q. So at least then from your perspective if either the agency or the FBI was trying to sell a pet theory of the Cuban involvement or the Soviet involvement, do I understand you correctly that you were not aware of any particular selling job being done on you. ? A. That is correct. This line of questioning has been limited to theo- ries relating to foreign entanglement and I am purporting now to dis- cuss whether those agencies had any institutional interest in the in- vestigation that they may have been trying to protect or further by trying to influence the work of the Commission. Q. Mr. Willens, for example, it has been alleged at least in the press most recently that the Cuban Government has taken the position that the CIA was at that time attempting to lay the blame for the assassina- tion on the Cuban Government and I am asking these questions most pointedly to ascertain from you who I would suppose to be one of the persons in a position to know or to have f6lt that pressure if it existed in 1963-64. Do I understand you then to say that if it existed you didn't see it ? A. In the sense of a strong and decided effort by the CIA to in- fluence us to believe there was a Cuban conspiracy, my answer is that I do not recall any such pressure. I do recall the CIA persomiel being keenly interested in the possibilities of either a Soviet or a Cuban in- volvement inthe assassination. I recall also some considerable disquiet about the Oswald trip to Mexico City shortly before the assassination. I am not sure that the agency then or perhaps now feels that all the questions with respect to that trip have been adequately resolved. To that extent I want to suggest that they were committed to investigating these matters, I believe, but that they did not have any special bias that came through to me at least in conversations I had with officials of the Agency. Q. I believe in your November 17, 1977, testimony you indicated that the principal person through whom the Agency interacted with the Commission was Mr. Helms, is that correct ? A. Yes; that is correct. He did have two deputies whose names were mentioned in my earlier testimony who also participated in this effort. Q. Can you recall anything in Mr, Helms' conduct that then vou interpreted or now that you might in retrospect interpret as an effort to sell Cuban-based conspiracy to the Commission? A. It seems now to be a matter of public record. The CIA in the years preceding the assassination of President Kennedy had in place plans to explore ways of assassinating Castro. It seems also to be d> matter of public record that the Agency did not in fact disclose these activities to representatives of the Warren Commission or, to put it am not aware that any such information was com- more precisely, municated tothe IWarren Commission. Q. We can come back to that specific topic a little later. A. Yes; but I am suggesting, and the reason I raise the question now is that this failure would have cut against any effort by the CIA really to focus our attention on involvement by the Cuban Govern- ment because it would have naturally raised among representatives of the Commission a question as to the basis for that hypothesis by the CIA and some further questioning regarding the information in the Agency's possession relating to Cuba. 403 Q. Did you perceive at the time any effort to push you away from looking into possible Cuban involvement or a Soviet involvement by the Agency? A. No. Let me just add that the record of the Commission's investi- gative activities will show the kind of investigative reports that we received from the CIA and it may be that this committee with the benefit of the last 14 years and other techniques may conclude that the Agency did in fact communicate information to us designed to mini- mize our concern about a foreign involvement. Q. But at least you weren't aware in 1963 that there was an effort to direct your attention elsewhere ? A. I do not remember any such effort. Q. All right. I have asked you the questions about outside pressures involving the Agency. You mentioned the State Department. Can you recall any effort by any of the people associated with the State Department; for example, Mr. Chayes indicated to you concerns by the Department of State of an international character ? A. My recollection is that the Department of State emphasized only the need to deal with such allegations carefully and responsibly. As I recall, there was considerable discussion regarding the substance and style of the communication to be addressed to the Soviet Union relat- ing to the work of the Commission. Q. Can you tell us more about that specific contact and the role of the State Department in shaping it ? A. I do not have a very specific recollection. My belief is that we consulted with the State Department on more than one occasion re- garding the kind of inquiry to be addressed to the Soviet Union and the likelihood that any such request would be honored by the Soviet Union. thatQ. itCan would you berecall the State honored ? Department's position on the likelihood A. I believe that the Department of State had some preliminary indication that a request for factual information with respect to Oswald from the Soviet Union would be honored. Beyond that, how- ever, Idon't recall whether we were encouraged not to ask particular questions or discouraged from the entire effort. Q. For example, do you recall making a distinction or discussing a distinction between public record information and I suppose I would call it police information? By public record information I mean a marriage certificate, application for a visa. By police information I mean internal reports of the KGB dealing with interviews or sur- veil ance ofLee Harvey Oswald. A. I don't remember that distinction but it certainly sounds now as though it makes considerable sense and might well have been discussed. Q. Do you recall in fact that the form of the request seemingly called for only public record information ? A. I do not have that specific recollection of the request that was actually made. Q. Do you recall getting anything other than public record infor- mation with signatures that you could not read ? A. No; I do not have a recollection of receiving anything other than the material such as you have described. 404 Q. Was it ever brought to your attention or to the other staff mem- bers or Commission members at least to your knowledge that there existed police information in the Soviet Union dealing with Lee Harvey Oswald ? A. I do not remember. Q, Do you recall any situation in which ]Mr. Helms discussed with you — by you I mean either the Commission or you being a staff mem- ber— that Lee Harvey Oswald was apparently subjected to police sur- veillance inthe Soviet Union and that the Soviet Union had that information ? A. I do have a recollection of either knowing or assuming that to be the fact. I do not recall what the source of my knowledge or assump- tion was. Of course Mr. Helms may have had conversations with members of the Commission, in particular Mr. Dulles, that explored the kind of problem in detail other than in any conversation in which I participated. Q. Can you recall anything of this character influencing the way in which the State Department requested the request should be made ? A. I may not be reconstructing this appropriately. My sense is that we recognize that only certain kinds of information could be obtained through formal diplomatic channels and that other perhaps more relevant or meaningful information could be obtained only through channels available to the CIA. We were trying to utilize both avenues to the best effect. I believe that the CIA had the responsibility for utilizing what sources and methods it had in those days to obtain such information as it could, Q. What I am really specifically worried about now is the form of the Commission's request and certain responses of the Soviet Govern- ment seemingly operated on the level of public information and I am wondering whether the agency and/or the State Department in- fluenced any way in which the Commission asked for information formally from the Soviet Union so that only public information was asked for and received. A. I don't remember the considerations that went into so limiting the request through formal diplomatic channels. I have a general recollection that we were depending on the CIA to get any nonpublic information that might be available to it. I have the recollection also that we thought it would be clearly inappropriate in a formal diplo- matic communication to inquire of the Soviet Union whether Lee Harvey Oswald was an agent of the KGB. It seemed to us that there was a certain futility involved in asking that kind of question through a formal diplomatic note and I assume that the Department of State would have strongly advised against so doing. Q. All right. Just to round out this point on a slightly different aspect of it, do you recall receiving either formally or informally from the agency any information that the agency had obtained other than through formal diplomatic channels on Lee Harvey Oswald from the Soviet Union? A. Yes. Q. Could you share that with me now? A. Well, I think such materials as we obtained are in the records of the Commission. I do not know whether they continue to be pro- tected by a security classification or not. 405 Q. For the record, you ought to be aware that the committee has access to all the information, both classified and not classified, that is made available to the Commission or is currently in existence in the agency. My question really was not designed to ask you to disclose classification information as much as to comment whether you were aware and more specifically of the existence of any Soviet defectors at about 1963-64 and any information that they may have had bear- ing on Lee Harvey Oswald. A. Yes ; I was aware of the reports from the CIA with respect to a Soviet defector whose knowledge with respect to Oswald was being evaluated by the agency at the time and as to which the agency even- tually offered some assessment on which the Commission felt it could rely. I do have a recollection also that there was other information originating from sources in addition to the defector of a kind that may have included nonpublic information of the sort you are refer- ring to. Q. Can you recall for us what the agency's position was at that time on the quality and accuracy of information obtained from Soviet defectors about Lee Harvey Oswald? A. I cannot speak in terms of more than one defector. There may have been others and it was my understanding then and is even more fully understood by me now that the handling of defectors by the agency is a very sophisticated and controvereial line of work. It is my understanding now that there was a considerable controversy regard- ing the credibility of the particular defector to whom I am making reference. I think the record probably has to stand as the best evidence of what their ultimate assessment was. As I recall, they cautioned us against premature or extensive reliance on the information coming from this particular defector but that near the end of our work my recollection is that we were given reason to believe that the defector had sup- plied some information that was confirmatory of conclusions that the Commission might otherwise reach with respect to the absence of Soviet involvement in any conspiracy. Q. Did the Commission rely to any degree on that information? It of course does not appear as such in the Commission's report and I would ask then as to whether any reliance was placed on that in writing the final report although there are no citations to the testi- mony of a Soviet defector either given formally or informally to the Commission. A. I really could not answer that question without reviewing the records of the Commission and the deliberations with respect to the findings set forth in the Commission report. Q. Could you make a comment in a general way? I am not really worried about any specific three lines in the Commission's report but rather that the general orientation of the Commission toward its conclusions. For example, the conclusion of no Soviet involvement or single assassin to the degree that the defector's information tended to support no Soviet involvement or single assassin, can you recall that defector's confirmation of those two theses played a role or was a factor in the willingness of the Commission to decide either of those two issues ? 406 A. It is my recollection that the Commission tried to resolve those two issues without reliance on the information coming from the Soviet defector. However, I believe that some members of the Commission and staff undoubtedly found some small comfort in the fact that a de- fector did exist who was characterized as possibly reliable by the CIA whose statements did not contradict the findings that the Commission was otherwise disposed to make. I think you can be confident that if the Soviet defector had stated knowledge of Soviet Union involvement in the assassination that the Commission would have qualified its conclusions with respect to the two issues even more than was done in the report as published. To that extent, therefore, the existence of this defector and the assessment at the time by the agency were relevant to the Commission's Conclusions. Q. Following up this same line of inquiry and perhaps jumping ahead in what I hope would be a very orderly discussion, nonetheless it seems to be appropriate to raise it here, the Commission had avail- able to it information stemming from what was described as unusually reliable sources dealing with the Cuban Government. Do you recall receiving a transmission from the Federal Bureau of Investigation outlining that the Bureau had an unusually reliable source of informa- tion closely connected to the Cuban Government whose information, if believed, would tend to indicate that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone ? I am doing my best to express this in indirect terms. A. But? your question refers to a transmission from the Ii'BI, is that correct Q. To the Commission. A. And by transmission do you mean something different than a report ? Q. Yes ; a letter. A. I have a recollection of a source described as confidential and reliable being utilized in connection with the Cuban aspect of the Com- mission's investigation. I do not have a recollection of that transmis- sion or a reference to a source from the FBI as opposed to the CIA but I may be mistaken in that connection. Mr. Blakey. Let me suggest that we take a 2-minute break and we can resume. [Whereupon, a short recess was taken.] Mr. Blakey. We can go back on the record. By Mr. Blakey : Q. Mr. Willens, let me show you a copy of what has been previously marked as Warren Commission Document 1359 which is a letter from J. Edgar Hoover, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to the Honorable J. Lee Rankin and ask if you would look at it, please. I might also note that the document also has a JFK document No. 002734. Have you seen that letter previously ? 407 BEGIN INSERT ON "d^ - ^ / ^ Coi,...iiP''lon No. /j-^l UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION TISUINCTON IS. D. C. June 17, 1964 BY COURIER SERVICE Honorable J. Lee Rankin • General Counsel The President's Commission 200 Maryland -Avenue, Northeast Washington, D. C, Dear Mr. Rankin: Through a confidential source which has furnished reliable information in the past, we have been advised of Borne statements raaae by Fidel Castro, Cuban Prime iiinister, concerning the assassination of President Kennedy, In connection with these statements of Castro, your attention is called to the speech made by Castro on November 27, 1963, in Havana, Cuba, durin:? which Castro made similar statements concerning this matter. The pertinent portions of this speech are set out in the report of Special- Agent James J. O'Connor dated May 8, 1964, at illami, Florida, beginning on page 30. According to our source, Castro recently is reported to have said. The source then advised that Castro's speculation vas based 408 Honorable J. Lee Rankin It will be noted that the information furnished by our source at this time as having come from Castro is consist- ent with and substantially the same as that which appears in Castro's speech of November 27, 1963, and which is referred to above. This additional material is set forth for the Cbnmission's information and no further action is contemplated by this Bureau concerning it. Sincerely yours, a.JL. ^ ^•' 409 A. I think so. Q. The letter in the form in which it has been shown to you had cer- tain sections excluded because of their sensitive character. Neverthe- less, do you recall the letter as well as the contents that are excluded in the copy shown you ? A. I do not have any recollection of the comments which were at- tributed toMy. Castro in that communication but which are not con- tained inthe letter as was shown to me. Q. Can you recall generally whether what Mr. Castro may have said at that time concerning the assassination of President Kennedy may have played any part in the Commission staff or the Commission itself being willing to find the absence of Cuban involvement or to affirm the probable validity of a single assassin theory ? A. I do not recall that we had any evidence or investigative leads implicating Mr. Castro personally or his government generally in the assassination. I am assuming that the comments attributed to Mr. Castro in that communication were not admissions that Mr. Castro or government officials acting at his direction had been involved in any way with the assassination of President Kennedy. Assurances of that kind were undoubtedly considered by the Commission staff and mem- bers of the Commission in evaluating the overall investigation and reaching a finding with respect to the possibility of Cuban involve- ment. My concern now, of course, is that additional sources of infor- mation may have been available to the investigative agencies with re- spect to this matter that were not fully exploited and results made available to the Commission pertaining to such results bore directly on the possibility of an informed conspiracy. Q. Let me ask you the last of the four elements that I discussed with you previously. Can you recall any outside or inside pressures or dis- cussions that reflect a concern that the Commission's effort might be a McCarthy-type witch hunt? A. I have the recollection that concerns of that kind were presented to the Commission both through the media and through other sources. I believe it is a desire to prevent any such accusation that the Commis- sion developed certain procedures with respect to its proceedings to protect the rights of individuals whose activities were being investi- gated bythe Commission and to exercise caution in the framing of con- clusions with respect to what the evidence showed. Q. Can you recall any specific discussions with specific people where the question of a witch hunt came up ? Not necessarily in those terms. A. As our records reflect, there was considerable controversy early on in the work of the Commission regarding the protection of Lee Har- vey Oswald's rights as a criminal suspect who could not be brought to trial. As you know, those deliberations resulted in certain procedures and safeguards being put in place to try to make certain that the Com- mission's sessment conclusions ofall the with respect relevant evidence.to That Oswald were is the onlybased on ainfair context as- which I remember this particular issue coming up over any period of time. From time to time there were published expressions of concern that the Commission not prematurely or unfairly reach a conclusion that because Lee Harvey Oswald had gone to Russia that there was a Soviet conspiracy. These expressions of concern balanced the other expreji- 410 sions to the effect that the Commission should not reach inappropri- ately any conclusion that this was the product of a right wing conspiracy prompted by conservative interests who were dissatisfied with the administration of President Kennedy. We had assured a wide range of concerns and wide conspiratorial theories and the proponents of each were pressing their theories and trying to urge the Commission to reject an alternative explanation. Q. Mr. Willens, let me show you what has been previously marked as Willens exhibit No. 2 which is a memorandum from the then Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to Mr. Moyers in the White House dated November 25, 1963. I take it you have had an op- portunity tosee that before today, is that correct ? 411 WILLENS EXHIBIT NO. 2A O { ■' y^ y ^■^■;; •C-V.^-i ..•-..;. Koveaber Koveitoer 25, ^>, 1963 i3b4 VJ.; uvV =r-^;"\- -c-V-O-f ■;^."- ■. >» • • . '• • . It Is impot^tAnt that all of th« facts . .v,;^iv'r;^:;,^; ^; ^^^i- surrounding President Kennedy's Aseaaoinatlon '^fs^'''^}^f^^0'^ made public in a way which will sfitiafy people in '^]-^:^fM<^ the United States a^n^ abroad that all the facts : ■-■i?^?^$'>W; have been told and that, a otatOKcnt to this effect :!^lf;^Xv' bo jnade now. '^^■:r:'::,,*.]^:y,,\^:^(i^^^^^^ 1« The public must be satisfied that- '<•-- V ' Oswald was the ascassini that he did not have ^> confederates who are still at largo^ and that ;'' the evidence was such that he v;ould have been ':-; convicted at trial, ; '':^.: '--^ ':-•::: :..:;-.. ^s:'-::-"-/-::H-^f^'i^'^^^yM "■.■., "'2,, Speculation about Oswald's motivation .; ou^ht to be cut off, end we should have eorce basis "i. for rcbuttlnf. thought that this was a Conraunist - ''vi.'T' conspiracy or (as the Iron Curtain press Is 8cyinfl)v>;^!^ a rlp,ht-v'in£ conspiracy to blame it on the CommunistSv Unfortunately t>iO facto on Oswald seem about too pat— >• too obvious (.Serxist, Cuba, Fussian wife, etc*). The Dallas police have put out statements on the Connunist conspiracy theory, and it was they who were in charge ;; .- was . when he shot and ~ "-J,-. :,_,■ v^i ^/:->-:I thus silenced, .' >r«''-i';'-*:■-'■•/;■., :-v-.ic-::: '. . • >^ ' .,. -_- ■', ■' 3. The chatter has been handled thus jfar with neither dignity nor conviction. Facts have been ^,-;, ciixed let thewith ruisour world nee and speculation. us totally in the Wo can ofscarcely ir.aRO ..,^'^^^;-'^ the ;/;,r;;^y::; Dallas police ■ • when our.-.•-President is murdered* . ' -- ^Vv>:i 1-1:' ... -.v. ..,-, iV. ■■-<^ ..•-? -i .. .>. .^.■•■'^'^^^«^-^'<4> I think this objective may be satisfied -'s^.'{:;;^ by makinp public as soon as possible a complete &n^')^;-.i thorou^li FBI report on Oswald and the assassination. " This p^y run into the difficulty of pointing to in- :;r':^-~ consistencies between this report and statements by.i^iyt^J Dallas police officials. But the reputation of the .:.':;j:S Bureau is such that it may do the whole "■■•^■-f^-^^r^job* V- .'>i,■.^■.;v .•"'i!^ '.'AJii '*'-■■;■.•»•' LI, oH-l"-/^ 43-819 0-79-27 412 '" * The only other step would bd the Appointment t'.::: of a Presidential Corcuission of unircpoachable personnel;.'.--^ to review ond exanine the evidence and announce it« /vV,f' ^^r conclusions*'. This has both advantaj-.^s and disadvantages ^^ It think it can awoit publication of the FBI Tepovt''y_^:i..y^ amd public reaction to It here and nhr<>ad»-\:'/V:\i^:t--^'?/iXjJ^^^ I think, however, that a fttatement that >> -;%^;* ' all- the facto will be lude public property in An'"---' orderly and responsible way should bo pade now* V7e : -i.t * ■>. need coirething to head off public speculation ^^:V > ; V. . ■ l\. .' - Nicholas de3* Katrenboch Vj^^ ;;';-'..• Deputy Attorney General v'wi'^.'ijJ 413 A. Yes ; I have reviewed this memorandum in the course of prepar- ing for my testimony before this committee. I do not have a recollec- tion of seeing this memorandum at the time that it was prepared in 1963. Q. Were you generally aware that memorandums of these kinds were circulating in the Government at that time ? A. I was generally aware that Mr. Katzenbach was having conver- sations regarding how best to deal with the assassination and what dis- closures, ifany, should be made to the public with respect to the assassi- nation. Q. You did not know then of this memorandum in 1963 or 1964 ? A. I do not recall seeing it at or about the time it was written. I do not believe also that it came into the possession of the Warren Com- mission but I might be mistaken in that regard. Q. At page 8-112 of your testimony on November 17 we discussed a letter of Mr. Katzenbach to the Chief Justice dated December 9, 1963. Let me show you a copy of what has been marked as Willens 2-B and ask you whether you are familiar with that letter. You have seen that letter before today, this morning ? 414 WILLENS EXHIBIT NO. 2B yJJUmS £nH»Cir ^Jrl I»»Mab«r •• Itei Thm Chisf Jttttle* Tlw f vpvMM Cottrt X^mr Kr« Oil«f JavtiMi At t^« dir««tiaA ef fr««id«iit J«^»o>f»» I •» tVMiSBittini h«r*«(i«iii to you mi^ to th« eth«r la^iri »f th« CcsB»is«i«» eop&ftfi of th« r«^ort of tte F»^r«l iaroAu of X«i^rootic«tlon oo th* «eo«««ia- otl«H ^ frooldoet >:onfio4y onO on tS^o ouboo^oont •hotttlBf of Loo Uorvoy 6««»«ld, Yott will ooto thot la »«M oopo^to tlio lAVootlfiotlon io ocmtiiMiBkg o^l_ fwrthor InforAotloo will t>o «mu)o ovolloblo to tbo Coonioolon «• it 4«vol*9«« Tho Socrof Sorvtoo oiu) tho DoputMkt •£ Stoto lifvo also pv«p«r»« roporto with VMpottt ♦• tbo i»ro^rotloiio Mtfo t» |««ri4t «f tlM StAto teptftrtmot wlt1» MO^oot to e«vol4« You «tll \iMwm th*»o proKHly* Tikis *op«ft i« iMrt • elosoifiod dooaoont «lii«o It 4000 mt\ «*ntftU dofonoo iiiforMtl«o« itowtvoi** «• luMTO b«oii tv««tlii« it «o o Hlieiily •Utslfiod damKmt «l4 X trott tfiot you ood tho otter «HK^ro »f tko CoiMilflon will do likowlso iMtil ottcli tifto oo yoo dJotorffino to roloooo aottors oottt«i«od within it. Mithifi tho CoworMMint it lo boinfi rood by « yory lijidto^l nu«d>or of pooplo en a *KOOd to know* iMioio* Tou wiU voooll that at tho tlM of OAiiottneins tho Fodoral loroou of InTootifation lawootifiation, and yrior to tha ap^latAont of tho CoooiosioA, Praaid»nt J^nton anKOoneod that tho TBI raport %*oald ha oado poblio. I hava. 415 hov«v«r, intvrwtl hi» of yowr rttquest th«t this r«r>ort not kit r«l«a««tf until th« Coft;»l«elcn h«s >t4d tine to t<«vl«w «11 of th« fdeta And evttlu^ts th«c>« At tK« »a«hi IIm* I «K sure you «r« «iMir« that th«r« is Mich public •P^cttltftloa *nd rv»ar in tbift cQnn«ctlon whle:i would b« 4l««lr«bl« to Allay «s quickly <^9 po^slMe. Tor ok.»wpl«, th« latest Tallap jioJll •hows th«r ov»r half thti Ai&«rie4n pocpla t>«liav« that Ottrald art«4 as ;>art of a conitrir*ey in alkcotin^ Pr«sl«i«nt Kannedy, AUil thar© i« ccn5icf«raM« ru«or In this co«»try and abroad to tho affact that ■ ji>y aotati as part of th« •«»« ur & rel^tac! con«|{rAcy. I think, tharafora. th« Co«>»i«sion sboul*: consi<>ar ralaatlng-— or allowtni* thr T)«pu?;h 9ciantific asaBLibatiou of avldaRoa, taatincny sn«r» and ethar tachnlcal a«i» asaiataJ by any ors.«ni>aticn, proap cnr f.ar^oa, foratgA or 4ofta«tie, in carrying out thie <3«star(;ly Act* In thla r«Kard, tha Fai hsa qu«stlcnad haodrads of ;>«»r- soaa mnd chackad out n«Biaro«to rusors tn%i raporta* To m»n naf,ativ«>* Ko oviUanca haa boon Ufieovarad indicating that any organijuiticn, f^rowp or poroon, inoluding Dallas ni^ht clab ovBor^ Jack Kii>y, wao inwolvad with Osvsld In ttci asoassinatlon of rro«ii»«i«ii «t «ny tis* you «Ho«14 Amsir^m I ar^ of cour*«« «WAy« «t yo«r Mirvico* Sine«relY your*. NlehoUa 2ld» staff :&»&tlx3s vaa caUsd by >tr» IteaMa to put •V- "befcaro tbet statT ell6sstioo3 of Ija©tl»Earwsy ^sfcioa of tl» Oasralii o3 taxproper handling luaawfccrvBr of the egent of th& Fedeoral Bcccesa of XoTsstl^lon o» other federal In^stl^ivo ..esdccar. ■ - ^-r. . ;^..^<.^-,y5. r^^'-'^-CitJv^ Mr* Eascasl» revlswed far' tb» tBesBjfcers'of tba ct^iff .Z!;'-?'. '- '. •>-r- 'ecaer of the aalies* facta rsgaa?aics thesa ellegations.^ Ka ^^c^ir^zejxjrt^A to thft'»t«ff oa tb» Ccsadosic^ at -Bhldh this' ;/^riatt«r wsa discu^eetl ^Itli 2texas officials Caaer, Wade, Alexscasr, .• ,JatforaSsi extd Storc7» • Ea eleo Twrought befcnw tba cseetljig tbo ■ • f oct that ti» FBI la t3>» GetaberUng rejorfc of Deceicber 23, I963 ■ teleiboca hod cHlttediwsber, iafoanaatlon llcezisdto lataiijor tbjs eifect that th& of Special nace, AQsnt ndcLress, Joises P. ^-'" Doaty,' JCr." of the JSallatt oftlea of th* FBI vas corrfcalcca la ..-:., : • ;^>' 0s«8iW*9- ©aaresa bc©>:»'-5!o ixcrpilsta tba foctiial jdctura )» • i^^-VV^J! .^r^tljpoloted out to tb» otaff thattb© Cccoisoica bad rsceived tl» ''^ ."' '" ^'''^^' letter of tba JCT dotea Jisauary gf, 1^ in vblch the f ^ict that Bcao of thla Itjforciatica vas coofcali;^ la Osvold'a 6^c»«i^v...^:J"^-^ .;.\ ' ..;«^^, .J.'n.. '^ -■ -> »< ^- . '• rCbo ojArdona of the rssEibera of the staff varied vldeOy. . J . Eoa» thou^rt that notbiotg cbcnald be done at this tlxos iratll '^ -. ve bad a further ojsjiartwnlty to tQpsnral^d fully tba vork of the '. .!." FEE, Gt vhicb tdrse e proper lettar cotOd bo atHxessod to tba , < FBI* Scco jaeoasor* of tho cteff tbou^ tbo oignlflcenco of *■;■ • thla csdsidca \na cot jwrtlcularly great and that no further .^ , octloa ehottld be tafe&n et thla tteo*' Kost of tba laecibora of the fiteff , bowrevar, thought that tl» cjnisaloa of the Jfoaty •--.-' Inforaatloso vaa of ccaialdBrablo l»cportanc& ond ccmld not ba ' ' Sr^-lsaieedLby,.tb8- Ccsp1«j1wv*;;33»» waa ais»Ctt»5loa' »• to-thoiy*' .•v"v ~- 423 g.XHa.B-4-T ^S >^,rfv-> tboo^bct 1i» FBT wasir tJila xse&tar that esatpessed t«sr» jointing 'brot^sht thio to Itaaaiasioa ottentloru out toTbatbe K3I Ed^ib la JToct prodaca box® occwrata rajorta by tbs FBI in tba ftstuxo- X et^gsssted tlisct tba (pxaxp^ consiibdr the possibility ct DSdr&ssias a lertter to tbe FBOC iftjich vould regvssst ca eaqplaaaafcioa Stem the Eureeu rogsrcULos this cfittter* Tba Kcjority :. ,. of tl» sjeoawaf* oS tha artsK prosentat the zasetlng aid not eeprc* ^v ,.- , . . - ^^ ^^^ ^^ ^ the gtMnbeofo o? tJto ct«fr ^^coaaide TogetJcgellI'!r«tb?EsuaJda r jT&certaBUggaat ed that of this protlea XDOxe fuUy «cd Inflieated that thean» -nould bo a mihseqyfsvA staff 23&etisg to dl9Ctta» thla further. .riM»-v •>. .: •••.. -.V-— .. .....,-. . -- ■ ■-*■-■ ..•■"■■■ ■ ■'.■•'■.•.'-•' ■> , \ ' ■ - ■. ■■*'.. o ■.• ■■' . ■■ ■ • " ■ ■ ..•"". 424 A. Yes; that is correct. I have had the opportunity to review this exhibit. Q. How would you characterize this incident and its impact on the work of the Commission ? do A.have"Well, themyrecollection recollectionas isindicated refreshedhere by that this memorandum andtheI the omission of Hosty information from Oswald's address book was, and I quote, "of considerable importance and could not be ignored by the Com- mission." End quote. I believe that was the predominant staff senti- ment at the time and we were generally upset by an incident which we thought was some question on the readiness of the FBI to supply all information forthrightly to the Commission. Q. For the record, at this point let me kind of summarize some of what the Hosty omission might be further described as. Mr. Robert P. Gemberging was a special agent of the FBI who acted as a coordinator of the FBI's assassination investigation. Gemberging's report dated December 23, 1963, submitted to the Warren Commis- sion on January 13, 1964, and labeled CD 205 contained a transcrip- tion of Oswald's address book but omitted the entrv of a name, office address, telephone number and license number of Special Agent James P. Hosty. His report dated February 11, 1964, submitted to the War- ren Commission on FebiTiary 20, 1964, and labeled CD 385, however, contained the remaining contents of the address book including the Hosty entry. He submitted to the Commission an affidavit dated February 25, 1964, explaining the original omission. Special Agent John T. Kesler who had reviewed the original transcription sub- mitted a similar affidavit. Both affidavits explained that the omission reflected Gemberging's instruction to the effect that Kesler was to extract all names and telephone numbers, the identities of which were unknown, together with any other lead information. On this basis Special it was neither Agent unknown Hosty's nor nameleadwasinformation. said to have been excluded because What impact did this set of events in this meeting that vou have had here have on the trust between the staff and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ? A. I think it had an adverse effect on the relationship between the staff and the Bureau that could be rehabilitated only over a fairly lengthy period of time. That was healthv in the sense that it alerted the staff to the possibility that the FBI might have institutional or other interests that were not fully consistent with the objectives of the Warren Commission. To that extent I think it caused the staff to exercise more initiative to review investigative reports more carefully and to make certain that the investigation could be fairly characterized when it was finally completed as an investigation by the Commission and its staff rather than investigation by the FBI. Q. It has subsequently become public that there was an apparent destruction of a note delivered by Lee Harvey Oswald to the FBI. Let me read to you a short description of that situation. Sometime approximately 2 weeks before the assassination it is said that Lee Harvey Oswald left a note at the Dallas office of the FBI for Special Agent James P. Hosty. The receptionist who took the note remembers its contents more or less as follows : 425 Let this be a warning. I would blow up the FBI and the Dallas Police Depart- ment if you don't stop bothering my wife. Special Agent Hosty has not acknowledged that he received the note on the same day. Nevertheless, he remembers it as saying : If you have anything you want to learn about me, come talk to me directly. If you don't cease bothering my wife, I will take appropriate action and report this to proper authorities. Hosty says he put the note in his workbox. He also indicates that on the evening of November 24, 1963, he was instructed by Gordon Shanklin, the special agent in charge of the Dallas field office, to de- stroy the note and a memorandum he wrote discussing the note and his contacts with Lee Harvey Oswald. Accordingly, Hosty destroyed them. Hosty testified before the Warren Commission on May 5, 1964, and during that testimony he made no mention of the note or its destruction had been instructed by the FBI not to volunteer infor- mation. he because Had you been aware of this information in 1964, do you think it would have affected the course of your investigation ? A. Are you talking about the Oswald note or are you talking about the knowledge that the Oswald note had been destroyed by Mr. Hosty ? Q. Both. A. If we had known about the Oswald note, I think it would have provided us still further confinnation of the findings reached by the Commission with respect to the adequacy of the liaison between the FBI and the Secret Service. If the substance of the note was more or less as recalled by the receptionist, it would have revealed a particular level of emotional intensity and capacity for threatened violence that might plausibly have prompted the Bureau to be more concerned about Oswald in light of the impending Presidential visit than was in fact apparently the case. At the same time though the note itself would have been largely confirmatory of facts already known to the Commis- sion from the FBI and other sources ; namely, that the FBI did have a file on Oswald and numerous contacts with him before the visit of President Kennedy to Dallas in November 1963. With respect to the destruction of the note, I think it is clear that knowledge of this fact would have prompted the most serious kind of criticism of the FBI by the Warren Commission. I find that reported destruction of a note to be inexcusable and the saddest possible com- mentary on the mentality that apparently prevailed in those days at the FBI. I do not think onr knowledge of either fact, however, would have prompted any additional investigation with respect to the substance of our inquirv that might have developed facts other than those that were ultimately set forth in our report. Q. Both of these incidents raise questions about the relationship between Lee Harvey Oswald and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. T am sure you are familiar with the concern expressed by some that Lee Harvey Oswald far from having an adversarv relationship with the Bureau as the note destruction incident might have indicated had instead an agent's relationship with the Bureau. 426 What significance do you think there would have been to the fact, assuming it could be established, that Oswald may have been an in- former or an undercover operative for the FBI ? A. I don't think I understand the question. Q. Suppose your inquiry into Oswald's background had demon- strated that he was an informant for the FBI reporting on the activity of an organization such as Fair Play for Cuba. Had that informant file not been more complicated than what I described to you as being among the materials considered by the Commission, would that (a) liave affected your investigation or (b) assuming that nothing addi- tional was known, would that have affected your ultimate conclusions about the assassination ? A. I certainly think that knowledge that Oswald was an informant of the FBI would have affected our investigation. It would have raised serious questions regarding the origin of that relationship between Oswald and the Bureau and any knowledge by the Bureau regarding Oswald's propensity for violence or his plan to assassinate the Presi- dent. It would have raised 14 years ago an issue that is very much in the newspapers today regarding the extent to which law enforcement agencies find themselves acquiring information from informants who themselves participate in criminal conduct, so at the very least it would have involved an investigation addressed toward that kind of possi- bility arising from Oswald's status as an informant of the FBI. I cannot begin to speculate whether it would have resulted in any differing conclusion of the Commission since by this time we are piling speculation upon speculation since it remains my conviction that Os- wald was not in fact an informant of the FBI as that term is cus- tomarily used. In fact, the destruction incident that we have just been reviewing cuts against any suggestion that Oswald was an informant in my view because the Bureau would perhaps have engaged in a more substantial reconstruction of the pertinent records if they had not been trying to conceal any such relationship. Q. Let me show you what has been previously marked as JFK Ex- hibit No. 71 which is a letter dated November 14, 1977, from you to me and ask you if you are familiar with it and its attachments ? 427 vsi^^ BEGIN INSERT ON /^ 002288 , WiLMER, Cutler & Pickering MANUEL F.COHeil(l*tt-l«77) r6«6 K STREET. N. W. llovo N.cunot WASHINGTON, D. C- 20006 STEWART A. SLOCK DONALD ClANGCVOORT OAVIO R. ANDERSON LACALANO H SlOOM.JR. JOHN H. PICKCRINO J. ROOOtiC" MaLER.IIt ALAN N. BRAVERMAM OCRALO J. LAPORTL HUGH *, M. SMrTM ARTHUR r MATHCW3 cABce AODMcaa: wickimo wash, o. c. ITNM BREGHAN ELWTN C LEC R. LIPSCTT CHRiSTOPHtR J. i>OGCff woLLCNaeno JAMCi 3 CAMPMU MICHAEL L. BURACft ChaNiXS C. OLOVU.XI. RICHARD A LOWE DENNIS M. fUlNHCRT INTERNATIONAL TCLEX'- 44O-Z30 RICHARD O. BURT RICMARD W. CASS ROBERT A. MAJOR, JR. MAIVSKALI. MOHMBLOWtfl JAMES SOeCBTSON MtNOT T. *»THf U«* TeLCx:ao-Z40x RAYMOND C CLEVENOCR,!! REuecM cutn* TCkEPHOMe C02 S7X-AOOO MICHELCB.COflASH BRUCE MAXIMOV LOUiS R. COHEN MART CAROITN COX ROBERTA.MCRCYNOLDS MARY a. McCAW SAMUn. J. LANAHAN MICHAO. R. ■LEIH RKTRIOA O. DOUGLASS A.A.SO*MEB,Jf>. STtPMEN A. ¥(ElS»»S5eR 5. ALLEN CARLT, SC eunoPCAN orr-ce A. DOUGLAS MELAMCD WILLIAM R. PCRLIK TIMOTKT N.aiACH LOWELL B. MILLER JAMES R- FARMNO SAMUU. A. STtAN SALLT MTTtM HANCT C. GARRISON WKJ.'AM J. PERLSTOn r. DAVID LAAC.JR. a CHCAPstoc AKROLOM.LCimAN NCALM.OOLODCRO WILLIAM I-R. RAOOrF RICHARDSON, J AOBCFT P. 5TIUHAMAN. JR. RAUL J. HOOe.JR. LONDON. CCZV SAA. CNOLAND PHILLIP CORNEUUS J. COLOEN, JR. REH^ TOWNSCNO ROSINSC MAIO.imjITT.J*. arepHCN r. buch TCLCPHONC OI-230-Z4OI COWARD T, HAND JOHN ROUNSAWILLE, JR. JOEL ROSCNBLOOM C. BOTOtN ORAT TCLBx: esi ae32-«2 ALLEN H. HARRISON, JR. HOWUD P. WILlfMS ttOMALO J- CRCCNE MICHAEL S- SCHOOLER CABLE address: WICRING LONDON JOHN H. HARWOODIE APtDRCW T. A. MACDONALO JAT r. LARN MICHAEL S-HELFCA OArL r. SCHUU ROeCRT A. HAMMOND JE KAREN KOSER SCHWARTZ November 14, 1977 OM*T 0. WILSON A.STEPHEN HUT. JR. DANICLX.MXTCRS C.LORINO ^TTON.JR. DAVID R.JOHNSON ARTHUR B.SPITZEH TtMOTHT B.On WILUAM T. LAKE JAMES T. HlLBRETM,m ALAN B.STIRNSTTIN ARTHUR H. weiSSURO czeiiieLO.STO00AMD NEIL J- HIHO CAROL ORESCHCR WOShA ARTHUR I-OARmHCR.jR. MULS.MorrsKT WILUAM J. KOLASKT, JR. ALAN s.w£rn COUMSCL ALEXANDER r WILES CANDACe S. KOMCtC VtCKI C.LAND ANNO.WILUAMS ROBERT G. WILSON mOCR M.WITTCN G. Robert Blakey, Esq. Chief Counsel and Director Select Conanittee on Assassinations U. S. House of Representatives 3331 House Office Building Washington, D.C. .20515 Dear Bob: In response to your letter of November 11, 1977, I will reserve Thursday afternoon for an appearance before the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I will plan to be present at 2:00 p.m. unless I hear from you before noon that you would like to have me come earlier. During our discussion on October 31, 1977, I men- tioned a letter that I wrote to the New York Times regarding the article published in that newspaper on February 23, 1975. Enclosed for your information is a copy of that letter. Thank you for the materials enclosed with your letter. Sincerely, P. Willens Enclosure 43-819 0 79 - 28 428 WlLMER. CUTLRI? & PlCKERING CI ■• U n Hint 1 ' ra..O (I 11jftONJOi* KiOG K SI lil.C I , N W. I'.inCNI ■flvt* iio»o N e-.in^ JOHN " •■ -IXINO P»HlH -.».<.) WS WASHING TON. t) C. 2000G »ii fill •. r iii*cii Mi*[l t CAOKN k lll>l'*C> MCl( ii-otH. n u*x nattn* JO>«N J H Bind aon-k HAMUCl » tTtfN mrHaliD » CaSl "■ H'»" ' v*«f BNAMUi MUCH • •• 5<«>M D*«>o o *NOcnsoH Mort. atmiric t.OW>t » 0»t»l>0"'t« J Boof-.c* -tiirp.m CARLC *DOOC55: wiCniNG WASH. .DC. nanHT o-r.Ha\r J nocca K-miiHrrnc MKKdf K r.o"*^'* c»>a(f9 I oinvin.iii j*-»-» •, <*Hriiri( tNirnNAMONAL Jt\.t>i:»*o- tin MOKinl *.M<»t>«MM Man* • M.CAW WltltAN A D>tfi:M ■•A»H«ti »on««'iiO-i 0rMN>9 H tKNxrar H(HII* t »*t(i »»ncti4 ^xrs M N COIOSIHO (•rat, f anaaMO ■ (x>ucv«a MtiaMco RCUSf* Cl**> j«»is ftotifniiOH ftttPHONC »o* e'Z-eooo . ftoacM) m MOHMti SJiHwri J (*««M*N (■«>>ir>(ii> c cicvtNcm.ra •r liatii f S H coa» no'nt"* CBCtM jaca B O-MCmS OUIIAH M rlML'k tOui* » COt't*. ^Kll* I •AOO'f cunoPEAN ori ICC IK>»*iO J. CaCfMI taHUCi • S'CAM MiCH*fv a -iriN JOMN •OUN'.aviiC.A. Hf-IH a *>«i»*ssrM Monrat c Hamca 'BMOlO »< »«I»M»M •ontitf » «t«*H*Hk>i I.J" iiMOi»> N ni*c« OaviU R MaMrg (KANNi e »trt»» t»fOI>oni «.%■*•» Mkl O INWMI, JA a«ll> ■aifiH •iifN H,«a■. id. LONDON, fCSw A*A,rNGl*NO . Micxart S Hiiicn PCWOtal 0 tMDHnOM.JII. jiiaN i wtirt jon ■o'vr'.ii'Xt" caw* O WHAtiM CMJI J MlttK. jn fttf'MIONI Ot ?1« ««OI Mh) ( MtD'.nM w*iiL« r. wtHSim*. jM. V • tM>l AHO C WltllMM CAULC irti « ; '"•! <•" •■■'** AUPMl.ti-J; WICIIINO.IONUOM A »t(M|M MUl JM. cm COUMSCI,5H>IM February 24, 1975 u'; Mr. Ben A. Franklin Washington Bureau The New York Times 1920 L Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Dear Mr. Franklin: * I appreciate the professionalism with which you appronchcd the story on tlie Warren Commission which was published in the Times (page 32) on Sunday, February 23, 1975. I disagree strongly, however, v/ith the suggestion that relevant material was v/ithheld from the Commission. I fee} that once again the New York Times has been used by those who desire, for motives beyond my comprehension, to discredit the conclusions of the Warren Commission. The following are my reasons for believing that your story is fundamentally inaccurate. First, there is clear evidence in the Commission's record that the Bureau memorandum dated June 3, 1960, was reviewed by the Commission. I offer the following facts in support of this assertion: (a) The memorandum was found in tfie National Archives among tl\o Commission's official papers. In the absence of any credible suggestion tliat the memorandum was inserted into those files after the Commission concluded its work, T hope you wi] 1 agree that its presence alone in the National Archives suggests that it was given appropriate consideration by the Commission before its Report was published. 429 (b) The Commission stated in its Report (page 433) that it reviewed "the complete files on Oswald, as they existed at the time of the assassination, of the Depart- ment of State, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the FBI and the CIA." Both an FBI spokesman and I confirmed that the Uurcau files on Oswald were in fact reviewed as asserted in the Commission's Report. In the absence ._ of any credible evidence that the Conruiiission, the Bureau or I wore lying or that the June 3, lOGO, mcn>orandum was not in tlie files at the time of the Commission's review, I believe it is reasonable to suggest that the Commission's statement should be considered valid. (c) The Commission's own public documentation confirms that the June 3, 1960, memorandum was in the FBI files reviewed by the Commission. Commission Exhibit No. 834, published in Volume XVII at pages 804-813, is a letter from the Bureau to the Commission dated May 4, 1964, which lists the contents of the FBI file concerning Osv/ald up to November 22, 1963. Item 14 is described as follows: "A letter from fhis Bureau to the Department of State dated June 3, 1960, furnishing the State Department data in the possession of the FBI concerning Lee Harvey Oswald and requesting the State Department to furnish this Bureau any information it may have concerning Oswald." This is obviously the same memorandum which your story alleges was withheld from the Commission. Second, your story demonstrates the risks inherent in relying upon the fragmentary and hastily solicited recollections of selected members of the Commission's staff. I am confident that none of the staff members interviewed, if they had boon aware of my statements to you and the facts summarized above, would have asserted that the memorandum in question was with- held from the Commission. Let me amplify a bit: (a) Contrary to thf> suggestion in your Rtory, the rosixins i l)i li ty for chocking out iiimorf. wnr. nol- an;: Lgncd oxc I iisi voly lt> any two or i:ln-<><> inombiMS of th(! Ci)mm ission ' s KtuEl". This was a responsibility of all the iiioinbcrs of the staff, operating witliin the general parameters of their individual assignments. It is not surprising to me, there- fore, thiit neither Mr. Slnwson nor Mr. Colt^mnn recall this particular memorandum. Tlie memorandum is both without substantive significance and irrelevant to tlie area of coiiciMii 111 Mossr;;. 5;l.iw;;<)n oncl Colciii.in, !;inco it in concerned not with Ihe acLivi tic:; of Or.waUI abi-oad but ratlicr with the "possibility" that someone might somewhere, at some time, seek to pose as Oswald using his por.'ional documents. 430 (b) The responsibility for reviewing the files . . in existence at the time of tlie assassination in the possession of the Bureau and other intelligence ayenciea was specifically assigned to one member of the staff. This task was given to Samuel A. Stern, currently one of my law partners, who had primary responsibility for studying tlie area of Presidential protection and making appropriate recommendations. For various reasons, both " Mr. nankin and I also took a particular interest in this area of the Commission's work. It was in that connection that I personally took upon myself the responsibility for reviewing the Bureau file on Oswald as it existed at the time of the assassination. In short, it is my best recollection that at least two members of the staff — Mr. Stern and I — reviewed the FBI files which contained the June 3, 1960, memorandum. I expect that we were also responsible for ensuring that this memorandum, and indeed most of the contents of the Bureau file, found its way to the Commission and into its files. (c) The concern expressed by the Bureau of the "possibility" that an imposfccr could be using Oswald's identification data was not. the kind of rumor or allega- tion which had to be dealt with in the "Speculations and Rumors" section of the Commission's report. As is apparent from this section of the Report, it was intended to rebut those widespread allegations which, if true, would contradict the conclusions reached by the Commission on the critical issues, i.e., did Oswald shoot the President, did he act Slone, was he an agent of a foreign power, etc. I hope agree that you willJune the Bureau's suggestion of a "possibility in its 3, 1960, memorandum did not require separate analysis and publication in the Report. Among other reasons, no facts were advanced by the Bureau, or subsequently came to the attention of the Commission' s staff, that an effort to use Oswald's papers as feared by the Bureau in 1960 had, in fact, been made by anyone other than Osv/ald himself. Third, your story demonstrates how the critics of the Warren Commission have demonstrated such an impressive ability to survive. Unable to find any real substantive grounds for al.L.u;kin.j I hi- Comni i .■;:; ion ' s woik, llicy hnvo .oni-cn Li .il.cil on llio prococlnro.s followod by tlio Coinmir.sJon and i t.s .-.taff. As you recognized In |.i is no rc>i\son to believe that llic Hiiii'.-iii iiu>iiior.iii(liiiii of .'linu? 3, ]'yC>0 -- cvcmi if it hnrl not been seen by the Commission — in any way impeached the lindings of the Commission. But, of course, it was seen, and 1 hoiJO you will ntjroc that onco Lhi.'; fact i 5: accopLcd there w.ts simply no story worthy of either your time or space in the Times. 431 As T iiionl. i.onccl over tlie phone, I linvo boon reasonably discrooL duriiuj Lhc (inst dccadi; idjoiiU my worl; with the Warren Conuiiission. 1 hiivc uryod n liiiiii lar course, ivi th limited success, vipon mnny of my former fissocintos. I hayo v/ritton this letter, howovt-r, hoi':nii.';o my |.>.nl. i t-nce In:; fiiinlly liecn cxhtnnstod mid bocaujic your article provides such a graphic example of human and Instiknl. i oiu'il frail tio.s. T hope you will not take this li'l.l;iM- pimmL5sion concluded had shot may have concerning subject the President — and who was shot to death by Jack Ruby two willTwo be appreciated," interna! State Depart- days later — was identified by ment memos transmitted Mr. his mother and other relatives Hoover's warning. One, dated and also by fingerprints and June 10, 1960, went to the de other physical features as that partmenfs Soviet desk. The of Lee Harvey Oswald. other, dated March 31, 1961. But the apparent withholding was senj from one section of of information from the com the Passport Office to another. mission investigators respon- Concern on Passport sible for checking Oswald's ac- The latter memo Indicated tivities inforeign countries sup- ported atheory of some critics concern 'that a revalidated pass- of the commission's final re preparation port to be issued to Oswald in' port that the panel had come the United States for his return to in June, 1962. to its conclusion regarding Os- not be mailed to him through wald without having had all the facts. the_ Soviet postal system but be A spokesman for the F. B. I. delivered to him "only on a per- said, in response to questions, Moscow. sonal basis" at the Embassy in that "we can definitely, state, The Warren Commission sub- without hesitation, that a copy of the Hoover memo was shown sequently developed that in Ju- to a member of the Warren ly. 1961, Pswald's passport was Commission staff in the pres- handed back to the man who Moscow Embassy officials were ence of an F. B. I. agent." How- satisfied was the same Oswald ever, the spokesman said that he could not identify the com- they had first met in 1959, mission staff member to whom when he angrily announced his the memo reportedly had been intention to renounce his citi- fhown. Neither J. Lee Rankin, zenship. The Slate Department the former general counsel of had ruled by then that he had the commission, nor any of his not given up his citizenship. former staff aides who were None of these documents — most involved in investigatini; not the Hoover memo nor cither of the State Department memos Oswald's background said they could remember seoiiig it. was wald in However, Howard P. Willcns, file asthei< department's was given to Os- the now a private lawyer here, Warren 'Commission in 19<>-1. identified- himself in an Inlcr- >«Mntfr •«-<..,, >r il ii I ■li|i 1 1 mTnT accordiiM; t " c Sccrr- the lull Oswald (,le, wss inter- lary of Transpr.rtalion, was askrd during an interview COW, where viewed by he telephone in Mos-'a was attending whether mrmris. be had seen the ., legal He conference. .said he hud no inemury u( "Il'it been 10 vcars." he said. 484 A. Yes ; I am. Q. The letter and attachments speak pretty much for themselves. Nevertheless, is there anything that you would like to add for the record at this time about the newspaper article and your own previous letter which is an attachment to your letter of November 14, 1977 ? A. No. Q. Let me turn your attention now to the relationship between the agency, the CIA, characterize and the Warren that relationship Commission.or uncooperative as cooperative "Would you generally or none of the above ? A. I would describe it as cooperative. Q. How would you describe their performance on the question on the issue of time? Were they timely in their responses with you? A. Yes ; I think they generally were although I think there were one or two investigative requests that were not responded to promptly. Q. We previously talked about the possible adversary character of the relationship between the Commission and the Bureau. Did a similar relationship, however characterized, exist or come to exist between the Commission and the agency ? A. I did not think so at the time although with the benefit of hindsight it probably should have. Q. We have also previously discussed the dynamics of the nature of the investigation shifting to some degree from the Bureau to the Com- mission. Did a similar process take place between the agency and the Commission ? A. I would not describe it in the same way. We made many fewer investigative requests of the CIA than we did of the FBI and I cer- tainly never had the impression that the CIA felt restrained in any way from doing what it thought was necessary or useful in connection with conducting any inquiry that it wished to with respect to the assassination. Q. Did they in fact furnish a great deal of information to the Com- mission on their own initiative that was not in response to the specific questions by the Commission ? A. I recall very little information that was submitted by the CIA other than in response to a specific Commission request. Q. Let me show you what has been previously marked as JFK ex- hibit No. 62 which is a series of items basically dealing with a request made by the Commission of the Agency and on the top having a memorandum in your own handwriting apparently dated March 12, 1964. You have had an opportunity before today to see these docu- ments, have you not ? [For a copy of JFK 62, see supra^ testimony of Burt Griffin.] A. Are you referring to all the materials that you have just handed me? Q. No; I am primarily referring to the materials associated with your shoit cover memorandum. A. Yes, I have seen these before. Q. Can you recall to whom the request in the Agency was given? A. Well, as I see by reference to a letter dated May 19, 1964, from Mr. Rankin to Mr. Helms that the memorandum of February 24, 1964, was delivered to Mr. Helms at a meeting on March 12, 1964. That 435 would coincide with my recollection of how we generally conducted business with the CIA. But you had no specific memory of giving it to Mr. Helms? Q. No. A. Q. Can you recall why the investigative request was apparently held for approximately 16 days from the time the draft memorandum was given to you until you recall it having been given to Mr. Helms ? A. No ; I don't have a recollection of the reasons for the decision to handle the matter at a meeting rather than by correspondence. I think we all anticipated that the matter would require discussion with the CIA representatives and it maj be that we had a meeting with the CIA for other reasons and decided simply to add this to the agenda of such a meeting. I don't recall that there was any particular con- troversy about any inquiry to the CIA for a review of files to acquire what information they might have in those files relating to Ruby or other persons whose names arose during the course of the Ruby investigation. Q. If only this written record were examined, it would tend to in- dicate that it took from approximately March to September for the Agency to respond to this request. There is testimony before the com- mittee that the written record does not always adequately reflect the verbal communications. Does that square with your memory? A. Well, as I indicated, I did recall a few investigative requests that were not responded to promptly by the CIA. This may have been one of those that I had in mind. 1 am confident that the failure to respond more promptly was undoubtedly brought to my attention either by Mr. Hubert or Mr. Griffin with the request that some follow- up be made as to the reasons for the delay. I do not recall personally, however, any conversation that I had with a CIA representative on this subject. Q. Assuming this written record is correct or approximately cor- rect, would delays of this magnitude have been typical of the Agency's response ? A. I don't believe that delays of that kind would have been typical. Also, I think that the agency was more responsive to our request than this particular written record would suggest. I am reasonably confi- dent that if the agency had any information in its files with respect to Ruby or other of the figures mentioned in that memo they would have advised us orally before any written response was made so as to give us the substance of our information before they confirmed it in writing. Q. You recall then that there was an extensive oral dialog between the agency and the Warren Commission ? A. I would not describe it as extensive but there were certainly oc- casional telephone conversations relating to investigative requests and I am surmising, and that is all it is, that the CIA might well have informed us of the substance of the September communication if my date is correct in oral form before they confirmed it in writing. Much of the correspondence in September was designed to confirm on the record information that had been previously communicated orally so that a committee such as this would have a firmer factual record on which to proceed than the clouded recollections of ancient staff members. 436 Q. I do understand you correctly saying though that if one were only to come and read the written record, one might come up with an impression of substantial delays that in fact might have had impact on the work of the Commission where in fact they did not because oral communications had been made. What I am really getting at, Mr. Wil- lens, is that, as I am sure you are aware of, critics have analyzed the record of the Warren Commission and through a series of Freedom of Information suits the forms of the CIA, and relying largely on the written record and not the memory of ancient staff members, have sharply criticized the agencies for not being responsive to the Warren Commission and I am trying to get for our record your judgment whether that kind of criticim where it is based only on the written record is wholly accurate or wholly fair. A. No ; I don't think it is wholly accurate because the written record provides only a partial record of what actually transpired. Q, Let me change the direction a little bit of my questions. Since 1964 it has been public knowledge that the Central Intelligence Agency and certain organized crime figures were involved, as you previously indicated, in efforts to assassinate Premier Castro. Had you been aware of the relationship between agency personnel and organized crime figures in this kind of activity, do you think it would have af- fected the course of the Warren Commission's investigation ? A. Yes; I think knowledge of that particular relationship might have prompted a specific investigative request to the CIA to utilize those relationships and sources to find out what Cuban involvement, if any, existed with the assassination. It may have been that the CIA utilized these relationships and sources independently and satisfied themselves that no evidence of Cuban involvement could be developed through these relationships and sources. I do not know what in fact they did on this subject. In response to your question, however, if we had known of these relationships, we would have requested that every effort be made to exploit these rela- tionships and sources and to report to the Commission the results of any such inquiries. I cannot state now that that would have in any way changed the ultimate findings of the Commission but it would have added another dimension to our investigative effort. Q. Let me take two possible examples of investigative decisions and let's see if we cannot analyze them with some hindsight. I^t me show you initially the exhibit previously marked as JFK exhibit No. 65. I believe you had an opportunity to review this memorandum previously. On November 17 we discussed at least preliminarily the question of to what degree the Commission reviewed various phone records. This memorandum raises that general question. Had you known of the Mafia-CIA plots involving Premier Castro, in retrospect now do you think you might have pursued an effort to trace the telephonic communications through toll records to a greater extent than you did? A. I think that is possible but I think it probably would have been done on a more focused basis than was proposed in this memorandum of February 24, 1964. We are discussing now a course of investigation prompted by full disclosure by the CIA of its relationships with or- 437 ganized crime figures in connection with a possible assassination of Premier Castro. If we had been confided in by the Agency, we might jointly have concluded that certain extensive investigative efforts should be directed at particular members of organized crime or particu- lar time frames when those persons might have been in Cuba or in com- munication with people in Cuba or in some other way have had leads that would have permitted a focused and potentially useful course of investigation. In other words, knowing of the CIA's relationship with a handful of organized crime figures with respect to a potential Cuban assassination does not necessarily make appropriate a broad scale review of all telephone records of all organized crime figures who might have any relationship whatsoever with the assassination. Q. Apart from the question of the CIA's relationship to organized crime figures that might have prompted additional investigation, was it presented to you as an active possibility that organized crime figures on their own might have been involved in the assassination? A. That was one of the main allegations that was reflected in the original investigative material supplied by the FBI. Q. Was it ever brought to your attention in 1963 or 1964 that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had conducted extensive unlawful electronic surveillance of the major figures involved in organized crime in the period of 1963, 1964 ? A. I do not think so. Q. You seem somewhat hesitant in answering me. Do you have a little bit of a memory that you may have known about it or heard about it ? A. Well, there is so much that has come to light in the intervening 14 yearsof with Some respect to surveillance the electronic the FBI's techniques that I didofbecome electronic surveillance. aware of in my capacity as a supervisory lawyer in the Criminal Division related to what I believe was considered lawful electronic surveillance at the time but then again I have a feel where you are the expert and so it is unfair to me that I have any recollection here that is useful to you. Q. Let me be a little more specific. The committee has had brought to its attention that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had hot wire taps that were at that time thought to be lawful under section 605 of the Federal Communications Act where there was only interception and no public disclosure but rather bugs — that is, electronic bugs — placed inside a home or an office, that the Bureau had in ex:istence somewhere between 75 and 100 bugs on the major figures of organized crime specifically — ^the Costa Nostra in New York, Chicago, Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Detroit and some on the west coast — that hundreds of volumes of logs and notes based on the work of the investigative clerks in listening to this existed within the FBI in 1963 and 1964. Was either the existence of this program or the products of that program ever brought to the attention of the Warren Commission? A. I do not recall. I was aware that an extensive investigative pro- gram was underway with respect to organized crime. I had every reason to believe that the FBI and the Criminal Division which had responsibility for the overall prosecutorial effort would bring to the 438 attention of the Warren Commission any information developed by any source that pertained to the work of tlie Warren Commission. I was aware also that the Bureau would frequently submit investiga- tive reports attributing information to confidential but undisclosed sources. To that extent I was aw^are that there were sources to which the Bureau attached a considerable confidence and importance and so it may be that those undisclosed and confidential sources were the means by which information obtained through this program that you referred to was made available to the Department of Justice or to the Warren Commission. Q. To your knowledge was there any effort made by the Commis- sion, by the Department of Justice or the Bureau to survey that electronic surveillance to determine whether there was any indication in it either direct or circumstantial that any of the major figures of organized crime might have had motive, opportunity, or the means to assassinate the President in Dallas ? A. I do not know whether any effort of that kind was made. I do not believe it was made, if it was made at all, at the request of the Warren Commission because I for one did not know that such a pro- gram was in effect at the time. Q. Had you known it, would you have asked for that kind of sur- vey to be made ? A. That certainly would have been a veiy reasonable and logical investigative request to have made and it is my hope that in fact it was done by the Bureau but I am confident that you and the com- mittee have information one way or the other. Q. Do you know of any informal communications between the Bu- reau and the Commission that might have given on a confidential basis and not in a written form the product of any such examination by the Bureau of this material ? A. No. Q. OK. A. The only other thing I can say on this general subject is that the Commission did have substantial confidence in the Bureau's ability to investigate allegations with respect to organized crime figures. There were many investigative reports submitted on this general subject as I recall and I think the Commission was inclined to regard this particu- lar kind of investigation as something peculiarly within the compe- tence of the FBI and to involve none of the controversy that was associated with some of the other kinds of investigative activities in which the Commission and the Bureau were jointly involved. Q. I^t me show you what has been previousy marked JFK exhibit Nos. 72 and 73. Exhibit No. 72 is a memorandum dated April 1, 1964, from Mr. Slawson to Mr. Rankin and exhibit No. 73 is a memorandum of April 24, 1964, from Mr. Slawson to Mr. Rankin. Both of these memorandums deal with an allegation by John B. Martino that Castro may in some way have been involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. You have had an opportunity before this morning to see these memo- randais; that correct ? 439 [Exhibit No. 72] WDS:mfd:lApr64 Memorandum to : J. Lee Rankin. From : W. David Slawsou. Subject : Allegations of John V. Martino, Author of the Book Entitled, "I Was Castro's Prisoner". Reference is made to Commission Nos. 657 and 662, dealing with the statements of Mr. Martino, copies of which are attached hereto. The substance of Mr. Mar- tino's assertions is that the death of the President resulted from a Castro plot, which itself resulted from a plot by President Kennedy to overthrow Castro through a "second Bay of Pigs Invasion." Mr. Martino has been questioned on his sources but he refused to disclose their identity although he describes them "a personarehigh Cuban Government." in thethan general in The assertions terms such of Mr.as,Martino of more usual interest for two reasons. First, because he is the author of the book, "I Was Castro's Prisoner," published in August 1963, by Devin- Adair Company of New York City, co-authored by Nathaniel Weyl, described as the author of "Red Star Over Cuba," and is therefore a person in whose statements the public at large may place con- siderable trust and indeed, despite his suspicious reluctance to name any of his sources, we ourselves must accord some consideration. Second Nathaniel Weyl is quoted on page 2 of Document No. 662 as saying that a friend who ran for President of Cuba in 1958 will testify soon before the Senate Internal Subcom- mittee as to alleged contacts between Jack Ruby and "Praskin" in Cuba, and this may tie in somehow with Mr. Martino. Burt Griffin has told me that the name "Praskin" is known to him from his Ruby investigatory work. Nothing appears from Mr. Martino's testimony which would indicate that he could claim a Fifth Amendment privilege were he subpoenaed by the Commission and asked to disclose his sources. His book was published in August 1963 and it would therefore appear that his information as to the alleged plot backed by Castro to kill President Kennedy are not sources that he came upon in the preparation of his book. Therefore, there does not appear to be any basis for his assertion of a "newpaper reporter's privilege," if such a privilege has any legal basis. Howard Willens and I have discussed this briefly and he asked that I write this memorandum and state my own conclusion. My tentative conclusion is that Mr. Martino should be asked to testify before the Commission and subpoenaed if necessary. Enclosures (2) [Exhibit No. 73] WDS : mfd :24Apr64 Date : April 24, 1964. Memorandum to : J. Lee Rankin. From : W. David Slawson. Subject : Allegations of John B. Martino, Author of the Book Entitled, "I was Castro's Prisoner" ; Supplemental Memorandum. Reference is made to my memorandum to you on this subject dated April 1, 1964. In that memorandum I concluded that we should follow up on Mr. Mar- tino's allegations of a Cuban conspiracy behind Lee Harvey Oswald's assassina- tion of the President. Since that memorandum was written, the FBI has inde- pendently followed up on Mr. Martino. The FBI reports that have come in are Commission Nos. 810 and 812. In substance, what has happened is this: Both John Martino and Nathaniel Weyl, the writer who helped Martino write his book, has [sic] been asked to name their sources or other evidence. With one exception, both men have refused to do so, although Martino has gone so far as to admit that his sources are not primary sources but only men who told him that they had sources who could prove what was said. Martino especially seems rather vague on where he got his information. The one exception is that Weyl named a man named "Buchanan" who used to work in Miami for an anti-Castro group who is supposed to have told Weyl that Lee Harvey Oswald was seen among some pro-Castroites in Miami in March 1963 and October 1962 passing out Fair Play for Cuba litera- ture. When approached on this, Buchanan backed up the statement in general but was very vague on when exactly and where he saw Oswald. Buchanan finally said it was his brother who really saw Oswald. The tenor of both Commission reports is that Weyl and Martino have no real evidence for their allegations. In view of the fact that the FBI has already fol- 440 lowed up on this subject, and because this follow-up has shown the weakness of the allegations, I feel that my conclusion in the April 1 memorandum that the Commission should call Martino as a witness no longer holds. I would now rec- ommend that we let the whole thing drop unless some new evidence which changes the picture appears. A. Yes ; I have a recollection of seeing these. Q. There is no indication on either of these memorandums that they went to you or through you. Do you recall seeing them in 1964 ? A. Yes. It would be frequently the case that I would see such memo- randa even though I was not the addressee. Q. These memoranda indicate that this particular allegation was handled only through field interviews, that there was no effort being made to subpena Mr. Martino and request from him an identification of the source to which he attributes the allegation. There is nothing here or in any other records of the staff of the Commission that indi- cates that a subpena was considered as a possible investigative tech- nique in addition or that a subpena might be employed whether or not Mr. Martino would have a lawful grounds on which to refuse to answer. I am thinking now of the fifth amendment or some other lawful privilege. Do you think that had you known in 1964 of the allegations involv- ing the agency in efforts to assassinate Premier Castro that this kind of lead that was followed only through field interviews might have been more vigorously pursued by subpenas and immunity grants or other more potent investigative techniques ? A. I can do nothing more than speculate in response to that question and I am reluctant to do so. This particular investigative lead was pur- sued as the memoranda reflect through FBI interviews of the principal figures and the reports of those interviews were reviewed by the re- sponsible Commission attorney. I obviously took no objection then and I do not take any objection now to the conclusion reached here that no further investigation was required at the time. If we had known of agency sources or specialized capability with respect to Cuba, any such allegation as this would have appropriately been the subject of an investigative request to the CIA as well as pur- suing the normal FBI avenue. This is an example of a kind of an alle- gation that one might have transmitted to the CIA and asked for them to conduct such investigation as seemed appropriate, particularly with respect to the individuals here involved, the conversations that al- legedly took place regarding a Cuban involvement. We obviously did not do so with respect to the CIA and I think it is probably what we would have done had we known then some of the facts that we have discussed here earlier today. Q. An examination by the staff of the Warren Commission mate- rials and the Warren Commission report itself, 492, does not indicate that Mr. Martino was called before the Commission and deposed or even placed under oath for an affidavit. In addition to asking you whether any additional investigative techniques might have been em- ployed through the agency, I would ask you to reflect and perhaps speculate whether if you may have had a more concrete understanding that Premier Castro may have had a motive to take revenge on Presi- dent Kennedy for the CIA plots, might you not have more vigorously pursued this allegation, for example, by deposing him and placing him under oath or by calling him before the Commission ? 441 A. I see nothing now that would have held out any greater promise of our obtaining relative information from Mr. Martino than was available at the time. I do not attach quite the same significance as you do to taking a deposition of a person under oath but there is one as- sumption underlying your questioning that I think deserves some examination. You are assuming that really we were not aware of the possibility that Premier Castro had a motive to participate in any way in an assassination attempt on President Kennedy. That is clearly not the case. There was ample evidence in the historical record at the time that Premier Castro might have felt that the United States and President Kennedy in particular were trying to overthrow his government and that certainly would seem to provide a sufficient possibility of a motive so as to justify exploration by the Commission staff of any meaningful allegations as suggesting Cuban involvement with Oswald in this assassination attempt. It was for that reason that we did try to explore to the best of our ability those allegations that came to our attention that suggested some Cuban or Cuban-related involvement. I am confi- dent that with the benefit of hindsight there were some of those alle- gations that were investigated excessively and other allegations that were not sufficiently investigated. Q. Let me see if I cannot rephrase your answer and see if you will accept it. Without the concrete knowledge of actual Government par- ticipation inthe effort to assassinate Premier Castro, it is your testi- mony that if you had sufficient knowledge nonetheless of the possi- bility that the Commission in your judgment adequately pursued that line of inquiry and that had you known concretely of the assassination plots, it is unlikely that you would h-ave done too many things too terribly different. A. Well, that is generally my position with the exception that we would have specifically enlisted the assistance of the CIA on a regular basis on any investigations relating to Cuba. I am confident if we learned of any indication that Castro personally was aware of the United States sponsored efforts directed at his assassination, then in that case we would have attached a higher priority — perhaps the highest possible priority — to these allegations so as to satisfy ourselves if we were able to regarding any involvement of the Cuban Govern- ment. Q. Mr. Willens, let me see if I cannot clarify and perhaps pin down precisely what the status of your knowledge was as to the possession on the part of the Commission or Commission members, Commission staff, of the Castro plots. Specifically to your knowledge did the Chief Justice have any information while he was serving on the Warren Commission concerning any involvement of any U.S. intelligence agency in plots against Cuba to assassinate Fidel Castro ? A. I do not know. Q. To your knowledge did any other Commissioner have any such information while he was serving on the Warren Commission? A. I do not know. Q. To your knowledge did any staff member have any such mforma- tion while he was serving on the Warren Commission ? A. I believe not. 442 Q. In retrospect was there any conduct on the part of the Chief Justice from which you could have or might have inferred that he had such information ? A. No. Q. In retrospect was there any conduct on the part of any other Commissioner from which you could have or might have inferred that he had such information ? A. Not that I recall. Q. In retrospect was there any conduct on the part of any staff member from which you could have or might have inferred that he had such information? A. Not that I recall. Q. Did you see any document from which you could have or might have inferred that either the Chief Justice or other Commissioner or any staff member had such information ? A. No. Q. Were you ever present during any discussions from which you could have or did infer that the Chief Justice or other Commissioner or any staff member had such information ? A. No. Q. Were you ever instructed by anyone, including the Chief Justice or any Commissioner or any staff member or anyone else, while you served on the Warren Commission staff not to pursue any area of inquiry ? A. No. ^ , Q. Were you ever instructed by anyone while you served on the Warren Commission staff not to pursue any area of inquiry because the area might endanger the national security ? A. No. Q. Did anyone ever suggest to you that certain matters should not be explored for any reason ? A. No. Q. Did anyone ever suggest to you that certain matters should not be explored for reasons of national security ? A. No. Q. Let me change the subject if I might a little bit. I have only this one last subject. I hope to get j^ou out in time for lunch, assuming you either eat a late lunch or eat quickly. Let me ask a little bit about the writing of the final report and its processes. Let me show you what has been previously marked as Willens Ex- hibit 5. 1 believe you have not had an opportunity to see it previously. Nevertheless it purports to indicate which staff member had primary .responsibility for writing the various chapters or rewriting the various chapters of the report. I wonder if you would look at it and indicate whether that generally corresponds with your memory? A. No ; it does not. . . Q. Would you indicate for the record to what degree that exhibit does not reflect the true facts ? A. This exhibit is in serious error with respect to almost everyone of the eight chapters of the report. I do not know what the source of this exhibit was and I don't know that it is worth your time or the committee's time to try to correct it. 443 Q. The source of the exhibit is from Epstein's book. A. I suspected as much and that is just further confirmation of the substantial errors that characterize Mr. Epstein's original work. One of the difficulties of Mr. Epstein's review of this subject was that he interviewed only selected members of the Commission staff and among those that he interviewed several, including myself, elected not to talk to him about some matters that we regarded as confidential to the work of the Commission. Have you questioned other witnesses witli respect to this exhibit ? Q. No. A. Do you regard this as something that is to be addressed in your committee report? Q. Not necessarily. Perhaps the best way to handle this would be if you want to write me a short letter later in which you could indicate to the best of your memory who had the primary responsibility to each of these sections, we could incorporate it at the end of your testimony. A. Why don't I take this exhibit under advisement then and see whether I can supply helpful information to you with respect to it. Q. All right. A. I would just generally say that the exhibit underestimates the number of people who contributed to the writing of the report and it overstates the contributions made by certain individuals. It also reflects a lack of precision as to the origin of the material that went into these various chapters. The chapters as they finally emerge in the Commis- sion report were the product of considerable discussion and debate among the Commission's stalT and the full Commission. Eventually proposed drafts that were prepared by some staff members were di- vided and found their way into several different chapters as we elected to reorganize the report and this summary neglects to trace back to the original drafters the individual subsections of individual chapters in the report. There were approximately 20 members of the Commis- sion staff who participated in a substantial way in writing the Com- mission report. If you let me consider it further, Mr. Blakey, to see if I can supple- ment that brief statement with any more detailed statement, that might be useful. Q. I might say this is the actual identity of individuals who wrote the particular sections and it may well only be of historical interest and for some inquiry. Someday in the future one may want to go back and figure that out. The Committee is, however, very interested in processes and not so much the people by which the material examined by the Commission ultimately found its way into the particular form that it took in the Warren Commission report. As I am sure you are aware, there has been considerable criticism of the Commission, some- times not so much on the substance of what it said but on its manner of presentation and sometimes what it omitted. Consequently, the proc- esses that are in the Commission document are a matter that the com- mittee isvery vitally concerned in so that if you would make an effort to reconstruct as best you can that process and its personalization and individuals, I can assure you that that letter's content would find its way into the committee's report. 1+3-819 0-79-29 AAA A. If them address you have to me specific questions and I will see if Iabout the process, can answer them. why don't you Q. Why don't we try some. Let me show you what has previously been marked as JFK exhibit No. 74. This is a memorandum of your own to Mr. Rankin dated August 8 commenting on what I take it is a relatively mature version of chapter 4 entitled "The Assassin." Let me ask you a couple of questions about that memorandum. [Exhibit No. 74] Date : August 8, 1964. Memorandum to : Mr. J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel. From : Howard P. Willens. Subject : Chapter IV— Draft dated 7/21/64. I think that this Chapter needs substantial revision. I suggest the following comments for your consideration. 1. As a matter of general style, this Chapter is different from any of the other chapters and should be brought into conformity. I have the following specifics in mind : a. The headings and subheading used in the table of contents and in the text of the chapter should be phrases rather than sentences. b. Marina Oswald and Lee Harvey Oswald are occasionally referred to as Marina and Lee Oswald. I do not think that Marina Oswald should ever be referred to as Marina and believe that Oswald should be referred to as Oswald or as Lee Harvey Oswald. c. I do not think that we need to use the prefix Mr. in the text of the Report. d. For witnesses who have appeared before the Commission or members of the staff, I believe we should use the past tense when referring to their testi- mony rather than the present perfect, i.e., "testified" rather than "has testified". e. In many sections of the chapter there is an inadequate introductory paragraph setting forth the conclusions documented in the subsequent discus- sion. The paragraphing in the chapter needs watching, since there is no con- sistent handling of paragraph length. 2. In view of the importance of the chapter, I think that we can afford more than a single long paragraph as an introduction to the overall chapter. This would permit the Commission to speak in the introduction of the other evidence con- sidered in the chapter, but not relied upon, although I have other suggestions to make regarding the handling of this material. 3. I still have a question about the validity of including as a minor finding Oswald's capability with a rifle. I think our case remains the same even if Oswald had limited or negligible capability with a rifle. In a way, we are emphasizing an argument we don't particularly need, which prompts controversy and may tend to weaken the stronger elements of our proof. I believe that this material should be discussed somewhere, and probably in this chapter, but I question whether it should be elevated to one of our eight major conclusions on which the Commis- sion relies. An alternative to consider might be to place the question of Oswald's capability as a subheading to one of the first two major conclusions. 4. I think that the first major section should be entitled solely "The Assas- sination Weapon". The fir.st subheading should be "Purchase of Rifie by Os- wald". The subsequent discussion should set forth the conclusion of the Com- mission that Oswald purchased the rifle based on (a ) handwriting analysis of the rifle purchase of alias Hidell. documents, (b) Oswald's rental of P.O. Box 2915, (c) prior use 5,. On page 4 I do not see the significance of the first full paragraph, with the exception of the first sentence. We know that Oswald lived in Dallas at the rel- event time and I do not believe it is significant that Oswald did not receive mail from the box after he left Dallas for New Orleans on April 23. 6. The next major subhead should be the section beginning on page 8 dealing with Oswald's palmprint. I think there should be some reference here to the fact that palmprints are as good a basis for identification as fingerprints, plus an appropriate reference to the appendix. 7. In the third line from the bottom of page 8 the meaning of the word "lifted" is not clear to the lay reader. Similarly with the reference to the "powder" in 446 the second line on page 9. The last sentence of the first full paragraph on page 9 might be combined with the prior statement on page 8 about the metal of the rifle in a separate paragraph offered as explanation for the lack of other prints on the rifle, assuming recent use. If there are any statistics or other evidence on this point, I think they should be set forth and explained. This is a more con- troversial matter than I believe we have considered,. 8. The section on fiber analysis lacks a conclusion in the text as opposed to the subheading. On page 10 in the second line, I do not think that the fibers in the shirt he was wearing should be described as "similarly colored" at this point. 9. With regard to the section beginning on page 10 we should consider re- organizing the discussion as follows : First paragraph. — Covering Marina's testimony on pictures including dates, places, number, etc. Second paragraph. — Setting forth the Commission's conclusion that the pictures were in fact taken with Oswald's camera at Neely Street, and are not superimposed. Third paragraph. — Dealing with the conclusion that the rifle in the pic- ture is Lee Harvey Oswald's rifle. If this reorganization is not adopted at the very least there should be an introductory paragraph setting forth the con- clusions reached by the Commission regarding these pictures. 10. With regard to the last paragraph on page 13 I would consider mentioning the name of the magazine. I also think some reference should be made to the fact that the Commission has examined these pictures and reached certain conclusions regarding the curvature of the stock problem and the scope situation. In short, I think it is necessary to expand this discussion. 11. I am concerned by the lack of introduction to the section beginning on page 13A and the fact that the conclusions drawn here seem to be somewhat elusive. If we are stating only that he was on the 6th floor 35 minutes before the shots were fired, that is one thing. If we are going to rely on Brennan in part, then we should state a conclusion at the beginning of this section which reflects our analysis of the eyewitness testimony. I realize that the "access" point has a colorful history going back several months, but I am not persuaded that it con- tributes very much. 12. It might be desirable prior to examining the scientific evidence to have a short section dealing with the site, setting forth the descriptive material now contained on page 14 and including other material in the chapter discribing the cartons which were used to construct a barricade from the rest of the fioor. 13. There still is a little too much of the Ball-Belin approach in this for my taste. For example, on page 14 I do not see why the reader has to know the cartons were forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for chemical processing, since subsequent testimony demonstrates that. Similarly, on page 15 the finding of the palmprint by Lt. Day is of no particular significance. 14. The conclusion sought to be drawn from this section seems to me to go too far. I do not know why we place ''great" weight on the fingerprint and palmprint identification to prove he was at the window. The basic question is when he was at the window and when we come near to that question we back away from it. Furthermore, we never do make an effort to refute the many other possibilities for those fingerprints which are consistent with Oswald's innocence. I would consider combining the section on the paper bag with the section on the cartons. The section on the paper bag also lacks a topic sentence pointing out the conclusion. I wonder why we have the description of the paper bag here since it could be a sandwich bag and still be used to make the point that is involved here. I question whether the whole section on carrying the rifle into the TSBD should not be before this "access — presence". That organization would permit us to introduce the paper bag in the most appropriate context. 15. Much of the material in the first full paragraph of page 17 should be relegated to the Appendix so far as I am concerned. 16. If we have any testimony as to the state of the southeast corner early in the morning, I think it should receive greater emphasis in the text, since it provides greater support for linking Oswald with the cartons and bag found in the corner after the assassination. 17. In the section on eyewitness identification, we should make some reference back to chapter 3 and Brennan's testimony there. 18. On page 21 the fact that another eyewitness identified Oswald in a way similar to Brennan does not seem to me to help support Brennan's identification. 446 I would eliminate this comparison here and perhaps make a reference to it later on when the Tippit shooting is discussed. 19. Throughout the discussion of Brennan's testimony we should reaffirm his testimony as to the source of the shots. On page 23 I think we go out of our way to qualify the Commission's reliance on Brennan's testimony. I see no reason why we should pick Brennan out as the subject for the second paragraph on page 23. He is a good witness despite his declination to identify Oswald positively in the police lineup. Why not place this paragraph at the end of the entire section on eyewitness testimony. The record on Brennan speaks for itself. The that last sen- tence in this paragraph is obvious, since we have stated several times our findings that Oswald is the assassin is based on many different categories of evidence. 20. It seems to me that the last paragraph on page 23B gives Fischer and Edwards more weight than Brennan. At least they are blessed with the "con- sistent with" characterization, which I think is overworked in his chapter. 21. I have substantial problems with the section beginning on page 24. I would consider placing the first subsection, dealing with the rifle's location in the Paine garage, in the first section of the chapter dealing with Oswald's ownership and conditional possession of the rifle. I do not think that this discussion here is necessary to the argument that he carried the rifle in on Friday. Also the testi- mony discussed here is more relevant here to the possession of the rifle than it is to the location of the rifle in the Paine garage. The first of these two points is the more important conclusion and it should be bolstered by all available evidence. 22. I do not follow the argument contained in the first full paragraph of page 24. We do not have to prove that Oswald never took the rifle out of the garage in order to make the point that the garage was its usual storage place. I would consider eliminating the paragraph entirely. 23. After the above relocation of the Paine garage section, I would consider organizing this section as follows : First conclusion, — The paper bag contained the assassination weapon. Second conclusion. — Lee Harvey Oswald carried this bag to work. (a ) He made the bag from TSBD material ; (b ) He had the opportunity to make the bag ; (c) He carried this bag on Friday ; (d ) He had handled the bag. Third conclusion. — He lied about the curtain rod story and the paper bag. On reviewing this again I am persuaded once more that this entire section should go before the section dealing with Oswald's presence in the window. 24. The discussion at the bottom of page 27 regarding disassembling seems to have limited relevance. I would consider combining the paragraph with the one at the end of this subsection. 25. On page 32 I question the relevance of the last sentence of the first full paragraph dealing with the location of the bag. I do not see how this is relevant to the conclusion that the bag contained the rifle. If this point is to be made, I think it should be made as part of the general description of the assassination scene as proposed in one of my earlier comments. 26. The third line on page 33, I do not think that the meaning of the word "matched" is clear. 27. I think that the way that the Frazier-Randle testimony is handled on pages 38-40 may well be the best possible way. It does occur to me, however, that under my proposed reorganization this testimony would be pertinent to the con- clusion whether the bag contained the assassination weapon. Perhaps the orga- nization should be changed so as to prove first that Oswald carried the paper bag to work, and then turn to the question whether the bag contained the assassi- nation weapon. The Frazier-Randle testimony could then be set against the sci- entific evidence as well as the other evidence bearing on this issue. 28. The characterization of the killing of Tippit on page 42 as a desperate act of escape may be true, but I would like to discuss this further. Perhaps this point could be made in the overall introduction or conclusion of the chapter after all the other evidence is set forth. 29. On page 45 I would not begin the discussion of Tippit eyewitnesses with Helen Markam. On page 4fi I think we should have at least a paragraph on Helen Markam's alleged description of Oswald s\^ "short", stocky and bushv-haired. 30. The sentence at the bottom of page .^9 is not necessary here in view of the Introductory paragraph which is contained in this subsection. 447 31. The discussion at pages 60-64 gives me some difficulty. I do not see why we have to proceed witness by witness in making the points to be made here. I would suggest that the paragraphs might be along these lines. a. Lee Harvey Oswald entered the theater at such and such a time. b. Police officers were summoned to the scene and entered the building. c. Lee Harvey Oswald was apprehended and in the source of this may have attemped to kill the arresting officer. d. Excessive force was not used by the Police officials. 32. I am still troubled by the location of the section dealing with the interval of time between the assassination of President Kennedy and the murder of Officer Tippit. Once we have found that he did both acts, what could have hap- pened in the interval which would be "inconsistent with" his having done this. In other words, once you prove that he did both acts what is the relevance of speaking of the intervening events. If there is anything in the intervening events which casts doubt on his committing either of the two acts, that is a different matter. In that event, the activity during the intervening period would be an element of evidence to be weighed in reaching the conclusion as to whether the actor is guilty of the crime in question. That is not our case here. The end result of this rambling may be the suggestion that this section be treated in chronologi- cal fashion after the assassination of President Kennedy and prior to the case against Oswald for the murder of Tippit. 33. Regardless of where it is located, I think that the full paragraph of the sec- tion should state the basic conclusions regarding Oswald's movements during this i>eriod of time. For example, the Commission concludes that Oswald went from the 6th floor to the 2nd floor by the stairway, through the lunchroom and out the front door of the building before 12 : 34 when the building was not closed off. He then took a bus and a taxi, went to his apartment, and proceeded to the site of the Tippit killing. 34. I do think that we should conclude that Oswald was in the process of flight or at least that some of the events suggest that he was. 35. With the above recommendation in mind the testimony beginning at page 72 would be handled different. This testimony would be set forth and appraised on the issue as to how and when Oswald descended from the 6th floor. In such a discussion the Commission could rely on some witnesses and reject the testimony of others, such as Victoria Adams. 36. On page 76, I think that we have to do something more with the Lovelady picture. It occurs to me that we should probably do a paragraph or section deal- ing with Oswald's known whereabouts at 12:30. In .setting forth the limited amount of evidence as to his whereabouts at this time we could reject the allega- tion that the picture in question shows him standing in the doorway at the time of the assassination. 37. With regard to the treatment of the General Walker shooting, I think that we need a paragraph summarizing the investigation, or lack of it, conducted by the Dallas Police Department after the Walker shooting. We also should set forth briefly the fact that Walker initiated an investigation into the matter. Our conclu.sion that Oswald was probably responsible builds of course on the fact that it was an unsolved crime. We have to make some reference to the investiga- tion made by Keaster and Roberts, whose statements regarding Duff should be made part of the record and have been collected by Liebeler. 38. I am of the mind now that there should be no other evidence section at the end of the chapter. This means that we have to find a place for each of the sub- sections. Ithink that the paraffin tests discussion should be set forth early in the Report, after the discussion of Oswald's ownership of the rifle. It could be set forth by the Commission in a frank statement that the Commission has noOswald scien- tific evidence as opposed to eyewitness and circumstantial evidence that fired the rifle on November 22. 39. I would eliminate the section now labeled clothing identification and make the point in the course of setting forth the testimony of the Tippit witnesses. It is clear enough what the Commission relies upon and what it does not rely upon and we do not need this section. 40. The Nixon attempt problem presents a more difficult problem. I would consider discussing this under the case heading as the General Walker shooting so as to cover all prior similar acts in one section. In the course of that General section we could state our evidence supporting the conclusion that he fired at Walker and why we believe he did not attempt to shoot Nixon. An alternative 448 to this would be to mako referene to this incident only by a single sentence in Chapter personality4 and and treat it moreof fully treatment in Chapter his wife. I do not7, think as an it illustration should be ofhandled Oswald'sat the end of this chapter. 41. The section drafted by Mr. Liebeler on the Irving sports shop story can be handled earlier in the chapter dealing with the ownership of the rifle. I think it is reasonable to set forth the evidence supporting the conclusion that Oswald owned and handled this weapon and make the point also that the Com- mission has no credible evidence that Oswald owned another rifle. It also might be worked in where we state that the rifle was shipped with the scope already on. For example, I note on page 2, paragraph 3, the memorandum em- ploys words to like "case," "argument,'* "weaken." Aren't these the words appropriate a brief, a legal brief ? A. These are the words that come naturally to a lawyer reviewing a written product. We thought it was important to have a fair and com- prehensive treatment of the evidence. We also thought it would be desirable to support the Commission's conclusions in as useful and as persuasive a way as possible. Q. It has been suggested by some that the Commission's report was in fact not a fair and objective analysis of the evidence but rather a brief in behalf of the Government's position ; to wit, the single assassin theory. I wonder if you would comment on this. A. I do not agree with that criticism obviously. I think there are several examples in the report that could be allowed in a response to that criticism ; for example, the decision of the Commission not to rely on the eyewitness testimony of Mr. Brennan. Q. Let me explore that with you if I might. On page 3 of this mem- orandum, paragraph 11, that very issue is raised and it is also raised on page 4, paragraph 18, and page 5, paragraphs 19 and 20. How did the staff and the Commission arrive at a decision in reference to Mr. Brennan's testimony ? Would you describe the processes that led you to handle Brennan in one way as opposed to another? A. Well, the process is not really very, very mysterious. There were initial drafts of the report or assessment of the relevant evidence going back as early as February and March of 1964. As we turned from the investigative stage of the report to the writing stage of the report, the responsible attorneys would make an initial cut at presenting the relevant evidence, evaluating it and supporting their conclusions. Q. In what sort of way ? A. In this particular case they were trying to use those standards that they thought would be the likely product of a contested trial. They were sensitive in this area in particular to the fact that there was no cross examination that could be used to challenge the eyewitness testi- mony of a person such as Mr. Brennan and there was a sensitivity to that concern supplemented by the fact that other evidence seemed more credible that led the staff attorneys and ultimately the Commission to conclude that some evidence should not be relied upon and other evidence should be emphasized. Q. Do I understand vou correctly to be saying that where informa- tion or evidence might' have been subjected to sharp challenge m an adversary proceeding there was an inclination of the Commission staff not to rely on it but to rely instead on evidence that could not have been as sharply criticized or challenged? A. That certainly was a general effort. I don't know how well it was achieved in the overall report but I do know that it was of particular 449 concern with respect to the evidence implicating Lee Harvey Oswald. This exhibit that I have in front of me, JFK exhibit No. 74, reflects a process by which the report ultimately emerged; it represents a de- tailed review by me of a proposed draft including the substantive and organizational changes that I thought would be useful. I had the general responsibility of submitting my views with respect to any portion of the report and I think I generally took advantage of that opportunity and performed that responsibility. After such a memo would be prepared by me or by Professor Redlich, customarily the drafts would be either rewritten by the responsible attorneys or Mr. Redlich and I or in some instances Dr. Goldberg would take the responsibility for incorporating the revisions into another draft. The drafts were generally commented upon by attorneys in other areas as well, particularly the most sensitive parts of the report, so that as the redrafting continued the use of a large number of staff members was taken into account. Mr. Rankin had the final responsi- bility for the drafts that went forward to the Commission and he looked primarily to Professor Redlich and myself to present to him a draft with which both of us were in agreement. Q. The committee has available to it in its record now testimony indicating that there was some controversy over the general structure of the report, and now I am referring to what the staff here has called the long-run/short-run report. The short-run report was one that in relatively clear and black letter terms made an effort to resolve as sharply as possible most controversies presented to the Commission appropriately qualified but nevertheless resolved. The long-run ver- sion would have been a report that included within the language of the report and its footnotes a great deal more of the ambiguity of the evidence and a clearer and a franker recognition of the ambiguities in the testimony and the unresolved questions, I grant that neither of these two characterizations would fully or adequately describe the document that was ultimately published. Nevertheless, they might well represent tendencies in a draft. The tes- timony in the record tends to indicate that the option taken by the Commission was the shoit-terni. I don't use that in a pejorative sense. That is, to write as clear and forceful and determined a report as possible. The option of writing a report that contained more ambi- guity and more unanswered questions was not adopted, I wonder if you would comment on that general description of the report and its tendencies. A. Well, I don't accept those characterizations as having any rele- vance to this end product. When the report came out it was regarded as being a lengthier and more thoroughly documented report than most people had anticipated. There was a considerable desire within the staff at least to prepare a report that would deal substantially and usefully with all the important questions addressed in the investigation. The numerous appendixes attached to this report and the decision to publish simultaneously the underlying evidence suggests to me a disposition quite contrary to the suggestion that this was a shortrun product designed to avoid controversy and overlook the ambi^ities inherent in the investigation. The report I think reflects the limita- 450 tions of the Commission's efforts in important respects when it con- cludes as to the existence of a consj)iracy and only that. There is no evidence regarding such a conspiracy and thei significance of that con- clusion has to be evaluated in light of the investigation that was conducted up to that point by the Commission in the various inves- tigative agencies. I think as a qualified conclusion that was appropri- ately made and that left others free, like this committee, to explore facts that have developed in the intervening years to re-examine that conclusion and see whether it is still a legitimate conclusion or not. I think the suggestion that the report should have reflected ambigu- ities and hold open more serious questions is both unrealistic and not very useful. We are, after all, dealing with a public report issuing over the signatures of seven extremely experienced and prominent public figures. We are well accustomed to the ambiguities of life and also the necessity of reaching conclusions notwithstanding the exist- ence of such ambiguities. They and the staff tried to do so in an honest and complete way, and I am sure that we all anticipated that criti- cism of whatever kind would come over the years and should be expected. Q. Let me direct your attention to page 4, paragraph 13, of JKF exhibit No. 74. There is a reference in the memorandum to the Ball- Belin approach. Do you recall what that was ? A. This characterization was not intended to be a critical one. My recollection is that the initial draft of this section of the report that was prepared by Mr. Ball and Mv. Belin devoted a considerable amount of space to tracing the chain of cusitody of particular items of evidence, for example, in the way that you would have to do if you were present- ing the matter in court. That is completely understandable in light of the considerable litigation experience of both of them and particularly Mr. Ball. My sense as someone who was trying to organize and present the material was that the lay reader of this report did not need that kind of detail in a report that already promised to be very long and ought to focus in on the issues of real controverey. I think it is that which I had in mind by the reference here to the Ball-Belin approach. That is more a difference in style than in substance and reflects my views as to what kind of a repo.rt ultimately should be produced. Q. Nevertheless I take it from your previous answers that trial-type standards on custody and authentication wei'e applied to the evidence that you ultimately relied upon. A. I would not want to go so far as to say that. I mean there was con- cern about custody and authentication but even if there was some con- cern that does not necessarily mean that the body of this report should contain a detailed recital of the chain of custody of particular items of physical evidence if the writers of the report are comfortable with the conclusion that the evidence that they are relying upon was not tam- pered with during the relevant period. Q. Let me make an effort to paraphrase you so I understand. You are saying that the Commission staff in evaluating evidence if it didn't apply trial-type standards on custody authentication at least only used that evidence that it was comfortaljle with and then in writing the report did not necessarily set forth the processes by which it came to 451 arrive at a judgment that they were comfortable with; for example, whether the rifle taken from the depository was indeed the rifle that Lee Harvey Oswald bought or whether the rifle first found in the depository is indeed the rifle ultimately examined by the ballistics people. A. We certainly would not have relied on physical evidence where we had any reason to suspect that there had been some substitution so as to make the results of examining that evidence not reliable. Q. The absence sometimes in the report of the detailed discussion of the reasoning process that led you to decide that a particular rifle was identical within a particular photograph that was authentic is not an indication that the Commission staff did not explore those questions prior to relying on the evidence. A. That is correct, and I think thait certainly is an option that that could have been considered in writing the report ; that is, to provide a more detailed explanation of the reasoning process in general terms at least if not with respect to each specific piece of evidence relied upon. Q. Although I might be moved to comment that if your one-volume report lacked a certain readership, then the two-volume report filled with even been the tedious less wellrecord read. systems entitled "Only to Lawyers" might have A. I suppose we would have addressed that kind of issue the way we did the more scientific questions that were considered in the appendixes but we did limit our discussion of the quality of our evidence only to a few very important items in the report of the kind that we previously mentioned. Q. What is included in the report is important. What is not included in the report is sometimes important, too. In that context let me show you what has been previously marked JFK exhibit No. 42. This deals with a question of a possible threat by Premier Castro to kill President Kennedy and whether or not that threat might have come to the attention of Lee Harvey Oswald. The memorandum addresses the issue of whether that should have been reflected in the final report. The official report at page 414 and the New York Times report at page 390 in general terms discussed this issue but at least to my reading do not explicitly adopt the suggestion that Mr. Liebeler had made to Mr. Ranldn in his memorandum on the 16th. Do you think that had the Commission known of the CIA plots that this kind of material might have found its way explicitly into the final report ? [Exhibit No. 42] Date : September 16, 1964. Memorandum to : Mr. Rankin. From : Mr. Liebeler. Reference : Quote from "New Orleans Times-Picayune" of September 19, 196.S concerning Fidel Castro's speech. We previously discussed the possible inclusion in Chapter "VII of the quote from the New Orleans Times-Picayune of September 9, 1963 concerning Fidel Castro to the effect that U.S. leaders would not be safe themselves if U.S. promoted attacks on Cuba continued. You and Mr. Redlich took the position that we could not include the quote unless there was some evidence that Oswald had actually read that particular newspaper. I stated that the material was relevant and the pos- sibility that Oswald had read it should be discussed. I was not. however, at that time able to indicate any other situation in which materials had been discussed on the possibility that Oswald had read it, in the absence of any specific proof that he had. 452 I now note, however, in reviewing the galleys of Chapter VI, that an extensive discussion of the "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" advertisement and the "Wanted for Treason" handbill are included. The following statement appears in connection : "There is no evidence that he [Oswald] became aware of either the 'Welcome Mr. Kennedy' advertisement or the 'Wanted for Treason' handbill, though neither possibility can be precluded." Our discussion of the possible inclusion of the Castro quote had obvious political overtones. The discussion set forth in Chapter VI concerning the "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" advertisement and the "Wanted for Treason" handbill have similar overtones. One of the basic positions that you have taken throughout this investi- gation is that the groups on both ends of the political spectrum must be treated fairly. I have agreed with that proposition in general, even though we have dis- agreed at times on specific applications of it. It appears clear to me, however, that if we are precluded from including the newspaper Orleansthat it, evenspeech concerningreadCastro's grounds the do thoughon we that wefrom quote havethenoNew evidence Oswald actually know he read a great deal, the same must be true of the "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" adver- tisement and the "Wanted for Treason" handbill. The discussion in Chapter VI actually admits that the "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" advertisement in the Novem- ber 22, 1963 "Dallas Morning News" probably did not come to Oswald's attention. Under those circumstances it would seem to me that fairness indicates either the deletion of the discussion of the advertisement and the handbill that is now set forth in Chapter VI or the inclusion of the Castro statement in Chapter VII. A. I can't say. Q. Do you recall this particular controversy at all ? A. I remember seeing that memorandum. There were several such Issues that were raised in the last week's effort to conclude the writing of the Commission report. People were working veiy hard. There was a keen sense of history involved in preparing the report. There was ap- prehension ofall kinds with respect to our ability to complete a satis- factory report. There were numerous instances where differences of views came to light with respect to what should be contained in the report and how it should be stated. Q. This is just one example. A. This is just one example and reflects a very substantial contribu- tion that Mr. Liebeler made throughout the Commission's investiga- tion to keep people's attention focused on the need for fairness and political balance and to be careful about matters of detail. Q. Should any particular significance be attached to the omission in the final report of explicit reference to the Castro threat? A. I don't think so but I do not really recall very clearly now what, if anything, is included in the Commission report regarding this par- ticular hypothesis. Q. You can, if you want to, examine this. I think on page 414 is the only reference at least that I have been able to find. You have in this a general section entitled "Entrance in Cuba" and you have a para- graph— I am reading now from page 319 of the New York Times ver- sion. Ithink you have page 414 of the official version. A. I noticed on page 414 of the official version that there is a refer- ence to a substantial difference in political views between Cuba and the United States, specifically the reference to a statement by Castro that Cuba could not accept a situation where at the same time the United States was tr3dng to ease world tensions it also was increasing its efforts to tighten the noose around Cuba. I note also a sentence from page 414 to this effect : "The general con- flict of views between the United States and Cuba was, of course, re- 453 fleeted in other media to such an extent that there can be no doubt that Oswald was aware generally of the critical attitude that Castro ex- pressed about President Kennedy." On page 415 there is a sentence that reads as follows : "While some of Castro's more severe criticisms of President Kennedy might have led Oswald to believe that he would be well received in Cuba after he had assassinated the American President, it does not appear that any to he Ithadseems plans to go there." me that those sentences demonstrate the resolution of the controversy raised by Mr. Liebeler's memorandum. The resolution seems to have been a generalized reference to the kind of criticism that existed at the time and that might have well come to Oswald's attention but without the need to focus on particular embodiments of that Castro criticism where there was no evidence that Oswald did in fact see the specific newspaper item. Q. That concludes my questions this morning, Mr. Willens. Let me say again I appreciate your time and effort to come over and share with us your thoughts, and I will look forward to reading your sub- sequent submission on the processes that led to and were involved in the writing of the report. I would like at this time to extend to you the opportunity to make any additional statement, that you want to for the record. A. Thank you. It will be short. I do want to summarize some of my views with respect to the work of the Warren Commission and the review of that work by this committee. First, I have not and do not oppose the work of this committee. It is certainly most appropriate for an instrumentality of the Congress to evaluate the findings of the Warren Commission in light of the technical developments and the disclosures of the last nearly 14 years. In addition, anyone who serves the public in any capacity, especially on a project as visible and historical as the Warren Commission, must be prepared to have his or her work subjected to the closest public scrutiny. All i or anyone associated with the Commission can ask is that the judgment this committee ultimately renders be reasoned and fair. By reasoned I mean a process of careful consideration of all the perti- nent evidence and factors and the framing of documented and balanced conclusions in light of the relevant evidence and factors. By fair I mean the application of a mature and humane judgment that recog- nizes that errors are inevitable and that the establishment of pri- orities isnecessary in any public endeavor. In particular I ask for some understanding of the incredible public pressures operating upon the Commission and staff to complete its work as the end of 1964 approached. Second, I will not reiterate at any length my views regarding the ability or integrity of the members of the Commission and staff. Any such opinions of mine are obviously self-serving. To the extent that the record of the Commission's work provides evidence of conflicting viewpoints among staff members, two points might be made. 454 First, the Commission had nothing to hide about the way it did its business. The difficulties are reflected in the records of the Commission for all subsequent interested parties to evaluate. Second, such differences surely must be expected of a staff of reason- able, mature and highly independent professionals. Nothing would have warranted suspicion as much as a unanimity of views among the members of the Commission staff. Third, I hope the committee will have the courage to conclude pub- licly that the Warren Commission was correct in its major findings, if that is indeed its conclusion. It will be an easy and attractive course to avoid such an assessment by finding deficiencies in the way in which the time "Warren that has Commission made furtherdid its work and investigation lamenting fruitless. the passage The public of deserves more than this. If the findings of the Warren Commission are n''/t soundly based on the evidence, this committee should so state but if the opposite is true and the committee concludes that the Warren Com- mission was essentially right, then the public deserves to be ^old this as well. Last, as you approach public hearings I hope you wi^l give careful thought to the fairness of your presentation of the facts. If you have concluded that the Warren Commission was deficient in its operating procedures, I hope you will consider giving an opportunity to mem- bers of the Commission or staff to comment on your findings or to testify in your public hearings. I offer this suggestion not because of any vested interest in the findings of the Warren Commission but in an age where governmental institutions are so persuasively distrusted it seems only fair to make certain that all perspectives are evaluated before concluding that the Warren Commission or any other Govern- ment agency associated with the assassination investigation of Presi- dent Kennedy did anything less than extend its best efforts to deal honestly with a most challenging public assignment. Thank you for your courtesy. Mr. Blakey. You're welcome. [Whereupon, at 12 :10 p.m., the deposition concluded.] CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC I, Annabelle Short, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by me in shorthand to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me ; that said deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said witness ; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken ; and further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel by the parties thereto nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action. Annabelle Short, Notary Public in and for the District of Colurribia. My Commission expires November 14, 1980. 455 (286) Attachment I: Letter and attachments from Judge Burt€3W. 3477 Griffin to G. Robert Blakey, November 23, 1977. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA CLEVELAND, OHIO A4\\3 3URT judge: w.GRiFFiN Noveufcer 23, 1977 Mr. Robert Blakey Chief Counsel House Committee on Assassinations House Annex #2 3rd and D Streets, S.W. Washington, D.C. Dear Bob: When I returned home fron VJashington on Novaiiber 17th try 14 year old son (thank God for 14 year old sons) mentioned to me that he had been rumnaging in our attic and had found a stack of Warren Cocmrission papers. Lo and behold when he brought them down, they were xeroxed copies of nearly every msno which I had written in 1964, together with some other inter-office connunications to me from other staff menibers. I now raneniber that these were sent to me in sOTfi months ago by Paul Hoch, a Warren Ccranission researcher San Francisco. I had never looked at them and merely stashed them away. I have now reviewed all of them and am forwarding four for your consideration. The enclosed papers, together with others which I have : not sent, suggest four inportant amendments to ray testimony 1. There are memoranda in the file showing that Leon Hubert was at work in Washington for the Commission at least as early as January 14, 1964, and it is my recollection that I began work before Hubert. Perhaps, you do not fully understand the significance of the pay records which you have sumnarized. 2. There are a number of inter-office memos dated prior to >1ay 1, 1964, vhich show rather substantial amounts of cctirtiunica- tion fron Hubert and me to others working in the ccmspiracy area and vice-versa. Your staff people are probably aware of these. 3. Tne June 1, 1964 memo that I have enclosed shows Willens "we believe the quite clearly that Hubert and I told will investigative requests now underway serve to correct all the matters specified in our manorandum of l-lay 14th." In light of 456 that statenent, I don't see how I can now coiplain about the follcw- through on the investigative matters requested in paragraphs four and five of the memorandum (pages 5,6,7,8,9 & 10). Moreover, other letters bearing Mr. Eankin's signature, \vtiich I have not sent to you, show the nature of the investigation that we requested with respect to the specific matters set forth in those pages. There are also, among the papers sent to me by Paul Hoch, a few other letters prepared around June 1, 1964, with Mr. Rankin's signature, vMch were not sent to the investigative agencies. Apparently, we did do sane conpronising. But obviously I was prepared to put in writing to Howard VJillens my satisfaction with the investigation we were doing, and I will not new atten^Jt to put the jacket on soneone else within the conmission staff. 4. On page 46 of an unpublished early draft of the conspiracy chapter, I wrote as follows: "The CIA has no information suggesting that Jack Ruby was involved in any t3^e of Cuban or other foreign conspiracy." Since that draft was obviously written before the September 14th letter ■which you showed me frcrn the CIA, I have to conclude that we had received oral coimunications from the CIA telling us that they had no information and that we ultimately insisted on their putting their oral statements to us in writing. That, I believe, is v^y the CIA letter came so late. This may not change your conclusion about the CIA cooperation in connec- tion with our requests for information on Ruby, but it does flesh in sane more detail on how they responded to that request. Do not hesitate to contact me if you wish to discuss these matters further. Sincerely, Burt W. Griffin Judge BWG/mjm Enclosures 457 HfiliORAlDVII An* Ip VM nam i«a d. uubin* «r* Bori «. Qrlffla «• as* iffnytriat* vlll iww tan dftlifar*< to tou. tttli win^nt to kMk un, m MUm* ibAt It a^r l«tar h« tJi* m or tr dsyoalUQA ■lawmtim tto tal^pfcnna ealU JinAgr sad* VIA to iiflTUla Mrii fiwrtliintm usiU tl» tMiAta ot fliiiBt* IMW ta« I— Tin! te ttddltloa, it itoiilt to ttet fwtJMr ljntiilc«Uvt tipii^i m^ hmam ^HpMprUt* tetto w«M or rw«ol«te your forwrding m ^oklj •« poa*lbI« !«%%«» •t«tlrsg ««wtii«r or not jwlor to Mov8rf)«r 2i,« 1963 t^BTtt ^a anQr infcmwition Ic your f Ues ooiw«pniM •»JtoT«r»iv» activltle* of J«ok Rul;?/. Ytsw oocfxirttioo in th* work of the Ccawii salon Sinaoroly, J. Le« Qankln Oenoral Ootjswel Griffin/ J V/9-22-6A CC: Griffin • P V h « «« p d _ i «<& a o " ••• ■ _ fra^3 •3 •- ^ > 7 V a • ,8258 5253 aw4 .* « ** Q • 461 (287) Attachment J : Letter from Howard P. Willens to G. Robert Blakey, December 14, 1978. WiLMER, Cutler S. Pickering 166© K STREET. N . W. tL0tON.CUTi.CI) ARTHUR r. MATHEWS WASHINGTON, D. C. 2 000S 0AV10 M.BECHER ■ ■LUAM J k0USK*,JR. JOmN H.PtCAERINO JAHE3 S.CAMPBELL HELEN iBENOIt HUCM R.H, SMITH CAN0ACE3 KOVACIC OEHNIS H FLANNCtrr BARBARA e.BCflC MAN VKIKI E LAND J. ROGER WOLLCNBCnc CABLE AOORESSIWICRINO WASH, O. C. JAUE9 nOBERTSOM ALAN H.BLANRENHtlMEa CM*»Lts c ct.ovt».n (UrHONO CClCVCmGER.III SUSAN LOW BLOCH DONALD C LANOCVOORT INTERNATIONAL TELCX! A*0- 230 MARSMALL HORNBLOWCR STEWART A Block LOUIS R. COHEN CEPALO o. J-levihe menrv LAPORfE HEHRT T.RATHBUM TCLCK:e9-2-02 ALAN N.BRAVERMAM MICHAEL R.KLEIM Christopmcr R, LIPSETT REueCN CUkRK TELEPHONE 2D2 672-0000 LTNN BRECHAN ftOSERT A . MA jOR , JR . STEPHEN A.WEIS'-ASSER SAMUCL J. UUtAHkN T1M0THT N. BLACK DANIEL L.8RENHen A.A.SOmmEA.JO. RICHARD O.BURT BRUCE MAXIMOV SALLT WTtEN EUROPEAN orrict MAURT J.MECMAMiC* r. DAVID laae.jr. RICHARD W.CAS9 LOWELL B-MILLER SAHUCLA.STCRN MUL J.MOOC.JR. S CHEAP3IOE JOHN r. COONET WILLIAM J. PCRLSTtlM ARNOLD MLCRHAN Stcphcn r. ButCA LONDON, EC2V OAA. ENGLANO pHiLUP L.RAfiorr MlCHELE B.COBASM WILLIAM R. RiCHAJtOSON. JR. ROBERT P. STRANAMAH, JR MART CAROLTN COX C BO'DEnOBaT TELEPHONE OI-23e-2-«Ol HA»0,TBUITT.JR, RONALD J.OREENE MARIE N. DOLANO KOti TOWNSEND ROBINSOrt telex: 851 883242 JOEL ftOSCHBLOOM PATRIDA D. DOUGLASS JOHN ROUNSAVILLT.JR. HOWARD P. WILLENS GAPT 0.*1LSON CABLE address: VWICRINC LONDON MICHAEL S. SCHOOlCA STEPHEN P. OOTLC ANORCW T. AMACOONALO ROSERT A .mAmhOnO, HI C LORING JETTON. JR. WIULtAM T. LA«t December 14, 1978 JAMES R.rARfUND NANCT C GARRISON GAIL r. SCHULZ narcn koser scHWAimr ARTHUR ICAROinCR.JR MICHAEL L.BURACA HARK L.GERCHICK CUZABETH A.SNrOEH OAHlELH. MATCRS MICHAEL S HELrCR CORNELIUS J. GOLDEN. JR. ARTHUR B SPITZER tlMOTHt B.D'A EOWARO T. HANO ALAN B.5TERNSTCIN OAtfiD R AH0ER9ON ALLEN H. HARRISON, JR. ARTHUR H WCiSBURO J RODERICK HELLER. in JOHN H.HARWOOO C CAROL DRESChER WEiSMAN ». STEPHEN HUT. JH ALCXANOeAF. WILE5 OAWIQ R. JOHNSON ANNO.WILUAMS EZEKIEL C. STODOARO JAMES T. KILflRETH.m ROBERT G WILSON WILUAHC. GIFTORD RAUL S.KOrFSKT ROGER M. WinCN COUNSEL Mr. G. Robert Blakey Chief Counsel and Director Select Committee on Assassinations U.S. House of Representatives 3331 House Office Building, Annex 2 Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Bob: In the course of my deposition on July 28, 1978, I undertook to comment on the enclosed exhibit purporting to identify the members of the Warren Commission staff that authored particular chapters of the report. I am sorry for the delay in responding to your re- quest that I review this document. I had hoped to find the time to review materials that I am confident exist reflecting the internal workings of the Commission staff regarding the writing of the report. I have not been able to do so, how- ever, and I am therefore unable to inform you and the Com- mittee on this subject with the thoroughness and precision that I would like to. Most importantly, this summary is seriously flawed and should not be relied upon by the Committee for any con- clusions whatsoever. Without resurrecting old controversies with Mr. Epstein, it is a matter of public record that he interviewed only a few members of the Warren Commission staff 462 and that only some of those interviewed responded to his questions with respect to the authorship of various sections of the report. Accordingly, his summary substantially over- states the contributions of some members of the staff, under- states the contributions of others, and does a disservice to the 20 or more members of the staff that participated sig- nificantly in preparation of the final report. Although I had originally intended to do so, I have decided that it would not be productive for me to try and recall the contribution made by each member of the Com- mission staff to each chapter of the report. Any effort by me to do so without refreshing my recollection with materials from the files of the Commission would undoubtedly suffer from the same inaccuracies that I attribute to Mr. Epstein's effort to do so. As I am sure you know from your own experience now, any final report emanating from a committee has numerous authors. Each chapter of the Warren Commission report went through 6 or more substantial redrafts, with different per- sons assuming editorial responsibility at different times. I am sure this will prove to be the case also as your Com- mittee completes its final report. I hope that this letter is useful and that you un- derstand my reticence in trying to be more exact. Sincerely, » d P. Wi liens Enclosure 463 Who Wrote What Chapter 1 - "Summary & Conclusions" - Norman Redlich Chapter 2 - "The Assassination" - primarily written by Redlich, although Specter and Stern contributed. Chapter 3 - "The Shots from the TSBD" - originally written by Specter and submitted in June. The chapter was rewritten by Redlich. Chapter 4 - "The Assassin" - originally written by Ball and Belin. In late June the Re-editing Committee rejected this chapter. Redlich rewrote the chapter which took him ten weeks. Chapter 5 - "Detention and Death of Oswald" - Griffin and Laulicht submitted the draft in August. Goldberg rewrote it. Chapter 6 - "Investigation of Possible Conspiracy," Pollak wrote the section on LHO's movements abroad and Slawson wrote the rest. Pollak then rewrote the entire chapter. Goldberg rewrote the chapter again. Chapter 7 - "LHO: Background and Possible Motives" - Liebeler wrote it originally and Goldberg rewrote it. Chapter 8 - "The wroteProtection the first ofdraft. the President" - Sam rewrote Howard Willens Stern the chapter. Rankin appointed Norman Redlich, Alfred Goldberg, Howard Willens, and himself as a "Re-editing Committee." Goldberg also wrote the Rumors Appendix 464 REFERENCES (1) Letter from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to President Lyndon B. John- son, Mar. 23, 1963 (JFK Doc. 015037). (2) Memorandum to the files by Presidential Assistant Walter Jenkins, Nov. 24, 1963 (JFK Doc. 015038). (5) Deposition of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Aug. 4, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, p. 46 (JFK Doc. 014569). U) Ibid., p. 8. (5) Memorandum from Walter Jenkins to Bill Moyers, Nov. 25, 1963 (JFK Doc. 015038). (6) Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzen- bach to Bill Moyers, Nov. 25, 1963. (7) See ref. 3, pp. 59-60. (8) "Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. John- son, 1: Nov. 22, 1963 to June 30, 1964" (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Govern- mentBookPrinting Olfice, 1965). (9) Leon Jaworski interview, "Oral History Project," p. 21 (JFK Doc. 003411). (10) Memorandum from Walter Jenkins to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Nov. 29, 1963 (JFK Doc. 015039). (11) See ref. 3, p. 9. (12) Memorandum from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, Sullivan, DeLoach, and Rosen, Nov. 29, 1963 (JFK Doc. 015040). (13) Lyndon edition, 1972), p.B. 26. Johnson, "The Vantage Point" (New York: Popular Library iU) Id. at p. 27. (15) Ibid. ^ ,^^ (16) "The Memoirs of Chief Justice Earl Warren" (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday& Co., Inc., 1977), pp. 356-358. (i7)003 Chief Justice 409 Earl Warren, ). "Oral History Project," pp. 16, 17 (JFK Doc. . ^ ^ ^^ „ {18) Testimony of Gerald R. Ford, Sept. 21, 1978, hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington. D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. Ill, p. 578 (hereinafter referred to as Ford testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 578) . (19) See ref. 13, p. 26. (20) Ibid. (21 ) See ref. 9, pp. 22, 23. {22) Id. at p. 24. {23) See ref. 6; see ref. 2. ^ .... a {24) Memorandum Clyde from Assistant FBI Director Cartha DeLoach to Asso- ciate FBI Director Tolson, Dec. 12, 1963 (JFK Doc. 015040). {25) Executive session testimony of Norman Redlich, Nov. 8, 1977,(JFK hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 144, 74 Doc. 014665) (see attachment A, this staff report) ; executive session testimony of Arlen Specter, Nov. 8, 1977, hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 57, 11 (JFK Doc. 014665) (see attachment A of this staff report). {26) See ref. 13, p. 26. . ^ a, ,t i • (27) Memorandum (o the files of Warren Commission staff member Melvin Eisenberg, Feb. 17, 1964 (JFK Doc. 015041). {28) Ibid. {29) The New York Times, Nov. 26, 1963, p. 15, {30) "The Whole Truth," The New York Times, Nov. 26, 1963, p. 3b. (31) The Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1963. ,. , rr« (32) "Indians Believe Oswald Was Only a Tool," The New York Times, Nov. 28, 1963, p. 33. . _, ^, or? rer. zo, (33) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, P- 71 ; see of Wesley Specter exec-utive session testimony, p. 52 ; executive session testimony 15, 1977, hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassma- Liebeler, Nov. staff report) ; execu- tions p 114 (JFK Doc. 0146&) (see attachment B of this tirse^ssi on testimony of Howard P. Willens, Nov^^l7 19^, ^^arings ^efore (see Doc. 014694) he House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 8o (JFK attachment C of this staff report) . 465 {34) Executive session testimony of W. David Slawson, Nov. 15, 1977, hear- ings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 88 (JFK Doc. 014668) (see attacliment B of tliis staff report). {35) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 7. {36) Sete ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 71. {37) Executive session testimony of Judge Burt W. Griffin, Nov. 17, 1977, hear- ings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 19 (JFK Doc. 014694) (see attachment C of this staff report) . {38) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 10. {39) Id. at p. 87. (40) Id. at p. 88. {41 ) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 143. {42) Id. at p. 157. {43) See ref. 18, Ford testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, HSCA-JFK hearings. (4^) Testimony of John J. McCloy, Sept. 21, 1978, hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. Ill, p. 605 (hereinafter referred to as McCloy testimony. III HSCA-JFK hearings, 605) . (45) Deposition of J. Lee Rankin, Aug. 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 6 (JFK Doc. 014027) bee attachment D of this staff report). {46) Warren Commission executive session transcript, Dec. 5, 1963 (JFK Doc. 000493. (.^7) See ref. 18, Ford testimony Sept. 21, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings 47. {48) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, p. 91. {49) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 9. {50) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 79. {51 ) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 15. {52) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 10. {53) Id. at p. 48. {54) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 60. {53) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, p. 105. {56) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, pp. 11-12. (5^7) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, pp. 73-74. {58) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 58. {59) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 10. {60) See ref. 45, Rankin deposition, p. 96. {61 ) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, pp. 118-119. {62) Ibid. {63) See ref. 45, Rankin deposition, p. 43. {64) Id. at pp. 97-98. {65) See ref. 34, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 59. {66) Ibid. (67) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 78. {68) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 9. {69) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 129. (70) See ref. 44, McCloy testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, III JFK hearing, 602. {71 ) See ref. 18, Ford testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 583. (72) Id. at 582. {73) See ref. 37, Griffin executive testimony, pp. 17-18. {74) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 9. (75) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, pp. 94^96. (76) See ref. 37, Rankin deposition, p. 13. (77) Id. at pp. 14-15. (78) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, pp. 16-17. (75 ) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, p. 97. {80) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 82. {81 ) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, pp. 22-23. {82) Id. at p. 82. {83) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 18. {84) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 14. (85) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 19. (86) See ref. 2.5, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 83. (87) See ref. 33, Liebeler executiVe session testimony, p. 127. 466 (88) Edward J. Epstein, "Inquest" (New York: Viking Press, 1966), p. 131; minutes of the Warren Commission executive session of Sept. 18, 1964 (JFK Doc. 000076). {Sif) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 14. testimony, Sept. 21, 197S, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 607.(90) See ref. 44, McCloy (91) "Warren Commission Report," p. 19. (92) Testimony of John Sherman Cooper, Sept. 21, 1978, hearings before House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Cong. 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office 1979) vol. Ill, p. 600 (hereinafter referred to as Cooper testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings, ). (93) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, pp. 20-21. (94) Id. at p. 50. (95) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, p. 115. (96) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 64 ; see ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 103. (97) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, pp. 49-50. (98) Id. at pp. 86-87. (99) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 27. (100) See ref. 45, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 100. (101) Id. at p. 101. (102) See ref. 44, McCloy testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 601. (103) See ref . 17, p. 28. (104) Id. at p. 26. (105) Id. at p. 17. (106) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 52. (107) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 10. (108) Id. at p. 26. (109) Ibid. (110) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, p. 125. (111) Id. at pp. 16-17. (112) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 144; fn. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 57 ; and fn. 37, p. 24. (113) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 154; see ref. 34, p. 101. (114) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, p. 130. (115) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 11 ; see ref. 25, Red- lich executive session testimony, pp. 74-75 ; see ref. 33, Liebeler executive ses- sion testimony, p. 154 ; see ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 11. (116) Seeref. 34, p. 11. (117) Id. at pp. 101-102. (118) See ref. 44, Cooper testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 601-02. (119) See ref. 18, Ford testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, III HSCA -JFK hearings, 589. (120) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, pp. 146-147. (121) Ibid. (122) Seeref. 46, p. 1. (123) Id. at p. 2. (124) Id- at p. 39. (125) S.J. Res. 137, Public Law 88-202. (126) See ref. 46, p. 8. ( 127 ) See ref. 46, Dec. 19, 1963, p. 3 (JFK Doc. 000501 ) . (128) Id. at p. 12. (129) See ref. 46, Dec. 16, 1963, p. 11 (JFK Doc. 000475). (130) Id. at p. 12. (131) Id. at p. 18. (132) Id. at p. 14. (133) Ibid. (134) Id. at p. 43. (135) Id. at p. 44. (136) Id. at p. 9. (137) Id. at p. 15. (138) Id. at p. 13. 467 (139) Id. at pp. 46-47. {1^1) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Richard M. Helms, Mar. 16, 1964 (JFK Doc. 000094 and 003872) ; Memorandum from Richard M. Helms to J. Lee Rankin, May 6, 1964. {142) "The Documents," The New RepubUc, Sept. 27, 1975, p. 28. {1^3) Id. at p. 27. . ^ ^^ _^^ (lU) See Warren Commission executive session transcript, Jan. 27, 19t)4, p. 128 (JFK Doc. 000001). (US) Id. at p. 137. (146) Ibid. (i47) Ibid. {U8) Ibid. {149) Id. at p. 139. {150) Id. at p. 140. {151) Id. at p. 141. {152) Id. at p. 142. {153) Ibid. {154) Ibid. {155) Id. at pp. 143-154. {156) Ibid. {157) Id. at p. 163. {158) Id. at pp. 163-165. {159) Id. at pp. 168-171. {160) Id. at p. 177. {161) Id. at p. 182. ^ ,. (jf62) Memorandum from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to J. Lee Rankin, Jan. 27, 1964. {163) XVII Warren report hearings, 814. {164) See CE 835, Warren Commission report. {165) See CE 825, Warren Commission report. {166) See Committee Report II, D., 3(d). {167) See Warren Report at pp. 484-490. {168) Secret Service Doc. No. 767 (JFK Doc. 002769) . {169) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 169. {170) See ref. 46, Apr. 30, 1964, p. 5851 (JFK Doc. 000496) . {171) Ibid. {172) Id. at pp. 5885-5886. {173) Id. at p. 5864. {174) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 115. (175) See ref. 33, Specter executive session testimony, p. 39. {176) Id. at p. 11. (i77) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, pp. 15-16. ( 178) See ref. 25. Redlich executive session testimony, p. 120. {179) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 20. {180) Ibid., p. 35. {181) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 77. {182) See ref. 33, Specter executive session testimony, p. 11. {183) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 16, {184) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 20. {185) Id. at p. 19. ( 186) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 10. (187) Id. at p. 11. {188) Id. at p. 13. {189) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 18. {190) Id. at p. 20. {191) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 18. {192) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 118. {193) See ref. 33, Specter executive session testimony, p. 39. {194) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 28. {195) See para. 228 ff. of the HSCA staff report on the Warren Commission. {196) Id. at p. 35. (197) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 103. {198) Id. at p. 72. {199) Id. at p. 122. 468 {200) Id. at p. 95. {201) Memorandum for the record by Howard P. Willens, "Staff Reaction to Hosty Problem," Feb. 12, 1964. {202) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, pp. 30-32. {203) See ref. 45, Rankin deposition, pp. 27-28. {204) Id. at p. 53. {205) Ibid. {206) Id. at pp. 51-52. (207) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session te.stimony, p. 17. {208) Ibid. (209) Memorandum from W. David Slawson to Raymond Rocca, June 6, 1964 (JFK Doc. 002539 and 002962) . {210) Ibid. {211) Id. at p. 34. {212) Ibid. {213) See para. 154, 157 and 158, of the HSCA staff report on the Warren Commission. {214) See ref. 209, p. 12. {215) Id. at p. 104. {216) Id. at p. 105. (2i7) See para. 268 of the HSCA staff report on the Warren Commission. {218) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 103. {219) Id. at p. 24. {220) Id. at p. 61. {221 ) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 164. {222) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 72. {223) Testimony of James R. Malley, September 20, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 444. {224) See, e.g., infra para. 216-18. {225) "The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy ; Performance of the Intelligence Agencies," book V, final report. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to intelligence, 94th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 47 (S. Rept. 94-755) (hereinafter SSC, book V). {226) Id. at p. 46. {227) Ibid. {228) See ref. 225, staff interview with William Sullivan. Senate Select Com- mittee to Study Governmental Operations, SSC, book V, pp. 78-79. {229) Id. at p. 5. {230) Id. at p. 85. {231) Ibid. {232) Ibid. {233) See ref. 223, Malley testimony, p. 33. {234) Id. at p. 41. {235) Id. at p. 47. {236) See ref. 223, p. 84. (237) Ibid. (238) Ibid. {239) Ibid. {240) Ibid. {241) Memorandum of James H. Gale to Clyde Tolson, September 30, 1964, as .quoted in SSC, book V, p. 54 (see ref. 225). {242) Testimony of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, September 21, 1978, III HSCA- JFK hearings, p. 50. {243) Id. at p. 47. {244) Ibid. {245) Id. at p. 53. {246) See ref. 203, Rankin testimony, p. 48. (2//7) See para. 124, HSCA staff report on the Warren Commission. {248) Ibid., para. 114 and 115. {249) See ref. 225, SSC, book V, p. 5T. {250) Id. at p. 31. {251) Id. at p. 57. {252) Ibid. 469 (253) Ibid. {254) Id. at p. 38-59. {255) Testimony of Richard M. Helms, September 22, 1978, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 31. {256) Ibid., p. 20-21. {257) Ibid., {258) See para. para.259, 256.HSCA staff report on the "Warren Commission. {259) See ref. 225, SSC, book V, pp. 57-60. {260) See para. 257, HSCA staff report on the Warren Commission. {261) Ibid., para. 115 {262) See ref. 255, Helms testimony, pp. 29-30. {263) Ibid. {264) Id. at p. 149. {265) See para. 183-187 and 137, HSCA staff report on the Warren Commis- sion. {266) See CE 3045, Warren Commission report. {267) See CE 3146, Warren Commission report. {268) Warren report, p. 324. {269) Executive session testimony of Leon Brown, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 139 (JFK Doc. 008343). {270) Id. at 138. {271) Id. at 139. {272) Ibid. (273) Ibid. {274) Id. at p. 141. (275) Id. at p. 142. {276) Id. at p. 144. (277) Ibid. (27S) Id. at p. 143. (279) Id. at p. 140. {280) Id. at p. 144. {281) Id. at p. 145. {282) Ibid. {283) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 133. {284) Draft cover letter to a memorandum from Leon D. Hubert and Burt W. Griffin to Richard M. Helms, "Jack Ruby— Background, Friends, and Other Pertinent Information," Feb. 24, 1964 (JFK Doc. 001927). {285) See ref. 284, attached routing slip. {286) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 37. (287) CIA internal memorandum for the record on CIA meeting with Leon D. Hubert and Burt W. Griffin, Mar. 12. 1964. {288) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Richard M. Helms, May 19, 1964. {289) Memorandum from Thomas H. Karamessines to J. Lee Rankin, Sept. 15, 1964. {290) Letter from Burt W. Griffin to G. Robert Blakey, Nov. 23, 1978 (JFK Doc. 003477). {291) Ibid. {292) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to John McCone, Director of Central In- telligence. Feb. 12, 1964. {293) Internal memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, Mar. 3, 1964. {294) Memorandum from Howard P. Willens to J. Lee Rankin, Mar. 9, 1964. (295) Ibid. {296) Memorandum for the record. Mar. 12, 1964; letter from Rankin to Helms. Mar. 16, 1964, see ref. 141. (257) Memorandum from Samuel Stern to J. Lee Rankin, Mar. 27, 1964. {298) See Warren Commission Doc. 674, National Archives. (299) Warren Commission hearings, 129. (300) CIA internal memorandum, Nov. 25, 1963, CIA item 173A. {301 ) CIA internal memorandum, May 12, 1964, CIA item 298. (302) Memorandum from David Slawson to Howard P. Willens, Feb. 21. 1964. (303) Memorandum from David Slawson to J. Lee Rankin, Mar. 27, 1964. (304) Ibid. (305) See ref. 302. (306) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, pp. 42-43. (307) Ibid. 470 (308) Executive session testimony of Robert Gemberling, p. 85. (309) Ibid. (310) Id. at p. 86. (311) Ibid. (312) Id. at p. 93. (313) Ibid. (SU) Id. at p. 104. (315) Ibid. (316) Id. at p. 132. (317) Id. at p. 104. (318) Ibid. (319) Id. at p. 107. (320) Ibid. (321) Book V, Senate Intelligence Committee report, p. 70. (322) Id. at p. 74. (323) Ibid. (32i) Id. at p. 70. (325) Ibid., pp. 67-68, 73. (326) See para. 363, HSCA staff report on the Warren Commission. (327) Book V, Senate Intelligence Committee report, p. 71. (328) Ibid. (329) Id. at p. 72. (330) Id. at p. 73. (331) Id. at p. 74. (332) See ref. 255, Helms testimony, pp. 151, 172. (333) See ref. 255, Helms testimony, pp. 178-9. (334) Id. at p. 183. (335) Memorandum from David Slawson to J. Lee Rankin, Sept. 6, 1964. (336) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, n. 27. (337) Ibid. (338) Id. at p. 28. (339) Ibid. (340) Id. at p. 27. (341) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 46. (342) See ref. 25, Redlfch executive session testimony, p. 132. (343) See ref. 203, Rankin testimony, p. 91. (344) See ref. 242, Katzenbacb testimony, p. 23. (345) Id. at p. 19. (346) See ref. 203, Rankin testimony, p. 28. (3^7) See ref. 242 Katzenbach te.stimony, p. 20. (348) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive testimony, p. 171. (349) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, pp. 38-61. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPPOKT PROVIDED TO THE WARREN COMMISSION BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Staff Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations U.S. House of Representatives Ninety-fifth Congress Second Session March 1979 (471) CONTENTS Paragraph I. Foreword (1) II. Organization of the CIA's Investigation of President Kennedy's assassination (21) III. The Warren Commission-CIA working relationship (47) A. Opinions of Warren Commission and CIA representatives regarding the Warren Commission-CIA relationship (47) B. ThetheCIA's failure Warren Commission to disclose CIA anti-Castro assassination plans to (60) C. Agency's legal responsibility to protect sensitive sources and meth- ods-factors affecting the CIA's response to Warren Commission re- quests (69) D. Warren Commission knowledge of CIA sensitive sources and methods (88) E. The photograph of an unidentified Individual (112) F. Luisa Calderon (133) IV. Balance of the evidence (163) (472) I. Foreword (1) The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) performance in pro- viding support to the Warren Commission has been a source of public concern during the past 15 years. Critics have repeatedly charged that the CIA participated in a conspiracy to suppress information relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy. During 1976, these critics' assertions were the subject of official inquiry by the Senate Select Com- mittee toStudy Government Operations (SSC) . The SSC, in its report regarding "The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy : Performance of the Intelligence Agencies," reached the following findings : The committee emphasizes that it has not uncovered any evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. The committee has, however, developed evidence which im- peaches the process by which the intellig'ence agencies arrived at their own conclusions about the assassination, and by which they provided information to the Warren Commission. This evidence indicates that the investigation of the assassination was deficient and that facts which might have substantially affected the course of the investigation were not provided the Warren Commission or those individuals within the FBI and the CIA, as well as other agencies of Government, who were charged with investigating the assassination, (i) (2) The committee sought to examine in greater detail the gen- eral findings of the SSC. It particularly focused its attention on the specific issue of whether the CIA or any employee or former employee of tlie CIA misinformed or withheld information relevant to the as- sassination ofPresident Kennedy from the Warren Commission. In addition, the Committee attempted to determine whether, if the War- ren Commission were misinformed or not made privy to information relevant to its investigation, it was because of conscious effort by the Agency or its employees. (3) In investigating this matter, the committee reviewed a 1977 task force report by the CIA (1977 TFR).(^) This report was highly critical of the SSC's findings pertaining to the AMLASH operation* and asserted that the SSC's Final Rej)ort conveyed the mistaken im- pression that the CIA had made a limited effort to assist the Warren Commission. The 1977 TFR disagreed with this characterization and noted that the "CIA did seek and collect information in support of the Warren Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies and submitted special analyses and reports." (4) *The assassination Castro plots. (S)was characterized by the SSC as one of the CIA's AMLASH operation (473) 474 (4 ) In order to demonstrate further the scope of support provided by the CIA to the Warren Commission, the 1977 TFK contamed a com- prehensive listing of CIA-generated material made available to both the U.S. intelligence community and the Warren Commission regard- ing the assassination of President Kennedy. In this respect, the evi- dence supports the 1977 TFR, in which it is stated that : This compilation [of CIA-generated material] is appro- priate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort, to the extent that it reveals something of the results of that effort. (5) (5) In its examination of the Agency's comprehensive listing of CIA-generated material, the committee followed the organization of these materials by the 1977 TFR. The 1977 TFR detailed four inter- related categories of Kennedy assassination material : (6) (1) Agency informa tion disseminated to the intelligence com- munity (formal and informal disseminations) ; (7 ) (2 ) Material disseminated to the Warren Commission ; (8) (3) Information disseminated to the FBI et al. regarding ru- mors and allegatio on ; sas inatiand ns regarding President Kennedy's as- (9) (4) Memorandum submitted by the CIA relating to the Warren Com- mission on rumors and allegations to the Presi- dent's assassination. . (10) In reviewing these categories, the committee concentrated its focus upon those CIA materials that the 1977 TFR documented as having been made available in written form to the Warren Commission. (11) During the course of this study, additional Agency files were reviewed in an effort to resolve certain issues that arose during the review of the 1977 TFR materials. Wliere apparent gaps existed in the written record, files were requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve those gaps. Where significant substantive issues arose related to the kind and quality of information provided the Warren Commis- sion, files were requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these issues.* In the end, approximately 30 files, comprising an approximate total of 90 volmnes of material, were examined and analyzed in prepa- ration of this staff report. (12) The evidence set forth here must be qualified. During the course of the past 15 years, the CIA has generated massive amounts of infor- mation related to the assassination of President Kennedy. Certain documents requested by the committee for study and analysis were not located, T^niether these documents were merely filed incorrectly or actually destroyed, gaps in the written record still exist. (13) Second, due to dissimilar standards with respect to the relevancy of materials to the committee's investijjation adopted by the CIA and the committee, certain files requested by the committee for review were made available to the committee in redacted form or were with- *E.g. : CIO JFK assassination materials provided the Rockefeller Commission ; CIA materials pertaining to Liiisa Calderon Curallero; AMLASH; CIA "Soft Files" pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald ; CIA materials generated by Warren Commission but carrying Agency classification. 475 held.* The evidence collected in this staff report is based on the evi- dence available to the committee, which mig:ht not have been all the relevant evidence to which the Agency had access. (14) Due consideration, moreover, must be given to the role that oral discussions and briefings between the Warren Commission and CIA representatives may have played in the supply of assassination-related information. The subject and substance of these discussions and brief- ings may not always be reflected by the written record reviewed in this study. Consequently, the committee conducted interviews, depo- sitions, and executive session hearings with key Warren Commission staff and members and former or present CIA representatives in an effort to resolve questions that were not addressed by the written record. (15) This staff report examines the following subjects generated by the committee's study in the following order : (16) (1) The organization of the CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination ; (17) (2) The working relationship of the Warren Commission staff and those CIA representatives concerned with Warren Commission inquiry ; (18) (3) The standards of investigative cooperation that the War- ren Commission staff believed governed the quality and quantity of information supplied by the CIA to the Com- mis ion ; (19) (4) The CIA's responsibility for protection of its sensitive sources and methods and the effects of the responsibility on the Warren Commission investigation; and (20) (5 ) The substance and quality of information concerning Luisa Calderon passed on to the Warren Commission, the results of this committee's investigation of Calderon and her sig- nificance tothe events of November 22, 1963. (21) The investigation by the committee of the CIA involved an extensive analysis of some of its sensitive sources and methods. Because these sources and methods are protected by law from unauthorized disclosure [see 505 U.S.C. 403(d)(3)], portions of this report have been written in a somewhat conclusory manner designed to avoid re- ferring explicitly to such sensitive sources and methods. A classified staff report dealing explicitly with these sensitive sources and methods is in the committee's files. {6) II. Organization of the CIA's Investigation of President Kennedy's Assassination (22) In his executive session testimony before the committee, Richard Helms, the CIA's deputy director for plans during 1963, described the Agency's as follows:role in the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination (23) This crime was committed on United States soil. There- fore, as far as the Federal Government was concerned, the *CIA files pertaining to A-1 and an Agency employee's personal safe holdings were made available to this Committee subject to Agency deletion. Because the committee's legislative mandate was limited in terms of time, H. Res. 433, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, the policy decision was made to negotiate for documents rather than engage in time-consuming lawsuits. 43-819—79 31 476 primary investigating agency would have been the Federal Bureau of Investigation without any question. The role of the CIA would have been entirely supportive in the sense of what material we are [sic] able to acquire outside the limits of the United States with reference to the investigation. * * * For investigative purposes, the Agency had no investigative role inside the United States at all. So when I used here the word "supportive," I meant that in the literal sense of the term. We are [sic] trying to support the FBI and support the Warren Commission and be responsive to their requests, but we were not initiating any investigations of our own or, to my recol- lection, were we ever asked to. (7) (24) On November 23, 1963, Helms had called a meeting of senior- level CIA officials to outline the Agency's investigative responsibility vis-a-vis the assassination. (5) At that time, Helms placed John Scelso, a desk officer in the Western Hemisphere Division and headquarter's Mexico branch chief, in charge of the Agency's initial investigative efforts.* (^) (25) Scelso testified before the committee that he was given charge of the Agency's investigation on the basis of two considerations : (1) his prior experience in conducting major CIA security investiga- tions; and (2) the observation of Oswald in Mexico (Scelso's head- quarters responsibility) reported to the CIA less than 2 months prior to the assassination, (icj) Scelso also noted that during the course of his investigative efforts, Helms did not pressure him to adopt specific investigative theories nor reach conclusions within a set period of time.** (74) (26) Scelso described in detail to the committee the manner in which he conducted the Agency's investigation: * * * practically my whole branch participated in the thing. We dropped almost everything else and I put a lot of my officers to work in tracing names, analyzing files. *During the course of the Agency's investigation, liaison with the FBI was handled for the CIA by a former FBI agent who was chief of the Special In- vestigations Group of the CIA's Counter-intelligence Staff. (iO) He characterized his functions with respect to the Agency as follows : I knew that we [at CIA] did not have the basic responKihility for investigating the assassination of the President. If there was a crime committed in the course of this activity, it belonged to the FBI. I recognized that it was our responsibility to give the fullest cooperation to the FBI to protect the Agency with regard to any aspects of our operations, you understand, and at the same time giving them coopera- tion, and I was in close contact with Mr. Sam Papich [of the FBI], and always fully cooperated, and lie always fully cooperated with me.(ii) [This officer] noted that his office (CI/SIG), at the direction of the Chief oi Counterintelligence, James Angleton, was designated the central! i)oint for col- lection of assassination-related information made available to the FBI.(12) **Raymond Roeca. chief of research and analy.sis for CIA's Counterintelligence staff, characterized Scelso's responsibility not as a mandate to investigate, but rather to "coordinate traffic (code facilitation, telegram or telegraphic considera- tion) for working with the DDP with respect to what was being done over the whole world. . . ."{15) Rocca referred to this phase of CIA activity bv a cryptonym. (i6) 477 We were flooded with cable traffic, with reports, suggestions, allegations from all over the world, and these things had to be checked out. We were checking out just dozens and dozens of people all the time. (77) (27) Scelso stated during his testimony that CIA field stations worldwide were alerted to the Agency's investigation "and the key stations were receiving tips on the case, most of which were phony. We did not send out instructions saying everybody participate in the investigation." (i5) It was his recollection, however, that throughout his tenure as coordinator of the Agency's investigation, the Mexican branch was the only CIA unit directly involved in investigatory activities related to President Kennedy's assassination.* (75) (28) Scelso effectively coordinated a voluminous flow of cable traffic related to the assassination. During the first half of December, he issued a summary report that described Oswald's activities in Mexico City from September 26, 1963, to October 3, 1963. Scelso characterized the summary report as incomplete by comparison to assassination- related information then available to the FBI but not provided to the CIA until late December 1963.** (^6*) (29) Following issuance of this report. Helms shifted responsibility for the CIA's investigation to th© Counterintelligence Staff. (^^) He testified that this shift was a logical development because the investi- gation had begun to take on broader tones. {2S) (30) Helms' reasoning was expanded upon by Raymond Rocca, chief of research and analysis for the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, who testified before the Committee that the shift in responsibility described by Helms was caused in part by the establishment of the Warren Cormnission. (24) Rocca added : (31) It was entirely appropriate in the [initial] phase that he [Scelso] would have that [responsibility for the Agency in- vestigation.] But the minute you had a commission set up out- side, the line obviously had to be the Director, and from the Director to his Chief of Operations overseas, because the spread involved then all of the divisions. Here you had Mr. [Scelso] being asked to sign off on cables that had to do with [other international concerns,] and it would have seemed to me utterly administratively simply a hybrid monster. (^5) (32) James Angleton, chief of the Counterintelligence Staff sup- ported Rocca's belief that "the spread [of investigative responsibility] involved ... all of the [CIA] divisions." Angleton testified to this com- mittee that the Agency's efforts to gather and coordinate information related to the assassination underwent a metamorphic transition. Ini- tially, Angleton noted, the Director, Deputy Director, Division Chiefs and Case Officers approached the Warren Commission's requirements ♦The CIA does not agree with this statement. According to the Agency, all of its branches were tasked immediately after the assassination. Subsequently, 10 of its stations were tasked to pursue investigative leads. ** Approximately 2 days after President Kennedy's assassination, Scelso pre- pared a summary report, provided to President Johnson by Helms. This report stated that Oswald probably was a lone assassin who had no visible ties to Soviet or Cuban intelligence though such ties could not be excluded from consid- eration. (2i) 478 in a piecemeal fashion. Eventually Angleton testified, the Agency was able to focus its resources to avoid duplication of effort and provide a system for the central referencing of assassination-related informa- tion as such information was developed. (^^) (33) The record reveals that during this second phase of CIA in- formation collection efforts in support of the Warren Commission investigation, the concentration of Agency resources shifted in em- phasis from exploration of Oswald's activities in Mexico City to his residency in the Soviet Union during 1959-62 and possible associa- tion with the Soviet intelligence apparatus. (27) Rocca commented that during this phase, primary interest in support of the Warren Commission was to pursue Soviet leads : * * * on the assumption that a person who spends four years * in the Soviet Union, under his circumstances, had to be of specific interest to Soviet State security and their col- lateral authorities. (28) (34) Rocca concluded that the areas on which the CIA tended to concentrate concerned the Soviets : (35) * * * because the people he [Oswald] was in touch with in Mexico had traces, prior traces, as KGB people. They were under consular cover and obviously could have been doing and were undoubtedly doing a consular job in those earlier contacts. (^5) (36 ) Nevertheless, Rocca did indicate that Cuban aspects of the CIA investigation were not ignored "because there was a lot of material that came through and went to the Commission that concerned the Cubans." (SO) (37) Helms also testified that the possibility of Cuban mvolvement was a source of deep concern within the Agency. (31) He added, how- ever, that development of information pertaining to Cuban knowledge of or participation in the assassinatio n was very difficult to ob- tain. {S£) . . (38) Angleton was in agreement with Rocca's analysis that durmg the second phase of the Agency's effort the CIA concentrated(33) its re- sources on exploring possible Soviet influence on Oswald. He indicated that in part, this simply reflected inadequate CIA resources : (39) I personally believe that the United States intelligence services did not have the capabilities to ever come to an adju- dication [ofthe Cuban aspect]. I don't think the capabilities were there. {34-) (40) As noted above, the counterintelligence Staff was given respon- sibility inlate December 1963-early January 1964 for the coordination of CIA efforts to assist the Warren Commission in its investigation. At that time, Raymond Rocca was designated point of contact with the Commission. concerned with : (J5) Rocca's research and analysis component was (41) analytical intelligence, anal3i:ical brainpower, which meant all source, all overt source comprehension; a study of cases * In fact, Oswald spent 2 years, eight months in the Soviet Union. 479 that had ceased to occupy operational significance, that is, closed cases, to maintain the ongoing record of overall quality and quantity of counterintelligence being performed by the entire DDP operational component ; * * * the Deputy Director for Plans. (r5^) (42) Kocca testified that assassination-related information generated by CIA components was directed to his staff (as designated point of contact with the Warren Commission) in the normal flow of day-to-day work. (57) This information was then reviewed by Kocca or his assistants, who included [Agency employee] (Soviet Expert), [Agency employee] (general research and document search man for the U.S. intelligence community and its resources) , and [Agency employee] (who had trans- ferred to the CIA from the FBI a number of years prior to the assas- sinati(38) on) . During the course of the Warren Commission investiga- tion, [this group] w^orked with those CIA divisions that were produc- ing substantive information related to the assassination. (55) Rocra and his group effectively coordinated the large volume of cable traffic available to them pertaining to the assassination. (43) Rocca testified that even though the Counterintelligence/Re- search and Analysis Unit was the Agency's point of reference with re- gard to the Warren Commission, neither his staff nor the counter- intelligence staff in general displaced the direct relations of Helms or any other concerned Agency official with the Warren Commission. (^0) Rocca indicated that in some instances J. Lee Rankin of the Warren Commission would go directly to Helms with requests; in other in- stances, David Slawson, a Commission staff counsel, conferred directly with [Agency employee] of Rocca's staff.* (^i ) (44) The record reveals that on certain issues of particular sensi- tivity, Rocca was not permitted to act as the Agency's point of contact with the Warren Commission. He testified that "compartmentaliza- tion was observed notwithstanding the fact that I was the working level point of contact." (44) Rocca cited by way of example the case of the Soviet defector Yuri Nosenko. Rocca testified that he did not attend any of the Agency discussions pertaining to Nosenko's case. (4p) Rather, responsibility for the case was assigned to the Chief of Soviet Russian Division, in addition to Helms. {4^6) (45) Rocca described the counterintelligence Staff mail intercept program, HT-Linjrual, ar. a second example of an Agency matter about which he had no knowledge nor input vis-a-vis the Agency's support role to the Warren Commission. (4^) Rather, Angleton and [Agency employee] handled the disposition of this particular material. (^^5) (46) In smnmary, it was Rocca's testimony that an internally de- centralized information reporting function, coordinated by the ♦Although James Angleton functioned as Rocca's direct superior during the course of the Warren Commission investigation, he did not participate on a reg- ular basis in the Agency's efforts to supply substantive information to the War- ren Commission, nor did he deal on a direct basis with Warren Commission rep- resentatives, excepting Allen Dulles on an unofficial basis. f-f2) Nonetheless. Angleton testified to this committee that he did attempt to keep apprised of developments as the investigation progressed through consultation with Kocca. (^) 480 Counterintelligence staff, best characterized the organization of this second phase of the Agency's investigative efforts to assist the Warren Commission. (4<9) III. The Warren Commission -CIA Working Relationship A. opinions of warren commission and CIA representatives REGARDING THE WARREN COMMISSION-CIA RELATIONSHIP (47) The Warren Commission was created on November 29, 1963, by- Executive Order No, 11130. Pursuant to that order, the Commission was in part empowered "* * * to evaluate all the facts and circum- stances surrounding such assassination * * *." In addition, the order made clear that "all executive departments and agencies are directed to furnish the Commission with such facilities, services and coopera- tion as it may request from time to time," (48) The committee contacted both members of the Warren Com- mission staff and those representatives of the CIA who played signif- icant roles in providing CIx4.-generated information to the Commis- sion. The general consensus of these people was that the Commission and the CIA enjoyed a successful working relationship during the course of the Commission's investigation. (J6>) William Coleman, a senior staff counsel for the Warren Commission who worked closely with Warren Commission staff counsel W. David Slawson on matters that involved the CIA's resources, characterized the CIA representa- tives with whom he dealt as highly competent, cooperative and intel- ligent. (Ji) Slawson expressed a similar opinion regarding the Agency's cooperation and quality of work. (52) (49) J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the Warren Commission, testified that the Warren Commission and its staff were assured by the CIA that the Agency would cooperate in the Commission's work. (5-5) John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence at the time of President Kennedy's assassination and during the Warren Com- mission's investigation, supported Rankin's testimony in this regard by characterizing the CIA's work vis-a-vis the Warren Commission as both responsive and comprehensive. (54) (McCone had been respon- sible for insuring that all relevant matters were conveyed by the CIA to the Commission.) (55) McCone testified that : (50) The policy of the CIA was to give the Warren Commission everything that we had. I personally asked Chief Justice Warren to come to my office and took him down to the vault of our building where our information is microfilmed and stored and showed him the procedures that we were following and the extent to which we were giving him — giving his staff everything that we had, and I think he was quite satisfied. (56) (51) Rocca likewise characterized the Agency's role as one of full support to the Commission, He stated under oath that Plelms had given the following directive: (52) All material bearing in any way that could be of nssist- ance to the Warren Commission should be seen by CI staff and R and A and marked for us. He issued very, very 481 strictly worded instructions— they were verbal in so far as I know— that we were to leave no stone unturned. {57) (53) Eocca added by Helms' orders were fol- that, to his knowledge, {58) lowed to the letter all CIA employees. He concluded that on this basis "the CIA was to turn over and to develop any infor- mation bearing on the assassination that could be of assistance to the Warren Commission." (55) (54) A different view of the CIA's role regarding the supply of CIA's information to the Commission was offered by Helms. Helms, who served as the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren Commission investigation, was directly responsible for the Agency's investigation of President Kennedv's assassination and the establishment of CIA policy vis-vis the Warren Commis- sion. {60) He testified to the committee that the CIA made every effort to be as responsive as possible to Warren Commassion requests. {61) He added further details regarding the manner m which the CIA provided its information to the Commission : (55) An inquiry would come over [from the to Warren Commis- sion]. We would attempt to respond it. But these inquiries came in individual bits and pieces or as individual items * * * Each individual item that came along we took care of as best we could. {62) (50) It was Helms' recollectionn that the CIA provided informa- tion to the Warren Commissio primarily on the basis of the Commission's specific requests. He said: Staff Counsel. In summary, is it your position that the Agency gave the Warren Commission information only in response to specific requests by the Warren Commission? Mr. Helms. That is correct. I want to modify that by saying that memory is fallible. There may have been times or circumstances under which something different might have occurred, but my recollec- tion is that we were attempting to be responsive and sup- portive to the FBI and the Warren Commission. When they asked for something we gave it to them. As far as our volunteering information is concerned, I have no recollection of whether we volunteered it or not. {63) (57) Helms' characterization of fulfilling Warren Commission requests on a caso-by-case basis rather than uniformly volunteering relevant information to the Warren Commission stands in direct opposition to Rankin's perception of the CIA's investigativ e responsibility. Eankin was asked by staff counsel whether he was under the impression that the Agency's responsibility was simply to respond to questions addressed it by the Warren Commission. In response, Eanl^in testified: (58) Not at all and if anybody had told me that I would have insisted that the Commission communicate with the Presi- dent and get a different arrangement because we might not ask the right questions and then we would not have the information and that would be absurd. {6If) 482 (59) Slawson supported Rankin's position, testifying that Warren Commission requests to the CIA were rarely specific. "The request was made initially that they give us all information pertinent to the assassination investigation." {65} B. THE CIA's failure TO DISCLOSE CIA ANTT-CASTRO ASSASSINATION" PLANS TO THE WAREIEN COMMISSION (60) An unfortunate consequence of the Warren Commission's reli- ance on the CIA to provide the Commission with all relevant mate- rial is reflected in the subsequent exposure of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots and the Agency's failure to provide this infor- mation. (66) Rocca indicated that he had no knowledge at the time of the Warren Commission investigation of Agency efforts to assassinate Castro. (67) Consequently, he was not in position to communicate this information. (61) The record also reveals that the CIA desk officer to whom Helms initially gave the responsibility to investigate Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy had no knowl- edge of such plots during his investigation. (68) Scelso testified that had he known of such assassination plots, the following actions would have been taken: (62) We would have gone at that hot and heavy. We would have queried the agent (AMLASH) about it in great detail. I would have had him polygraphed by the best operative security had to see if he had [sic] been a double-agont, informing Castro about our poison pen things, and so on. I would have had all our Cuban sources queried about it. (69) (63) As the record reflects, these plots were known to few within the CIA. Mr. Helms' testimony regarding these plots reveals that some Agency employees compromised the policy of its Director to supply all relevant information to the Warren Commission. The following exchange between committee counsel and Helms illustrates the extent of the Agency's compromise : Staff Counsel. Mr. Helms, I take it from your testimony that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact, were relevant to the Warren Commission's work; and, in light of that, the Committee would like to be informed as to why the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti-Castro assassination plots. Mr. Helms. I have never been asked to testify before the Warren Commission about our operations. Staff Counsel. If the Warren Commission did not know of the operation, it certainly was not in a position to ask you about it. Is that not true? Mr. Helims. Yes, but how do you Icnow they did not know about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How was I to know that? And besides. I was not the Direc- tor of the Agency and in the CIA, you did not go traipsing around to the Warren Commission or to Congi-essional 483 Committees or to anyplace else without the Director's permission. Staff Counsel. Did you ever discuss with the Director whether the Warren Commission should be informed of the anti-Castro assassination plots? Mr. Helms. I did not, as far as I recall. (76>) (64) McCone testified that he first became aware of the CIA's anti- Castro assassination plots involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963.* He stated that upon learning of these plots, he directed that the Agency cease all such activities. (75) Wlien asked whether the CIA desired to withhold information from the Warren Commission about the Agency anti-Castro assassination plots to avoid embarrass- ing the Agency or causing an international crisis, he gave the follow- ing response : (65) I cannot answer that since they (CIA employees knowl- edgeable ofthe continuance of such plots) withheld the infor- mation from me. I cannot answer that question. I have never been satisfied as to why they withheld the information from me.(7<5) (66) Regarding the relevancy of such plots to the Warren Commis- sion's work, Warren Commission counsels Rankin, Slawson, and Spec- ter were in agreement that such information should have been reported to the Warren Commission. (77) (67) Rocca testified that had he known of the anti-Castro assassina- tion plots, his efforts to explore the possibility of a retaliatory assassi- nation against President Kennedy by Castro would have been intensi- *0n August 11, 1963, a Chicago Sun Times article reported that the CIA had in the past ])een in contact with Chicago Mafia figure Sam Giancana. Upon being apprised of this article, McCone requested a report about the article from Richard Helms. The memorandum that Helms provided to McCone stated : 1. Attached is the only copy in the Agency of a memorandum on subject, the ribbon copy of which was sent to the Attorney General in May of 1962. I was vaguely aware of the existence of such a memorandum since I was informed that it had been written as a result of a briefing given by Colonel Edwards and Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General in May of last year. 2. I spoke with Colonel Edwards on the telephone last evening, and, in the absence of Mr. Bannerman on leave, I was with Colonel Edwards' as- sistance able to locate this copy. As far as I am aware, this is the only written information available on Agency relationships with subject. I hope this will serve your purpose. 3. I assume you are aware of the nature of the operation discussed in the attachment. (7i) Attached to the above memorandum was a May 14, 1962. memorandum from Sheffield Edwards to Attorney General Robert Kennedy which described the CIA- Giancana connection as(72) having been concluded terminated that priorthe"to CIA-Giancana McCone's assumption the CIA directorship. McCone operationof concerned the assassination of Fidel Castro. (73) The 1967 CIA Inspector Gen- eral's Report concluded that August 1963 was : * * * The earliest date on which we have evidence of Mr. McCone's being aware of any aspect of the scheme to assassinate Castro using members of the gambling syndicate. (7^) 484 fied. He stated that : "a completely different procedural approach prob- ably would and should have been taken." (75) (68)sure to Scelso the Warren a highly critical offeredCommission : appraisal of Helms' nondisclo- Staff Counsel. Do you think Mr. Helms was acting prop- erly when he failed to tell the Warren Commission about the assassination plots? Mr. ScELSO. No, I think that was a morally highly repre- hensible act, which he cannot possibly justify under his oath of office, or any other standard of professional public service. (7P) c. agency's legal responsibility to protect sensitive sources and METHODS- — factors AFFECTING THE CIA RESPONSE TO WARREN COMMIS- SION requests (69) The length of time required by the CIA to respond to the War- ren Commission's request for information was dependent on (1) the availability of information; (2) the complexity of the issues in- volved in the request; and (3) the extent to which the relevant infor- mation touched upon sensitive CIA sources and methods. On the first two points, Helms testified that when the CIA was able to satisfy a Commission request, it would send a reply back. With respect to timing : (70) ... some of these inquiries obviously took longer than others. For example, some miglit involve checking a file which was in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to see if we could locate somebody in some o^-erseas country. Obviously, one takes longer to perform than the other. (cW) (71 ) Under law, the Director of Central Intelligence has alwavs l^een required to ])rotect sensitive sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure ( [50 TT.S.C. § 403 (d) (3) 1 ) . As a result of this responsibility, in some instances the Agency initially limited access by the Commis- sion to CIA original source materials. {81) J. Lee Rankin expressed tlie opinion that on occasion, the Agency's effort to protect its sensitive sources and methods affected the quality of the information to which the Warren Commission and its staff were given access. {82) (72) The committee was fully aware that traditional intelligence re- porting procedures do not normally include revealing sources and methods. Moreover. Federal law obligates the CIA to protect its sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Had tlie Warren Commission investigation been conducted under normal conditions, 7-evealing sources and methods would not have been expected, much less required. Nevertheless, it may be argued because the circumstances of this investigation were extraordinary, no possible source of relevant evidence should have been considered an unauthorized disclosure. (73) The committee identified two related areas of concern in which the Agency's desire to protect its sensitive sources and methods may have impeded the Warren Commission's investigation. These were: 485 (74) — Initially not providing the Commission with original source materials pertaining to Oswald's trip to Mexico ; (75) — The Agency's reluctance to reveal the origin of a photograph of an unidentified man who had mistakenly been linked to Oswald. . . (76) The CIA's concern over revealing the existence of sensitive sources and methods was evident from the inception of the Warren Commission. Scelso commented that "we are not authorized at first to reveal: all our [sensitive] operations." (<9J) He did, however, testify that (77) We were going to give them intelligence reports which derived from all our sources, inckiding [sensitive] sources, including the [sensitive sources] and the information gotten from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for example, which corresponded almost exactly with the information from the [sensitive sources] .(84) (78) Scelso's characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Com- mission, dated January 81, 1964, regarding Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (55) Much of the information provided to the Warren Commis- sion in this report was based on sensitive sources and methods, iden- tification ofwhich had been deleted completely from the report. (79) The CIA policy limiting Warren Commission knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to a [for- eign country] station. The cable stated : (80) Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of [sensitive sources and methods] in order to protect [* * *] continuing ops. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave [State Depart- ment]. (5^) (81) The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963, cable, as it specifically concerned the CIA's relations with the FBI, is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of December 10, 1963. (6*7) In that memorandum, [an Agency employee] of the CIA Counterintelligence Staff, Sjjecial Investigations Groiip, wrote that he had been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which supported or com])lemented the FBI's five volume report of De- cember 9, 1963, that had been submitted to the Warren Commission. Papich provided [the Agency employee] with this report, which indi- cated that some U.S. agency was conducting a sensitive ojieration abroad and asked him w^hether the FBI could supply the Warren Commission with the source of this operation. The [Agency employee] memorandum shows that he discussed this matter with Scelso. After a discussion with Helms, Scelso was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be ])assed to the Warren Commission. The [Agency em- ployee] then made the following notation regarding sensitive sources and methods: 486 (82)make He available[Scelso] was to thequite sure it wasat not the Agency's desire to Commission least in this manner — via the FBI — sensitive information which could relate to sensi- tive sources and methods * * * [The] Agency desired to establish some other policy with regard to meeting the needs of the Commission.* (88) (83) The CIA policy of eliminating reference to Agency sensitive sources and methods is further revealed by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29, 1964, sent from CIA headquarters to a CIA [unit]. (91) This cable indicated that Imowledge of Agency sources and techniques was still being withheld from the Warren Commission, and stated that on Saturday, February 1, 1964, the CIA was to present a report on Oswald's Mexico City activities to the Warren Commission that would be in a form protective of the CIA sources and tech- niques. (5>^) (84) On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the Commission. It is likely that he discussed the CIA memorandum to the Warren Commission of January 31, 1964.** (5J) On February 10, 1964, Rankin wrote Helms in regard to that CIA memorandum. (,9^) A review of Eankin's letter indicates that as of his writing, the Warren Commis- sion had no information pertaining to CIA's [sensitive sources and methods] that had generated the information on Oswald. (85) Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964, letter whether Os- wald's direct communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy in ^Mexico City (as stated in paragrajih 1 of the January 31 memo- randmn) had been obtaind by [sensitive source and methods] or by interview. Manifestly, had the Warren Commission been informed of * The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December 20, 1963, was set forth on January 14. 1964. in a formalized fashion when Helms expressed his concern regarding exposure by the FBI of Agency sources to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote that the CIA had become aware that the FBI had already : called to the attention of the Commission, through its attorney, that we have information [as determined from Agency sources] coinciding with dates when Oswald was in Mexico City and which may have some bear- ing on his activities while in that area. (89) Helms further indicated that the CIA might be called upon to provide addi- tional information acquired from checks of CIA records and agency sources. He suggested that certain policies be employed to enable CIA to work cooperatively with the Commission in a manner which would protect CIA information, sources and methods. Among the policies articulated were two which Helms claimed would enable the Agency to control the flow of Agency originatod information. In this way the CIA could check the possibility of revealing its sources and methods inadvertently. The policies articulated were : (1) Your Bureau not disseminate information received from this Agency without prior concurrence. (2) In instances in which this Agency has provided information to your Bureau and you consider that information is pertinent to the Commission's interest, and/or complements (or otherwise is pertinent to information developed or received by your Bureau through) other sources and is being provided by you to the Commission, you refer the Commission to this Agency. In such cases it will be appreciated if you will advise us of such referral in order that we may nnticipate the possible further interest of the Commission and initiate action prepara- tory to meeting its needs. (90) **See paragraphs 78. 487 the sensitive source and method, this inquiry by Eankin would not have been made. (86) Nevertheless, it was Rocca's recollection that during the time period of January 1964-April 1964, Warren Commission repre- sentatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Va., and had been shown the original source materials derived from sensitive CIA sources and methods. (55) Rocca, however, did not personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren Commission first learned of these operations. (96) (87) On February 19, 1964, the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. (97) The Agency response indicated that Oswald had contacted the Soviet consulate and w^as also interviewed at the con- sulate. Nevertheless, the Agency still did not explicitly reveal the source of this information. (98) D. WARREX COMMISSION KNOWLEDGE OF CIA SENSITR-E SOURCES AND METHODS (88) During the period of March-April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memorandums that, among other issues, concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the material derived from relevant CIA sensitive operations. CIA headquarters had obtained the raw data generated by these sensitive operations almost immedi- ately after the assassination. (55) A review of these memorandums tends to support the belief tliat the Warren Commission, through Messrs. Slawson. Coleman and Willens, did not obtain access to CIA [original source] materials until April 9, ldQ4:.{100) On that date, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with a CIA [representative] wlio provided them with [raw data] derived from [sensitive operations].* (89) It appears doubtful that the Commission had been given direct access to this material prior to April 9. Nevertheless, by March 12, 1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware of the CIA [sensitive operations] that had generated information JMarch 12 reveals concerning that the Oswald. Warren (i{?^) Slawson's Commission had memorandum of learned that the CIA possessed information concerning conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Hernandez Armas, and Cuban Presi- dent Dortico?.** The Dorticos- Armas conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives at a March 12 meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, concerned Silvia Duran's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal Police. (7^4) Helms re- sponded to the Commission's request for access that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission's representatives to review this material. (7^5) (90) Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964, con- cerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson wrote that the tentative con- clusions hehad reached concerning Oswald's Mexico trip were derived * Slawson, when interviewed by this committee, stated that he became aware of the existence of CIA [sensitive operations] probably prior to his April 9, 1964, trip to Mexico City and no later than durins' his visit to Mexico City. (7^/) **These conversations had been summarized in the CIA's .Tannary 31, mem- orandum concerning Oswald's activities while in Mexico City. (/OS) 488 from CIA memorandums of January 31, 1964, and February 19, 1964, and, in addition, a Mexican Federal Police summary of interrogations with Silvia Duran, her brother Ruben, husband Horacio, and a hand- ful of friends, conducted shortly after the assassination, (it*^) (91) Slawsonsaid: A large part of it [the summary report] is simply a sum- mation of what the Mexican police learned when they interro- gated Mrs. Silvia Duran, an employee of the Cuban con- sulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police. {107) (92) These comments indicate that Slawson placed qualified reliance on the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had been provided the [raw data] pertaining to Duran that had been obtained by means of [sensitive CIA sources and methods]. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments concerning the Mexican police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission, as of JNIarch 25, had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Silvia Duran. As Slawson revealed, the Commission had been forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make reference to the [sensitive operations], and a smnmary report issued by the Mexican Federal Police. Thus, the Agency had for over 3 months precluded exposing [raw data] generated by its [sensitive operations] to the actual review and analysis of the Warren Commission. {108) (93) The evidence indicates that Slawson had not been given access to the [raw data] pertaining to Duran that had been generated by CIA [sensitive operations.] This is further supported by his memorandum of INIarch 27, 1961, in which he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy at least twice and probably on three occa- sions. (76*5) This conclusion, he again wrote, was based upon an analysis of Silvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police. This memoran- dum bears no indication tliat he had reviewed any [raw data] pertain- ing to this issue. (94) The record supports the judgment that as of April 2, 1964, the Warren Commission, although aware of their existence, had still not been given access to the above-referenced series of [original source materials]. A memorandum of that date by Coleman and Slawson posed one question to the CIA and made two requests for information from the Agency : {110) (95) (1) Wliat is the information source referred to in the No- vember 28 teleffram that Oswald intended to settle down in Odessa ; (96) (2) We would like to see copies of the [raw data] in all cases where the [raw data] refer to the assassination of related subjects; (97) (3) We would especially like to see the [raw data] in whirh the allegation that money was passed at the Cuban Embassy is discussed. (777) (98) The question initially posed by (item 1) in the above-referenced memorandum of April 2 concerns a [sensitive CIA operation]. (/7^) Obviously, if Slawson found it necessary to request the source of the 489 information, he had not as yet been provided access to the original material by the CIA. (99) Item No. 2 of the above listing tends to show that the Commis- sion had not been given access to certain [sensitive raw data] concern- ing the assavSsination. (100) Item No. 3 of the above listing reveals that the [sensitive raw data] pertaining to the Dorticos-Armas conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing of moneys w^as discussed, had not, as of April 2, been provided to the Commission, despite the Commission's having specifically requested this information at a March 12, 1964, meeting betw^een Commission representatives and Agency representa- tives. {113) (101) On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson expressed their con- cern about getting complete access to all materials relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip : (102) The most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, conspiracies, etc. took place. (103) * * * Jn order to inahe such a judgment [that all reason- able lines of investigation that might have uncovered other motivations or possible conspiracies have been followed through with negative results)^ ive must become famAliar with the details of what both the American and Mexican investiga- tory agencies there have done. This means reading their reports^ after translation^ if necessary., and in some cases talking loith the investigators themselves. [Emphasis added'.] {lU) (104) Nevertheless, as the record tends to show, Coleman's and Slawson's desire for a thorough investigation was subject to the lim- itations imposed by the CIA's concern for protecting its sources and methods from disclosure. Given the gravity and significance of the Warren Commission's investigation, the Agency's initial withholding of original source material from the Commission staff may have im- peded its ability to reach accurately reasoned conclusions with respect to Oswald's activities while in Mexico City. (105) On Mexico City,Ai^ril Mexico,8, 1964, Slawson, to meet Wi'llens, with the and Coleman representatives of theflew to State Department, FBI, CIA, and the Government of Mexico. (775) The group was met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clark Anderson of the FBI and a [CIA represent- ative]. (7i5) That same day, the [CIA representative] made available the [raw data] concerning Oswald and Duran that the Agency had [collected] . {117) In addition, he provided the group with photographs for wrotethe: time period covered by Oswald's visit. (ii5) David Slawson (106) * * * The [CIA representative] stated at the beginning of his narrative that he intended to make a complete dis- closure ofall facts, including the sources of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for Top Secret and that we would not disclose beyond the 490 confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the infor- mation we obtained through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. We agreed to this.{119) (107) The [CIA representative] described to the Commission staff members the CIA's course of action directly following the assassina- tion, indicating that his staff immediately began to compile dossiers on Oswald, Duran and everyone else throughout INIexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald. (7^6*) He revealed that all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents had quickly been put under surveillance. Slawson concluded : (108) The [CIA representative's] narrative plus the material we were shown disclosed immediately how incorrect our pre- vious information had been on Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Mexican (sic) Embassies.* Apparently the dis- tortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown hy the [CIA re'pre- sentati've] was unamhiouovs on almost all the cr-uc'ml foints. We had previously planned to show the [CIA representa- tive] Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's probable activ- ities at the embassies to get the [CIA representative's] opin- ion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information was we realized that this Vvould be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to take as close notes as possible from the original source materials at some later time during our visit. (i^7)** (109) It may be that the "informational distortions" that Slawson notes were merely the product of Slawson's mistaken analysis of the CIA material provided to him. The record does reflect that Slawson had reviewed the CIA's January 31 memorandum that accurately summarized all of the [raw data] in question. {I'ZS) Nevertheless, as the result of his direct review of the active [raw data] derived from the original source material, Slawson was able to clarify substan- tially his analysis of Oswald's activities while in Mexico City. {1^1^) (110) It may be argued therefore that the CIA's reluctance to pro- vide the Warren Commission with its original source material may have hampered the efficiency of the Commission's investigation of Oswald's Mexico City activities. In the process, the CIA's reluc- tance conflicted with President Johnson's Executive order that the executive agencies : (111) * * * furnish the Commission with such facilities, serv- ices and cooperation as it may request from time to time. {125) E. THE PHOTOGRAPH OF AN TJNIDENTIFrED INDIVIDUAL (112) On November 23, 1963, an FBI Special Agent showed Mar- guerite Oswald a photograph of a man. {126) This photograph had been supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA. {121) It had ^■'The reference should be to the Ciil)aii Embassy. **A separate Slawson memorandnm of Apr. 21, 1964, records the results of his notetakiiig from original source materials following the [CIA representa- tive's] disclosures. These notes dealt exclusively with the [sensitive raw data] pertaining to Duran and Oswald for the period September 27 to October 1, 1963. (i 22) 491 been obtained in early October 1963 and at that time bad been linked by some [Agency employees] to Lee Harvey Oswald. (7^5) The subject of the photograph, however, bore no resemblance to Lee Harvey Oswald. (113) On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under which she was shown the photograph. {129) Mrs. Oswald testified that she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. {130) (114) Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote to Thomas Karramesines, assistant deputy director for plans (DDP), requesting both the identity of the individual in the photograph and an explanation of the circumstances by which the photograph had been obtained by CIA. {131) (115) On that same day, in a separate letter, Rankin wrote to ;McCone regarding materials that the CIA had disseminated since November 22, 1963, to the Secret Service, but not to the Warren Commission. He requested copies of these materials, which included three CIA cables concerning the photograph of the individual orig- inally identified by some [Agency employees] as Lee Harvey Oswald and thereafter shown by the FBI to Oswald's mother. {132) (116) John Scelso testified about the reasons why the CIA did not explain to the Commission the origin of the photograph : (117) We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commis- sion all of our [sensitive] operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had [such opera- tions] because the November photo we had [of the unidenti- fied man] was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean any- thing, you see ? (155) Staff Counsel. * * * So the Agency was making a uni- lateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Com- mission. (75^^) Mr. Scelso. Right, w^e were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our [sensitive] operations. {135) (118) On March 5, 1964, Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination." (i5^) Rocca first outlined Angleton's desire not to res])ond directly to Rankin's request of Februai-y 12 regarding the CIA material for- warded to the Secret Service since Novemlser 23, 1964.(757) Rocca then stated : (119) "Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2 [of the above-referenced February 12 letter to McCone re- questing access to CIA reports provided the Secret Service after November 22, 1963] . If they come back on this point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the material rather than pass it to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the mate- rial in substance to the Commission in response to earlier levies or the items refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous six photographs which are not of Oswald . . .^\{138) 43-819—79 32 492 (120) On March 12, 1964, representatives of the Warren Com- mission and the CIA conferred regarding the February 12 request for the materials forwarded to the Secret Service by the Agency. {139) The record indicates that the Commission at the March 12 meeting pressed for access to the Secret Service materials, (i^'^) Rankin wrote to Helms on March 16 that it was his understanding that the CIA would supply the Commission with a paraphrase of each report or communication pertaining to the Secret Service materials with all indications of your confidential communications techniques and confidential sources deleted. You will also afford members of our staff working in this area an op- portunity to review the actual file so that they may give assurance that the paraphrases are complete, {lli-l ) (121) Rankin further indicated that the same procedure was to be followed regarding any material in the possession of the CIA prior to November 22, 1968, which had not as yet been furnished because it concerned sensitive sources and methods. (7^^) (122) Helms responded to Rankin's March 16 letter on March 24 with two separate communications. (i4^hich it set forth the dissemi- nation of the information on Lee Harvey Oswald. I realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer to our in- quiry to the CIA dated ^March 16, 1964 and I hope that the complete answers will give us the additional information we requested. {150) Coleman went on to state : As you know, we are still trying to get an explanation of the photograph which the FBI showed Marguerite Oswald soon after the assassination. I hope that paragraph 4* of the memorandum of March 24, 1964 [CD 631] sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA is not the answer which the CIA intends to give us as to this inquiry. (i<5i) (127) The following day, as agreed by Warren Commission and Agency representatives, Samuel Stern of the Commission visited CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.(i^-^) (128) Sterns' memorandum of his visit reveals that he reviewed Oswald's file with Rocca.(i55) Stern indicated that Oswald's file contained those materials furnished previously to the Warren Com- mission bythe CIA. (i-5.^ ) The file also contained : (129) Cable reports from the CIA of November 22 and 23, 1963, of a person who had visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies during Oc- tober and November [sic] 1963 ; and reports on these cables furnished on November 23, 1963. by CIA to the Secret Service. (155) (130) Stern noted tliat these messages were accurately paraphrased in the attachments to CD 674 provided the Warren Commission on March 24, 1964. (7.W) Stern also reviewed the October 9, 1963, cable from a CIA unit to CIA headquarters reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in JMexico City. (/.5'7) In addition. Stern examined the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA lieaclquarters reporting back- ground information on Oswald. (7.55) Stern recorded that these mes- sages were accurately reported in the CIA's January 31 memorandum to the Warren Commission reporting Oswald's Mexico City trip. (755) (131) Last, Stern noted that Rocca provided him for his review a computer printout of the references to Oswald-related documents located in the Agency's electronic data storage system..{J60) He stated "there is no item listed [ . . . ] which we [the Warren Commis- sion] have not been given either in full text or paraphrased." (7^7) (132) Thus, by IMarch 27, a Warren Commission representative had been apj^rised of the circumstances surrounding the mysterious photograph.** ♦Paragraph 4 of CD 631 stated that OIA concluded, based upon press photo- graphs of Oswald generally available on November 23, 1963, that the photograph of the unidentified individual was not of Oswald. *''Helnis, in a sworn atlidavit before tlse Warren Commission, stated that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken ontside of the conti- nental T'nited States sometime during the period Julv 1. 1963. to November 23. 1963. (i 62) 494 r. liUISA CALDERON CARRALERO (133) The committee devoted considerable attention to tlie following memorandum that was obtained as a result of a review of the Oswald (134) Subject : Comments of Luisa Calderon Carralero 1. A reliable source reported that on 22 November 1963, several hours after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Luisa Calderon Carralero, a Cuban employee of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, and believed to be a member of the Cuban Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI) , discussed news of the assassination with an acquaint- ance. Initially, when asked if she had heard the latest news, Calderon replied, in what appeared to be a joking manner, "Yes, of course, 2. After further I knew almost of discussion before Kennedy," the news accounts about the assassination, the acquaintance asked Calderon what else she had learned. Calderon replied that they [assumed to refer to personnel of the Cuban Embassy] learned about it a little while ago. (135) Rocca, in response to a 1975 Rockefeller Commission request for information on a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate Presi- dent Kennedy, wrote regarding Calderon's comments : (136) Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto suggestion of foreknowledge. This is the only item in the [sensitive opera- tion] coverage of the Cubans and Soviets after the assassina- tion that contains the suggestion of forelmowledge or expectation.* (165) (137) Standing by themselves, Luisa Calderon's cryptic comments may not have merited serious attention. Her words may indeed have indicated foreknowledge of the assassination but may equally be inter- preted without such a sinister implication. Nevertheless, the commit- tee determined that Luisa Calderson's case merited serious attention in the months following the assassination. ♦ Regarding the issue of whether Calderon's comments could reasonably be interpreted to indicate possible foreknowledge, the CIA position is as follows : During the Rockefeller Commission inquiry, Calderon's conversation was identified as a possible item of information from the Agency's Cuban and Soviet [sensitive sources] that might suggest foreknowl- edge of a plot to assassinate the American President. This involves a faulty translation * * * [Calderon's statement]. In answer to * * * [a] * * * question as to whether she had heard the latest news, Cal- deron said: "Si, claro, me entere casiantes que Kennedy." The verb entere is mistranslated. Me entere (the first person of the verb enterarsede, past tense) should be translated as "* * * I found out (or I learned) [about it — the assassination] almost before Kennedy [did]." In other words, Calderon was saying she heard about the shooting of Kennedy almost at the time the event took place. . . .{Ui.'i) The narrow interpretation of Calderon's comments assigned by the Agency is not the only reasonable one. The translation of me entere as either "I found out" or "I learned about" does not foreclose interpretation of Calderon's com- ments as a suggestion on her part of possible foreknovi^ledge of President Ken- nedy's assassination. The interpretation, in any event, should have been left to the judgment of the Warren Commissiou, not the CIA. 495 (138) Luisa Calderon's name first surfaced in connex:tion with the assassination, on November 27, 1963, in a cable sent by then-Ambas- sador Mann to the State Department. {166) (139) In that cable, Mann stated : . . . Washington should urgently consider feasibility of re- questing Mexican authorities to arrest for interrogation: Eusebio Azcue, Luisa Calderon and Alfredo Mirabal. The two men are Cuban national and Cuban consular officers. Luisa Calderon is a secretary in Cuban Consulate here. {167) (140) This cable does not state the basis for arresting Calderon.^ Nevertheless, the CIA's copy of this cable bears a handwritten nota- tion on its routing page. That notation states : "Info from Amb Mann for Sec. Rusk re : . . . persons involved with Oswald in Cuban Em- bassy." Mann went on to state in urgent terms: "They may all quickly be returned to Havana in order to eliminate any possibility that Mexican government could use them as witnesses." (16"^) (141) According to CIA files, Calderon made reservations to return to Havana on Cubana Airlines on December 11, 1963, less than 4 weeks after the assassination. {170) (142) Calderon, Azcue and Mirabal were not arrested nor detained for questioning by the Mexican Federal Police.^ Nevertheless, Silvia Duran, a friend and associate of Calderon's and the one person believed to have had repeated contact with Oswald while he was in Mexico City, was arrested and questioned by the Mexican police on two separate occasions. (77^) (143) During her second interrogation, Duran was questioned re- garding her association with Calderon. There is no indication in the reinterrogation report accounting for the questioning of Duran about Calderon. (i 7c?) The information regarding Duran's interrogation was passed by CIA to the Warren Commission on February 21, 1964, more than 2 months after Calderon had returned to Cuba. {17 J^) (144) During May 1964, information from a Cuban defector tying Luisa Calderon to the Cuban Intelligence apparatus was reported to the CIA. The defector, [A-1], was himself a Cuban intelligence officer who supplied valuable and highly reliable information to the CIA regarding Cuban intelligence operations. (775) At that time, Joseph Langosch, Chief of Coimterintelligence for the Special Affairs Stafi;,^ reported the results of his debriefing of the Cuban defector, [A-1]. Langopch's memorandum stated that [A-1] had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban intelligence serv- ice officers. (i7^) Specifically, [A-1] was asked if Oswald was known ^ Although IMann conld not recall his motivation when interviewed by the committee staff, Mann was prompted to request the arrest of Calderon on the basis of [an] allegation that Calderon was present at the Cuban Embassy when Oswald was allegedly given a sum of money, presumably to carry out the as- sas ination of President Kennedy. (Pp. 28-30, 40-43.) (^ osition) : see ref. 6, Helms Executive Session Testimony, p. 10. (10) Deposition of [Agency Employee], June 20, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 7 and 52 (JFK classified document 0147:)5) ; see ref. 9, Scelso Deposition, p. 80. (11) Id. at p. 52. (12) Id. at pp. 52-53. (13) See ref. 1, SSC, book V, p. 25; see ref. 9, Scelso Deposition, pp. 311-112. (;//) See ref. 9, Scelso Deposition, p. 112. (15) Deposition of Raymond Rocca, July 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 9 (JFK classified document 014718) (hereinafter Rocca, Depo- sition). (16) Ibid. (17) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, p. 131. (18) Id. at p. 133. (19) Id. at p. 134. (20) Id. at pp. 114-115 ; CIA report by John Scelso to chief /counterintelligence, Dec. 13, 1963. (21 ) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, p. 114. (22) Ibid., Scelso deposition, p. 136; see also ref. 15, Rocca deposition, in which Rocca stated that responsibility shifted from Scelso to CI staff on January 12, 1964. (23) See ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, p. 14; see also Scelso deposition, p. 13X. (24) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, pp. 12-13. (25) Id. at p. 12. (26) Deposition of James Angleton, Oct. 5, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 7(J-77 (JFK classified document 014720 (hereinafter Angle- ton deposition) ; see also ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 23. (27) Id. at pp. 32-33 and 44; .see i-ef. 6, Helms executive session testimony, p. 23. (28) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, pp. 32-33. (29) Id. at p. 33. (30) Id. at )). 44. (31 ) See ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, p. 21. (32) Id. at p. 138. (33) See ref. 26, Angleton deposition, p. 86. (3-',) Id. at p. 93. (35) Ibid. (36) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 7; see also ref. 26, Angleton deposition, p. 77. (37) Id. at pp. 16-17. (38) Id. at p. 17. (39) Ibid. (40) Ibid.; Rocca testified that neither CI staff nor his staff displaced the CIA's Soviet Division (represented by [Agency employee] Chief of the Soviet Russian division and his assistant, [Agency employee] in its contact with the Commission; nor did counterintelligence/research and analysis displace Scelso in his contact with the Warren Commission). (///) Id. at p. .36. (42) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, pp. 17-18. See ref. 26, Angleton depo.sition, p. 78. r)Oi {.'f3) Id. at p. 81. {Jf4) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 18. (J,5) Ibid. (46) Ibid. UD Id. at pp. 19-20. (iS) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, p. 113, in which Scelso stated that counter- Intelligence staff, including [Agency employeel. was repository of HT-Lingnal intercepts; but see also deposition of [Agency employee], HSCA, July 20, 1978, pp. 83-84 (JFK classified document 014735), in which [Agency employee] stated that he did not know whether the Warren Commission had knowledge of the HT-Lingual program because it was not his responsibility to provide tlie Com- mission with material derived from the HT-Lingual program. (^9) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 10 : ref. 20, Angleton deposition, pp. 75, 80 ; see also CIA document, Raymond Rocca memorandum for the record. April 1, 1975, re : Conversation with David W. Belin, April 1, 1975 ; in which it is stated that Helms remained the senior oflBcial in charge of the overall investigation, with counterintelligence stafE acting as a coordinator and repository of information collected. (50) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 18; see also ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, pp. 9 and 24. (51) Staff interview of William Coleman, Aug. 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations. (52) Executive session testimony of W, David Slawson, Nov. 15, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 17 (JFK document 008625) (hereinafter Slawson executive session testimony) ; see also JFK exhibit 23, hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. I, p. 190 (hereinafter HSCA-JFR liea rinses). (53) Deposition of J. Lee Rankin, August 7, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (JFK Chissitied Document 014874) (hereinafter Rankin Deposition) ; see also deposition of John McCone, August 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 9 (JFK Classified Document 014729) (herein- after McCone deposition ) . (54) See ref. 53, McCone deposition, p. 5. {,55 (56)) Id. Id. atat pp. p. 9..")-(>. (57) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 14. (58) Id. at p. 24. (59) Id. at p. 26. (GO) Id. at p. 23. (61 ) See ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, p. 10. (62) Id. at pp. 10-11. (63) Id. at p. H4. (64) See ref. 53, Rankin deposition, p. 4. (65) See ref. 52, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 29. (66) See ref. 1, SSC, book V; see also Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Operations, S. Rep. No. 94-465, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975 (hereinafter cited as SSC, Alleged Plots). (67) See ref. 15, Rocoa, p. 50. ( 68 ) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, pp. 73 and 142-143. (69) Id. at p. 166. (70) See ref. 6. Helms executive session testimony, pp. 30-31. (71) Memorandum to Director of Central Intelligence, re: Sam Giancana, from Richard Helms, August 16, 1963, in SSC Alleged Plots, p. 107 (see ref. 66). (72) Id. at pp. 107-108. (73) Ibid. (74 ) CIA Inspector General's report, p. 70. (75) See ref. 53, McCone deposition. (76) Ibid. ( 77 ) See ref. 53, Rankin deposition, pp. 61-63 ; ref. 52, Slawson executive ses- sion testimony, p. 27 ; executive session testimony of Arlen Specter. November 8, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 45-46 (JFK document 013094) (hereinafter Specter executive session testimony) ; but see also executive 502 session testimony of Wesley Liebeler, November 15, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 71 (JFK Document 008625) (liereinafter Liebeler executive session testimony ) . (78) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 45. (79) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, p. 153. (80) See ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, p. 25. (81 ) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, p. 158. . . (82) See ref. 53, Rankin deposition, pp. 22-23 ; see ref. 9, Scelso deposition lo8. (83) Ibid. (84) Ibid. (85) CIA FOIA Document No. 509-803. (86) Classified CIA Document, December 20, 1963, DIR. 90466. (87) CIA memorandum for file, December 20, 1963, CI Soft File. (88) Ibid. (89 ) CIA FOIA Document No. 474-191. (90) Ibid. (91 ) CIA FOIA Document No. 498-204. (92) Ibid. (93) CIA FOIA Document No. ,509-803 ; CIA FOIA Document 498-204. (94) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Richard M. Helms, February 10, 1964 (JFK Document 003872). (95) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 89. (96) Ibid. (97) Letter from Richard M. Helms to J. Lee Rankin, February 19, 1964, CIA FOIA Document No. 553-808A. (98) Ibid. (99) See classified staff study, "Lee Harvey Oswald, the CIA and Mexico City," House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 178-185. (100) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, April 22, 1964, p. 22. (lUl) Staff interview with W. David Slawson, August 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (JFK Document 010623). (102) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, Mar. 12, 1964. (103) CIA FOIA Document No. 509-803. (104) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, Apr. 22, 1964, pp. 3, 19, and 4.5-i6. (105) Warren Commission classified docum'ent, memorandum of W. David Slawson, Mar. 12, 1964, p. 6. (106) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, Mar. 25, 1964, p. 20. (107) Ibid. (108) See ref s. 73-75 and accompanying text in this report. (109) V\^arren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, Mar. 27, 1964, p. 2. (110) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of William Coleman and W. David Slawson, Apr. 2, 1964. (111) Ibid. (112) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. Da^'ld Slawson, Apr. 21, 1964, p. 1. (113) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, Mar. 12, 1964. (IL'i) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of William Coleman and W. David Slawson, Apr. 3, 1964, p. 11. (115) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, Apr. 22, 1964, p. 1. (116) See rof. 100, Slawson memorandum, pp. 9-10. (117) Ibid. (118) Ibid. (119) Ibid. (120) Ibid. (121) Id. at p. 24. (122) Warren Commission classified document of W. David Slawson, Apr, 21, 1964. (123) See ref. 100, Slawson memorandum, pp. 52-54. 503 {124) Id. at p. 24. {125) Executive Order No. 11130, Nov. 29, 1963. {126) Report of the President's Commission on tlie Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 364 (hereinafter cited as tlie Warren Report) . {121) CIA classified sion document 64. document, Mar. 24, 1964, DDP4-1555, Warren Commis- {128) Ibid. {129) Warren Report, Vol. I, p. 153. {ISO) Ibid. {ISl) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Thomas Karramesiries, Mar. 12, 1964 (JFK Document 003872 ) . {122) Letter from J, Lee Rankin to John McCone, Mar. 12, 1964 (JFK Document 003872). {13S) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, p. 158. {13If) Ibid. {1S5) Ibid. {1S6) CIA FOIA document No. 579-250. (137) Ibid. {138) See ref. 26, Angleton deposition, pp. 131-132, in which Angleton stated that the only reason for not providing the Warren Commission with access to (these and materials) was due to the Agency's concern for protecting its sources methods. {139) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Richard Helms, Mar. 16, 1964 (JFK Document 003872) ; Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, Mar. 12, 1964. {IJfO) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, Mar. 12. 1964. {lU) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Richard Helms, Mar. 16, 1964 (JFK Document 003872). {1J,2) Ibid. {l\3) CIA FOIA document No. 622-258 (hereinafter CD 631) ; CIA classified document FOIA 621-2.59 (hereinafter CD 674) . {lU) See ref. 143, CD 63L {l.'t5) Ibid. (See also testimony of Marguerite Oswald, I Warren Commission Hearings. 152.) {Ilt6) Ibid. {11,1) See ref. 143, CD 674. {im Ibid. {11,9) Ibid. {150) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of William Coleman, Mar, 24, 1964. {151) Ibid. {152) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of Samuel Stern, Mar. 27, 1964. (153) Ibid. {151,) Ibid. {155) Ibid. {156) Ibid. {151) Ibid. {158) Ibid. {159) Ibid. {160) Ibid. {161) Ibid. {162) Affidavit of Richard Helms, Aug. 7, 1964, XI Warren Commission Hearings. 469^70. {163) This memorandum paraphrased the original source materials. See JFK Exhibit F-518, HSCA-JFK hearings. {161,) CIA document memorandum regarding Luisa Calderon conversation, undated 1979, p. 1. {165) CIA classified document, memorandum of Raymond Rocca, May 23, 1975, p. 15. {166) CIA FOIA document No. 138-598. {161) Ibid. {168) See ref. 1, SSC, Book V, pp. 28-30 and 40-43. 504 (169) Ibid. (170) CIA classified document, Apr. 26, 1965. {171 ) CIA FOIA document No. 717-312, attachment C. (172) CIA FOIA document No. 98-137, CIA FOIA document 34-595. (173) CIA FOIA document No. 559-243. {175) CIA classified document, memorandum of Joseph Laugosch, June 23, 3964. {176) Ibid. (i77) Ibid. (178) Ibid. {17i)) CIA FOIA document No. 687-295, attachment 2. {180) Ibid. {181) Ibid., attachment 4. {182) Ibid. {183) CIA FOIA document 687-295. {184) Id. at p. 2. {185) CIA FOIA document 697-294. (186) Ibid., attachment. (187) CIA FOIA document 739-316. {188) Ibid. {189) Ibid. (190) Classified letter from HSCA to CIA, August 28, 1978. (191) CIA classified document, memorandum regarding Luisa Calderon con- versation, Aug. 28, 1978, p. 8. {192) See ref. 53, Rankin deposition, pp. 18-19. {193) CIA classified document, memorandum of Joseph Langosch, May 5, 1964. {194) CIA FOIA document No. 687-295, attachment 4. (195) See ref. 6, Helms executive .session testimony, p. 136; see ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 148 ; classified staff summary of interview of former CIA employee, Joseph Langosch, Aug. 21, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK classified document) : classified staff summary of interview v/ith CIA employee, Aug. 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK classified document 014740). Further details analyzing this issue are set forth in the classified HSCA staff report upon which this study is based. Classified staff report, "HSCA Investigation of CIA Support to the Warren Commission,'^ House Select Committee on Assassinations, Dec. 10, 1978 (JFK classified docu- ment 015036). {196) See ref. 2, 1977 TFR, p. 10. POLITICS AND PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION THE MOTORCADE Staff Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations U.S. House of Representatives Ninety-fifth Congress Second Session March 1979 (.505) CONTENTS Paragraph Summary (1) I. The origins of the plan for President Kennedy to visit Texas (10) II. The process of the selection of dates for the trip and the planning of the itinerary (16) III. The Texas Christian University appearance (22) IV. The political controversy surrounding the selection of a speech site for the President's appearance in Dallas (30) V. The role of the Secret Service in the resolution of the selection of the speech site and the motorcade route (36) VI. The publication in Dallas newspapers of the motorcade route (52) VII. The residual role of the Secret Service in motorcade plannng : (a) The Main Street-Houston-Elra turn (60) (b) The Protective Research Section (64) (c) Physical protection along the motorcade route (80) (506) Summary (1) It has been suggested that the selection of a motorcade route that resulted in the passage of President John F. Kennedy's open limousine at low speed immediately below the Texas School Book Depository Building in Dallas, Tex., and in the closest possible prox- imity in De'aley Plaza to the grassy knoll, was probably no mere coinci- dencethat ; the use of a motorcade and the selection of its route was more likely controlled by the conspiracy that planned the President's death; and that the Secret Service, since it had responsibility for protecting the President, may have been more than simply a negligent bystander in the decisionmaking process, (i) The list of suggested conspirators who allegedly arranged this aspect of the assassination ranges from the Secret Service itself, to right-wing businessmen, and even includes the Governor of Texas, John B. Connally (2) — the Gov- ernor, perhaps, being an innocent dupe, since it is unlikely (in the extreme) that he would have wittingly arranged to have shots fired at the limousine in which he and his wife were also to ride. (2) The results of the committee's investigation of these allegations are described in this staff report. In summary, the evidence indicates that political considerations dictated that there would be a motorcade, and what its route would be, and that the Secret Service's protective responsibilities were subordinated to those political considerations. The committee found no evidence of conspiracy in the processes that led to the use of the motorcade or the selection of its route. (3) The political considerations that apparently led to those two fortuitously critical decisions were traditional Democratic Party poli- tics and, as such, were characterized by a struggle between liberal and conservative wings of the party: between the conservative wing of the party in Texas led by Gov. John B. Connally, and liberal ele- ments, including Texas Senator Kalph Yarborough, but primarily, of course, centering around the President himself. In the end, iron- ically, itwas the tension and compromise between the two views that produced the fatal motorcade route. If either side had been able to dictate its desires without compromise, the assassination might never have occurred. (4) On one hand, Governor Connally, who was asked by the Presi- dent to arrange the trip as a means of broadening and strengthening his support among conservatives in Texas, selected the Dallas Trade Mart, a new and attractive convention hall on the Stemmons Freeway, for the luncheon site. It had the attribute of appealing to the conser- vative business element, but the drawback of limiting the number of guests that could be accommodated, (5) The President, on the other hand, believed that his availability to the people by motorcade was a major factor in his successful cam- paign for the Presidency, (.f) and since his schedule in Dallas did not involve a major public speech before a large audience, but included (507) 43-819 — 79 33 508 only a "limited" speaking engagement before a "select gi'oup" at the Trade Mart, the President felt even more strongly that a motorcade should be used to broaden his exposure. (^) Both Governor Connally and Frank Erwin, executive secretary of the Texas State Democratic Committee, objected to the staging of a downtown motorcade. (5) Connally opposed the motorcade because the strain placed on Kennedy of "exuding enthusiasm" would have been excessive, especially in view of his tight schedule, and because he considered it a possibility that an embarrassing picket or sign might be held up before the President during the motorcade. (6") Erwin objected to a downtown motorcade because it exposed the President unnecessarily to the possi- bility of an embarrassing incident provoked by the right-wing element in Dallas. (7) Supporters of right-wing extremist leader Gen. Edwin Walker were feared, (5) since Lyndon Johnson and Adlai Stevenson, in 1960 and 1963, respectively, had been publicly assaulted by radical conservatives in Texas. (P) The memory of these occurrences was still vivid, and many Connally associates were still concerned that the image of Dallas would be taniished by an incident in which the Presi- dent would be publicly embarrassed, (it*) Erwin was so concerned about this aspect of the trip that when he first heard that the Presi- dent had been harmed, his first thought was that a right-wing ex- tremist had been responsible. (7i) In the end. President Kennedy's wishes prevailed, and there was a motorcade, (i^) Its route was a simple by-product of the decision to hold the luncheon at the Trade Mart.(ii) (6) Two luncheon sites had initially been considered: the Women's Building at the fair grounds which was located in the central southern part of the city,(i4) and the Dallas Trade Mart, which was located on Stemmons Freeway to the west and north of Dealey Plaza. (75) (7) The Secret Sei-vice initially preferred the Women's Building for security reasons, (i^) and the Kennedy staff preferred it for political reasons. (i7) If the Women's Building had been selected, the Presidential motorcade would have entered Dealey Plaza on Main Street west of Dealey Plaza and traveled eastward on Main Street, traversing the Plaza' briefly, at high speed, (75) without taking any turns in or around the Plaza. (7^) Such a west-to-east route through Dealey Plaza on Main Street would have decreased the probability of the occurrence of the assassination for two reasons. First, the Presi- dential limousine would liave presented a more difficult target at which to shoot because it would have been moving more quickly and would have been positioned one lilock farther away (to the south) from the assassins' locations than it was when the assassination occurred on Elm Street. (^^) Second, the President, who rides in the right rear of the limousine in accord with military protocol, would have been positioned so that Mrs. Kennedy would liave been seated between him and any gunfire emanating from the Texas State Book Depository (TSBD) andthegrassvknoll.(^7) (8) Xevortheless, in this case the President deferred to Mart the Gov- ernor: the Women's Building was rejected, and tlie Trade was selected. (,^^) The result, then, was the deployment of the motorcade westward through downtown Dallas and, in turn, the inclusion of the turn, nortliward from :Main Street onto Houston Street and then 509 westward from Houston onto Elm Street, which placed the limousine directly in front of the line of fire. (9) The Secret Service was, in fact, a bystander in the process; its protective functions were subordinated to political considerations. The committee found no evidence indicating that a conspiracy affected either the President's decision to incorporate a motorcade into the Dallas itinerary, or the Governor's decision to insist on a Presidential appearance at the Trade Mart, or the Secret Service's acquiescence in those controlling decisions. I. The Origins of the Plan For President Kennedy to Visit Texas (10) Governor John B. Connally of Texas indicated that the idea of a Presidential visit to Texas arose first in the spring of 1962, dur- ing the Texas gubernatorial campaign. (^5) Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson approached Gonnally with the information that the Pres-- ident wished to come to Texas for the purpose of fundraising.(^4) Connally was not interested at that time in attempting to coordinate such a trip for various reasons. First, he was in the midst of a cam- paign for Governor, was running against an incum.bent, and his ini- tial showing in voter polls had been poor.(^J) Second, he became involved in a statewide campaign for the general election after win- ning the primary and he had doubts about the capacity of his organiza- tion both to do justice to a Presidential visit and simultaneously to run an effective campaign. {26) Nevertheless, since Connally won the gubernatorial election and apart from Vice President Johnson, was the Texan who was closest to the administration, the Vice President continued to remind him about the President's interest. (^7) Connally continued to hesitate to commit himself to a specific time for the Presidential visit. As Governor, he had to prepare a legislative pro- gram for his first session with the Texas State Legislature, which was scheduled to convene on January 20, 1963. That session was to last 120 days. Nevertheless, upon its completion, Connally became willing to undertake the organization of a Presidential visit. (^5) (11 ) It was his understanding from the beginning that the President wanted to raise money. (^,9) It also became apparent that the Presi- dent wished to shore up his sagging popularity in a State that he considered, with Massachusetts, to be one of the two primary political objectives for the Presidential campaign of 1964. (J{?) In 1960, Ken- nedy had carried Texas by the small margin of 46,000 votes, despite Johnson, a Texan was his running mate. (.57) The President's legisla- tive program had not fared well in the first year of his Presidency, and the President was concerned about the 1964 election. For these reasons, a visit to Texas had assumed great importance. {32) (12) Connally believed that, for specific reasons, the President wished to come to Texas under Connally's auspices rather than under the aus- pices of Vice President Johnson or on his own. Since a Governor of a State is the titular head of his party and sets the political tone of his State, neither Kennedy or Johnson would have considered it politi- cally advisable to visit a State without the political support of the Governor. (33) And in Connally's opinion, Kennedy had another, more narrowly focused reason for wanting to come to Texas. Connally had I 510 developed a base of support among the moderates and conservatives in the Texas Democratic Party. (=?4) The President hoped to obtain l^olitical benefit by associating with Connally, the leader of the mod- erate and conservative interests whose support Kennedy needed in Texas. (=55) The liberal wing of the party still supported Kennedy; but the moderates and conservatives thought of Kennedy as anti-busi- ness. (-5) O'Donnell would listen to the Secret Service, but not always accept their suggestions. (i57) None of the President's po- litical advisers "ever let [the Secret Sei^ice] have the last word" because the advisers' interest in the President's political welfare out- weighed security factors. (i55) Moyers characterized the reaction of the Secret Service when being overruled as that of "good soldiers," that is, "loyal to their obligation, but they accepted the fact that the Presi- dent of the United States is also the chief political figure of our soci- ety." (75,9) This seems consistent with Bruno's statement that, when faced with the political dilemma of how to react to Connally's insist- ence on the Trade Mart, the President and O'Donnell made a decision based on political concerns. (7 ffi9) The Secret Service was powerless to comment at that point, much less to intervene. (50) In his testimony before the committee. Governor Connally recalled that the issue of having a motorcade was not resolved until the week of the assassination, as Bruno had stated, (i^i) But with respect to the problem of choosing a speech site, Connally stated that he was largely ignorant of any controversy. {162) Connally's version of the decisionmaking process was that whenever such problems could not be resolved on the staff level, he would "just make a decision we are going to do thus and so," or sometimes "call somebody at the White House and get it worked out." (7^5) With respect to the inter- relationship between the speech site and the motorcade route, Con- nally did acknowledge that "if the Women's Building had been chosen, the motorcade could have gone another route and probably would have." (7^^) (51 ) Bruno indicated that Moyers was asked to visit Texas on behalf of the President to settle the conflict over the speech site and motor- asked cadehim route. to(7^5) smooth Moyers over indicated that both the differences O'Donnell between differentandDemocratic Kennedy Party factions. (76'^) Moyers at first objected on the grounds that as Department Director of the Peace Corps, his presence in Texas would involve that agency in partisan politics. The President overrode INIoyers' objection by saying that Moyers, a Texan with close personal and ]:)rofessional ties to Vice President Johnson and good professional relations with Connally, should go to Texas and permit the President to worry about the Peace Corps. (7^) VI. The Publication ix Dallas Newspapers or the Motorcade EOTJTE (52) One function Moyers performed, as a representative of the President, was to insist that the motorcade route be published. {168) Moyers coordinated the President's visit to Texas from Austin. He 520 worked the Dallas situation by phone through his Dallas representa- tive, Ms. Elizabeth Harris. (i6'P) He had chosen Ms. Harris because she was a Dallas native, had been married to a prominent Dallas person, and had been an associate of Moyers in the Peace Corps. {170) (53) Moyers stated that the only "major decision" he made witli respect to Dallas was that : . . . some 24 hours before the President arrived, there was a dispute as to whether or not to print in the newspapers the route, and Betty Harris called me . . . and said they were not going to print the route of the . . . [motorcade] procession and I said, "Oh, yes they are. He's not coming down here to hide. He's coming down here to get a public reaction, and the decision is to print the route of the President's pro- cession," and I don't know what Betty did after that, but the route was printed. {171) Moyers later amended his recollection of when this decision occurred^ I think it was the second night before his — preceding his ar- rival .. . and we were printing the route in the other papers, and I couldn't see why an exception should be made in Dallas. (i7^) (54) Moyers was in contact with the Secret Service at this time, and. was aware of the security implications of printing the motorcade route. He recalled asking the Secret Service agent stationed with him in Austin, whom Moyers characterized as having been "in charge of the Dallas trip," whether there was any reason why the route should not be printed. Moyers believed the agent agreed with him that the route should be published. {173) (55) In Dallas, Ms. Harris was working directly with the Connally representatives and the Secret Service. Her conception of the "basic problem", as she defined it for Moyers over the telephone, was that the conservative city fathers of Dallas did not want to do anything for the liberal Democrats, who were led by Senator Ralph Yar- borough. The two groups were fighting both about the distribution of tickets for the luncheon and also about the publicity to be given about the motorcade. The conservative faction wanted it to look like Kennedy was not popular in Dallas, and hence frowned upon publication of the route because that would draw crowds. (i74) The matter of pop- ularity was of special significance because at that time the polls re- flected adecline in the President's popularity on the national political scene. (77^,) (56) Ms. Harris distinctly recalled a meeting that occurred on either the Monday or Tuesday prior to the assassination. She described this as a "confrontation meeting" that was attended by Governor Connally, Robert Strauss (a Connally associate), Sam Bloom, a Dallas ad- vertising man in charge of publicity for Connally, and Winston Lawson of the Secret Service, whom she described as "totally neu- tral". {176) She recalled that she took one side of the argument regard- ing publication of the motorcade route and that Sam Bloom and Strauss took the other. (777) During this meeting, she used "pres- sure"— an appeal for the status and prestige of the office of the Presi- dency— to persuade Bloom to publish the route not on Friday morn- ing, November 22, but a few days earlier. {178) Her purpose in having 521 it published ahead of time was to help "get the crowd ouV^ (179) Hence, the route was published in the Dallas Times Herald on Wednesday afternoon and the Dallas Morning News on Thursday morning. (756^) (57) Ms. Harris' perception of the role of Secret Service Agent Lawson during the controversy was that he seemed concerned primar- ily about route selection because of the time factor and only second- arily about the security factors. (i5i) Lawson did not seem to "get too much into the political aspect;" "he was a nuts and bolts man" who worked closely with the local police "to make sure that all of the arrangements were as his superiors in Washington wanted to have them."(75S) (58) Ms. Harris and Lawson were not oblivious to the threat of right-wing extremism. They did not consider it when planning the publicity and motorcade route. ISIs. Harris stated that, in the case of the Adlai Stevenson incident, "he had been spat upon ... I was aware of that. We knew that."(i^) began to undertake basic trip planning. (68) On November 8, Lawson checked with PRS at the Executive Office Building, leamincr that there were no active subjects in the Dal- las area and that no JFK file existed. {207) Further comparison dis- closes that by November 13, Lawson was in Dallas and in contact with local Secret Service Agents Sorrels and John Joe Howlett, with whom he met concerning protective investigations of local anti-JFK sus- pects. {208) (69) Kellerman also testified about an inquiry in Dallas which was conducted prior to November 22, in order to locate anti-JFK subjects. When asked specifically about right-wing invididuals, scurrilous lit- erature, and extremist groups known to be in Dallas, he claimed virtu- ally total ignorance. (M9) He insisted that no one told him anything about an investigation of threat information submitted to the Secret Service in Dallas on November 21 and 22 by the FB1.{210) Addition- ally, Kellerman observed that it was strange that among five cities in one State and despite the anti-Adlai Stevenson demonstration in Dal- las on October 1963, no infomiation about suspects was forthcoming and nothing had been given him. {211) (70) The Secret Service final report for the November 21 trip to Houston mentioned two active subjects. (^7^) Both individuals had made specific threats in Houston. {213) Nevertheless, Kellerman was not questioned about Houston. {214') 43-819 — 79 34 524 (71) However, without being questioned about the San Antonio leg of the Texas strip, Kellerman did recall the receipt of PES informa- tion prior to November 21 regarding anti-Presidential picketing that did in fact occur in San Antonio on that date. {215) (72) The importance of Kellerman's testimony is that, as the one agent who was in direct contact with Kennedy and his innermost circle of advisers, and who was therefore ideally placed to relay information that provided cause for alarm, he was effectively sealed off from the information that he needed to perform with maximum protective effort. (73) As regards SAIC Sorrels' role, both Sorrels and Howlett co- operated with the special services bureau of the Dallas Police De- partment, the police in Denton, Tex., Felix McKnight of the Dallas Times-Herald, and the FBI. (^7^) The FBI was interested in a Ku Klux Klan suspect from a neighboring area. (^77) Additionally on November 21, Dallas field office FBI agent James Hosty informed the local Secret Service office of a handbill accusing Kennedy of being a traitor. (^i5) (74) The results of these investigations indicated that there were no known, periodically checked PRS subjects; that no formerly institu- tionalized persons were out on release ; and that neither the DPD nor the Secret Service could link anyone with the "traitor" handbill. {219) (75) White House Detail agent Lawson's position was that the re- sponsibility for any investigation was that of the PRS or Sorrels, and was not \n^.{220) Although Secret Service procedure allowed him to investigate or not, on the basis of discretion, he did not because he Imew that the Semdce preferred to have the local agents, who have to work with the police on a daily basis, maintain liaison and conduct investigations, (^^i) Secret Service procedure would not necessarily require him to receive information solely from the local office. It could come from Washing-ton PRS as well.' In his opinion, the handbill presented no "direct threat" to John Kennedy. {222) (76) Wlion interviewed by the committee. Sorrels stated that in No- vember 1963 all known PRS subjects within the jurisdiction of the Dallas field office were in mental hospitals. Hence, he was surprised when he heard about the circulation of the "JFK — Wanted for Treason" handbills. His reaction was to determine who the printer was, bring him in, and interview \\\m.{223) Sorrels stated that the standard procedure the field office SAIC forwastheto"Wliite becomeHouse Detailwith familiar advance agentsthreat the entire and profile before endeavoring to contact the local police department. {22 Jf) (71) ^Vlien interviewed by the committee, Lawson said that as a '^'V^lite advances, House and Detail that inagent, effect,his he duties were was not limited totoshift encouraged work and participate in the process of investigating threats at the local level and referring them back to PRS. (^^-5) Lawson's only recollection concerning PRS procedures was that when PRS received information about a threat subject from a local agent or a "White House detail agent making an advance, the subject was given a file number. "In the old days," files consisted of a folder containing 3 by 5 cnrds and PRS had the job of coordinating what were called "collateral" investigations in the same or an adjacent district. (^^6) At no time while he was in Dallas did 525 Lawson receive information about threats to the President made in other regions. (227) (78) "\Vliite House Detail mittee the procedures in useSAIC Gerald in PRS Behn time. at this described to the com- He disclosed the great extent to which the PRS was the central focus of protective op- erations. Information from the field about active or potential threats to the President were referred to PRS directly from the local office before they were referred to the C-hief of the A^liite House Detail. The SAIC of the White House Detail (Behn) would receive reports from the field only from White House Detail advance agents. He and the SAIC of the PRS (Robert I. Bouck) would then discuss the matter with the overall Chief of the Secret Service, Mr. James Rowley. (^^5) (79) Behn did not recall whether PRS distributed information to Winston Lawson about the October 1963 heckling and harassment of Adlai Stevenson in Dallas, Tex. Nor could he recall whether any infor- mation was distributed prior to the November 21 Texas trip about Dallas area right-wing extremist Edwin Walker, Behn specifically stated, as to the availability to him of informaition. about both Walker and Stevenson, that "no one in PRS passed it on." (^^5) When asked if he himself warned any agents about either one of those subjects, he said that he did "not remember any discussion with any ^g&n!t."{230) (C) PHYSICAL PROTECTION ALONG THE MOTORCADE ROUTE (80) In reviewing the perfonnance of the Secret Service, consider- ation must be given to the Dallas Police Department also, since the agency defined and supervised the functions of the police during Ken- nedy's visit. The activities of the Secret Service, in collaboration with the DPD, covered many areas of security apart from PRS activities. (81) Arrangements made by the Dallas police included provisions for traffic control to contain the crowd; followup assignments for each officer directing him to subsequent stations after the motorcade has passed his post; assigning at least two officers to each intersection, one to cover traffic primarily, the other to control the crowd; and the stationing of officers at all over- and underpasses. (231) The Secret Service notified the DPD frequently about their joint responsi- bility for crowd control and crowd observation, but no followup in- structions were made in writing nor did Lawson, as the Dallas ad- vance agent, make any written checklist of such instructions. Lawson indicated that it was not normal for there to be such written directions. (2.32) (82) At Love Field, the DPD put men on the roofs of buildings surrounding the landing area. Detectives mingled with the crowd, while officers patrolled both sides of a chain-link barricade fence. One of the two service roads linking two general public areas were closed off for motorcade use. The danger from rooftops was not great, since no building faced the side of the plane where the President clisem- barked. The next most adjacent building was only one story and was blanketed by crowds. Nevertheless, officers were placed on top of this building as well as on the ones adjacent, but there was no check made of offices providing vantage points overlooking the area where the President's plane would land. {2JJ) 526 (83) Advance agent Lawson testified in 1964 that the Secret Service did not check buildings along a motorcade route except under three circumstances : Presidential inaugurations, visits by a king or a presi- dent of a foreign country, or when the motorcade route has been known for years. (^) He indicated that he saw Hargis to his right as he left Houston for FAm.{B61) (100) Hargis. too, rode to the rear left side of the limousine and remained car. He testified even with that itsas bumper he turned onto move left than rather Ehn Street, President's the was "past" he staying right up with Kennedy's car, though crowd density prevented iiim from staying riglit up next to it. Nevertheless, because of the thinning out of the crowd by the triple overpass, Hargis stated that he was right next to Mrs. Kennedy Avhen he heard the first iiiiot. (202) (101) Officers M. L. Baker and Clyde A. Hay good were assigned to the right rear of the Presidential limousine. (263) The activity of both indicated again a departure from standard maximum security protec- tion. Haygood, for example, admitted that although he was stationed to the right rear of Kennedy's car, he was generally riding several cars ha,ck(26^) and offered no explanation for this. Haygood testified be- fore the Warren Commission that he was on Main Street at the time of the shooting. (^^^) (102) Baker stated that in addition to being instructed by his ser- geant not to ride beside the President's car. ho was also instructed by him to fall in beyond the press car.(^^^) Baker interpreted this as- signment as an order to place himself about six or seven cars behind Kennedy. (^^7) Baker was on Houston Street at the time of the first shot. (^^5) Haygood and Baker were too far from the Presidential limousine to aflFord Kennedy any protection. They were in no position ♦Both Baker and Martin stated to the committee that it was at the President's reriur!=t that thpy made no effort to stay in close formation immediately to the rear of the Presidential limousine. See footnotes 259 and 266, infra. 529 to rush forward to intercept danger had there been a street-level inci- dent, yet the forward interception capability of the motorcycles was the basic rationale for Lawson's November 21 rearward deployment of the motorcycles. {269) (103) Kellerman who rode in the right front seat of the Presidential limousine testified before the Warren Commission that there were two motorcycles on each side of the rear wheel of the President's car. (^76') Nevertheless, he was not asked either about the reason for that posi- tioning or whether the two motorcycles on the right side were there at the time of the shooting. (104) The Secret Service's alteration of the original Dallas Police Department motorcycle deployment plan prevented the use of maxi- mum possible security precautions. The straggling of Haygood and Baker, on the right rear area of the limousine, weakened security that was already reduced due to the rearward deployment of the motorcycles and to the reduction of the number of motorcycles originally intended for use. (105) Surprisingly, the security measure used in the prior motor- cades during the same Texas visit show that the deployment of motor- cycles in Dallas by the Secret Service may have been uniquely insecure. The Secret Service Final Survey Report for the November 21 visit to, Houston stated that in all motorcade movements, "six motorcycles flanked the Presidential limousine and an additional 33 motorcycles were used to flank the motorcade and cover the intersections." (^7i) There is no mention in the Foit Worth Secret Service Final Report about the deployment of motorcycles in the vicinity of the Presidential limousine. (^7^) (106) The Secret Service knew more than a day before November 22 that the President did not want motorcycles riding alongside or paral- lel to the Presidential vehicle. {273) If the word "flank" denotes paral- lel deployment, and if in fact such deployment was effected in Houston, then it may well be that by altering Dallas Police Department Captain Lawrence's original motorcycle plan, the Secret Service deprived Ken- nedy of security in Dallas that it had provided a mere day before in Houston. (^74) (107) Besides limiting motorcycle protection, Lawson prevented the Dallas Police Department from inserting into the motorcade, behind the Vice-Presidential car, a Dallas Police Department squad car con- taining homicide detectives. For the Secret Service, the rejection of this Dallas Police Department suggestion was not unusual in itself. Lawson testified before the Warren Commission that with the excep- tion of New York City motorcades, it was not the Secret Service's standard practice to insert a police homicide car into a motor- cade. (^7<5) He did not remember who recommended either its inser- tion, its proposed placement, or its cancellation. (.'^7^) (108) On November 14, 1963, Lawson met with Dallas SAIC Sor- rels and Dallas Police Department Chief Jesse Curry and "laid out the tentative number of vehicles that would be in the parade and the order in which they would be." (^77) Curry stated at the organiza- tional meeting on November 21 that he "thought we had planned that Captain Fritz [Chief of DPD Homicide] would be in the motorcade behind the Vice President's car." (^75) Sorrels spoke up at that point 530 and stated that "nothing was discussed on that." (^75) Lawson ex- plained that a car with Secret Service agents would follow the Vice President's car and added that the protective detail would like to have a police car bring up the rear of the motorcade. (^ Staff outside contact report, Aug. 1, 1977, HSCA (JFK document ^o. 015029). (ih Letter to Capt. Donald Nielsen, Aug. 2, 1977, HSCA (JFK document No. 013564). (16) Staff outside contact report, Larry Huff, Feb. 15, 1978, HSCA. (17) Ibid. (IS) Ibid. 550 (19) Ibid. (20) See outside contact report, Nov. 9, 1978, for reference to letter to Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, Mar. 9, 1978, HSCA (JFK document No. 015048). (21) Ibid. (22) Staff outside contact report, Apr. 19, 1978, HSCA (JFK doccument No 007369). (23) Id. at pp. 6-7. (2Jf) Id. at p. 7. (25) Ibid. (26) Staff outside contact report. May 1, 1978, HSCA (JFK document No. 007656). (27) Staff outside contact report, May 5, 1978, HSCA (JFK document No. 008120). (28) Deposition of Larry Cecil Huff, May 9, 1978, HSCA, p. 7 (JFK document No. 014!Ur.). (29) Ibid. (30) Id. at p. 9. (31) Id. at p. 7. (32) Id. at p. 8. (SS) Ibid. (3-'i) Id. at p. 9. (35) Ibid. (36) Id. at p. 10. (37) Id. at p. 15. (38) Ibid. (S9) Aviator's flight log book of Larry Huff (JFK document No. 013552). (40 ) See ref . 28, HufE deposition, p. 11. (41) Ibid. (42) See ref. 38. (43) Ibid. (44) See ref. 28, Huff deposition, p. 12. (45) Ibid. (46) Ibid. (47) Ibid., p. 13. (48) Ibid. (49) Ibid. (50) Ibid. (51) Id. at p. 1.5. (52) Id. at pp. 13-14. (53) Id. at p. 14. (54) Id. at p. 15. (55) Ibid. (56) Id. at p. 9. (57) Id. at p. 10. (58) Id. at p. 16. (59) See ref. 38. ( 60 ) See ref. 28. Huff deposition, p. 16. (61) Ibid. (62) Id. at p. 17. (63) Id. at p. 16. (64) Letter from Roger E. Leblanc, June 15, 1977, with li.^t attached (JFK document No. 013551). (65) Ibid. (66) Ibid. (67) Ibid. (68) Huff interview, May 8, 1978. HSCA, p. 2 (JFK document No. 008531). (69) Ibid. (70) Staff outside contact report, June 14, 1978, HSCA (JFK document No. 010037). (71) Staff interview of George Moffitt, June 15, 1978. HSCA. p. 1 (JFK document No. 10145). (72) Ibid. (73) Id. at p. 3. (7/,) Td. at p. 2. (75) Ibid. 551 (76) Id. at p. 3. (77) Id. at p. 1. (78) Id. at p. 2. (79) Ibid. (SO) Id. at p. 3. (81) Id. at p. 2. (82) Aviators flight log book of George Moffitt (JFK documeut No. 013554). (83) Ibid. (84) Ibid. (85) See ref. 71, Moffitt interview, p. 5. (86) Ibid. (87) Ibid. (88) Ibid. (89) Staff interview of Gen. Carson A. Roberts, May 25, 1978, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK document No. (X)9408). (90) Ibid. (91) Ibid. (92) Id. at pp. 1-2. {9.1) Id. at p. 2. (94) Ibid. (95) Id. at p. 3. (96) Id. at p. 2. (97) Id. at p. 3. (98) Id. at p. 2. (99) Staff outside contact report, Nov. 7, 1978, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK document No. 013020). (100) Ibid. (101) Id. at pp. 1-2. (102) Id. at p. 1. (103) Ibid. (104) Ibid. (105) Staff letter to Roger G. Morgan, Nov. 7, 1978, HSCA (JFK document No. 013080). (106) Staff outside contact report, Nov. 7, 1978, HSCA, p. 2 (JFK document No. 013020) . (107) Ibid. (108) Letter to Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, Nov. 9, 1978, HSCA (JFK document No. 015048) . (109) Letter to Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, June 26, 1978, HSCA (JFK document No. 015048). (110) Letter to Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, June 19, 1978, HSCA (JFK documeut No. 015048). (111) Letter to Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, June 26, 1978, HSCA (JFK document No. 015048). (112) Ibid. (113) Fact sheet from Department of Defense, July 26, 1963, tab A (JFK classified document No. 103) . (114) Ibid. (115) Ibid. (116) Ibid., enclosure 2, p. 10. (117) Memorandum to the House Select Committee on Assassinations from Judy IMiller, Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 14, 1978 (JFK document No. 009986) . (118) Staff outside contact report, Nov. 6, 1978, HSCA (JFK document No. 013005). (119) Ibid. (120) Ibid. (121) Id. at p. 2. (122) Ibid. (123) Ibid. (124) Letter from Roger G. Morgan to House Select Committee on Assassina- tions staff. Dec. 5, 1978 (JFK document No. 013576) . (125) Ibid. o BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY 3 9999 00124 078 5 Boston Public Library Copley Square GENERAL LIBRARY The Date Due Card in the pocket indi- cates the date on or before which this book should be returned to the Library. Please do not remove cards from this pocket. 1^