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B . ad % vere ena OD ae “ig gagerg, \% Mn eas te eehs APPENDIX TO HEARINGS BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES - NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS VOLUME X ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIBS AND ORGANIZATIONS LEE HARVEY OSWALD IN NEW ORLEANS CIA PLOTS AGAINST CASTRO ROSH CHERAMID i ae Bich eS.” SSS ee chavea Pe eed By MARCH 1979 a as pune ate ee A y Seta Wau fe ete } a Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations KP a | 512 INES NAT pin... apae VUES fyU ] - Hou tA} AUTHOR Investigat ion of th TITLE Pres, e Assassg is werk Vor 4h DATE DUE BORROWER 'S NAME INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY halftect CalLam Lipa APPENDIX TO. HEARINGS BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION VOLUME X ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS LEE HARVEY OSWALD IN NEW ORLEANS CIA PLOTS AGAINST CASTRO ROSE CHERAMIE MARCH 1979 Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations ae U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 43-944 WASHINGTON : 1979 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 Stock No. 052—070—04981-2 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS: LOUIS STOKES, Ohio, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio WALTER E. FAUNTROY, District of STEWART B. McKINNEY, Connecticut Columbia CHARLES THONE, Nebraska YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, HAROLD S. SAWYER, Michigan California CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana ROBERT W. EDGAR, Pennsylvania Subcommittee on the Subcommittee on the Assassination of --Assassinationof Martin Luther King, Jr. John F. Kennedy WALTER E. FAUNTROY, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, Chairman HAROLD E. FORD YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE FLOYD J. FITHIAN CHRISTOPHER J. DODD ) ROBERT W. EDGAR CHARLES THONE STEWART B. McKINNEY HAROLD S. SAWYER LOUIS STOKES, ex officio LOUIS STOKES; ex officio SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio SAMUEL L, DEVINE, ex officio STAFF G. ROBERT BLAKEY, Chief Counsel and Staff Director Gary T. CORNWELL, Deputy Chief Counsel (11) CONTENTS Page ee re ee oe ee eo ee wee 3 Anti-Castro activists and organizations and Lee Harvey Oswald in New ie Dee ee oe cS 1 The evolution and implications of the ClIA-sponsored assassination con- EEL ICe! OAStTOur tn oo. 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Coury Queen (kay te e" " "27 4°) iY - PJ 7 ¢ ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVISTS AND ORGANIZATIONS AND LEE HARVEY OSWALD IN NEW ORLEANS Staff Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations U.S. House of Representatives Ninety-fifth Congress Second Session March 1979 (1) CONDANTSA Paragraph . The Ingredients of an Anti-Castro Cuban conspiracy__------------------- (9) The background : The regime of Fidel Castro Kuz____-_--_-~_.-i2ss5ae (15) DE TO AD CIO BT ee ee (62) ~sAntonio Veciana’ Blandhi 2050 2200 l eC See a (114) ~» Cuban Revolutionary Council: A eoncise history... eee (205) . Cuban Revolutionary Council: New Orleans Chapter______-_----_-~-_~_ ——ngimes KD . Brigade 2506—Manuel Artime—Movimiento de Recuperaci6n Revolucionaria (282) (MERE) poo See ee ee ee ea ee . Movimiento Demécrata Cristiano, (MDC) =.W--..._-_.-.~-__. eee (247) wuunta “Revolucidnaria ‘Cubana *(JURD)L2ei eto se ee eeeee (266) - Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil!™ (DRE) 2222S es eee (286) . Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperaci6n Revolucionaria (MIRR) and Orlando. Bosch” Avilaz 2 22202232 pee ee ee ee (324) {Junta del Gobierno de Cuba, en el Wxili0ss = 2 ee aa ee eee (342) 4 David Cherri eee eee ee ee (389) . 544-Camp ‘Street and related ¢vents.t2 i. 232.255 2 ok. eee (460) . Manvel Ray Rivero (MEP-JURE) 2 io a eee eee (517) . Addendum to the Junta del Gobierno de Cuba en el Exilio: Carlos Rodriguez Quesada 222. ft a ela Se ae (548) INTRODUCTION (1)* Two primary factors prompted the committee’s investigation of anti-Castro activists and organizations. First, the committee ascer- tained that as a consequence of the efforts, the failure and the eventual unwillingness of the Kennedy administration to liberate Cuba from Castro, these persons and organizations, acquired the means, motive, and opportunity to assassinate the President. Second, the committee believed that Lee Harvey Oswald’s verified association with anti- Castro Cubans while living in New Orleans during 1963, together with his possible contacts with other anti-Castro activists, further enhanced the possibility of the involvement of anti-Castro elements in the assassination. For these reasons, the committee investigated numerous anti-Castro organizations and operatives and Oswald’s activities while living in New Orleans to determine their connection, if any, to the assassination. (2) The committee initiated its investigation by selecting the most active anti-Castro groups and their key leaders from among the more than 100 anti-Castro organizations in existence in November 1963. These groups included Alpha 66, Cuban Revolutionary Junta (JURE), Commandos L, the Directorio Revolutionario Estudiantial (DRE), the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), which includes the Frente Revolucianario Democratico (FRD), the Junta Gobierno de Cuba in Exilo (JGCE), the 30th of November, the International Penetration Forces (InterPen), Revolutionary Recovery Movement (MRR), and Ejercito Invasor Cubano (EIC). Their selection evolved both from the committee’s independent field investigation and the examination of the files and records maintained by the Federal and local agencies then monitoring Cuban exile activity, including local police departments, the FBI, the CIA, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (now the Drug Enforcement Administration, or DEA), the Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Department of Defense. (3) These “action groups” were the movements most active on both the military and propaganda fronts: the groups that not only talked about anti-Castro operations, but actually carried out infiltrations and raids into Cuba, conducted Castro assassination attempts, participated in a multiplicity of arms dealings and possessed the most vociferous and aggressive leaders. These groups and individuals, the target of the Kennedy administration’s crackdown on anti-Castro operations fol- lowing the Cuban missile crisis, were the bitterest and felt the most betrayed by President Kennedy’s policies. *Arabie numerals in parentheses at the beginning of paragraphs indicate the paragraph number for purposes of citation and referencing; italic numerals in parentheses in the middle or at the end of sentences indicate references which can be found at the end of each report or section. (3) 4 (4) After selecting these groups, the committee focused its investi- gation on the key members in each group and concentrated on uncover- ing links to Lee Harvey Oswald. The committee found evidence or indications of contacts between Oswald and four individuals who were associated with anti-Castro groups. These persons were JURE mem- ber Silvia Odio, Alpha 66 leader Antonio Veciana, CRC designate Frank Bartes, and DRE member Carlos Bringuier. Oswald encoun- tered both Bartes and Bringuier in New Orleans during the summer of 1963. (5) The committee also focused its investigation on Oswald’s ac- tivities while living in New Orleans from April to August 1963. Os- wald apparently established some contacts with non-Cubans of anti- Sl! sentiments who were not alined with any group, such as David errie. (6) This staff report reflects the nature of the committee’s investiga- tion of the anti-Castro and New Orleans areas. It-does not, however, reflect all of the investigative work conducted, nor all of the staff anal- ysis relating to the anti-Castro and New Orleans subject matters. (7) Other areas that are not directly reflected in these reports include the statements of the “Clinton witnesses,” seven persons who claim they saw Oswald together with David Ferrie and a New Orleans busi- nessman, Clay Shaw, in Clinton, La., during late August or early Sep- tember 1963. (8) This report does not contain committee conclusions. I. THE INGREDIENTS OF AN ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN CONSPIRACY (9) Was the John F. Kennedy assassination a conspiracy involving anti-Castro Cuban exiles? The committee found that it was not easy to answer that question years after the event, for two reasons. First, the Warren Commission decided not to investigate further the issue despite the urging of staff counsel involved with that evidence and the apparent fact that the anti-Castro Cuban exiles had the means, moti- vation, and opportunity to be involved in the assassination. (10) In addition, the area of possible Cuban exile involvement was one in which the Warren Commission was not provided with an ade- quate investigative background. According to the Senate Select Com- mittee on Intelligence: (11) Despite knowledge of Oswald’s apparent interest in pro-Castro and anti-Castro activities and top level awareness of certain CIA assassination plots, the FBI... made no special investigative effort into questions of possible Cuban Government or Cuban exile involvement in the assassination independent of the Oswald investigation. There is no indica- tion that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or of sources within the Cuban exile com- munity. (7) (12) Nevertheless, even from the paucity of evidence that was available to them in 1964, two staff attorneys for the Warren Com- mission speculated that Lee Harvey Oswald, despite his public posture as a Castro sympathizer, was actually an agent of anti- Castro exiles. Pressing for further investigation of that possibility, Assistant Counsel William Coleman and W. David Slawson wrote a memorandum to the Commission stating: (18) The evidence here could lead to an anti-Castro involve- ment in the assassination on some sort of basis as this: Oswald could have become known to the Cubans as being strongly pro-Castro. He made no secret of his sympathies, and so the anti-Castro Cubans must have realized that law enforcement authorities were also aware of Oswald’s feelings and that, therefore, if he got into trouble, the public would also learn of them .. . Second, someone in the anti-Castro organization might have been keen enough to sense that Oswald had a penchant for violence . . . On these facts, it is possible that some sort of deception was used to encourage Oswald to kill the President when he came to Dallas . The motive of this would, of course, be the expectation that after the President was killed Oswald would be caught or at least his identity ascertained, the law enforcement author- ities and the public would then blame the assassination on (5) 6 the Castro government and a call for its forceful overthrow would be irresistible. . . .(2) (14) It is important in considering the possibility of anti-Castro Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination to recall the polit- ical and emotional conditions that affected the Cuban exile commu- nities in Miami, New Orleans, and Dallas while Kennedy was President. THE BACKGROUND: THE REGIME OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ (15) If it can be said to have a beginning, the anti-Castro Cuban exile movement was seeded in the early morning hours of New Year’s Day 1959 when a DC-4 lifted from the fog-shrouded Camp Columbia airfield in Havana.(3) Aboard the plane was Fulgencio Batista, the military dictator of Cuba for the previous 6 years.(4) Batista was fleeing the country, his regime long beset by forces from within and without, now crumbling under pressure from rebel forces sweeping down from the mountains. When dawn came, the bells tolled in Havana and, 600 miles away, Fidel Castro Ruz began his triumphal march to the capital.(5) For seven days Castro and his 26th of July Movement rebels moved down Cuba’s Central Highway while thou- sands cheered and threw flowers in their path. (6) Castro finally arrived in Havana on January 8 and characteristically gave a speech. Clad in his green fatigue uniform while three white doves, which someone had dramatically released, circled above him, Castro boldly proclaimed: “There is no longer an enemy !”(7) (16) That was not true, of course, and he knew it. A hard core of Batistianos had fied the country early, many long before their leader, and were already concocting counter-revolutionary plots from their refuges in the United States, the Dominican Republic and _ else- where. (8) (17) And it was not very long after Castro took power that a sense of betrayal began to grow among those who had once been his strongest supporters.(9) As each day went by it became more apparent that Castro’s revolution was, as one chronicler noted, “leading inexorably toward an institutionalized dictatorship in which individuals were contemptuously shorn of their rights and dissenters were met with charges of treasonable conduct, counterrevolutionary activity or worse.” (70) Then, too, there was a large number of public executions. Within 2 weeks of his reign, Castro shot 150 ex-Batista officials. (17) Within 8 months, there were at least 506 executions. (12) (18) The disillusionment for many Cubans deepened when it became obvious that the form of Castro’s rule was turning toward communism and that Castro’s attitude toward the United States was engendering a hostile relationship. The publishing of Castro’s Agrarian Reform Law in May 1959, was a significant sign.(73) It was far more radical than had been expected and was obviously designed to strip both Cuban and American-owned sugar firms of their immensely valuable cane lands. (14) A few weeks later the chief of Castro’s air force, Maj. Pedro Diaz-Lanz, resigned, charging “* * * there was Communist influence in the armed forces and Government.” (75)Then, when Castro’s own hand-picked president, Manuel Urrutia, announced at a press confer- ence that he rejected the support of the Communists and said “T believe that any real Cuban revolutionary should reject it openly,” Castro 7 immediately forced him to resign and accused him of actions “border- ing on treason.” (16) (19) And so, after the broken pledges of free elections and a free press, the mass trials and executions, the assumption of unlimited power and the'bellicose threats against the United States, it slowly became apparent to many Cubans that Fidel Castro was not the political savior they had expected. (/7) ayaa) ; (20) Then, on October 19, 1959, there occurred an incident which precipitated the formation of the first organized anti-Castro opposi- tion within Cuba. Maj. Huber Matos, one of Castro’s highest ranking officers and considered by most Cubans to be one of the key heroes of the revolution, resigned from the Army in protest against the increas- ing favoritism shown to known Communists.(/8) The next day Matos was arrested, charged with treason, subsequently tried and sentenced. to 20 years in prison. Shortly afterward, Castro himself called a secret meeting of the National Agrarian Reform Institute managers at which he outlined a plan to communize Cuba within 3 years.(79) There the suspicions of Dr. Manuel Artime, the manager in Oriente Province, were confirmed. “I realized,” Artime later said, “that I was a demo- cratic infiltrator ina Communist government.” (20) (21) Artime returned to Oriente and began organizing students and peasants to fight against Castro and communism. By early November each province in Cuba had an element of Artime’s new underground movement. It was called the Movimiento de Recuperacién Revolu- cionaria (MRR). It was the first anti-Castro action group originating from within Castro’s own ranks. (2/) (22) By the summer of 1960, it had become obvious both within and outside of Cuba that the foundation for an eventual confrontation: between Castro and anti-Castro forces had been laid. The Eisenhower administration had canceled the Cuban sugar quota.(22) Soviet first deputy chairman, Anastas Mikoyan had visited Havana and Raul Castro had gone to Moscow.(23) Ernesto “Che” Guevara had pro- claimed publicly that the revolution was on the read set by Marx, and Allen Dulles of the Central Intelligence Agency had said in a speech that communism had perverted Castro’s revolution.(24) By then, Castro had seized more than $700 million in U.S. property within Cuba. (25) (23) On March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to organize, train and equip Cuban refugees as a guerrilla force to overthrow Castro.(26) Soon it became common knowledge within Cuba that a liberation army was being formed and that a political structure in exile had been created.(27) As the flight from Cuba in- creased in size and fervor, the exile community in the United States grew in spirit and confidence. One historian captured the special characteristics of the new arrivals: They were new types of refugees. Instead of a home, they were seeking temporary asylum. They found it along the sandy beaches and curving coastline of Florida. They arrived by the thousands, in small fishing boats, in planes, chartered or stolen, and crowded into Miami. Along the boulevards, under the palms, and in hotel lobbies, they gathered and plotted their counterrevolution. Miami began to take on the air of a Cuban city. Even its voice was changing. Stores and cafes began advertising in Spanish and English * * *. Everyone talked of home only 100 miles away. And every- 8 one talked about the great liberation army being formed in the secret camps somewhere far away. (28) (24) By April 1961, the more than 100,000 Cubans who had fled Castro’s revolution lived in anticipation of its overthrow. They had been buoyed in that hope by public pronouncements of support from the U.S. Government. In his state of the Union address, President Kennedy had spoken of “the Communist base established 90 miles from the United States,” and said that “* * * Communist domina- tion in this hemisphere can never be negotiated.” (29) In addition, the Cuban exiles had been organized, directed and almost totally funded by agencies of the U.S. Government, principally the CIA.(30) _ (25) From an historical perspective, in light of its later radical change, the attitude of the Cuban exiles toward the U.S. Government prior to the Bay of Pigs is especially significant. Author Haynes Johnson who, in writing a history of the invasion, collaborated with the top Cuban leaders, including brigade civilian chief Manuel Ar- time, described that attitude in detail: : From the beginning, the Cuban counterrevolutionists viewed their new American friends with blind trust. Artime was no exception. He, and later virtually all of the Cubans involved, believed so much in the Americans—or wanted so desperately to believe—that they never questioned what was happening or expressed doubts about the plans. Looking back on it, they agree now that their naivete was partly genuine and partly reluctance to turn down any offer of help in liberat- ing their country. In fact, they had little choice; there was no other place to turn. Some, of course, were driven by other motives: political power and personal ambition were in- volved. Even more important was the traditional Cuban at- titude toward America and Americans. To Cubans the United States was more than the colossus of the north, for the two countries were bound closely by attitudes, by history, by geography and by economics. The United States was great and powerful, the master not only of the hemisphere but perhaps of the world, and it was Cuba’s friend. One really didn’t question such a belief. It was a fact; everyone knew it. And the mysterious, anonymous, ubiquitous American agents who dealt with the Cubans managed to strengthen that belief. (37) (26) This “blind trust” by the Cuban exiles in the U.S. Govern- ment prior to the Bay of Pigs was specifically noted by the military commander of the 2506 Brigade, José (Pepe) Pérez San Roman; “Most of the Cubans were there,” he said, because they knew the whole operation was going to be con- ducted by the Americans, not by me or anyone else. They did not trust me or anyone else. They just trusted the Americans. So they were going to fight because the United States was backing them. (32) (27) The debacle at the Bay of Pigs was not only a military tragedy for the anti-Castro Cuban exiles but also a painful shattering of their confidence in the U.S. Government. The exile leaders claimed that the failure of the invasion was a result of the lack of promised air 9 ‘support, and for that they directly blamed President Kennedy. (33) Particularly galling to them was Kennedy’s public declaration to Soviet Premier Khrushchey at the height of the invasion, when the Brigade was being slaughtered in the swamps of Bahia de Cochinos: «... 1 repeat now that the United States intends no armed inter- vention in Cuba.” (34) (28) Even those exile leaders who were willing to rationalize the extent of Kennedy’s responsibility were dissuaded when Kennedy himself admitted the blame. Cuban Revolutionary Council leader Manuel Antonio de Varona, in his executive session testimony before the committee, told of the President gathering the Council members together at the White House when it became clear that the invasion was a disaster. Varona recalled : We were not charging Mr. Kennedy with anything; we just wanted to clarify. We knew that he didn’t have any direct knowledge of the problem, and we knew that he was not in charge of the military effects directly. Nevertheless, President Kennedy, to finish the talks, told us he was the one—the only one responsible. (35) A few days after that meeting, the White House issued a public state- ment declaring that President Kennedy assumed “sole responsibility” for the U.S. role in the action against Cuba. (36) (29) The acceptance of responsibility did not cut the bitter dis- appointment the Cuban exiles felt toward the U.S. Government and President Kennedy. Much later, captured and imprisoned by Castro, Brigade Commander San Roman revealed the depth of his reaction at the failure of the invasion: “I hated the United States,” he said, “and I felt that I had been betrayed. Every day it became worse and then I was getting madder and madder and I wanted to get a rifle and come and fight against the U.S.” (37) (30) Prominent Cuban attorney Mario Lazo wrote a book caustically titled Dagger in the Heart.(38) Lazo wrote: The Bay of Pigs defeat was wholly self-inflicted in Wash- ington. Kennedy told the truth when he publicly accepted responsibility . . . The heroism of the beleaguered Cuban Brigade had been rewarded by betrayal, defeat, death for many of them, long and cruel imprisonment for the rest. The Cuban people and the Latin American nations, bound to Cuba by thousands of subtle ties of race and culture, were left with feelings of astonishment and disillusionment, and in many cases despair. They had always admired the United States as strong, rich, generous—but where was its sense of honor and the capacity of its leaders ? The mistake of the Cuban fighters for liberation was that they thought too highly of the United States. They believed to the end that it would not let them down. But it did ...(39) (31) President Kennedy was well aware of the bitter legacy left him by the Bay of Pigs debacle. It is not now possible to document the changes in Kennedy’s personal attitude brought about by the mili- tary defeat, but the firming of U.S. policy toward Cuba and the mas- sive infusion of U.S. aid to clandestine anti-Castro operations in the wake of the Bayof Pigs was editorially characterized by Taylor 10 Branch and George Crile in Harper’s magazine as “the Kennedy vendetta.” (40). (32) What can be documented is the pattern of U.S. policy be- tween the period of the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. That pattern, replete with both overt and covert maneuvers, had a significant effect on the reshaping of Cuban exile attitudes and, when it was abruptly reversed, could have provided the motivation for involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy. (33) In retrospect, the period between the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis can be considered the high-water mark of anti-Castro activity, almost every manifestation of the U.S. policy providing a reassurance of support of the Cuban exile cause. As a matter of fact, only a few days after the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy delivered a particularly hard-line address before the American So- ciety of Newspaper Editors on the implications of communism in Cuba. “Cuba must not be abandoned to the Communists,” he de- clared. In appealing for support from Latin America, he indicated that the United States would expect more from the nations of the hemisphere with regard to Cuba and asserted that the United States would not allow the doctrine of nonintervention to hinder its policy. Said Kennedy, “... our restraint is not inexhaustible,” and spoke of Cuba in the context of the “new and deeper struggle.” (47) (34) When Castro, in a May Day speech, declared Cuba to be a socialist nation, the State Department retorted that Cuba was a full- fledged member of the Communist bloc. (42) ' (35) Another U.S. response was the establishment of the Alliance for Progress, after years of relatively little attention to Latin America’s economic and social needs.(43) President Kennedy gave the Alliance concept a memorable launching in a speech in March, 1961 when he called for vigorous promotion of social and economic development in Latin America through democratic means and, at the same time, pledged substantial financial and political support. (44) (86) While the campaign to broaden its Cuban policy base was being pursued, the United States was proceeding on another course. In one of the first unilateral efforts to isolate Cuba from its allies, the United States in September 1961 announced it would stop assist- ance to any country that assisted Cuba. In December, Kennedy ex- focaagjay denial of Cuba’s sugar quota through the first half of 1962. (37) Meanwhile, the secret. policy aimed at removing Castro through assassination continued as FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover informed At- torney General Robert Kennedy in May that the CIA had used the Mafia in “clandestine efforts” against Castro.(46) In that month, poison pills to be used in a plot to kill Castro were passed to a Cuban exile in Miami by a Mafia figure.(47) In November 1961. Operation Mongoose, designed to enlist 2,000 Cuban exiles and dissidents in- side Cuba to overthrow Castro, was initiated. (48) (38) Although the bitter aftertaste of the Bay of Pigs invasion lingered in the Cuban exile community, those who remained active in the fight against Castro came to realize that these subsequent actions of the Kennedy administration were manifestations of its determina- tion to reverse the defeat. What Kennedy had euphemistically termed “a new and deeper struggle” became, in actuality, a secret war: 11 * * * the new.President apparently perceived the defeat as an affront to his pride. Within a matter of weeks he com- mitted the United States to a secret war against Cuba that eventually required the services of several thousand men and cost as much as $100 million a year * * * Kennedy entrusted its direction to the CIA, which * * * conducted an operation that could be described either as a large-scale vendetta or a small crusade. (49) (39) The fact that the agency of the U.S. Government the anti- Castro exiles had dealt most with and relied on prior to the Bay of Pigs became, after the invasion failure, the controlling force of the “secret war” was another indication of the Cuban exiles that the Ken- nedy administration was, indeed, still sincere about overthrowing astro. Within a year of the Bay of Pigs, the CIA curiously and inexplicably began to grow, to branch out, to gather more and more responsibility for the “Cuban problem.” The company was given authority to help monitor Cuba’s wireless traffic; to observe its weather; to follow the Castro government's pur- chases abroad and its currency transactions; to move extraor- dinary numbers of clandestine field operatives in and out of Cuba; to acquire a support fleet of ships and aircraft in order to facilitate these secret agent movements; to advise, train, and help reorganize the police and security establishments of Latin countries which felt threatened by Castro guerrilla politics; to take a hand in U-2 overflights and sea-air Elint (Electronic Intelligence) operations aimed at tracing Cuban coastal defense communications on special devices; to pump * * * vast sums into political operations thought to be helpful in containing Castro * * *.(50) (40) ‘Thenerve center of the United States “new and deeper struggle” against Castro was established in the heartland of exile activity, Miami. There, on a secluded, heavily wooded 1,571-acre tract that was part of the University of Miami’s south campus, the CIA set up a front operation, an electronics firm called Zenith Technological Serv- ices.(57) Its code name was JM/WAVE and it soon became the largest CIA installation anywhere in the world outside of its headquarters in Langley, Va. (52) (41) The JM/WAVE station had, at the height of its activities in 1962, a staff of more than 800 Americans, mostly case officers. (53) Each case officer employed from 4 to 10 Cuban “principal agents” who, in turn, would each be responsible for between 10 and 30 regular agents. (54) In addition, the CIA set up 54 front corporations—boat shops, real estate firms, detective agencies, travel companies, gun shops—to provide ostensible employment for the case officers and agents operat- ing outside of JM/WAVE headquarters. (55) It also maintained hun- dreds of pieces of real estate, from small apartments to palatial homes, as “safe houses” in which to hold secret meetings.(56) Asa result of its JM/WAVE operation, the CIA became one of Florida’s largest employers. (57 (42) Itwasthe JM/WAVE station that monitored, more or less con- trolled, and in most cases funded the anti-Castro groups.(58) It was 12 responsible for the great upsurge in anti-Castro activity and the lifted spirits of the Cuban exiles as American arms and weapons flowed freely through the training camps and guerrilla bases spotted around south Florida.(69) Anti-Castro raiding parties that left from small secret islands in the Florida Keys were given the “green light” by agents of the JM/WAVE station.(60) The result of it all was that there grew in the Cuban exile community a renewed confidence in the U.S. Government’s sincerity and loyalty to its cause. (43) Then came the.Cuban missile crisis. The more fervent Cuban exiles were initially elated by the possibility that the crisis might pro- voke a final showdown with Castro.(6Z) For several months there had been increasing pressure on President Kennedy to take strong meas- ures against the buildup of the Soviet presence in Cuba, which was becoming daily more blatant. In a report issued at the end of March 1962, the State Department said that Cuba had received from the Soviet Union $100 million in military aid for the training of Cuban pilots in Czechoslovakia and that the Soviet Union also had provided from 50 to 75 Mig fighters as well as tons of modern weapons for Cuba’s ground forces.(62) Fortifying the Cuban exile’s hope for ac- tion was the fact that the increasing amounts of Soviet weapons moy- ing into Cuba became the dominant issue in the news in the succeed- ing months, leading to congressional calls for action and a series of hard-line responses from President Kennedy.(637) In September, Ken- nedy declared that the United States would use “whatever means may be necessary” to prevent Cuba from exporting “its aggressive purposes by force or threat of force” against “any part of the Western Hemisphere.” (64) (44) The fervent hope of the Cuban exiles—that the Cuban missile crisis would ultimately result in the United States smashing the Castro regime—was shattered by the manner in which President Kennedy resolved the crisis. Cuba itself was relegated to a minor role as tough negotiations took place between the United States and the Soviet Union, specifically through communication between President Ken- nedy and Premier Khrushchev.(65) The crisis ended, when President Kennedy announced that all IL-28 bombers were being withdrawn by the Soviets and progress was being made on the withdrawal of offen- sive missiles and other weapons from Cuba. In return, Kennedy gave the Soviets and the Cubans a “no invasion” pledge. (66). (45) If Kennedy’s actions at the Bay of Pigs first raised doubts in the minds of the Cuban exiles about the President’s sincerity and de- termination to bring about the fall of Castro, his handling of the missile crisis confirmed those doubts. Kennedy’s agreement with Khru- shchev was termed “a violation” of the pledge he had made 3 days after the Bay of Pigs invasion that the United States would never abandon Cuba to communism.(67) Wrote one prominent exile: “For the friendly Cuban people, allies of the United States, and for hun- dreds of thousands of exiles eager to stake their lives to liberate their native land, it was a soul-shattering blow.” (68) (46) The bitterness of the anti-Castro exiles was exacerbated by the actions the U.S. Government took to implement the President’s ‘no invasion” pledge. Suddenly there was a crackdown on the very train- ing camps and guerrilla bases which had been originally established and funded by the United States and the exile raids which once had the 13 Government’s “green light” were now promptly disavowed and’ condemned. (47) On March 31, 1963, a group of anti-Castro raiders were arrested by british police at a training site in the Bahamas.(69) The U.S. State Department admitted it had given the British the information about the existence of the camp.(70) That same night another exile raiding boat was seized in Miami Harbor.(7/) On April 8, the Soviet Union charged that the United States “encourages and bears full responsibil- ity” for two recent attacks on Soviet ships in Cuban ports by anti- Castro exile commandos.(72) The United States responded that it was “taking every step necessary to insure that such attacks are not launched, manned or equipped from U.S. territory.”(73) On April 5, the Coast Guard announced it was throwing more planes, ships, and men into its efforts to police the straits of Fiorida against anti-Castro raiders.(74) Asa result of the crackdown, Cuban exile sources declared that their movement to rid their homeland of communism had been dealt ‘a crippling blow” and that they had lost a vital supply link with anti-Castro fighters inside Cuba. (48) ‘There were numerous other indications of the U.S. crackdown on anti-Castro activity following the missile crisis. The Customs Service raided what had long been a secret training camp in the Florida Keys and arrested the anti-Castro force in training there. (75) The FBI seized a major cache of explosives at an anti-Castro camp in Louisiana.(76) Just weeks later, the U.S. Coast Guard in coopera- tion with the British Navy captured another group of Cuban exiles in the Bahamas.(77) In September, the Federal Aviation Administra- tion issued “strong warnings” to six American civilian pilots who had been flying raids over Cuba.(78) Shortly afterward, the Secret Service arrested a prominent exile leader for conspiring to counterfeit Cuban currency destined for rebel forces inside Cuba.(79) In October, the Coast Guard seized 4 exile ships and arrested 22 anti-Castro raiders who claimed they were moving their operations out of the United States. (80) (49) The feeling of betrayal by the Cuban exiles was given reinforce- ment by prominent sympathizers outside their community, as well as by Kennedy’s political opponents. Capt. Eddie Rickenbacker, chair- man of the Committee for the Monroe Doctrine, asserted: “The Ken- nedy administration has committed the final betrayal of Cuban hopes for freedom by its order to block the activities of exiled Cuban freedom fighters to liberate their nation from Communism.”(8/) Senator Barry Goldwater accused Kennedy of “doing everything in his power” to keep the flag of Cuban exiles “from ever flying over Cuba again.” (82) Richard Nixon urged the end of what he called the “quarantine” of Cuban exiles. (83) (50) Of course, the most strident reactions came from within the anti-Castro community itself. Following the U.S. Government’s notifi- cation that it would discontinue its subsidy to the Cuban Revolutionary Council, its president, José Miré Cardona, announced his resignation from the council in protest against U.S. policy.(84) The Cuban exile leader accused President Kennedy of “breaking promises and agree- ments” to support another invasion of Cuba.(85) Miré Cardona said the change in American policy reflected the fact that Kennedy had become “the victim of a master play by the Russians.” (86) 43—944—79—_2 14 (51) The extent of the deterioration of relationships between the Cuban exiles and the Kennedy administration is indicated in the State Department’s reply to Miré Cardona’s charges. It labeled them ‘a gross distortion of recent history.” (87) (52) Against the pattern of U.S. crackdown on Cuban exile activity during this period, however, emerges a countergrain of incidents that may have some bearing on an examination of the Kennedy assassina- tion. These incidents involve some extremely significant Cuban exile raids and anti-Castro operations which took place, despite the crack- down, between the time of the missile crisis and the assassination of the President. In fact, in the midst of the missile crisis, one of the most active Cuban groups, Alpha 66, announced that it made a successful raid on the Cuban port city of Isabela de Sagua, killing about 20 defenders, including Russians.(88) On October 15, the same group sank a Cuban patrol boat.(8&9) On October 31, the day after the block- ade was lifted, it struck again.(90) Immediately after the crisis ended in November, a spokesman for the group pledged new raids. (97) (53) During this period, other anti-Castro groups also remained active. In April, a group calling itself the Cuban Freedom Fighters reported bombing an oil refinery outside Havana.(92) In May, the Cuban Government confirmed that anti-Castro rebels had carried out a “pirate” raid on a militia camp near Havana despite U.S. promises “to take measures to prevent such attacks.” (93) Later that month, the anti-Castro Internal Front of Revolutionary Unity reported it had formed a military junta in Cuba to serve as “provisional government of Cuba in arms.” Shortly afterwards, a group of returning Cuban exile raiders claimed they had blown up a Cuban refinery, sank a gunboat and killed “many” of Castro’s soldiers.(94) It is not known exactly how many incidents took place during this period, but in April 1963 one anti-Castro fighter asserted that, by then, the U.S. Government knew of 11 raids on Cuba since the missile crisis and did nothing. (95) (54) One analyst, reviewing that period of United States-Cuban relations, noted: “The U.S. Government’s policy toward the exiles was equivocal and inconsistent * * *” (96 (55) It cannot be determined to what extent, if any, the military activities of the anti-Castro exile groups were sanctioned or supported by the Kennedy administration or by the CIA or both. At a press conference in May 1963, in response to a question as to whether or not the United States was giving aid to exiles, President Kennedy was evasive: “We may well be * * * well, none that I am familiar with * * * T don’t think as of today that we are.” (97) And it is known that by June 1963, the U.S. Government was supporting at least one Cuban exile group, Jure. under what was termed an “au- tonomous operations” concept. (98) (56) In retrospect, this much is clear: With or without U.S. Govern- ment support and whether or not in blatant defiance of Kennedy ad- ministration policy, there were a number of anti-Castro action groups which were determined to continue—and, in fact, did continue—their operations. The resignation of Miré Cardona actually split the Cuban Revolutionary Council down the middle and precipitated a bitter dispute among the exile factions. (99) The more moderate contended that without U.S. support there was little hope of ousting Castro and that the exiles should concentrate their efforts in mounting political pressure to reverse Washington’s shift in policy. (100) Other exile 15 groups announced their determination to continue the war against Castro and, if necessary, to violently resist curtailment of their para- military activities in the Kennedy administration. (70/) In New Or- Jeans, for instance, Carlos Bringuier, the local leader of the Cuban Student Directorate (DRE) who, coincidentally, would later have a contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, proclaimed, in the wake of the Mir6 Cardona resignation, that his group “would continue efforts to liberate Cuba despite action by the United States to stop raids originat- ing from U.S. soil.” (102) (57) The seeds of defiance of the Kennedy administration may have been planted with the exiles even prior to the Bay of Pigs in- vasion. In his history of the invasion, Haynes Johnson revealed that shortly before the invasion, “Frank Bender,” the CLA director of the invasion preparations, assembled the exile leaders together at the CIA’s Guatemala training camp: It was now early in April and Artime was in the camp as the civilian representative of the Revolutionary Council. Frank called Pepe (San Roman) and (Erneido) Oliva again. This time he had startling information. There were forces in the administration trying to block the invasion, and Frank might be ordered to stop it. If he received such an order, he said he would secretly inform Pepe and Oliva. Pepe re- members Frank’s next words this way : “Tf this happens you come here and make some kind of show, as if you were putting us, the advisers, in prison, and you go ahead with the program as we have talked about it, and we will give you the whole plan, even if we are your prisoners.” * * * Krank then laughed and said: “In the end we will win.” (703) (58) That, then, is the context in which the committee approached the question of whether or not the John F. Kennedy assassination was a conspiracy involving anti-Castro Cuban exiles. It also considered the testimony of the CIA’s chief of its Miami JM/WAVE station in 1963, who noted “ ‘assassination’ was part of the ambience of that time.” (704) (59) This section of this staff report details the evidence developed in the committee’s examination of some of the most active anti-Castro exile groups and their key leaders. These groups were specifically selected from the more than 100 exile organizations in existence at the time of the Kennedy assassination. (105) Their selection was the result of both independent field investigation by the committee and the com: mittee’s examination of the files and records maintained by those Federal and local agencies monitoring Cuban exile activity at the time. These agencies included local police departments, the FBI, the CIA, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (now the DEA), the Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Department of Defense. (60) The groups selected can be termed the “action groups.” These were the ones most active on both the military and propaganda fronts, the ones that not only talked about anti-Castro operations, but actual- ly planned and carried out infiltrations and raids into Cuba, conducted Castro assassination attempts, were involved in a multiplicity of arms dealings and had the most vociferous and aggressive leaders. These 16 were also the groups and individuals who took the brunt of the Ken- nedy administration’s crackdown on anti-Castro operations when it came after the Cuban missile crisis. These were the ones who, in the end, were most bitter at President Kennedy, the ones who felt the most betrayed. Finally, these were the groups and individuals who had the means and motivation to be involved in the assassination of the President. (61) The committee, however, found no specific evidence that any anti-Castro group or individual was involved in Kennedy’s assassina- tion. It did appear, however, that there were indications of associa- tion between Lee Harvey Oswald and individuals connected to at least. some of the groups. Submitted by: GaAEToONn J: Fonzi, Investigator. REFERENCES (1) “The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F, Kennedy : Performance of the Intelligence Agencies,’’ Book V, Final Report, Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, 94th Congress, 2d sess., Apr. 23, 1976, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office, 1976, p. 4 (Senate Report 94-755), (hereinafter Intelligence Committee Report, Book V). (2) Memorandum of William T. Coleman, Jr. and W. David Slawson to War- ren Commission, pp. 110-111, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 013105). (3) “The Longest Night,” Miami Herald, Tropic, Dec. 28, 1975, p. 7. (4) Ibid. (5) Haynes Johnson, “The Bay of Pigs” (Norton, 1964), p. 17 (hereinafter cited Johnson, “Bay of Pigs’). (6) Ibid. (7) Id. at p. 18. (8) “U.S. Seizes Batista Backer in Miami,’ New York Times, Apr. 9, 1961, p. 4. (9) See ref. 5, Johnson, “Bay of Pigs,” p. 238. (10) Paul Bethel, ‘“‘The Losers” (Arlington House, 1969), p. 102. (11) “A Selected Chronology on Cuba and Castro, Mar. 10, 1952—Oct. 22, 1962,” Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, p. 6 (J. F. K. Document 013100) (hereinafter cited “‘A Selected Chronology on Cuba and Castro”). (12) Ibid. (18) Mario Lazo, “Dagger in the Heart” (Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), p. 186. (hereinafter cited Lazo, ““Dagger’’). (14) Ibid. (15) See ref. 11, “A Selected Chronology on Cuba and Castro,” p. 7. (16) Ibid. (17) See ref. 5, Johnson, “Bay of Pigs,” p. 23. (18) Ibid. (19) Ibid. (20) Id. at p. 24. (21) Ibid. (22) See ref. 11, “A Selected Chronology on Cuba and Castro,” Jan. 26, 1960, 9. (23) Ibid. (24) See ref. 5, Johnson, “Bay of Pigs,” p. 18. (25) Ibid. (26) Id. at p. 28. (27) Id. at p. 19. (28) Ibid. (29) “U.S.-Cuba Relations, 1959-1964: An Analysis,” Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 011478.) (hereinafter cited “United States-Cuba Relations.’’) (30) See ref. 5, Johnson “Bay of Pigs,” pp. 23-31. (31) Id. atp, 27. (32) Id. at p. 76. 17 (33) Id. at p. 222. (84) See ref. 11, “A Selected Chronology on Cuba and Castro,” Apr. 18, 1961, p. 26. (85) Executive session testimony of Manuel Antonio de Varona, Mar. 16, 1978, hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 23. (36) See ref. 11, “A Selected Chronology on Cuba and Castro,” Apr. 24, 1961, p. 29 29. (37) See ref. 5, Johnson, “Bay of Pigs,” p. 213. (38) See ref. 13, Lazo, ‘‘Daggers.” (39) Ibid., p. 299. (40) Taylor Branch and George Crile, III, ““The Kennedy Vendetta,” Harper’s, Aug. 1975, p. 49 (hereinafter cited Branch and Crile). (41) See ref, 29, “United States-Cuba Relations,” p. 39. (42) Id. at p. 40. (43) Id. at p. 41. (44) Ibid. (45) Id. at p. 42. (46) See ref. 1, Intelligence Committee Report, Book V, p. 11, footnote 4. (47) Id. at p. 99. (48) Ibid. See also “Our Heritage—The Exile Cuban Terrorists,” Washington Post, Nov. 7, 1976, p. C8. (49) See ref. 40, Branch and Crile, p. 49. (50) Andrew St. George, “The Cold War Comes Home,” Harper’s November 1973, p. 70. (51) ““How the CIA Operated in Dade,” Miami Herald, Mar. 9, 1975, p. 1. (52) Thid. (53) See ref. 40, Branch and Crile, p. 51. (54) Ibid. (55) Ibid. (56) See ref. 51, “How the CIA Operated in Dade,” p. 1. (57) Ibid. (58) Ibid. See also the memorandum of interview of Ron Cross Jan. 16, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 004721). (59) See ref. 40, Branch and Crile, pp. 52, 56. (60) Id. at p. 58. (61) Id. at p. 62. (62) See ref. 29, ‘United States-Cuba Relations,” p. 48. (63) Id. at p. 49. (64) Ibid. (65) Id. at p. 53. (66) Id. at p. 54. (67) See ref. 13, Lazo, “Dagger,” p. 364. (68) Id. at p. 378. (69) “A Selected Chronology on Cuba, Apr. 1, 1963—Apr. 30, 1963,” Congres- -sional Research Service, Library of Congress, p. 1 (J. F. K. Document 013101) ‘(hereinafter “A Selected Chronology on Cuba’’). (70) Ibid. (71) Ibid. (72), i1G..at:p. 2. (73) Ibid. (74) Id. at p. 4. (75) “U.S. Nabs Anti-Castro Fighters,” Miami Herald, Dec. 5, 1962, p. 21A. (76) New Orleans Times-Picayune, Aug. 1, 1963, p. 1. (77) “United States-Cuba Relations, 1960-1963: Neutrality Enforcement and -the Cuban Exiles During the Kennedy Administration,” Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, p. 12 (J. F. K. Document 013099) (hereinafter cited “United States-Cuba 1960-1963”). (78) Ibid. (79) Ibid. (80) Ibid. (81) See ref. 69, “A Selected Chronology on Cuba,” Apr. 6, 1963, p. 4. (82) Ibid., Apr. 7, 1963, p. 5. (83) Ibid., Apr. 20, 1963, p. 18. (84) Ibid., Apr. 10, 1968, p. 7. (85) Ibid., Apr. 15, 1963, p. 10. (86) Ibid., Apr. 18, 1963, p. 12. 18 (87) Ibid., Apr. 15, 1963, p. 10. (88) Ibid., Oct. 10, 1962, p. 24. (89) See ref. 77, “United States-Cuba 1960-1963,” p. 8. (90) Ibid. (91) Ibid. (92) See ref. 69, “A Selected Chronology on Cuba,” Apr. 26, 1963, p. 24. (93) Ibid., May 21, 1963, p. 10. (94) Ibid., June 12, 1963, p. 5. (95) See ref. cG “United States-Cuba 1960-19638,” p. 9. (96) See ref. 29, “United States-Cuba Relatons: 1959-1964: An Analysis,’”” p. 69. (97) Id. at p. 71. (98) CIA memorandum to Director, July 9, 1964. (99) See ref. 69, “A Selected Chronology on Cuba,” Apr. 19, 19638, p. 16. (100) Paris Flammonde, “Why President Kennedy Was Killed,” p. 69 (J. F. K. Document 013106). (101) Ibid. (102) Ibid., Associated Press dispatch, May 10, 1963. (103) See ref. 5, Johnson, “Bay of Pigs,” pp. 75-76. (In a footnote in later editions, Johnson notes that after initial publication of his book, “the CIA let it be known that Frank Bender denied—in writing—making such statements.” ) (104) See ref. 1, Intelligence Committee Report, Book V, p. 14. (105) “Our Heritage—The Exile Cuban Terrorists,’ Washington Post, Nov. 7, 1976, p. C8. If. THE ODIO INCIDENT (62) In connection with the question of anti-Castro Cuban involve- ment in the Kennedy assassination, the committee examined one in- cident which, over the years, particularly intrigued critics of the Warren Commission’s investigation. It became known as the “Odio incident” and involved a young Cuban exile, Silvia Odio. Here, in part, is how the Warren Commission detailed the incident and its conclusions in its final report: (63) ‘The Commission investigated [Mrs. Odio’s] state- ments in connection with its consideration of the testimony of several witnesses suggesting that Oswald may have been seen in the company of unidentified persons of Cuban or Mexican background. Mrs. Odio was born in Havana in 1987 and remained in Cuba until 1960; it appears that both of her parents are political prisoners of the Castro regime. Mrs. Odio is a member of the Cuban Revolutionary Junta (JURE) an anti-Castro organization. She testified that late in Septem- ber 1963, three men came to her apartment in Dallas and asked her to help them prepare a letter soliciting funds for JURE activities. She claimed that the men, who exhibited personal familiarity with her imprisoned father, asked her if she were “working in the underground,” and she replied that she was not. She testified that two of the men appeared to be Cubans, although they also had some characteristics that she associ- ated with Mexicans. Those two men did not state their full names, but identified themselves only by their fictitious un- derground “war names.” Mrs. Odio remembered the name of one of the Cubans as “Leopoldo.” The third man, an Ameri- can, allegedly was introduced to Mrs. Odio as “Leon Oswald,” and she was told that he was very much interested in the Cuban cause. Mrs. Odio said that the men told her that they had just come from New Orleans and that they were then about to leave on a trip. Mrs. Odio testified that next day Leopoldo called her on the telephone and told her that it was his idea to introduce the American into the underground “be- eause he is great, he is kind of nuts.” Leopoldo also said that the American had been in the Marine Corps and was an ex- cellent shot, and that the American said the Cubans “don’t have any guts * * * because President Kennedy should have been assassinated after the Bay of Pigs, and some Cubans should have done that, because he was the one that was hold- ing the freedom of Cuba actually.” (64) Although Mrs. Odio suggested doubts that the men were in fact members of JURE, she was certain that the American who was mtroduced to her as Leon Oswald was (19) 20 Ae Harvey Oswald. Her sister, who was in the apartment at the time of the visit by the three men, and who stated that that she saw them briefly in the hallway when answering the door, also believed that the American was Lee Harvey Os- wald. By referring to the date on which she moved from her former apartment, October 1, 1963, Mrs. Odio fixed the date of the alleged visit on the Thursday or Friday immediately preceding that date, i.e. , September 26 or 27. She was positive that the visit occurred prior to October 1. (65) During the course of its investigation, however, the Commission concluded that Oswald could not have been in Dallas on the evening of either September 26 or 27, 1963. It also developed considerable evidence that he was not in Dallas at any time between the beginning of September and October SL 960. 7%. F (66) In spite of the fact that it appeared almost certain that Oswald could not have been in Dallas at the time Mrs. Odio thought he was, the Commission requested the FBI to conduct further investigation to determine the validity of Mrs. Odio’s testimony. The Commission considered the prob- lems raised by that testimony as important in view of the possibility it raised that Oswald may have had companions on his trip to Mexico. The Commission specifically requested the FBI to attempt to locate and identify the two men who Mrs. Odio stated were with the man she thought was Oswald. * * * | (67) On September 16, 1964, the FBI located Loran Eugene Hall in Johnsandale, Calif. Hall has been identified as a par- ticipant in numerous anti-Castro activities. He told the FBI that in September of 1963 he was in Dallas, soliciting aid in connection with anti-Castro activities, He said he had visited Mrs. Odio. He was accompanied by Lawrence Howard, a Mexican-American from East Los Angeles and one William Seymour from Arizona. He stated that Seymour is similar in appearance to Lee Harvey Oswald; he speaks only a few words of Spanish, as Mrs. Odio had testified one of the men who visited her did. While the FBI had not yet completed its investigation into this matter at the time the report went to press, the Commission has concluded that Lee Harvey Os- wald was not at Mrs. Odio’s apartment in September of 1963.(7) (68) The evidence did not support the definitive character of the Warren Commission’s conclusions. The Commission had based its conclusion on two points: the “considerable” evidence that Oswald could not have been in Dallas on the evening Mrs. Odio alleged she saw him;(2) the FBI’s report of Loran Eugene Hall’s speculation that Odio misidentified his companion, William Seymour, as Lee Harvey Oswald.(.2) Although the Warren Commission Report stated that. Odio “fixed” the date of the alleged Oswald visit on September 26 or September 27, she actually told the FBI that she was not at all positive about the exact date,(4) and that it might have been as early as September 25.(45) 21 (69) The Warren Commission asserted that Oswald left New Or- leans by bus for Houston, on his way to Mexico, on September 25. (6) Yet there was no documentary evidence as substantiation, and neither the bus driver nor any passenger could recall seeing Oswald on that bus.(7) In fact, Warren Commission General Counsel J. Lee Rankin asked the FBI to investigate the possibility that Oswald left New Orleans on September 24,(8) when a neighbor saw him leaving his apartment carrying two suitcases.(9) Rankin pointed out in his let- ter to J. Edgar Hoover that: Marina Oswald told the Commission that her husband told her he intended to leave New Orleans the very next day fol- lowing her departure on September 238, 1963. She has also indicated that he told her an unemployment check would be forwarded to Mrs. Ruth Paine’s address in Irving from his post office box in New Orleans. * * * It also seems impos- sible to us that Oswald would have gone all the way back to the Winn-Dixie store at 4303 Magazine Street to cash the unemployment check which he supposedly picked up at the Lafayette Branch of the Post Office when he could have cashed it at Martin’s Restaurant, where he had previously cashed many of his Reily checks and one unemployment check. That is particularly true if he received the check on September 25, 1968, as previously thought, and had left his apartment with his suitcases the evening before. (70) (70) The FBI never came up with any evidence which resolved the questions raised in Rankin’s request. In sum, the Warren Commis- sion developed no hard evidence that could substantiate the fact that Oswald was or was not in Dallas during the time period Odio said she saw him. (71) Although the Warren Commission stated that the FBI had not yet completed its investigation at the time its report went to press, (ZZ) it was only 2 days after its September 16, 1964, interview of Loran Eugene Hall that the FBI interviewed William Seymour, who denied he ever had any contact with Silvia Odio and that he had been in Dallas with Hall in September 1963.(72) The FBI subsequently confirmed the fact that Seymour was working in Florida during September 1963.(13) On September 23, 1964, the FBI interviewed Loran Hall’s other associate, Lawrence Howard.(/4) Howard also denied he had ever contacted Silvia Odio.(/5) The FBI then went back and re-inter- viewed Hall who then said that he had been accompanied on his trip to Dallas not by Seymour but by a Cuban friend he knew as “Wahito” and that he no longer recalled any contact with Odio.(16) The FBI determined that “Wahito” was Celio Sergio Castro(17) who, when interviewed, said he had never heard of or met Silvia Odio.(78) On October 1, 1964, the FBI showed Silvia Odio photographs of Loran Hall, William Seymour, Lawrence Howard and Celio Sergio Cas- tro.(19) She examined the photographs and said that none of the individuals were identical to any of the three men who had come to her apartment door in Dallas. (20) (72) In view of the premature character of the Warren Commis- sion’s conclusion based on the impeached Loran Hall allegation and. 22 the unresolved question of Oswald’s whereabouts at the time, the Odio incident remains one of the lingering enigmas in the original assassina- tion investigation. Unfortunately, the nature of the incident makes it, from an investigative standpoint, particularly susceptible to the ero- sive effects of time. The canvassing, for instance, of both pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups in Dallas, New Orleans, and Miami in search of descriptive similarities to the men who visited Odio might have been fruitful at the time; today it is impractical. The construction of a composite sketch of the individuals when their features were still fresh in Odio’s memory might have provided productive evidence 15 years ago; today it 1s of questionable value considering the natural adulteration of recall over that period of time. A search for the car that the men were driving might have been very productive at the time; today it is useless. The committee was, therefore handicapped by the limitations of the initial investigation and the paucity of evi- dence developed. The valid investigative approaches remaining were distressingly limited. Nevertheless, because of the potential signifi- cance of the Odio incident to a possible conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination, the committee decided that, in addition to pursuing any substantive leads it possibly could, it would also attempt to verify the record regarding Silvia Odio’s credibility and the details of her allegations. (73) Also of interest to the committee, of course, were the initial assertions of Loran Hall that he and two associates, William Seymour and Lawrence Howard, were the ones who had visited Odio in Sep- tember.(27) All three had been actively involved in anti-Castro activ- ity and were members of a group of soldiers of fortune called Inter- pen.(22) The group was arrested at No Name Key, Fla., in Decem- ber 1962 as part of the Kennedy administration’s crackdown on anti- Castro operations.(23) That policy, which highly incensed the anti- Castro and rightwing factions, was the result of an agreement Ken- nedy had made with Khrushchev and Castro.(24) Those factions -considered the agreement a “betrayal.” (25) (74) Loran Hall provided sworn testimony to the committee at an executive session on October 5, 1977. The following passage is an ex- -cerpt from that testimony : Q. Did there come a time when the FBI spoke’to vou about whether or not you visited Silvia Odio in September 1963? Hat. Yes; there was. (). Who spoke to you ? Harr. An FBI agent. Q. At that time were you advised why you were being ques- tioned about Silvia Odio? Hats... I really don’t recall. He stated as I recall, he stated something to the effect that were you ever in Dallas. Tex., and T said yes. He said do vou know 9 Mrs. Odin, and T said I don’t recall knowing a Mrs. Odio. I think IT knew a Profes- sor Odio, who was a nrofessor at Texas, some university in Texas. inst outside of Dallas, as I revall. He asked me anyway about the anartment buildine on Magellan, and I said it is possible, I don’t know. I said do you have a picture of her 23 and he said no; I do not have. And I said, it is possible I met her but I don’t recall. He then asked me who was with me and I told him I was with Alba and Howard, and then it was like maybe a month or two. (). And you told him you were there with Howard and Alba? Hatt. Yes. Q. On the first trip ? Hauu. Yes. We both read the same FBI report. You know ‘it is directly contradictory to what I am saying. (. So it is your testimony that at no time did you ever tell an FBI agent that you were in Dallas accompanied by Law- rence Howard and William Seymour, is that your testimony? Hatt. That is true. Q. Were you ever directly or indirectly involved with Silvia Odio in acquiring military equipment for anti-Castro raids? Hatz. No; I was not. (26) (75) The committee interviewed Lawrence Howard on May 23, 1978. ‘Howard stated he has never met Silvia Odio. (27) The committee also interviewed William Seymour, who acknowledged his relationship with Hall and Howard but did not recall any details of a trip to Dallas, including meeting any Cubans there. (28) (76) The committee believed it important in its investigation to examine in detail the substance of Silvia Odio’s allegations as well as their credibility. One of the problems faced by the committee was Odio’s negative attitude toward a governmental investigation of the Kennedy ‘assassination. Her attitude, she said, was the result of her relationship with the Warren Commission. (29) She expressed sharp disillusionment with the Warren Commission and said that it was obvious to her that the Commission did not want to believe her story. (30) A committee investigator noted that her whole demeanor was “one of sharp distrust of the Government’s motives. She claims she feels she was just used by the Warren Commission for their own ends and she does not want to be put in the same position.” (37) Never- theless, after contact was established by the committee, Odio’s coopera- tion with the committee was excellent, and she voluntarily submitted to interviews and, subsequently, sworn testimony. (77) Evidence indicated that Odio’s story remained basically con- sistent with her Warren Commission testimony. There are, however, details concerning Odio, her background, and certain points of her story developed by the committee, which should be noted. (78) Silvia Odio was one of 10 children of Amador and Sarah Odio who were sent out of Cuba when their parents began taking an active part in a counterrevolutionary movement shortly after Castro took power. (32) Amador Odio was among’s Cuba’s wealthy aristocracy, the personal friend of diplomats and Ambassadors, including, during the last days of the U.S. presence there, American Ambassador Phillip Bonsal. (33) Odio was owner of the country’s largest trucking business and was once described in Time magazine as the tp ansport tycoon” of Latin America.(34) Yet, from their youth, both he and his wife were active, frontline fighters against the succession of tyrants who ruled 24 Cuba. During the reign of Gen. Gerardo Machado in the 1930’s, Saral» Odio was captured and beaten with a machete until her ribs were: broken. (35) Twice during the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, the Odios were forced into exile for their revolutionary activity.(30) Amador Odio’s trucks were the main supply line for the weapons and. ammunition which kept Castro’s hopes alive in the mountains. Yet. when the Odios decided that Castro had “betrayed the revolution,” (37) they were among the founding members, with Manolo Ray, of one of the early, most aggressive anti-Castro groups, the Movimiento Revolu- cionario del Pueblo (MRP ).(38) (79) Amador and Sarah Odio were arrested by Castro on October 26, 1961.(39) Their arrest was the result of the capture of MRP na- tional coordinator Reynald Gonzales in hiding on their country es- tate.(40) Ironically, the Odios had once hosted the wedding of one of Fidel Castro’s sisters on the very estate, a large, resortlike retreat in El Cafio, outside of Havana.(47) Later, Castro would turn it into a national women’s prison and Sarah Odio would spend 8 years incar- cerated there, while her husband was placed in a cell on Isla de Pinos.(42) Reynald Gonzales had been wanted in connection with his involvement in the assassination attempt on Castro that had been organized by Antonio Veciana. (43) (80) Silvia was the oldest of the Odio’s 10 children.(44) She had been sent for her early education to a private girls’ school near Phil- adelphia and later returned to Cuba and attended law school there. (45) | (81) When her parents were arrested, Silvia Odio was 24 years old,. living in Puerto Rico with her husband and four young children. (46) The next year her husband, sent to Germany by the chemical firm for which he was working, deserted her and her children.(47) Destitute and alone, she began having emotional problems.(48) By that time, Silva’s younger sisters, Annie and Sarita, were settled in Dallas. (49) Sarita, a student at the University of Dallas, had become friendly with Mrs. Lucille Connell, the leader of a women’s club at a local Episco- pal church who had organized a club program to provide financial and social support to the Dallas Cuban Refugee Center.(60) Connell also’ happened to be very active in the Mental Health Association of Dallas and, since her son was a psychiatrist, had personally acquired an in- terest in mental health problems.(47) When Sarita told Connell of her sister Silva’s plight, Connell made arrangements to have Silvia move to Dallas and to receive psychiatric treatment for her emo- tional problems at the Southwestern Medical School. (42) (82) According to Connell, who for a period was Silvia’s closest confidante, Silvia’s emotional problems, brought on by her suddenly being left alone with four young children, her parents being impris- oned and her lifestyle abruptly changing from one of wealth to one of deep destitution, were manifested in attacks of total loss of con- sciousness “when reality got too painful to bear.”(53) Connell said she personally witnessed Odio suffer these attacks in her home when she first arrived in Dallas, but with psychiatric treatment their frequency subsided and they subsequently ended, until the Kennedy assassination. (54) 25 483) Silvia Odio had moved to Dallas in March 1963.(55) By Sep- tember 1963 she was well established in the community, had a decent income from a good job, had her emotional problems under control and was doing well enough to be planning a move into a better apart- ment.(56) She was scheduled to make that move on October 1, 1963, a Monday.(57) The week before, she recalled, she had done some pack- ing in preparation for the move and there were boxes scattered across her living room floor which she had to jump over to get to the door.(S8) Her sister Annie, who was then 17, had come to the apart- ment to help her and babysit with her children.(59) When the doorbell rang early one evening in that last week of September, it was Annie who went to the door to answer it. (60) (84) The complex in which Silvia Odio lived at 1084 Magellan Cir- cle in Dallas was a series of garden-type rental apartments, two-story units with four apartments to each unit.(67) The two lower units had front doors that faced a common inner vestibule which, in turn, bordered a small, open cement porch elevated a few steps above the ground level.(62) Both the vestibule and porch had overhead lights. (62) Silvia Odio lived in apartment A of the 1084 unit, a first floor apartment. (64) (85a) Annie Odio provided the committee with a sworn statement of her independent recollection.(65) She remembered the evening when three men came to the door of Silvia’s apartment in Dallas. (66) One of the men asked to speak to Sarita.(67) He spoke English in- itially but when Annie answered him in Spanish he subsequently also spoke Spanish.(68) Annie told him that Sarita didn’t live there. (69) ‘Then, according to Annie’s recollection : He said something, I don’t recall exactly what, perhaps something about her being married, which made me think that they really wanted my sister Sylvia. I recall putting the chain on the door after I told them to wait while I went to get Silvia. I don’t exactly recall but they may have also said something about belonging to JURE, the anti-Castro move- ment. (70) (85b) Annie also recalled that Silvia was initially reluctant to talk with the strange visitors because she was getting dressed to go out. But she remembered Silvia coming out in her bathrobe to go to the door.(77) Annie said that she could only recall what one of the two Latin men looked like, but it is not a specific recollection, only that he was heavy set, had dark shiny hair combed back and “looked Mex- ican.” (72) She said “the one in the middle was American.” (7) (85c) In testimony to the committee, Silvia Odio also recalled that it was early evening and that she was getting dressed to go out when the three men came to the door.(74) She recalled that it was a week- day because she worked that day.(75) She said the men identified themselves as members of JURE, spoke of both its founder, Manola Ray, and her father, who had worked closely with Ray.(76) Odio said that almost all the conversation she had was with only one of the men, the one who identified himself as “Leopoldo.” (77) 26 85d) Odio was positive in her recollection of the name “Leo- poldo” (78) but said that the men admitted to her they were giving her aliases or “war names.”(79) She was less certain of the other Lat- in’s name, but believed it might have been “Angelo” or “Angel.” (SO) She described him, as her sister did, as being stocky, with black hair and looking “more Mexican than anything else.”(87) The third visi- tor, the “A merican,’ *(82) was introduced to her as “Leon Oswald.” (83) She said “Leon Oswald” acknowledged the introduction with a very brief reply, perhaps in idiomatic Spanish, (S4) but she later con- cluded that he could not understand Spanish because of his lack of. reaction to her Spanish conversation with “Leopoldo.” (85) (86) Silvia Odio was relatively consistent in her testimony to the: Warren Commission and to the committee in ‘her specific descriptions of the three vistors. (86) Her description of “Leopoldo” was especially noteworthy because he has certain very distinct features, including an unusual hairline that is sharply recessed. on the sides.(87) Her descrip- tion of “Leon Oswald”was similar to the characteristics of Lee Harvey Oswald.(88) There was absolutely no doubt. in her own mind that her visitor was, in fact, Lee Harvey Oswald. (89) She pointed out that she did have ample opportunity to view him, her conversation with the. three men lasting more than 20 minutes, her viewing distance being only about 3 feet and the light available more than adequate. (90) She also. recalled but not very clearly, that “Leopoldo” may have told her that they had just come from New Orleans. (97). (87) Odio told the committee, as she did the Warren Commission, (92) that the reason the men came to her was to get her help in soliciting funds in the name of JURE from local businessmen. (93) She said: He (Leopoldo) told me that he would like for me to write them in English, very nice letters, and perhaps we could get some funds. (94) That is consistent with the recollection of her sister Annie, who was in the apartment at the time the conversation was being conducted through the open door in the vestibule. She recalled that the men came because “they wanted something translated.” (.95) (88) According to Silvia Odio, her conversation with “Leopoldo” ended without her giving him any commitment to do anything, but he gave her the impression he would contact. her again.(96) The visit ended without “Leon” or “Angelo” having any conversation with her aside from a brief greeting word or two.(.97) After the men left, Odio decided to go to the window and watch them.(98) She saw them get into a red car that was parked in the driveway in front of the apart- ment.(99) She said she could not see who was driving the ear, but did see “Angelo” on the passenger side of the car. (700) (89) The cloudiest part of Odio’s recollection concerned the telephone: call she later received from “Leopoldo.” (707) It could have occurred, she said, the day after the visit or 2 days after the visit.(702) She. thought it was in the afternoon, but she cannot remember. (703) She believed it was on a Saturday, when she was not working, but is not certain.(/04) She was, however. relatively clear in her recollection of the gist of what “Leopoldo” told her when he called her on the tele- phone and that, too, was consistent with her testimony before the War- ren Commission.(/05) She said that “Leopoldo” told her that “the 27 Gringo” had been a Marine, that he was an expert marksman and that he was “kind of loco.” (706) She recalled : He said that the Cubans, we did not have any guts because we should have assassinated Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs. (107) (90) On the day that President Kennedy was assassinated, Silvia Odio was coming back from lunch when she heard the news. (08) She recalled: As soon as we got back to the office, everybody had their radios on and everybody was listening to it. By the time the hews came that the President was dead, the president of the company told us that we could go home. I started going back to—I was very frightened and very upset * * * I started moving across the warehouse toward the parking lot where we kept our cars * * * I think next I had passed out. My mind was going around in circles * * *(109) (91) During her testimony before the committee, Odio was asked if, when she heard that Kennedy was assassinated, she thought of the three men who had visited her apartment almost 2 months prior. Her reply: “Oh, very definnitely, very definitely.”(710) She added: “I had put them eut of my mind, but they came back that day.” (ZZ) (92) ‘The next thing she remembered after blacking out was re- gaining consciousness later in a hospital room.(/72) She recalled that her sister Annie had just entered.(//3) She remembered watch- ing the first image of Oswald she saw coming across the television screen in the hospital room: “Annie and I sort of looked at one another and sort of gasped. She said, ‘Do you recognize him?’ I said yes, and I said, ‘Do you recognize him?’ She said, ‘It is the same guy, isn’t it 2’ I said, ‘Yes, but do not say anything.’” (77/4) (93) This excerpt from the independent sworn statement given to the committee by Annie Odio concerns the day of the assassination. On the day of the assassination of President Kennedy I had gone with my girlfriend, Cherie Matlock, and some other friends to a place where we could see the President’s motor- cade pass by. I don’t remember where it was, only that it was quite a distance from downtown Dallas and Dealey Plaza. After the motorcade passed by we went to a drive-in restau- rant for some hamburgers. When we were coming out of the drive-in we heard that Kennedy was shot. When I first heard that Kennedy was shot I did not make any connection between the shooting and the men who came to Silvia’s door. Later in the afternoon I was by myself in the Matlock home when I first saw Oswald on television. My first thought was, “My God, I know this guy and I don’t know from where! But I’m not going to tell anybody because they’re going to think I’m crazy.” But I kept thinking, “Where have I seen this guy?” Then my sister Sarita called and told me that Silvia had fainted at work and that she was sending her boyfriend Jim, who is now her husband to pick me up and take me to the hos- pital to see Silvia. Sarita did not tell me then why Silvia had 28 fainted. I remember that it was getting dark when Jim picked me up and that we had to drive by Dealey Plaza. 1 don’t remember Jim coming up to the room in the hospital with me when I saw Silvia. I don’t remember anyone else in the room, but it was a very small room. Silvia was in bed. The first thing I remember when I walked into the room was that Silvia started crying and crying. I don’t remember her saying anything. I think that I told her: “You know this guy on TV who shot President Kennedy? I think I know him.” And she said: “You don’t remember where you know him from 2” I said: “No, I cannot recall, but I know I’ve seen him before.” And then she told me: “Do you remember those three guys who came to the house?” And that’s when I rela- ized I had seen Oswald before. And then she told me every- thing, including the fact that one of the men had called back, that she had called him “Leon,” that he said he wanted to be called “Leon,” and that he said something like the Cubans should kill Kennedy because of what he did with the Bay of Pigs. Silvia also told me that when she first heard that Presi- dent Kennedy was shot, she started saying: “Leon did it. Leon did it!” I remember that Silvia was very excited at the hos- pital and that she kept saying that she knew that Leon was going to do it.(115) (94) Because they were extremely frightened, concerned for their brothers and sisters and their own safety, worried about their mother and father in prison in Cuba and terrifyingly bewildered about the meaning of the three men’s visit, Silvia and Annie Odio decided not to reveal the incident.(776) It was, in fact, only circuitously that the FBI came to learn of it. (95) According to Silvia Odio’s close friend, Lucille Connell, she received a call from Silvia’s sister Sarita who told her that Silvia had fainted and was in the hospital.(17) Sarita also told her why Silvia had fainted and the fact that Silvia had met Oswald and that he had come to her apartment. (778) Connell could not recall] exactly when Sarita called; she said it was either the day of the assassination or the day after.(Z79) Connell said that Sunday, however, she was speaking on the telephone to a friend of hers, Mrs. Sanford Pick, then working as a receptionist in a Dallas law firm office, when they both saw Ruby shoot Oswald on their television sets. (720) Connell recalled: “And she said to me, ‘Oh my goodness, Ruby was in our office last week and had power of attorney drawn for his sister.’ ” (727) (96) Connell said that later that same day she happened to be speak- ing with another friend, Marcella Insua, the daughter of the head of the Dallas Cuban Relief Committee. Connell mentioned to Insua what her other friend had said about Ruby being in her law office. (722) In- sua, Connell said, happened to have a class of American children to whom she was teaching Spanish. (723) In that class, she got into a dis- cussion of the Kennedy assassination and mentioned that she knew someone who knew someone who had some dealings with Ruby. (724) It also happened that there was a son of a local FBI agent in Insua’s class.(125) That was how the FBI subseauently came to contact. Con- nell and learn about the Odio incident. (726) 29 (97) Bb, Feeaure netther POR on? the witornes, Grek ig cnet =, d'h . ft veeall wher ovey Gent ng he ae 0. ie {; tu wt bani 2) Baie Roch, Maa Boe Peeerde oo (he p warn Be Cre wet 4 FS aero orn neater Mower oo Wed ial CHMEY tyr Am : £707) “eee C8. Cetin deeett on, me isf2F) Sin Se f ot, Amato OAS Weveaw, 7. 2 III. ANTONIO VECIANA BLANCH (114) On March 2, 1976, a staff investigator from the office of U.S. Senator Richard S. Schweiker (Republican of Pennsylvania) inter- viewed Antonio Veciana Blanch, the founder and former leader of Alpha 66, at his home in Miami.(1) At the time, Senator Schweiker was a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and co- chairman of the Subcommittee on the John F. Kennedy Assassina- tion.(2) The staff investigator told Veciana that he was interested in the relationships between U.S. Government agencies and Cuban exile eroups; he did not specifically mention an interest in the Kennedy assassination.(?) During the course of that interview, Veciana re- vealed that from about mid-1960 through mid-1973 he had been directed and advised in his anti-Castro and anti-Communist activities by an American he knew as Maurice Bishop.(4) Veciana said that Bishop had guided him in planning assassination attempts on Premier Fidel Castro in Havana in 1961 and in Chile in 1971; that Bishop had directed him to organize Alpha 66 in 1962; and that Bishop, when breaking their relationship in 1978, had paid him $253,000 in cash for his services over the years. (5) (115) Veciana revealed further that at one meeting with Bishop in Dallas in late-August or September 1963, he saw with him a young man he later recognized as Lee Harvey Oswald. (6) (116) Veciana told Senator Schweiker’s investigator that he had not previously disclosed that information to anyone. (7) (117) The committee took an intense interest in the Veciana allega- tions. From Senator Schweiker, it obtained the complete files of his office’s investigation ;(8) it also conducted additional interviews with Veciana and other witnesses who might have had knowledge of Veciana or Bishop. Further, on April 25 and 26, 1978, Veciana was questioned under oath before the committee in executive session. (118) This effort developed the following general details of the relationship between Veciana and the American he knew only as Maurice Bishop: (119) To the best of Veciana’s recollection Maurice Bishop first approached him in Havana in the middle of 1960.(9) At the time, Veciana was employed in the Banco Financiero, owned by Julio Lobo, the “Sugar King” of Cuba.(/0) Veciana himself was well known, however, as president of the professional accountant’s association. (17) (120) Veciana said Bishop introduced himself with a business card which indicated he was with a construction firm headquartered in Belgium.(72) Although Veciana initially assumed he was a new bank customer, Bishop’s conversation with him soon focused on the Castro revolution. “He also made me aware of his concern regarding the Cuban Government leaning toward Communism and tried to impress on me the seriousness of the situation,” Veciana recalled. (77) (121) Bishop then invited Veciana to lunch and during that and (37) 08 subsequent lunches convinced Veciana to work against the Castro government. Veciana admittedly did not need much convincing because he himself had concluded only 30 days after the revolution that Castro was a Communist. (74) (122) Veciana said he did ask Bishop during their first meeting if he worked for the U.S. Government. “He told me at the time,” Veciana testified, “that he was in no position to let me know for whom he was working or for which agency he was doing this.” (75) Bishop also said he could not tell Veciana whether or not it was Julio Lobo who sug- gested he contact him. “Supposedly Julio Lobo had very important contacts with the U.S. Government,” Veciana pointed out.(/6) Veciana, however, later suspected that it might have been another very close friend, Rufo Lopez-Fresquet, who led Bishop to him.(77) Lopez- Fresquet, although then Castro’s Minister of Finance, was a covert anti-Castroite. (18) : (123) Once Veciana agreed to work with Bishop on anti-Castro activity, he was put into a “training program.” (19) Veciana described this as a “2 to 3 week” program which consisted of nightly lectures. He was the only one in the program, which was conducted by a man he knew only as “Mr. Melton.” The lectures were held in an office in a building, which Veciana could recall as being on El Vedado, a com- mercial thoroughfare. He also remembered the building housed the offices of a mining company “with an American name” and, on the first floor, a branch of the Berlitz School of Languages. (20) (124) Although Veciana said he was given some training in the use of explosives and sabotage techniques, most of the program consisted of lessons in propaganda and psychological warfare. “Bishop told me several times * * * that psychological warfare could help more than hundreds of soldiers, thousands of soldiers,” Veciana testified. (27) Veciana also said: “The main purpose was to train me to be an organizer so I was supposed to initiate a type of action and other people would be the ones who would really carry it out.” (22) (125) Following the training, Veciana worked with Bishop on several very effective psychological warfare operations, including a program that resulted in the destabilization of the Cuban currency and the creation of public distrust in its value.(23) Meanwhile, Veciana also became chief of sabotage for the Movimiento Revolu- cionario del Pueblo (MRP), an anti-Castro group head by Manuel Ray. (24) (126) Before the American Embassy in Cuba was closed in Janu- ary 1961, Bishop suggested to, Veciana that he go there and contact certain officials for help in his anti-Castro activity. Veciana said the names suggested by Bishop were “Smith,” “Sam Kail,” and a CIA employee. Said Veciana: “Maurice Bishop suggested the names of these individuals because we needed specific weapons to carry out the jobs and he told me that these were the people that could help me.” (25) Veciana, however, also said that Bishop asked him not to reveal his name to these people. (26) (127) Veciana has never assumed that Maurice Bishop was a true name. At one of their early meetings in Havana, Veciana noticed a Belgian passport which Bishop had in his open briefcase. Examin- ing it when Bishop left the room briefly, Veciana made a quick note oY of it on a scrap of paper. Veciana kept that scrap of paper and showed it to Senator Schweiker’s investigator. The name on the paper was “Frigault.” (27) (128) A few months after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, Bishop called Veciana to a meeting. According to Veciana: “At that time Bishop decided that the only thing left to be done was to have an attempt on Castro’s life.” (28) Although Veciana himself did not participate in the attempt, he recruited the action men and organized the operation, including renting the apart- ment from which the shot was to be fired.(29) The day before the actual attempt, however, Veciana escaped from Cuba by boat with his mother-in-law, in whose name the apartment had been rented. (30) His wife and children had left a few months prior. According to Veciana, it was Bishop who urged him to leave because, he said, Castro’s agents were becoming suspicious of Veciana’s activities. (37) (129) Shortly after he settled in Miami, Veciana testified, Bishop again contacted him.(32) Veciana said it would have been easy for anyone to locate him in the close-knit Cuban exile community in Miami.(33) The result of their reestablishing contact eventually led to the founding of Alpha 66 which, according to Veciana, was Bishop’s brainchild. “Bishop’s main thesis was that Cuba had to be liberated by Cubans,” Veciana testified.(24) Veciana established himself as the civilian chief and principal fundraiser for Alpha 66 and recruited the former head of the Second National Front of the Escambre (SNFE), Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, as the military chief.(35) Menoyo had a reputation among Cuban exiles of being socialistic and Bishop had some doubts about his loyalty, but Veciana insisted that Menoyo could be trusted. Besides, he said, “if he did not work out right we could get rid of him.” (36) Veciana said that Menoyo was not aware of the existence of Maurice Bishop. (180) Alpha 66 became one of the most active of the anti-Castro exile groups, buying guns and boats, recruiting and training commandos, and conducting numerous raids on Cuba.(37) At one point, Veciana proclaimed a war chest of $100,000 and announced that all the major exile organizations were backing Alpha 66’s efforts. He also said pub- licly that all the planning was being done by leaders “I don’t even know.” (38) (131) According to Veciana, the man behind all of Alpha 66’s strat- egy was Maurice Bishop. Over the 12-year period of their association, Veciana estimated he met with Bishop more than 100 times. (39) Veci- ana, however, claimed he had no way of getting in touch with Bishop and that all the meetings were instigated by Bishop, a procedure Bishop established early in their relationship.(40) To set up a meet- ing, Bishop would call Veciana by telephone, or, if Veciana was out of town, call a third person whom Veciana trusted, someone who always knew his location.(47) Veciana said that this third person never met Bishop but “knew that Bishop and I were partners in this fight because this person shared my anti-Communist feelings.” (42) (132) Besides contacts with Bishop in Havana and Miami, Veciana also had meetings with him in Dallas, Washington, Las Vegas, and Puerto Rico and in Caracas, Lima, and La Paz in South America. (43) (133) Veciana specifically recalled some meetings with Bishop be- 40 cause of their special nature. For instance, shortly after reestablishing contact with him in Miami, Bishop took Veciana to an office in the Pan American Bank Building in the downtown section of the city. (44) Veciana did not recall the exact floor of the building nor if there was any name on the office door.(45) Bishop unlocked the office with a key and, in the presence of two men who were in the office, asked him to sign a piece of paper and take part in a “commitment” ceremony. (446) “It was like a pledge of my loyalty, a secret pledge,” Veciana testified. “T think they wanted to impress on me my responsibility and my commitment to the cause.” (47) Veciana could not identify the two men who were present with Bishop at this ceremony, nor did he recall if he was introduced to them. “They were like spectators,” he said. (48) (134) From August 1968 until June 1972, Veciana worked in La Paz, Bolivia, as a banking adviser to Bolivia’s Central Bank.(49) His con- tracts were financed by the U.S. Agency for International Develop- ment, (50) and his office was located in the passport division of the American Embassy.(57) Veciana believed that Bishop was instrumen- tal in his getting the AID job, because he himself was surprised that the Agency would hire a known “terrorist” and anti-Castro acti- vist.(52) The records indicated that Veciana was hired by the Agency even though his application was never signed. (53) (135) While supposedly employed as a banking adviser in Bolivia, Veciana actually did very little such work, but instead was engaged mostly in anti-Castro and anti-Communist activities with Bishop. (54) Among the operations instigated bv Bishop at the time was an attempt to assassinate Castro in Chile in 1971.(55) (136) According to Veciana, that aborted assassination attempt even- tually led to the dissolution of his relationship with Bishop.(46) AJ- though Bishop directed the operation and provided Veciana with intelligence information,(57) Veciana himself recruited anti-Castro Cuban associates in Caracas to take part in the attempt.(58) Without his knowledge, Veciana said, these associates introduced a new element into the plan, a scheme to blame the assassination on certain Russian agents in Caracas. (59) The associates even produced phony documents and photographs.(60) When Bishop later found out about this un- authorized part of the scheme, he was extremely unset and aceused Veciana of being part of it.(67) Although Veciana told Bishop he had no knowledge of it, Bishop apparently did not believe him and even- tually suggested that their relationship he terminated. (62) (187) On July 26, 1973, Bishop arranged for Veciana to meet with him in the parking lot of the Flacler Dog Track in Miami.(62) When Veciana arrived, Bishop was waiting for him with two younger men in an automobile.(64) At that time Bishop gave Veciana a suitease which, Veciana later ascertained, contained $253.000 in cash.(65) Since, at the beginning of their relationship. Veciana had refused Bishop’s offer to pay him for his work with him, the lump sum pay- ment, was meant as compensation for his efforts over the years. (66) (138) The committee’s interest in the relationship between Antonio Veciana and Maurice Bishop is. of course, predicated on Veciana’s con- tention that he saw Bishop with Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas a few months before the assassination of John F. Kennedy. (139) Veciana could not specifically pinpoint the date of that meet- 41 ing with Bishop. He believed it was in Jate August 1963.(67’) Over the ears that he knew Bishop, Veciana had at least five meetings with him in Dallas.(68) The meeting at which Oswald was present took place in the lobby of a large office building in the downtown section of the city, perhaps a bank or an insurance building with a blue facade or lobby.(69) When Veciana arrived for the meeting, Bishop was there talking with Oswald. Veciana does not recall whether he was intro- duced to Oswald by name, but said he did not have any conversation with him.(70) Oswald remained with Bishop and Veciana only for a brief time as they walked toward a nearby coffee shop. Oswald then departed and Bishop and Veciana continued their meeting alone. (77) (140) Veciana testified that he recognized the young man with Bishop as Lee Harvey Oswald after seeing photographs of him fol- lowing the Kennedy assassination.(72) There was absolutely no doubt in his mind that the man was Oswald, not just someone who resembled him. Veciana pointed out that he had been trained to remember the physical characteristics of people and that if it was not Oswald it was his “exact” double. (73) (141) Veciana’s next meeting with Bishop was in Miami about 2 months after the assassination of President Kennedy.(74) Although they discussed the assassination in general, Veciana did not specifi- eally ask him about Oswald. “I was not going to make the mistake of getting myself involved in something that did not concern me,” he testified. (75) Also, he said, “That was a very difficult situation because I was afraid. We both understood. I could guess that he knew that T was knowledgeable of that and I learned that the best wav is not to know, not to get to know things that don’t concern you, so I respected the rules and I didn’t mention that ever.” (76) (142) Bishop himself, however, did suggest to Veciana the possibil- ity of some involvement. At the time there were newspaper reports that Oswald had met with some Cubans during his visit to Mexico. Veciana said that Bishop was aware that he had a relative, Guillermo Ruiz, who was a high-ranking officer in Castro’s intelligence service stationed in Mexico City.(77) Bishop told Veciana that if he could get in touch with Ruiz, he would pay Ruiz a large amount of money to say publicly that it was him and his wife who had met with Oswald.(78) Veciana agreed to make the attempt to contact Ruiz because, as he testified, “T knew that Ruiz would be tempted with money; he liked money.” (79) Veciana, however, was never successful in contacting Ruiz, and when he mentioned it to Bishop a couple of months later, Bishop told him to forget it.(80) That was the last time Veciana ever spoke about the Kennedy assassination or Lee Harvey Oswald to Bishop, and. he testified, he never told anyone about seeing Oswald until questioned by Senator Schweiker’s investigator. (87) (143) In assessing Veciana’s testimony, the committee made an at- tempt to evaluate his general credibility and, concurrently, take the necessary steps to determine if there was a Maurice Bishop or someone using that name and, if there was, with whom he was associated. (144) The timing and circumstances of that initial interview with Veciana by Senator Schweiker’s investigator is a factor in determin- ing his credibility.(82) Two weeks prior ot the interview, Veciana had been released from the Federal penitentiary in Atlanta after serving A‘) 27 months on a narcotics conspiracy conviction. (83) Veciana, although having served his time, insisted he was innocent, but claimed that the case against him was so well fabricated that the Federal prosecutor actually believed he was guilty.(84) According to Senator Schweiker’s investigator, Veciana appeared confused and frightened by the situ- ation in which he found himself, but said he believed that in some way his legal problems were related to his previous association with Bishop, although he did not know exactly how.(85) The investigator speculated that Veciana felt that by revealing his association with Bishop to an official representative of the U.S. Government, he would be providing himself with an element of security.(86) Much later, however, Veciana apparently changed his position and decided that Castro agents, not Bishop, were responsible for his drug arrest. (87) This charge was inconsistent with information provided to the com- mittee by one of Veciana’s closest associates, who said that Veciana told him that he thought the CTA framed him because he wanted to go ahead with another plot to kill Castro.(88) This associate, Prof. Rufo Lopez-Fresquet, Castro’s former Minister of Finance, however, said he was not aware that Veciana had had any association with anyone like Maurice Bishop and that he, himself, could not identify Bishop. (89) (145) The committee conducted numerous interviews of other key anti-Castro associates or former associates of Veciana, not only as part of its efforts to locate Bishop but also to further aid in assessing Veci- ana’ credibility Generally Veciana’s reputation for honesty and integ- rity was excellent. A former associate, who worked with him when Veciana was chief of sabotage for the MRP in Havana, said “Veciana was the straightest, absolutely trustworthy, most honest person I ever met. I would trust him explicitly.” (90) Still, not one of his associ- ates—neither those who worked with him in anti-Castro activity in Cuba nor those who were associated with him in Alpha 66—said they were aware of any American directing Veciana or of anyone who had the characteristics ef Maurice Bishop. (146) Nevertheless, there were many aspects of Veciana’s story that the evidence does corroborate. Veciana’s claim, for instance, that he was the principal organizer of the attempt on Castro’s life in Havana in October 1961, was documented in a Cuban newspaper report at the time.(97) Early in their relationship in Miami, Bishop asked Veciana to monitor the activities of an anti-Castro operation called “Cellula Fantasma.” (92) Veciana said he attended a few meetings of the group and described the operation as a leaflet-dropping mission over Cuba which involved known soldier-of-fortune Frank Fiorini Sturgis. (93) Veciana said he did not know why Bishop would have been interested in the operation, but the committee reviewed files which confirmed the existence and mission of the group, and the involvement of Frank Fiorini Sturgis at the time. (94) (147) While Veciana was still in Cuba, among those at the American Embassy Bishop suggested he contact for aid in anti-Castro operations was a Col. Sam Kail.(95) The committee ascertained that there was a Col. Samuel G. Kail at the American Embassy in Havana in 1960 at the time Veciana said he contacted him. Kail, now retired, was located and interviewed in Dallas. 43 (148) Colonel Kail served as the U.S. Army attaché at the US. Embassy in Havana from June 3, 1958, until the day the Embassy closed, January 4, 1961.(96) His primary mission as a military attaché was that of intelligence.(97) Later, in February 1962, he was trans- ferred to Miami where he was in charge of the unit that debriefed newly arrived Cuban refugees. Although he reported directly to the Chief of Army Intelligence in Washington, Kail said he assumed his unit was actually functioning for the CIA. “I suspect they paid our bills,” he said. (98) (149) Kail said that prior to the American Embassy closing in Havana, there was a “constant stream” of Cubans coming through his office with anti-Castro schemes, including assassination plans, asking for American assistance in the form of weapons or guarantees of escaping. “We had hordes and hordes of people through there all the time,” he said. For that reason, he said, he did not specifically remem- ber Veciana visiting him. “I think it would be a miracle if I could recall him,” he said, but does not discount the possibility that he did meet him. (99) (150) Kail said, however, agents of the CIA would frequently use the names of other Embassy staff personnel in their outside contacts without notifying the staff individual it was being done.(100) It hap- pened “a number of times”; he said that a Cuban would come in and ask to see Colonel Kail and, when introduced to him, tell him that he was not the Colonel Kail he had met outside the Embassy.(707) Kail said he would then have the Cuban point out the CIA agent who had used his name. (702) (151) Kail said he was not familiar with a Maurice Bishop, nor had he ever heard of anyone using that name. (103) (152) Another aspect of Veciana’s story that the committee examined closely was his alleged involvement in the assassination attempt on Castro in Chile in 197i. Ina report given to Senator George McGovern in 1975, Castro provided information detailing the plot and accused “counterrevolutionaries from Alpha 66” as coconspirators.(/04) Veci- ana himself, however, was not specifically mentioned. Nevertheless, the committee probed the anti-Castro Cuban community in Miami and found that Veciana’s involvement in the plot was known by many of the active exiles. Max Lesnik, editor and publisher of Replica, the most prominent Spanish-language weekly publication in the commu- nity, said he was aware of Veciana’s involvement in the assassination attempt at the time.(705) He said, however, that Veciana told him that it was “his own plan,” and did not mention the involvement of a Maurice Bishop.(706) Lesnik could not identify Bishop but said he always did think that Veciana must have had “some high Government contacts, probably CIA.” (707) (153) The committee also attempted to confirm Vecianas’ role in the Chile plot by locating two other anti-Castro Cubans allegedly involved with him. They were interviewed in Caracas, Venezuela, but, because they are not U.S. citizens, they could not be subpenaed for sworn statements. (154) One of those named was Lucilo Pena. A Cuban-born graduate of Auburn University in Georgia, Pena is now a Venezuelan citizen and a sales manager for a large chemical firm. He has lived in Vene- zuela since 1961. (708) df (155) Although Pena denied any involvement in the Castro assassi- nation plot in Chile, he admitted to knowing Veciana since 1964 or 1965,” when he was active in Alpha 66’s “Plan Omega,” a plot to in- vade Cuba from a base in the Dominican Republic.(209) He said he first met Veciana through a friend, Secundino Alverez, who was the Caracas chapter leader of Alpha 66.(110) (Alverez was among those named by Veciana as also being involved in the Chile plot.) (777) Pena admitted he had been in contact with Veciana during the period the Chile plot was being planned but, he said, their meetings were only casual, usually at boxing matches which Veciana promoted. (/7/2) Pena also admitted that Veciana may have discussed the possibility of assassinating Castro with him during one of these encounters at the boxing matches. “I think he asked some help in raising money,” Pena said, “but that’s all I know about that.”(772) Pena denied any knowledge or involvement in any plot to blame Russian agents for the planned Castro assassination in Chile. “I am not the type to do that kind of counterintelligence work,” he said. “I am too open and honest.” (714) (156) Pena, however, admitted to knowing, perhans since 1963, Luis Posada, another anti-Castro Cuban in Caracas, who Veciana claims was involved in the plot to kill Castro in Chile. (775) (157) The committee interviewed Luis Posada in the Venezuelan political prison. Cuartel San Carlos, in Caracas. Posada had been arrested in October 1976, along with well-known anti-Castro Cuban terrorist Orlando Bosch, and indicted for being involved in the bomb- ing of a Cubana Airlines plane in which 73 persons were killed. (776) (158) Posada had earlier been linked with assassination plots against Cuban officials in Chile, including two who disappeared in August 1976.(117) (159) Posada’s background as a military and intelligence operative is eclectic. He was a member of Brigade 2506, but he did not take part in the Bay of Pigs landing. (778) In 1963, he joined the T7.S. Army and was commissioned a, first lieutenant. (779) He resigned his com- mission in 1964. (720) He went to Venezuela in 1967 and shortly after- wards joined the Venezuelan secret police, called DISTP, the Direccion de los Servicios de Inteligencia v Prevencion. (727) From 1971 to 1973, he was chief of operations of the General Division of Security for DISTP, which included counterintelligence.(722) He resigned from DISIP in 1973 and went to Washington, D.C. to take training from what he termed “a private company” in the field of lie detection. (723) He then returned to Caracas to open his own nrivate detective agency. (160) Posada told committee investigators that he was not involved in the Castro assassination attempt in Chile in 1971. (724) He admitted that he knew Veciana but said he onlv met him twice, once in Miami and once in Caracas at the boxing matches. (125) He said he did talk to Veciana about the time the Chile plot was being planned, but Ve- ciana never mentioned anything to him about it. (726) | (161) Another aspect of Veciana’s allegations that were of interest to the committee was Bishop’s suggestion of developing a misinforma- tion scheme involving a Castro intelligence agent and Oswald. (127) Veciana said that Bishop knew that a relative of his was in the Cuban 45 Intelligence service assigned to Mexico City at the time of the Ken- nedy assassination. (128) According to Veciana, a news story was cir- culating immediately after the assassination that Oswald had met a couple on the Mexican border while on his way to Mexico City prior to the assassination. (129) Bishop, Veciana said, suggested he attempt to get in touch with his relative and offer him a bribe to say that it was he and his wife who met Oswald in Mexico. (130) Veciana said he was never able to get in touch with his relative about it and eventually Bishop told him to forget it. (737) (162) Veciana’s relative, Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez, was, in fact, a relative by marriage, the husband of a first cousin to Veciana. (132) Veciana said he first learned of Ruiz’s affiliation with Castro’s intelh- gence service shortly after Castro took power. He and Ruiz were walk- ing in a Havana park when they were stopped and searched by Castro’s police. Ruiz was found to be carrying a gun and was taken away. Con- cerned, Veciana immediately placed a call to a close friend inside Cas- tro’s government, Minister of Finance Rufo Lopez-Fresquet. Lopez- Fresquet told Veciana not to worry about Ruiz because Ruiz was actu- ally working for the intelligence service. (133) (168) Although Ruiz was a Castro agent and Communist he warned Veciana that he was being observed visiting the American Embassy in Havana and told him to be careful.(724) That was why Veciana later thought that he might be able to turn Ruiz into an anti-Castro agent. Some time after the Kennedy assassination, Veciana said he was ap- proached by another anti-Castro Cuban named Robert Vale. (735) Vale asked Veciana to attempt to contact Ruiz about possibly becoming an asset for the CIA.(136) Ruiz, at the time, was stationed in Spain, and when Veciana found a friend, Roblejo Lorie, who was traveling to Spain, he asked him to carry a letter to Ruiz. Lorie gave the letter to Ruiz but, according to Veciana, Ruiz tore the letter up in front of Lorie and told him that he did not want to have any contact with Veciana because he knew Veciana “was working for the CIA.” (137) (164) The committee was able to interview Orestes Guillermo Ruiz in Havana.(738) Ruiz acknowledged that he was related to Veciana through marriage.(739) He said that “everyone in Cuba” knows that Veciana is associated with the CIA and was involved in assassination attempts on Castro.(/40) He said, however, aside from what he read in the American newspapers, he has no knowledge of Veciana’s asso- ciation with Maurice Bishop or who Maurice Bishop could be.(747) He said he was never contacted by Veciana about Oswald(/42) and, in fact, has not seen Veciana since 1959. (743) (165) Ruiz expressed disdain for Veciana, said he considered him a coward(744) and ‘ta person you cannot believe.” He said Veciana had personality problems and was under psychiatric care from the time he was 16 years old until he was 21.(745) Ruiz said that “another counterrevolutionary,” a cousin of Veciana’s who is a doctor “in Miami or Chicago” and whose name is Jose Veciana, could attest to Veciana’s psychiatric problems because he had advised the family about them. (746) (166) Committee investigators located Dr. Jose Veciana in Martin, Tenn., where he was chief of pathology at Volunteer General Hospital. He confirmed that he is a first cousin to Antonio Veciana and that he 43-944—79——_4 Af had known him when he was a child in Havana.(147) Dr. Veciana said he has never known his cousin to have personality problems or to have ever been under psychiatric care. He said he himself has never pro- vided Veciana any psychiatric advice nor offered it to his family. (748) He said he believed that Veciana must be of sound mental condition because he knows that Veciana had to undergo vigorous tests in his rise in the banking business. (749) (167) Veciana himself denied Ruiz’ allegations that he had had psy- chiatric problems as a young man. His. mother confirmed his denial. (250) THE SEARCH FOR BISHOP (168) One of the factors utilized in the committee’s efforts to locate Maurice Bishop was the description of him provided by Veciana. When he first met him in 1960, Veciana said, Bishop was about 45 years old, about 6 feet, 2 inches tall, weighed over 200 pounds, and was athletically built. He had gray-blue eyes, light brown hair, and a light complexion.(J5/) Veciana said, however, that Bishop appeared to spend much time outdoors or in sunny climate because he was usually well tanned and there was some skin discoloration, like sun spots, under his eyes.(152) He appeared to be meticulous about his dress and usually concerned about his weight and diet.(753) In the latter years that Veciana knew him, Bishop began using glasses for reading. (154) (169) Shortly after he revealed his Bishop relationship to Senator Schweiker’s investigator, Veciana aided a professional artist in devel- oping a composite sketch of Bishop. Schweiker’s office provided the committee with a copy of the sketch. Veciana told the committee that he considered the artist’s composite sketch of Bishop a “pretty good” resemblance. (756) (170) Prior to the committee’s efforts, Senator Schweiker’s office, as well as the Senate subcommittee he headed, looked into certain as- ects of Veciana’s allegations. Schweiker, for instance, requested the eloian Embassy to conduct a record check for information about a passport issued under the name of “Frigault.” The Belgian Embassy said that, without additional identifying information, it could not help.(256) In addition, Schweiker’s investigator showed Veciana numerous photographs of individuals who may have used the name of Bishop, among them Oswald’s friend, George de Mohrenschildt, who was then a teacher at Bishop College in Dallas. The results were negative. (757) (171) It was Senator Schweiker who focused the committee’s atten- tion to David Atlee Phillips, former chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA Deputy Directorate of Operations, as perhaps having knowledge of Maurice Bishop. Immediately after receiving the Bishop sketch, Schweiker concluded that Phillips, who had earlier testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, bore a strong resemblance to the sketch. (172) When Veciana was shown a photograph of David Phillips by Schweiker’s investigator, he did not provide an absolutely con- clusive response.(758) For that reason, it was decided that Veciana be given the opportunity to observe Phillips in person.(/59) Schweiker arranged for Veciana to be present at a luncheon meeting A’7 t of the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers in Reston, Va., on September 17, 1976.(160) Phillips was one of the founders of the association. Veciana was introduced to Phillips prior to the luncheon. (767) He was introduced by name but not by affiliation with Alpha 66 or involvement with anti-Castro activity.(762) According to Schweiker’s investigator, there was no indication of recognition on Phillips’ part.(763) Following the luncheon, Veciana had the op- portunity to speak with Phillips in Spanish.(/64) Veciana asked Phillips if he was in Havana in 1960 and if he knew Julio Lobo. (165) Phillips answered both questions affirmatively and then asked Veciana to repeat his name.(/66) Veciana did and then asked, “Do you know my name?” Phillips said he did not.(767) Phillips was asked if Ve- ciana was on Schweiker’s staff.(768) He was told that he was not, but that Veciana was helping Schweiker in his investigation of the Ken- nedy assassination. (/69) Phillips declined to be interviewed by Sena- tor Schweiker’s investigator, but said he would be happy to speak with any Congressman or congressional representative “in Congress.” (170) Following the encounter of Veciana and Phillips, Schweiker’s investi- gator asked Veciana if David Phillips was Maurice Bishop.(177Z) Veciana said he was not. (772) (173) Schweiker’s investigator expressed some doubt about Veciana’s credibility on the point, however, because of Veciana’s renewed in- terest in continuing his anti-Castro operations and his expressed de- sire to recontact Bishop to help him.(773) In addition, Schweiker’s investigator expressed doubt that David Phillips, who was once in charge of Cuban operations for the CLA and whose career was deeply entwined in anti-Castro operations, could not recognize the name of Veciana as being the founder and vociferous public spokesman for one of tt qn and most active anti-Castro Cuban groups, Alpha 66.(174 (174) The committee considered other factors in examining Phillips, including his principal area of expertise and operations until 1963. (175) In 1960, when Veciana said he first met Bishop in Havana, Phillips was serving as a covert cperative in Havana.(776) From 1961 to 1963, Phillips was Chief of Covert Action in another relevant country. When Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City in 1968, Phillips was also in charge of Cuban operations for the CIA in same country. Phillips had earlier lived in and had numer- ous associations in another relevant country.(777) He had also served as chief of station in several other places of general relevance. (178) (175) The committee developed other information that further gave support to an interest in Phillips in relation to Bishop. In Miami, its investigators interviewed a former career agent for the CIA, who for present purposes will be called Ron Cross. From September 1960 until November 1962, Cross was a case officer at the CIA’s JM/WAVE station, the operational base which coordinated the Agency’s activities with the anti-Castro exiles.(779) He handled one of the largest and most active anti-Castro groups.(/80) At the time that Cross was at the Miami JM/WAVE station, David Phillips was responsible for certain aspects of the CIA’s anti-Castro operations. Cross coordinated these operations with Phillips, who would occasionally visit the JM/WAVE station from Washington.(187) Generally, however, 48 Cross worked with Phillips’ direct assistant at the station, who used the cover name of Doug Gupton. (176) Inhis book about his role in the Bay of Pigs operation, former CLA officer IX. Howard Hunt used a pseudonym when referring to the chief of the operation. (782) The chief of propaganda was David Phillips. Hunt called him “Knight.” (783) (177) When asked by the committee if he was familiar with anyone using the cover name of Bishop at the JM/WAVE station, Cross said he was “almost positive” that David Phillips-had used the cover name of Maurice Bishop. (/&4) He said he was “fairly sure” that Hunt himself had used the cover name of Knight. (785) Cross said, however,, that the reason he was certain that Philips used the name of Bishop was because he recalled sometimes discussing field and agent problems with Phillips’ assistant, Doug Gupton, and Gupton often saying,. “Well, I guess Mr. Bishop will have to talk with him.” Cross said: “And, of course, I knew he was referring to his boss, David Phillips.” (186) (178) The committee ascertained that the cover name of Doug Gup- ton was used at the JM/WAVE station by a former CIA employee.. (179) The committee staff interviewed Doug Gupton on August 22,. 1978, at CLA headquarters. (787)Gupton said he worked for the CLA. from December 1951 until his retirement. (788) Gupton confirmed that he was in charge of a special operations staff at the Miami JM/ WAVE station and that his immediate superior was David Phillips. (789) Gupton acknowledged that Ron Cross (cover name) was a case officer who worked for him and that he saw Cross on a daily basis. (790) Gupton said he did not recall whether E. Howard Hunt or David Phillips ever used the name of “Knight.” (797) He said he does not re- call Phillips ever using the name of Maurice Bishop.(/92) When told about Cross’ recollection of him referring to Phillips as “Mr. Bishop,” Gupton said: “Well, maybe I did. I don’t remember.’ (793) He also said, however, that he never heard the name of Bishop while he was stationed in Miami.(/94) When shown the sketch of Bishop, he said it did not look ke anyone he knew. (/95) (180) Explaining his working relationship with David Phillips, Gupton said he was in contact with him regularly in Washineton by telephone and cable, and that Phillips visited Miami “quite often.” (196) Gupton said, however, that there were two sets of operations. Ilis set of operations was run out of Miami and he kept Phillips in- formed of them. Phillips ran another set of operations personally out of Washington and, Gupton said, Phillips did not keep him briefed about them.(797) Gupton also said he knew that Phillips used many of his old contacts from Havana in his personal operations. (798) (181) David Atlee Phillips testified before the committee in execu- tive session on April 25, 1978. He said he never used the name Maurice Bishop. (799) He said he did not know of anyone in the CLA who used the name Maurice Bishop.(200) He said he had seen Antonio Veciana only twice in his life, the second time the morning of his hearing before the committee when Veciana, who had testified earlier, emerged from the hearing room while he, Phillips, was in the hallway. (20/) Phillips said the first time he met Veciana was at a meeting of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers in Reston.(202) He said 49 that Veciana was brought to that meeting by an investigator from Senator Schweiker’s office but, said Phillips, Veciana was not intro- duced to him by name but only as “the driver.” (203) He said Veciana asked him some questions in Spanish, but at the time he did not know who Veciana was or why Senator Schweiker’s office had sent him to the meeting. (204) (182) Phillips also testified that he had never used the name Frigault and had never used a Belgian passport. (205) (183) Phillips was shown the sketch of Maurice Bishop but could not identify it as anyone he knew. He said, however, “It looks hke me.” (206) (184) In sworn testimony before the committee in executive session on April 26, 1978, Antonio Veciana said that David Atlee Phillips is not the person he knew as Maurice Bishop.(207) He said, however, that there was a “physical similarity.” (208) (185) On March 2, 1978, the committee requested the CIA to check all its files and index references pertaining to Maurice Bishop. (209) On March 31, 1978, the CIA informed the committee that its Office of the Inspector General, its Office of the General Counsel, its Office of Personnel, and the Deputy Directorate of Operations had no record of a Maurice Bishop. (2/0) (186) On August 10, 1978, B. H., a former covert operative of the CIA, was interviewed by the committee in a special closed session. (277) B. H. was a CIA agent from 1952 to 1970.(212) Between 1960 and 1964 he was assigned to Cuban operations.(273) As such, he test1i- fied, he was involved in “day-to-day” operations with David Atlee Phillips. He characterized Phillips as “an excellent intelligence offi- cer” and “a personal friend.” (274) (187) When asked if he knew an individual named Maurice Bishop, B. H. said: “Again, Mr. Bishop was in the organization but I had no personal day-to-day open relationship with him, Phillips, yes; Bishop, no. I knew them both.” (275) (188) Although he couldn’t describe Bishop’s physical characteris- tics, B. H. said he had seen him “two or three times” (2/6) in the “hall- ways or cafeteria” (2/7), at CIA headquarters in Langley. B. H. said he thought Bishop worked in the Western Hemisphere Division (278) and that he had a position “higher than me.”(279) He could not be more specific. The two or three times he saw Bishop, he said, was be- tween 1960 and 1964 when he himself was in Cuban operations, al- though, he said, he did not know if Bishop worked in that area also. (220) (189) Asked how, if he did not personally know Bischop, he knew the person he saw at CIA headquarters was Maurice Bishop, B. H. said: “Someone might have said, ‘That is Maurice Bishop,’ and it was euny 2 from Dave Phillips or Joseph Langosch guys that I know.” 927) (190) When shown the sketch of Maurice Bishop, however, B. H. could not identify it as anyone he recognized. (191) On August 17, 1978, the committee deposed John A. McCone, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from October 1961 until April 30, 1965. (222) 50 (192) During the course of the deposition, the following questions. and answers were recorded : Q. Do you know or did you know Maurice Bishop? A. Yes. Q. Was he an agency employee$ A. I believe so. Q. Do you know what his duties were in 1963 # ALN: Q. For instance, do you know whether Maurice Bishop worked in the Western Hemisphere Division or whether he worked in some other division of the CIA ? A.I do not know. I do not recall. I knew at that time but I do not recall. Q. Do you know whether Maurice Bishop used any pseudonyms ¢ A. No; Ido not know that. (223) (198) In view of the information developed in the interviews with B. H. and former Director McCone, the committee asked the CIA to renew its file search for any files or index references pertaining to Bishop. (224). It also asked for a written statement from the CIA indicating whether an individual using either the true name or pseu- donym of Maurice Bishop has ever been associated in any capacity with the CIA. (225) (194) A reply was received on September 8, 1978, from the CIA’s Office of Legislative Counsel indicating that all true name files, alias files and pseudonym files were again checked and, again, proved nega- tive. “No person with such a name has a connection with CIA,” said the reply.(226) Added the Agency: “Quite frankly, it 1s our belief— from our earlier check, reinforced by this one—that such a man did not exist, so far as CIA connections are concerned.” (227) (195) Additional efforts to locate Maurice Bishop were made by the committee in file requests to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (228) and to the Department of Defense.(229) Both proved negative. (230) (196) Although file reviews of Maurice Bishop proved negative, the *On October 19, 1978, the committee’s chief counsel received a letter from the principal coordinator in the CIA’s Office of Legislative Counsel. The letter said, in part: “This is to advise you that I have interviewed Mr. McCone and a retired employee concerning their recollections about an alleged CIA employee reportedly using the name of Maurice Bishop. * * * “We assembled photographs of the persons with the surname of Bishop who had mployment relationships of some type with CIA during the 1960’s, to see if either Mr. McCone or the employee would recognize one of them. “Mr. MeCone did not feel it necessary to review those photographs, stating that I should inform you that he had been inerror. * * * “The employee continues to recall a person of whom he knew who was known as Maurice Bishop. He cannot state the organizational connection or responsibili- ties of the individual, not knowing him personally, and feels that the person in question was pointed out to him by someone, perhaps a secretary. He is unable, however, to recognize any of the photographs mentioned above. * * * “In summary, Mr. McCone withdraws his statements on this point. The employeee continues to recall such a name, but the nature of his recollection is not very clear or precise. We still believe that there is no evidence of the exist- ence of such a person so far as there being a CIA connection. * * *” (J. F. K. Document No. 012722.) 51 committee learned that Army intelligence had an operational interest in Antonio Veciana during one period.(/97) Veciana was registered in the Army Information Source Registry trom November 1962 until July 1966. (231) (198) The nature of the Army’s contact with Veciana appeared to be limited to attempting to use him as a source of intelligence information about Alpha 66 activities, with Veciana, in turn, seeking to obtain weapons and funds.(232) Veciana acknowledged and detailed to the committee these contacts with Army intelligence and said that, aside from keeping Bishop informed of them, they had no relationship with his activities with Bishop. (233) (199) Given the Army’s acknowledgement of an interest in Veciana and Alpha 66, the committee made the assumption that the CIA may also have had an interest in Veciana and his Alpha 66 activities as part of its pervasive role in anti-Castro operations during the 1960's. (200) Ina review of its own files on March 15, 1978, the CLA noted that Veciana had contacted the Agency three times—in December 1960; July 1962; and April 1966—for assistance in plots against Castro.(234) According to the CIA: “Officers listened to Veciana, expressed no interest, offered no encouragement and never recontacted him on this matter. There has been no Agency relationship with Veciana.” (235) (201) The committee’s own review of the Agency’s files basically confirmed the stated conclusions about the meetings with Veciana in 1960 and 1966. A review of the files pertaining to 1962, however, revealed that on July 7, 1962, Veciana received $500 from a wealthy Puerto Rican financier and industrialist with whom the CIA had a longstanding operational relationship.(236) Although the files do not explicitly state whether the money originated with the CIA or the industrialist, and even though during this same period the Agency was using the Puerto Rican, it appears that in Veciana’s case the money was provided by the industrialist, and not by the Agency. (202) Finally, to locate or identify Maurice Bishop, the committee issued a press release on July 30, 1978 and made available to the media the composite sketch of Bishop. The sketch was part of a release of several other items, including two sketches and three photographs. The committee warned that it should not be assumed that the release indicated the committee believes the person in the sketch was involved in the Kennedy assassination, only that information resulting from possible citizen recognition of the sketch might “shed additional light on the assassination.” The committee asked that anyone who had infor- mation contact the committee by mail, not by telephone. (237) (203) By November 1, 1978, the committee received from the gen- eral public a total of four written responses relating to the Bishop sketch. The three photographs were identified, the two sketches were not. (238) (204) No definitive conclusion could be reached about the credibility of Antonio Veciana’s allegations regarding his relationship with a Maurice Bishop. Additionally. no definitive conclusions could be drawn as to the identity or affiliations of Bishop, if such an individual existed. While no evidence was found to discredit Veciana’s testimony, there was some evidence to support it, although none of it was con- O2 elusive. The available documentary record was sufficient to indicate that the U.S. Government’s intelligence community had a keen interest in Antonio Veciana during the early 1960’s and that he was willing to receive the financial support he needed for the military operations of his anti-Castro groups from those sources. From the files of these agencies, it thus appears reasonable that an association similar to the alleged Maurice Bishop story actually existed. But whether Veciana’s contact was really named Maurice Bishop, or if he was, whether he did all of the things Veciana claims, and if so, with which U.S. intelligence agency he was associated, could not be determined. No corroboration was found for Veciana’s alleged meeting with Lee Harvey Oswald. Submitted by: GAETON J. Fonzi, Investigator. REFERENCES (1) Interview of Antonio Veciana Blanch, Mar. 2, 1976, House Select Commit- tee on Assassinations, p. 1 (J. F. K. Document 012927) (hereinafter Veciana interview ). (2) “The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V,”’ Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing ‘Office, 1975) (Senate Rept. No. 94-755) (hereinafter Intelligence Committee Report, Book V). (3) Memorandum to Marston, Mar. 3, 1976, House Select Committee on Assassi- nations (J. F. K. Document 012924). (4) See ref. 1, Veciana interview, p. 4. (5) Ibid., see also pp. 1, 2, 5, 6. (6 Wdeat pit: (7) Id.‘at p. 37. (8) Letter from Senator Richard S. Schweiker, Dec. 14, 1976, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 000521). (9) See ref. 1, Veciana interview, p. 4. (10) “Sugar King a Many-Sided Man,” New York Times, July 20, 1958. (11) Executive session testimony of Antonio Veciana Blanch, Apr. 25, 1978, hearing before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (hereinafter Veciana session testimony). Cie) Ue. 0. (28510. at D770. (14) Id. at p.'5. (76) Id-at.pes. (16) 50. at p.. (17) Staff memorandum, Jan. 17, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassina- tions (J. F. K. Document 012922). (18) “My 14 Months With Castro,’ Rufo Lopez-Fresquet (World Publishing OF) ee as Ba (19) See ref. 11, Veciana testimony, executive session, p. 10. (20), 10, aU. UL, (21) Id. at p. 12. (22) Ibid. (23) Id. at p. 15. (24) Id. at p. 14. (25) Id. at p. 18. (26) Id. at p. 19. 27) Immunized testimony of Antonio Veciana Blanch, Apr. 26, 1978, Hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 68 (hereinafter Veciana immunized testimony). (28) See ref. 11, Veciana executive session testimony, p. 21. (29) See ref. 1, Veciana interview, p. 2. (30) Ibid. 53 (31) See ref. 11, Veciana executive session testimony, pp. 21, 59. (32) Id. at p. 22. (33) Id. at p. 26. (34) Id..at p. 25. (Ja)cld.atp..25. (36) Id. at p. 24. (37) U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 29, 1962, p. 40. (38) New York Times, Sept. 14, 1962, p. 13. (39) See ref. 27, Veciana immunized testimony, p. 72. (40) See ref. 11, Veciana executive session testimony, p. 27. (41) See ref. 27, Veciana immunized testimony, p. 88. (42) Ibid., p. 89. (43) Outside contact report, Aug. 30, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassi- nations (J. F. K. Document 011267). (44) See ref. 11, Veciana executive session testimony, p. 26. (45) Id. at p. 28. (46) Id. at p. 27. (47) Id. at p. 28. (48) Ibid. (49) Id. at p. 39. (50) Telegram, Department of State (J. F. K. Document 012920). (51) Ibid.; see also ref. 11, Veciana executive session testimony, pp. 88 and 40. (52) See ref. 1. Veciana interview. p. 5. (53) Telegram, Department of State (J. F. K. Document 012920). (54) See ref. 1. Veciana interview, p. 5. (55) See ref. 11, Veciana executive session testimony, p. 41. (56) See ref. 1, Veciana interview. (57) See ref. 27, Veciana immunized testimony, p. 55. (58) See ref. 11, Veciana executive session testimony, p. 42. (59) Ids at p. 48. (60) See ref. 1, Veciana interview, p. 9. (G1) Ibid. (62) See interview of Antonio Veciana Blanch. (63) Ibid. Mar. 11, 1976, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 012929). (64) Ibid. (65) See ref. 25, Veciana immunized testimony, p. 73. (66) See ref. 62, Veciana interview, p. 3. (67) Id. at p. 4. (68) See ref. 11, Veciana executive session testimony, p. 19. (69) Ibid ; see ref. 1, Veciana interview, p. 7. (70) Ibid. (71) See ref. 11, Veciana executive session testimony, pp. 24, 25. (72) Id. at p. 21. (73) See ref. 1, Veciana interview, p. 7. (74) See ref. 11, Veciana executive session testimony, p. 31. (75) Id. at pp. 28, 36. (76) Id. at pp. 29, 30. (77) Id. at p. 28. (78) Id. at p. 29. (79) Ibid. (80) Id. at p. 37. (81) Ibid. (82) See ref. 1, Veciana interview. (83) Ibid. (84) Memorandum to Marston, Mar. 4, 1976, House Select Committee on As- sassinations, p. 1 (J. F. K. Document 012923). (85) See ref. 1, Veciana interview, p. 10. (86) See ref. 84. (87) See ref. 11, Veciana executive session testimony, p. 9. (88) Staff interview with Lopez-Fresquet, May 19, 1977, House Select Commit-- tee on Assassinations, p. 13 (J. F. K. Document 001512). (89) Id. at p. 9. (90) Memorandum, July 27, 1976, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (J. F. K. Document 012919). 5d Uv (91) ‘‘Revolucién,” Nov. 7, 1961, p. 1. (92) See ref. 1, Veciana interview, p. 6. (93) Ibid. (94) CIA memorandum to FBI, Sept. 11, 1962 (Rorke pamphlet attachment). (95) See ref. 11, Veciana executive session testimony, p. 18. (96) Staff memorandum, Kail interview, July 24, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (J. F. K. Document 010307). (97) Ibid. (98) Id. at p. 5. (99) Id: atp. 2. (100) Ibid. (101) Ibid. (102) Ibid. (103) Id. at p. 4. (104) Castro report, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 000593). (105) Staff memorandum of Max Lesnik interview, May 30, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (J. F. K. Document 008888). (106) Ibid. (107) Ibid. (108) Staff memorandum of Lucilo Pena interview, June 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 009270). (109) Tbid. (110) Ibid. (111) See ref. 27, Veciana immunized testimony, p. 54. (112) See ref. 108. (113) Ibid. (114) Ibid. (115) Ibid. ; see also ref. 27, Veciana immunized testimony, p. 54. (116) Miami Herald, Oct. 16, 1976, p. 8. (117) FBI file No. 2—2173, section 6, serials 231. (118) Staff memorandum on Posada interview, June 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (J. F. K. Document 009412). (119) Id. at p. 2. (120) Ibid. (121) Ibid. (122) Ibid. (123) Ibid. (124) Ibid. (720)? Tdvat pel: (126) Id. at p. 3. (127) See ref. 11, Veciana Executive Session Testimony, pp. 28-30. (128) See ref. 1, Veciana interview, p. 8. (129) Ibid. (130) Ibid.; see ref. 11, Veciana executive session testimony, p. 28. (131) Ibid. (132) Staff interview of Orestes Guillermo Ruiz, Aug. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1, 7. (133) Outside Contact Report, Aug. 30, 1978, House Select Committee on Assas- sinations, p. 1 (J. F. K. Document 011267). (1384) Interview notes, Mar. 16, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassina- tions, p. 5 (J. F. K. Document 012928). (135) Outside Contact Report, Aug. 30, 1978, House Select Committee on Assas- sinations, p. 2 (J. F. K. Document 011267). (136) Ibid. (137) Ibid. (138) See ref. 182. (168) Tadsat pr 7. (7405 elas at pel2: (147) Ids at p13. (142) Ibid. (143) Id. at p. 7. (144) Id. at p. 9. (145) Td. at p. 11. (146) Thid. ere) (147) Outside Contact Report, Sept. 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 011465). (148) Ibid. (149) Ibid. (150) Outside contact report, Aug. 30, 1978, House Select Committee on Assas- sinations, p. 1 (J. F. K. Document 011267). (151) See ref. 27, Veciana Immunized Testimony, pp. 65-66. (152) See ref. 62, Veciana interview, p. 4. (158) Ibid. (154) Ibid. (155) See ref. 27, Veciana Immunized Testimony, p. 87. (156) Letter from Senator Richard S. Schweiker, Dec. 14, 1976, House Select Comunittee on Assassinations, p. 3 (J. F. K. Document 000521). (157) Memorandum, Aug. 6, 1976, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (J. F. K. Document 012921). (158) Memorandum to Gustavson, Sept. 20, 1976, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 013455). (159) Ibid. (160) Ibid. (161) Id. at p. 2. (162) Ibid. (163) Ibid. (164) Id. at p. 3. (165) Ibid. (166) Ibid. (167) Ibid. (168) Ibid. (169) Ibid. (170) Ibid. (171) Ibid. (172) Tbid. (173) Id. at p. 4. (174) Id. at p. 3. (175) Veciana executive session testimony. (176) Ibid. (177) David Phillips, Nightwatch, Atheneum, 1977, p. 5. (178) Ibid. (179) Staff interview, Jan. 16, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1,3 (J. F. K. Document 004721). (180) Id. at p. 2. (181) Id. atp. 4. ;ret By Howard Hunt, Give Us This Day (Popular Library, 1974), p. 26. A id. (184) Memorandum of interview, Feb. 4, 1978, p.1 (J. F. K. Document 005063). (Tho). at p. 2. (186) Thid. (787) Staff interview of Doug Gupton, Aug. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 002101). (788) Ibid. (189) Ibid. (190) Ibid. (191) Id. at p. 2. (792) Ibid. (193) Thid. (194) Ibid. (195) Ibid. (196) Ibid. (197) Ibid. (198) Ibid. (199) Executive session testimony of David Atlee Phillips (classified), Apr. 25, 1978, hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 89. (200) Ibid. (201) Td. at p. 86. (202) Ibid. (203) Ibid. (204) Id. at p. 95. (205) Id. at p. 88. (206) Id. at p. 90. (207) See ref. 27, Veciana immunized testimony, p. 70. (208) Ibid. (209) Letter from the chief counsel of the House Select Committee on Assassi- nations to CIA, Office of Legislative Counsel, Mar. 2, 1978. (210) Outside contact report, Mar. 31, 1978, House Select Committee on Assas- sinations, p. 4 (J. F. K. Document 006911). (211) Committee interview of B. H. (top secret closed session), Aug. 10, 1978,. House Select Committee on Assassinations. (212). Id..atpe6. (Zio) [d, at pes. (214) Id. at p.29. (215) Id. at p. 30. (216). Id. at p. 31. arps gelta Ra Fra @ PRS (215) 1d. at p. ol. (279) Id. at p. 32: (220) Id. at p. 35. (221) Id. at p. 33. (222) Deposition of John A. McCone, Aug. 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4. (223) Id. at pp. 45-46. (224) Letter from chief counsel, House Select Committee on Assassinations, to CIA principal coordinator, Aug. 16, 1978. (220d Laat Dice (226) Letter from the CIA principal coordinator to chief counsel, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Sept. 8, 1978. (227) Ibid. (228) Letter from chief counsel, House Select Committee on Assassinations, to Attorney General, Justice Department, Mar. 9, 1978. (229) Letter from chief counsel, House Select Committee on Assassinations, to- Secretary of Defense, Mar. 9, 1978. (2390) FBI letter, Mar. 17, 1978 (J. F. K. Document 006622) ; Outside contact report, April 19, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Docu- ment 007369). (231) Department of Defense file No. AA 90 49 16; House Select Committee on Assassinations file review (J. F. K. Document 012918). (232) Ibid. (233) Interview of Antonio Veciana Blanch, May 10, 1976, House Select Com- mittee.on Assassinations, p. 1 (J. F. K. Document 012930). (234) CIA Directive 188531, Mar. 15, 1978. (235) Ibid. (236) CIA Document, IN 24788, July 7, 1962. (237) Release: House Select Committee on Assassinations, July 30, 1978. (238) House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Documents 010528). 010508, 010524, 011018). TV. CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL: A CONCISE HISTORY (205) The forerunner of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) was the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), formed in May 1960.(7) At the head of it were the leaders of five major anti-Castro _groups. The proclaimed purpose of the FRD was to establish a demo- cratic government in Cuba through the use of military force. (2) (206) The FRD set up headquarters initially in Mexico, but re- cruited most of its proposed invasion force from Miami.(3) The mill- ‘tary arm of the FRD was known as Brigade 2506.(4) The Brigade was eventually composed of 1,443 men who were trained by U.S. Army -specialists at two sites on the south coast of Guatemala. (4) (207) The leaders and their organizations that composed the FRD executive committee were: Aureliano Sanchez Arango of the Triple A group; Justo Carrillo of Montecristi; Antonio de Varona of Rescate; Manuel Artime of the Revolutionary Recovery Movement (MRR) ; and Dr. Jose Ignacio Rasco of the Christian Democratic Movement (MDC).(6) Antonio de Varona served as General Coordinator(7) and the membership was soon expanded to include Dr. Antonio Maceo, a ‘noted Cuban surgeon; former Cuban President Carlos Hevia; and conservative leader Rafael Sardinas. (8) (208) In March 1961, The State Department pressured FRD leaders to accept the Movimento Revolutionario del Pueblo (MRP), headed by Manuel Ray Rivero, into the FRD.(9) The inclusion of Ray’s group into the alliance of Cuban exiles was reportedly also “terribly im- portant to the White House,” which wanted to broaden the political base of the FRD.(/0) In an effort to attract Ray and his group into the FRD, Antonio de Varona resigned voluntarily and Dr. Jose Miro Cardona was elected its new president.(77) Dr. Miro Cardona was a former Havana jurist who broke with Castro after serving him as his first Prime Minister. (72) (209) Shortly before the April 17, 1961, Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) was formed to coordinate and direct FRD activities with U.S. Government support.(/3) The new organization had direct access to President Kennedy and top White House aides.(74) All the groups within the CRC maintained their separate identities, (75) the leaders expressing publicly their unity, es- pecially during the period prior to the planned invasion. The regroup- ing included the following Cuban exile leaders: Chairman, Dr. Jose Miro Cardona; Board of Directors—Antonio de Varona, Justo Carillo, Carlos Hevia, Antonio Maceo, Manuel Ray, and Manuel Artime. (16) CRC committees were organized in key cities in the United States and delegations appointed in Latin American countries. (17) (210) The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion resulted in Castro capture and imprisonment of over 1,000 of the Brigade’s members. (78) The dejected leaders of the CRC, who had been sequestered for security (57) ro Oo reasons at the start of the invasion, (19) were later taken to the White House for a personal visit with President Kennedy who expressed his. regret and assumed responsibility for the invasion failure. (20) (211) Shortly after the unsuccessful invasion, Manuel Ray withdrew his organization, the MRP, from the Council,(27) and by October 1961, the CRC had completely absorbed the FRD.(22) Dr. Miro Cardona remained at the helm of the Council, which had been enlarged to in- clude the Revolutionary Action and a faction of the 30th of November Movement. (22) While some unification had been achieved through the FRD and CRG, the Cuban exile groups were plagued by factionalism, personal rivalries for leadership roles, and conflicting programs. (24) Nevertheless, the CRC was still considered the principal unifying or- ganization of the Cuban exile community(25) although no anti- Castro leader emerged who could command broad support of the community. (26) 7: (212) After the October 1962 missile crisis, the policy of the United States toward the Castro regime changed drastically. In his book “The Losers,” Paul Bethel, former press attaché at the Havana Embassy noted : There is no doubt that President Kennedy and his brother, the Attorney General, consciously set about the business of stopping all efforts to unhorse Fidel Castro—from outside exile attacks, and from Cuba’s internal resistance move- ment. (27) When two Cuban exile groups made raids against Russian installa- tions in Cuba and a Russian freighter in the Cuban port of Caribarien, the Attorney General dispatched 600 Federal agents to Miami in an effort to prevent further actions against the Castro regime.(28) A directive was issued that prohibited key anti-Castro leaders in Miami from leaving the area without Federal approval. (29) (213) Although individual groups received financial aid from the U.S. Government (30) the effectiveness of the CRC as a unifying oganization deteriorated. In April 1963, Jose Miro Cardona resigned his position as president in a clash with the Kennedy administration over Cuban policy.(31) Miro Cardona claimed that Kennedy had promised another invasion would be launched and had instead chosen a course of peaceful coexistence with the Castro regime. (32) The CRC was revamped and Dr. Antonio Maceo elected president, (33) although Antonio de Varona was still a dominating force in the organiza- tion.(34) Government funds to the CRC were cut off on May 1, 1963, and could no longer support its Latin American delegates. (35) (214) ‘The credibility of the CRC then took a severe blow. In June 1963, the Miami News revealed that a highly publicized commando raid on Cuba, purportedly made on June 21, was actually a hoax. (36) According to the newspaper, “Although Dr. Maceo did not say it, sources related that the proposed landing of up to 3,000 commandos was a fraud that ballooned with the tacit consent of other publicity- minded CRC members.” (37) Following the revelations, Dr. Maceo resigned as president of the CRC and was succeeded by Antonio de Varona. (38) 59 (215) Varona was able to hold the financially pinched CRC together for about 6 months, but he himself had to leave Miami 1 in early 1964 and move to New York to seek employment, giving up his full-time activities as an anti-Castro revolutionary leader.(39) The Cuban Revolutionary Council quietly disintegrated. Submitted by: GAETON J. Fonzi, Investigator. ELIzABETH J. PALMER, Researcher. REFERENCES (7) CIA Memo, October 30, 1967. (2) Executive session testimony of Antonio de Varona, March 16, 1978. Hear- ings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 10 (hereinafter Varona executive session testimony). (8) FBI teletype to Director and SAC, New Orleans from SAC, Miami, Sep- tember 7, 1960, Bureau No. 105-78462—4 (JFK document 012692, item 3). (4) Mario Lazo, “Dagger in the Heart,’ (Scranton, Pa.: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968), p. 258. (5) Ibid. (6) E. Howard Hunt, “Give Us This Day,” (New York: Popular Library, 1973), p. 44. (hereinafter cited Give Us This Day.) (1) FBI Airtel to Director from SAC, Sergio Arcacha Smith Black Line file, New Orleans, December 12, 1960, HSCA (JFK document 012691). (8) See ref. 17, “Give Us This Day,” pp. 71-72. (9) Id. at pp. 172-73. (10) Id. at p. 1738. (71) Id. at p. 154. (12) Theodore A. Ediger, “Battle of Miami,” Dallas Morning News, July 1, 1962. (13) CIA Memo, October 30, 1967. (14) Ibid. (15) Security File No. 020, CIA Handbook, House Select Committee on Assas- sinations. (16) CIA file. (17) See ref. 7. (18) “Selected Chronology on Cuba,’ Congressional Research Service, Li- brary of Congress, December 21, 1962 (JFK Document 012743) (hereinafter Selected Cuban Chronology ). (19) See ref. 6, “Give Us This Day,” pp. 191-192. (20) See ref. 3, Varona, executive session testimony, p. 23. (21) CIA cable, April 9, 1963. (22) CIA Memo, October 30, 1967. (23) See ref. 12. (24) Staff security file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, FBI Sen- study Document, vol. 37, item 1, Cinal 100—422089, National Security Informa- tion—Latin American Activities, October 18, 1961 (JFK Document 000092). (25) Ibid. (26) Ibid. (27) Paul D. Bethel, ‘The Losers,” New Rochelle, N.Y.: (Arlington House, 1969), p. 398. (28) Id. at pp. 398-399. (29) Id. at p. 399. (30) CIA Memo, July 9, 1964; CIA undated document. (31) See ref. 18, “Select Cuban Chronology.” (32) Ibid. April 15, 1963. (838) “Maceo Quits as Head of Cuba Group,” Dallas Morning News, June 23, 1963. 60 June 11, 1963. (JFK Docu- (34) FBI No. 105-107224-126, report from Miami, ment 012 689, item 4.) (35) Ibid. Quits,’ Miami News, (36) Hal Hendrix, “Raid a Hoax. Cuban Exile Boss June 23, 1963. (37) Ibid. (38) See ref. 18, “Selected Cuban Chronology.” in Jersey by Night,” New (39) “Cuban Anti-Castro Chief by Day Selling Cars York Times, August 22, 1964. V. CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (CRC): NEW ORLEANS CHAPTER (216) Nine days after the assassination of the President, the U.S. Secret Service began an investigation into the activities of Lee Harvey Oswald during his residency in New Orleans. (1) (217) Oswald had been arrested there in August 1963 while dis- tributing Fair Play for Cuba literature. Some of his leafiets had the address 544 Camp Street stamped on them. The Secret Service en- deavored to determine if Oswald maintained an office at this address. (2) (218) During the course of its investigation, the Secret Service as- certained that the New Orleans chapter of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) had occupied an oflice at 544 Camp Street for about 6 months during 1961-62. At that time, Sergio Arcacha Smith was the oflicial CRC delegate for the New Orleans area. The Secret Service also learned that Arcacha Smith had been fired from his position by the Miami CRC headquarters in early 1962, allegedly because he did not have the confidence of the New Orleans Cuban exile community. Luis Rabel replaced Arcacha Smith and moved the CRC offices to his home. (3) (219) At the time of the Secret Service investigation, another Cuban exile, Frank Bartes, headed the New Orleans CRC delegation and maintained offices in his home in Metairie, a suburb of New Orleans. (4) (220) After an extensive investigation by the FBI and the Secret Service regarding the possibility that Oswaid rented office space at 544 Camp Street, the Warren report concluded there was no evidence that Oswald ever maintained an oifice at that address. (5) (221) This material only pertains to the committee’s attempt to as- certain if any activities of the CRC had any relationship to Oswald’s activities in New Orleans. (222) ‘The Committee questioned the first New Orleans delegate to the CRC, Sergio Arcacha Smith.(6) He told the committee that he arrived in Miami in August 1960 and, at the request of Antonio de Varona, a director of the CRC, agreed to establish a chapter of this group in New Orleans. Arcacha Smith was initially afforded free office space in the Balter Building; he later rented space at 544 Camp Street. (7) (223) During his tenure as head of the New Orleans delegation, Areacha Smith endeavored to raise funds by selling CRC bonds, and was instrumental in organizing several rallies to promote the cause of the Cuban exiles. (S) (224) Arcacha Smith said he had never seen Oswald in New Orleans and, from what he had read, Oswald was not even in that city at the same time Arcacha Smith lived there.(9) When he was relieved of his official. position with the CRC in early 1962, Arcacha left New Orleans. (70) (61) 43-—944—79 5 62 (225) Arcacha Smith’s replacement, Luis Rabel, assumed the dele- gate duties in January 1962 but, he told the committee, found it neces- sary to resign by October of that year because his job entailed exten- sive traveling.(77) During his short tenure, Rabel said he organized several rallies and brought in prominent Miami speakers to inspire the New Orleans Cuban exile community.(/2) Other than going to the Camp Street address to remove office materials left there by Arcacha Smith, Rabel said he had no connection with the building and never saw Oswald in New Orleans. (72) (226) Frank Bartes, former president of Consolidated Railroads in Cuba,(74) became the third designated delegate of the New Orleans CRC chapter. He reported the activities of the group regularly to the FBI (74) and was primarily concerned with solicitation of monthly pledges from Cubans for the purchase of arms for their countrymen actively engaged in the fight against Castro.(/6) He reported that he had purchased an M-2 rifle with collections and displayed it at an October 1963 meeting for “psychological reasons.”(17) Bartes said, however, because of the rate of collections at that time, the group was able to send only enough money to the Miami CRC headquarters to purchase one gun per month.(/8) (227) On November 15, 1963, a CRC meeting was held at Gallier Hall. Antonio de Varona was invited to come to New Orleans to speak to the Cuban exiles and bolster their morale.(79) He stayed at the home of Agustin Guitart, (20) uncle of Silvia Odio. (228) Bartes told the committee he headed the New Orleans dele- gation until the CRC was dissolved in 1964.(27) During his tenure, he said, he maintained the CRC office in his home.(22) He could not recall ever having visited the 544 Camp Street office maintained by Arcacha Smith in 1961-62.(23) (229) After Carlos Bringuier and Oswald had been arrested in a street scuffle, Bartes appeared in court with Bringuier.(24) Although not a CRC member, Bringuier was respected by Bartes and it was as a show of support that Bartes appeared at Bringuier’s hearing. (25) (230) After the hearing, the news media surrounded Oswald for a statement, Bartes said. At this point, Bartes got into an argument with the media and Oswald because the Cubans were not being given an opportunity to present their views.(26) He also spoke to an FBI agent that day, warning that Oswald was a potentially dangerous man.(27) Bartes declined to identify the agent to the committee, saying only that he had had frequent contact with him during this period of time.(28) Bartes said he had no other contact with Oswald. (29) (231) The evidence would seem to indicate, therefore, that the New Orleans chapter of the CRC had no relationship with Oswald other than the brief encounter with Bartes, and in no way was officially involved in any activities that touched upon those of Oswald. Submitted by: GAETON J. Fonzi, Investigator. EvizABETu J. PALMER, Researcher. 65 REFERENCES (1) Secret Service report, “Lee Harvey Oswald,” December 9, 1968, Secret Service No. CO-2-34,030 (JFK Document 003759). (2) Ibid. (3) Ibid. (4) Ibid. (5) “Report of the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy” (Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 292 (hereinafter Warren report). (6) Staff Interview of Sergio Arcacha Smith, July 7, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 010458). (7) Id. at pp. 12, 45. (8) Deposition of Luis Rabel, May 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 28, 47 (JFK Document 009080). (9) Id. at pp. 21-22. (10) See ref. 1, p. 4. (11) See ref. 8, Rabel deposition, p. 45. (12) Id. at p. 41. (13) Id. at pp. 127-128. (14) FBI report, January 20, 1965 (JFK Document 006305), Item 9). (15) Ibid., items 1-8. (16) Ibid., items 34. (17) Ibid., item 4. (18) Ibid. (19) Ibid., item 5. (20) Ibid. (21) Staff interview of Frank Bartes, March 15, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 007252). (22) Ibid. (23) Id. at p. 7. (24) Id. at p. 17. (25) Ibid. (26) Ibid. (27) Ibid. (28) Id. at p. 18. (29) Ibid. 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BRIGADE 2506—MANUEL ARTIME—MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MRR) (232) No other anti-Castro Cuban group more naturally attracted the initial attention of the committee than Brigade 2506, the organ1- zation formed specifically for the Bay of Pigs invasion and the one that experienced the most dramatic relationship with the Kennedy administration in terms of its hopes and failures. (233) Following their release from Castro’s prisons in December of 1962, the members of the brigade harbored deep-seated emotional conflicts in their attitude toward the government. An observer who watched them arrive in Miami noted: They were earnest, bewildered, still in a state of shock at their sudden liberation, still nursing a bitter sense of be- trayal at the manner in which they were sent ashore and abandoned, still torn between trust and cynicism, still in awe at the power of an American Government that could, at will it seemed, pluck them out of the darkest dungeons in Ha- vana and on the Isle of Pines, and deposit them back in Florida with their families by Christmas Eve. (7). (234) In the perspective of an investigation of the Kennedy as- sassination, the members of Brigade 2506 had to be considered of primary interest if only in terms of motivations and means. As one member, who later became involved in anti-Castro terrorist activity, explained :“We learned from them. We use the tactics that we learned from the CIA * because we were trained to do everything. We were trained to set off a bomb, we were trained to kill.” (2) (235) The formation of what was to become Brigade 2506 can be traced to March 1960 when President Dwight Eisenhower authorized the CIA to organize, train, and equip Cuban refugees for the purpose of eventually overthrowing Castro.(3) To head the group, a young physician was chosen who had organized the Movimiento de Recuper- acién Revolucionaria (MRR), the first anti-Castro action group in- side Cuba.(4) His name was Manuel Artime; he had fled Cuba the previous December.(5) Castro had appointed him a member of the National Agrarian Reform Institute but when, in October 1959, he heard Castro outline a plan to communize Cuba, Artime publicly re- signed his position and denounced Castro. (6) (236) The group that eventually grew into Brigade 2506 originally consisted of only 28 men.(7) The nucleus was 10 former Cuban military officers whom Artime had recruited. (8) He told them that he had been told by a group of Americans who claimed to have no association with the U.S. Government that they would receive a huge amount of arms, equipment, and funds.(9) The Americans tried to give Artime and *In fact, U.S. Army Special Forces, not the CIA, trained the brigade. (65) 00 re his men the impression that an anonymous Cuban millionaire was pay- ing the bills, but the Cubans eventually began referring to their bene- factor as “Uncle Sam.” (70) (237) At secret camps in Florida, in Panama, and eventually in Guatemala, the U.S. Government trained the core of future brigade leaders in guerrilla warfare.(/7) By September 1960, this initial cadre was part of a group of 160 men undergoing vigorous military condi- tioning in the treacherously dense mountain jungles of the Sierra Madre in Guatemala.(/2) That month, one of the men, Carlos (Carlyle) Rodriguez Santana, was killed in training. (23) In his honor, the members of the unit decided they would name the brigade after his serial designation, 2506. (74) (238) Although Manuel Artime, through his MRR organization transplanted in Miami, was the principal recruiting apparatus for brigade personnel, chosen as military leader of the brigade was Jose (“Pepe”) Perez San Roman, a graduate of Cuba’s military academy who had also undergrone U.S. Army officer training at Fort Benning, Ga.(15) He had been freed by Castro from a Batista prison, then later reimprisoned by Castro before escaping from Cuba. (16) (239) Nevertheless, it was Artime who remained the key figure in the U.S. Government’s relationship with the activist exiles and the brigade. When, as the Cuban exile population in Miami grew and the political squabbling among anti-Castro factions spread to Guatemala and sparked a camp mutiny that almost stopped the train- ing, it was Artime the CIA called upon to help resolve the problem. (77) Artime had been made a director of the Frente Revolucionario Demo- eratico (FRD),(78) a political and propaganda organization involv- ing several anti-Castro groups formed in May 1960.(79) The brigade was to be its military arm.(20) But the political fighting among the groups eventually led to its dissolution and creation of a broader- based organization, the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), before the Bay of Pigs invasion.(27) Artime also was made a director of that group. (22) (240) The Bay of Pigs invasion took place in April 1961.(23) More than 1,200 brigade members were taken prisoner by Castro.(24) Be- fore they were released in December 1962, in an exchange for $53 mil- lion in medical supplies,(25) the members of the brigade suffered not only the humiliation of defeat and capture by Castro, they also were subject to the agony of false hope when, within a few months of their imprisonment, they saw Castro’s offer to exchange them for 500 trac- tors become inextricably bogged in the muck of partisan U.S. polities. As one historian noted : The prisoners suffered more from domestic politics than they did at the hands of Castro. * * * Had the political climate in the United States been less inflammatory, it is not at all unlikely that Brigade 2506 could have been released in June of 1961 for $28 million in tractors, cash, and credits. Instead of freedom through tractors, however, the men were doomed to the degradation of a year and a half longer in prison. (26) (241) The final formation of Brigade 2506 took place at the Orange Bow! Stadium in Miami on December 29, 1962. President Kennedy 67 was there to welcome back the surviving members who had spent al- most 20 months in Castro’s prisons.(27) The crowd of 40,000 friends, families, and relatives cheered in tearful joy as brigade chief Pepe San Roman presented Kennedy with the brigade flag, which had flown over the Bay of Pigs beach for 3 days.(28) The President ac- cepted the flag and declared: “I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this brigade in a free Havana.” Mrs. Kennedy spoke in Spanish and called the brigade members “the bravest men in the world.” (29) It was a dramatic and emotional scene, but it may have been misleading. Although the event reflected publicly a concordant rapport between the President and the brigade, beneath the surface there ran a vein of bitter resentment among those who felt the event was a display of political hypocrisy. E. Howard Hunt, once assigned liaison duties with the brigade, claimed later that the brigade feel- ing against Kennedy was so great that the presentation of the flag nearly did not take place. (30) (242) Nevertheless, it is difficult to finalize an assessment of the bri- gade’s collective attitude toward the U.S. Government and the Ken- nedy administration following the Orange Bowl event. Kennedy’s resolution to the Cuban missile crisis, in which he promised Castro that raids against Cuba from the U.S. mainland would be halted, was considered an act of betrayal to their cause by many of the exiles in the anti-Castro communities. Yet most of the members of the brigade seemed to maintain a basic confidence in the U.S. Government’s re- solve to topple the Castro regime, and, in fact, nearly half of them en- listed in the U.S. Armed Forces through a special arrangement made by President Kennedy himself. (37) (245) Although Brigade 2506 officially ceased to exist after De- cember 1962,(32) Manuel Artime, who had become known as the CIA’s “golden boy,” (33) was soon scouting around Latin America for sites on which to establish guerrilla training camps. By October 1963, he had established four bases, two in Costa Rica and two in Nicaragua. (34) Artime’s 300-man force consisted mainly of veterans of the bri- gade.(35) Artime would later admit that his resources included two large ships, eight small vessels, two speed boats, three planes, and more than 200 tons of weapons and armaments and about $250,000 in elec- tronic equipment.(36) During the year of his operation, Artime was able to conduct four major operations, three of which failed: the mis- taken shelling of a Spanish cargo ship (which caused an international uproar) ; an infiltration mission in which all the participants were captured; an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Castro;(37) and finally, a six-man infiltration mission that did succeed. (38) (244) Although Artime received U.S. Government support, there remained the question of whether President Kennedy was knowledge- able of or approved Artime’s anti-Castro operations after the Cuban missile crisis. Following the assassination of both John F. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy, Artime said publicly that both the President and his brother were responsible for his establishing the Latin Ameri- can bases.(39) He said that after his return from prison in Cuba, he met President Kennedy in West Palm Beach, Fla., and that Kennedy referred him to his brother.(40) Artime said he met Robert Kennedy 68 in Washington and that the then Attorney General promised him military aid if he, Artime, could get the bases. (47) (245) Artime claimed that his anti-Castro operations from the bases ceased “when Bobby Kennedy separated from the Johnson adminis- tration.” (42) Nevertheless, in December 1964, the Costa Rican police ordered the camps shut down when it uncovered a $50,000 contraband whisky operation involving a plane from Artime’s group. The camps in Nicaragua were also closed, although Artime kept close personal ties to that country by becoming a beef broker for Nicaraguan Presi- dent Gen. Anastasio Somoza, the country’s largest beef producer. (43) (246) When Artime was first contacted by the committee, he stated that he had had direct contact with both President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy and, through them, was given full support by the CIA for his anti-Castro operations. He said he felt the death of Pres- ident Kennedy marked the end of the U.S. Government’s attempts to liberate Cuba.(44) He agreed to be interviewed by the committee (45) but, before that was possible, he died of cancer at the age of 45 after a brief illness. (46) Submitted by: Garton J. Fonzz, Investigator. ELizABETH J. PALMER, Researcher. REFERENCES (1) Haynes Johnson, “The Bay of Pigs,’’ Orlando Sentinel Star, June 12, 197 t,-DalG. (2) Ibid. (3) Haynes Johnson, “The Bay of Pigs,” New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1964), pp. 28-29 (hereinafter Johnson, ‘‘Bay of Pigs’’). (4) Id. at p. 24. (5) Ibid. (6) Ibid. (7) Id. at pp. 28-29. (8) Ibid. (9) Ibid. (10) Id. at p. 37, (11) Id. at pp. 3442. (12) Ibid. (13) Id. at p. 47. (14) Id. at p. 56. (15) Id. at pp. 32-389, 55. Cioy fal aL po. (17) Id. at pp. 60-68. (18) FBI report No. 105-87912, MRR miscellaneous references (J.F.K. Docu- ment 012383). (19) CIA document, Oct. 30, 1967. (20) Ibid. (21) See ref. 3, Johnson, “Bay of Pigs,” p. 62. (22) Ibid. (23) “Selected Chronology on Cuba,” Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, April 17, 1961. (J.F.K. Document 013100). (24) Ibid., June 2, 1961. (25) Ibid., Dee. 21, 1962. (26) See ref. 8, Johnson, “Bay of Pigs,” p. 246. (27) See ref. 23, Selected Urban Chronology, p. 31. (28) Johnson, “Bay of Pigs,” p. 344. (29) Id. at pp. 342-846. (30) E. Howard Hunt, “Give Us This Day,” (New York: “Popular Library Edition, 1973), p. 221. 69 (31) See ref. 3, Johnson, “Bay of Pigs,” p. 353. (32) Id. at p. 352. (33) Helga Silva, “Manuel Artime,” profile, Miami News, July 2, 1977. (34) Leonard Novarro, “Artime Had a Little Help From Friends in the CIA,” Orlando Sentinal Star, June 12, 1977, p. 2C. (35) Ibid. (36) See ref. 33, p. 1C. (37) Ibid. (38) Ibid. (39) Ibid. (40) Ibid. (41) Ibid. (42) Ibid. (43) See ref. 34. (44) HSCA (J.F.K. Document 003175). (45) Ibid. (46) Miami Herald, Nov. 8, 1977. Cree Seeger Pidiow Fes in} y GUarehe! line tae 4 oy A "heie | ui hy ia: in lke Mine §2" 4, Ge at “wy e Cer ties Recs wre) tower wWiote I Aeaill HOA at ft ph inten hat se bie or A gre iia Aeterna grow, bit"f 7V veiiaeks he eee BO US Sheet oe 1 ta’ , Ave ies “ 7 @ : ’— sere ee by keccardy-e dat broiler foo itt . 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MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO (MDC) (247) After Castro’s assumption of power in 1959, it became evident to many Cubans that political parties were being suppressed and the 26th of July Movement was being infiltrated by Communists. ‘This political atmosphere gave rise to the creation of underground orga- nizations such as the Christian Demoratic Movement of Cuba (MDC).(7) Proclaiming the doctrine of Christianity as its founda- tion, the MDC published a manifesto in March 1960 (2) denouncing communism and strongly advocating the free enterprise system. (?) One of the founders of the MDC, 35-year-old law professor Dr. Jose Ignacio Rasco, was elected head of the organization (4) and immedi- ately criticized the violence prevalent in the Castro regime.(5) This public criticism produced pressure on him to leave Cuba and he ar- rived in Miami on April 22, 1960.(6) By June, Rasco had allied him- self and the MDC with the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD) (7) and thus became one of the five original exile Cuban lead- ers brought together by the U.S. Government to form the nucleus of a. Cuban government-in-exile. (8) (248) After the Bay of Pigs invasion, the MDC split into fac- tions.(9) Rasco remained head of the largest faction and organized delegations in Miami, New York, Chicago, Venezuela, and Cuba. (/0) The clandestine faction operating in Cuba was led by a Cuban who used the alias “Lucas.”(//) When this Cuban arrived in the United States in October 1961, he presented his credentials to the Cuban Rey- olutionary Council (CRC), claiming he was the representative of the MDC movement in Cuba.(72) Council president, Dr. Miré Cardona, accepted him into the CRC hierarchy.(73) The “Lucas” faction re- mained with the council but its role was ineffectual because the Cuban eventually failed to hold the group together. (14) (249) The “Rasco” faction of MDC had as its military chief an independently wealthy young Cuban, Laureano Batista Falla.(15) Free spirited and under no financial pressures, Batista Falla orga- nized and partially financed the infiltration attempts of the MDC. (/6) It was one of the most active and effective underground groups in Cuba during the early 1960’s. (77) (250) At that time, most underground groups worked together, sharing supplies and information.(78) Nevertheless, the repressive measures of the Castro regime after the April 1961 invasion caused members of the Cuban underground to live in fear of discovery and made intergroup laison extremely risky.(79) Despite the inherent dangers, the underground movements of the MDC and Movimento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP) worked jointly for an all-out sabotage effort in the fall of 1961.(20) (251) The “Batista” faction of the MDC (so named after the youth- ful military chief rose to the position of president in 1962) (27) en- tered into similar cooperative alliances with other exile groups for (71) 72 the purposes of propaganda, sabotage, and supplying the Cuban un- derground. Many MDC members joined the Cuba Committee in 1962, which was formed to counteract the propaganda of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, a pro-Castro organization in the United States. RE The MDC and the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE worked together to formulate plans for an underground organization to infiltrate Oriente Province.(23) The active operations between thie MDC and other anti-Castro groups peaked in the year 1963. One in- volved the MDC, the: Movimento Insurreccionial de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR), and the Movimento Recuperacion Revolu- clonaria (MRR). In April, Frank Sturgis, Miami-based soldier of fortune, supplied information that Batista Falla, Orlando Bosch Avila, Manuel Artime,; and Alexander Rorke were jointly planning an airstrike over Havana on April 25.(24) According to Sturgis, the strike was to originate from an airstrip in Puerto Rico and the target was a sugar refinery.(25) The bombs were homemade, assembled by Batista.(26) Rorke announced publicly that the strike had taken place as scheduled, which took the other planners by surprise.(27) Sturgis claimed the strike was still in the planning stage and financial back- ing had not been completed.(28) This incident created a stir and re- sulted in an intensive, FBI investigation of Rorke’s allegation. (29) Since Radio Havana;,contrary to usual policy; made no immediate protest over the bombing,(30) the FBI concluded. that Rorke’s story was probably untrue(3Z) and, according to Sturgis, merely a pub- licity stunt. (32) (252) In early June 1963, the MDC made a unity pact with Com- mandos L, in which.Commandos JL was to provide training and _as- sistance in military intelligence and the MDC was to provide three small boats and a team of men to infiltrate Cuba.(33) The MDC also made a pact with Dr. Carlos Prio Socarras, former President of Cuba, who donated $50,000 to the group for military aid in return for its promise of political support. (34) (258) -Richard Rudolph Davis, a Cuban alien,(35) had a peripheral association with the MDC through his contact with Batista Falla in the summer of 1963. This association was noted in book V, “Final Report; of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operation.” (36) | (254) Davis was residing in New Orleans and, although not an MDC member, claimed to have once been a “coordinator” for the group and the New York Police Department.(37) He was a friend of Batista Falla and contacted him because, he said, Batista Falla was in a position to recommend men in the Miami area who needed work.(38) Davis claimed he could provide employment for a small group of Cuban emigrees. He said he had entered into a business deal with geologist David L. Raggio and a wealthy, rightwing New Or- leanian, Gus de LaBarre, forming the Guatemalan Lumber & Mineral Corp.(39) It was their intention to train the Cubans on some land in Lacombe, La., to which De LaBarre had access through his nephew Frank de LaBarre.(40) After a necessary training period, the group was to be sent: to Guatemala to cut mahogany trees, he claimed. (255) A group of about 18 Cubans did arrive in New Orleans in the summer of 1963. Leading them was a well-known Cuban exile, i) Victor Paneque,(41) who used the military code name of ‘“Comma- dante Diego.” (42) Paneque was closely associated with Batista Falla in the military activities of the MDC.(43) Davis.admitted later to the FBI that the men had arrived dressed in khakis(44) and thought that they were to receive military training. (45) (256) In the latter part of July 1963, the FBI conducted a raid on property near that of the “lumber company” training camp. The Bureau seized a cache of dynamite and other explosives.(46) This raid, according to Davis, unnerved his trainees, and they elected to return to Miami. (47) 257) A somewhat different version of this episode comes from us de LaBarre’s nephew and attorney, Frank de LaBarre, who first related his story in 1966 to his former law school classmate, Jim Garrison. (48) (258) De LaBarre said his “Uncle Gus” had introduced him te Davis, whom De LaBarre described as a “floater.” They came to see De LaBarre about drawing up articles of incorporation for the Guatemalan Lumber Co, and that is when he says he learned. of their plans to bring unemployed Cubans from Miami to train as lumber- jacks. Uncle Gus sent provisions to the exiles on a daily basis and solicited money for food and clothing from friends and relatives. (49) (259) Although he suspected that military training was being con- ducted at the camp, Frank de LaBarre said he did not pay much atten- tion to the activities of the group. When he heard on his car radio that the FBI had seized a cache of ammunition at a house in Lacombe, however, he immediately called his uncle. Although receiving assur- ances that the lumber group was not involved, De LaBarre called the officers of the corporation together and insisted that the Cubans be taken out of there. Davis told him that the Cubans did not want to leave, whereupon De LaBarre said he had to do some real “brain- storming.” He rented a Hertz ton-and-a-half truck and instructed Davis to take it to the camp and tell the Cubans “that the invasion is on.” Davis complied, and the Cubans loaded their gear, jumped in the truck, and were brought to the Greyhound bus terminal in New Orleans. Each was given a one-way ticket to Miami plus a small amount of cash and told they would get their orders when they reached Miami. Looking as though ready for war, with knapsacks and guns bulging from under their clothes, they boarded the bus. De LaBarre said that was the last he saw of them. (260) The last he heard of Davis, he said, was in 1964 when one of De LaBarre’s friends reported he had gone into business with Davis and was left with a lot of bills. (40) (261) Other than providing the manpower for the training camp, Batista Falla was not involved in this episode or was the MDC as an organization. (262) Concurrent with his involvement with leaders of other exile organizations, Batista Falla was dealing with foreign governments in an effort to gain support for his faction of the MDC. After the World Congress of Christian Democrats in Strasbourg, France. two officials of a foreign political party conferred with the MDC in Miami.(57) According to one of the officials, his country, after months of study, had decided to help finance the MDC, not because they were 74 particularly fond of them, but felt once Cuba was liberated the Cubans would have a moral superiority over the rest of Latin America. (52) (263) Another offer of help came from an official who provided the MDC a base for operations in that country.(5?) Another Latin American official allegedly also offered to make a base available for the MDC and provide it with personnel and supplies. (54) Recognizing that these Latin American bases of operation were important to the MDC, Batista Falla nonetheless preferred to work out of the Miami area. Its proximity to Cuba, good facilities for operating boats and the availability of a large number of Cubans to serve as mechanics and do other necessary labor made Miami more desirable than the Latin American facilities. (55) The major drawback in Miami was the presence of U.S. Government officials determined strictly to enforce the Neutrality Act and other Federal statutes. (264) U.S. Customs raided MDC headquarters in Miami on April 21, 1964, and confiscated a large cache of arms and ammunition. (56) Un- deterred, the MDC simply relocated the military section in separate headquarters, continued to store materials for infiltration and attack missions against Cuba,(57) and conducted study courses in military training and theory.(58) In July, Batista Falla and Victor Paneque infiltered men and equipment into Cuba to form a nucleus of guerrilla bands that, once they got adequate arms and ammunition, planned to go into the mountains of Cuba. (59) (265) The MDC eventually suffered the fate of other anti-Castro organizations: Increasing difficulty in financing infiltration and sabo- tage missions, and intensive surveillance by U.S. authorities determined to limit their activities. The organization’s activities gradually de- clined, Batista Falla eventually gave up his anti-Castro activities, moved to Washington, D.C., and received a doctoral degree in political science. (60) In the spring of 1970, he moved to Venezuela. Submitted by: GAETON J. Fonzi, Investigator. ELIzABETH J. PALMER, Researcher. REFERENCES (7) CIA study. (2) Thbid. (3) FBI Document No. 105-87909-5, Jan. 30, 1961, item 4, p. 2 (J. F. K. Doew ment 009538). (4) Ibid. (5) CIA study. (6) See ref. 3. (7) Thid. (8) E. Howard Hunt “Give Us This Day” (New York: Popular Library, 1978), pp. 48-44. (9) CTA Document, Aug. 16, 1962. (70) Ibid. (17) Thid. (12) Ibid. (73) Thid. (14) Senstudy document, vol. 32, item 1, No. 97-4110-72 (J. F. K. Document 000092). (75) Thid. (16) FBI No, 97-4623-149, sec. V (J. F. K. Document 009303). 75 (17) Senstudy document, vol. 37, item 4, No. 105-95461-15, p. 4 (J. F. K. Docu- ment 000092). (18) Ibid. (19) Id. at p. 2. (20) Ibid. (21) FBI Document No. 105-183815, House Select Committee on Assassina- tions, p. 8, item 4 (J. F. K. Document 009303). (22) CIA cable, June 21, 1962. (23) CIA cable, Mar. 14, 1964. (24) FBI No. 9704623, House Select Committee on Assassinations, sec. 1, p. 1 (J. F. K. Document 009303). (25) Ibid. (26) Id. at p. 5. (27) Ibid. (28) Ibid. (29) FBI Document No. 97-4623, secs. II through VI, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 009308). (30) Id. at p. 8, sec. IV. (31) Id. at p. 2. (32) Id. at p. 2,item1 (9). (33) CIA report No. 3536, Sept. 3, 1963. (34) Ibid. (35) J. F. K. Document 012981. (36) Final report, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Opera- tions with respect to Intelligence Activities, Book V (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975). The group of Cubans connected with the Guatemalan Lumber Co. project is identified as the same group arrested when the FBI raided and seized dynamite on property in Lacombe, La. It should be noted that the FBI raid occurred on July 31, 1963, at property owned by William J. McLamney, whereas the Guatemalan Lumber Co. trainees were on property owned, according to Frank De LaBarre, by a friend of his. Although De Labarre did not mention the name of the owner, the FBI report from Miami, Bufile No. 2-1821, sec. 33, lists the names of the Cubans arrested on McLaney property; Victor Paneque was not among them (Book V, p. 12). (37) J. F. K. Document 012981. (38) Ibid. (39) Ibid. (40) Ibid. (41) Ibid. (42) Senstudy vol. 32, item 2, No. 97-4110—-1238, p. 2, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 000092). (43) Ibid. (44) FBI report on Richard Rudolph Davis, vol. I, New Orleans, July 3, 1964, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (J. F. K. Document 006716). (45) Id. atp. 2. (46) Ibid. (47) Ibid. (48) Memorandum Sept. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 012981). (49) Ibid. (50) Ibid. (51) CIA report No. 4531, Jan. 29, 1964. (52) Ibid. (58) CIA report, July 26, 1963. (54) CIA report, Nov. 14, 1963. (55) Senstudy document 33, item 1, No. 97-4110-86, p. 13, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 000092). (56) Ibid., vol. 32, item 2, No. 97-4110-123, p. 1. (57) Ibid. (58) Ibid., vol. 33, item 2, No. 97-4110-132, p. 2. (59) Ibid. (60) FBI Document No. 97-4110-207, report from Miami, Jan. 28, 1970, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 7, item 3 (J. F. K. Document 009303). Beatty y tf a _ or Gs ee | aay ey wl iw ay : + Loon a pietnalad thon. bot Mabe siten €) Veoryrod tee 1aH9R, Book 4%) tg Betokyiecat of bio batlu? nesestp0i evi et es ae A ie F « ar’ ins ee i . 0¥| =e een ae - iil 1)sate ahrene 2B 4 =. aad asdodt pAS2t 93°): > tana 200.03 o f mS \ HO suloneanoct a: RY 1 A ) SOOk, Mie teta ¢ r . ue en 2 osiilaicoDh tot oasOkh, L 4.0 pas eaoiaatoanes (0 ‘ (2080 ce SCT he Ti | He/4\ \ " 4 mY ra “a ‘ soir), Jonlok qeneLl AV dasone LT pons Pb $8 0K. eet, (SS _(ENGR00 a ostooC 2h a) eon Ga eee oe Fe eR: we o mth bg } ee | pee ag fe DLO e VaRNCaW ‘ic | | 440), Asha oft . 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SS kT, ele el fate aslidguitine ad at gion 2eds poy he alt x st Hit? nernt4t froin’ f os to sastien:' 1 site cre) agelte ofall o atadtyon Brod 1 tad? tate bat ot solepliaacs cp a GitiW Pee? fathesiat2 betin') act To fashieo 1 oft dil 91 we van etl eatuls fregia'l aft to toemieee'h wit Hid of gaiviqaien | ee of RGkexr” ewtTOr ft eohto tank ty olepomey eer) sft siete oe! wa ath Orisala:pw! on wie? betia J of) to taahives'l oct iia ot. ; Re ‘ fan py pe TY ANE fated, ai orto ld ptteaw of Sadr Le rod ars 700 qo ind we. ait mi (ya) Lhd | | 2ottnaslit “ano T peigite ot 9onehive oat hata? a £48. XI. JUNTA DEL GOBIERNO DE CUBA EN EL EXILIO (342) In April 1963, the spirit of the exiled Cubans who hoped to return to a liberated Cuba reached its nadir. The U.S. Government, which had been subsidizing a Cuban anti-Castro organization, the Cuban Revolutionary C‘ouncil, dropped its extensive backing of this most visible example of American assistance to the Cuban move- ment.(7) The move came on the heels of an announcement of a tough new policy of the Justiee and State Departments. They planned a vigorous enforcement of laws breached by anti-Castro Cuban raiders, who were operating hit-and-run guerrilla attacks from the United States on Cuban and Russian tar wets. (2) These events resulted in an- other shuffling of alliances between various Cuban groups, but no bright new hopes. (343) Despite a common desire to overthrow Castro and return to Cuba, the exiles differed in many ways. They represented the extremes of the political left and right, and everything in between. Many had carried arms against Batista: others were former Batistianos. They differed as to how the counterrevolution could be accomplished. They differed as to what type of government and which leaders would take the place of the ousted government. Unification of these diverse stances seemed doubtful. (344) Dr. Paulino Sierra Martinez, a Cuban exile and lawyer from Chicago, hoped to foster a change. Arriving in Miami in May 1963, Sierra scheduled a series of meetings at a local hotel and invited Cuban exile leaders of all political persuasion to discuss unification for the purpose of military invasion of Cuba. (3) (345) Tomany Cubans the idea seemed ridiculouslynaive. (4) Sierra was hoping to unify elements that had remained splintered through- out most previous efforts, attempting to draw well-known exile leaders when he himself was virtually unknown in the anti-Castro movement. (346) But Sierra came with some big ideas and big promises. He claimed to represent a group of Americans in Chicago interested in combining their efforts with those of the Cuban exiles to overthrow the Castro regime with or without U.S. Government approval. (5) Sierra told them that American financial interests would participate on condition there was a true unity of the majority of Cubans in exile.(6) For military planning, he claimed he had the assistance of several high-ranking U.S. Navy and Army officers, who would also help arrange for arms and the establishment of training bases in a Latin American country.(7) Most surprisingly, Sierra ‘claimed the Chicago backers were willing to lend assistance to the extent of $30 million,(8) no small sum even for a large-scale government-back mn operation. For a private group it was unheard of. (347) While many Cubans did not immediately join Sierra, by July 1963 he had built a coalition of predominantly rightwing anti-Castro (QO) 96 groups and attracted some impressive names fron: among the exiles to form an organization called the Junta de Gobierno de Cuba en el exiho (JGCE—Junta of the Government of Cuba in Exile.) (9) (848) Among the groups to join Sierra’s junta were the Unidad Revolucionaria faction headed by Juan Medina Vega (J(0) and the major faction of the 80th of November Group headed by Carlos Rod- riguez Quesada.(Z/) Sierra could also boast the participation of Jose “Pepin” Bosch, president of Bacardi Rum, and Alberto Garrido, a much-admired Cuban entertainer. (12) (349) In the selection process by which the committee chose those anti-Castro groups to be further investigated, certain factors about the junta discovered in preliminary research indicated a need to care- fully examine the purpose and activities of this group. (350) The junta was active during the critical period of interest to the committee. Sierra surfaced in March 1963 (23) and the organiza- tion abruptly ceased activity by January 1964.(/4) The committee hoped to discover what sparked the group’s genesis and what con- tributed to its final demise. (351) Its financial backing appeared to be remarkably impressive, and although Sierra claimed the group was to receive funds from American companies whose financial assets in Cuba had been nation- alized, it was widely rumored that the money was actually from “gam- bling interests” of organized crime.(5) There were other rumors that wealthy Texans were behind the group.(/6) The committee hoped to determine exactly what means were available to the group and from what source. (352) Preliminary research also indicated that the Secret Service in Chicago was investigating a “threat to the President” case at the time of President Kennedy’s assassination, in which Paulino Sierra was of interest.(/7) The committee wished to explore the nature of the allega- tion and the extent of Sierra’s involvement in the case. (353) The committee obtained considerable information from the contemporaneous investigative reports of the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding the structure, membership, and activities of the junta. Field interviews and research into reports of the Secret Service probed those questions raised by the alleged threats against the President. (354) Paulino Sierra Martinez was a tall and dapper lawyer(/8) employed in the legal counsel’s office of the Union Tank Car Co, in Chicago.(/9) Before his immigration to the. United States, he had reportedly been employed by Carlos Saladrigas, a minister under Batista.(20) He had also worked with Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez, former senator during Batista’s regime.(27) Sierra left Havana in 1960 and settled for a time in Miami where he worked as a judo instrue- tor and translator (Sierra speaks, reads, and writes English, Italian, French, and Spanish).(22) In 1962, he moved to Chicago and was ad- mitted to the Illinois bar under the sponsorship of William Browder, general counsel of Union Tank Car Co., for whom Sierra soon began work. (23) (855) By early 1963, Sierra had organized a Cuban Lawyer’s Asso- ciation in Chicago and gained somewhat of a reputation as “coordina- tor” of Cuban activities in the Chicago area.(24) In March 1963, he 7 was mentioned in an article in the Chicago Tribune for his active role in Cuban exile affairs in Chicago.(25) Nevertheless, he still had not made a national name in Cuban exile affairs. (356) Yet, as noted previously, Sierra’s meetings with anti-Castro Cuban exiles in Miami in the spring of 1963 produced the official struc- ture of a Cuban government in exile by July.(26) Sierra was named Secretary General, Felipe Rivero Diaz was named Vice Secretary Gen- eral, Carlos Rodrig uez Quesada was appointed head of internal affairs, Juan Medina was to head up finances, Manuel Lozano Pino was named head of external relations, Alberto Garrido was put in charge of propa- ganda, Reinaldo Pico was given a position in charge of labor issues, and Gilberto Rodiiguez was asked to run military «operations. (27) (357) The junta was formed after an organizational meeting in Chi- eago in June 1963 with Union Tank Car Executive Vice President J. W. Van Gorkum and Gener al Counsel Wiliam Browder. (25) Infor- mation regarding the meeting is scant. One source who attended said that Van Gorkum and Browder discussed the unity plan only insofar as suggesting that if the group could successfully establish a govern- ment in exile, it then might be able to obtain U.S. Government support and financing from other sources. (29) (358) But “evidence exists to suggest that Union Tank Car had a greater role in the junta. The company was reportedly paying for Sierra’s personal and travel expenses plus his salary.(30) Browder also told FBI agents in October 1963 that although he did not know the identity of Sierra’s backers, he (Browder) kept the group’s funds under his control to avoid any possible criticism of misappropriation or mismanagement of funds by Sierra.(37) Browder would not indi- cate the exact amount under his control other than to say it was “considerable.” (32) (359) There have been several contradictory reports to the CIA and FBI regarding the source of Sierra’s funds. (360) Early. reports indicated Sierra’s backers were Chicago gam- blers. The Miami News headline for an article reporting on ‘Sierra’s meetings read “Gamblers Pop Out of Exile Grab Bag.” (33) The source of such reports is unclear, although there are indications it may have been Sierra himself. (361) At Sierra’s initial meetings with Cuban groups, he was accom- panied by an American named William Trull, ,(34) who may have been partly responsible for circulation of rumors of the involvement of gambling interests in Sierra’s proposals, but whose ultimate relation- ship to Sierra is obscure. (362) In an interview with the FBI in June 1963, Sierra said Trull had ealled him after seeing the March 10 article about Sierra in the Chicago Tribune. (35) Sierra said Trull talked about sponsorship of a unified eroup of Cuban exiles and vaguely mentioned the owner of the King Ranch and a Mr. “Jarvis,” who Trull identified as a mil- lionaire in ‘Texas. (36) Sierra said he was concerned about Trull being involved with “impure” financial sources, and would have nothing further to do with him. (37) (363) Trull’s story is different. A former entertainer from Dallas, Trull said Sierra had first contacted him in March 1963 and proposed that he help Sierra explain Sierra’s plan to the Cuban exiles in 98 Miami.(38) Trull said Sierra had wired tickets so that he could join Sierra in Miami for the series of meetings with the exiles.(29) Sierra carefully outlined the proposal Trull was to explain to such Cuban leaders as former Cuban Prime Minister Carlos Prio and Eusebio Mujal, a former Cuban labor leader.(40) Trull reiterated the plan ‘to the Cubans, telling them he represented wealthy American interests ‘who had a business proposition for the Cuban people if they would ‘unify with Carlos Prio as president and Sierra as secretary of a pro- visional government. (47) (864) Reports by Cubans who heard Trull lend credence to his tale. Trull was found to be “contradictory” and “vague” about his plan, (42) as might be expected of a person who was just repeating what he had been told. (365) Trull later told FBI agents that he had dropped names to Sierra such as Cleburg of the King Ranch, but Sierra had told him he did not need Trull’s financial influence. (43) Sierra claimed, according to Trull, that representatives of Las Vegas or Cleveland gambling interests had contacted him and offered up to $14 million in exchange for 50-percent interest in gambling concessions in Cuba, provided Sierra was able to organize a successful ouster of Castro. (44) (366) 'Trull told the FBI that because he had frequently performed before Cuban audiences, he felt he had been chosen by Sierra and used as an “actor” to sell the Cubans on Sierra’s plans. (44) (867) Sierra had other assistance at his early meetings that disap- peared as quickly as Trull. According to a CIA report, one of the promoters for a meeting in May with exiles was George Franci, a Haitian national who had previously been involved in gambling interests in Havana.(46) Franci’s name does not show up as involved in any later activities of Sierra, particularly after the stories of gamblers’ backing hit the newsstands. (368) As late as July 1963, Sierra himself was the source of another report that gamblers were backing him. Miguel A. “Cuco” Leon, a colleague of Manuel Artime Buesa, reported that when Sierra visited Nicaragua that month, he told him he represented U.S. gambling concessions in Cuba. (47) (369) Another possible basis for the stories about Sierra’s “gambler’s backing” are separate reports of an actual offer to Chicago Cubans in March 1963. Dr. Cesar Blanco of the Chicago-based Cuban Bar Association of Tllinois reported a meeting of Cuban exiles on March 11, 1963. (48). He said that a Burt Mold of the American Edueation Leagne of Los Angeles had asked Blanco how much money the Cubans needed to work out a program to free Cuba.(49) Mold. according to Blanco, stated that the “Nevada group” would help since the 17.8. Govern- ment could do nothing.(50) Blanco said that Mold even offered Blanco the job of head of police in Cuba when the country had been freed. (57) (370) A CTA renort of March 1963 reported that Blanco and Sierra had been approached by gamblers from the West to work with them. (52) Tt was reported that Sierra spoke about an offer of $10 million in hacking for ouarantees of gambling concessions in Cuba after Castro was overthrown. (43) a (371) In his public meetings in Miami in May, Sierra had publicly named the American Educational League of Los Angeles as being in support of his proposal.(54) When that group challenged Sierra’s claims, Sierra backed off, indicating he had received assurances of assistance from other sources.($5) But it is not known whether Mold had made the offer at the behest of the American Educational League or for some other party. His affiliation with the league was just as a member. (56) (372) If an offer from gambling interests was ever made, it appears that Sierra either backed away from such an offer or began to dress it. in legitimate clothing after the adverse publicity. (373) The backers were identified in public in only the most nebu- lous terms. Sierra claimed several U.S. companies were behind his plans and these at first were only identified as the Lawver’s Corp. and the American Bankers. (57) Later, he frequently named such large corporations as United Fruit, Esso, Standard Oil, Du Pont, and United States Steel, among others. (58) 874) The Chicago office of the FBT closed its investigation of Sierra’s activities in June 1963. concluding that he was involved in a “eon job” rather than any real activities, hoodlum or otherwise. (49) (375) The FRI’s decision to close the investigation may have been justifiable at the time. since there was no indication either through money spent or by actual group-sponsored operations that Sierra had a viable organization.(60) The activities. however, were just beginning. (376) As soon as the organization was formally set up, Sierra and Felipe Rivero left on a trip to Nicaragua and Colombia to discuss plans for a military base of operations outside the United States. (67) They reportedly spoke with Luis Somoza in Nicaragua and also at- tempted to obtain the use of the Isle of Andres off of Colombia. (62) Tt was also reported that Sierra and Rivero traveled to New York, Chicago, St. Lonis, and Washineton. D.C., to meet with backers and make further arrangements.(63) Tater, it was learned that Sierra alone had spent a little over $11,000 on travel expenses by October 1963.(64) (377) The group was also spending money on arms and equipment by late summer 1963. Rich Lauchli, a well-known arms dealer from Collinsville, Il].. was contacted by Sierra in August to purchase a quantity of guns.(65) Soldier-of-fortune and Gerrv Patrick Hemming associate. Steve Wilson, was asked by Sierra to deliver the arms to Miami.(66) Sierra also ordered a two-man submarine from California in October 1963.(67) which was transnorted to Miami for storage in the earace of Cuban exile Manuel Acuilar. (68) (378) The FBI received information that Sierra had been on an arms shonping spree in Detroit accompanied by Jose Cardoso, and pur- chased $6.000 to $7.000 worth of weapons to be transported to Miami.(69) Dennis Lynn Harber, another Hemming associate, as- sisted Sierra in the transport of military equipment. (70) (379) Sierra was also holding discussions with several “action” eroups for assistance in a militarv operation against Cuba.(77) Among those contacted who renorted]v sioned “pledges” of support were Aldo Vera Serafin of the militant MAPA group (American Patriotic Ac- tion Movement) :(72) Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and Antonio Veciana 109 Blanch of the SNFE-Alpha 66 alliance; (73) Santiago Alvarez Rodri- guez of Comandos L;(74) Eduardo Mor Ruiz, an independent anti- Castro Cuban fighter ;(75) and Orlando Bosch of MIRR. (76) (380) Reports of funds given to those groups indicate Sierra was advancing modest sums from the alleged $650,000 at his disposal. Aldo Vera Serafin reportedly received $3,500(77) and Tony Cuesta of Comandos L received $1,000.(78) Members of the Junta’s board of officers also received contributions from Sierra. Carlos Rodrignez Que- sada received $2,800; Felipe Rivero Diaz received $1,890; and Gilberto Rodriguez got $1,500. (79) (881) There are various descriptions of the military operations allegedly being prepared by the Junta. On October 30, 1963, informa- tion was received that the Second National Front of Escambray had plans for an operation from a base in the Dominican Republic. (80) The arrangements were allegedly being made by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, head of SNFE, and Abel Camacho in Key West.(87) The: plan called for action against a bridge in Oriente Province and had been masterminded by Antonio Veciana and one of the engineers who had designed the bridge.(82) Consistent with this information, it was also reported to the FBI that the Junta offered soldier-of- fortune Joe Garman $11,000 to lead a raid on Oriente Province. (8?) (382) There were other reports that an attack on a Havana oil re- finery was planned.(&4) Still other reports simply indicated that al- though all-out war against Castro was the objective, a hit-and-run raid for publicity purposes would be attempted first. (85) (383) While all these activities were getting underway, Sierra had some conflict with other officers in the Junta. Gilberto Rodriquez Her- nandez was replaced as military coordinator in the summer of 1963 because, according to Sierra, Hernandez was feared to be a Castro agent.(86) In turn, Hernandez, who had returned from Cuban prison in April 1963 in the prisoner exchange, called Van Gorkum and Browder at Union Tank Car Co. and complained bitterly about Sierra’s lack of leadership. (87) | (384) After Sierra had signed a pact with Alpha 66-SFNE, another member of the Junta, Manuel Lozano Pino, resigned from his posi- tion as head of external relations.(88) He objected to the inclusion of such a “left-wing” organization, but also protested Sierra’s expendi- tures. (89) (385) These complaints may have had something to do with Sierra’s summons to Chicago in early November 1963 for a stormy session with Browder.(90) Sierra was blasted for wasting funds, reportedly total- ing up to $50,000.(97) According to sources of the CIA and FBI, Sierra was accompanied to the Chicago meeting with Armando Fleites of SNFE, and Browder allegedly ordered Sierra to turn over all moneys and supplies to the SNFE-Alpha 66 alliance.(92) Although several of the Junta officers had asked for Sierra’s replacement and had specifically named Jose “Pepin” Bosch as an attractive alterna- tive,(97) Sierra remained in place as the “guiding spirit” for the next 2 months :(9/) the remainder of the group’s existence. (386) A CIA memorandum reported on November 20, 1963, of the strange activities of Sierra and the Junta: 101 Although he (Sierra) has been some what ubiquitous among Cuban exile leaders in Miami since March 1963, he still remains somewhat of a mystery man in terms of his means of support, and indeed, his long-range objectives. (95) (387) The report also raised the question of how Sierra managed ‘to remain in the exile political scene so long. “Perhaps his mysterious backers are providing him with sufficient funds to keep the pot boiling for the present,” the writer of the memo conjectured.(96) Indeed, Sierra’s activities were not only continuing, but he also soon found himself the subject of interest i a Secret Service investigation into -a threat against the President.* Submitted by: GaEton J. Fonzz, Investigator. Parricia M. Orr, Researcher. REFERENCES (1) “Chronology of United States-Cuban Relations,’ Congressional Research ‘Service, Library of Congress (J. F. K. Document 010426). (2) Ibid. (3) Staff summary of FBI file for Paulino Sierra Martinez, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, pp. 1 and 2 (J. F. K. Document 012887). (4) Id. at p. 2 (ref. to FBI LHM re Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez, June 3, 1963). (5) Id at p. 1; see also staff summary of CIA file, p. 1 (CIA dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963). (6) See ref. 3 (CIA report, Apr. 30, 1963, p. 1, CIA report, May 7, 1968, and FBI 105-121010-8, May 5, 1963, teletype to Director from SAC, Chicago, re Paulino Sierra Martinez, p. 2 (J. F. K. Document 012887) ). (7) Id. at p.1 (ref. CIA report, Apr. 30, 1963). (8) Id. at p. 2 (ref. to CIA report, May 7, 1963, p. 3, FBI 105-121010—-8 memo to Attorney General from Director, p. 5, FBI 105—-121010-35, memo to Director from SAC, Chicago, May 3, 1977). (9) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (ref. to dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1968, and attachments). (10) Staff summary of CIA handbook, House Select Committee on Assassina- tions (J. F. K. Security 020). (11) Staff summary of FBI file for Carlos Rodriguez Quesada (ref. FBI 94-1— 19634, Aug. 28, 1963), House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (J. F. K. Document 012655). (12) Staff summary of CIA files, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (ref. dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963). (13) Id. at p. 1; see also staff summary of CIA handbook, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Security 020). (14) Staff summary of CIA handbook (J. F. K. Security 020) : see also ref. 3, p. 6 (ref. to FBI report, Feb. 25, 1964, from Miami, re Paulino Sierra Martinez) (J. F. K. Document 012887). (15) Staff summary of CIA handbook, House Select Committee on Assassina- tions (J. F. K. Security 020). (16) See ref. 3, p. 4 (ref. FBI memo from Chicago, June 26, 1963, re Paulino Sierra Martinez). (17) U.S. Secret Service report, Nov. 27, 1963, to Chief from SATIS Martineau, ‘Chicago, re Homer S. Echevarria. pp. 2 and 3. House Select Committee on Assas- sinations (J. F. K. Document 007601) : see also Secret Service Report 1266, file ‘CO-2-34, 104, Dec. 19, 1963, from Tucker and Noonan, pp. 4 and 5. *See the agency performance section I D 1 of the committee’s report for more information about this threat. 102 (18) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations (rough notes) (ref. CIA report, Nov. 17, 1963). (19) See ref. 3, p. 1 (ref. FBI Report 105-121010 of departure, Jan. 8, 1963). (20) Id. at p.2 (ref. CIA report, May7, 1963). (21) Id. at p. 8 (ref. FBI memo, June 3, 1963, re Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez). (22) Id. at p. 4 (ref. FBI memo, June 26, 1968, re Paulino Sierra Martinez. ) (23) Ibid. (24) Id. atp.8 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963, from Miami). (25) News article, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 10, 19638 (J. F. K. Document 013397). (26) Staff summary of CIA handbook, House Select Committee on Assassina- tions (J. F. K. Security 020). (27) Ibid. (28) See ref. 3, p. 6 (ref. FBI report, Feb. 25, 1964, from Miami, re Paulino Sierra Martinez, information from Gilberto Rodriguez Fernandez). (29) Ibid. (30) Summary of CIA files, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 6, undated report. (31) Staff summary of FBI file for Carlos Rodriguez Quesada (ref. FBI Rept. 105-1210-31, Jan. 28, 1964, from Chicago, re Paulino Sierra Martinez), House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3. (32) Ibid. © (33) See ref. 3, p. 1 (ref. news article, May 19, 1963, Miami News, Miami). (34) Id. at p.2 (ref. CIA report, May 7, 1968). (35) Id. at p. 4 (ref. FBI memo from Chicago, June 26, 1963, re Paulino Sierra Martinez). (36) Ibid. (37) Ibid. (38) Id. atp. 2 (ref. FBI Rept. 105—-121010-2, June 14, 1963). (39) Id. at p..2 (ref. FBI Rept. 105-121010-38, May 25, 1963,Lag to Director from SAC, Chicago, re Paulino Sierra Martinez). i10) Thid. (41) Ibid. (2) Id. at p. 3 (ref. FBI memo, June3, 1963, re Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez). (43) Id. at p. 4 (ref. FBI memo, June ‘99, 1963, re Paulino Sierra Martinez). (44) Tbid. (15) Ibid. (46) Id. at p. 2 (ref. CIA report, May 7, 1963) ; see also staff summary of CIA handhook, House Select Committee on Assassinations. (47) See ref. 3, p. 7 (ref. FBI memo, Sept. 28, 1963, re Paulino Sierra Martinez). (48) Staff summary of CIA undated report, House Select Committee on Assassi- nations, p. 6. (49) Thid. (50) Thbid. (51) Thid. (52) Id. at p. 3, CIA undated report. (53) Thid. (54) See ref. 3, p. 7 (ref. FBI memo to Director from SAC, Miami, Dec. 10, 1963, re Americanism Educational League). (55) Thid. (56) Ibid. (Note: Mold was also listed as a member of Uanitovtentes for Freedom” at the same address as the American Educational League. There is no evidence that this group was ever investigated by the FBI. See House Select Committee on Assassinations staff summary of CIA file, p. 6, undated CIA report.) (57) See ref. 3, p.1 (ref. CIA report, Apr. 30. 1963). (58) Td. at p. 11 (ref. CIA report. July 5, 1963): see also p. 2 (ref. CIA report, Mav 7. 1963: and staff summary of CTA file, House Select Committee on Assassi- nations, n. 6. CTA memorandum, May 9, 1963). (59) See ref. 3. p. 3 (ref. memo to Director from SA, Chicago, June 26, 1963, re Paulino Sierra Martinez). (f0) This conclusion is based on a review of all documents pertaining to Sierra. (61) See ref. 3, p. 10 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 7. 1963), and p. 11 (ref. report 406, Julv 5. 1963). (62) Staff summary of CIA files, House Select Committee on Assassinations, ny. 10 (ref. CTA report. Nov. 7, 1963). (fK2) See ref. 3, p. 9 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963, from Miami, re JGCR, p. 41). 64) Id. at p.9 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 14, 1963). 3 103 (65) Id. at p. 7 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 14, 1963, from Miami re INTERPEN), p. 8 (FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963, from Miami re JGCE, pp. 29-30) ; see also Gerry Patrick Hemming chronology from FBI files. (66) See ref. 3, p. 8 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963, from Miami re JGCE, pp. 29-30). (Note: The use of soldiers-of-fortune types such as Wilson and Garman may have been a result of prior contact with Hemming’s men by Carlos Rodriguez, Quesada and the MILTN. See FBI notes—Quesada, Hemming chronology). (67) Id. at p.10 (ref. CIA report, Oct. 16, 1963). (68) Ibid. (Note: Aquilar’s group affiliation was unknown. However, he was known to be acquainted with Loran Hall, Lawrence Howard and William Sey- mour, who spent much time at Aquilar’s house. See memo, June 5, 1968, of con- versation with Aquilar. See also Nov. 1, 1963 memo re Hemming complaint that Hall stole a rifle and that Hall was staying with Aquilar at that time). (69) See ref. 3, p. 6 (ref. FBI memo, Novy. 1, 19638, from Miami re SNFE). (70) Id. at p. 7 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 22, 1963) ; see also staff summary, p. 2 (ref. CIA report 4039, Nov. 14, 1963). (71) Id. at p. 9 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963, from Miami, JGCH, p. 43) and p. 5 (ref. CIA report, May 17, 1963) ; see also staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (ref. dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963, with attachment). (72) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (ref. dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963, with attachment). (73) Id. at pp. 1-2 and p. 5 (ref. CIA memo Apr. 18, 1968). (74) Id. at p. 2 (ref. dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963, with attachment). (75) Ibid. ; see also J. F. K. Document 012887 (ref. CLA report, Sept. 27, 1963). (76) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 9 (ref. CIA report, Sept. 14, 1963). (77) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 14, 1963). (78) Summary, p. 8, note 3 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1968 from Miami re JGCH, pp. 29-80). (79) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 14, 1963). (80) See ref. 3, p. 7 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 1, 1963, from Miami re SNF E). (87) Ibid. (82) Ibid. (83) Id. at p. 8 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963, from Miami re JGCH, pp. 29-80). (84) Id. at p. 10 (ref. CIA report, Oct. 15, 1963) ; see also staff summary of CIA file. House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (ref. report, Oct. 15, 1963 extract). (85) Summary, CIA handbook. (86) See ref. 3, p. 9 (ref. FBI memo, Nov. 2, 1963, from Miami re JGCH, p. 37). (87) Id. at pp. 10-11 (ref. CIA report. Sept. 13. 1963). (88) Staff summary, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (ref. CIA report, Noy. 14, 1963, extract) ; see also J. F. K. Document 021887, p. 9 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 14, 1963). (89) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (ref. CIA report, Nov. 14, 1963). (90) See ref. 3, p. 8 (ref. CIA report, Dec. 11, 1963). (91) Ibid.; see also staff summary of CIA file. House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (ref. dispatch 12627, Nov. 20, 1963, with attachment). (92) See ref. 3, p. 8 (ref. CIA report, Dec. 11, 1963). (93) Id. at p.11 (ref. CIA report, Sept. 18, 1963). (94) Staff summary of CIA file, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (ref. dispatch 12627, Noy. 20, 1963, with attachment). (95) Thid. (96) Tbid. Or eas See VATALLAL 6 me bali. Aue Tee HOT) COGS. 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Ak suas tt}haba at & LVS Rie,pete ot rtnateitysTare), &tls hivo a Te ‘ T samiaint AE, i atl murs AT, IN hat 393 34 ne¢.1; BORE EL eBarvast ta DT +4 PETG si no, antsformer japlet!suwEL alin. AD yer sia Mae-T, 28 “i stat 2nARDAREEY Oi ah er M4, TOK falas ae ht (atiawa wy ALLEY LA menorandarnm, Vay ¥ ate pteBl 5 (37) S ed Sot Ri (eer. mewnsh bo °S*eees Ceoam & A, ih’ dhicas raftp ee : re Pawih terra Wisertines ) . a ‘ el ' ie eer yi tet flv Tae ona rere 2? oF v Tees pert Aion LAT Rem eee, & He Te (ret. CLA repest fan wb, op. 2 (mt a Joie, tae aa 59) Seat mena of (HA Mda, TF, eynia, etl voy} Cresmvtiieg om ae not epee? OFA vepoet Now. 7, 70h), 62) Sue prof, 3p. 9 {eer PRT wienin, Mee, 2, 1960, trav Miamt, ra FOO {67) teat yp 0 (ref CLA coport, No ’. 14, 1068) XII. DAVID FERRIE (388) In connection with its investigation of anti-Castro Cuban groups, the committee examined the activities of David William Fer- rie, an alleged associate of Lee Harvey Oswald. Among other conten- tions, it had been charged that Ferrie was involved with at least one militant group of Cuban exiles and that he had made flights into Cuba in support of their counterrevolutionary activities there. (889) On Monday afternoon, November 25, 1963, Ferrie, Moreover, voluntarily presented himself for questioning to the New Orleans police, who had been looking for him in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy.(/) The New Orleans district attorney’s oflice had earler received information regarding a rela- tionship between Ferrie and accused assassin Lee Harvey Oswald, (2) including allegations that: Ferrie may have been acquainted with Oswald since Oswald’s days in the Civil Air Patrol youth organization in 1954-55, Ferrie may have given Oswald instruction in the use of a rifle and may have hypnotized Oswald to shoot the President, and that Ferrie was in Texas on the day of the assassination and may have been Oswald’s getaway pilot. (2) (390) Ferrie denied all the contentions, stating that at the time of the President’s assassination, he had been in New Orleans, busy with court matters for organized crime figure Carlos Marcello, who had been acquitted of immigration-related charges that same day.(4) Other individuals, including Marcello, Marcello’s lawyer, the lawyer’s secretary, and FBI agent Regis Kennedy, supported Ferrie’s alibi.(5) (391) Ferrie also gave a detailed account of his whereabouts for the period from the evening of November 22, 1963, until his appearance at the New Orleans police station.(6) Interviews of Ferrie’s associates and the results of a field investigation verified Ferrie’s statements. (7) (392) Ferrie’s assertion that his Stinson Voyager airplane could not be flown at the time of the assassination was later verified by the FBI.(8) Jack Martin, a New Orleans private detective and colleague of Ferrie, who had originally mentioned Ferrie to New Orleans offi- cials, subsequently informed authorities he had no specific information to support his allegations. (9) Thus, the FBI and the Warren Commis- sion concluded that the stories relating to an Oswald-Ferrie relation- ship were unfounded. (393) Ferrie died in 1967, shortly after New Orleans District Attor- ney Jim Garrison announced he was reopening the Kennedy probe and was interested in Ferrie’s activities in 1963. While there was much spec- ulation that his death may have been suicide, the New Orleans coroner determined the death was a result of natural causes. (10) Nevertheless, this further fueled suspicion about his activities. (394) The committee determined that Ferrie’s activities during the months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy warranted examination. The committee was particularly concerned about the (105) 106 possibility of a relationship between Oswald and Ferrie. Several par- allels in the lives of the two emerged : complex personality and political beliefs ;difficulty in achieving normal social adjustment; and a pattern of visiting the same locality at the same time, and engaging in similar activities. (395) . Garrison papers, Nat Orleans Police report, Nov. 22, 1963 (J. F. K. Document 001986) : Note: There are conflicting reports as to why Banister attacked Martin. Martin has told the committee that it was Over {22 a remark he (Martin) had made in jest about the Kennedy assassination. Banister’s secretary, Delphine Roberts, who was also present, told the committee the two men came to blows when Martin tried to remove certain files from the oftice (see interview of Jack Martin, Feb. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.3 (J. F. K. Document 000212) and interview of Delphine Points Roberts, July 6, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations, Dp. Sid denen K. Document 009978) ). The original police report referenced above indicates Banis- ter and Martin were engaged “in various discussions about personal and political subjects” when the matter of the long-distance telephone calls came up and the conversation grew heated. | (182) Ibid. (183) FBI interview of G. Wray Gill, Nov. 27, 1968, p. 219, SA J. Smith ; FBI teletype, Nov. 26, 1963, to SAC Dallas and Director from SAC, New Orleans, pp. 2-38, 7, and 15. (184) Ibid. \ (185) Ibid., pp. 2-4 and 7-8; letter from Jack Martin to Richard Robey, FAA investigator, Nov. 25, 1963, FAA. voi. 4 (J. F. K. Document 014904). (186) FBI report, Nov. 25, 19638, interview of Layton Martens, St. Hoverson, 0.12 €p."302):. “ice FBI report, Nov. 25, 1963, interview of Alvin Beauboeuf by SA Scheffer . 807). see FBI report, interview of Layton Martens, Nov. 27, 1963, SA Hoverson, p. 2 (p. 303). (189) Ibid. (190) FBI teletype, Nov. 26, 1968, to Director from SAC, New Orleans, p. 16. (191) Ibid., Secret Service report, Dec. 13, 1963, CO-—2-34, 030, p. 4 (J. F. K. Document.003840). (192) FBI teletype, Nov. 26, 19638, to Director from SAC New Orleans, pp. 11-17; Secret Service report, Dee. 18, 1968, CO-—2-34-030, p. 3 (J. F. K. Docu- ment 003840). (193) FBI teletype, Nov. 26, 1963, to Director from SAC New Orleans, pp. 12-13 ; statement by David W. Ferrie in FBI file, p. 580. No. 44-2064. Dee. 10, 1963. (194) FBI teletype, Nov. 26, 1968, to Director from SAC New Orleans, p,,13; FBI interview of G. Wray Gill, Nov. 27, 1968. (195) FBI interview of David Ferrie, Nov. 26, 1968, No. 89-69, pp. 3—4. Ferrie’s activities for the period Nov. 22-25, 1963 are described in detail in this report; see also FBI interview of Melvin Coffey, Nov. 30, 1963, New Orleans, SA EB. Wall. (196) FBI report, No. 62—109060—2143, Dee. 18, 1963. (197) FBI report, No. 62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 1, interview of Lee Fletcher. (198) Ibid. (199) Ibid. (200) FBI report, No. 62-109060-2148, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 1, interview of Chuck Rolland. Ferrie called ahead on Nov. 22, 19638, arrived Nov. 23, 1963 between 3 :30: and 5:30, did not discuss operating rink as Ferrie had suggested he would. (201) FBI teletype, Nov. 26, 1963, to Director from SAC, New Orleans, p. 14. (202) FBI report, No. 62-109060—2143, Dee. 18, 1963, p. 2. (203) FBI report, No. 62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 1. (204) FBI report, No. 62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 2. Hotel registration card No. 38063 ; checked in 11 p.m., Nov. 28, 1963; checked out Noy. 24, 1963. Mrs. Shirley Dial, clerk at the Driftwood Motor Hotel, recalled three individuals checked out at around 10 a.m. on Novy. 24, 1963. (205) FBI report, No. 109060-2148, Dee. 18, 1963, five calls made from Alamotel, Houston, and one call made from Driftwood Motor Hotel, Galveston. (206) FBI report, No. 62-109060-2143, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 1. (207) FBI report, No. 62-109060-21438, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 1—indicated Ferrie called 947-6435 in New Orleans collect. (208) Deposition of Mrs. Jesse Garner, House Select Committee on Assassina- tions, p. 34. Note: While Mrs. Garner believes it was the night of the assassina- tion, it would appear, given that Ferrie left New Orleans that evening, that Ferrie may have come by her house on a later date. (209) Ibid. anSeat Ferrie file, item DF-7, Mar. 11, 1968, Garrison file (J. F. K. Document (211) FBI report, Nov. 27, 1963, interview of Roy, p. 212, McCoy 105-82555-10, SA Callendel. XIII. 544 CAMP STREET AND RELATED EVENTS (460) On August 9, 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested on Canal Street in New Orleans and charged with disturbing the peace.(Z) The arrest was the result of a confrontation with anti-Castro Cuban exile Carlos Bringuier and two of his associates, Miguel Cruz and Celso Hernandez.(2) Oswald was handing out pro-Castro leaflets(3) when Bringuier, Hernandez and Cruz approached him.(4) When Hernandez tried to take the leaflets from Oswald, a shouting match began ;(4) the New Orleans police then intervened, arresting all four individuals. (6) (461) Samples of Oswald’s literature were confiscated by the po- lice.(7) One of the pamphlets bore the hand-stamped imprint of an address for the pro-Castro Fair Play for Cuba Committee—of which Oswald was the president and only member in New Orleans—as “544 Camp Street, New Orleans, La.” (8) (462) This pamphlet was among the materials turned over by the New Orleans police department to the Secret Service following the assassination. (9) The Secret Service and the FBI then set out to inves- tigate the 544 Camp Street address.(/0) These agencies established several facts: (463) The address had been stamped with a home printing kit in the same manner Oswald had stamped other literature with his alias “A. J. Hidell” or “L. H. Oswald,’ (7/) indicating it was by Oswald’s own hand that the 544 Camp Street address was printed on the pamphlet. (464) It was learned also that Oswald had written to the national president of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, Vincent T. Lee, on August 1, 1963, 8 days before his arrest.(72) In the letter, Oswald mentioned he had rented an office for his local FPCC chapter, but was told to vacate after 3 days because the building was to be re- modeled. (73) (465) The FBI and the Secret Service investigation apparently fo- cused on whether or not Oswald actually had rented an office at the 544 Camp Street address. (74) (466) In interviews with the FBI and the Secret Service, the build- ing owner, Sam Newman, denied renting an office to Oswald.(44) Others renting office space at 544 Camp Street were questioned, but none recalled seeing Oswald at the Newman Building or elsewhere in New Orleans. (76) (467) During the course of that investigation, however, the Secret Service received information that an office in the Newman Building had been rented to the Cuban Revolutionary Council from October 1961 through February 1962.(77) Leaders of the CRC were contacted and asked if they had any association with or knowledge of Oswald or the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.(78) The Cubans said they had none because they had vacated the building 15 months prior to Os- wald’s appearance in New Orleans. (79) (123) 124 (468) The investigation of a possible connection between Oswald and the 544 Camp Street address was closed. (20) The Warren Com- mission findings concurred with the Secret Service report that no addi- tional evidence had been found to indicate Oswald ever maintained an oflice at the 544 Camp Street address. (27) (469) The committee investigated the possibility of a connection between Oswald and 544 Camp Street and developed evidence pointing to a different result. (470) The committee learned that the Newman Building occupied the corner lot facing Lafayette Square. On one side its address was 544 Camp Street. (22) Its other entrance was addressed 531 Lafayette Street. (23) It was a three-story granite structure owned and operated by Sam Newman as a rental income property for commercial offices. (24). (471) The committee interviewed Sam Newman and other witnesses to obtain a complete list of the occupants of the building for the period from May 1963, when Oswald arrived in New Orleans, to Sep- tember 1963, when he departed. (472) Newman told the committee he had great difficulty renting space in the building. (25) Consequently, there were few tenants there in the summer of 1963. ‘The Camp Street address was the main en- trance to offices for two workers’ associations: the Hotel, Motel, and Restaurant Workers’ Union and the Amalgamated Association of Street Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America. (26) It was also the entrance that led to the quarters of the building’s jani- tor, James Arthus.(27) There was only one office at the Lafayette Street address, that of Guy Banister Associates, a private investigative firm.(28) The offices once rented by the Cuban Revolutionary Council at 544 Camp Street still lay empty.(29) “Mancuso’s,” a small coffee shop, was located on the ground floor with its own entrance onto the corner of Camp and Lafayéette Streets. (30) (473) The committee located and interviewed individuals associated with these organizations. Whenever possible, the committee obtained relevant records from the organizations to check for any link to Os- wald or persons implicated in the assassination investigation. The com- mittee investigation produced no evidence of any connection between Oswald and any person or organizations occupying the Newman Building in 1963, except for that involv ing Guy Banister’s private detective agency. (474) Before discussion of the investigation of the Banister office, this material sets forth the results of the investigation into the other occupants of 544 Camp Street. (475) The Hotel, Motel, and Restaurant Employees Union is known today as the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders’ Union (International).(37) Although the committee was unable to locate personnel who had worked in the office at 544 Camp Street and had been interviewed by the Secret Service following the assassination, the committee did obtain a “master” membership list from the union. (32) The lists contained names of members for the years 1962 through 1964 that were studied for names of associates of Oswald or others of inter- est in the investigation. Among the names appearing on the list as a member from October 30, 1962, “through April 1963” was Kerry 125 Thornley,(33) who had been an acquaintance of Oswald’s for “3 or 4 months” in 1959 when both were stationed at the El Toro Marine Corps base in Santa Ana, Calif.(24) Later, Thornley learned of Oswald’s defection to the Soviet Union from newspaper accounts. (35) Thorn- ley found the story so interesting that he set out to write a novel based on Oswald’s defection. (36) (476) Nevertheless, the committee’s investigation of Kerry Thornley uncovered nothing of significance in the appearance of Thornley’s name on the list of members of the union. As reflected in the union’s records, Thornley dropped his membership after April 1963. (37) Thornley had left New Orleans to travel to California and Mexico and did not return to New Orleans until August 1963,(38) leaving little overlap of time in which Oswald and Thornley could have possibly come in contact. (477) Thornley firmly denied contact with Oswald at 544 Camp Street in New Orleans or at any time since his Marine Corps days.(39) His statements have been corroborated and no evidence has been found to contradict him. (478) The committee also located and interviewed George S. Gay, present president of the Amalgamated Association of Street Electric Railway and Motor Employees of America.(40) Gay has been presi- dent of the union since 1960(47) and confirmed for the committee that the union’s office was located in the Newman Building in 1963.(42) While Gay reiterated what he had told Secret Service agents, that he did not recall ever seeing Oswald in the building,(43) he told the com- mittee he was not in the office very much due to frequent. business trips.(44) He said he did not mingle with the other tenants in the building.(45) Gay believed the union’s secretary at the time, Mrs. Eugenia Donnelly, would have more information about others in the Newman Building. (46) Subsequent attempts to locate Donnelly proved futile and she was believed deceased.(47) Unfortunately, she was not questioned by investigating officials following the assassination of President Kennedy. (479) Jack Mancuso, owner of Mancuso’s Coffee Shop located on the ground floor of the Newman Building, was interviewed by committee investigators and questioned about his customers.(48) Mancuso re- called that Guy Banister and his associates Jack Martin and David Ferrie were “steady” customers, but Mancuso could not personally recall ever having seen Oswald.(49) Mancuso was not interviewed by FBI or Secret Service agents following the assassination. (50) (480) James Arthus was interviewed ‘by Secret Service agents im- mediately following the assassination. (57) He told the agents that an unknown man had ‘attempted to rent an office at 544 Camp Street, but that he had discouraged him.(52) Arthus could not describe the man and recommended the agents speak with “Mrs. Downing,” presumed to be Mrs. Donnelly, since she had also seen the man and could possibly provide a description of him. (63) As pointed out above, Mrs. Don- nelly was not interviewed by either the Secret Service or the FBI on this matter. The committee learned that Arthus died in 1967.(54) (481) The FBI and the Secret Service apparently failed to question all the occupants of 544 Camp Street, including a witness who may have had information about a man who had attempted to rent space 43-944—-79—_9 126 there. While the FBI did speak to Guy Banister, there is no indication from the report of that interview that Banister was asked any ques- tions about Oswald. Instead, he was asked about Serigo Arcacha Smith and the Cuban Revolutionary Council. (85) (482) The overall investigation of the 544 Camp Street issue at the time of the assassination was not thorough. It is not surprising, then, that significant links were never discovered during the original in- vestigation. The committee concentrated on an investigation of the activities and individuals in and around the office of Guy Banister, since this was the area of the least investigation in the days following the assassination. Various resources were consulted by the committee for information regarding Banister and his colleagues. These in- cluded: original documents from Banister’s office collected during the 1967-69 investigation into the Kennedy assassination by the New Or- leans District Attorney; investigative reports of the district attorney’s office dating from that investigation; materials amassed during the 1961-63 investigation of David Ferrie by Federal Aviation Adminis- tration officials including transcripts of Ferrie’s grievance hearings; information obtained from Aaron Kohn of the Metropolitan Crime Commission ot New Orleans: and information obtained from reviews of relevant files of the FBI, Secret Service, DOD and CIA. In addi- tion, the committee interviewed several surviving witnesses, many of whom had worked for or with Guy Banister. (483) According to one of Banister’s own biographical sketches dated March 1964, he was born in a log cabin in rural Louisiana in 1901, the eldest of 7 children.(56) He started his career in criminal justice with the police department of Monroe, La.(57) In 1934, he be- came a special agent for the agency of the Department of Justice that was soon to be named the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (58) Banister served in the FBI for 20 years, 17 of those years as special agent in charge.(69) He retired in 1954 to become assistant super- intendent for the New Orleans Police Department and was assigned the task of investigating police corruption.(60) After a falling out with the mayor of New Orleans, allegedly over Banister’s attempt to have the mayor indicted on charges of “malfeasance, etc.”, Banister quit public service and formed his own private detective agency, Guy Banister Associates, Inc. (67) (484) According to FBI files reviewed by committee staff, Ranister also became excessively active in anti-Communist activities after his separation from the FBI and testified before various investigating bodies about the dangers of communism.(62) The CIA file on Guy Banister indicated the agency considered in September 1960 using Guy Banister Associates for the collection of foreign intelligence, but ulti- mately decided against it (62), for several reasons. (64) Early in 1961, Banister helped draw up a charter for the Friends of Democratic Cuba, an organization set up as the fundraising arm of Sergio Arcacha Smith’s branch of the Cuban Revolutionary Council.(65) Banister described his work for the Council: Our work was primarily to gather food and clothing for the refugees. However because of my being known in con- 127 nection with that, [and] my background being known with Arcacha Smith and others, I have had high-ranking Cuban refugees in my office asking me how to go underground, and I gave them diagrams for that. I have talked to military and political leaders from the various provinces of Cuba that have slipped out and slipped back. (66) (485) The FBI files also indicate Banister was performing another service for the Cuban exile group. He ran background investigations on those Cuban students on the campus of Louisiana State University who wished to be members of Arcacha Smith’s anti-Castro group, ferreting out any pro-Castro sympathizers who might be among them.(67) Banister also talked Sam Newman into leasing 544 Camp Street to the Cuban Revolutionary Council. (638) (486) It was probably a result of such anti-Castro activities that Banister became acquainted with David Ferrie. Ferrie, an Hastern _ Airlines pilot, was also extremely active in Sergio Arcacha Smith’s anti-Castro group.(69) Ferrie shared Banister’s anti-Communist and anti-Castro fervor. (70) (487) Both Ferrie and Banister were implicated in a raid in late 1961 against a munitions depot in Houma, La., in which various weapons, grenades and ammunition were stolen.(77) Banister’s role may have been limited to storing the materiel which was reportedly seen stacked in Banister’s back room by several witnesses. (72) Others who actually participated in the raid, include Andrew Blackmon, a Ferrie associate and former Civil Air Patrol cadet, and Sergio Arcacha Smith, (72) (488) In February 1962, Ferrie requested Banister’s assistance in fighting his recent dismissal from Eastern Airlines.(74) Banister in- vestigated the case for Ferrie’s defense to charges brought by the air- line and local New Orleans police of crimes against nature and extor- tion.(75) In exchange, Ferrie provided Banister research services, such as analysis of autopsy reports.(76) Banister worked with Ferrie’s lawyer, G. Wray Gill, on this matter until its culmination in Ferrie’s hearing before the Airline Pilot’s grievance board in the summer of 1963.(77) Banister testified on Ferrie’s behalf during those hear- ings.(78) According to the statements of witnesses in the fall of 1963, Ferrie and Banister worked together again with G. Wray Gill for the defense of New Orleans organized crime head Carlos Marcello on a deportation case.(79) Little is known of Banister’s exact contribution to that investigation which ended in acquittal on the day and at almost the precise hour that President Kennedy was shot. (S0) (489) The long-standing relationship of Ferrie and Banister is sig- nificant since Ferrie became a suspect in the Kennedy assassination soon after it had occurred.(8/) The information to the district at- torney’s office that had put the spotlight on Ferrie had emanated from Banister associate, Jack Martin.(82) As detailed elsewhere in this staff report, although Ferrie was cleared of suspicion in the assassina- tion during the original investigation, the committee found evidence of a possible association between Ferrie and Oswald. (490) Although Banister was questioned by the FBI following the assassination in regard to the activities of the CRC at 544 Camp Street, 128 the FBI and the Secret Service failed to discover the significance of Banister’s connection to 544 Camp Street; Banister’s close association with a suspect in the assassination, David Ferrie; and Banister’s close association with Ferrie’s accuser, Jack Martin—all of which raised the question of what, if anything, was Banister’s relationship to Lee Harvey Oswald. (491) Witnesses interviewed by the committee indicate Banister was aware of Oswald and his Fair Play for Cuba Committee before the assassination. Banister’s brother, Ross Banister, who is employed by the Louisiana State Police, told the committee that his brother had mentioned seeing Oswald hand out Fair Play for Cuba literature on one occasion.(&3) Ross Banister theorized Oswald had used the 544 ‘Camp Street address on his literature to embarrass Guy.(84) Ross Banister did confirm Guy’s interest in the assassination and Oswald, but knew of no direct association between Oswald and Banister. (492) Ivan E. “Bill” Nitschke, a friend and business associate and former FBI agent,(85) corroborates that Banister was cognizant of Oswald’s leaflet distributing. Nitschke was deposed by the committee in July 1978.(86) He testified that he had known Banister when they were both in the FBI and for a short time worked for Banister in the office in the Newman Building. (87) (493) Nitschke said he never saw Lee Harvey Oswald at 544 Camp Street and does not know if Banister ever met Oswald.(88) Neverthe- less, Nitschke recalls that Banister became “interested in Oswald” during the summer of 1963 when Oswald had been distributing hand- bills.(89) Nitschke recalls Banister had some of these handbills in his office or made reference to them.(90) From the context of the con- versation, however, he was not pleased. (97) (494) Delphine Roberts, Banister’s long-time friend and secretary, stated to the committee that Banister had become extremely angry with James Arthus and Sam Newman over Oswald’s use of the 544 Camp Street address on his handbills. (92) (495) The committee questioned Sam Newman regarding Roberts’ allegation. Newman, could not recall ever seeing Oswald or renting space to him.(93) He did recall. however, asking a young man who was in the office once used by the Cuban Revolutionary Council to leave.(94) Newman did not think this person was Oswald.(95) New- man theorized that if Oswald was using the 544 Camp Street address and had any link to the building, it would have been through a con- nection to the Cuban Revolutionary Council or Banister’s office. (96) (496) The committee questioned other individuals once affiliated with Guy Banister, including: Joseph Newbrough and Vernon Gerdes, investigators who had worked with Banister in 1963; (97) Mary Helen Brengel, one of two secretaries in Banister’s office from approximately June 1963 to December 1963; (98) Louise Decker, a secretary in Banis- ter’s office for the period from October 1961 to January 1962;(99) Joseph Oster, one time partner of Banister’s who set up his own private detective agency, Southern Research, in 1958;(100) and Carlos Quir- oga, the Cuban exile who visited Oswald at his home on approximately August 16, 1963, endeavoring to learn more about the FPCC.(70/) Quiroga told the committee he frequently visited Banister’s office and Mancuso’s coffee shop in the company of Sergio Arcacha Smith and 129 David Ferrie when all were heavily involved in Cuban exile activities. (102) Yet this would have been in 1961 and 1962.(703) None of these individuals recalled seeing Oswald at 544 Camp Street. Several wit- nesses recommended the committee speak with Jack Martin or Del- phine Roberts since they were in most contact with Banister. (104) (497) Martin and Roberts have both been interviewed by the com- mittee on several occasions. Roberts, who initially refused to speak with the committee staff, told the committee she was very active in anti-Communist activities in the early 1960’s.(705) She said she worked with Banister as a volunteer typing correspondence, making files and clipping newspapers because Banister was working for what Roberts believed in.(106) Roberts claimed Banister had an extensive file on Communists and fellow travelers, including one on Lee Harvey Oswald, which was kept out of the original files because Banister “never got around to assigning a number to it.” (707) Roberts did not remember what was in the file other than that it contained general information on Oswald such as newspaper clippings.(708) Roberts also related the incident described previously in this section in which Banister became angry over Oswald’s use of the Camp Street address. (109) Roberts gave the committee her version of an incident that took place late in the evening on the day of the assassination. She said Jack Martin came into the office and approached the area of the office where the files were kept, when Banister walked in.(710) Banister accused Martin of stealing several files and hiding them in his coat. (777) When Martin protested, Banister pulled out his gun and struck Martin on the head, causing him to bleed.(772) Both men then went into Banister’s private office and continued their discussion beyond Roberts’ ear- shot. (773) (498) During another interview, Roberts told the committee that Oswald came into the office seeking employment and sometime later brought Marina in with him.(774) Contrary to her statements in the initial interview, that she had never seen Oswald, she stated that she saw Oswald come into Banister’s office on several occasions.(77/45) Because of such contradictions in Roberts’ statements to the committee and lack of independent corroboration of many of her statements, the reliability of her statements could not be determined. (499) A New Orleans police complaint filed by Jack Martin on No- vember 22, 1963, corroborated Roberts’ story insofar as it established Banister’s assault against Jack Martin with the pistol.(776) According to the renort. Martin and Banister had been drinking at a bar neigh- horinge the Newman Building, then visited the Banister’s office and became involved in various discussions about “personal and political subjects.”(777) They then began to argue about unauthorized long- distance telephone calls which Banister accused Martin of making from the office.(778) The discussion became more heated and Banister pulled out a 357 magnum revolver and hit Martin on the head four or five times with the butt of the gun.(779) When Martin began to bleed, Banister stopned hitting him and Martin went to the restroom to clean u9.(720) Banister told Martin to watch himself and be careful. (727) Martin then went to Charity Hospital for treatment, returned home and called the police to file the report.(722) Martin refused to press charges as Banister was “like a father” to him. (123) 130 (500) Martin was questioned by the committee regarding the inci- dent and for information about Banister’s office. Martin told the com- mittee he is a part-time investigator and writer, as he was in the early 1960’s.(724) Martin was one of the members of Banister’s investigative “pool” and was frequently in and out of Banister’s office. (125) Martin told the committee that on November 22, 1963, he was having drinks with Banister at a local bar and they got into an argument. (126) They went to Banister’s office and, in the heat of the quarrel, Banister said something to which Martin replied, “What are you going to do—kill me like you all did Kennedy?” (727) Banister drew his pistol and beat Martin in the head. (728) Martin believed Banister would have killed him but for the intervention of Banister’s secretary, who pleaded with Banister not to shoot Martin. (129) (501) It was the day after this incident that Martin related his suspicions about David Ferrie to the New Orleans district attorney’s office.(730) Martin had at one time been a close associate of Ferrie. (131) Ferrie told the FBI he met Martin in the fall of 1961, probably not long after Ferrie had met Banister.(732) Martin apparently shared Ferrie’s interest in obtaining a position with an ecclesiastical order, although Ferrie insisted he became involved with these religious orders only to assist Martin in a Department of Health, Education, and Welfare investigation into the sale of phony certificates of ordina- tion and consecration.(/32) Ferrie said he and Martin had a falling out when he put Martin out of attorney G. Wray Gill’s office in June 1963, because Gill did not want Martin “hanging around the office.” (734) Gall said Ferrie and Martin had been “close friends” until they got involved in an “ecclesiastical deal wherein Martin was supposed to represent a large territory of the Holy Apostolic Catholic Church of North America.” (735) Martin held Ferrie responsible for not get- ting the job and has “slandered Ferrie at every opportunity.” (736) (502) Martin has also told the committee he saw Lee Harvey Oswald with Ferrie in Guy Banister’s office in 1963. (137) Nevertheless, in light of Martin’s previous contradictory statements to authorities shortly after the assassination in which Martin made no such allegation about having seen Oswald, (738) it may be argued that credence should not be placed in Martin’s statements to the committee. (503) The committee sought to trace Banister’s office files that had been reportedly scattered to various individuals or agencies soon after Banister’s death in June 1964. (504) Mary Banister Wilson, Guy Banister’s widow, told the com- mittee she had not retained any of the files but had given many away to various organizations. (139) Mrs. Wilson said she sold some of Banister’s files to the Louisiana State police in a transaction involving Russell Willie of the State police.(740) She said another portion of the file was given to Aaron Kohn of the New Orleans Metropolitan Crime Commission. (7417) The committee learned several books from Banister’s collection went to Banister’s associate, Kent Courtney. (742) The rest of Banister’s “extensive” library of books was donated to the Louisiana State University Library. (743) (505) Russell Willie and Joseph Cambre of the Louisiana State Po- lice confirmed for the committee that they purchased from Mary Banister in late 1964 a five-drawer file containing file folders belonging 131 to the late Guy Banister.(744) The “half-filled” file cabinet contained 10 large manila folders, each subject titled and numbered.(745) One of the folders contained a group of 3’’ by 5’” index cards. (746) The in- dex cards contained numbers and subject headings corresponding to the file folders in the cabinet.(747) Not all the files listed in the index were among those files given to the Louisiana State Police; most of the files obtained by the State police dealt with Communist oroups and subversive organizations, according to State Police Officer Cam- bre.(Z48) Cambre recalled that although Lee Harvey Oswald’s name was not included among the main subjects of the files, Oswald’s name was included among the main subjects of the file on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. (749) Cambre had read the FPCC file and found news clippings and a transcript of a radio program in which Oswald had participated, presumably a transcript of the August 21, 1963, de- bate between Oswald and Carlos Bringuier on WDSU radio. (150) Unfortunately, this file was routinely destroyed in keeping with the requirements of the Privacy Act. (157) (506) Aaron Kohn, managing director of the New Orleans Metro- politan Crime Commission, “acknowledged that he received files from Mary Banister Wilson after Guy Banister’s death. (152) The files received by Kohn dealt with an investigation of corruption within the New Orleans Police Department, which Banister had conducted while he was assistant superintendent of police in New Orleans in the mid-1950’s. (153) (507) While the committee was unable to trace or recover all of Banister’s files, a partial index of the files was made available by Jim Garrison, former district attorney of Orleans Parish, La. (154) Garrison had sent investigators to the Louisiana State Police intelli- gence section in 1967 during his investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy.(755) The index did not include the name of Lee Harvey Oswald or the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. (756) (508) Thus, the committee could find no documentary proof that Banister had a file on Lee Harvey Oswald nor could the committee find credible witnesses who ever saw Lee Harvey Oswald and Guy Banister together. There are indications, however, that Banister at least knew of Oswald’s leafietting activities and probably maintained a file on him. As for Jack Martin’s reasons for calling attention to Ferrie as a suspect in the assassination, they may not have been based on personal knowledge—Martin never claimed such information—but his action seems to ‘have been based on sincere concerns and some legitimate sus- picions. Consequently, it is not possible to determine definitely the reasons for Banister’s assault on Martin the night of the assassination, Barn cet whether it had anything to do with Martin’s suspicions of errie (509) The primary import of the 544 Camp Street address must be analyzed within the context of evidence of a Ferrie-Oswald link. Un- touapalely, the precise nature of their relationship may never be snown (510) Ascan be seen by the committee investigation into Ferrie’s as- sociations and activities throughout his life and especially during the summer of 1963, there are several factors which explain why Ferrie and Oswald could have become closely associated, as improbable as this may seem: 132 (511) A. Both men spent considerable time in the same locale: Ferrie frequently visited the office of Guy Banister in the building at 544 Camp Street ;* Oswald worked only one block away and had used 544 Camp Street as the address of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Ad- ditionally, the testimony of a number of witnesses from Clinton, La., placing Oswald and Ferrie together in early September 1963, may be credible. Evidence also exists to support the belief that a Ferrie col- league, Guy Banister, knew Oswald’s pro-Castro leafletting. (512) B. Both men had similar, fervent interest in political topics, especially the Cuban question. Although Ferrie stood firmly on the anti-Castro side of the issue and Oswald was involved in pro-Castro activities, this alone would not rule out the possibility of an Oswald- Ferrie association. (513) Oswald, on at least one occasion, made a friendly over- ture to a known anti-Castro activist, Carlos Bringuier, the New Or- leans delegate to the Student Revolutionary Directorate (DRE) and even offered Bringuier assistance in military training of Cuban exiles. The Oswald-Ferrie association may have begun in the same manner, (514) OC. Significant to the argument that Oswald and Ferrie were associated in 1963 is evidence of prior association in 1955 when Ferrie was captain of a Civil Air Patrol squadron and Oswald a young cadet. This pupil-teacher relationship could have greatly facilitated their re- acquaintance and Ferrie’s noted ability to influence others could have been used with Oswald. (515) D. Ferrie’s experience with the underground activities of the Cuban exile movement and as a private investigator for Carlos Marcello and Guy Banister might have made him a good candidate to participate in a conspiracy plot. He may not have known what was to be the outcome of his actions, but once the assassination had been successfully completed and his own name cleared, Ferrie would have had no reason to reveal his knowledge of the plot. Further, fear for his life may have prevented him from doing so. (516) While it could not be definitely determined whether Ferrie had any contact with Oswald after Oswald left New Orleans on September 24, 1963, until the day of the assassination only 2 months later, the possible Oswald-Ferrie relationship is a significant Oswald association. Submitted by: . GAETON J. Fonzi Investigator. Parrictra M. Orr Researcher. *Strangely, although Ferrie seemed to be straightforward during his inter- views with FBI agents in discussing his opposition to Kennedy, his conflict with Jack Martin, his involvement in the Marcello case, et cetera, Ferrie denied outright that he had ever known “of the Cuban Revolutionary Front maintaining an office at 544 Camp Street, nor does he have any knowledge of Sergio Arcacha Smith maintaining an office at that address during the time he was head of the organization and later after he was replaced.” (1757) This is clearly in contradic- tion to the accounts of the witnesses on this subject. 133 REFERENCES (1) Report of the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 728 (hereinafter cited as the Warren Report). (2) Ibid. (3) Hearings before the President’s Commission on the Assassination of Presi- dent Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), vol. XXVI, CH-2966 A and B (hereinafter cited as Warren Commission Hearings). (4) Warren Report, p. 728; Deposition of Carlos Bringuier, May 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 126-129 (J. F. K. Document 009084). (5) Ibid. (6) Warren Report, p. 826. (7) Ibid. (8) XXVI, Warren Commission Hearings, p. 30, CE-3120, Pamphlet, ‘The Crime Against Cuba,” Corliss Lamont. (9) Ibid., vol. XXVI, p. 11, CH-3119, Secret Service Report, Nov. 30, 1963, CO-2-34,030. (10) Ibid.; FBI teletype, FOIA materials, 62-109060-1668, Nov. 26, 1968, pp. 1-3. (11) XXVYI, Warren Commission Hearings, CE-2966 A and B. (12) Ibid., vol. XX, Lee DE-7. (13) Ibid. (14) Warren Report, p. 408; XXII, Warren Commission Hearings, CE—1414; FBI teletype, FOTA materials, 62-109060-1668, Nov. 26, 1968, pp. 1-3. (15) Ibid. ; XXII, Warren Commission Hearings, CE-1414. (16) Ibid. (17) Ibid. (18) Ibid. (19) Ibid. (20) Ibid. ; FBI teletype, FOIA materials, 62-109060-1668, Nov. 26, 1963, pp. 1-3. (21) Warren Report, pp. 292 and 408. (22) Deposition of Sam Newman, Noy. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 21 (J. F. K. Document 014020). (23) Ibid. (24) Id. at p. 5. (25) Id. at p. 22. (26) XXII, Warren Commission Hearings, CH-1414, Secret Service Report, CO-2-34,030, pp. 4-5. (27) See ref, 22. (28) Id. at pp. 9,.21. (29) Id. at pp. 23-24. (30) Id. at p. 18. (31) Outside Contact Report with Attachment, Mrs. Anna Stewart, Apr. 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 007364). (32) Ibid., attachments: Rosters through October 1962, April 1963 and March 1964. (33) Ibid., roster through October 1962, p. 14 (first list) ; roster through April 1963, p. 16 (second list). (34) FBI teletype, FOIA material, 62-109060-1668, Noy. 26, 1963, p. 9. (35) Kerry Thornley affidavit, Jan. 8, 1976, p. 1, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 012740). (Note: This statement, while ram- bling and confusing, remains consistent on the major point that Thornley had no contact with Oswald after service in the Marines. ) (36) Ibid.: see also testimony of Kerry Thornley, May 18, 1964, XI, Warren Commission Hearings, pp. 96-97. (37) Outside Contact Report, Mrs. Anna Stewart, Apr. 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, attachment roster through March 1964 (J. F. K. Document 007364). (38) FBI teletype, FOTA material, 62-109060-1668, Nov. 26, 1963, p. 9. (39) Ibid.: Secret Service Report, Dec. 2, 1963, CO-2-34,030 (J. F. K. Docu- ment 003675) : Thornley testimony, XI, Warren Commission Hearings, 110. (40) Outside Contact Report, George S. Gay, Jan. 18, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 005191). 134 (41) XXII, Warren Commission Hearings, CE-1414, Secret Service Report, CO-2-34,030, Dec. 9, 1963, p. 5. (42) Outside Contact Report, George C. Gay, Jan. 18, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 005191). (43) Ibid.; XXII, Warren Commission Hearings, CH-1414, Secret Service Re- port, CO- 2-34, 030, Dee. 9, 1963, p. 5. (44) See ref. 42. (45) Ibid. (46) Ibid. (47) Outside Contact Report, George S. Gay, re: Eugenia Donnelly, June 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 009115). (48) Outside Contact Report, Jack Mancuso, Jan. 26, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 014120). (49) Tbid. (50) Ibid. (51) XXVI, Warren Commission Hearings, CE-3119, Secret Service Report, Nov. 30, 1963, CO-2-34, 030, p. 15. (52) Ibid. (53 Yalbid: (54) Outside Contact Report, re: James Arthus, June i, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 009047). (55) FBI Teletype, FOIA material, 62-109060-2668, Nov. 26, 1963, p. 2. (56) Material received from files of New Orleans district attorney’s office per- taining to investigation and trial of Clay Shaw, 1967-69, attachment D, section 5, regarding Guy Banister, ‘Biographical Sketch” (J. F. K. Document 007271). (57) Ibid. (58) Thid. (59) Ibid. (60) Ibid.: FAA materials, Svstems Board of Adjustments Grievance Hearing of David Ferrie, testimony of Guy Banister, Aug. 5, 1963, p. 828 (J. F. K. Docu- ment No. 014904). (61) See ref. 56. (62) Staff review of FBI files for Guy Banister, Oct. 28, 1978, pp. 1-2. (63) CIA document. (64) Staff review of FBI files for Guy Banister, Oct. 28, 1978, pp. 1-2. (Note: Coincidentally, Gerard F. Tujague, owner of Gerard F. Tujague, Ine. Forwarding Co., who had employed Oswald as a messenger from November 1955 to January 1956, was also a member and officer (vice-president) of Friends of Democratic Cuba (see FBI teletype, 62-109060-1668, Jan. 26, 1963, p. 5).) \(65) Ibid. \(66) See ref. 60, p. 828. (67) Staff review of FBI files for Guy Banister, Oct. 28, 1978, pp. 1-2. (68) Deposition of Sam Newman, Nov. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 22 (J. F. K. Document No. 014020). (69) Staff report, “Anti-Castro Activist and Organizations and Lee Harvey Oswald in New Orleans,” Appendix to the Hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d session (Wash- ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. X, par. 419ff (here- inafter the Anti-Castro Cuban staff report) . (70) Ibid., pars. 402 and 418. (71) FBI teletype, FOIA material, 62—-109060-5237, May 7, 1967, pp. 1-2. (72) Outside Contact Report, Vernon Gerdes, Jan. 10, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, p. 3 (J. F. K. Document No. 005208) ; see ref. 68, p. 49; Outside Contact Report, Jack Martin, Dec. 5, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 6 (J. F. K. Document No. 005212). (73) FBI teletype, FOIA material, 62-109060-5237, May 7, 1967, pp. 1-2. (74) See ref. 60, p. 825. (75) TIbid., p. 481. (76) Ibid. (77) Ibid. (78) Ibid., pp. 825-855. '(79) Outside Contact Report, Mary Helen Brengel, Apr. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document No. 008861) ; and ref. 69, Anti- Castro Cuban Staff Report, par. 439ff. (80) Ibid., par. 390. 135 (81) Ibid., par. 390ff. (82) Ibid., par. 392. (83) Outside Contact Report, Ross Banister, Feb. 20, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, p. 3 (J. F. K. Document No. 005967). (84) Ibid. (85) Ibid. (86) Deposition of I. EH. “Bill” Nitschke, July 31, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 5 and 12 (J. F. K, Document No, 012308). (87) Id. at pp. 12-14. (88) Id. at pp. 386-37. '((89) Ibid. (90) Id. at pp. 38-41. (91) Ibid. (92) Outside Contact Report, Delphine Roberts, July 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (J. F. K. Document No. 009979). (93) ‘See ref. 22, p. 27. (94) Id. at pp. 35-36. \(95) Ibid. (96) Id. at p. 30. (97) Outside contact report, Joseph Newbrough, Apr. 10, 1964, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (J. F. K. Document No. 009113). Newbrough was associated with Banister’s agency from approximately 1958 to 1964; Outside Contact Report, Vernon Gerdes, Jan. 10, 1978, House Select Committee on Assas- sinations (J. F. K. Document No. 005208). Gerdes was associated with Banister for the period 1960-63. (98) Outside contact report, Mary Helen Brengel, Apr. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (J. F. K. Document No. 008861). (99) Notes of an interview of Louise Decker, May 30, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 015045). (100) Outside contact report, Joseph Oster, Jan. 27, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 005207). (101) Deposition of Carlos Quiroga, May 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 21-27 (J. F. K. Document 009394). (102) Id. at pp. 50, 51, and 57. (103) Ibid. (104) See ref. 22, p. 31. Newman recommended the committee speak with Martin because he was in Banister’s office ‘90 percent of the time; every day almost” and he “kept up with all that stuff’ related to the Cubans. See also ref. 86. pp. 59-60. Nitschke told the committee, “* * * If you were trying to explore this to the fullest extent, I would say that Delphine (Roberts) would be No. 1 * * *,” (105) Outside contact report, Delphine Roberts, July 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (J. F. K. Document 009979). (106) Id. at p. 3. (107) Ibid. ‘(108) Ibid. (109) Ibid. (110) Ibid. (111) Ibid. (112) Ibid. (113) Ibid. (114) See ref. 105, p. 3. (115) Ibid. (116) Guy Banister file, Garrison papers, Aug. 14, 1977, item GB-2, “Report of Offense Against Persons,” Nov. 22, 1963, New Orleans Police Department (J. F. K. Document 002066). The report indicates the incident took place at 5:15 p.m. and was classified as “aggravated battery”; the motive was “sudden anger.” (117) Ibid. (118) Ibid. (119) Ibid. (120) Ibid. (121) Ibid. (122) Ibid. (123) Ibid. : (124) Outside contact report, Jack Martin, Dec. 5, 1977, House Select Commit- tee on Assassinations, p.1 (J. F. K. Document 005212). 136 (125) See ref. 86, pp. 9-16. (126) See ref. 124, p. 3. (127) Id. at p. 4. (128) Ibid. (129) Ibid. (1380) FBI interviews of Jack Martin, Nov. 25, 1963 and Nov. 27, 1963, Bureau file No. 89-69. (131) FBI interview of G. Wray Gill, Nov. 27, 1963, Bureau file No. 89-69, p. 2. (182) FBI interview of David Ferrie, Nov. 26, 1963, Bureau file No. 89-69, p. 9. (133) See ref. 124, p. 1; FBI interview of G. Wray Gill, Nov. 27, 1963, Bureau file No. 89-69, p. 2; and FBI interview of David Ferrie, Nov. 26, 1963, Bureau file No. 89-69, p. 9. See also FAA Systems Board of Adjustment Grievance hearings for David Ferrie, July 15-17 and Aug. 5, 1963, for more discussion of Ferrie’s and Martin’s involvement in unusual religious orders. (134) FBI interview of David Ferrie, Nov. 26, 1963, Bureau file No. 89-69, p. 9. (135) FBI interview of G. Wray Gill, Nov. 27, 1963, Bureau file No. 89-69, p. 2. (136) Ibid. (137) See ref. 124, p. 2. (1388) Ibid.; see also FBI interviews of Jack Martin, Nov. 25, 1963 and Nov. 27, 1963; Secret Service interview of Jack Martin, Nov. 29, 1963, ‘reported in report of Dec. 18, 1963, p. 5. Martin makes no mention of the alleged sighting of Oswald and Ferrie together. (139) Outside contact report, Mary Banister Wilson, Apr. 7, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 012448). (140) Ibid. (141) Ibid. (142) Outside contact report, Kent Courtney, Mar. 19, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 006676). (143) See ref. 189. (144) Outside contact report, Russell R. Willie, June 8, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 009262) ; outside contact report, Joseph Cambre, June 8, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 009263). (145) Ibid., outside contact report, Willie. (146) Ibid. (147) Ibid. (148) Outside contact report, Joseph Cambre, June 8, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document No. 009263). (149) Ibid. (150) Ibid. (151) Ibid. (152) Outside contact report, Aaron Kohn, Jan. 20, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document No. 005121). (153) Ibid. (154) Guy Banister file, Garrison papers, Aug. 14, 1977, item GB-1, index of Banster file (J. F. K. Document No. 002066). (155) See ref. 148. (156) Guy Banister file, Garrison papers, Aug. 14, 1977, item GB-1, index of Banister file (J. F. K. Document No. 002066). (157) FBI interview of David Ferrie, Nov. 26, 1963 and Nov. 27, 1963, Bureau file No. 89-69, p. 10. XIV. MANUEL RAY RIVERO (MRP-JURE) (517) When he first came into prominence as a Cuban exile leader, Manuel Ray Rivero was described as “softspoken and unassuming,” @ person of “highest intellect, sincerity, and conviction”—in other words, a natural leader.(7) In 1947, the 23-year-old Ray was granted a schol- arship by the Cuban Ministry of Public Works to study civil engineer- ing at the University of Utah.(2) Ray was in the United States for 2 years before returning to his native Cuba in 1949 and obtaining vari- ous positions in the engineering field, one of which was project man- ager for the construction of the Havana Hilton Hotel. (2) (518) Reacting to the excesses of the military rule of Fulgencio Batista, Ray organized the Civic Resistance Movement in 1957 and began supervising sabotage and acts of terrorism against the Gov- ernment.(4) His political posture and active resistance to Batista was recognized by Fidel Castro who, upon assuming control of the Government of Cuba, appointed Ray his Minister of Public Works in February 1959.(5) Within a few months of his appointment, Ray confided to two anti-Castro Cubans that he had recognized the symp- toms of communism in the Castro regime but was not prepared to con- spire against “I] Lider Maximo.” (6) (519) Ray’s tenure in Castro’s government was short lived. He was relieved of his official position in November 1959.(7) No definite reason for this sudden move has been documented but, according to one source, Ray did not leave Castro because of ideological or policy discrep- ancies, but rather because of a personality clash with Castro’s Minister of Labor who almost shot Ray after a stormy cabinet meeting.(8) Another theory about his leaving was that he opposed Castro’s plan to declare Hubert Matos a traitor and execute the Cuban revolutionary hero with whom Ray had been associated. (9) (520) For whatever reason, Ray did continue to permit his name to be associated with the Castro regime(20) until May 1960 when he formed the Revolutionary Movement of the People (MRP).(/7) (521) The MRP was an anti-Castro organization that believed that the ideas and aims of the democratic left best suited the needs and aspirations of the Cuban people.(72) It did not wish to reinstate the 1940 Cuban constitution, rather it favored continuation of the laws passed by Castro at the beginning of his regime(13) and advocated the regulation of private investment and nationalization of all utili- ties.(74) Associated with Ray in this underground organization were Rogelio Cisneros,(15) Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Felipe Pazos, and others. (76) (522) Organized in each of Cuba’s six provinces, the MRP was con- sidered the most important underground group.(17) Working in tightly organized cells, the leadership in one province was unaware of the identities of their counterparts in other provinces.(78) The MDC (137) 138 engaged in acts of sabotage and was supplied with explosives sent by launches from the Florida Keys. (19) (523) Having waited until May 1960 to organize his resistance group, Ray was criticized as being suspiciously tardy to the anti-Castro move- ment.(20) Charges of “Fidelism without Fidel” were made against him and the MRP because of their leftist ideologies.(2/) Perhaps for these reasons, Ray’s background was questioned by some in the State Department (22) and the Miami CIA station (23) when, in the summer of 1960, he was in the process of becoming a member of the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), a newly formed anti-Castro organization sponsored by the U.S. Government.(24) The U.S. Gov- ernment considered him an important political asset(25) and facili- tated his entrance into the United States(26) on November 10, 1960. (27) (524) Nevertheless, there was disagreement within the U.S. Govern- ment about Ray’s political compatibility with U.S. Government policy. In a memo for record, dated November 21, 1960, one officer declared “. . Ray did not politically represent anything to cheer about.” (28) An officer who met privately with Ray in November 1960 noted that his political posture was “doubtful” as far as U.S. Government acceptance was concerned,(29) and a further assessment portrayed Ray as so far “left in his thinking that he would be as dangerous to U.S. inter- ests as Castro.” (30) (525) Some prominent Cubans also expressed negative opinions about Ray, among them Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, president of the FRD. Miro opposed Ray because he considered his program too Marxist (37) and declared that Ray was bitterly anti-American as well as prob- ably totalitarian in his thinking.(32) Manuel Artime, head of the Movimento Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR), noted that Ray’s group was opposed to banning the Communist Party and in favor of “nationalizing everything.” (33) Although aware of his controversial political philosophy, attempts were continued to recruit Ray to join the FRD(34) because the White House and State Department pushed for his inclusion. (35) (526) Ray received full operational approval as a “political asset” on February 7, 1961.(36) He resisted joining the newly formed Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) just as he had resisted inclusion into the FRD. He said he felt the members of the CRC were too restrained and he did not want to become a part of a situation in which someone else was running the show for the exiles.(37) Three weeks before the Bay of Pigs invasion, however, Ray was persuaded to join the CRC asa show of unity. (38) (527) In recalling the events of this period, Ray told the committee that he was aware of the fact that certain influential and wealthy Americans, among them former Ambassador William Pawley, were opposed to him and that a lot of heavy propaganda was being cir- culated accusing him of being a Communist. (39) (528) Ray withdrew from the CRC shortly after the Bay of Pigs in- vasion. In a Miami news conference on May 28, 1961, he said the major reason for the MRP break with the CRC was that the Council had failed to live up to the written promises given it in March, out- lining conditions Ray had insisted upon before joining the organiza- 139 tion.(40) The first condition had been that the Council was to give first priority to the underground fighters in Cuba during the Bay of Pigs invasion. Second, Ray had insisted that anyone too closely asso- ciated with the Batista regime would not be used in the invasion. In addition, he said, he was to have been allowed prior approval of any appointment of invasion military leaders.(47) Ray told the assembled newsmen that his program to overthrow Castro was based on maxi- mum mobilization of the discontented people inside Cuba, and that he thought the leadership of this underground should come from Cubans who could prove they had access to such a potential force. (42) (529) Ray sought U.S. Government support for the MRP independ- ent of the Council,(43) claiming that the group had an effective un- derground organization but needed material and financial sup- port.(44) Ray felt the MRP had to be allowed to plan its own opera- tions and broaden its base of financial support to include sympathetic Latin American governments.(45) He was totally opposed to another large invasion. (46) (5380) A recommendation was made that Ray be given an initial $50,000 for operational expenses.(47) Reaction in the U.S. Govern- ment was immediate. Within 24 hours a memorandum was circulated, objecting to the recommendation and claiming that Ray did not ever produce any substantial military actions against Castro.(48) Ray was told to submit a “prospectus” of his plans for the MRP and advised that no financial help would be forthcoming until such a plan was reviewed. (49) (581) Ray went to Puerto Rico about July 1961, where he received sympathetic support for the MRP from the Governor of that island, Luis Munoz Marin, who personally liked Ray.(50) While Ray was in Puerto Rico, a member of the MRP underground in Cuba reported to the MRP Executive Council that he had been told that no mate- rial resources would be available for the group until Manuel Ray was dismissed as general coordinator.(57) Charging the U.S. Govern- ment with repeated interference in the affairs of the MRP, Ray re- signed so that there would not be any obstacle to the group’s co- hesion. (52) (5382) In October 1961, the Puerto Rican Planning Board announced that Ray had accepted a $12,000-a-year position as consultant to that Board.(63) Although there was no evidence that the Puerto Rican Government was supporting the MRP, Ray was looked upon with great favor by Puerto Rican officials(54) and he endeavored to re- build the MRP with Cuban exiles residing there. (55) (533) Although still associated with the national leadership of the MRP in April 1962,(56) Ray began formulating plans for a new anti- Castro organization, Junta Revolucionario Cubana (JURE) (57) which, he said, would be only political in nature.(48) Ray freely ad- mitted that this group, organized in July 1962(59) would cooperate with the CRC but ultimately hoped to dominate it. (60) (534) Concurrent with his JURE activities, Ray began giving information to the U.S. Government regarding possible recruitment or defection of Castro officials.(67) Specifically, he discussed plans to approach a Cuban Ambassador.(62) The degree of Ray’s success in this area is not documented, but his efforts continued into the sum- 140 mer of 1963.(62) It was noted that Ray’s abilities were quite impres- sive. (6. 3885 te June 1963, the concept of “Autonomous Operations” was inaugurated under which JURE could be financed independently, not through the CRC.(65) Military operations were also initiated (66) with Rogelio Cisneros as JURE military coordinator. (67) (536) Under his interpretation of the “Rules of Engagement of the Autonomous Operations,” Cisneros felt that JURE was not obligated to report its military or political plans to the U.S. Government but that the latter was obligated to finance JURE’s purchase of military equipment.(68) —- : (537) By the fall of 1963, Ray was devoting his full time to JURE, (69) traveling extensively in Latin American countriesto gain support which would allow JURE to mount resistance operations in- side Cuba.(70) Ray told this committee that he and Cisneros were in Caracas for this purpose on November 22, 1963. He remembered that the assistant to a Venezuelan official came into the JURE meeting shortly after lunch that day and announced that President Kennedy had been shot. (77) ! (588) In January 1964, Ray’s organization was making plans to move their operations to another area (72) and, at the same time, establish a guerrilla training base.(73) He also began to formulate plans for his own infiltration into Cuba (74) declaring that he would turn the oper- ation of JURE over to Rogelio Cisneros during his absence. (765) (589) Ray’s plan was delayed until May, at which time he quit his job in Puerto Rico and dropped out of sight.(76) His infiltration plans were known throughout the Miami Cuban exile community.(77) Soon the story spread to Cuba where Castro ordered a full-scale military alert and rounded up scores of suspected Ray supporters. (78) (540) After several days of bad weather and dodging Cuban patrol boats, Ray and his crew of seven,(79) including a reporter-photogra- pher team from Life magazine,(80) landed at the Anguilla Cays, 40 miles off the Cuban coast.(87) There Ray intended to make a final equipment check and a final radio transmission. (82) (541) Because of their proximity to Cuba, the Anguilla Cays were heavily patrolled by Castro forces and by the British who owned them. (83) The British discovered Ray and his group and their cache of weapons and explosives, arrested them for illegal entry into the Bahamas and took them to Nassau.(&4) The minimal fine of $14 was levied on each member of the group and each was admonished to never trespass again. (85) (542) Upon his release, Ray said that he was as determined as ever to infiltrate Cuba: “Fidel knows me,” he said, “and he knows I’m coming.” (86) (543) Compounding Ray’s problem was the revelation by the FBI and U.S. Treasury that Rogelio Cisneros had illegally purchased $50,000 worth of arms for JURE from a California arms manufac- turer.(87) It also caused considerable embarrassment.(88) Because of the autonomous nature of its relationship with JURE, no attempt was made to stop Revenue’s investigation. (89) Ray was told to move all his operations outside U.S. territory. (90) (544) In order to shore up his waning credibility within the Cuban exile community, Ray again tried to infiltrate Cuba in July 1964 but, again, his boat developed motor trouble and the plan was aborted. (97) 141 The failure this time led three exile groups to withdraw from JURE. (92) ve (545) All these events, from May through July, resulted in a decision to stop financing Ray until he ceased all activities from the U.S. main- land. (93) A final payment was made to the group to facilitate the move,(94) thereby “closing the books” on JURE.(9) (546) Ray kept his organization together until August 1968(96) al- though it was relatively ineffective. He personally maintained an interest in anti-Castro activities. In 1969, he called together a congress of Cuban exiles to create a new organization.(97) As late as 1972, he was actively engaged in the formulation of the People’s Revolutionary Party, hoping to reinvigorate the anti-Castro movement, (98), but it, too, failed to make an impact. (99) (547) In 1978, Ray was residing in Puerto Rico and headed his own engineering consulting firm in San Juan. (100) Submitted by: GAETON J. Fonzi Investigator. ELIzABETH J. PALMER Researcher. REFERENCES (1) CIA Cable to Director from MASH, Nov. 17, 1960. (2) FBI Manolo Ray references, section 2, p. 9, item 8 (J. F. K. Document 006468). (3) Ibid. (4) Memo to G. Robert Blakey, June 28, 1978, interview of Manolo Ray Rivero, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J. F. K. Document 009005). (5) Ibid. (6) E. Howard Hunt, Give Us This Day (New York: Popular Library Edition, 1963), p. 91 (hereinafter Hunt, Day). (7) FBI correlation study, Manolo Ray, file No. 97-4546, section 1, p. 2 (J. F. K. Document 005990). (8) CIA memo, July 16, 1962. (9) CIA report, Mar. 16, 1961. (10) See ref. 6, Hunt, Day, p. 92. (11) See ref. 4. (12) CIA document, June 9, 1962. (13) CIA document, Nov. 17, 1960. (14) Ibid. (15) CIA document. (16) See ref. 6, Hunt, Day, p. 92. = (17) Tad Szule, “Castro Foes Map Multiple Forays,” Apr. 10, 1961, New York mes. (18) Ibid. (19) Thid. (20) See ref. 6, Hunt, Day, p. 92. (21) CIA report, Oct. 17, 1960. (22) CIA memo, Sept. 27, 1960. (23) CIA cable from MASH, Sept. 29, 1960. (24) CIA memo, Sept. 7, 1960. (25) Thbid. (26) CIA eable to Director from MASH, Nov. 5, 1960. (27) CIA cable to Director from MASH, Nov. 11, 1960. (28) CIA memo for the record, Nov. 21, 1960. (29) CIA cable to Director from MASH, Noy. 17, 1960. (80) CIA memo for the record, June 2, 1961. (31) CIA information report, Dec. 22, 1960. (32) CIA memo, Mar. 16, 1961. (33) CIA cable from JMWAVE, Mar. 1, 1961. (34) CIA cable to Director from MASH, Nov. 17, 1960. (385) See ref. 6, Hunt, Day, pp. 172-173. 43-944—79——_10 142 (36) CIA administrative form. (37) See ref. 4. (38) CLA memo for the record, Mar. 27, 1961. (39) See ref. 4. (40) Sam Pope Brewer, “One Cuban Group Quits Exile Body,” May 28, 1961, New York Times. (41) Ibid. (42) Ibid. (43) CIA memo for the record, June 2, 1961. (44) CIA cable from JMWAVE, Apr. 29, 1961. (45) Ibid. (46) Ibid. (47) CIA cable from JMWAYVE, May 4, 1961. (48) CIA memo, May 5, 1961. (49) CIA memo, June 2, 1961. (50) CIA memo, Dec. 19, 1961. (51) Peter Kihss, ‘(Cuba Exile Group Criticizes CIA,” July 17, 1961, New York Times. (52) Ibid. (53) CIA memo, Oct. 10, 1961. (54) CIA eable to Director, July 2, 1962. (55) CIA memo, Dec. 19, 1961. (56) CIA document, Apr. 20, 1962. (57) CIA memo, July 25, 1962. (58) CIA memo, July 12, 1962. (59) CIA cable to Director, July 25, 1962. . (60) CIA memo, July 12, 1962. (61) CIA cable, July 25, 1962. (62) Ibid. (63) CIA eable to Director, June 19, 1963. (64) CIA dispatch, July 2, 1963. (65) CIA memo, July 9, 1964. (66) CIA memo, Aug. 23, 1963. (67) See ref. 4. (68) CIA eable to Director from JMWAVE, Sept. 11, 1963. (69) CIA draft, Oct. 4, 1963. (70) CIA cable to Chief, Oct. 22, 1963. (71) See ref. 4. (72) CIA eable to Director from JMWAVH, Jan. 14, 1964. (73) CIA cable, Feb. 4, 1964. (74) CIA cable to Director from JMWAVE, Mar. 28, 1964. (75) CIA memo, Apr. 14, 1964. (76) “The Hemisphere—Cuba,” Time, June 12, 1964, p. 48. (77) Ibid. (78) Ibid. (79) Ibid. (80) CIA cable to Director from JMWAVE, May 20, 1964; cable to Director from JMWAVE, June 8, 1964. (81) See ref. 76. (82) Ibid. (83) Thid. (84) Ibid. (85) Ibid. (86) Ibid. (87) CIA memo, May 20, 1964. (88) Ibid. (89) Ibid. (90) CIA memo, June 29, 1964. (91) CIA cable to Director, July 15, 1964. (92) CIA wire service printout, Miami, Fla., July 24, 1964. (93) CIA memo, June 29, 1964. (94) CIA, “Autonomous Operations—Operating Plan.” (95) CIA memo, draft, Sept. 22, 1964. (96) CIA cable, June 4, 1969. (97) Ibid. (98) See ref. 4. (99) Ibid. (100) Ibid. XV. ADDENDUM TO THE JUNTA DEL GOBIERNO DE CUBA EN EL EXILIO: CARLOS RODRIGUEZ QUESADA (548) Carlos Rodriguez Quesada was general coordinator of the Cuban underground movement known as the 30th of November, (7) named for an anti-Batista uprising on November 30, 1956, led by Frank Pais who was killed in the assault.(2) The organization was made up mainly of labor union members. (49 (549) Quesada was also a leader of the labor movement among sugar and agricultural workers in the Province of Las Villas and rose to national prominence in the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC).(4) Although Quesada had fought Batista with Castro and was elected to Secretary General of the CTC after Castro took power, he grew disgruntled with Castro’s Communist leanings. (5) (550) Likewise, the 30th of November that philosophically leaned toward socialism and nationalization of industry, was totally opposed to Castro and communism.(6) The group began across-the-board anti-Castro activities including guerrilla actions, sabotage, propa- ganda, and exfiltrations of members from Cuba.(7) The 30th of No- vember was considered to be one of the most effective organizations in the Cuban underground until infiltration by Castro agents and Cuban Government Tepression following the Bay of Pies invasion severely crippled its activities. (S) (551) Quesada and other 30th of November members were forced to seek asylum.(9) Quesada escaped to the United States in March 1961 aboard a fishing ‘boat. (10) (552) During his last days in the Cuban underground, Quesada had been in contact with U.S. agents in Havana.(/Z) Nevertheless, after he took asylum, he began to disagree with them about how to utilize the underground members within labor and peasant organiza- tions.(12) But the 30th of November did join the Cuban Revolution- ary Council, and was funded by it. (23) (553) Yet Quesada also had his troubles with the council. One in- cident occurred when Quesada went to Puerto Rico on a special op- eration for the council.(74) It was learned that Quesada had been independently courting sympathetic military leaders and Senators who disagreed with what was then State Department policy toward Cuba. (15) At the same time, Quesada was involved in discussions among the leaders of the DRE, MRP, and the 30th of November about faye a new unity group outside the council organization umbrella. 15a (554) These activities put Quesada at odds with the council leader- ship and in March 1962 he was expelled by Antonio de Varona, the council’s general coordinator, for “lack of discipline.” (76) The actual reason given for Quesada’s expulsion was his involvement in orga- nizing a hunger strike in Bayfront Park in Miami at which 152 people (143) 144 were arrested.(17) The strike had been planned as a peaceful demon- stration during President Kennedy’s March 10 visit to Miami. (78) The strikers called for aid for the liberation of Cuba and the resigna- tion of Jose Miro Cardona as head of the council.(79) Other well- known Cuban exile leaders such as Laureano Batista Falla of the MDC had joined Quesada in the protest.(20) The so-called peaceful demonstration, however, deteriorated into a wild melee and the arrests ensued. (555) A few weeks later, Quesada held a press conference criticizing the council.(27) These actions caused a division among the members of the 30th of November.(22) Part of the group elected to remain with the council while Quesada set up a rival faction named the Movimento Revolucionario de Frank Pais. (23) Because the 30th of No- vember had been so closely identified with Quesada and his followers, Quesada’s group continued to be referred to as the 30th of November. Having lost the healthy council subsidy, however, Quesada spent the next few months trying to gain recognition for his group and find ways to fund it. (24) : (556) The group soon became known as one of the more outspoken of the anti-Castro organizations. In April 1962 an FBI report noted that the group’s leaders no longer trusted the U.S. Government. (25) Quesada revealed that in a February 1962 operation the 30th of No- vember group had given names of the participants in Cuba to the CIA but those individuals had been subsequently arrested. (26) (557) By 1963, Quesada’s attitude toward the U.S. Government showed no signs of softening. In March, he wrote a letter to President Kennedy requesting immediate armed intervention in Cuba to fight. communism. (27) “You are either with or against America,” Quesada claimed. (28) (558) Shortly after, Quesada and his followers joined Paulino. Sierra’s Junta del Gobierno de Cuba en el Exilio.(29) Quesada be- came the junta’s head of internal affairs. (30) (559) Several reports reviewed by the committee, however, raise questions about Quesada’s motivation in joining the junta. One report indicated Quesada wanted respectability to cover illicit dealings. (37) The report also suggested Quesada was living suspiciously high for someone receiving assistance from the Cuban Refugee Center. (32) Other reports were more critical. One called Quesada unreliable and untrustworthy, describing him as a man who surrounds himself with “thieves, homosexuals and drug addicts.” (33) (560) In early 1964, after the junta had ceased activities, Quesada was expelled from his own group, the MRFP.(34) There were re- Pree Quesada had been misappropriating funds for his own use. (561) In assessing Quesada’s role in the Junta del Gobierno de Cuba and the effectiveness of the junta itself, Quesada’s personal relation- ship with the anti-Castro organizations may be significant. Several reports reviewed by the committee suggest that “opportunists” made: up much of the membership of the junta and contributed to its final demise. (36) Quesada may well fit into that category of individuals who- sought funds from the junta but made no effort to recruit followers. 145 or help unify all the anti-Castro groups into the junta. In fact, Que- sada may have been less a true leader of a group than one who used his role in the organization for his own ends. Submitted by: “ GAETON J. Fonzi Imwestigator. Patricia M. Orr Researcher. REFERENCES (1) Staff summary of the CIA handbook (hereinafter handbook summary) ; see also staff summary of CIA file, p. 1 (ref. memo, May 19, 1962) (hereinafter “CIA-Quesada). (2) See ref. 1, handbook summary. (3) See ref. 1, CIA-Quesada, p. 1. (4) Ibid. (5) Id. at p.3 (ref. Jan. 18, 1961, memo). (6) See ref. 1, handbook summary. (7) Ibid. (8) Ibid., see also staff summary of FBI file for Carlos Rodriguez Quesada, p. 5 (ref. 105-107224-16, Mar. 15, 1962, Miami) (hereinafter FBI-Quesada). (9) See ref. 1, CIA-Quesada, p. 3 (ref. Jan. 18, 1961, memo). 0). 10.a0.p. 1. (11) Ibid. (12) Ibid. (73) Ibid. (14) See ref. 8, FBI-Quesada, p. 7 (ref. 105-107224-16, Mar. 15, 1962, Miami). (15) Ibid. 7auBae Id. at p. 6 (ref. 109-584-3414, Feb. 14, 1963, and 97-4133-60, Apr. 30, (16) Id. at p. 7 (ref. 105-107224-16, Mar. 15, 1962, Miami) ; see also ref. 1, handbook summary. (17) Id. at p. 4 (ref. 105-107224—A., Mar. 19, 1962) and p. 8 (ref. 105-92196-24, Mar. 15, 1962). (18) Id. at p.1 (ref. 109-584-3102, Miami, Mar. 15, 1962). (19) Ibid. (20) Ibid. (21) Id. at p. 4 (ref. 109-584-3183, May 28, 1968, Miami). (22) See ref. 1, handbook summary. (23) Ibid. (24) Ibid. (25) See ref. 8, FBI-Quesada, p. 8 (ref. 105-92196-30, Apr. 16, 1962). (26) Ibid. (27) Id. at p.7 (ref. 105-92196-70, Apr. 12, 1963). (28) Thid. (29) See ref. 1, handbook summary. (30) Ibid. (31) See ref. 1, CIA-Quesada, p. 1. (82) Ibid. ‘(33) See ref. 1, handbook summary. (34) Ibid. (35) See ref. 8, FBI-Quesada, p. 4 (ref. 105-137256—-4, Apr. 21, 1964). (86) Staff summary of FBI file for Paulino Sierra Martinez, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 7, memo, Feb. 28, 1961, re JGCE. wees me ve strats on rs ea fora x veBrant 4ditat enon roieye naetaraeet y shapoc?es Hnvagtb thon af Jom Miro Cardona 2 heel WE wie commit. 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Or ey i} LCS. wohhy. descr! 7 } im ae ft ran ve A “inves homoswenal ana dtngaddicts,§ mnvebasets AiO)r on — (S90) da early 3 »f bar. the Sabbip Ga ioghilnt t 333 OTS Salah) ty ; ' ‘ : "™TY {? fo bad Ri, ATS. .) ru fi J te thy sneha Fey gh-PBREL- rotten © iaighanse ORHAN Par 4a |ipoipg“gunath oenreae grein onliseeT 16 aif THY to traci Raeat ae Tn nw ra ees we af Ot CHE: vitAEH AIR ERE AP a ord and they aflert: wer ef the ts, itee!f, {) rand’ porsnnt velwe chin with tha antiasro orcam PEN witmary be cipnifivan na reports temewcd by the ocannitice tng iy that “oprortanist My qurin ena conteorinaiet of ihe uy tine cof the membership déraine, (27) Cnetwila muy wellBtfet Mat cateso sseniggyt, Forse’ froin the junta bat ern no effort’? THE EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CIA- SPONSORED ASSASSINATION CONSPIRACIES AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO Staff Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations U.S. House of Representatives Ninety-fifth Congress Second Session March 1979 (147) CONTENTS Paragraph Ty WOrewoOrd fois os i ett ow ae eee (1) II. Background material—Relevant summary : ASVOCTAcMatia plots. 6c soe el i eee eee ee (6) Beas) Vegas. wiretap, incident2. =... 22 22 2 2 Os eee eee CLs Cy} Robert’ Maheu- andthe: Long committees ese sae ease eee (20) D, Efforts of John Roselli to avoid prosecution ...~..-.-o-u. eee (21) BH, Debut of the retaliation theory 2 Wea ea ee eee (23) Hw CIA 1967 Inspector General's réport..—-_-.--—~- 4... ee (27) G:; sAnderson, articles22 202 2S a a ee eee (29) HH.” Rovelli deportation cake oan oo eo een ee (30) I. Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Kespect to Intelligence Activities u lb).eee (31) J. CLA. 1977) task: foreé report eos See ae ee eee (35) iy Syndicate’) operationsy223 2a. eee 8 ee es iss_ Sesncseeuwe tie} 2 AMULASH Sok #27 Atk ARE E NA UE ALIS ee 47) K; Recent yAnderson rarticles. 2223 750.) 2s 323. 4c ckkeee ce eee (56) III. Issue analysis: » Preface ounce ed ee es a aa (58) B. AMLASH operation: 1. Characterization of-the~AMGASH operation____<-l-lSe see (63) 2. The probability that Castro would have assassinated the President of. the United States__.<. i sl eee (69) o.) Summary * £2. Sea ere ee eee p25) Ue eee (79) Cc. CIA- oreanined crime plots: . Scope and nature of the plots: (a) Roselli knowledge of CIA sponsorship___________-_— (80) (b) Diseovery of "trué identities 25.22.26 eee (82) (c) Roles of principals: (1) aPhase. 1 ee Se ee a ee eee (87) (2)4#Phase :22bA1 Oy gre (97) (a). Delivery, sof (the! pills-2 32 35 ee eee (100) (e) sLocation: of ‘Trafficantes =) =" Se eee (105) ff) Cuban exile leader’s other contacts___________-____-_ (109) g) Introduction of “Joe” and ‘Gold’ and related events__ (114) (h) sRichard ‘Gain’ 220 8). 2 eee (118 (i) The “girl” in the October 18, 1960, FBI memorandum (139) (]) “Articlés om Rrank Stuureis. 0 e) eee (142) (k) Implications arising from phase 2__-_....-_-_-.. (151) 2. Motivation of organized crime to be involved in the plots______ (160) 3. Retaliation theory: +f Results of the committee’s investigation.=7 ..u-uceoe (173) (b) Proponent of the retaliation’ theory. lo 322). (176) (c) Summary” coo oen ee wa cee ee (178) 4. Related organized crime activities: (a) "NormangeRothman = # = 3222 eee eee (180) (b) Name links between the AMLASH and the CIA-orga- nized. crime operations. oi... Jo6-.seunel eee (185) (1) Link: doe ee ee See eee (187) (2) Dane ee a ae ee (189) (3). Link Bou ee ee ee (195) 5. Deaths of Roselli and Glancana oo 229 eee (202) 6. CIA actions in concealing the reactivation and continuation of the assassination plots from Attorney General Robert F. RGnne0y oc deca eels ania kee pee eee (207) I. FOREWORD (1) The attempt of the U.S. Government to assassinate Cuban Pre- mier Fidel Castro and other foreign leaders during the 1960’s seriously disturbed the American people. When it was disclosed that the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency solicited and received the assistance of various members of organized crime in the furtherance of plots, additional concern was expressed. (2) ‘These assassination attempts, moreover, gave birth to the theory that Fidel Castro may have orchestrated the assassination of the Presi- dent in retaliation for the plots on his life. (8) In its final report published in April 1976, the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intel- ligence Activities (SSC) considered this theory. (4) Inits report, the SSC focused on two operations of the CIA that may have provoked Castro into retaliation. First, the SSC documented the joint effort of the CIA and organized crime to eliminate Castro. Second, the SSC examined the nature and extent of the CIA AMLASH operation. The SSC concluded its analysis with the state- ment that “‘[t]he committee believes the investigation should continue in certain areas, and for that reason does not reach any final conclusions.” (7) (5) This staff report is an effort to summarize the result of addi- tional investigations. Not every detail of the CIA-Mafia plots or of the AMLASH operation is reviewed. Neither is any effort made to resolve all of the conflicting viewpoints of the SSC and the CIA in regard to the importance of the various operations. (2) Instead, this report presents a review of the CIA operation AMLASH and of the involvement or potential involvement of organized crime in the CIA operations against Castro during 1960-63. From this review, it will then be possible to analyze the nature, scope, and implications of these operations. 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Wk oe”é. edt bas O88 ocd ' to Fintocwmsiy, thetae. Ya +bastanl (&) cproliatand apottnr ad t bie He ATV rarer Ste Gy Pl). 9 drto. esl) or arntito has ee caps g! “likey stenail ras ti .wareot atsld PHS ft wontasbiaesy Oe to enoitest! (fol werLeto: ait of} Stee aY Pris watts ti ?. Pe ‘ = rok i TAeORE, —ee 7 i Pe 4 2 - 4% + sl ay. he rif teow? ii And °c iANCEM y= ——- an sctivome ts, CONneweling the peed chen /3 mu & voeartinn (As woee relent nial ont Array Bela B Aenea aoe utee » dd bees eam r ree ‘ / 7 - mm Il. BACKGROUND MATERIAL—RELEVANT SUMMARY A. CIA-Marta Puiors (6) The genesis of the use of the national syndicate of organized crime by the CIA to attempt to assassinate Castro is placed by the 1967 report of the Inspector General (I.G. Report) as occurring dur- ing a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell, and the Director of Security, Col. Sheffield Edwards. (3) These plots extended from late 1960 until early 1963 and can be divided into two stages.(4) The first stage occurred from August 1960 until April 1961 and can best be termed as phase I or the pre-Bay of Pigs period. (5) From April 1961 until late 1961, CIA records indicate that the operation was inactive. (6) (7) In late 1961, the CIA decided to renew the CIA-Mafia plots, then neg phase IT, and kept them active until late 1962 or early 1963. (7 (8) During the initial stages of phase J, Edwards assioned the spe- cific task of locating the proper persons to assassinate Castro to the Chief, Office of Security Operations Support Branch.(8) Both men agreed that the Support Chief should contact Robert A. Maheu, a private investigator and former FBI man, whom the CIA had pre- viously used in several covert operations, to recruit the necessary personnel. (9) (9) Maheu subsequently contacted John Roselli,(/0) an organized crime figure, who in turn recruited two persons known initially to the Support Chief as “Sam Gold” and “Joe.” (717) The Support Chief says he, alone with Maheu, later discovered the true identities of these per- sons to be Sam Giancana and Santos Trafficante, respectively,(12) two major figures in organized crime. (10) After meeting several times in Miami and deciding upon poison pills as the method of assassination, the I.G. report states that Trafficante made the arrangements for the assassination of Castro with one of his contacts inside Cuba on one of the trips he allegedly made to Havana, Cuba.(73) This contact was a Cuban official who held a posi- tion close to Castro. (74) (11) The I.G. report then stated that Roselli passed the pills to Trafficante.(75) Roselli subsequently told the support chief that the pills were delivered to the Cuban official in Cuba.(76) The Cuban of- ficial apparently retained the pills for a few weeks and then returned them since he was unable to fulfill any plan.(77) The Cuban official was "0peer in a position to kill Castro because he had lost his Cuban post. (78 (12) With the Cuban official unable to perform, the syndicate looked elsewhere. Roselli next told the support chief, sometime during early 1961, that Trafficante knew a man prominent in the Cuban exile move- ment who could accomplish the job.(79) After receiving approval, (151) 152 Trafficante approached this person about assassinating Castro and re- ported that he was receptive.(20) The I.G. report stated that the support chief again distributed pills that eventually reached the Cuban exile leader. (27) (13) This activity concluded the pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the plots. The I.G. report did not document any actual attempt to administer the pills to Castro. (14) The I.G. report related that after a period of apparent dor- mancy,(22) Bissell directed William Harvey, a CIA agent, in approxi- mately November 1961 to reactivate the CIA-Mafia plots.(23) The support chief then introduced Harvey to Roselli.(24) During this phase, the CLA decided against using Giancana or Trafficante ;instead, a person referred to as “Maceo” entered the plot as the person who would help provide Castro contacts.(25) In addition, the plots still utilized the services of the Cuban exile leader. (26) (15) Even though the plots no longer included Trafficante and Gian- cana, the CIA admitted that Roselli most likely kept them informed. The 1967 I.G. report noted that “[i]t would be naive to assume that Roselli did not take the precaution of informing higher-ups in the syn- dicate that he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate.” (27) (16) In June 1962 Roselli reported to Harvey that the Cuban exile leader dispatched a three-man team into Cuba with the general assign- ment of recruiting others to kill Castro and, if the opportunity arose, to kill him themselves, maybe through the use of pills.(28) In Sep- tember 1962, Roselli reported to Harvey in Miami that the “medicine” was reported in place, that the three-man team was safe, and that the Cuban exile leader was prepared to dispatch another three-man team to infiltrate Castro’s bodyguard.(29) In December 1962, Roselli and Harvey agreed that not much seemed to be occurring and by February 1963, Harvey terminated the plots. (30) B. Las Veaas Wrrerar INCIDENT (17) The I.G. report also mentioned an event that occurred during phase I of the CIA-Mafia plots that resulted in the first dissemination of the details of the plot to persons other than the ones involved in the operation. On October 31, 1960, Las Vegas police arrested Arthur J. Balletti, an employee of a Florida investigator named Edward Du- Bois, for placing an electronic bug in a hotel room in Las Vegas. (37) Subsequent investigation determined that Robert Maheu authorized the surveillance and possibly the wiretap of the subject involved and that Maheu probably acted on behalf of Giancana and the CIA.(32) (18) The violation of the wiretap statute placed the case under Federal jurisdiction and the FBI soon began an investigation. In the course of this investigation, Maheu informed the FBI that he insti- tuted the surveillance on behalf of CIA efforts to obtain Cuban intel- ligence through the hoodlum element, including Giancana. (33) In its efforts to prevent the prosecution of Balletti, Maheu, and an unidenti- fied individual known as J. W. Harrison, who had allegedly assisted Balletti in the wiretap, the CIA eventually told the Justice Depart- ment the details of phase I of the CIA-Mafia plots to kill Castro. This 153 communication can most accurately be related through the following memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Ramsey Clark (quoted in part) :(34) To: Attorney General From: Director, FBI [Attorney General Robert Kennedy] indicated that a few days prior to [5-9-62] he had been advised by the CIA that Robert A. Maheu had been hired by the CIA to approach Sam Giancana with a proposition of paying $150,000 to hire gunmen to go into Cuba and kill Castro. He further stated CIA admitted having assisted Mahen in making the “bugging” installation in Las Vegas which uncovered this clandestine operation and for this reason CIA could not afford to have any action taken against Giancana or Maheu. Mr. Kennedy stated that upon learning CIA had not cleared its action in hiring Maheu and Giancana with the Depart- ment of Justice, he issued orders that the CIA should never again take such steps without first checking with the Depart- ment of Justice. Mr. Kennedy further advised that because of this matter it would be very difficult to initiate any prosecution against Giancana, as Giancana could immediately bring out the fact the U.S. Government had approached him to arrange for the assassination of Castro. He stated the same was true con- cerning any action we might take against Maheu for any violation in which he might become involved. (19) In summary, the Las Vegas wiretap incident forced the CIA to acknowledge the existence of the CIA-Mafia plots to non-CIA Government officials and provided the first occasion for participants to manipulate the operation to prevent prosecution. C. Rosert MaHEeU AND THE Lone ComMITTEE (20) The next major event related to the CIA-Mafia plots occurred in 1966 when Maheu used his involvement with the CIA to avoid testifying before Senator Edward Long’s committee, which was in- vestigating invasions of privacy.(35) The attorney for Maheu, Ed- ward Pierpont Morgan, informed the committee that Maheu con- tacted him during the fall of 1966 and said he was going to be called before the Long committee in conjunction with the Morganthau in- vestigation.(36) Maheu then informed Morgan of the plots and sug- gested that any testimony might necessarily reveal his previous covert activities with the CIA.(37) Morgan then contacted Senator Long and Lawrence Houston, the General Counsel to the CIA, to reiterate Maheuw’s concerns in an apparently successful effort to block any testimony. (38) D. Errorts of Joun Roserxrt To Avow Prosrcurion (21) The SSC related that in May 1966, the FBI threatened to deport Roselli “for living in the United States under an assumed name unless 154 he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia.”(39) The SSC then stated that Roselli contacted Edwards who subsequently spoke to the FBI in regard to Roselli. (40) (22) The SSC reported that Roselli again contacted CIA sources in an effort to thwart prosecution when Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling activities at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills, Calif., in 1967.(47) Roselli contacted Harvey, who was no longer a CIA employee, to represent him.(42) Harvey subsequently attempted unsuccessiully to influence the CIA into preventing the prosecu- tion.(42) The Justice Department, however, subsequently convicted htoselli for a violation of the interstate gambling laws. (44) E. Desut or THE RETALIATION THEORY (25) The genesis of this theory can be attributed to an interview that Premier Castro held on September 7, 1963, with Associated Press kteporter Daniel Harker. In that interview, Castro warned against the United States ‘aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders.” (43) He stated, according to Harker, that U.S. leaders would be in danger if they promoted any attempt to eliminate the leaders of Cuba. (46) (24) Inearly January 1967, Edward Morgan approached Columnist Drew Pearson, related the background of the plots, posed the possibil- ity that the plots could have provoked a Castro retaliation, and asked Pearson to inform Chief Justice Earl Warren of the operation. (47) Warren subsequently informed Secret Service Director James J. Rawley who in turn notified the FBI.(48) Morgan informed the com- mittee that Roselli initially approached him complaining of excessive FBI surveillance ever since he had been involved in this patriotic venture.(49) Roselli also informed Morgan that Castro had retaliated for these plots by assassinating President Kennedy. (50) (25) After receiving this information the FBI decided not to investi- gate the allegation further.(57) Following the publication of the Jack Anderson and Drew Pearson articles of March 3 and 7, 1967, however, where the theory of retaliation first gained public notoriety, President Johnson ordered the FBI to investigate the matter. (52) (25a) The FBI consequently interviewed Edward Morgan on March 20, 1967.(63) Morgan informed the FBI that he represented clients that were reasonable individuals who entered into a project that they understood to have high governmental backing and that involved the assassination of Fidel Castro.(64) Morgan then stated that his clients had reason to suspect that Castro learned of these plots and killed President Kennedy in retaliation. (54) 84 (26) The FBI investigation resulted in President Johnson acquiring a personal interest in the retaliation theory, which prompted CIA Director Richard Helms to prepare a report on the assassination plots. (56) F. CIA 1967 Inspecror GENERAL’s Reporr (27) On March 23, 1967, Director Helms ordered the CIA Inspector General to prepare a report (I.G. Report) on the CIA assassination plots.(57) This report detailed the accounts of various CIA plans and operations against Castro including an analysis of the CIA-organized crime plots and the AMLASH operation. The I.G. Report also ex- amined the 1960 Las Vegas wiretap incident. 155 (28) In reference to the AMLASH operation, the I.G. Report re- lated AMLASH’s activities in Madrid, Spain in late 1964 and early 1965, where AMLASH was meeting with Manuel Artime.(58) The I.G. Report noted further that Rafael Garcia-Bongo, a former lawyer in Cuba for Santos Traflicante, was in Madrid, Spain in March 1965.(59) Bongo claimed to be in contact with dissident Cuban military leaders, including AMLASH. (60) G. ANnprERSoN ARTICLES (29) In 1971, Anderson once again published information setting forth the retaliation theory in two articles dated January 18 and 19. These articles exhibited more detail, relating that several assassins made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before being apprehended, that this event occurred in late February or early March 1963, that Robert Kennedy at least condoned the CIA-Mafia plots, and that Roselli delivered poison pills to be used in killing Castro to a contact at the Miami Beach Fontainebleau Hotel on March 18, 1961.(67). H. Rosrerxr Drrorratrion (80) In 1971, the same year that Anderson released additional in- formation on the plots, the CIA contacted the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, in an attempt to pre- vent information on CIA operations from being disclosed in the event INS brought deportation proceedings against Roselli.(62) The CIA’s concern was the protection of intelligence sources and methods. The SSC stated in its Interim Report, released in November 1975, that the deportation order was still in the process of being litigated.(63) In August 1976, authorities discovered Roselli’s butchered body stuffed in an oil drum and floating in Miami’s Biscayne Bay. His colleague in the plots to kill Castro, Sam Giancana, had been shot to death in his home in June 1975. I. SENATE SELECT CommITTreEE To Srupy GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS Wirs Respect to INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (81) In connection with its mandate to investigate the full range of governmental intelligence activities, the SSC “examined the per- formance of the intelligence agencies in conducting their investigation of the assassination and their relationship to the Warren Commis- sion.” (64) In April 1967, the SSC published its final report (Book V), which, in essence, faulted the CIA for its errors of omission in not in- forming the Warren Commission of the CIA’s ongoing plots against the life of the premier, Fidel Castro. (32) After reviewing the details of the CIA-Mafia plots, the SSC stated that “Castro probably would not have been certain that the CIA was behind the underworld attempts” and that it would have been unlikely that Castro would have distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld from any plots sponsored by the Cuban exile com- munity and not affiliated in any way with the CIA. (65) (33) The SSC identified the AMLASH operation, however, as being “clearly different” from the underworld plots.(66) The SSC stated that AMLASH was in progress at the time of the assassination, that 156 it could clearly be traced to the CIA, and that AMLASH’s proposal for a coup had been endorsed by the CIA, the initial step being the assassination of Castro.(67) The SSC cautioned, however, that it saw “no evidence that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban Government plotted President Kennedy’s assassination in retaliation for U.S. operations against Cuba.” (68) (34) As related in the introduction to this material, the SSC did not reach any conclusion because it believed additional investigation needed to occur. (69) J. CIA 1977 Task Force Revort (35) Asa result of concern with the Senate criticism and the effect that Book V caused in the media, the CIA prepared a comprehensive report in 1977 designed to critique, at least within the CIA, the critical questions postulated in the SSC final report. (36) The T. F. Report identified a principal theme of Book V as the possibility that Castro retaliated against the United States for at- tempts on his life and that the CIA operations may have specifically caused such actions by Castro.(70) In responding to this theory, the CIA decided: (1) to conduct a full review of information and operations against the Cuban target to identify any activity that might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy; and (2) To review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy. (77) 7 (37) The details of the T. F. Report are related in this staff report because no source has previously released them publicly. 1. Syndicate operations (38) The T. F. Report first refers to a series of articles written by Paul Meskill and appearing in the New York Daily News in April 1975. (39) In these articles Meskill described how Frank Fiorini, also known as Sturgis, allegedly recruited Marita Lorenz, a former mistress of Castro, to spy on Castro(72) and how Sturgis knew a Cuban official and planned to use him in a bombing assassination of Castro.(72) Meskill asserted that Sturgis claimed he had been a hired operative for the CIA for at least a decade and that Sturgis was in touch with all the casino operators in Havana during the period of the Castro takeover.(74) In another article on June 13, 1976, Meskill related the claim of Marita Lorenz that in the fall of 1960 Frank Sturgis, acting for the CTA, gave her two capsules of poison powder, which she was to sprinkle in some food or drink of Castro. (75) (40) The writers of the T. F. Report were concerned with these assertions because aspects of the newspaper story were similar in some respects to certain elements involved in phase I of the CTA operation. The possibility of some relationship with the CIA operation attracted the attention of the CIA.(76) (41) In reference to Sturgis’ allegation that he had been a hired operative for the CIA for a decade, the T. F. Report asserted that “he was in contact with some of the CLA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationship with the Agency.”(77) The T. F. 157 Report recognized that Sturgis, through his gambling activities and relationships with various casino owners, may quite possibly have known the Cuban official, and also raised the question of whether Sturgis may have been a source of information to Castro regarding the Cuban official’s participation in any assassination plot.(78) (42) In reference to the Lorenz-Sturgis poison pill plot, the T. F. Report noted the similarity of this plot to the details in an October 18, 1960, FBI memorandum describing a plot to kill Castro.(79) The CIA concluded that this October date is too early for the CIA syndicate operations and that therefore the syndicate may have been acting independently. (80) (43) The CIA also concluded that the Cuban exile leader active in the CIA syndicate operations may have already been active in plots with the Mafia when the CIA approached him. (87) (44) The CIA cited two FBI memorandums as support. First, a December 21, 1960, memorandum pertaining to underworld support for some Cubans; and second, a January 18, 1961, memorandum re- lating an unconfirmed report that the Cuban exile leader was one of the Cubans receiving support. (82) (45) The CIA acknowledged further that although the operation with the Mafia was suspended after the Bay of Pigs, 1t appeared to still be in progress when reactivated in early 1962. (83) (46) The report summarized its position concerning non-CIA-spon- sored syndicate operations in the following passage: It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in pro- viding additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had underway * * * [I]n a sense CIA may have been piggybacking on the syndicate and in addition to its material contribution was also supplying an aura of official sanction. (84) 2, AMLASH (47) The T. F. Report stated the SSC suggested that AMLASH was possibly a Castro agent assigned a provocation mission that would then justify retaliation, or, in the alternative, that AMLASH was a security risk through which details of the plotting may have surfaced to Castro, thus providing the impetus for provocation. (85) Addi- tionally, the T. F. Report cited the SSC as holding that in either case, AMLASH should have been reported to the Warren Commission. (86) (48) The T. F. Report contended neither theory is correct. (87) stating that the relationship between the CIA and AMLASH before the death of President Kennedy was so “unsubstantial and inconclu- sive that it provided no basis for AMLASH/1 to feel that he had any tangible CIA support for plotting against Castro.” (88) (49) Insupport, the T. F. Report proceeded to narrate the Agency’s understanding of the operation. On August 17, 1962, the case officer for AMLASH reported that he “[has] no intention [of giving AM- LASH/1] physical elimination mission as requirement but recognize this [as] something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiation.” (89) Headquarters replied the next day, “Strongly concur that no physical elimination mission be given AMLASH/1.” (90) From August 29, 1962, until September 1963, the CIA stated, it did not have any contact with AMLASH. (97) (50) On September 7, 1963, the CIA received the following cable: 43-944—-79-__11 158 AMLASH still feels there only two ways accomplish change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough to realize latter out of question. According AMWHIP, AM- LASH still awaiting for U.S. reveal plan of action. (92) The T. F. Report noted that the SSC interpreted “inside job” as re- ferring to an operation against Castro; the CIA, however, said it referred to a general commitment concerning how to effect change.(93) The T. F’. Report also stated that at this point Book V said “characterization of this phase of the AMLASH operation is dis- puted.”(94) The CIA contended that any dispute exists only in the eyes of the SSC. (95) (15) The T. F. Report next commented on an interview of Castro by Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker in which Castro said that anti-Castro terrorists had the support of U.S. leaders.(96) The T. F. Report stated that the Book V implied that AMLASH/1 may have re- ported to Castro what the SSC characterized as assassination plots. (97) The CIA response is that “Castro’s remarks at that time could not have stemmed from anything said to AMLASH/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing.” (98) (52) On October 11, 1968, the case officer cabled headquarters and said that AMLASH/1 claimed to have the necessary people and equip- ment to overthrow Castro without U.S. assistance.(99) In October 1963, Desmond Fitzgerald met AMLASH/1 outside the United States.(700) At this meeting the CIA maintained that Fitzgerald rejected AMLASH’s request for an assassination weapon: specifically, a high-powered rifle with a telescopic lens.(707) The T. F. Report con- tends that at this point it was clear that AMLASH was informed that there would be no U.S. assistance until after the fact, which was contrary to the SSC statement in Book V that it was uncertain how AMLASH interpreted the putoff by Fitzgerald. (102) (53) On November 19, 1963, Fitzgerald approved informing AMLASH/1 that he would be given a cache inside Cuba and that a high-powered rifle with a scope would be included upon request. (703) On November 20, the case officer informed AMLASH that he would be receiving the meeting he requested.(704) This meeting occurred on November 22. (705) (54) The T. F. Report summarized the significance of these contacts with AMLASH as related to the contention in Book V in the follow- ing passage : Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/1 following the death of President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President Kennedy’s life AMLASH/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of any- thing. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CTA plot directed against Castro. (706) (55) Finally, in reply to the SSC allegation that the CIA inade- quately responded to the Warren Commission’s request for all possible relevant information, the T. F. Report observed: 159 While one can understand today why the Warren Commis- sion limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CLA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms— the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assas- sination of (J.F.K.) because of tensions of the time... The Agency should have taken broader initiatives, then, as well. (207) K. Recent Anperson ARTICLES (56) In September 1976 and October 1978, Jack Anderson again published articles that propounded the retaliation theory.(/08) In addition, for the first time Anderson revealed publicly that John Roselli served as his source for the retaliation theory in all of the articles published through the years. (57) The September 7, 1976, article appearing in the Washington Post contained all components of the retaliation theory. The article stated: Mafia mobster John Roselli may have taken the secret of the John F. Kennedy assassination with him to his death. He was brutally murdered a few weeks ago, his hacked up body stuffed into an oil drum and dumped into Miami’s Biscayne Bay. Before he died, Roselli hinted to associates that he knew who had arranged President Kennedy’s murder. It was the same conspirators he suggested, whom he had recruited earlier to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. By Roselli’s cryptic account, Castro learned the identity of the underworld contacts in Havana who had been trying to knock him off. He believed, not altogether without basis, that President Kennedy was behind the plot. The Cuban leader, as the supreme irony, decided to turn the tables and use the same crowd to arrange Kennedy’s assassination according to Roselli’s scenario. To save their skins, the plotters lined up Lee Harvey Oswald to pull the trigger. Roselli could never be pinned down on names or details. It was also difficult to assess whether he knew what he was talking about or whether he merely described what he thought might have happened. Certainly there is no real evidence to support Roselli’s story. But there are enough curious circum- stances to justify telling it. Here are the fascinating high- lights. The ruggedly handsome Roselli, a flamboyant mobster with underworld contacts in Havana, was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1960 to assassinate Castro. He had no authority, however, over the underworld elements in Havana. They were under the loose control of Florida’s Mafia chief- tain, Santos Trafficante. His gambling enterprises in Havana had been closed down by Castro after the 1959 revolution. 160 In fact, Trafficante had been lodged for a period in a Cuban jail, an indignity that didn’t endear Castro to him. After Trafficante made it back to his Florida haunts, he left part of his organization behind in Havana. Some of his henchmen even managed to develop contacts in Castro’s inner circle. These were the people Roselli wanted to use to knock off Castro. But Roselli didn’t have the stature inside the Mafia to make the necessary arrangements with Trafficante. So Roselli called in his patron, the Chicago godfather Sam (Momo) Giancana, to deal with Trafiicante. As Roselli’s associates tell it, he persuaded Giancana that it would be to their advantage to win the good will of the CIA. Convinced, Giancana flew down to Florida to make the pre- liminary arrangements. Once Giancana and Trafficante set it up, Roselli used the Havana underworld to plot Castro’s demise. At first, they tried to plant poison pills, supplied by the CIA, in Castro’s food. The pills would have made it appear that he died of natural causes. When this failed, snipers were dispatched to a Havana rooftop. They were caught. The word reached Roselli that some of the plotters had been tortured and that Castro had learned about the whole operation. The CIA called off the Roselli operation in March 1963, but recruited a Castro associate, Rolando Cubela, to murder Castro. In an impromptu, 3-hour interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker, Castro indicated that he knew about the attempts on his life and warned that U.S. leaders also might not be safe. That was September 7, 1963. According to Roselli, Castro enlisted the same underworld elements whom he had caught plotting against him. They sup- posedly were Cubans from the old Trafficante organization. Working with Cuban intelligence, they allegedly lined up an ex-Marine sharpshooter, Lee Harvey Oswald, who had been active in the pro-Castro movement. According to Roselli’s version, Oswald may have shot Kennedy or may have acted as a decoy while others am- bushed him from closer range. When Oswald was picked up, Roselli suggested, the underworld conspirators feared he would crack and disclose information that might lead to them. This almost certainly would have brought a massive U.S. crackdown on the Mafia. So Jack Ruby was ordered to eliminate Oswald, making it appear as an act of reprisal against the President’s killer. At least this is how Roselli explained the tragedy in Dallas. Several key CIA officials believed that Castro was behind the Kennedy assassination. It has also been established that Jack Ruby, indeed, had been in Cuba and had connections in the Havana underworld. One CIA cable, dated November 28, 1963, reported that “an American gangster type named Ruby” had visited Trafficante in his Cuban prison. Ill. ISSUE ANALYSIS A. PREFACE (58) The committee investigated this material to determine what conclusions, if any, could be drawn concerning the nature, scope, and implications of these operations. In this regard, various issues are presented in the following sections and subjected to analysis. (59) To fulfill this process, the committee reviewed material from numerous governmental sources that pertained to the persons and operations relevant to the investigation. These persons included: . John Roselli—principal in CI A-O.C. operation. . Santos Trafficante—principal in CIA—-O.C. operation. Cuban exile leader—principal in CIA-O.C. operation. . Sam Giancana principal in CILA-O.C. operation. . Robert Maheu—principal in CIA-O.C. operation. . Michael McLaney—Involved in Havana casino business. . Samuel Benton—Involved in Havana casino business. . Norman Rothman—Havana casino operator. . John Martino Anti-Castro activist. . Edward P. Morgan—Washington, D.C., attorney. —_SOMDMTIRMOoF SHH . Edward K. Moss—International public relations representative. . Dino Cellini—Havana casino operator. . Richard Cain—Associate of Sam Giancana. . Charles Tourine—Involved in Havana casino business. . Rafael “Macho” Gener—Associate of Santos Trafficante. . Identity protected—Anti-Castro Cuban. . Identity protected—Anti-Castro Cuban. . Joseph Shimon—Former inspector for the Washington, D.C., Police Department ; associate of Sam Giancana. . Angelo Bruno—Reputed organized crime leader of Philadel- phia. . Sam Mannarino—Havana casino operator. . Kelly Mannarino—Havana casino operator. . Edward Browder—Pilot active in anti-Castro activities. . Joseph Merola Pilot active in anti-Castro activities. . Arthur Balletti—Former private detective for Edward Du Bois. . Dominick Bartone—Reputed organized crime figure from Cleveland, Ohio. . Richard Helms—Former Director of CIA. . Chief, Office of Security Operations Support Branch—Former employee of CIA. . Luis Balbuena Calzadilla—Associate of the Cuban referenced in item 16. . AMLASH—Cuban official in the Castro government. _ . William Alexander Morgan—Figure active in anti-Castro activities. (161) 162 31. Identity protected—Cuban official close to Castro. 32. Jack Anderson—Columnist. 33. Frank Sturgis—Soldier of fortune active in anti-Castro activities. 34. Fidel Castro Ruz—Premier of Cuba. 35. Victor Espinosa Hernandez—Anti-Castro Cuban. 36. Meyer Lansky—Organized crime figure. (60) Whenever possible and desirable, the committee either inter- viewed or deposed these persons or subpenaed them to give testi- mony before the committee. ; (61) The government and other sources where the committee re- quested and reviewed material were: . Central Intelligence Agency. . Federal Bureau of Investigation. . Drug Enforcement Agency. Department of Defense. Department of State. Department of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. U.S. Customs Service. . Immigration and Naturalization Service. . U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence. TP st . U.S. Secret Service. SDODNA whe 11. Chicago Crime Commission. 12. Chicago Police Department. 13. New York City Police Department. 14. Public Safety Department, Organized Crime Bureau, Dade County, Fla. 15. Cuban Government. (62) In the majority of instances, review of the material at these sources and the statements from individuals were not pertinent to any assassination plots against Castro, particularly the CIA- organized crime and the AMLASH operations. Further, much of the relevant information acquired was already known through the SSC investigation and the CIA I. G. Report and T. F. Report. For this reason, the following analysis represents evidence derived prin- cipally from information substantively the same as that which the SSC and CIA considered previously. Nevertheless the committee investigation resulted in additional factual corroboration of this information from a diversity of sources. (109) B. AMLASH Operation 1. Characterization of the AMLASH operation (63) Richard Helms, the former Director of the CIA, stated in his testimony before the committee that the AMLASH operation was not designed to be an assassination plot. (770) As already indicated, the T. F. Report concluded that AMLASH had “no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro” during President Kennedy’s life. (1/7) (64) Joseph Langosch, the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA’s Special Affairs Staff in 1963, the component responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the 163 Cuban Intelligence Services, offered a contrasting view to the testi- mony of Mr. “Helms and the assertions of the T. F. Report. (1/2) Desmond FitzGerald headed the special affairs staff (773) that was responsible for the AMLASH operation. (114) In an affidavit to the committee, Longosch recalled: [T]he AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was characterized by the special affairs staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other senior CIA offi- cers as an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the CIA. (715) (65) Langosch recollected further that as of 1962 it was highly possible that the. Cuban Intelligence Services were aware of AMLASH and his association with the CIA and that the informa- tion upon which he based his conclusion that the AMLASH opera- tion was insecure was available to senior level CIA officials, including Desmond FitzGerald. (716) (66) In response to Langosch’s sworn statements, the committee received the affidavit of Kent L. Pollock (CIA pseudonym), a former CIA employee. Pollock “served as executive officer for Desmond FitzGerald during the entire period in which he was chief of the special affairs staff... and discussed with him the AMLASH operation as it progressed. » (i 7) Pollock specifically contested the assertions of Langosch stating: To the best of my knowledge, Mr. FitzGerald considered the AMLASH operation to be a political action activity with the objection of organizing a group under AMLASH/1 to overthrow Castro and the Castro regime by means of a coup d’ etat. I heard Mr. FitzGerald discuss the AMLASH operation frequently, and never heard him characterize it as an assassination operation. Mr. FitzGerald stated within my hearing on several occasions his awareness that coup d’ etat often involves loss of life. (118) (67) Healso stated: Desmond FitzGerald did not characterize the AMLASH operation as an “assassination operation”; the case officer did not; I, as Executive Officer did not, never discussed any aspect of the AMLASH operation with J oseph H. Langosch; the deputy chief, the other branch chiefs and the special assistants could not have so characterized it since they did not know about the pen (the pen was specially filled with a hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by AMLASH for a means to start the coup by killing Castro.) The case officer offered the pen to AMLASH on the day of President Kennedy’s death. AMLASH rejected the pen with disdain. (179) (68) The committee also reviewed numerous files in an effort to deter- mine the true character of the AMLASH operation. In the course of its investigation, the committee found no specific evidence that the AMLASH operation provoked Premier Castro into assassinating President Kennedy. Although it is possible that he learned of it, and 164 if so, that he assumed it involved both assassination as an objective (or probable consequence), and U.S. Government support. 2. The probability that Castro would have assassinated the President of the United States (69) In his interview with the committee, Premier Castro set forth some reasons why he would not have assassinated President Kennedy. Castro said in part: That was insane. From the ideological point of view it was insane. And from the political point of view, it was a tremen- dous insanity. I am going to tell you here that nobody, nobody ever had the idea of such things. What would it do? We just tried to defend our folks here, within our territory. Anyone who subscribed to that idea would have been judged in- sane . .. absolutely sick. Never, in 20 years of revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor even speculate about a measure of that sort, because who could think of the idea of organizing the death of the President of the United States. That would have been the most perfect pretext for the United States to invade our country which is what I have tried to prevent for all these years, in every possible sense. Since the United States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain from a war with the United States? The United States would lose nothing. The destruction would have been here. (720) (70) Castro also added: I want to tell you that the death of the leader does not change the system. It has never done that. (727) (71) In this interview Castro also commented on the speech of Sep- tember 7, 1963, that has been cited throughout the years as an indica- tion that Castro may have assassinated President Kennedy in retalia- tion. Premier Castro asserted : So, I said something like those plots start to set a very bad precedent. A very serious one—that that could become a boomerang against the authors of those actions * * * but I did not mean to threaten by that. I did not mean even that * * * not in the least * * * but rather, like a warning that we knew; that we had news about it; and that to set those precedents of plotting the assassination of leaders of other countries would be a very bad precedent * * * some- thing very negative. And, if at present, the same would happen under the same circumstances, I would have no doubt in saying the same as I said (then) because I didn’t mean a threat by that. I didn’t say it as a threat. I did not mean by that that we were going to take measures—similar meas- ures—like a retaliation for that. We never meant that be- cause we knew that there were plots. For 3 years we had known there were plots against us. So, the conversation came about very casually, you know; but I would say that all these plots or attempts were part of the everyday life. (722 (72) Some general analysis here may be of some assistance. It does not seem likely that Castro would make a veiled reference to assassi- 165 nating any American leader in retaliation for plots on his life if he was actually planning or contemplating such acts: he would want to call as little attention as possible to himself. Rather, it seems Castro was attempting to display his public dismay and knowledge of such attempts in an effort to prevent their continuance. (73) Consequently, together with an absence of any evidence im- plicating Castro in the assassination, it seems probable that this inci- dent, while displaying Castro’s displeasure at American activities, does not implicate Castro in the assassination. This argument 1s not based on Castro’s denial that he made a threat; Castro would natu- rally deny such a charge. It rests on what would seem to be reasonable. (74) There are additional reasons to discount any involvement of Castro in the assassination. These reasons are also necessarily general in character. (75) First, William Atwood, Special Advisor to the U.S. Dele- gation to the United Nations, was involved in diplomatic efforts to establish a framework for détente during the fall of 1963. (123) At- wood told the SCC that McGeorge Bundy, an advisor to President Kennedy, told him that President Kennedy was in favor of “pushing toward an opening toward Cuba” to take Castro “out of the Soviet fold and perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back to normal.” (724) Atwood also arranged for a French journalist, Jean Daniel to meet with Kennedy prior to a scheduled trip by Daniel to see Castro.(125) Daniel and Kennedy discussed the prospects for reestablishing United States-Cuba relations and Kennedy asked Daniel to see him after visiting Castro. (726). (76) It seems likely that such efforts to establish a peaceful co- existence between the United States and Cuba would have dampened any desire by Castro to assassinate Kennedy. (77) Second, in comparing the attitudes of the leaders of the United States, it can be argued that President Kennedy supported a less hostile attitude and position toward Cuba. Even if Castro felt the relations between Cuba and the United States were bad under the Kennedy Presidency, there were legitimate reasons to suspect they would have been worse under the Johnson administration. (78) Consequently, assuming that AMLASH was not an assassina- tion plot during the life of President Kennedy and that Castro un- covered its existence and scope, it is highly unlikely that Castro would have been provoked in a manner sufficient to induce assassinat- ing President Kennedy in retaliation. Further, assuming that AMLASHL was an assassination plot during the life of President Kennedy and that Castro uncovered its existence and scope, it is still unlikely that Castro would have resorted to assassinating the Presi- dent of the United States in retaliation. 3. Summary (79) Thus, with the prospects of renewed diplomatic relations in the air and the knowledge that Kennedy possessed a more favorable attitude toward Cuba than other military or political leaders, Castro would have had every reason to hope that Kennedy maintained the Presidency. Further, eliminating Kennedy would not necessarily have favorably altered the U.S. operations and ties toward Cuba. In addition, it does not seem probable that Castro would have assassi- 166 nated President Kennedy because such an act, if discovered, would have afforded the United States the excuse to destroy Cuba. The risk would not have been worth it. C. CIA-OrcGanizep Crime Puiots 1. SCOPE AND NATURE OF PLOTS (a) Roselli knowledge of CIA sponsorship (80) The support chief informed the committee that Maheu told Roselli he represented an international group of clients who had vested interests in Cuba. Roselli, however, testified to the SSC that Maheu told him from the beginning that the support chief was with the CIA.(727) Maheu confirmed this account to the SSC.(128) Maheu has also indicated that Giancana knew at the time that the support chief was with the CIA.(729) Further, Trafficante testified to the committee that Roselli informed him that he (Roselli) was operating as an agent of the CIA. (130) (81) The weight of the evidence indicates that Roselli, and thus Giancana and Traflicante, knew the CIA was behind the assassina- tion plots at an early stage. (6) Discovery of true identities (82) Roselli arranged for the entrance of Giancana and Trafficante into the plots and introduced them to the support chief as “Sam Gold” and “Joe.” (737) The support chief contends he learned the true iden- tities of these persons a few months after the operation was in prog- ress when he and Maheu saw an article in one of the Sunday sections of the Miami newspaper.(/32) This article supposedly pertained to organized crime in the United States and contained pictures of top hoodlums, including Sam Giancana and Santos Traflicante.(733) In the I. G. Report the support chief stated that the article came from the Parade magazine(7/34) in the Miami Times. Maheu also con- tended that he did not know the true identities of Sam Gold and Joe until this article appeared.(735) The support chief also stated that this incident occurred after “we were up to our ears” in the oper- ations and consequently the CIA decided to progress forward. (136) (83) The SSC conducted a search of supplements to all Miami news- papers for the requisite time period and could not locate any such article.(137) The committee consequently searched Parade magazine for the fall of 1960, all of 1961, and all of 1962, the years that spanned the entire operation. The committee found that on January 21, 1962, Parade published an article entitled “The Untold Story: Our Govern- ment’s Crackdown on Organized Crime,” written by Jack Anderson, which contained a listing of the top 10 hoodlums in the country as well as several photographs of mobsters, including Santos Trafficante. (138) The article focused on the efforts of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy’s campaign against organized crime and mentioned both Giancana and Trafficante. (84) Although this Parade article appears to correspond with the supvort chief’s and Maheu’s description, it is over 1 year past the beginning months of the operation. Indeed, it occurred 9 months after the completion of phase I of the plots. Neither the SSC nor the com- 167 mittee has discovered any other article pertaining to organized crime in Parade magazine or the supplements of any Miami newspaper for the alleged time period. (85) It appears the support chief and Maheu are not telling the truth in an attempt to look for an ex post facto reason for continuing the operation after the introduction of two of the top organized crime figures in the United States. Implicit in their contention is that while the CIA wished to solicit criminal sources to assassinate Castro, it would not knowingly have recruited any figures from the top echelon of organized crime. (/39) Additionally, the support chief’s statement that “we were up to our ears in it” is even more difficult to fathom since according to the I. G. Report, the operation was in its embryonic stage in the fall of 1960 and no pills were even delivered until approxi- mately February or March of 1961. Without additional support, the contentions of Maheu and the support chief are not believable. (86) Further, this CIA plot to assassinate Castro was necessarily a highly volatile and secret operation. Once Roselli introduced addi- tional contacts into the scene, it is not logical that the CIA would have neglected to verify the identities of such principals. On the con- trary, it is more believable that the CIA ascertained the true identities of “Sam Gold” and “Joe” at an early stage and progressed consciously forward in the operation, confident that these two persons, in the words attributed to Col. Sheffield Edwards, were individuals “tough enough” to handle the job. (140) (C) Roles of principals (1) Phase 1 (87) Col. Sheffield Edwards assigned the support chief the task of finding someone to assassinate Castro.(747) They both decided to use Maheu as someone to recruit persons to effectuate the operation. (742) The support chief also described his role as the liaison to the CIA and confirmed that all reports or information would proceed through him to the Agency.(743) In addition, the support chief said he acted as a “babysitter” to Roselli: He remained with him to occupy his time to insure that Roselli was fulfilling his role. (144) (88) There exists a discrepancy over who suggested Roselli for the operation,(745) but in any event, he was recruited because he had connections with persons who could handle the assignment. (746) (89) Conflict arose over the role of Giancana. Roselli informed the SSC that Giancana was only a “back-up” man.(747) Giancana was murdered 4 days before Roselli made this statement. Maheu, however, described Giancana as having a key role and characterized his job as “to locate someone in Castro’s entourage who could accomplish the assassination.” (748) Joseph Shimon, a close friend of Roselli who had knowledge of the plots at the time, stated that Roselli contacted Gian- cana to provide Cuban contacts.(749) Shimon further characterized Giancana as only providing contacts, specifically Santos Trafficante, and not as an active participant. (750) (90) The most sound analysis is that Giancana served solely as a person Roselli could approach who could then make the necessary contact into the Cuban domain, specifically Santos Trafficante. Roselli, who FBI files indicate represented Giancana’s interest in Las Vegas 168 and was subordinate to him, probably would not directly contact the organized crime boss of the Cuban and southern Florida area without first contacting his superior, Giancana, who would then make any necessary arrangements. Both Giancana and Traflicante, being bosses of two organized crime domains, would have the means, power, and stature to arrange for the assassination. (91) After contacting Trafficante, who had the influence to recruit the necessary personnel to perform the assassination, Giancana prob- ably was not an active participant in handling the poison pills or actually arranging the assassination. (157) (92) The role of Trafficante, the only living major organized crime figure involved in the plots, is a major source of conflict. The I. G. Re- port contained several references to Traflicante which characterize his function. In discussing how poison pills could be given to Castro, it stated that “Trafficante (‘Joe, the courier’) was in touch with a disaf- fected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a way that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro.”(162) Later the report stated that “Roselli passed the pills to Trafficante” and that “Roselli reported to [the Support Chief] that the pills had been de- livered to [the Cuban official} in Cuba.” (53) After the Cuban official lost his position in the Cuban government and could no longer pass any pills, the I. G. Report said “Roselli told [the Support Chief] that Trafficante knew of a man high up in the Cuban exile movement who might do the job.” (754) Roselli identified him as a leading figure in the Cuban exile movement.(155) The following passage further confirms Trafticante’s role: Trafficante approached [this Cuban] and told him that he had clients who wanted to do away with Castro and that they would pay big money for the job. [The Cuban] is reported to have been very receptive, since it would mean that he would be able to buy his own ships, arms, and communications equip- ment. (756) (93) Trafiicante testified in public to the committee that Roselli asked him to act solely as an interpreter between the American opera- tions and the Cuban contacts.(157) Trafficante denied handling or carrying any poison pills used in the operation,(158) denied reeruit- ing the Cuban exile leader,(159) and denied recruiting the Cuban effi- cial.(/60). In his Senate testimony, Roselli confirmed Trafficante’s role as that of a translator. (767) (94) The Support Chief, however, informed the committee that Trafficante was the person in contact with Cubans in Havana. (162) Giancana partially confirmed this, according to the I. G. Report, by identifying Joe as a man “who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there.”(163) The Support Chief also confirmed that he was the only CIA. conduit and that if the I. G. Report states Trafiicante contacted or procured the assassin then it accurately re- flects the information the CIA received. (164) (95) The 1975 and 1978 congressional testimony of Roselli and Trafficante corroborate each other, but remain contrary to how the principals reported the facts in 1967. The evidence indicates strongly that Trafficante was not merely an intrepreter but an active partici- pant in passing the poison pills and in recruiting the potential assas- 169 sins. One can understand why Trafficante today wishes to downplay his role; the facts, however, simply do not support his assertions. The evidence supports the I. G. Report. (96) The committee also heard testimony from the Cuban exile leader. He stated that he is not aware of any CIA assassination plots to kill Castro and denied involvement in their operations.(165) He is obyiously not telling the truth. (2) Phase 2 (97) In phase 2 William Harvey assumed the Support Chief’s role.(766) Giancana and Trafiicante were no longer involved in the operation.(1/67) The I. G. Report states that Roselli remained as a prominent figure and worked “directly with the Cuban exile com- munity and directly on behalf of the CIA.” (168) (98) Although the I. G. Report does refiect that Trafficante was not involved in phase 2,(169) it contained this caution: Trafficante was one of the principals in Shef Edwards phase 1 of the operation. He presumably was not involved in phase 2 under Harvey, but we cannot be sure of that. After all, Trafficante was the man who brought the Cuban exile leader into the operation late in phase 1, and the Cuban exile leader was one of the main players during phase 2.(170) (99) It is reasonable to assume that Roselli at least kept both Gian- cana and Traflicante informed of the operation’s progress. (d) Delwery of the pills (100) Neither the I. G. Report nor the SSC pinpoints the date on which the support chief delivered the pills to Roselli during phase 1 of the plots. The chain of custody, as already mentioned, was for Roselli to deliver the pills to Trafficante. The subsequent steps remain a mystery but Roselli reported to the support chief that the pills had been delivered to the Cuban official in Cuba in late February or early March 1961. (277) (101) Joseph Shimon informed the committee that he and Maheu traveled together to Miami to the Fontainebleau in March 1961, to witness the Patterson-Johansson fight.(772) Once there Maheu in- formed him of the plot to assassinate Castro.(173) Shimon also says that during this trip he attended a meeting where a poisonous liquid to be used in the assassination was passed. (774) (102) Shimon is probably the source for Jack Anderson’s column of January 19, 1971, which fixes the date of the passage of the poison at the Fontainebleau as March 18, 1961. (103) In any event, it appears that the CIA did not pass any pills, poison, or assassination weapons before February 1961. The fall seg- ment of the plots only constituted a planning stage; no one undertook any operational activities. (104) Richard Helms stated in his testimony to the committee that he doubted if the pills ever left the United States or even if this project was an assassination plot. He said: I also understand that there was a question of poison pills which were supposed to be transported to Havana. There was 170 never any evidence they were transported there or ever left the United States. There was never any evidence that the plot ever left the Florida mainland, and if it was indeed an assassi- nation plot, it was misadvertised to me because I had under- stood it was an effort to see if a connection could be made between the Mafia in Florida and the Mafia in Havana. As to the best of my knowledge, the connection never was made. (/745) (e) Location of Trafficante (105) To support the description of Trafficante as a courier, the I. G. Report states that “[ A ]t that time the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba, and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami and Havana on syndicate business.” (176 y (106) The committee has obtained some evidence that indicates that Trafficante was not traveling to Cuba during this period. No records available to the committee from INS, State Department, or the FBI reflect any travels after February 1960. During this time, the FBI maintained physical surveillance on Trafficante. (277) Trafficante testi- fied before the committee that he only made two trips to Cuba after his release from the Trescornia prison, Cuba, in August 1959, and that these trips occurred within 2 to 3 months of this release.(778) Addi- tionally, considering Trafficante’s reputed top position in the La Cosa Nostra, it seems more reasonable that Trafficante would send a repre- sentative to Cuba to conduct any business rather than risk being de- tained by Castro again. (107) If Trafficante was actually traveling between Miami and Ha- vana, the implications are interesting. He was either willing to risk being detained again or had acquired assurance from the Cuban Gov- ernment regarding his safety. In any event, the presence of Trafficante during the fall of 1960 in Cuba raises the possibility of a more coopera- tive relationship between himself and the Cuban Government than believed previously. Such a relationship during the period when Traf- ficante was scheming to assassinate Castro invites the theory that Traf- ficante was possibly informing the Cuban Government of activities in the Miami area in general and of the plots in particular. In return for such information, Trafficante could have been promised lost gambling operations as well as support and a Cuban sanctuary for the smuggling of contraband into the United States. (108) There are enormous ramifications to such a theory and it should be stated explicitly that the committee has not received any in- formation or evidence that would demonstrate it. In addition, the available evidence indicates Trafficante was not traveling between Miami and Havana although it is recognized that Trafficante, proba- bly could have made such trips and not disrupt his normal route in Miami and Tampa, notwithstanding the effect of any surveillance. (f) Cuban ewile leader's other contacts (109) As previously related, the FBI forwarded to the CIA a mem- orandum dated December 21, 1960 revealing that U.S. racketeers were making efforts to finance anti-Castro activities and subsequently for- warded another memorandum dated Januar y 18, 1961 that associated the Cuban exile leader with those schemes. (179) (110) Other sources were also providing assistance to the Cuban exile leader to conduct anti-Castro operations. At the time of his introduc- 171 tion into the CIA-organized crime plots, the Cuban exile leader was active in the Revolutionary Democratic Front and the Cuban Revolu- tionary Council.(180) The exile leader informed the committee that the purpose of the council stemmed from an agreement with the American Government to invade Cuba and establish democratic con- trol of the island. (187) (111) Adding to the support for the Cuban exile leader were the promotional efforts of Dino and Eddie Cellini who reportedly were working through a Washington, D.C., public relations firm: Edward K. Moss & Associates. Moss had previous CIA associations. He also was supposedly acting as a conduit for funds supplied by the Cellini brothers with the understanding that this group would receive priv- ileged treatment in the Cuba of the future. (182) (112) In his testimony before the committee the Cuban exile leader also described a meeting with an anti-Castro Cuban and Meyer Lansky in Lansky’s home in Miami in the summer of 1960.(J83) Lansky said he had business interests in Cuba and wanted to help the Cubans fight Castro, destroy Castro, and try and establish a democratic govern- ment. (184) (118) ‘The logical inference to be drawn from this is that the CIA, organized crime, and other persons interested in removing the Castro regime all settled upon the Cuban exile leader, probably independ- ently, as a person who had the potential of uniting the multitude of exile groups to overthrow Castro. Additionally, the exile leader’s reported contacts with organized crime raises the possibility that he was involved with them in a plot to kill Castro before the evolution of the ClA-organized crime plots. If this was the case, then Traf- ficante’s recruitment of the exile leader into the CIA operation would result in providing official U.S. sanction to an already existing inde- pendent operation. The CIA recognized this in stating, “| I]t is pos- sible that the exile leader already was involved in independent opera- tions with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination.” (185) (g) Introduction of “Joe” and “Gold” and related events (114) ‘The timing of the introduction of Giancana (Gold) and Traf- ficante (Joe) is important to the analysis of the true role of orga- nized crime in the Castro assassination plots. This introduction, to- gether with other related events, suggests further the thesis that the CIA found itself involved in providing additional resources for an in- dependent operation that the syndicate already had commenced. (115) According to the I. G. Report, the entrance of Giancana and Roselli occurred during the week of September 25, 1960.(286) In con- trast, the SSC did not assign a precise date for their entrance because of conflicting evidence between the I. G. Report and Maheu’s Senate testimony which set the date after November 1960. (187) The SSC did conclude, however, that Giancana was involved in the operation during October because of the Las Vegas wiretap incident which occurred on October 30, and because of the October 18, 1960, FBI memorandum that revealed Giancana had told several people of his involvement in a plot to assassinate Castro. (188) (116) Although these two events that the SCC cited may support the involvement of Giancana during October, they also invite speculation 172 of independent organized crime operations. The October 18, 1960, FBI memorandum is particularly applicable. This states: [D]uring a recent conversation with several friends, Gian- cana stated that Fidel Castro was to be done away with shortly, said it would occur in November. Moreover, Gian- cana said he had already met with the would-be assassin on three occasions, the last meeting taking place on a boat docked at the Fontainbleu Hotel, Miami Beach. Giancana stated everything had been perfected for killing Castro and that the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a “pill” in some drink or food of Castro. (189) (117) Since the poison pills that the CIA prepared at Giancana’s request were not ready for delivery until late February or early March 1961, it is doubtful that Giancana’s November 1960, assassination plot was part of the CIA operation. Rather, it appears that organized crime already had its poison plan in progress, using a mistress of Castro to accomplish the deed, when the CIA entered the scene for- tuitously. Organized crime then occupied a perfect position: If their private plot succeeded, they then would possess far-reaching blackmail potential against the CIA that they could exercise at an opportune moment. If their intrigue failed, however, they could then assume the position that they were only executing the directives of the Govern- ment and could possibly still use their involvement as blackmail potential. (h) Richard Cain | (118) The assassination attempt that is referenced in the Octo- ber 18 memo may have involved Richard Scalizetti Cain. Cain, in connection with the top echelon criminal informant program, informed the FBI of his criminal activities and close association with Giancana.(790) Cain admitted that he had worked covertly for Giancana and been on his payroll while he was a member of the Chi- cago Police Department from 1956-60, director of a private detective agency from 1960-62, and chief investigator for the Cook County Sheriff’s Office from 1962-64. (797) (119) Several of Cain’s activities during the fall of 1960, together with his past experience, support the proposition that if Giancana was involved in any Cuban affairs, specifically an assassination of Castro PAPA NT ANE of the CIA plot, he would have recruited Cain to assist im. (120) First, Cain maintained a record of providing information voluntarily to the CIA concerning his foreign ventures, a practice Giancana may have promoted in an effort to gain possible leverage with the CJA. In a CIA memorandum to the FBI dated November 4, 1960, een supplied the following information in his first contact with the 1. That in 1950-52 while in Miami, Fla., he initiated several telephone taps on various Cuban revolutionary figures under the supervision of William Buenz, a private detective who had contact with the Batista government; 2. That on October 2, 1960, William Buenz, then operating out of New York City, met with Cain at O’Hare Airport and offered him $25,000 to travel to Cuba rsne pest of former President Piro to install telephone taps on various ubans; an 173 for the Cuban 26th 8 That is 1959, Constantine Kangles, a former attorney t, inquired whether Cain would instruct Castro army officers of July movemen in the use of polygraphs. (192) (121) It seems more than coincidental that Cain’s approach to the CIA to supply this information occurred simultaneously with Gian- cana’s meeting with Roselli and Maheu. Cain subsequently volunteered information to the CIA during 1961-63. War (122) Second, on November 2, 1960, a confidential informant told the Bureau that on October 20, 1960, Serapio Montejo, the former head of the July 26 movement in Chicago, met Richard S. Cain in the office of Constantine Kangles, the former attorney in Chicago for the Cuban 96th of July movement and former counsel in the United States for the Cuban Government headed by Fidel Castro.(797) Cain indicated to Kangles that he had clients who wished to get news stories and photographs out of Cuba concerning rebel activity in the Cuban foot- hills.(794) Cain indicated further that he wanted to cover this story and was soon going to Miami in an attempt to enter Cuba, and that Jack Mobley, a Chicago columnist, and Bob Ajamian, of Life magazine, had knowledge of this venture. (195) (123) Third, on November 2, 1960, the FBI interviewed Cain in Miami at the Sands Hotel, Miami Beach.(796) Cain said he was a representative of Accurate Detective Laboratories,(/97) Life maga- zine, and 64 other newspapers. (798) After providing information on the military armaments in Cuba, Cain said that the resistance move- ment had 800 men fighting in the Escambray Mountains and that he was awaiting the opportunity to parachute into the Escambrays to take photos for Life. Cain said that the Cuban exile leader gave him the information on the Cuban armaments. (200) (124) When Cain’s plans to visit Cuba, either to install wiretaps for former President Prio or to take photographs of rebel activity, or both, are considered simultaneously with Giancana’s presence in Miami, Giancana’s reference to the assassination of Castro in Novem- ber and Cain’s approach to the CIA, the true purpose and possible interrelation of these events become even more suspect. The wiretap assignment and the photographic story may have been covers: Gian- cana may have been attempting to send Cain to Cuba to supervise the poisoning attempt on Castro. Cain was connected to La Cosa Nostra, spoke Spanish, had extensive contacts in Latin America, was well- versed in sabotage and investigative procedures, had been on Gian- cana’s payroll for 4 years, and apparently was attempting to arrive in Cuba by approximately November 1960.(20/) Further, Cain’s ref- erence in his FBI interview to the Cuban exile leader, the person that the CIA concedes may have been active in independent organized crime assassination plots against Castro prior to his recruitment by Trafficante in March 1961, raises more suspicion. : (125) It can, therefore, be argued that these events indicate that Cain may have been the “assassin-to-be” whom Giancana referred to in the October 18, 1960, FBI memorandum, or he may have been the contact man for the operation. (126) Cain could also have provided another service to Giancana. As already indicated, a second person, called J. W. Harrison, allegedly accompanied and assisted Balletti in the wiretap. Although the Justice 43-944—79 12 174 Department pursued this investigatoin vigorously and_ prepared to indict the principals, no one could determine who Harrison was and no participant would admit to knowing hisidentity. (127) There is no doubt he existed :he signed the hotel register and accompanied Balletti on the flight to Las Vegas.(202) DuBois, the private investigator Maheu hired to conduct the surveillance, main- tained that Maheu arranged for J. W. Harrison to accompany Balletti from Miami to Las Vegas to assist in the operation.(203) The support chief, the CTA liaison man, informed the committee that whoever Harrison was he was not a CIA employee. (204) (128) Clearly, someone arranged for Harrison’s presence and knows his true identity. Since DuBois and Balletti acted only as the instru- ments of Maheu, it seems logical that they would have revealed Har- rison’s identity in the face of Federal prosecution if Harrison were just an employee of DuBois with no connection to the CIA or to the associates of Maheu in the CIA operation against Castro. Thus, Bal- letti and DuBois either did not know the identity of Harrison or felt that their client’s interests prohibited them from revealing such in- formation. (129) ‘The theory that Maheu provided Harrison at the request of a source that had a direct interest in the surveillance seems most logical. Maheu, however, denied ever recruiting or arranging for Harrison to participate in the operation.(205) Maheu did say, however, that he instituted the surveillance to pacify Giancana’s concerns in a personal matter and to uncover any possible leaks regarding the operation. (206) Roselli confirmed these two accounts in his Senate testimony. (207) Shimon informed the committee further that Giancana told him’ he paid $5,000 for the Las Vegas operation. (208) (130) Assuming that Maheu did provide for Harrison, he did so at the request of someone else. Maheu did not have any reason independ- ently to prefer one person over another; the CIA or Giancana, how- ever, did have such a personal interest. Giancana’s interest obviously stemmed from his personal matter and it is probably correct that Giancana requested Maheu to bug the room. This personal interest could have prompted Giancana to direct Maheu to use a person of Giancana’s choice: Cain fit that role perfectly. He was a skilled elec- tronic surveillance technician and was in Miami during late October and early November, which was the debarkation point for Harrison and Balletti on their trip to Las Vegas. (131) As already mentioned, Maheu, in a deposition to the commit- tee, denied any knowledge of Cain.(209) When shown several photo- graphs of Cain from the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, Arthur Balletti also could not identify Cain as Harrison.(2/0) These denials do not detract from the theory that Cain was Harrison: If no one would identify Harrison in 1960 there is no reason to expect any change in testimony. (132) In regard to the wiretap incident, the CIA had an interest in surveilling target A (two persons were targets, target A and target B) because of the October 18, 1960, memorandum where Giancana dis- cussed an. assassination plot against Castro. The SSC concluded that this memo caused. the CIA to be concerned about determining if Giancana was leaking information on the CIA-organized crime plots. 175 This may be partially correct, but as already indicated, the FBI memorandum depicts a plot substantially in progress and involving a girl who cannot be found in the October status of the CIA operation. The CIA could have been more concerned that Giancana was involved in a separate assassination plot and consequently could have been con- cerned with its nature and extent. (133) The reasons why target A was the object of such surveillance were two-fold. First, target A’s relationship with Giancana might have entailed the learning of certain clandestine activities. Second, target A was one of the “several friends” in the conversation related in the October 18 memo. (2/7) (134) The CIA interest would also explain why a wiretap was in- stalled. Maheu informed the committee that he only ordered physical surveillance of the target and could not understand why anyone in- stalled a wiretap since the primary intent was to check on the personal matter. (272) (185) Physical surveillance and a room bug would, admittedly, be more than adequate to uncover any evidence of the personal matter. If, however, Maheu also wished to investigate the possibility of leaks in the operation as well as the possibility of Giancana’s involvement in an independent plot, then the use of a wiretap would have been logical. (186) Assuming that investigating the personal matter was not the primary focus of the Las Vegas operation, it can be argued that direct surveillance of target A in target A’s own room and other habitats, as opposed to investigating target B, would have been the optimum method to investigate for any leaks and information that Giancana may have provided. This type of investigation, however, would have run the risk of incurring the wrath of Giancana and his possible departure from the CIA assassination plots if he detected the sur- veillance. Through the cover of surveilling target B for a possible association with target A, however, the CIA had the opportunity to surveil target A to obtain information on the assassination plots for a reason which met the approval of Giancana. Indeed, Giancana prob- ably always believed that his directive to investigate the personal matter was the only issue involved in the surveillance. (187) In any event, the objectives of both Giancana and the CIA could have been achieved whether Harrison was a Giancana choice, specifically Cain, or an Agency operative. (138) After the Las Vegas operation backfired, the CIA obviously decided to continue the assassination plots. This indicates that the Support Chief felt the security of the CIA organized crime plot had not been seriously breached. Additionally, it possibly indicates that the CIA determined that even if Giancana was involved in an inde- pendent operation, that it would not hamper their efforts, and that all interests could be reconciled. (t) The “girl” in the October 18, 1960, FBI memorandum (139) In this memo, Giancana spoke of a girl who was going to drop a pill in some food or drink of Castro. This format is again in con- tradiction to the CIA operation which initially relied on the Cuban official, someone close to Castro, to administer the pills. 176 (140) The identity of this “girl” referred to by Giancana has not been conclusively ascertained, but it is reasonable to assume that Traffi- cante was in a position to recruit a mistress of Castro because of his numerous contacts in the Cuban gambling and prostitution circles. Consequently, the use of a girl is quite logical and further supports the involvement of organized crime in an independent plot to kill Castro. (141) Therefore, the CIA is probably correct in asserting what the Agency “may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addi- tion to its material contribution was also supplying an aura of official sanction.” (273) (j) articles on Frank Sturgis (142) As indicated in section II Paul Meskill of the New York Daily News wrote several articles in 1975 and 1976 concerning activities of Frank Sturgis. These articles reflect further the theory that organized crime was involved in independent Castro assassination plots. (143) The following points should be made about'this theory; they also more thoroughly respond to the allegations in the Meskill articles: (144) First, organized crime probably initiated independent assassi- nation plots against Castro prior to any CIA involvement in late 1960. Such plots may have been in progress when the CIA reactivated its plans to kill Castro in April 1962. (145) Second, organized crime could quite possibly have been direct- ing activities such as those described in the New York Daily News article. (146) Third, Frank Sturgis most probably established contacts with organized crime through his gambling associations and probably was used by them in some capacities. This does not mean that he was con- nected to organized crime. (147) Fourth, Frank Sturgis probably knew the Cuban official and could have been involved with him in an assassination plot. Since Sturgis is not a reliable source, however, his allegations are suspect. (148) Fifth, according to the available evidence, the CIA was not involved in any operations with the Cuban official prior to late 1960. (149) Sixth, Sturgis was not necessarily involved with Marita Lorenz, one of Castro’s witnesses or the Cuban official in a plot to kill Castro. He may have learned of plots involving the Cuban official and possibly Marita Lorenz in Miami after the Cuban official arrived there in 1965. (150) Additionally, the April 1975 Meskill articles did not include the Sturgis-Lorenz plot to kill Castro with poison pills. Tt was only after the publication of the SSC interim report in November 1975 and the final Report in April 1976, that Meskill described this plot. Thus. Sturgis may have combined accurate information obtained from the Cuban official and other Miami sources with the facts the SSC presented and then fabricated the Marita Lorenz story, which, to- gether with other evidence such as the October 18 memo, can unfor- tunately succeed in appearing both logical and believable. (k) Implications arising from phase 2 (151) Significant differences are apparent between phase 1 and phase 2 which reflect upon organized crime’s motivation and seriousness in fulfilling its part of the bargain originally initiated in 1960. 177 (152) First, in phase 1, Roselli and his colleagues demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, indeed, in a position close to Castro. In phase 2, the modus operandi and the ability of the assassin or assassins becomes quite vague. Harvey reported that the Cuban exile leader had an asset in Cuba who had access to someone in a restaurant which Castro fre- quented who could administer the poison.(2/4) In June 1962, Roselli reported to Harvey that the Cuban exile leader had dispatched a three-man team to Cuba to recruit persons to kill Castro, or to kill him themselves, maybe with poison pills, if the opportunity arose. (215) Harvey said they had no specific plans. (2/6) | (153) Second, as already indicated, the cast of the organized crime figures involved changed. Maheu, Giancana, and Trafficante allegedly retired from the scene, with a “Maceo” assuming the position of Trafficante. Roselli and the Cuban exile leader remained. The CIA is probably correct in suggesting that these figures, at least Trafficante and Giancana, were kept informed of the progress of the plots. (154) What is puzzling is the introduction of a person simply re- ferred to as “Maceo” into a highly sensitive and covert CIA operation without any apparent attempt by the CIA to check his background or ascertain his identity. It seems extraordinary that the CIA would permit the plots to go forward without performing any security check. Indeed, it seems more logical that at least Roselli and Harvey did ascertain the identity of Maceo and for whatever reason decided to withhold this information. : (155) Further, although the I.G. Report characterized Maceo as Roselli’s man, it is more probable that Trafficante, who had recruited all the Cuban personnel used previously in the attempts and who maintained the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba, provided this individual. If this argument can be sustained then it displays Trafficante again performing a direct role during phase 2, a function every source has denied. . (156) ; , ' her ! Aviv LOC ; f ya { ts ? Poy ts) Mh, . ° BY # a 7 i , 4 44 vtrowad wo tt 7 iv \ F01-GUL are A F a 4¢ r : , Ota. A100), 2b Sap Ps ‘® nish ooitan't: ad somirnasd .qsedea HInwh ** fogs? ISHIAGD SO a Fg EBBBBenyiaVvs 3 oem Oba Tash) See Jyl soled vic, pare aie ; £ He CKY .F710 he4)T mtieit Nuss a 7," i, shen 47 Wale a $2 jbl ‘ = Be ~~ ve ; 27 4 je ft <2f 4.78 bt 4 £4) $3-24 Gq 16 D4 “LEB Ny panheH . " tisdodl 101 alse ipreieas.) 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(O77) 1d. wtp 104. ROSE CHERAMIE Staff Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations U.S. House of Representatives Ninety-fifth Congress Second Session March 1979 (197) ms, 5 oe, io. fptrae OPeee 'F' ee ee en (a. a i Lit ai ¥ lee. : { ; * eo ow yi We ty Pat | : nN yas : ? é * zy Wit aA, : ‘ >' whe >t "2 : . : PI ‘| ; pat W cur we n + Fi Pa s nae - 7 74 ¥ —* U ; f ne ~ 7 - > | 7 ee | Fs “ : a < [e ool aries \ g 49 es a ® : ' : 7 4 | y 2 al < ‘ i ’ a ia ; Lvs S a9 ie ‘» i] *h ® ‘ . EE eee re TRE PA rad RhPORES ee ER | REE Te eA ON Lg a mee a Ae a — St = eee es Ce oe ee te, ie - Pee + ee MIMAAGIC GAoy Seeger emneemene proqefl Tate ent to enoijanivastaA mo ssitionntoD toolee AF esviteimsetqoH to setoHl if | exsrano.) Mirt-ywout | nore Lae. © CVOr ‘dora Secs sl tela A Ce A A CCT OLDIE AA EL LOOT AIO a GE LE OL ODL LEAL LLL LI LDA LE LAL LEA GON ou ecg tere atest ante Ay NT TET (Ter) nal nl if : ' or . te. f i, The al a oA : j A ’ uy ee iy MV ads vay a vy he @? | uy 1 eee - aoe i. a ye He J ql : : Aeiy eens iis Bias a : heh v7 e ; J) ee iat?” ey a a): aa ioe ere vy 4 ROSE CHERAMIE (1) According to accounts of assassinations researchers, a woman known as Rose Cheramie, a heroin addict and prostitute with a long history of arrests, was found on November 20, 1963, lying on the road near Kunice, La., bruised and disoriented.(Z7) She was taken to the Louisiana State Hospital in Jackson, La., to recover from her injuries and what appeared to be narcotics withdrawal.(2) Cheramie re- portedly told the attending physician that President IXennedy was going to be killed during his forthcoming visit to Dallas.(3) The doctor did not pay much ‘attention to the ravings of a patient going “cold turkey” until after the President was “assassinated 2 “days later.(4) State police were called in and Cheramie was questioned at length.(5) She reportedly told police officers she had been a stripper in Jack Kuby’s night ciub and was transporting a quantity of heroin from Florida to Houston at Ruby’s insistence when she quarreled with two men also participating in the dope run.(6) Cheramie said the men pushed her out of a moving vehicle and left her for dead.(7) After the assassination, Cheramie maintained Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald had known each other well. (8) She said she had seen Oswald at Ruby’s night club and claimed Oswald and Ruby had been homosexual partners. (9) (2) Ironically, the circumstances of Rose Cheramie’s death are strikingly similar to the circumstances surrounding her original in- volvement in the assassination investigation. Cheramie died of iinjuries received from an automobile accident: on a strip of highway near Big Sandy, Tex., in the early morning of September 4, 1965. (20) The driver stated Cheramie had been lying in the roadway. and although he attempted to avoid hitting her, he ran over the top of her skull, causing fatal injuries.(77) An investigation into the accident and the possi- bility of a relationship between the victim and the driver produced no evidence of foul play. (12) The case was closed. (72) (3) Although Cheramie’s allegations were eventually discounted, her death 2 years later prompted renewed speculation about her story. It was noted, for example, that over 50 individuals who had been asso- ciated with the investigation of the Kennedy assassination had died within 3 years of that event. (74) The deaths, by natural or other causes, were labeled “mysterious” by Warren Commission critics and the news media. (75) The skeptics claim that the laws of probability would show the number of deaths is so unlikely as to be highly suspect.(76) As detailed elsewhere, the committee studied such claims and determined they were erroneous.(/7) Nevertheless, allegations involving Rose Cheramie, often counted among the “mysterious” deaths, was of partic- ular interest to the committee, since it indicated a possible association of Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby ; an association of these indi- viduals with members of organized crime; and possible connection between Cheramie’s confinement at the State Hospital in Jackson, La. (199) 200 and Oswald’s search for employment there in the summer of 1963. (4) The committee set out to obtain a full account of the Cheramie allegations and determine whether her statements could be at all cor- roborated. The committee interviewed and deposed pertinent wit- nesses. Files from U.S. Customs and the FBI were requested. Infor- mation developed during the investigation by New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison was examined. Records of Cheramie’s hos- pitalization at the East Louisiana State Hospital were studied. (5) Hospital records indicate Melba Christine Marcades, alias Rose Cheramie, was brought to the State Hospital in Jackson, La. by police from Eunice on November 21, 1963 and officially admitted at 6 a.m.(18) She was originally from Houston, Tex., where her mother still lived. (19) She was approximately 34 years old in 1963, had used many aliases throughout her lifetime and had lived many years in Louisiana and Texas. (20) (6) According to the clinical notes, the deputy accompanying Cheramie said the patient had been “picked up on [the] side of [the] road and had been given something by the coroner.” (27)The coroner in Eunice was contacted by doctors at the hospital and he told them Cheramie had been coherent when he spoke with her at 10:30 p.m., November 20, but he did administer a sedative.(22) He further indi- cated that Cheramie was a 9-year mainlining heroin addict, whose last injection had been around 2 p.m., November 20.(23) The doctors noted that Cheramie’s condition upon initial examination indicated heroin withdrawal and clinical shock. (24) (7) Relevant to Cheramie’s credibility was an assessment of her mental state. From November 22 to November 24, Cheramie required close attention and medication.(25) On November 25 she was trans- ferred to the ward.(26) On November 27 she was released to Louisiana. State Police Lieutenant Fruge. (27) (8) The hospital records gave no reference as to alleged statements made by Cheramie or why she was released to Lieutenant Fruge on November 27, 1963. These records do indicate Cheramie had been hos- pitalized for alcoholism and narcotics addiction on other occasions, including commitment to the same hospital in March 1961 by the criminal court of New Orleans.(28) During this stay, the woman was diagnosed as “. . . without psychosis. However, because of her pre- vious record of drug addiction she may have a mild integrative and pleasure defect.”(29) Her record would show she has “intervals of very good behavior” but at other times she “presents episodically psychopathic behavior” indicative in her history of drug and alcohol abuse, prostitution, arrest on numerous, if minor, charges. (30) (9) ‘The committee interviewed one of the doctors on staff at East Louisiana State Hospital who had seen Cheramie during her stay there at the time of the Kennedy assassination. (37) The doctor corroborated aspects of the Cheramie allegations. Dr. Victor Weiss verified that he was employed as a resident physician at the hospital in 1963.(32) He recalled that on Monday, November 25, 1963, he was asked by another physician, Dr. Bowers, to see a patient who had been committed No- vember 20 or 21.(33) Dr. Bowers allegedly told Weiss that the patient, Rose Cheramie, had stated before the assassination that President Kennedy was going to be killed.(34) Weiss questioned Cheramie about 201 her statements. (35) She told him she had worked for Jack Ruby. She did not have any specific details of a particular assassination plot against Kennedy, but had stated the “word in the underworld” was that Kennedy would be assassinated.(36) She further stated that she had been traveling from Florida to her home in Texas when the man traveling with her threw her from the automobile in which they were riding. (37) (10) Francis Fruge, a lieutenant with the Louisiana State Police in 1963, was the police officer who first came to Cheramie’s assistance on November 20, 1963, had her committed to the State Hospital, and later released her into his custody following the assassination to investigate her allegations. (38) As such, he provided an account further detailing her allegations and the official response to her allegations. (11) Fruge was deposed by the committee on April 18, 1978. (39) He told the committee he was called on November 20, 1963 by an adminis- trator at a private hospital in Eunice, La. that a female accident victim had been taken there for treatment.(40) She had been treated for minor abrasions, and although she appeared to be under the influence of drugs since she had “no financial basis” she was to be released. (47) Fruge did what he normally did in such instances. As the woman required no further medical attention, he put her in a jail cell to sober up.(42) This arrangement did not last long. The woman began to display severe symptoms of withdrawal.(43) Fruge said he called a doctor, who sedat- ed Cheramie and Fruge transported Cheramie to the State hospital in Jackson, La. (44) (12) Fruge said that during the “1 to 2 hour” ride to Jackson, he asked Cheramie some “routine” questions. (45) Fruge told the commit- tee: She related to me that she was coming from Florida to Dal- las with two men who were Italians or resembled Italians. They had stopped at this lounge . . . and they’d had a few drinks and had gotten into an argument or something. The manager of the lounge threw her out and she got on the road and hitchhiked to catch a ride, and this is when she got hit by a vehicle. (46) Fruge said the lounge was a house of prostitution called the Silver Slipper.(47) Fruge asked Cheramie what she was going to do in Dal- las: “She said she was going to, number one, pick up some money, pick up her baby, and to kill Kennedy.” (48) Fruge claimed during these in- tervals that Cheramie related the story she appeared to be quite lucid. (49) Fruge had Cheramie admitted to the hospital late on Novem- ber 20. (50) _ (18) On November 22, when he heard the President had been assassi- nated, Fruge said he immediately called the hospital and told them not to release Cheramie until he had spoken to her.(5/) The hospital ad- ministrators assented but said Fruge would have to wait until the fol- lowing Monday before Cheramie would be well enough to speak to anyone.(42) Fruge waited. Under questioning, Cheramie told Fruge that the two men traveling with her from Miami were going to Dallas to kill the President.(53) For her part, Cheramie was to obtain $8,000 from an unidentified source in Dallas and proceed to Houston with the two men to complete a drug deal.(54) Cheramie was also supposed to 202 pick up her little boy from friends who had been looking after him. (55) (14) Cheramie further supplied detailed accounts of the arrange- ment for the drug transaction in Houston.(56) She said reservations had been made at the Rice Hotel in Houston. (47) The trio was to meet a seaman who was bringing in 8 kilos of heroin to Galveston by boat.(58) Cheramie had the name of the seaman and the boat he was arriving on.(59) Once the deal was completed, the trio would proceed to Mexico. (60) (15) Fruge told the committee that he repeated Cheramie’s story to his supervisors and asked for instructions.(6/) He was told to follow up on it.(62) Fruge promptly took Cheramie into custody—as indi- cated in hospital records—and set out to check her story.(62) He contacted the chief customs agent in Galveston who reportedly verified the scheduled docking of the boat and the name of the seaman. (64) Fruge believed the customs agent was also able to verify the name of the man in Dallas who was holding Cheramie’s son.(65) Fruge recalled that the customs agent had tailed the seaman as he disembarked from the boat, but then lost the man’s trail.(70) Customs closed the case. (77) (16) Fruge had also hoped to corroborate other statements made by Cheramie. During a flight from Houston, according to Fruge, Cheramie noticed a newspaper with headlines indicating investigators had not been able to establish a relationship between Jack Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald.(72) Cheramie laughed at the headline, Fruge said.(73) Cheramie told him she had worked for Ruby, or “Pinky,” as she knew him, at his night club in Dallas and claimed Ruby and Oswald “had been shacking up for years.(74) Fruge said he called Capt. Will Fritz of the Dallas Police Department with this informa- tion.(75) Fritz answered, he wasn’t interested.(76) Fritz and the Louisiana State Police dropped the investigation into the matter. (77) (17) Four years later, however, investigators from the office of District Attorney Garrison in New Orleans contacted Fruge.(78) Fruge went on detail to Garrison’s office to assist in the investiga- tion into the Kennedy assassination. (79 (18) During the course of the New Orleans D.A.’s investigation Fruge was able to pursue leads in the Cheramie case that he had not checked out in the original investigation. Although there appeared to be different versions as to how Cheramie ended up by the side of the road, and the number and identity of her companions, Fruge attempted to corroborate the version she had given him. Fruge spoke with the owner of the Silver Slipper Lounge.(80) The bar owner, a Mr. Mac Manual since deceased, told Fruge that Cheramie had come in with two men who the owner knew as pimps engaged in the business of hauling prostitutes in from Florida.(8/) When Cheramie became intoxicated and rowdy, one of the men “slapped her around” and threw her outside. (82) (19) Fruge claims that he showed the owner of the bar a “stack” of photographs and mug shots to identify.(83) According to Fruge, the barowner chose the photos of a Cuban exile, Sergio Arcacha Smith, and another Cuban Fruge believed to be named Osanto.(84) Arcacha Smith was known to Kennedy assassination investigators as an anti- Castro Cuban refugee who had been active in 1961 as the head of the New Orleans Cuban Revolutionary Front.(85) At that time, he be- friended anti-Castro activist and commercial pilot David Ferrie, who 203 was named and dismissed as a suspect in the Kennedy assassination within days of the President’s death.(S¢) Ferrie and ih cacha Smith were also believed to have had ties with New Orleans organized crime figure Carlos Marcello.(87) Arcacha Smith moved from the New Orleans area in 1962 to go to Miami and later to settle in Houston. (88) The weekend following the assassination, Ferrie took a tr ip to Houston and Galveston for a little “rest and relaxation,” while police searched New Orleans for him after receiving a tip he had been involved in the assassination.(59) The committee has found credible evidence in- dicating Ferrie and Oswald were seen together in August 1963 in the town of Clinton, La., 18 miles from the hospital in “Jackson where Cheramie was treated and where Oswald reportedly sought employ- ment, Allegations regarding Arcacha Smith and Ferrie and the com- mittee’s investigation are set forth in detail elsewhere in the Report. (90) Clearly, evvidence of a link between Cheramie and Arcacha Smith would be highly significant, Arcacha Smith, however, denied any knowledge of C her:amie and her allegations. Other avenues Of corrrobo- ration of Fr uge’s identification of Cheramie’s traveling companion as Sergio Arcacha Smith and further substantiation of Cheramie’ s elle- gations remained elusive. (20) U.S. Customs was unable to locate documents and reports re- lated to its involvement in the Cheramie investigation although such involvement was not denied.(9/) Nor could customs officials locate those agents named by Fruge as having participated in the original investigation, as they had since left the employ of the agency. (92) (21) Since the FBI had never been notified by the Louisiana State Police and U.S. Customs of their interest in Cheramie, the FBI file did not have any reference to the Cheramie allegations of November 1965.(93) FBI files did give reference to the investigation of a tip from Melba Mercades, actually Rose Cheramie, in Ardmore, Okla. that she was en route to Dallas to deliver $2,600 worth of heroin to a man in Oak Cliff, Tex.(94) She was then to proceed to Galveston, Tex., to pick up a load of narcotics from a seaman on board a ship destined for Galveston in the next few days.(95) She gave “detailed descriptions as to individuals, names, places, and amounts distrib- uted.”(96) Investigations were conducted by narcotics bureaus in Oklahoma and Texas and her information was found to be “erroneous in all respects.” (97) (22) Y | on Septeraler & Ges WintWat juet, eee afier short the WEL. 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