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Pitas a § j a 7 | INVESTIGATION 0OF THE ASSASSINATION ' OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY NS aewe ae HEARINGS rahe Adit, es ee eng eyRas <"" Se. nz. ae . SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION SEPTEMBER 22, 25, AND 26, 1978 VOLUME IV Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations oo BRkawr iO ¢ 4Sat ‘ao a BARB SON A AENT hi DEFARTpee ath atf |MAY 27 ae : ——$—<$ KF 5125 OES NOT CIRCULATE AUTHOR Investigation of the Assass'n Or 4 TITLE Pres. raGoad ag 8 Vol. 4 DATE DUE DOES NOT CIRCULATE INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY as (rn) : byA Se ae ~ HEARINGS” BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATION S OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION SEPTEMBER 22, 25, AND 26, 1978 VOLUME IV Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations ae U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 41-373 O WASHINGTON : 1979 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 Stock Number 052—070-04906-5 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS LOUIS STOKES, Ohio, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio WALTER E. FAUNTROY, STEWART B. McKINNEY, Connecticut District of Columbia CHARLES THONE, Nebraska YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, HAROLD S. SAWYER, Michigan California CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana ROBERT W. EDGAR, Pennsylvania Subcommittee on the Subcommittee on the Assassination of Assassination o, Martin Luther King, Jr. John F. Kennedy WALTER E. FAUNTROY, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, Chairman HAROLD E. FORD YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE FLOYD J. FITHIAN CHRISTOPHER J. DODD ROBERT W. EDGAR CHARLES THONE STEWART B. McKINNEY HAROLD S. SAWYER LOUIS STOKES, ex officio LOUIS STOKES, ex officio SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio (ID CONTENTS September 22, 1978: Page Narration by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel .............cccccccccscsescecseceececeeccecsececen. 1 Testimony of Richard Helms, former Director of Central Intelligence ........ 5 AFTERNOON SESSION Testimony of Richard Helms—(Resumed) ..............scccescesescssecescscsssscescssesescseseeee 118 September 25, 1978: Opening remarks by Chairman Stokes .0..........ccccccsscsscsccssesstesescecssssecssssesscsceseee 251 Further testimony of Joseph McNally. ....c3.......cccccscscosscscocsccececcscscssescacecssscdscooece 254 Further testimony of Sgt. Cecil Kirk, Metropolitan Police Department, WSSnePLOn LCs nat meee i ae ed eee he as 362 Testimony of Dr. Clyde Collins Snow, physical anthropologist...............:.00.+- 367 POCALETIIOE] Ved VERSE ISIE Wet tendstee ors Senn gonsstects borer eoenlsiote elaneih coainaat eee 386 éstimony of: Di5. Bob: Re Hurts tess: deen’ criaze:.cud. wh. nc at bie 387 AFTERNOON SESSION. Testimony, of Dr., Bob. R.. Hunt—(Resumed) ....5::.....ceccscosessescessssecescassscececsesessesers 420 LEB GN Vat LONIe, SCOVOI WY Ei bes choir sos 4 caus cies favans tosdaieresdtusheovan ccsceconasecdlls eiet 429 PPSLATTIONY Ol a CUI CLITIC RES@RE tree a oath ean tsp lcaues vas eaniies, deoccdegecee ele 454 September 26, 1978: Narration by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director .............0..... 469 PPRALIMONY OF Ari ERtDY 2)chet eit tees a ee ABN, «caidas, 500 Narration by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director ................... 539 Testimony of Capt. Jack Revill, Dallas Police Department .......0.0...cccccsceeeeees 568 (IIT) Peas initio Se oe : - ) j a 7 P ; co . ° | ' ‘ : " 4 oe teal Soagiito z ‘ones : ; a ‘i fad ~~ re qed#5 | Senet pudqanvoy tubes vise bas bareecassademre is ee tans ~ * 14 ( ag: a ys aggre ee yy sae at area pape denned *~ ji g ritesy ne eoao Hi Sutpusatee pus Subphasigee ape A yo ; G Yo tee oar ee At ae Se PRIRTRON. ; mit meen”ew ade cnet cae ceweree eenrnr DIR . ee pdeanan sander teres” annie : ; an SVONNE ana’oo CRIT OPHER J. DOE * 4 wi CHARLES THONE °: . S HAROLD GAY Bh Vs ‘s A Los ate or ag gee | , SAMUEL b peekTs THAN NM, ve: patie ae ae e be a aol s ae *y a a. : . - Ase: oa & 41 Mgty Be by. ? LP a cara a Ly ieee > 7 : er ony 4 ie ba ae ‘eepeeina <. i. 7 ye ie oe INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1978 House OF REPRESENTATIVES, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, Washington, D.C. The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:10 a.m., in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Richardson Preyer (acting chairman) presiding. Present: Representatives Stokes, Preyer, Dodd, Ford, Fithian, Edgar, Devine, and Sawyer. , Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; Michael Goldsmith, senior staff counsel; Charles Berk, research attorney; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk. Mr. Preyer. The committee will come to order. The Chair recognizes Mr. Blakey. NARRATION BY MR. G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL Mr. Buakey. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Over the years, the Central Intelligence Agency has conducted a massive investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald, the proof of which is a 142-volume file at the Agency headquarters in Langley, Va. Nevertheless, despite an impressive effort to probe the periods of Oswald’s life during which there had been foreign encounters, some questions about the CIA persist. Several principal questions remain: Was the CIA’s post-assassination investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald thorough and reliable, and did the Agency share with others the relevant information it had or learned? Was there a preassassination relationship between the CIA and Oswald? If so, could that relationship have extended to complicity in the assassination, or short of that, might it have led the Agency to seek to hide the relationship out of fear of being accused of complicity. Much of the mystery is, of course, the result of the secretive nature of the CIA and its understandable unwillingness to reveal operational information. A brief review of the history of the CIA might afford a better grasp of the problem. Created by the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA was, in fact, a postwar outgrowth of the Office of Strategic Services. The head of OSS, though never a CIA official, was William J. Donovan who, adapting the British approach, combined the intelligence ac- tivities of various agencies into one office. (1) 2 Toward the end of World War II, President Roosevelt sought Donovan’s advice on a permanent intelligence apparatus. Dono- van’s classified reply, leaked to the press 3 months later, described an “all-powerful intelligence service * * * which would supercede all existing Federal police and intelligence units.” The reaction among the heads of existing intelligence and investigative agencies was predictable panic. Few wanted to see the OSS become more powerful. President Roosevelt’s death turned out to be a serious blow to OSS—very nearly a crippling one—for President Truman abolished the wartime OSS without even consulting Donovan or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result, the United States was handicapped by a serious intelligence gap in the postwar international struggles. Unification of the Armed Forces was the main objective of the 1947 act. But it also created the National Security Council, of which the CIA was to be the intelligence coordinating unit. Under the act, the CIA was charged with four responsibilities: One, to advise the NSC on intelligence matters relating to na- tional security. Two, to make recommendations on the coordination of intelli- gence activities. Three, to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence. Four, to perform additional intelligence activities and national security functions at the direction of the NSC. In its early years,the CIA was hampered by internal organization difficulties and bad relationships with other agencies. The turnover of directors was rather rapid—Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter in 1947, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith in 1950, Allen W. Dulles in 1952. Dulles, who had been a wartime master spy, had strong opinions as to the type of men who should be named to top posts in the Agency. At Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on the National Security Act, he testified that the CIA: * * * should be directed by a relatively small but elite corps of men with a passion for anonymity and a willingness to stick to that particular job. They must find their reward in the work itself, and in the service they render their Govern- ment, rather than in public acclaim. In addition, in its formative period, the CIA was subjected to the tirades of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, who demanded a purge of Agency personnel. The upshot was a severe tightening of employ- ment standards, as well as a restriction within the Agency of the expression of political viewpoints. Although the CIA is not required to make public its organization- al structure, it is publicly known to consist of five main entities— the Office of the Director and four Directorates. The Director and Deputy Director, one of whom must be a military officer, are appointed by the President. The four Directorates are as follows: Operations: The clandestine services unit, with 45 percent of its personnel stationed overseas, most of them in cover positions. Sub- divisions of operations are foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert action. Intelligence: Its responsibility is to turn out finished intelligence products. 3 Science and Technology: It’s responsibility for basic research and development, and it operates reconnaissance satellites and analyzes highly technical information. Management and Services: This is the Agency’s housekeeping department. There are also a number of proprietry organizations, front groups and social or political institutions that are run by the CIA or in its behalf. The best known proprietaries are Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, both established in the early 1950’s. Among the front organizations are airlines and holding companies to support clandestine operations. In early 1967, it was, for exam- ple, learned that the CIA had for years been subsidizing the coun- trys largest student organization, the National Student Associ- ation. Eventually, it became known that the Agency had channeled money to a number of business, labor, religious, charitable, and educational organizations. In 1974 and 1975, a commission headed by then Vice President Rockefeller investigated CIA activities in the United States, specifi- cally whether domestic CIA activities exceeded the Agency’s statu- tory authority. The investigation was in response to charges that the Agency had engaged in large-scale spying on American citizens and had compiled dossiers on many citizens. Mail intercepts, infil- tration of dissident groups, illegal wiretaps and break-ins were among other charges delved into in the investigation. The Rockefeller Commission concluded that the “great majority of the CIA’s domestic activities comply with its stautory authority * * * nevertheless, over the 28 years of its history, the CIA has engaged in some activities that should be criticized and not permit- ted to happen again—both in light of the limits imposed on the Agency by law and as a matter of public policy. It was hardly worth noting at the time, but an event on October 31, 1959, would ultimately become part of the history of the CIA. A 20-year-old ex-Marine radar operator named Lee Harvey Oswald appeared at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and handed consular official Richard Snyder a note demanding that his American citi- zenship be revoked. He also intimated to Snyder that he intended to pass radar secrets to the Soviet Union. This information was sent via the State Department to CIA Headquarters, and the CIA opened a file on Oswald. Oswald’s citizenship was not revoked. He was also permitted to remain in Russia until June of 1962. He then returned to the United States with a Russian wife, Marina, and an infant daugh- ter. As a returning defector, Oswald was of interest to U.S. intelli- gence agencies. His tracks were picked up once more when, in September 1963, Oswald turned up in Mexico City where he visited the Soviet Embassy and the Cuban Embassy and Consulate. The information that was added to Oswald’s CIA dossier in Washington on October 11, 1968, was imprecise—it identified him as being 35 years old—he was 23 at the time—and as Lee Henry Oswald. It is, of course, now public knowledge that the CIA continued overt operations against Cuba after the Bay of Pigs defeat in 1961. They included plots to murder Fidel Castro by the Agency and American gangsters, who had been operating lucrative gambling Casinos in Havana until Castro threw them out of the country. 4 They also included CIA contact with a high-level associate of Pre- mier Castro, code named ““AMLASH,” who had expressed a desire to murder Castro. While Castro himself was apparently aware of the American plots on his life, there is no evidence that the Warren Commission knew of the Castro plots. In 1964, when the Warren Commission determined that Oswald was the lone assassin, it also concluded he had never been associat- ed with, nor employed by, the CIA. Critics of the Warren Commis- sion were quick to challenge the assertion, raising questions about the thoroughness of the Warren Commission’s investigation and raising the sinister possibility that intelligence agencies may have been responsible for the assassination itself. Mark Lane, in ‘Rush to Judgment,” implies, for example, Oswald had ties to the CIA, and in his more recently published code name ‘Zorro,’ a book on the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., he writes: The evidence now available discloses that Oswald worked for the FBI and with the Gracte* The Rockefeller Commission examined the allegation of Oswald’s CIA ties and found no credible evidence to support it. In accord with its mandate, the select committee undertook to assess the quality of the CIA’s performance in its investigation of Oswald and its working relationship with the Warren Commission. The investigation covered all periods of Oswald’s life when he came in contact with an official entity overseas, either United States or foreign. It included Oswald’s hitch in the Marine Corps, his trip through Europe and defection to the Soviet Union, his stay in Russia, his return to the United States, his political activities in the United States as they pertain to foreign affairs; for example, the fair play for Cuba campaign, and finally of course his trip to Mexico in 1963. Second in the sequence, but by no means subsidiary in impor- tance, the committee considered the charge that Oswald had ties to the CIA. Resolution of this issue was uppermost in the minds of committee investigators, as they poured over CIA reports—not only the 142 volumes on Oswald himself, but hundreds of other volumes as well. Again, the committee was aware that if a relationship was discovered, it did not necessarily mean that the Agency was guilty of complicity in the assassination. Nevertheless the committee rea- soned that the CIA might have covered up links to Oswald out of concern for their implications. On the other hand, if the committee found no signs of coverup, it felt it could reach some reasonable judgment on the issue. Ambassador Helms was serving as the CIA Deputy Director for Plans at the time of the Kennedy assassination. As such, he was responsible for the Directorate of Plans which was the office en- gaged in covert operations. In 1964, Ambassador Helms was the senior CIA official who worked with the Warren Commission on a day-to-day basis, and he testified before the Commission on May 14, 1964. Ambassador Helms was appointed Director of Central Intelli- gence in 1966, serving in that capacity until 1973. In 1978, he was named Ambassador to Iran. 5 At present, Mr. Helms is a business consultant here in Washing- ton. Mr. Chairman, it is appropriate to note that the committee’s questioning of Mr. Helms today will be based on documents that have been released by the CIA in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act. The select committee has also, in the past week, reached agreement with the CIA for the declassification and re- lease of certain documents not previously available to the public. These newly released documents will also be referred to in today’s hearing. On August 9, however, Ambassador Helms testified at an execu- tive session of the committee, in which many issues of a classified nature were discussed in detail. Because they are still classified, they will not be brought up today. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Ambassador Helms. Mr. PRrEyeER. The committee calls Ambassador Helms. Mr. Helms, will you be sworn at this time. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give this committee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Hens. I do, Mr. Chairman. TESTIMONY OF RICHARD HELMS, FORMER DIRECTOR OF CEN- TRAL INTELLIGENCE, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO IRAN, AND PRESENTLY A BUSINESS CONSULTANT IN WASHINGTON, D.C., AND REPRESENTED BY GREGORY B. CRAIG, OF WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Helms. We appreciate your being here today, and the Chair will recognize Mr. Goldsmith to begin the questioning. Mr. GotpsmiTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Helms, as part of your association with the CIA were you required to execute a secrecy oath? Mr. Hes. Yes, I was. Mr. GotpsmiTH. Do you recall testifying before this committee in executive session on August 9 of this year? Mr. HE ns. Yes, I do. Mr. GoupsmitH. At that time, Mr. Helms, were you presented with a series of letters which authorized you to testify fully and truthfully about all information that you had available pertinent to the committee’s legislative mandate? Mr. HELMS. Yes. Mr. GotpsmiTH. At this time I would ask that Mr. Helms be shown JFK exhibit F-536. Mr. Chairman, I would indicate for the record that JFK exhibit F-536 consists of two exhibits, A and B. They are both letters dated September 1, 1978, from the General Counsel’s Office of the CIA. They are directed to Mr. Helms. [Handed to witness. ] Mr. Chairman, may we have JFK exhibits F-536A and F-536B admitted into the record? Mr. Preyer. Without objection, so ordered. CCMA INcHIgENCe “Ageng’ “,, .BS= tl DERI 4 . . WashurgionD.C.20505 OGC 78-6272 21 September 1978 The Honorable Richard Helms Safeer Company Suite 402 1627 K Street, N. W. Washington, D. C. 20006 Dear Ambassador Helms: The Agency has been notified that the House Select Committee on Assassinations has invited you to testify in open session on 22 September 1978. the Please be advised that the Agency agreement with Committee, a copy of which was attached to Mr. Carlucci's dis- letter to you dated 27 July 1978, deals only with the It does cussion of classified matters in executive session. not constitute a grant of authority to discuss classified matters in public circumstances, nor a waiver of any secrecy such oath or agreement that might otherwise be applicable in circumstances. Therefore, if you are asked any questions in open session requiring the disclosure of classified informa- tion, I suggest that you indicate to the Committee your you ask willingness to respond in executive session and that Committee to convene such a session for that purpose. the Sincerely, ( hog (Ze LLox Anthony A. Lapham General Counsel JFK Exuisit F-536A Central Intelligence Agency a Psa) wea — JFK Exhibit VARGO LIDS — Washington, D.C 20505 21 September 1978 The Honorable Richard Helms Safeer Company Suite 402 1627 K Street, N.W. byl. Washington, D.C. 20006 ~~ Dear Ambassador Helms: By way of elaboration upon Mr. Lapham's letter to you of this date concerning your testimony in open session before the House Select Committee on Assassinations on 22 September, Mr. Lapham has authorized me to relay the fol- lowing to you. You are, of course, completély at liberty to discuss unclassified materials, including the materials which have been declassified and made available to your counsel on 20 September 1978. However, in the event a response would involve the disclosure of classified infor- mation, whether based on these or other materials, it is the Agency's position that you should so inform the Committee and request that your response be heard in executive session. - hig tee S fe CELL + see yy ves ore rape \ Deputy General Counsel | 8 Mr. Gotpsmitu. Mr. Helms, have you received the originals of these letters? Mr. HE.tns. Yes, I have. Mr. GotpsmitH. Have you had a chance to discuss these letters with your attorney? Mr. HELMs. Yes. Mr. GotpsmitH. Do you understand these letters? Mr. Hetns. I hope so. Mr. GotpsmitH. Do you understand that at today’s hearing you are still obliged to testify truthfully before this committee? Mr. Hens. I understand that. Mr. Gotpsmitu. Do you understand, Mr. Helms, that in the event that your testimony touches upon classified information, the alter- native would be to request that the committee go into executive session? Mr. HeExtos. I understand that, sir. Mr. Go.tpsmiTH. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I would indicate for the record that the letters that Mr. Ambassador was shown at the August 9 hearing corre- spond with JFK exhibits F-94, F-125, F-126, and F-127. Mr. Helms, what was the organizational function of the Deputy Directorate for Plans in 1963? Mr. Hetms. The Deputy Director for Plans or the Deputy Direc- torate for Plans? I was the Deputy Director for Plans and head of an organization which performed certain covert activities overseas. Mr. Gotpsmitu. Before you proceed I would like to show you JFK exhibits F-94, F-125, F-126, and F-127 from the hearing that we had in August. [Handed to witness.] Mr. Heutms. Thank you. [Pause.] I have not read every word of those memoranda, Mr. Goldsmith, but I recall having seen them on August 9. Mr. GoupsmitH. At the time did you understand them? Mr. HELMS. Yes. Mr. GotpsmitH. I might ask, for the record, would Mr. Helms’ attorney identify himself. a Craic. My name is Gregory B. Craig, of Williams & Con- nolly. Mr. Gotpsmitu. Thank you. Returning to my previous question, would you descibe the organizational function or purpose of the DDP in 1963 which I believe you headed. Mr. HeEtos. That is one of the most—it contained one of the most highly classified documents in Washington, the description of what the DDP does, and if you have received a specific authority from the Director of Central Intelligence to disclose all these activities, I would be glad to do so. Mr. GotpsmiTuH. I would ask that Mr. Helms be given a copy of the declassified transcript from his executive session testimony. Mr. Helms, I refer your attention to page 4 of that transcript, specifically lines 111 through 118. Mr. Hens. All right, Mr. Goldsmith. Since this has been declas- sified, I understand, then let me just read what it says: 9 In 1963, the Deputy Director for Plans was * * * the Deputy Director who was in charge of—I guess the simplest term is—overseas operations. This entity of the CIA received its mandate from NSC documents. In any event, the responsibility of this unit was to conduct espionage and counter- espionage and covert actions outside the continental limits of the United States. Some of the lines you will note have been excised. Mr. GoLpsmITH. I understand. Mr. HE.Ms. So if to the press it is not a coherent statement, it is because it is not coherent. Mr. GotpsmiTH. Mr. Helms, I would ask to the extent you are able to testify without touching upon classified information you make an effort to do so. Have you had a chance to review the declassified transcript that the committee made available to you? Mr. Hews. Yes. I have looked through it. I am not sure, though, that I have become aware of all of the things that have been taken out and all the things that have been left in. It is really difficult to read something that has been chopped up the way this has. I have looked through it but I would not say I have in my head what was allowed in and what was taken out. Mr. GoupsmiITH. Mr. Helms, did the committee make available to you the testimony from your executive session transcript? Mr. Hewtms. Yes, I have in front of me these documents which were made available to me by the committee I think 2 days ago. I went through them. Mr. GOLDSMITH. I understand that. My question now is, Has the committee made available to you the full transcript from your executive session testimony? Mr. HE.tns. Yes, I believe I could have come and read it at any time, at least I was so assured by the committee. Mr. GoLpsmMITH. Did you ever avail yourself of that opportunity? Mr. Hews. I[ did not. Mr. GotpsmitH. Mr. Helms, what role, if any, did the Agency have in the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy? Mr. Heitms. At the time that the Warren Commission was formed, the Agency did everything in its power to cooperate with the Warren Commission and with the FBI, the FBI having the lead in the investigation. As best I can recollect, it was the Agency’s feeling that since this tragic event had taken place in the United States, that the FBI and the Department of Justice would obviously have the leading edge in conducting the investigation, and that the Agency would cooperate with them in every way it was possible, and the same applied to the Warren Commission. Mr. GouLpsmiTH. So I take it, then, that the Agency perceived its role to be somewhat secondary to the role of the FBI? Mr. HEtMs. That is correct. Mr. GotpsmitH. What were your specific responsibilities with regard to the investigation? Mr. Hetms. As the Deputy Director for Plans, I regarded my responsibility as being one which saw to it that inquiries given to the Agency by the FBI or originated with the Warren Commission, were answered as well and as expeditiously as possible. Mr. GoipsmitTH. Which staff or unit within the CIA was given primary responsibility for coordinating the investigation? 10 Mr. Hetms. After I believe maybe 2 or 8 weeks following the assassination, the counterintelligence staff in the Deputy Director- ate for Plans was given the job of coordinating and handling the inquiries which came in and the replies which went back, both to the FBI and to the Warren Commission, and as you are aware, the so-called counterintelligence staff had the job in any event of carry- ing on liaison on covert matters with the FBI for the CIA. Mr. GoLpsmitH. Would you describe in general terms what the organizational function of the counterintelligence staff was in 1963? Mr. HeE.ms. In the organization of the Deputy Director for Plans at that time we had a series of staffs. These staffs were assigned functions in terms of the mission of the entire DDP. There was a foreign intelligence staff which dealt with the acquisition of normal intelligence. There was a counterintelligence staff which provided staff guidance to the rest of the organization in counterintelligence matters. May I say that the counterintelligence staff's mandate was some- what wider than the others because the CIA had the mandate within the intelligence community to maintain basic files on coun- terintelligence cases, counterespionage cases, originating overseas. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Was the investigation of the death of President Kennedy perceived as a counterintelligence-type case? Mr. HeEtms. It was not perceived in any specific terms at all that I recollect. It was perceived as a great national tragedy, and I think the feeling in the Agency was that anything it or its person- nel could do to help resolve the questions that prevailed at the time, we would try to do, whether it was counterintelligence, posi- tive intelligence, or what it was. Mr. GoLpsmiTH. Are you able to state why the CI staff in particu- lar was given this responsibility? Mr. HeEtms. Well, I think one of the more compelling reasons was that since it had had through the years the responsibility for carrying on liaison with the FBI, that it was in a better position and used to dealing with that Agency and therefore it was sensible to have them continue to. Mr. GoupsMmiTH. Now prior to giving the CI staff this responsibil- ity was the chief of one of the Western Hemisphere desks desig- nated to coordinate the flow of information at CIA headquarters? Mr. Hews. I believe in the early days after President Kennedy’s demise that there was a feeling that the principal point of interest as far as the Agency was concerned was Mexico City, where infor- mation had been provided by the CIA to the rest of the Govern- ment that someone called Lee Harvey Oswald had been in touch with the Soviet and Cuban Consulates there. Once it was estab- lished that this investigation was going to be far more wide rang- ing than just Mexico City, the responsibility was transferred. Mr. Go.tpsmiTH. Did this particular desk officer ever complain to you about interference with Mr. Angleton, who was then chief of the CI staff? Mr. Hes. I do not recall any complaint, Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Go.psmiTH. Do you recall whether this desk officer had any particular responsibilities with regard to the investigation after the 11 responsibility for coordinating the investigation was transferred to the CI staff? Mr. Hews. I don’t have any recollection of the details. Mr. GoipsmitH. What role, if any, did Mr. McCone, who was then Mineo of Central Intelligence, have in the Agency’s investi- gation‘ Mr. HE.Ms. I think that he had the role any Director would have had that was to see to it that sufficient manpower and funds and other resources of the Agency were put to work in support of the Warren Commission and the FBI. And I recall certainly that he maintained a continuing and abiding interest in these proceedings. Mr. Go.psmitH. Was he kept regularly apprised of the develop- ments of the investigation? Mr. Hetms. I would have thought that he was. I can’t tell you in precise detail 15 years later, but he had every opportunity 5 days a week at the agency staff meeting to ask any questions on his mind, and we had every opportunity to pass on to him anything that had come up we thought would be of interest. Mr. GotpsmitH. Has Mr. McCone ever indicated to you that he was not satisfied with the flow of information from below upstream to him? Mr. HEtns. In connection with this investigation? Mr. GoLpsMITH. Yes, sir. . Mr. Hews. Not that I am aware of, Mr. Goldsmith. I think, if knowing Mr. McCone, if he had been dissatisfied he would have made his dissatisfaction clear and I wouldn’t have forgotten it. Mr. GoLpsMITH. You mentioned earlier that the responsibility for investigating this case was primarily in the hands of the FBI and the CIA saw itself serving as a support function. Do you think this division of responsibility was adequate? Mr. HeEtns. But I think it is the only way the matter could have been handled. I can’t conceive of its being handled any differently. There has to be one investigative organization in charge of an investigation, and I can’t see how this could have been otherwise. Am I missing something here? Mr. GoLpsmiTH. I am not suggesting that you are missing any- thing, Mr. Helms. Mr. Helms, were there any substantive or procedural problems between the Bureau and the CIA in conducting the investigation? Mr. Hews. I don’t recall any procedural problems. As for ques- tions of substance, my memory is not all that clear. I don’t know whether there were some small disagreements about certain as- pects of this case or not. Certainly investigators, no matter how well motivated, tend to have different emphases, and it may well Seah there were some, but nothing that looms large in my mind today. Mr. Gotpsmitu. Do you recall specifically whether there was any disagreement in the handling of the Nosenko case? Mr. Hes. I don’t recall any disagreement about the so-called handling of the Nosenko case. There was I believe a difference of interpretation as to what Nosenko represented. It was my impres- sion that the FBI had passed on what Nosenko had to say about Lee Harvey Oswald to the Warren Commission exactly the way Nosenko had given it to them, and that at a later date it was 12 necessary to point out to the Warren Commission that the bona fides of Mr. Nosenko had not been established. Mr. GoupsmitH. Did the agency’s investigation reflect any work- ing hypotheses? By that question I mean, Did any particular aspect of the investigation receive emphasis? Mr. Hetms. You mean inside the CIA? Mr. GOLDSMITH. Yes, sir. Mr. Hews. Oh, I think there was concern among many officers working on these matters that the Soviets might have been in- volved in this in some fashion and that the Cubans might have been involved in some fashion. I imagine we shared the concerns of the Warren Commission at the time. After all, there is a lot of give and take and conversation and meetings back and forth and one organization obviously influences the sensations of another organization. Mr. Gotpsmitu. Did the Agency pay particular attention to the area of foreign conspiracy? You made reference to Soviet involve- ment and Cuban involvement. Was that the primary focus? Mr. Herts. That was obviously a matter of prime concern and since Nosenko was in the Agency’s hands this became one of the most difficult issues to face that the Agency had ever faced. Here a President of the United States had been murdered and a man had come from the Soviet Union, an acknowledged Soviet intelligence officer, and said his intelligence service had never been in touch with this man and knew nothing about him. This strained credu- lity at the time. It strains it to this day. Mr. GoupsmitTH. Was all information pertinent to the Warren Commission’s work promptly given to the Warren Commission, Mr. Helms? Mr. Hetms. I don’t know how to answer that question, Mr. Goldsmith. I thought we made a major effort to be as cooperative and prompt and helpful as possible. But in recent years I have been through enough to recognize that you can’t make a flat state- ment about anything, so I don’t know. Maybe there were some places where it wasn’t as prompt as it should have been. But I am not in a position to identify them. Mr. GoupsmiTH. Are you able to state what factors generally governed whether information was made available to the Warren Commission—— Mr. Hetms. I misunderstood the first part of your question. Mr. GoupsmiTH. Are you able to state what factors governed whether information was made available to the Warren Commission? Mr. HeEts. I don’t think there were any governing factors except the necessity for us to be careful about our sources and methods in certain cases, and I believe that obstacle was gotten over by going down and having conversations with the Warren Commission at various times in order to make these points clear on what the issues were. I don’t believe we held anything back. _ Mr. GoutpsmituH. As a general rule, did you wait to receive an inquiry from the Commission prior to passing information on to the Warren Commission? Mr. HeExtms. Yes; I believe so. 13 Mr. Gotpsmitu. Turning to another area now, to what extent, if any, did Mr. Dulles, former Director of the CIA, play a special role on the Warren Commission insofar as the Agency was concerned? Mr. Hews. I don’t have any sensation that he played any special role. He obviously was in touch with the Agency on two or three occasions, as was only natural under the circumstances. He had been Director of it for a long time and he would obviously feel more comfortable dealing with people in the Agency than he might in other agencies of the Government. But I don’t recall this had any particular force and effect as far as the conduct of the Agency was concerned or the conduct of the Warren Commission investiga- tion. Mr. GotpsmitH. To what extent did he attempt to represent the interests of the CIA while serving as a member of the Warren Commission? Mr. Hews. I have no idea, Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. GotpsmirH. At this time I would ask that Mr. Helms be shown JFK F-529. Mr. Chairman, I move for the admission into the record of JFK exhibit F-529. ' [Documents handed to witness.] - Mr. Preyer. If there is no objection, exhibit F-529 will be ad- mitted into the record. | Mr. Go.psmitu. That’s F-529. [Whereupon, exhibit F-529 was received.] 41-373 O- 79 - 2 14 JFK Exuisit F-529 a eS —JFK Emer F-529 iad 8 July 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans SUBJECT: Discussion with Mr. Dulles Re the NOSENKO Information on OSWALD 1. Mr. Dulles, with whom I spoke today, recalled his earlier conversation with you on this subject and said that there were still some members of the Commis- _ sion who were concerned lest they suppress the NOSENKO ~ information now only to have it surface at a future date. They expressed concern that this. could possibly prejudice the entire Warren Commission report. I told Mr. Dulles that this concern was understandable but that we still felt the best course by far would be toa omit any reference to the NOSENKO information in the final report. While it is conceivable that NOSENKO might someday be in a position to claim that he provided information on the KENNEDY assassination, I said that the difference between NOSENKO's situation and that of other bona fide defectors was such tnat it would be. less . likely that NOSENKO would be allowed to surface in this - way. I noted that if the NOSENKO information were in- - cluded as is in the final Commission report and then later the facts:of NOSENKO's agent mission became public knowledge, this could have perhaps an even’greater nega-—— tive affecton the standing of the Commission's report. The only way for the Commission to avoid this and still use the information would be for them to indicate that , doubt existed regarding the source of the information. We would be opposed to this because it would signal to NOSENKO's principals something of how we viewed this case and could also bring about renewed press and public in- terest in NOSENKO, ‘ 20 Mr. Dulles and I then exchanged views on the possibility of finding language which would allude to the existence of other, unverified information on the CSWALD case. This language would permit the Commission to say if challenged in the future on this issue that it had taken the NOSENKO information into consideration in 15 the final report but at the same time it would not be presented in a manner which would be at variance with the important operational considerations we have raised. 3. It was agreed that an effort might be made to £ind such language if Mr. Dulles is again unsuccessful in persuading his colleagues to eliminate any reference to the NOSENKO information from the report. To attempt this, however, we would have to know precisely in what context the Commission intended to make use of the NOSENKO information. This, Mr. Dulles will have to determine from Mr. Rankin. He will do this as soon as possible. He knows that I am leaving this week and therefore, will contact you as soon as he has the infor- mation he needs from Mr. Rankin. 4. I have briefed C/SR/CI_ |on these latest developments and since he and CIA officefin my shop are fully cognizant of all the problems involved, they can work out language ae ie approval which hopefully will be satisfactory. C/SR/CI | knows Mr. Dulles and would be the most suitable person to work with him directly if this is indicated. ~ ‘nmala & i Chief, SR Diviszgn 16 Chief, SR . p- EX ORANDU?: FOR: NSE ies 5s . t answers to our questions 2ppear to be quite coziciete. No really new information appears and they are consistent with his previous statements. Their chief value lies in the fect that they elaborate what he has said before concerning OS WALD in the USSR. The details he provides concerning KGB involvement in the OS WALD case elimiznate a number of minor obscurities which were present in his earlier statements bet they do not change the overall picture of OSVWALD's status and activities in the USSR. pe, Lenere 2 Fe eRer some rather surprising statements in ' Fd : n & MeEsesieg A . é 5 ‘c s replies - and these statements may call into question all 3) rH 5 H Ld Q nis story. For example: a) he says (paragraph 5) that although the AGB recognised that OSWALD might have been an American agent, no *ynusual measures” were taken to check on this possibility since it had already b2en Recited not to ict him stey in the USER. b) he says (paragraph 15) that the KGS did not consider recruitirs h.arina to report on CSY ALD “because she wos his wife and it was considered dangerous to recruit a yr to report on her husband." / c) he repeatediy refers ’ x! 1— by a ie c) he ¥épeatealy rhicks to KGB recognition that OSWALD "a.2s5 not normal’ 23s the reason for KGS failure ta take various steps wigs is could mormally be expected to take vis-a-vis a foreigner like OSWALD. In ‘other words, 2 lack af normality and the KGB's recognition of it provide the peg for the whole story of KGB ‘handling of the CSWALD matter. 1 cht Ba Ak wie Ses Nes ers | 3. Another sequence of ca rae as related by eseseg is noteworthy. He states that Maxine had no teoune marrying OSWALD Beaune he was a resident of and wor King in the USSR, and that she had no difficulty leaving the country because she was married toa foreigner. This reasoning seems to overlook the fact that OSWALD had already “declared his intention (via mail to the US Embassy} to leave the USSR. If this fact were known to the KCB as we must presume it was, we would expect Marina's marriage request to have beex giver more than routias 4. Although I believe that the Commission would be interested in the entire set of questions and answers as a follow up to the information it ' Nesentioc received earlier from fQ3BAGEEP via the FFBI, perhaps you will think it not advisable to send them on at this late date, especially in view of the nN CHENKD % Bodtinuixg doubts concerning {Sg bona fides. There are no {specific pbints in 18 that change the CSWALD story soecific points in this latest information ‘or 2dd siznificantly to it and ould therefore warrant separate transmittal to the Comission in my opinion. Vrhen the results of our further caecks with LD's arrival time in Helsinki are in, we might send 2long them AGED statement that a 2-4 Gay celay in obtaining a Soviet e . : - tourist visa is not uncommon. Cn Side Waa eee Pe C/SR/C I/Res earch 19 Mr. GOLpSsMITH. I would ask that you skim through exhibit F-529, Mr Helms, paying particular attention, however, to para- graph No. 3. Mr. HELMs. Yes; I have read paragraph 3. Mr. Go.psmiITH. Does this exhibit, Mr Helms, refresh your memory on the extent to which Mr. Dulles may have represented CIA interests while serving as a member of the Warren Commission? Mr. HE.Ms. I don’t read that memorandum that way Mr. Gold- smith. I read this memorandum to say that since the Agency was not able to, what shall we say, vouch for the bona fides of Mr. Nosenko, that this was going to have an effect on the Commission report and what the Commission had to say and the point at issue here, if I read this correctly, was how best to have the Commission word its report, come to its conclusions without leaving itself hang- ing on a limb on the basis of the fact that they thought that Mr. Nosenko was bona fide when in fact this had not been demon- strated. That is the way I read this memorandum. Mr. GoLpsmITH. I certainly understand what the central issue is. My question is whether Mr. Dulles was attempting to represent the Agency views to the Warren Commission. Mr. HE.s. I don’t get that from reading this exhibit. I believe in reading the material that you have made available to me that the gentleman who signed this memorandum made that deposition before you, and I assume that you asked him what he thought about it. Did he give a different answer? Mr. GoupsmiTH. Mr. Helms, I am sorry but I am not in a position today to answer your questions. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my initial line of inquiry. I would defer to you at this time, sir. Mr. PrreYER. The Chair recognizes Congressman Stokes for such time as he may consume for the questioning of the witness. Chairman SToKEs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Ambasssador Helms. Mr. HEts. Good morning, Mr. Stokes. Chairman Stokes. Mr. Helms, I wonder if you would tell us what role, if any, you played with regard to Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Hetms. When Nosenko defected in Geneva and came to the United States, or was brought to the United States, in my position as Deputy Director for Plans, I obviously was involved in the basic decisions that were going to have to be made or were made in now and the past involving the interrogation of him, his handling, and what we would do with respect to finding out what he represented and what information he had to purvey. Chairman SroxkEs. So would it be fair to say that right from the very beginning of the initial contact with him, right on through his custodial period here in the States, that you were constantly in charge of that situation? Mr. Hetms. No; I was not constantly in charge of it. In fact, I was not in charge of it from the first day because I do not think any Deputy Director regards himself as being in charge of any- thing when he has a Director who is really in charge, plus the fact there were other members of the Interagency Defector Committee which is composed of other agencies of Government interested in 20 these matters. They also have a say in what happens with respect to these things. So I certainly was involved with decisions on Nosenko from beginning to end, but I was not the controlling authority at all times. Chairman Stokes. There were three major agency reports that were written in regard to the Nosenko case; specifically there was a report in 1968 issued by the Soviet Russia Division, another report later in 1968 called the Office of Security report, and then a third report in 1976, referred to as the Hart report. Would you tell us whether you are familiar with all three of these reports? Mr. Hews. I don’t recall any longer whether I read the first two or whether I was simply briefed on their contents. The Hart report I have never seen. I left the agency in early February 1973 and I have had no substantive connections with it since. Chairman Stokes. During his defection in 1964 and upon his arrival in the United States was Yuri Nosenko in the custody of the CIA? Mr. Hens. I am sorry, I missed the question. Chairman SToKEs. I was asking precisely during his defection in 1964 and upon his arrival in the United States, was Yuri Nosenko in the custody of the CIA? Mr. Hews. Yes, he was. That was an accepted procedure under the functioning of the Interagency Defector Committee that defec- tors that came to this country were handled by the CIA, through the interrogation period, resettling period, whatever had to be done to them. Chairman Strokes. Is that the legal authority under which he was being detained? Mr. Hetms. No. I think that perhaps, Mr. Chairman, if you would not mind, I would like to answer that question a little bit more fully. If you would indulge me. Chairman STOoKEs. Certainly. Mr. HELMs. Two days ago, un September 20, 1978, I received a transcript of my testimony before this committee in executive ses- sion on August 9. While reviewing that transcript I noted that, although I am not a lawyer, I characterized Mr. Yuri Nosenko’s legal status with the CIA between 1964 and 1969 in a number of | different ways. Since this is an area of obvious interest to the | committee, I would like to take this opportunity to describe my | understanding in somewhat greater detail as to what Mr. Nosen- | ko’s legal status with the Central Intelligence Agency was. As I say, I am neither a lawyer nor a judge, so I was not | prepared to draw any legal conclusions about Mr. Nosenko’s tenure | with the Central Intelligence Agency. I’m sorry, I am not prepared. On January 238, 1964, in Geneva, Switzerland, Mr. Nosenko re- | quested that he be permitted to defect to the West. Mr. Nosenko’s | request, I believe, was accompanied by a claim that he could give a comprehensive report on Lee Harvey Oswald’s contacts in connec- | tion with the KGB during Oswald’s stay in the Soviet Union be- tween 1959 and 1962. | It is difficult to overstate the significance that Yuri Nosenko’s | defection assumed in the investigation of President Kennedy’s as- | sassination. If Mr. Nosenko turned out to be a bona fide defector, if } 21 his information were to be believed, then we could conclude that the KGB and the Soviet Union had nothing to do with Lee Harvey Oswald in 1968 and therefore had nothing to do with President Kennedy’s murder. If, on the other hand, Mr. Nosenko had been programed in advance by the KGB to minimize KGB connections with Oswald, if Mr. Nosenko was giving us false information about Oswald’s con- tacts with the KGB in 1959 to 1962, it was fair for us to surmise that there may have been an Oswald-KGB connection in November 1968, more specifically that Oswald was acting as a Soviet agent when he shot President Kennedy. If it were shown that Oswald was in fact acting as a Soviet agent when he shot President Kennedy, the consequences to the United States of America and, indeed, to the world, would have been staggering. Thus, it became a matter of the utmost importance to this Government to determine the bona fides of Mr. Yuri Nosenko. Mr. Nosenko arrived in the country in February 1964. By the end of March it was clear to us that the task of evaluating Mr. Nosen- ko’s credibility would not be easy. On April 2, 1964, as Deputy Director of Plans, I, along with David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, and Mr. Lawrence R. Houston, the General Counsel to the CIA, met with Mr. Nicho- las Katzenbach, then Deputy Attorney General of the United States; Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chief of the Internal Security Divi- sion of the Justice Department; Mr. William E. Foley, who was then Mr. Yeagley’s First Assistant in the Internal Security Divi- sion; and Mr. Harold F. Riese from the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department. The meeting took place in Mr. Katzenbach’s office in the Justice Department. The purpose of the meeting was to define Mr. Nosen- ko’s legal status in the United States and to anticipate what kind of legal problems might arise in connection with the Agency’s ongoing custody of Mr. Nosenko. The Agency provided me a copy of the memorandum for the record written by Mr. Lawrence Houston describing this meeting on April 2, 1964, and a second memorandum which reflects the _ substance of a telephone call from Mr. Foley on the following day, _ April 3, 1964. These documents were in part declassified by the Agency on September 18, 1978, and I would like to make them part _ of the record of these proceedings. During the meeting of April 2, 1964, the Department of Justice was fully informed of Mr. Nosenko’s status with the Agency and _the Department’s opinion was requested as to the scope of the Agency's ongoing authority with respect to Mr. Nosenko. As Mr. Houston’s memorandums relate, Mr. Nosenko’s technical status in the United States was one of “exclusion and parole,” _which means that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had technically excluded Mr. Nosenko from the United States but had also temporarily “paroled him” to the custody of the Central Intel- _ligence Agency. It is my understanding that the terms of the parole provided that ' Mr. Nosenko would remain in the custody of the Agency unless it was determined whether Mr. Nosenko should be deported or 'whether he should be permitted to settle in the United States. 22 If Mr. Nosenko violated the terms of the parole, he would be deported. As these memorandums indicate, it was the opinion of the Justice Department that the Agency was free “to take any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole.”’ That opin- ion was expressed to us in the meeting of April 2, 1964, and repeated to us the following day by way of a telephone call from Mr. Foley, who had been requested by Mr. Katzenbach to check and to confirm the Department’s legal opinion. In addition to the Justice Department, the Interagency Commit- tee on Defectors was also fully informed of Mr. Nosenko’s’ status. The agency and that committee concurred, I believe, with the legal position adopted by the Department of Justice. The Interagency Committee on Defectors was the Government body which was formed in order to preside over the care, feeding, and general treatment of defectors. That committee is composed of representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the De- fense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the De- partment of State, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. As the Rockefeller Commission report indicated, Mr. Nosenko’s confinement—and I quote from the report, “was approved by the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, the Attor- ney General, and the U.S. Intelligence Board; selected Members of the Congress were also aware to some extent of the confinement.” End of quotation and end of my statement. Chairman STOKES. So then, do I understand that based upon that meeting it was your opinion then that this man was being held legally and not in violation of law? Mr. HeEtnos. It was our opinion that—I don’t know, I am not a lawyer, I have to be careful of my words—but let me just say it was our impression we had the authority to hold him as we were holding him. Chairman Stokes. At the time you testified to our committee | here in executive session, is that what you said to us? | Mr. HE.tns. No. I say, when I went through the transcript of my } testimony that day on August 9, I found that I characterized his confinement in various ways, so I composed this statement in order } to straighten the matter out as we understood it. | Chairman Strokes. Now, can you recall what Mr. Katzenbach } said in that meeting? You were present and Mr. Katzenbach was | present; right? Mr. HELMS. Yes. | Chairman STOKES. Can you tell the committee what Mr. Katzen-} bach said on that occasion about the situation? Mr. Hetms. What we remember about this, Mr. Stokes, is pretty well encompassed in here, that we shared with him the problem wef} had in connection with Mr. Nosenko. We identified to him why the} problem was very serious. We pointed out that there might be difficulties in connection with holding him. Suppose that Mr. No-} senko got a lawyer; then what did we do about it? How did we ever} establish what his bona fides were? | In other words, we had a whole series of problems which we were} sharing with the Justice Department in an effort to get some help I] ; 23 or assistance, how we ought to go about this matter and ascertain what our authorities to do it were. That was the purpose of the meeting. But 15 years later I certainly do not remember direct quotations, from either Mr. Katzenbach or myself. Chairman Stokes. But it would be fair to characterize the situa- tion as saying that he did make comment upon the situation and give you advice? Mr. Hes. That is right. Chairman Stokes. Now, Mr. Helms, yesterday Mr. Katzenbach appeared before this committee and testified in the same hearing room. I want to read to you from the transcript of that testimony and then ask for your comment: Chairman STokEs. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Katzenbach, Mr. Sawyer asked you about the decision to sign off for Mr. Nosenko. Can you tell us whom it was that came to you and asked for your permission to begin the interrogation of Nosenko? Mr. KATZENBACH. I don’t recall anybody doing so, Mr. Chairman. I understand that Mr. Helms had a conversation with me or thinks he recalls he had a conversa- tion with me on it. I have no recollection of that conversation, but perhaps his recollection is better than mine. I don’t know. I don’t recall any such conversation. Chairman STokEs. Was this your testimony, that you don’t recall anyone talking to you about it? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, sir, that is my testimony. “~ Chairman SrToxkes. At any time? Mr. KATZENBACH. At any time. Chairman SToKEs. How did you learn of it? Mr. KATZENBACH. I learned of it when the gentleman writing a book called me up about 3 or 4 months ago or 6 months ago, and asked me about it. And I said, who is Nosenko? Chairman STokEs. That would be Mr. Epstein? Mr. KaTZzENBACH. Yes, sir, Edward J. Epstein, right. And that was the first time that I heard of it, to my recollection. Chairman SToKEs. So, then, so that the record is patently clear on this point, during your tenure you knew absolutely nothing at all of this situation? Mr. KatzeENBACH. Nothing that I can recall at this time. It was quite a while ago, but I have absolutely no recollection of Mr. Nosenko or anything to do with him during that period of time. _ Chairman Stokes. While you held the office that you held, were you at any time requested to give your approval to treating any defector in this manner? Mr. KaTzENBACH. No, sir. The only connections that I can recall with the CIA at all fell into two categories. One was when they wished to wiretap or some electronic » device to be put within this country they came to me, and the only other thing was mprnever they wanted a book suppressed they came to me and I told them not to do it. Chairman SToKEs. Told them what? Mr. KaATzENBACH. Told them not to do it, that there was not any way you were ‘going to do it. Those were the only ways, at least offhand, when I—none that I recall as Deputy. A little bit I guess at the time of the Cuban missile crisis and perhaps some at the time of the Cuban prisoner exchange, but I had very little connection with the CIA. And I don’t recall except for those occasions their ever asking me any legal advice whatsoever, perhaps for good reason. Chairman Stokes. Are you absolutely certain that you cannot recall any conver- sation with Mr. Helms about Nosenko? Mr. KatzENBACH. I am certain that I don’t recall it, yes, sir. I can’t flatly deny 'such a conversation occurred, but I have no recollection of it. It is quite a while ago -and I believe if it was as dramatic as put by Congressman Sawyer, I would remem- ber it. I was simply informed that somebody was being questioned. There was a potential defector, I might not recall that. Chairman Stokes. Thank you. Any other questions? Mr. Sawyer. Mr. Sawyer. Yes. Mr. Katzenbach, I don’t know whether you were informed of the details of the Situation, but we had testimony by a spokesman for the CIA so that it is not just a 24 statement of some employee or something. He was designated by the present Direc- tor to come here and present the story because he was supposed to be the most familiar with it since he had reviewed it for the CIA. He stated in substance, Mr. Nosenko was taken into custody in this country by the CIA after defection or after alleged defection, held in a so-called safe house on a diet of tea and porridge twice a day, was allowed no reading material. The guards were instructed neither to talk to him or smile to him. He was subjected to 48 hours at a crack interrogation. This being while they built a separate facility somewhere else in the country; namely, a device described by him as a bank vault, and then built a house around the bank vault to put this man in and then kept him there under the equivalent of some 3 years with that kind of thing, 1,277 days to be specific, at which point they finally gave up and gave him some emolument and put him on their payroll and let him go. And then they gave as their—I questioned on the authority to do a thing like that. Did they have any kind of process, and they said other than the fact that Mr. Helms had conferred with you and gotten your OK, that this would be legal. And I just found it awfully difficult to believe that. And that is why—and I don’t imagine it would be the kind of thing that you would be asked to OK enough that you would not rather clearly remember the incident if it had occurred. Mr. KATZENBACH. If the facts that you have just set forth to me, Congressman, | had ever been made known to me, I would recollect it, I am certain; and I would hope to goodness I would not have given the legal advice that is claimed. Mr. Saywer. It makes me feel better about it. Thank you. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Having heard Mr. Katzenbach’s testimony of yesterday, can you reconcile his testimony to this committee with your statement just read to this committee? | Mr. Hews. I can only say, Mr. Stokes, that it is very hard to. reconcile. I think the basic point at issue here is really whether the | meeting with him took place at all. What happened after the meeting is something he was not responsible for as far as I am aware. Let me read to you the memorandum for the record which Mr. Lawrence R. Houston, the General Counsel of CIA, wrote on April | 3, 1964. I have a copy in front of me. It is headed Memorandum for } the Record and the subject is the Nosenko case. | It reads: | Mr. Helms, Mr. Murphy, and I met with Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, J. Walter § Yeagley, William E. Foley, and Harold F. Ries, on April 2, 1964. Mr. Helms outlined the problems foreseeable in our future relations with Nosenko and asked the opin- ion of the Justice representatives on what we could do to control the situation. I } pointed out that his technical status is one of exclusion and parole—or more technically, deferment and parole. Paragraph 2: After some discussion, Mr. Foley stated it was his opinion that Agency representa- tives could take any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check this and let me know and Mr. Foley later confirmed this position by telephone. I in turn, after the meeting, reviewed the parole agreement and provided an interpretation thereof for Director of Security, a copy of which is attached hereto. Also, I informed Mr. Foley of this interpretation. Signed, Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel. The attachment is a memorandum also dated April 3, 1964. It is signed by Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel. It is a memoran-f} dum for the director of security. That would be the officer who was} the director of the security office of the Central Intelligence Agency. The subject is Parole status of defectors: | On 2 April 1964, we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by INS— | 25 that is the Immigration and Naturalization Service, I interpret here so there will not be a lack of clarity— whose inspection by INS is deferred upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency. It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole. That, I believe, is paragraph 1 of this memorandum, Mr. Stokes. The balance of the memorandum has been excised and therefore is not on the sheet there. Chairman Stokes. Then, in light of the document which you have just read and along with your other testimony, then obviously the statement of Mr. Katzenbach to this committee yesterday could not be true, could it? _ Mr. Hes. No; I am afraid it is not. Mr. Preyer. Chairman Stokes, may I interrupt? Chairman Sroxkgs. Certainly. Mr. Hews. I would like to say, because I would like to be clear with this committee, that I asked my attorney to be in touch with Mr. Katzenbach some weeks ago in connection with this matter. It is reflected in his testimony that it was brought to his attention that I had this meeting with him. I did not want to have this committee think I pulled this as a surprise on Mr. Katzenbach and he came down here innocently and had no opportunity to review the facts if he cared to. Chairman Strokes. Then he was appropriately advised prior to his appearance here yesterday of the memorandums you just read? Mr. Hes. I don’t know that he was advised of the memoran- dums, but he was advised certainly of our recollection of this meeting. Chairman Srokss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Preyer. Mr. Helms, I understand that you are requesting that this document be made a part of the record. I would like to ask the clerk if she will mark it as an exhibit so that we can enter it into the record at this point. Mr. HeEtos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, as a point of clarity, is it just these memoranda that you want to make a part of the record? My statement is in the transcript so I don’t think that is necessary. I think these are the two documents. Mr. Preyer. The document will be marked as exhibit F-413 and made a part of the record at this point. [The information follows:] 26 JFK Exuisit F-413 3 April 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Nossenko Case 1. Mr. Helms, Mr. Murphy and I met with Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Mr. William E. Foley,. and Mr. Harold F. Reis on the Nossenko case on 2 April 1964. -Mr. Helms outlined the problems forsceable in our future relations with Nossenko and asked the opinion of the Justice representatives on what we could do to control the situation. I pointed out that his . technical status was one of exclusion and parole (or more technically deferment of inspection and parole). 2. After some discussion, Mr. Foley stated it was his opinion that Agency representatives could take any action necessary to carry ‘out the terms of the parole. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check this and let me know and Mr. Foley later confirmed this position by telephone. I, in turn, after the meeting reviewed the parole agree- : ment and provided an interpretation thereof for the Director of Security, a copy of which is attached hereto. Also Ilinformed Mr. Foley of this interpretation. spayJ a fogpS = ~ LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON ‘General Counsel Att. Declassified 19. September 1978 by Anthony A. Lapham,General > Counsel CRIT PGT IE v ; 3 April 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security SUBJECT: Parole Status of Defectors 1. On 2 April 1964 we had a discussion with the Departme nt of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by I&NS is deferred upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency. It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole. Declassified (paragraph 1 only) 19 September 1978 by Anthony A. nace figGeneral Counsel. ; P2 'Lsy Cc, Lalo : ( A /s/ Lawrence R. Houston LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON General Counsel toca PEK Lghiber F-413 B. 28 Chairman Strokes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now, Mr. Helms, I note that the memorandum does not give any indication from which Mr. Katzenbach would be able to draw the conclusion with reference to the way that the CIA intended to treat this man. That is not in that memorandun,, is it? Mr. Hetos. No, it is not in the memorandum as of the time that the meeting with Mr. Katzenbach was held. Deliberations were still going on inside the Agency as to what exactly to do about Mr. Nosenko, and as things developed over the months, I don’t think that Mr. Katzenbach can be held responsible for that and I have no reason to want to involve him in it. Chairman Strokes. Is it fair also to say that in all probability he was never informed of the way this man was treated? Mr. Hes. In all probability, that is correct. Chairman Strokes. Now, how long did Mr. Nosenko remain in CIA custody? Mr. Hes. I think all told, I think it was from 1964 when he defected until he was resettled with the new identity which I believe was in 1969 or 1970. Chairman SrokEs. Can you tell us what unit within the CIA had the primary responsibility for handling Mr. Nosenko in 1964? Mr. Hetms. My recollection is that the office of security was given the responsibility for his housekeeping, his care, his feeding, his guarding, and that the Soviet bloc division had the responsibil- ity for his interrogation. Chairman SrokEs. Did the Soviet Russia division continue to have responsibility for questioning Nosenko until he was released from CIA custody in 1969? Mr. Hews. No. I believe that it was in 1967 that the decision was made or, I made the decision if you would prefer that, that the case simply could not go on in that fashion, it had to be resolved. Therefore, a change was made. Nosenko was turned over to an — officer in the office of security who had made an examination of the case. He felt that he could get along well with Nosenko and that possibly he could, if he couldn’t solve the problem of his bona fides, at least he might be able to solve the problem of how we were going to resettle him on the American scene. I was rather puzzled by some of Mr. Hart’s testimony the other day before this committee. He seemed to go into lurid detail about Nosenko’s treatment, but when it came time to make his contribu- tion to the purposes of the committee hearing, in other words, what Nosenko knew about Oswald, he had no clarification to make and | nothing to contribute. , Yet he was here as the official representative of the Director of | Central Intelligence, as I understand it. It was almost as though } his purpose was to use his testimony before this committee to] excoriate some of his former colleagues for the handling of the Nosenko case. In any event, I never heard of the note alleged to have been} handwritten by the “Deputy Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division” } using such sensational terms as “liquidate the man, commit him to a looney bin,” et cetera. These options were never presented to me,} were never entertained by me, and were never considered. 29 The problem was to resettle Nosenko in American society and this is what the Agency did. Any other assertions are false as far as I personally am aware. I would not like to see perpetuated on indefinitely into the history of this country that there was any consideration given by senior officials of the Agency to those op- tions that were identified in this lurid, handwritten memorandum. I don’t know how the thing happened to get written. I don’t know how it happened to be held in the files. I don’t know how it happened to be part of Mr. Hart’s role to bring it down here, but in any event, I want to put to rest once and for all that this was never considered. Chairman Stokes. Now you have mentioned a security officer. When did the security officer assume the responsibility for han- dling Nosenko? Mr. Hes. My recollection Mr. Stokes, is that it was about 1967, some time in 1967. Chairman Stokes. So at that time would they have assumed primary responsibility and taken it away then from the Soviet bloc? Mr. Hetms. Well, they assumed primary responsibility. I think that is the fair thing. I had asked Adm. Rufus Taylor, who sadly died the other day but who became Deputy Director of Central Intelligence after I was made Director, to make it his personal responsibility to look into all aspects of the Nosenko case in an effort to get it resolved. He had done a lot of work on this case and one of his recommen- dations as I recall it was that this be turned over to the office of security and that we try an entirely different approach. Chairman Strokes. Can you tell us why the responsibility for handling Nosenko in terms of questioning was transferred from the SR people over to the security officer? Mr. HEtns. It was just another approach we were attempting. In other words, we wanted to take him away from those people who had been interrogating him and see if a quiet, solicitous, and, let’s say, favorable approach were used, that we might be able to solve the problem of his bona fides but at least get him in the frame of mind where we could resettle him. Chairman SToKeEs. How long a period of time was Nosenko actu- ally held in this status? Mr. Hetos. Well, during the period of 1964 to 1967 he was held under Spartan circumstances. In 1967 when he was turned over to the office of security he was moved to a safe house where he certainly was in confinement but lived under very comfortable conditions, perhaps as well as anybody in this room. Chairman Stokes. Now, during that 3-year period, and I suppose you would say it is 3 years he was held in confinement, as a basis of Mr. Hart’s testimony a few days ago, I posed the question to him that the man was actually being held in jail, wasn’t he. His answer _ was substantially yes. How would you characterize the period? Mr. Hews. I find no fault with that characterization. Chairman Stokes. Initially, can you tell us how the individuals who handled Mr. Nosenko for the SR division had been selected? 30 Mr. Hetms. When the defection took place in Geneva, or at least before it took place, two officers were sent to Geneva to talk to Mr. Nosenko. One was a high officer in the SR division and the other was a case officer who not only spoke fluent Russian but had had a great deal of experience in handling Soviet agent cases and this seemed to be a good team as far as those in charge thought at the time, and so did I. Chairman Stokes. Can you tell us how knowledgeable or how expert they were in terms of the Oswald case? : Mr. Hews. I don’t have any recollection of that any more, Mr. Stokes. I don’t think that we chose them because of their knowl- edgeability in the Oswald case initially. The issue was to decide about the defection of this man in the first place. The Oswald matter really hadn’t gotten viable until it was indi- cated he knew something about it, and then when we got him to the United States, what he knew about it. Actually, I think that it may be of interest to the committee that in attempting to establish the bona fides of someone, it is necessary to have information in some depth of the facts about which they are talking. With respect to Nosenko, we put people who were knowledgeable about the Soviet Union and Soviet mores, and so forth, on’ the case because we had more information about those things and could check his statements out much better than if we were using some- thing about Lee Harvey Oswald. He had been in the Soviet Union and we knew very little about him, because I would like to remind you, Mr. Stokes, that what is known about Lee Harvey Oswald today was certainly not known in early 1964. This is all material that has been developed since. I think one has to be fair with history that when we go back to February 1964, the knowledgeability of anybody in the Government on Lee Harvey Oswald was very limited, even more limited than it is now. Chairman Stoxes. Wouldn’t I understand that first they did know he was a KGB officer at the time he came to you; correct? Mr. HEtos. That is what he told us. Chairman Strokes. You did know that Oswald had.been in Russia, did you not? Mr. Hetos. Yes, we knew that he had been in Russia, certainly. Chairman Stokes. And a part of your responsibility to the Warren Commission was to give them such information as came to your knowledge regarding Oswald in Russia, was it not? Mr. Hens. Certainly, Mr. Stokes. Chairman Strokes. And in establishing this man’s bona fides, would it not be logical that you would want to know everything he knew about Oswald as a part of the interrogation process so that you might establish his bona fides through that? Mr. Hetos. But I thought that he was asked about what he knew about Oswald. I thought there were four or five interrogations, one by the FBI and some by us during this period. Am I wrong? Chairman Stokes. Well, he was under the custody of the CIA. You have told us that. Mr. Hetms. But other people had access to him. The FBI was given access to them. We gave other people access to these people if they requested it. It was the FBI’s statement to the Warren Com- 31 mission quoting Nosenko based on their own interrogation that led me weeks later to go down and talk with the Chief Justice of the United States and point out with him that we could not go bail, we could not vouch for the bona fides of this man, and therefore we could not vouch for his statement. Chairman SToKEs. Yes, and this was the precise problem that you were confronted with. You knew you had an important issue on your hands, didn’t you? Mr. HELMs. Certainly. Chairman Strokes. And it was extremely important by virtue of the high level conference which you had had, which you referred to this morning, that you had been able to establish his bona fides; isn’t that correct? Mr. HeEtmMs. We were doing our best to do so. Chairman STOKES. So it is in that area, then, I would think, that you would want to see the top interrogators, not only those expert in interrogating with reference to the Soviet Union, but also about events in the Soviet Union such as Oswald would be important to you to have him interrogated about? Mr. HE.tMs. Well, sir, I was not present at these interrogations -and I don’t know the exact questions. I assume there is a record available someplace. But it seems to me that in posing this ques- tion this way, to me it is damned if you do and damned if you don’t. You are damned if you hold a fellow too long and treat him badly because you would like to find out what he does know about Oswald, and you are damned the other way if you have not dug his teeth out to find out what he knows about Oswald. I don’t know sir, the answer. If we had to do it over, I don’t know what we would do. We would probably do it differently, but I don’t know how we would have arrived at the truth in the space of time we had available to us. You may recall from the record that Mr. Nosenko, at the time he defected and before, was a very heavy drinker. One of the problems we had with him during his first period of time in the United States was he didn’t want to do anything except drink and carouse. We had problems with him in an incident in Baltimore where he started punching up a bar and so forth. One of the reasons to hold him in confinement was to get him away from the booze and settle him down and see if we could make some sense with him. The fact that he may have been held too long was therefore deplorable, but nevertheless we were doing our best. Chairman SToKEs. Well, in light of what you are now saying to us about the fact that you are damned if you do and damned if you don’t, was it important to you that you be kept informed regularly of everything that he was saying and everything that he was doing, et cetera? Mr. Hetms. Mr. Stokes, I felt that certainly I should be kept generally informed, but during the period of the Warren Commis- sion, they are the ones who should be kept informed, the FBI Should be kept informed, and that after the Warren Commission had made its report and things then were not guided by their investigation, we still went on with the job of attempting to find out what this man represented. 32 Chairman STOKES. But if, as you say, as you have just indicated, the Warren Commission needed to be informed and so forth, and wasn’t it your direct responsibility to inform the commission? Mr. HeEtms. But I thought I did. I thought I told them that we couldn’t establish his bona fides. Chairman SToKEs. Well, in order for you to be able to communi- cate with the Warren Commission, you had to get information from some source, didn’t you? Mr. HELMS. Yes. Chairman STOKES. So my question to you is: What direction did you give those under you as to how often you were to be briefed, how often you ought to be given the results of the interrogation or whatever was occurring with this man? Mr. Hetms. Certainly I stayed current to that extent. If there had been the slightest intimation that we were prepared to vouch for his bona fides or that the interrogation reached that point, it would have been brought to me immediately. I think that if I don’t any longer recall the exact date, but I think it was in June or something of 1964, that after getting the permission of the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, I went to see the Chief Justice privately to point out to him what our difficulties in this matter were. It seems to me I was as forth- coming as a man could be. What else could I do? What else should I have done? Chairman SToKEs. What did you tell him about your difficulties? What were they? Mr. Hetns. I told him we were not able to satisfy ourselves that the man was what he was purported to be, that the jobs that he had held were the ones that he really did hold, that there were inconsistencies in his testimony, that what he had to say about the Oswald case didn’t make sense to us, and that, therefore, I simply wanted to point out to the Chief Justice that I was sorry but whatever the FBI had given him or given the Commission about what Mr. Nosenko had said about Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald, that I felt he should take into consideration the fact that we could not vouch for his bona fides and therefore they should not take at full strength what he said. It was up to them to make their evaluation, but I felt we owed this to him. Chairman SToKEs. In order for you to tell the Chief Justice that, how often had you been briefed? Mr. Hens. I[ have no recollection any longer, Mr. Stokes. Chairman Stoxss. In terms of the interrogation that took place of Oswald, I’m sorry, Nosenko, were the interrogators instructed to pose a large number of questions relative to Oswald to Nosenko? Mr. Heuos. Mr. Stokes, there was no issue more central in those days than an effort to straighten out this business about Oswald. But I would submit in evidence, I don’t know whether you have been an interrogator, sir, but there are so many questions you can ask about based on the information that was known about Oswald at the time. If my facts are straight, the information about Oswald that was known was that he had gone to the Soviet Union, that he ex- pressed a desire to give up his citizenship. That is what he told the 33 American Embassy. He had gone to Minsk, married a Russian girl, which was suspicious in its own right. He then decided to come back to the United States and virtually disappeared, but it was not the CIA’s jurisdiction to keep an eye on him in the United States and the amount of information available at that time based on which one could make an interrogation was pretty thin for the simple reason that how were we going to find out in the Soviet Union what Oswald had done there except from his own statements? We had no independent means of verification. We didn’t have that good an organization inside the Soviet Union. We had no means of following up on these leads. Chairman STOoKEs. In light of your statements in this context, let me cite to you the testimony of Mr. Hart to this committee and get your comment on that. Mr. Hart, with reference to the matter of whether Nosenko was being incarcerated or being questioned, said to this committee this: Mr. Hart. Insofar as I can tell, the assumption among the top leadership of the agency was that during this period of incarceration Mr. Nosenko was being ques- tioned or interrogated. That is flatly contrary to the facts because although he was incarcerated for 1,277 -days, on only 292 days was he in part questioned. We do not, it is difficult to tell just how many hours of questioning there took place on those 292 days when he actually was questioned. The rest of the time, which is 77 percent of the total time of incarceration, he was left entirely unoccupied and was not being questioned. There was, in other words, no effort being made to get at more information which he might have. Do you agree with that statement? Mr. Hens. I have no comment to make on it. Mr. Hart, I gather, was appointed by Director George Bush in 1976 to look into the whole Nosenko case. I have been informed of that in recent times. I assume he looked into it fairly and squarely. I would assume also that this committee has talked thoroughly with all the interroga- tors and has verified independently whether these facts are true or not. I have no capacity for doing that. Chairman SToKEs. So you take no issue with that statement? Mr. HeEtms. None. I don’t know its merits one way or the other. Chairman STokEs. Then I take it from that you in no way contest the statement of Mr. Hart? Mr. Hens. I have no basis for contesting it, Mr. Stokes. I mean, he has a record there. I simply was saying that I have no independ- ent verification of the number of days he was interrogated. I would assume, though, that the committee does have an independent verification because I believe that the interrogators are still alive and I assume the committee has talked to them. Is this correct? Chairman STokEs. I think that is substantially correct, yes. Mr. Helms, in January 1968 when the SR division report con- cerning Nosenko was issued, what was the Agency’s position re- garding Mr. Nosenko’s bona fides? Mr. Hetms. There were those in the agency who believed he was bona fide and there were those in the agency who did not. I never recall having resolved the case in my own mind one way or the other. My preoccupation at the time was to get Mr. Nosenko reset- tled. If there were those who felt there was a reasonable chance he 34 was bona fide, that was all right with me, but as far as I am aware, I never signed off on any document or made any final decisions about his bona fides. If you have a document, I would appreciate seeing it because I have not been shown one, and if my recollection is not accurate, I don’t want to mislead this committee. I want to be absolutely fair and truthful and forthcoming. Chairman STOKES. Perhaps it may help refresh your recollection that at the time the committee took your testimony previously, Mr. Goldsmith asked you the question: “Is it not a fact that the SR report of 1968 indicated that in fact Mr. Nosenko was not a bona fide defector?” Your answer at that time was: “I don’t remember firsthand what the thrust of the report was.” So I take it, then, that your testimony today is that you still do not recall? Mr. Heitms. No. But I am sorry, I must have misunderstood your earlier question. I am sorry. I thought that you were asking me what my opinion was about that. Chairman SToKEs. No, no. Mr. HE.tms. I am sorry. Chairman SToKEs. Basically, what we are asking you is this: In January 1968, when this report came out of the SR division, what was the Agency’s position regarding Nosenko bona fides? Mr. Hetms. Well, the Agency’s position would not have been reflected in the 1968 report. The Agency’s position would have been one that I would have signed off on and I don’t recall ever having made personally the decision based on recommendations and var- ious other factors involved, whether he was bona fide or not. I simply was trying to explain that my interest then was different. Chairman SToKEs. Well, then, can you tell us in January of 1968 the Agency’s position with regard to the veracity of the informa- tion Nosenko had provided concerning Oswald? Mr. HeExtms. I don’t think any judgment has ever been made about that. I thought I read in the newspapers—and I assume the newspapers reported accurately—that Mr. Hart, after all his inves- tigation, was not able to tell you that Nosenko was accurate about Oswald er not accurate about Oswald, if he could not do it—— Chairman Strokes. To the contrary. He said to the committee, based upon everything he knew about him, that the testimony he had given this committee, he said I would not use it, so he did have an opinion. Mr. Hens. He said he would not use it? Chairman STOKES. That is what he said. Mr. HeEtms. That confuses me. Chairman Stokes. Why? Mr. Heutms. Well, it confuses me because isn’t that a cop-out? If you are not going to use it, then it is not true. Chairman Stokes. That is substantially correct, that would be my own interpretation. Now let me ask you this: Wouldn’t your analysis and the doubt which you had of this man’s overall bona fides also bear upon the question of what he was saying to you and through you to the Warren Commission about Oswald, that is, if you doubted his gen- 35 eral bona fides, wouldn’t you have to doubt what he was saying to you about Oswald? Mr. HELMs. Yes, sir, that is why I went to see the Chief Justice. Chairman SToKEs. Now let me ask you this: After the SR division issued its report in 1968, was the Nosenko case reinvestigated by the security officer? Mr. Hexms. Oh, I think the ground was gone over not only by that security officer, but I think that through the weeks after that a long interrogation, or if you don’t want to call it an interroga- tion, let’s say an elicitation, was carried on with Nosenko to find out what he knew about a whole host of things, including the Oswald case. I believe it was during that latter period that he had additional contributions to make about the size of the files that the KGB held on Oswald and matters of this kind. Chairman SToKEs. Let me ask you this: In light of what you said to us this morning, would you agree that the consequences of the Nosenko case for the American intelligence community were quite great, particularly if it turned out that he was not a bona fide defector? I think you may have commented on some of that in your first statement. Mr. Hews. Yes, I did, Mr. Stokes, but I agree with what you said. | Chairman STOKES. I would like to call your attention to page 137 of the declassified transcript which you have there at the witness table with you. Lines 6 through 20. Do you have that? Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir. | Chairman Stokes. This, of course, is your testimony before this subcommittee of this committe earlier. Now, at that time did you testify that you had no recollection of ever signing off on any piece of paper that made Nosenko a consul- tant to the CIA and that you never agreed to any such thing? Mr. HEtMs. When I made that statement in executive session on August 9, it was my distinct impression that we had made an arrangement or signed a contract with Nosenko which made him an independent contractor. In other words, it was a relationship between him and the Agency whereby he would do research work under controlled circumstances and we would control the environ- ment, what documents he saw, what he did, and in this way we would be justified in seeing if his expertise was of any help to us, and, second, under this document we could pay him so that he could live and eventually get to be resettled. I was not aware at that time that the independent contractor provision had along with it in the document the word “consultant.” If I was aware of it at the time, I never thought about it. I must confess that my thought of what a consultant is has been changed in present times, because I am a consultant to various American businesses now and my relationship to them is not the relationship I contracted for with Nosenko, so this is a semantic problem. I can only say that I am sorry that I was maybe the slightest bit misleading, but I have now explained it and I hope that satisfies you. Chairman Stokes. Mr. Chairman, I will ask that an exhibit in the possession of the Clerk be marked as JFK F-531. I will ask that 36 a copy of it be delivered to the witness and that the exhibit be made a part of the record at this time. Mr. Preyer. If there is no objection, the exhibit, F-531, will be entered into the record at this point. [The information follows:] JFK Exuisit F-531 a \ £7? A Ee BS ve ine, quanedor roe keah eea ee & Ocr 872 bay ; MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Cexntr2l Intelligence + THROUGH " - g Executive Director-Gomptraller - SUBJECT + Retroactive Reimb=rsemsentof “Yuriy Ivancvich Naserko =O ? . - ‘I. This memorandum suggests action om the part ofthe _ Director of Cermimal Intelligence; this ection is comtzined in _ peregreph 9. . 2. Mr. Yuriy Ivenovich Nosexko, 2 45-yea>-old, former Stefi OfScexr of the Committee for Siete Security (KGB) of the USSR, 2ttended the Instimts of Interr2tional Relations, Moscow, from 1945, to 1950; was afSlieted with Russian Navel Inteligerce during the 1951-1953 period; and wes an officer with the KGB from Mareh 1953 mt his defection to the Agency im Geneva, © Switzerland, on 4 Febrvary 1964, after heving worked for CLA. for epproxmetely two years. Lt 3. A review of Mr. Nodentat s case reflects that,z2 the time of his defection, various officizl cormmitments were made to him, including 2 lump sum pzyment of $50,000.00 based upo= his nearly two years! work inside the KGB; 2 $10,C00.00 bonus for his work on the|Povun ease: and 2 contract as 2 consultant 2ta salery of $25,000. a0 perennum. Mr. Nosemko wes zdvised f by his Agency Case Officer that Mr. Nosenko wes working for the Central Intelligence Agency 2s of 5 February 1964, and that his selary began from that date. This wes 2 verbsl Ry aie? vrith the (ertncy Case Officer, end is fully documented in our files. 37 s 4. In the early debriefing of Mr. Nosenko, it becarm apparent that he wes 2 particularly complex individu2l. ToOo Darmit extensive and prolonged debriefing, arrangements were m2d= tg ae Ce ee oece Mr. Nosezko unde> highly secure conditions 2: of xs 2 where he remained from 1964to 1967. These tizh: security arrengemerts were dicttéd > during thé inite! phases at least, by the eddthamal need to provide Mr Scitas ants “pqs - coniiming personal protectian, since uate was the dist possibility that he would be targeted for execution if the Soviets _ should discover his whereabouts. - 5. Since October 1967, the primary responsihility fo> Mir Noserkso has been in the OfSce of Security, which conducted a thorough review of prior developments inthe cease. Mr.‘Nosenks wes moved to the Waskingten, D.C. 2rea in late 1967, end tke c2se passed through various stages of phased normalization, as _ he was given an increzsed degree of freedom and independance, Mr. Noserko was actuzlly resettled on the economy in April 1969; he obteizned 2 diyores from his former Soviet spouse in September 19693; Stansted isto Dering the period from October 1967 to April 1969, Mr. Nosexka did not receive a2 s2lary, but he wes provided with 2 moderetes amount of £ spending money. 6. As of April 1969, Mr. Nosenko signed2 one-year contractuz] agreement for $16,500.00, including 2 clause giving 2ssistance to him in resettlement expenses in the armount.of $8,000.00. In Merch 1970, Mr. Nosenko signed 2 new contract for two yeers 2t $18,500.00 per emaum. At 2bout this same tims he wes provided with certein finencizl assistance, $20,000.09 © being for the down payment on 2 new house, end $5,000.00 for other related household expemses. Mr. Nosenko's comtract wes renewed at the new rete of $19,500.00 per anaurmm on I March 1971, end the contrect wes 2gz2in renewed in Februery 1972, atthe salary -- of $21,000.00 per 2znnumn. f e 7 An analysis of this case clearly indicates that i ‘Nosenko has been 2n extremely velu2tle source, ome who h2s identified many hundreds of Soviet Intelligence Officers, and h= has otherwise provided a considerable quanitty of usefirl info>matiaz on the organization of the KGB, its operational doctrine, and methods. . Séasitwt (ato hzve been : 8 forwerded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation based on cate from Mr. Nosenke; He has conducted numerous special securi pa reviews on Soviet subjects of speciac intelligemce interest, an he hes proven himself to be inveluable in exploring countarintallz— gence leads. He recently authored 2 book which is of intexest to the Agency- In effect, Mz. Noserka has shown himself to bz a Satinwative and hard working defecta>, wha is prexebilitet ad and favorenly disposes towards the Agency. : 8. In the course of a recent meeting with Mr. Nosenka, - he brought up tha subject? of his missirg salary, covering the | period from April 1964 ta Marck 1969. Mr. Noserka readily i admitted that he is Living very well at the presert time, but he is not im 2 positicn to save any money for the frture. He also expressed deep 2ppreciation to the Agency for the Srenci2i assistence which was provided him through the years, andhe = -. comsiders this to have cancelled out the orginal Agency obligation of 2 icmp sum payment in the amount of $50, 000.00. Mr. Naserko, however, still feels quite strongly that heis oo entitled to be reimbursed for the salary whick the Agency did not provide him over 2 five-year period. He understands, of © course, tazt income tess would have to be deducted from this back salezy of $25,000.00 per ammum. 9. In summary, the original oral egreerment with Mr. Noserke is fully documented end supports his claim; his resettle ment since 1967 hes heen relatively smooth, with ma signifcert security problems having developed; and he continves ta function at the present time 2s 2 highly pia and useful source of information on the KGB. In view of these various consideretions - it is requested thet this payment of $125,000.00 to Mr. Noserka © be approved. These funds would be pzid out of ubauidated obligetions 2pplicable to lapsed appropriations, — Seas:TW Sources e - ; ai | dad ples a a ont ee eRe (s i Pictseis eeities Director of Securit; 39 SUBJECT: Retroactive Reimbursement of Yuriy Ivanovick Nosenko - CON CURRENCE: ne “a COM nem paren \encce ey VO (Date) , STR % Creer Pah AQ ieee cisel ew atialie, wy Pree Eee Flot ele | ” gpsite bare be OEr-67 APA be te Sect ef ! Zi ' Fete Whee ioow asl, cial PP we eS) Pe Ane2 = , UF ap . Thormas H. Karamessines . - (Date) ? ae Deputy Director ‘ wy 960,he! for Plans ; ofA f Gees Mis ta Aa -| , William % Colby - ' (Date) Executive Direttor-Comptroller i) - =f f ? 1 | - £2ae The recommendation 5 in 2 paragraph 9 is epprovediarl- Upopsit DD: (owestezt 3%. . ase Mee elt 48 ocr i972 Richard Helms (D2te) Director : 40 Ge bs) Me [UNCL ASSIF IED - ( ~ Tata , : hryee te: EL eeOp cone THTIAL 2) secrer 1 USCA eas etek SRL Covon tr, Sere ROUTING AND RECORD SHEST USSECT: (Coterel} +t genet FMA Reseed ERE CTS; wires, Drow @ linw carsee coluewe citer sacs comers} I. abe General Counsel lto 2 and 3: With the z : initiation of this rehabilita— ~ DD/P - ca tion program, it would _ seem timely to brief th= 3. . Peas La appropriate staif personnel DCI ~ | © of cur congressional sub- 7 .cormmittees on the status of j were to go wrong, resulting -e ; in bad publicity without suck a briefing, the reaction of . our subcommittees would, i aa Sommer /P fe Zl -rf unfortunate, ‘eey Tas. 2ts Houston ie %* . > 610 “eese* ~ secret] conrivenTiaL -C iow © C] UNctassiFien 41 24 WAR 6g MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT o Preparations for the Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Yuri Nosenko l. This memorandum is for your information and contains a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 5, 2. As you know, since last meeting with you on this ee ’ _we have been very slowly easing some of the physical restrictions on Nosenko in an effort to condition him for his ultimate rehabilita-— tion and resettlerment in this country if this is the final disposition decision. During this period, both the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion and this Office have continued to elicit information from him. 3. .Nosenko is becorming increasingly restive and desirous of obtaining freedom on his own. After nearly five years of varying degrees of confinement, this desire, including that for feminine com- panionship, is understandable. We have conformed the pace of privileges allowed him to his attitude and cooperation. At 2 recent meeting in which the Deputy Director of Plans, Chief, Soviet Bloc Division, Chief, CI Staff, Office of General Counsel and the under— signed participated, it was agreed that we would allow him a two . week vacation in Florida accompanied by two Security agents of this Office. He will not be allowed ta be alone outside the confines me en adjoining room during this period. 4. There still remains a disagreement as to his bona fides and the Chief, CI Staff is now compiling questions to be used for continued elicitation from Nosenko upon his return. Itis clear and agreed by all concerned that the problem of Nosenko's bona fides and his rehabilitation and resettlement can be considered separately if we 42 are to keep him in a favorable frame of mind with regard to the Agency. Any treatment which can be regarded by him as retro- gression, in terms of physical restraint but not continued elicitation, would make his ultimate disposition extrernely difficult. Attached for your approval is‘a brief summary of the steps we recommend be - taken in Nosenko's rehabilitation and resettlerment beginning with his return from his vacation in Florida, It is understood that implemen— tation of these atens will be predicated on the ah a # ° His attitude and behavior during his Florida vacation. We will try to delay each step as long as possible consistent with his attitude and his | ee ahto cooperate. This Office will take every poavibte precaution to prevent contact between Nosenko and KGB e _ representatives in this country. If heis given limited freedom, however,. there can be no guarantee of this since he is a professional intelligence officer and could evade surveil- < lance if he so desired. If he is a dispatched agent, itis to be assumed that he was given emergency means of contact. 5. Your approval of these actions, as outlined, is recommended. - Di¥ectar of Se ity Distribution: 43 CONCURRENCE: rs betic & (2. | 25 Nasr OF Lawrence R. Houston Date General Counsel . ys Sa Thomas Karamessines : : . on e Date , Deputy Director for Plans | 7 The recommendation in paragraph 5 is approved. : © APR 1353- Richard Helms _ Date — Director of Central Intelligence ; 44 - STEPS IN THE REHABILITATION AND £RESETTLEMENT OF NOSENKO Step 1. Uponhis return from vacation in Florida or soon thereafter, we will begin to negotiate a contractual relationship with Nosenko which will provide him with financial reimbursement not to exceed twenty thousand dollars a year for the period of time he is working with this Agency in a program of information elicitation. This contract, in addition to the standard features, will contain a "quit claim" provision regarding his past relationship with the Agency in the event he should be kidnapped, become recalcitrant or redefect. It will stipulate residence in an area acceptable to the Agency. It will - also provide that upon conclusion of his active cooperation with this Agency, we will renegotiate to provide for a modest continued annuity _ " comrmensurate with his ability to secure employment on his own. There will be no bulk resettlement fund. wht Step 2. Wewill negotiate with Immigration and Naturalization authorities to secure appropriate alien registration for Nosenko in this. country under a registered alias. It will be necessary for the Agency to accept continued responsibility for Nosenko until such time as he has established residence long enough to satisfy the ten year citizenship requirement. Step 3. We will begin to look with him for suitable living ~ accommodations. He accepts the fact that these accommodations will have to be so arranged that we will occupy contiguous quarters and _that he will be required for an undetermined period to let us know where’ - he is going and when he leaves these quarters. We will, initially at least, provide for technical coverage of his telephone and living quar- ters and will, within the extent of our capability, cover© him through . surveillance when he leaves these quarters. . 45 Step 4. The program of information elicitation based on questions compiled by CI Staff will begin soon after Nosenko's return from Florida, Any significant developments and changes _ in the handling of Nosenko and the conduct of the interviews will _ be coordinated with the CI Staff acting on behalf of the DDP. This program of elicitation will be so designed as to prevent broadening further the base of Nosenko's knowledge. Future elicitation from Nosenko will not include new information except on the basis of calculated approved coordination between the Office of Security and the CI Staff about: subject matter and Nosenko will be encouraged and allowed to give full responses on each subject. The FBI will be advised about these procedures. . | Step 5. When we have favorably resolved disagreement . within the Agency as to his bona fides, we will allow him his ultimate freedom, including assistance in finding suitable ermployment. IE . . disagreement persists, however, 2s to his bona fides beyond the ) ‘end of this calendar year, we will consult with other appropriate . Government agencies as to whether he may be allowed full freedom as a normal resident alien or whether the security interests of the United States. ait his deportation. . \ 41-373 O- 10 = 6 46 4 October 1968. MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director — SUBJECT : Yuri Ivanovich. Nosenko 1. The Director of Security has provided me with a completed ' report on the re-examination of subject-named individual. He has also provided me with a copy of a summary prepared by the FBI on the same subject in the light of the periodic reports received by them throughout the course of this re-examination. The FBI report was provided in only one copy, personally to Howard Osborn by Special Agent Burt Turner, in consideration of the fact that the FBI had been continuously kept au courant of the results of our re-examination of subject. Presumably the F BI will expect from us a copy of Cer hr nt final report and will then eon ao ees us with a copy of their summary of Setcase. 2 The FBI summary notes that a minimum of 9 new cases have been developed as a result of this re-examination and that new inforrnation of considerable importance on old cases not previously available resulted from this effort. Before we are through with this the F BI just might level official criticism af this Agency for its previous handling of this case. However, because of the finesse and candor with - which the Director of Security has handled this re-examination, I am inclined to doubt that the F BI will wish to make an issue of our previous actions. . 1 3. Now to the heart of the matter. I am now convinced that there is no reason to conclude that Nosenko is other than what he has claimed to be, that he has not knowingly and willfully withheld information from us, that there is no conflict between what we have learned from him and what we have learned from other defectors or informants that would cast any doubts on his bona fides. Most particularly, I perceive no significant conflict between the information Nosenko has provided and the information and opinions Golitsyn has provided. Thus, I conclude that | Nosenko should be accepted as a bona fide defector. ae 7 4. In Bidston, I recommend that we now r proceed with the resettlement and rehabilitation of Nosenko with sufficient dispatch to perrnit his full freedom by 1 January 1969. This recommendation I feel should be reviewed by the Deputy Director for Plans, the Director of 4 Security and the Inspector General prior ta its implementation, whatever your own views may be after examining the case yourself. © S. Navy “De puty ae ctor 47 P6keassieies— Oe as EJ commeNTiaL ‘J. SECRET Oo eb eI aSRE a ot 2 ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET Oh tht Sate. eee JET: (Carenel) Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenks (Payment of Certain Funds DR isa }\' HES : 5 us 10s ' gritrsiorn no. P : Sidney D. Stembridge Acting Director of Securit Dz (Oster dovigasiony, rome: mmives, and: COMMENTS(Nustees rani @amment ta Dew fren wre sebdeog) LS ts ee Drow @ lime cert alwene afmws ewe camer.) - ~ Chief, SER & A From General Counsel to General Walters: We have reviewed this casein em ee erewemes Seer tans considerable detail. Technically, the release signed by Nosenka could be asserted. In fac:, hawever, on the basis of the record, it epnears he is due this final payment and we see no prodlem in your approving ~ - - a - - RASS SASH Mn 5bers ue Sepmescsgalilin s ery arene eh meearrar Tree TES ee a ~ Sok S. Warner “General Counsel i e k ali hee Ae pan mae we nene rarer ge ae ee NO ot) ory -f ee a we ae ee Mts TA TOY A 4Rd ee e610 ee FT-szcrer__ 77 conFiventiaL (7) yseoncy INTERNAL C} UNCLASSIFISO 48 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director yA C FROM = Sidney D. Stembridge 7 Acting Director of Security — VIA : Deputy Director for Operations Deputy Director for Administration. SUBJECT : Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko (Payment. of Certain Funds . ‘ Previously Promised) Il. This memorandum submits a proposal for your approval. The proposal is to immediately pay Yuriy Ivanavich Nosenko ; $28,500 in back salary in settlement of an Agency commitment to him and to authorize a subsequent one-time payment of $10,000 to him directly or as 2 contribution to his retirement for Saes.twe ce tqn Was ; maaan, as 2. Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko is 2 48-year-old former ~ as an Soviet intelligence officer who is currently emplayed independent contractor by this Agency. Mr. Nosenko hes for some time been of the opinion that he is entitled to $28,500 in back pay. This amount represents the difference between the salary actually paid to him during the 1 March 196S to. promised lL March 1975 period and the $25,000 per year which was to him at the time of his defection in February 1964. At the time of his defection, Mr.. Nosenko was also :promised the addi- tional $10,000 fory SénsiWy fomniqe Case : : / d Sr eae 3 é 3. While serving as a KGB security officer with the Soviet Disarmament Commission in Switzerland, Mr. Nosenko contacted an American diplomat in Geneva on S-June 1962 and 2 small loan to repay official Soviet funds whick requested he had squandered. Based on this contact Mr. Nosenko was recruited shortly thereafter by the Agency and he agreed to 49 work as an agent in place. On 15 June 1962 Mr. Nasenko returned to the Soviet Union where he resumed his duties as an intelligence officer with the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB in Moscow. Mr. Nosenko worked in place in the Soviet Union until January 1964 when he returned to Switzerland. At that time Mr. Nosenka decided to defect and requested political asylum in the United States. é 4. Mr. Nosenko defected in Switzerland on 4 February 1964 and was brought to the United: States under Public Law 1130 on li February 1964. At the time of his defection, certzin financial commitments were made to Mr. Nosenko. These commit— ments were substantiated in a conversation with him on 7 February 1964 and were documented in a 10 February- 1964 Memorandum to the Acting Deputy Director for Plans from yorqloya Ylawr~—*, Chief, Soviet Russia Division (SR Division}. - This memorandum stated as follows: | _"First, I assured Subject [Mr. NosenkoJ that I Ei Was satisfied that he was genuine. Based on : this and assuming his continued ‘cooperation’ I said we would proceed to make arrangements- to bring him to the States. Second, I con- firmed our agreement to pay him $25,000 for each year in place ($50,000) plus $10,000 for fF Ste foreign Ase and our readiness - to contract for his services at $25,000 per yéar. Third, I explained the polygraph he would be expectedto take as final proof of his bona fides.” S. Shortly after his arrival in the United States, the SR Division encountered serious difficulties in attempting to establish the bona fides of Mr. Nosenko. The SR Division con- cluded that Mr. Nosenko was not what he claimed to be and thus Was not 2 bona fide defector. As noted in paregraph four of © Attachment A, Mr. Nosenko was held under highly secure conditians at an Agency installation from April 1964 until October 1967. In October 1967 the primary responsibility for Mr. Nosenko was transferred from SR Division to the Office of Security, which conducted 2 thorough review of the developments in this case. The conditions of confinement of Mr. Nosenko were progressively relaxed and in October 1968 the bona fides of Mr. Nosenko were established by the Office of Security. At this point it should be noted that the confinement of Mr. Nosenka was cited by the 50 Rockefeller Commission Report in June 1975 and that Mr. Noseaks is aware of this citation. Mr. Nosenko has, hoxever, made no threats concerning possible damages as a result of this con- finement. Alsa, despite the difficult period through whick Mr. Nosenko passed, he has been and continues to be a coop- erative and productive source. “2 aS ° I . - +? S ens itwe ‘sto ewan aes TOM ¥ +4 7. Prior to 1 March 1969 Mr. Nosenko received no salary for his cooperation with this Agency. Effective 1 March 1969 Mr. Nosenko was employed as an independent contractor at the rate of $16,500 per year. Because of the previous difficulties and uncertainties involved in establishing the bona fides of Mr. Nosenko, the extent of our commitments and obligations to him were not clear at that time. Mr. Nosenko, therefore, was not initially employed at the rate of $25,000 per year as he had been promised. Mr. Nosenko's salary was increased annually, however, until 1 March 1975 when he beganto receive the stipu- — lated $25,090 per year. Once the bona fides of Mr. Nosenko were firmly established and the earlier difficulties regarding his status were resolved, the initial commitments took effect and the payment of $125,000 (less federal income tax) was completed ‘on 16. November 1972 in settlement of salary arrears for the period April 1964 to March 1969 (see Attachment B}- On 12 July 19735 2 final payment was made on the obligation of $50,000 due Mr. .Nosenko for the period 1962-1964. 51 , _8. There remains. to be paid $28,500 (less federal incons tax) in salary arrears for the period I March 19469 to 1 March 1975S (see Attachment C) and $10,000 outstanding for case. (He has never requested the latter amount Dut the obligation Still exists.) Although Mr. Nosenko signed a2 quitclaim for the period prior to 12 July 1975 (see Attachment D} and may have legally waived his right to back salary prior to that date, the earlier payment of $125,000 for the period 1964- 1969 recognized our commitment to Mr. Nosenko to honor all agreements and established a precedent for pzying him the total salary difference. We also believe that we have a moral obli- _gation and that this obligation should be met. 9. This matter is being brought to your attention since Mr. Nosenko believes he has 2 valid claimto cited back salary for the 1969-1975 period and in connection with the current transfer of full responsibility for Mr. Nosenko to the Counter- intelligence Staff, Directorate of Operations. It is, therefore, recommended that you approve the expenditure of $28,500 in full payment of back salary for Mr. Nosenko for the period 1969-1975. ~ Of the $28,500, $27,667 can be paid for out of the FY1974 unodli- gated balance allotted to the Office of Security, with the _remainder of $833 being charged to the Officeof Security FY197S5- allocation. 7 > 10. It is further requested that approval be granted for- the $20,000. Seraitlu.tpetiqn C2si., which could be paid directly to Mr. Nosenko at a later date or preferably could be incorporated into a retirement program for him, which is being given consid- eration by ‘the Counterintelligence Staff. If approved, these transactions would represent a fulfillment of all commitments to Mr. Nosenko as of this date and would to fulfill serve outstending Agency commitments to Mr. Nosenko prior to his transfer to the Counterintelligence Staff. : Attachments 52 SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko (Payment of Certain Funds Previously Promised) Sa i: bicw 1976 oie Ve Date ——__ William F7 Nelson : af Deputy Director’ for Operations eS pie a fe fi 2 LER Te is 24 aa ate : vies! . : re =i Director : Deputy for . | haha ioe _ Administration APPROVED: Vye = =? \Olle es Dep eds, Ag nd NGT6 DISAPPROVED: 53 ae -— 2% “Fs Fits 83285 TA LAINMO: Rewmene wren. < : ta’ i" oS > + sabe . User: {Op~——l) . Retrozctin zyrent Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenka : ; : : Ae ‘Director a of s| Teecumacoemes, COMMENTS. (Nuxeo cock: ¢amampetpy. Shene fren. whoay > wires, Deae @ Ge corm . 65375 06 1 Dec 69-30 Nov 70 17,999.94 25,000.00 7,000.06 1 Dec 70-30 Nov 71 19,249.98 25,000.00 35790.02 1 Dec 71-30 Nov 72 20,625.00 25,000.00 _ 4,375.00 IL Dec 72-30 Nov 73 1; 95 io 25,000.00 3,062.47 1 Dec 73-30 Nov 74 23,374.94 25,000.00 1,625.06 I Dec 74-30 Nov 75 24,875.04 25,000.00 522-59 $140,437.43 $168,937.43 $28,500.00 Less Estimated Tax Liability’ - $,084.00 NET PAYMENT $20,416.00 *Rate of $25,000.00 for period 1 Dec 74 - 28 Feb 1975 Rate of $25,250.00 for period 1 Mar 7S - 30 Nov 1975 - 59 o> WHEREAS, Tarey, Ivanovich Nosenko, a former citizen of the Union - > of Soviet Socialist Replies gad.22. a employe ee ofthe As capeeps for State Security (KGB), first Pspecelabsies oats Officers of the Woaead See Govern— ment and then, Piste 2 a defected to the United States: and, o ~ WHEREAS, Mr. Nosenko was promised certain sums of monsy for his cooperation and defection, only part of which have previcusly bese to paid to him; ana, - WHEREAS, there. rem2izcs 2ce stain balance o£ money agreed unaz= by Mr. Rosecies aad Officers of tie .Central Intelligeace peasy. 4 at aie NOW THEREFORE, in considerstion at < the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND and 00/100 Dollars ($15, 000.00) the receipt of whichis herehy res ledged, i Yuriy Po isoten Nosenka for himself and for his heizs. “ie s, adenini— “strators and SERS hereby releases and forever or agere the United. | States Goversment and the Gentrel ay Pa paper Agenc mecalh tegtle oar cf its “employees and Mieka is from any claim ian money promised to him for, and/or at the time OF his defection, and from f aur 25d sllotter claims( —_-- a ——— ey meeorands and liabilities in any form Shotsoave arising out of or in any way 7 eens with his. cooperation aes pascetatiar wth the United States Govern : ment and the Central Intelligence Agency P. ior to the date of this eocument, | 12 ng 1973.5" | | | WITNESS THE FOLLOW ING SSONATURE AND SEAL: i deyFteeveisbll aHe. Loser) Yuriy! Ivaaovich Nosenko | WITNESS; On Behali of the United States tear pen tial 60 Mr. Hews. I have the document before me, Mr. Stokes, now. It is a document dated October 5, 1972. Chairman Stokes. That is the document. Can you tell us what that document is? Mr. Hetms. The subject of it is retroactive reimbursement of Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko. It entails a description of his case, what he was promised in the way of money, and gives at the end a suggestion as to how the moneys might be handled. This in turn was passed up the line in the Agency and was approved on October 1S ake Chairman Stokes. Mr. Helms, I would direct your attention to page 4 of that document and ask you whether or not your signa- ture appears on that document? Mr. Hes. Yes, it does, beside the date October 18, 1972. That is my signature. Chairman Stoxres. Now, I will ask you to read three of the paragraphs from this document, paragraphs 6, 7 and 9. Would you do that, please, read it out loud? Mr. HE.LMs. Six, seven, and nine? Chairman STOKES. Yes, sir. Mr. HE.LMs. Yes, sir. As of April 1969, Mr. Nosenko signed a 1-year contractual agreement for $16,500, including a clause giving assistance to him in resettlement expenses in the amount of $8,000. In March 1970, Mr. Nosenko signed a new contract for 2 years at $18,500 per annum. At about the same time he was provided with certain financial assist- ance, $20,000 being for the down payment on a new house and $5,000 for other related household expenses. Mr. Nosenko’s contract was renewed at the new rate of $19,500 per annum on March 1, 1971 and the contract was again renewed in February 1972 at the salary of $21,000 per annum. Paragraph 7: An analysis of this case clearly indicates that Mr. Nosenko has been an extremely valuable source, one who has identified many hundreds of Soviet intelligence offi- cers, and he has otherwise provided a considerable quantity of useful information on the organization of the KGB, its operational doctrine and methods. Then I find a blank and written in here in somebody’s hand is | sensitive information. The remainder of the sentence reads: Have been forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation based on data from | Mr. Nosenko. He has conducted numerous special security reviews on Soviet sub- jects of specific intelligence interest and he has proven himself to be invaluable in exploring counterintelligence leads. He recently authored a book which is of interest to the Agency. In effect, Mr. Nosenko has shown himself to be a productive and hard working defector, who is rehabilitated and favorably disposed to the Agency. Paragraph 9: In summary, the original oral agreement with Mr. Nosenko is fully documented and supports his claim; his resettlement since 1967 has been relatively smooth, with no significant security problems having developed; and he continues to function at the present time as a highly productive and useful source of information on the KGB. In view of these various considerations, it is requested that the payment of $125,000 to Mr. Nosenko be approved. These funds would be paid out of unliquidated obligations applicable to lapsed appropriations. The sentence stops there and it is written in somebody’s hand-} writing, “sensitive sources and methods information.’’ And the memorandum has the signature below. Chairman SrTokgs. Thank you. In paragraph 9 where it says: “and he continues to function a the present time as a highly productive and useful source of infor 61 mation on the KGB,” that does not, to you, connote the activities of a consultant? Mr. HEtms. No, sir. Chairman Stokes. That’s how you would interpret that? Mr. Hetms. That is the kind of information we get from any agency. I am sorry, but my impression today, and it may not have been 5 years ago, I don’t know, but today my impression of a consultant is one that has a closer relationship with the organiza- tion for which he is working than an agent does in an intelligence relationship. They are insulated from certain kinds of information; puey. are insulated from certain access, and insulated from a lot of things. Consultant is not necessarily so. Consultant is a very wide rang- ing term which covers all kinds of things in our language. I would just not like to see a reference at that time to his having been a consultant. I have been told since, I don’t know how accurately, ‘that Nosenko has been seen in the CIA headquarters building at Langley. I guess if he has access to the building out there, maybe he is a consultant now, but he was not considered one in my time. Chairman STOKES. I see. . Mr. Chairman, I will ask that the clerk mark another exhibit in her possession, JFK exhibit F-587 and that a copy of it be shown to the witness. Mr. HeEtms. I have the document in my hands. It is JFK exhibit F-537. Chairman Stokes. Have you had a chance to read that docu- ment? Mr. HE.tns. No. | Chairman SToKEs. Could you take the time to familiarize your- self with it? Mr. Hews. This is an interrogatory which this committee pre- sented to the Agency; is that correct? Chairman SToKEs. That is correct, sir. Mr. HE.s. I have read the document now, Mr. Stokes. Chairman STOKES. All right. Mr. Helms, prior to referring you to that particular document, ‘would you look at page 133 of the declassified transcript before you, beginning at line 11%. It looks like where Mr. Goldsmith poses a question to you and your answer follows. Mr. Hens. Is this where Mr. Goldsmith says, “What about at the conclusion of the [security officer’s] work?” Chairman STokEs. That is right. Would you please read Mr. Goldsmith’s question and your answer? Mr. HELMs [reading]: Mr. Go.tpsmitH. What about at the conclusion of [the security officer’s] work when he issued his report, at that time did the Agency have a position with regard to Nosenko’s bona fides? Mr. Hens. I do not believe so. At least during my time there I do not recall us ever taking a position as an agency. Chairman Stokes. Now let me ask you, having read that ques- tion and your answer to it, is that your best recollection? Mr. Hes. That is my best recollection, Mr. Stokes. I notice that in this document which you tell me the Agency has provided, they 11-373 O- 79 - 3 62 say that the final conclusion was that he is a bona fide defector. I simply do not recall participating in any meeting or signing any document which made the final judgment that he was a bona fide defector. Chairman Stokes. Let me now refer you to the exhibit, F-537 and ask you, now that is a document from the Director of Central Intelligence, is it not? Mr. HE.LMs. It is not signed by him, sir, so I don’t know. Chairman STOKES. Well, on the first page it does have a signa- ture on there. Mr. Hetms. On the first page it just has the signature of Mr. Breckinridge, principal coordinator for the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Chairman STOKES. Is there a letterhead at the top of it? Mr. HE.s. Yes, it say, “Office of Legislative Counsel.” Chairman Stokes. And ahead of that? Mr. HeEtMs. The Director of Central Intelligence. Chairman SToKEs. Washington, D.C.; right? Mr. HEtMs. Yes, 20505. Chairman STokEs. Does the first page read as follows: 1 September 1978, Mr. G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. BLAKEy: Forwarded herewith are answers to the interrogatories re- ceived at the close of business on 28 August 1978. Signed, S. D. Breckinridge, Principal for HSCA with attachment. Mr. HELMs. Yes. Chairman Stokes. Now, would you turn to the next page, com- mencing where it says question 8, would you read everything from that point forward? Mr. HELMs [reading]: Define Nosenko’s present and past employment arrangements with the Central Intelligence Agency, include (a) the dates and nature of this employment; (b) the services rendered by Nosenko; (c) itemize the counting of all compensation received by Nosenko; (d) an account of the roles of Richard Helms and John McCone in authorizing Nosenko’s employment and compensation arrangements for the CIA. Prior to Nosenko’s defection on 4 February 1964, he was promised $50,000 for previous cooperation, $10,000 for his identification in 1962 of a particular espionage agent, and $25,000 a year compensation for future services. Mr. Richard Helms himself approved the foregoing on 17 February 1964. Al- though no effort was made to fulfill the promise until some 5 years after Nosenko’s defection, the original promise formed the basis for the eventual employment and/ or monetary remunerations. Following acceptance of Nosenko’s bona fides in late 1968, Mr. Helms approved an arrangement which resulted in Nosenko’s employ- ment as an independent contractor effective 1 March 1969. This first contract called for him to be compensated at a rate of $16,500 a year. As of 1978 he is receiving $35,327 a year (see attached annual compensation table for years 1969 to 1978). In addition to regular yearly compensation, Nosenko was paid for the years 1964 to 1969; in November 1972 in the amount of $25,000 a year, less income tax. The total amount paid was $87,000—I beg your pardon—total amount paid was $87,052. He also received in varying increments from March 1964 to July 1973 amounts totaling $50,000 to aid in his resettlement on the private economy (see attached table for the breakdown). The total resettlement figure in effect satisfied that portion of the above 1964 promise to pay Nosenko $50,000 for previous cooperation. In 1976, Nosenko was paid $10,000 to satisfy that part of the above promise relating to his identification of an espionage agent. Further, he was compensated in the amount of $28,500, represent- f ing the difference between the $25,000 a year promised and the actual amount paid to him during the period 1 March 1969 to 1 March 1975. 63 Since 1969, the agency has contributed to Nosenko’s hospitalization insurance premium. The agency has also compensated him for certain unusual medical and dental expenses. To date, Nosenko continues to work as an independent contractor with the com- pensation provision being periodically amended. His work for the agency includes consultation with both the agency and the FBI on certain matters of current interest concerning Soviet intelligence activities and personnel both in the U.S. and abroad. From time to time he was also consulted by various elements of the agency on current Soviet developments and requirements. He has been, and continues to be, used as a regular lecturer at counterintelligence courses of the agency, the FBI, Air Force, OSI, and others. Our records do not show that Mr. John McCone played any role in authorizing Nosenko’s employment compensation arrangements with the CIA. Annual compensation table. Do you want me to go through that? Chairman STOKES. No. Having read this answer to the interrogatories posed to the agency, is there anything at all in this interrogatory that you would say is untrue? Mr. HE.tms. The only two statements, Mr. Stokes, that I would cavil with are the one that is “Following acceptance of Nosenko’s bona fides in 1968,” and I guess it appears on the last page of the document. That is the only point. If these bona fides were estab- lished in late 1968, I have no recollection of this having happened, that is all. I am sorry, I just—you want me to tell the truth here. I am doing my best. | Chairman STOKES. So then, if I understand your answer, you are not sticking with your previous testimony with reference to the et that the agency never arrived at a determination on his bona ides? Mr. HeEtms. I didn’t believe they ever did. I think my other testimony is consistent with what I am saying now. If it is not consistent, then you and I are misunderstanding each other, and that I would like to get straightened out right away. Chairman STOKES. I guess where I am having difficulty is my understanding of how you enter into this financial arrangement. Whether you call it consultant or independent contractor or give it any other name, how you justify entering into a contract where you give taxpayer funds to someone who you say in your opinion is not bona fide. Mr. HeEwns. I think, Mr. Stokes, that I can explain—I trust I can explain this satisfactorily. It has been said, and I believe it is true, that in the latter days of his interrogation Mr. Nosenko provided the agency with useful information with respect to certain Soviet activities. I do not recall that he gave them any additional informa- tion that helped to resolve the Oswald case or Oswald status with the KGB. The reimbursement was for two purposes, one, to get him reset- tled in the United States. May I say that this was the only viable option left to us at that time. There was no way of deporting him to the Soviet Union; he would have been shot and killed when he got back. He would never have been able to explain to them what he was doing during the period that he was away. So we had only one option and that was to try to resettle him. That was what I had in mind to do, and he needed money and he _ needed employment. 64 If you will study the history of Soviet defectors in this country, they have had an extraordinarily difficult time adjusting to our society. They have a very difficult time making money and running businesses and being gainfully employed. I think if you will put an interrogatory to the agency to give you a history of the resettle- ment of defectors since 1945, you will find what I am telling you is true. Therefore, it was a complex of matters involved in his com- pensation; part of it was the useful information, part of it was to get him resettled, and part was because we had no choice except to do these things. At least we had no choice in my opinion. Maybe somebody else would have a different opinion, but at least in our opinion we had no choice. Chairman STokKEs. That is your total answer as to why he was being given this kind of compensation? Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir. Chairman StToxkEs. Let me now ask you this—— Mr. Preyer. There is a vote on the floor at this time. The committee will take a 10-minute recess. The committee stands in recess for 10 minutes. [Recess. ] Mr. PREYER. The committee will come to order. Mr. GoupsmitH. Mr. Chairman, there are a number of other documents which relate generally to the subjects of Mr. Helms’ testimony, but with respect to which there was not sufficient time to ask specific questions. May they be admitted into the record as JFK exhibit F-5382 at this time? Mr. PREYER. Without objection, so ordered. [The exhibit referred to follows:] 65 JFK Exuipit F-532 Dear Mr ge eeaaen iegd-ence — JFK E HRT [asx hex: Reference is made to your contract with the United States ‘Governme r as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970, as amended. Effective 1 March 1972 said contract, as amended , ts further amende as set forth below: “(a) The first sentence-of paragraph four (4) entitled '"COM- PENSATION" is revised to read as follows: “You will be ‘compensated by the CIA at the rate of Twenty-one Thouagand Dollars ($21,000) per year." (b) Sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph six (6) entitled "NEGOTIATED BENEFITS" is deleted, sud3in lieu thereof theafgioying is substituted: "6(a): You presently have a private health insurance plan for yourself and your wife. It is understood and agreed that you will bear a portion of the total prermium cost of said plan; this organization will bear the remainder. Your portion is herein established at $12.50 per month and will be deducted from contractual payments due you. The total annual premium cost of said plan is presently $603.52. If required, the , Government's portion may be paid yearly, in advance." All other terms and conditions of said contract, as amended, remais in full force and effect. Please peneeiatee by signing ‘in the sia provided pice UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT As Represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC ~~ Gontracting Offer | ACCEPTED: t Date: SE»- Sore Ler OX. PEVOTRE CLOG I) es LaLE eee v WITNESS: Ay i /s/ es Date: February 29, 1972 Certified to be a true copy of the signed original which is on file’ in the Offic of Security. / Dear Mr®& Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970. Effective 1 March 1971 said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph four (4) entitled 'Compensation" to read as follows: ey "You will be compensated by the Central Intelligence Agency at the rate of Nineteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars © (19, 500. 00) abe year. ie . All athe Reo and conditions of said depetticarest remain in full force and eae te re naan 2m Please acknowledge by signing in the space provided ee UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT As Represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY . - ACCEPTED: ; | ¥ Date: 12 February 1971 [s/ ae se Date: 12 February 1971 Certified to be a true copy of the signed original which is on file in the Office of Security. _ $ Chief, Budget aadewie #51Byadeh OttrscnhSecapity | 67 - Dear Mr. Saisie Reference is made to your contract with the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY effective 1 March 1969. Effective i March 1970 said contract is herein terminated by mutual consent of tae parties thereto, and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted. The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under the following terms and conditions: l. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an independent contractor or consultant. You are not considered an employee of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this contract. You will be required to hold yourself available at all times to fulfill requests made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or to respond ts tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. You will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment or occupation until approval has been received from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Instructions furnished to you pursuant to this contract and within the terms hereof shall be as binding upon you aa if included in the written terms. hereof. 2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant instructions from an individual hereinafter referred ta as the "Authorized Government Reoresent:tive."" He will be fully authorized to discuss matters with you relating to your responsibilittes under this contract including, but not limited to, cover arrangements, place of assignment, conditions of work or any other matters relating to your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. 3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your responsibilities hereunder, a2propriate arrangements will be made regarding cover and general security conditions. You may be required to execute certain documents in the course of establishing cover arrangements but it is to be expressly understood that such documents are solely for the purzose of cover and security and confer no additional legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights aad obligations with respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from this agreerment. In connection with cover and security you will be provided from time to time specific'instructions by the Authorized Government Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely to such instructions. a 68 4. COMPENSATION. You will be compensated by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($18,509.00) per year. Payment of this comsensation shall be monthly in accordance with arrangements accentable to the Authorized Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income taxes and to such income tax law3 as are apalicabie to your place of residence. Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes. The current rates and metnod of payment will be in accordance with apslicable laws and the security instructions issued by the Authorized Government Representati Payment of all taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your personal obligation aad responsibility but ic accord with aporopriate securit instructions which will be furnished by the Authorized Government. Representative. Ls ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary _allowancee in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations. _ If, im the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur cther expenses, reimbursement for expenses will be made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial accordance with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY regulations. 6. NEGOTIATED BENEFITS. a. You vresently have a private healta insurance plan for yourself and your wife paid until late Decermber 1979. Prior to the expiration date of the current policy the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY has the option of paying premiums ~ on the current oolicy until 1 March 1972 or enrolling you in-a health insurance program for selected contract individuals of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will pay the premiums on either insurance coverage until | March 1972. However, any new contract will include an aporopriate clause providing that this organization will bear a portion of the total premium cost of any health insurance and you will bear the remainder. b. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will endeavor to arrange for you to secure a term life insurance policy with a face value of $15,000.00. This policy contains no additional accidental death benefits. The premiums for the policy will be your personal responsibility. The current premium charge is $12.00 per moath, 69 contract year to be taken only at times aad places asoroved in advance by the Authorized Goverament Representative. Vacation time is not accruable aad will not be carried over from year to year. Payment for unused vacation time will not be authorized. (2) If incapacitated for work due to illness, injury and the like, your compensation may be continued for periods not to exceed a total of thirteen (13) working days per contract year. Periods of absence in excess of three (3) consecutive days will require a doctor's certificate. Like vacation time, . this benefit is not accruable and will not be carried over from year to year. Cash payment in lieu of this benefit will not be authorized. 7. SECRECY CBLIGATION. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY from suca obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, as amended, and other apnlicable laws and regulations. Your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship aad contract with any person other than the Authorized Government Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve. 8. UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than fibee expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any ‘amendment thercto shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. 9. TERM. This agreement is effective as of 1 vemas 1970 and - shall be for a term of twa (2) years. At the end of that period. this contract © shall be deemed to be renewed for another year unless notice of ——— termination has been furnished to you thirty (30) days in advance. ‘Thereafter the coatract will be renewed automatically ona Similar terms and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any time by either party upon furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon termination of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments, if any, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist you in obtaining gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation to assure you that you will be able to maintain 2 reasonable standard of living. This undertaking is contingent ugon your fulfilling the terms of 70 this. contract aad the continuing comoliance with tae secrecy ooligations imposed oa you by paragraph 7 of this contract anc the provisions of any secrecy agreement whica you have signed with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY UNITED STATES GOVEXNMENT As Represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC By: Date: 6 March 1970 ACCEPTED: | S degapeeegesi rea Date: 6 March 1970 = - Certified to be a true copy of the signed original which is on file in the Office of Security. Chief, Budget and Fiscal Branch Office of Security 71 The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under the following terms and conditions: lL. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an indevendent contractor or consultant. You are not considered an employee of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this contract. You will be required to hold yourself available at all times te fulfill requests made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or to respond to tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY... You will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment or occupation until approval has been recsived from the CENTRAL 2 INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Instructions furnished to you pursuant to this contract and within the terms hereof shall be as binding ne you as if included in the written terms hereof. 2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant instructions from an individual hereinafter referred to as the "Authorized Government Representative."' He will be fully authorized to discuss matters with ae relating to your responsibilities underthis | contract including, but i limited to, cover arrangements, place of assignment, conditions of caenia or any other matters relating to your relationship pare the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. 3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the gsrformance of your responsibilities hereunder, aporoprizte arrangements will be made regarding cover and general security conditions. You may be reauired | 12 to execute certzin documants in the cocrse of establishirg cover arrangemants but it is to be expressly understood that such documents are solely for the purpose of cover and security and confer no additional legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from thia agreement. In connection with cover and security you will se provided from time to ties specific instructions hy the Acthorized Government Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely fo euch iantrotiience aes ~ Am Rio tbigen . 4. COMPENSATION. You will be compensated by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16, $09. 00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall oat monthly in accordance with arrangements accectable tc the Authorized Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income taxes and to such income tax laws as are apnlicable to your pase of | residence. Additionally, this compensation Is subject to FICA tazas. The current ratss and method of Sipstuae will be in accordance with applicable laws and the sacurity instructions {saued by the Authorized Government Representative. To assist you in establishing yourself, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will assiat you in procuring an automobile and necessary household fc=nishings, providing funds therefor up to a maxirnum of Fight Thousand Dollars ($8,900.93). Payment of all taxes and nade ois of necessary tax returns are your personai obligation and responsibility but in accord with Spprooriate security instructions which will be furnished hy the Authorized Government _ Representative. 73 - in thea interests of security, you will be required to live in such State, area, and House or apartment as is specifically approved by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY after mutual discussion and due consideration of all circumstances. All of Se expenses of such leased house or apartment will be borne by you and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will not be obligated to pay any such expenses, $. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this igreerasnt eoneteer allowances wouldbe payable under general UNITED STATES | GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monstary allowances in ai mere accordance with those laws and regulations. If, in the course of this pete ae you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for eeaeee will be made by tha CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial accordance with ciderhniay CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENS regulations. | . re 7. HOSPITALIZATION AND MEDICAL CARE. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will provide you with reasonable insurance covering medical care aad hospitalization equivalent to that which could oe obtained through eed ee insurance policies; or, or CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY may provide directly such medical care and ra 24 hospit2lizatioz. 8. SECRECY OBLIGATION. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain oy Treason hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY fram such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such 74 secrecy May sudject you to criminal prosecution uder the espionag= laws as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. Your relaticnshir with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of thia relationship and contract with any person other than the Authorized Government Representative or such other person. as he may specifically approve. 9. UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS. No promises or coramitments pertaining to rights, privilegas, or benefits other than those ae . : (7: || exprosaly stinulated in writing in this agrsement or any amendment there: shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. | 19. TERM. This agreement is effective as of 1 Mazch 1949 aK - and shall be for 2 term of one (1) year. At the end of that period this - contract shall be deemed to be renewed for ansther year unless notice of aap. O29 ee . ee anes © ————_——$— SS termination has been furnished _-_ oe. to you thirty (39) days in advance ~—— of the ~~ = LS a ome on... oer elapse of one (1) year. Thereafter the contract will Se renewed automatica — —_ on similar terms and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any time by either party upon furnishing thirty (39) days advance natice. Upsa termination of this contract or renewals thexeat| including eclenditantes ifany, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY wit iA Seats to assist you in obtaining gainful employment or to provide noageete compensation to assure you that you will be able to SSaintainvs reasonable Pinnd teste living. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of y - this contract end the continuing compliance with the sec odliz2tians > +. & ao 75 imposed on you by paragraph 8 of thia contract and the Provisions of any secrecy agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL, INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 4s Represented Sy the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY By: : - Date: ACCEPTED: Date: WITNESS; . 38 : « Date: Certified to be a true copy of the signed original which is on file in the Office of Security. : 5 . + * \ =< HOWARD J. (O§BORN | DIRECTOR OF SHCURITY ‘ 76 & OCT i372 ae Pea rate MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Centre! Intelligezce © THROUGH ts sce wchitoes, Directar—Comptraller SUBJECT — Patrcactioe Reimbersement: of Yan “Yuriy Ivancvick Nosexks ngrine 2 . 4 5a I. This memorandum suggests action on the part of the _ Directs=> of Central CNR this action is contzined in : peregrank9. ‘ 2. Mr. Yuriy Ivanovich Noserko, 2 4S-yeaz-old, former | Staff OfScer of the Committee for Stete Security (KGB) of the USSR, 2ttended the Instiints of Intermational Relations, Moscow, from 1945, to 1950; was affliated with Russian Navel Intelligence during the 1951~1953 period; and was an officer with the KGB “rom March 1953 until his defection ta the Agency in Gereva, Switrerlend, on 4 February 1964, after heving worked for CIA. for 2pproximately two * tergrin avs 3. A review of Mr. Nosenko's case reflects that, zt the © time of his defection, various officiel commitments were made to him, including a =e sum payment of $50,000.00 based upon his nearly two yesrze work inside the KGB; a $10,000.00 bonus for his work on the|E2%:4 ease; and 2 contract as 2 consultent ata salary of $25,000. 00 per z2nmum. Mr. Nosenks wes advised .. by his Agency Case Officer that Mr. Nosenko wes working for ~- the Centrzl Intelligence Agency 2s of 5 February 1964, and that his salary began from that date. This was a verbal 2greement with the Agency Case Officer, and is fully documented in our files. . . ee ee ee 17 4. In the early debriefing of Mr. Nosenko, it became apparent that he was a particularly complex individual. To narcmit extensive and prolonged debriefing, arrangements were m2d= ta wecommmodate Mr. Nosenko under highly secure conditions 2: ISOLATION, where he remained from 1964 t0 1967. These tight security arrangements were dictztéd, during the initial shase-s a+ least, by the addiScmal needto provide Mr. Naosenke with - conbnwings personal protection, Since there was the distinct possibility that he would be targeted for execution if the Soviets should discover his whereabouts. - 5. Since October 1967, the primary, nisldo tod ee| fo> Mz. Nosenko has been in the Office of Security, which conducted 2 thorough review of prior developmects inthe case. Mr.Nosenke wes moved to the Washington, D.C. 2rea in late 1967, and the c2se passed through various stages of phased normalization, as he wes given an incre2sed degree of freedom and independence. Mr. Noserka was actually resettled on the economy in April 1949;. he obteined a Cvorce from his former Soviet spouse in ‘September 19693; SeneTNe iATO During the period from October 1967 to April 1963, Mr. Nosazka did not receive a salary, but he was BS geass, with a maoderete amount of{ore money. ; agai 6. As of April 1969, Mr. Nosenko signed 2 one-year ontractu2l egreemerxt for $16,500.00, including 2 clause giving assistence to him in resettlement expenses in the amount. ne . $8, 000. 00.- In March 1970, Mr. Nosenko signed 2 new contrac . for two years at $18,500.00 per amnatm. At about this same time he wes provided with certein financial zssistence, $20,000.09 - being for the down payment on 2 new house, and $5,000.00 fo> other related household expenses. Mr. Nosenko’s contract wes renewed at the new rate of $19,500.00 per ennurm on 1 March 1971, end the contract wes 2gain renewed in February 1972, atthe selezy of gets 000.00 per annum. T. AZ anzlysis of this case clearly indicates that Mr. ‘Nosenko has been an extremely velv2ble source, ome who h2s identified many hundreds of Soviet Intelligence Officers, end he has otherwise provided 2 considerable quantity of useful information on the organization of the fat ese its eer is doctrine, and methods.) Séasitue wat 4 have been 41-373 O-79 - 4 78 _— o forwerded to the Federal Bore of Investigation based om cata fromm Mr. Noserko: He has conducted numerous special security reviews on Soviet subjects of specific intelligence interest, an he hes proven himself to be inveluable in exploring countarinialli- gence leads. He recently authored 2 bo0k which is of intexest to the Agency. In effect, Mz. Noserka has shown himself ito ke 2 produstiva and hard working defector, wha is "rebabiliizted™ and feverehbly disposed towardsthe Agers;. 8. In the course of a recert meeting with Mr. Noserko, he brougkt up the subject of his missing salary, covering the period fom April 1964 to March 1959. Mr. Noserka readily admitted that he is livirg very well at the presert ime, but he is not in 2 position to save any money for the futere. He also expressed deep appreciation to the Agency for the franci2l 2ssistence which was provided him thr ough the years, end he rs corsiders this to have cancelled out the originalAgency obligation of a Jump sum payment in the amount of $50, 000.00. eat Noserko, however, still feels quite strongly that heis Hved to be reimbursed far the salary which the Agency did s3 pravide him over 2 five-year period. He understands, of course, that incame tex would have to be deducted form this back ae of $25,000.00 per 2mmc=m.- 9. In summary, the origina! oral 52M Baek Sey Mr. Nosenko is fully documented and supports his claim; his resett nent since 1967 has been relatively smoacth, with no significant security problems having developed; and he contimres to fmcton at the present time as a highly productive and useful source of information on the KGB. Im view of these various considerations, it is requested that this payment of $125,000.00 to Mr. Nosenka be approved. These funds would be paid out of unliquidated obligetions 2pplicable ta laps ed as Ghihewem _ StasiTWH. ScuseeeS a eres alone tion ae z \ Aad Q: . Oa J. Osborn C003 83 Director of Security 19 Ls : ; _— a . . SUBJECT: Retroactive Reimbursement of ’ Yuriy Ivanovick Nosenko CONCURRENCE: aks ee Oe Van ee (er W. Cotte} | et (abel Mahe WA St? epaty Director ; . ate for The ciagt : geuan hae tcabaet f 6? feApelor Cres : Bee aes Sow ey oe ge Snes Thomas H, Karamessines , Deputy Director for Plans : ; Wate) 268,be | William E% Calby - > (Date) age Executive Direttor-Comptroller : ¥ De The recommnendation in excep 9 is 2: iii Sil yteen DOP betatsee, as, Ye - 3 A. 9. 1& OCT 1972 Rich2zrd Helms > (D2te) Director ; 80 —=- ~ reese = ROUTING AND RECORD SHEST ifs WECT: (Oprerel} » COeEGCN ial an’ Soward J. Osborn 6777 5 =t Director of Security — wot paige ay este cn eee a COMMENTS [Number each comment te shaw from when [recaves | INITIALS. to whom Drew a line coross colurws after coc Comment) RECSVEO | FoxwAsce] 34 as ess , W A Wis : : General Counsel EY, PL b3 Lto Zand 3: With the 38 . initiation of this rehabilim— DD/P m4 Se _ tiom program, it would 3 seem timely to brief the : : ig appropriate staff personnel Dcr eo of our congressional sub- -- (committees on the stama of ae this case. Ifsomething .. were to go wrong, resulting in bad publicity without suck a briefing, the reaction of = our subcommittees would, unfortunate. V4 O ( tase if L. Ri Houston as | - : = i Rar rk dome) BC/S RS. si eg sie PL LT coosses STORE] seset CT] cowrimeniaL -C) Pte CT ncasiien 81 ‘ | | | | 24 WAR t96g MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central intelligence SUBJECT ee Preparations for the Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Yuri Nosenko 1. This memorandum is for your information and contains a ' recommendation for your approval in paragraph 5. = 2. As you know, since last meeting with you on this subject we have been very slowly easing some of the physical restrictions on Nosenko in an effort to condition him for his ultimate rehabilita— tion and resettlement in this country if this is the final disposition . decision. During this period, both the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion and this Office have continued to elicit information from him. _ 3. .Nosenko is becoming increasingly restive and desirous of. obtaining freedom on his own. After nearly five years of varying “Megrees of confinement, this desire, including that for feminine com- _panionship, is understandable. We have conformed the pace of privileges allowed him to his attitude and cooperation. At a recent meeting in which the Deputy Director of Plans, Chief, Soviet Bloc Division, Chief, CI Staff, Office of General Counsel and the under- signed participated, it was agreed that we would allow him a two week vacation in Florida accompanied by two Security agents of this Office. He will not be allowed to be alone outside the confines of an ‘adjoining room during this period. , - &. There still remains.a disagreement as to his bona fides and the Chief, CI Staff is now compiling questions to be used for continued elicitation from Nosenko upon his return. Itis clear and agreed by all concerned that the problem of Nosenko's bona fides and his rehabilitation and resettlement can be considered separately if we 82 are to keep him in a favorable frame of mind with regard to the Agency. Any treatment which can be regarded by him as retro- gression, in terms of physical restraint but not continued elicitation, would make his ultimate disposition extremely difficult. Attached for your approval is a brief surmmary of the steps we recommend be taken in Nosenko's rehabilitation and resettlement beginning with his return from his vacation in Florida. Itis understood that implemen- tation of these steps will be predicated on the following. 3 His attitude and behavior during his Florida vacation. oc We will try to delay each step as long as possible consistent with his attitude and his willingness to cooperate. This Office will take every possible precaution to prevent contact between Nosenko and KGB representatives in this country. If he is given limited freedom, however, there can be no guarantee of this since he is a professional intelligence officer and could evade surveil~ : is lance if he so desired. If he is a dispatched e agent, it is to be assumed that he was given emergency means of contact. 5. Your approval of these actions, as outlined, is recommended. Director of Se ity Distribution: 83 CONCURRENCGE: Sie recur & (2. Lawrence R. Houston General Counsel . Thomas Karamessines Deputy Director for Plans The recommendation in paragraph 5 is approved. e 4 e Richard Helms Director of Central Intelligence 84 STEPS IN THE REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT OF NOSENKO Step l. Uponhis return from vacation in Florida or soon thereafter, we will begin to negotiate a contractual relationship with Nosenko which will provide him with financial reimbursement not to exceed twenty thousand dollars a year for the period of time he is working with this Agency in a program of information elicitation. This contract, in addition to the standard features, will containa | “quit claim" provision regarding his past relationship with the Agency in the event he should be kidnapped, become recalcitrant or redefect. It will stipulate residence in an area acceptable to the Agency. It will also provide that upon conclusion of his active cooperation with this Agency, we will renegotiate to provide for a modest continued annuity commensurate with his ability to secure help ef 2 on his own. There > * will be no bulix resettlement fund. ; Step 2. Wewill eeu olive with Immigration and Naturalization authorities to secure appropriate alien registration for Nosenako in this country under a registered alias. It will be necessary for the Agency to accept continued responsibility for Nosenko until such time as he has established residence long enough to satisfy the ten year citizenship requirement. Step 3. We will begin to look with him for suitable living ~ accormmodations. He accepts the fact that these accommodations will - ‘have to be so arranged that we will occupy contiguous quarters and. that he will be required for an undetermined period to let us know where * he is going and when he leaves these quarters. We will, initially at least, provide for technical coverage of his telephone and living quar- ters and will, within the extent of our capability, cover him through surveillance when he leaves these quarters. 85 Step 4. The program of information elicitation based on questions compiled by CI Staff will begin soon after Nosenko' s return from Florida. Any significant developments and changes in the handling of Nosenko and the conduct of the interviews will be coordinated with the CI Staff acting on behalf of the DDP. This program of elicitation will be so designed as to prevent broadening further the base of Nosenko's knowledge. Future elicitation from Nosenko will not include new information except on the basis of calculated approved coordination between the Office of Security and the CI Staff ahout- subject matter and Nosenko will be encouraged and allowed to give full responses on each subject. The FBI will be advised about these procedures. Step 5. When we have favorably resolved disagreement within the Agency as to his bona fides, we will allow him his ultimate freedom, including assistance in finding suitable employment. If | disagreement persists, however, as to his bona fides beyond the end of this calendar year, we will consult with other appropriate Government agencies as to whether he may be allowed full freedom | a3 a normal resident alien or whether the security interests of the | United States require his deportation. ; - aa Jy Gh dd Pee 1: oe weg ey SU2JECT: (Optional) FRO Chief, SR Division ” aa 17 February 1964 oe TO: Ss ignation, room ber, and Parasol CO?AMENTS. (Number each comment ta show fron 5 as ae | LARA I oda ealeeen = Le DD/P 6. yy gO ites ue Beas “10 “Stonons* [ T SECRET [] CONFIDENTIAL cy INTERNAL, =]: UHCLASSM 87 17 Feoruary 1964 MEHVRANDVUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans SU3JECT: a:- ._--- INGER a Current Status and Immediate ‘ Plans I. Recoanendations for approval are contained in. parazraph 8. For background on events in the case since 5 February 1964, I suggest you read the report of my trip to Germany, 8-10 February, to meet Subject; the statement on conclusions and recommendations drawn up following that meeting; and the chronology of events in the case which took place between 3 and 1l February. dette obs He ' 2. None of the events of the past few days including the way in which the Soviets played the pre-confr@mtetion ~~ publicity or the confrontation itself changes the substance of the conclusions contained in ny 10 February memorandun. However, there is greater evidence now I believe for the view that this operation is designed for Leng-range goals o£ utmost importance tothe Soviets. Gne of these is probably a massive propaganda assault on CIA in which Subject, most provably as a “re-defected CIA agent", will play a aajor but not necessarily the sole role. That this could be the final goal does not detract from the validity of any of the intermediate missions Subject has such as penetration of our operational effort, protection of past or possidly existing _ sources, part of an effort to discredit @ggeeetc., since © LtTs- each of these intermediate tasks is adaptable to and would be quite useful in the final stags. ; : 3. While admitting that Sudj ct is. hereon a KG3 directed Mission, it has been generally agreed r— by both us and the FBI that he still possesses valid information which we would Llixe to obtain. At the same time, we, at lcast, believe that Subject must be broxen at some point iz we are to learn something of the full scope of the kG3 plan, the timing for its execution, and the role played sy others in it. Im addi- jj; tion, we must have this information if we are to decide what ~- countermeasures we should take in teras of counter-propaganda, --=-, modifications in our security practices, and planning for et future operations against the Soviet target. Admittedly, our desire to continue debriefing to ostain additional infor- ; Mation may conflict with the neec to break Sudject. Clearly, ! iz problem is one-off timing. How long can sue keep act, or his kG3 controllers, ignorant of our awareness is operation and how long will it take us to asseuble @ kind of brief we will need to initiate a hostile interro- gation in conditioniS°@&maximum control? 4. If we are to proceed along the lines indicated . abovewe should accept in advance the premise that we will not be able to prevent Subject from evading our custody or communicating with the Soviets unless we place him under such physical restraint that it will becoue immediately apparent to him that we suspect him. This may not be an acceptable risk and if itis not, we should so determine right away and decide on a completely different course of action. If this is to be the case, we should agree to forego additional debriefings, place Subject in escape-proof quarters away from the Washington area under full-time guard and commence hostile debriefing on the basis of the material we already have (although the prospects for success would not be great). Disposal would prooably be via 8erlin followed by a brief press release to the effect that Sudject had confessed to being a plant and had been allowed to return to Soviet control. : 5. The abdove course need not be adopted. He can also opt for a debriefing pericd during waich Subject believes— We trust hia while at the same tine we take the necessary steps te get ready for the final confrontation. To maintain the minimum atmosphere of trust (and conviction on Subject's sart that he is moving ahead in his initial goal which is acceptance by CIA as a CI consultant Od>Sambations) we de- lieve we should adhere yenerally to the stateaents made to Subject during our meetings in Geneva and Franksure, Tecoc— nizing thatwe can shape tnis program to our own tine tadle. Ye should: a. Inform Subject that he has been “granted political - asylum" and the first phaseof which we spoke is ready to begin. b. Devise 2 daily schedule and full agenda for this debriefing phase on matters of urgent interest to us and the FSI (which we tnink can take about four weeks or more). 89 c. Advise Subject that during this phase he will continue to live and work in the safehouse, and Will be escorted at all times when on shopzing trips, visits to movies, etc., because of his faulty English and unfaniliarity with the country, customs, etc. hile we can explain this regime as needed for his security, we cannot keep hin locked up in the hause 24 hours a day. . - d. Provide Subject with "flash'" docunentation in another name to be carried on his person during excursions from the house. They may also help persuade him he has been accepted. e. Make available to Subject a portion of the ; $60,000 promised hia which he can use for pur- eee Chases of SLACHE A, cigarettes, personal SS, etc. £. Agree* that whenever this first phase is over (four ~¢ ————— a to six weeks) that he be permitted to take a two- week vacation with escort. ; . 6. The vacation period will be of greater benefit to us since it will provide us with an opportunity to review and make judgments on the value of the information already obtained and also to consider the prozress made in the other aspects of the case outlined below. During the vacation we can decideon whether we should proceed to the second phase or are ready to commence hostile interrogation under con- trolled conditions. If it is the former, we will nave to reckon with the need to modify the living and working arraige- ments for Subject in a way which will inevitably give hin some additional freedom. At the same time, we would be expected to move forward with Subject's legalization, i. e., final decision on a name he will use, securing an alien Tegistration card, establishing a bank account, etc. Ther force, it will be terribly inportant to make the proper dec at the end of phase one. ; of Aare LMA buen +faa 90 DDP approval is requested for: 8. efing period a. The initiation of a first phase debri S avove rather along the lines descrived in para and hostile than moving to an inmeciate showdown i interrogation. : Recouaendations Para $ Approved= Co. 2 AbuE : : Py. pen po Lan SSS — @puty Director ror Plans 91 | UNCLASIIFicU Lt tom OHLY = Fess es “SROUTING AND RECORD SH UBECT: (Oprenel} Retroactive Reimbursement of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Director of Securi Room gee a Headauart widseg) ' DD/Support G Room gaeee oo DD/Plans yf . Room Seer yv| fR - For Concurrence “Exec. Dir. -Compt. male ee Room ae . \s/\ 7A \. 3. For Concurrence | For Your Approval - ‘P-Director of Security com eae. - ‘Aer. pDd Joee : 610 “timors’s [] SECRET [[] CONFIDENTIAL Pee ee Pa] SUNCLASSI RIED 92 & OCT i972 - MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH : Executive Director-Comptroller SUBJECT : Retroactive Reimbursement of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko . 1. This memorandum suggests action on the part of the Director of Central Intelligence; this action is contained iin paragraph 9. Ne ee 2.. Mr. Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, a 45-year-old, former Staff Officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR, attended the Institute of International Relations, Moscow, from 1945 to 1950; was affiliated with Russian Naval Intelligence during the 1951-1953 period; and was an officer with the KGB from March 1953 until his defection to the Agency in Geneva, a Switzerland, on 4 February 1964, after having worked for CIA for approximately two years. oor 3. A review of Mr. Nosenko's case reflects that, at the time of his defection, various official commitments were made to him, including a lump sum payment of $50,000.00 based upon his nearly two years’ work5 nai se the KGB; 2 $10,000.00 bonus for his work on 333255 mp and a contract as a consultant at a salary of $25,000. 00. per annum. Mr. Nosenko was advised. by his Agency. Case Officer that Mr. Nosenko was working for the Central Intelligence Agency as of 5 February 1964, and that his salary began from that date. This was a verbal agreement with the Agency Case Officer, and is fully documented in our files. > epee 93 4. In the early debriefing of Mr. Nosenko, it became apparent that he was a particularly complex individual. To permit extensive and prolonged debriefing, arrangements were made to accommodate Mr. Nosenko under highly secure conditions at ISOLATION, where he remained from 1964 to 1967. These tight security arrangements were dictated, during the initial phases at least, by the additional need to provide Mr. Nosenko with continuing personal protection, since there was the distinct possibility that he would be targeted for execution if the Peer. should discover his whereabouts. ae ee wae 1967, the primary cetera ae Mr. Nosenko has been in the Office of Security, which conducted a _ thorough review of prior developments in the case. Mr. Nosenks was moved to the Washington, D.C. area in late 1967, andthe ~ case passed through various stages of phased normalization, as he was given an increased degree of freedom and independence. Mr. Nosenko was actually resettled on the economy in April 1969; he obtained a divorce from his former Soviet +anss in September samen the een! fo October 1967 to“April 1969, eee Wossnien did not receive a salary, but he was provided witha moderate amount of spending money. 6. As of April 1969, Mr. Nosenko signeda one-year —- contractual agreement for $16,500.00, including a clause giving assistance to him in resettlement expenses in the amount.of $8,000.00. In March 1970, Mr. Nosenko signed a new contract for two years at $18,500.00 per annum, At about this same time he was provided with certain financial assistance, $20,000.00 being for the down payment on 2 new house, and $5,000.00 for other related household expemses. Mr. Nosenko's contract was renewed at the new rate of $19,500.00 per annum on I March 1971, and the contract was" newed in i ees 1972, at the salary =a $21,000.00 per annum. 7. An analysis of this case clearly indicates that Mr. Nosenko has been an extremely valuable source, one who has identified many hundreds of Soviet Intelligence Officers, and he has otherwise provided a considerable quantity of useful information on the organization of the KGB, its operational Smceaiaan tatand methods. SSessss SiGeae aienhe cig PRE SenetSe ae A1_292 f\ _ An 94 forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation based on data from Mr. Nosenko. He has conducted numerous special security reviews on Soviet subjects of specific intelligence interest, and he has proven himself to be invaluable in exploring counterintelli- gence leads. He recently authored a book which is of interest to the Agency. In effect, Mr. Nosenko has shown himself to be a productive and hard working defector, who is "rehabilitated" and favorably disposed towards fs Agency. 8. In the course ‘of a recent meeting with Mr. Nosenko, . he brought up the subject of his missing salary, covering the period from April 1964 to March 1969. Mr. Nosenko readily admitted that he is living very well at the present time, but he is not in a position to save any money for the future. He also expressed deep appreciation to the Agency for the financial | assistance which was provided him through the years, and he | considers this to have cancelled out the original Agency obligation of a lump sum payment in the amount of $50, 000. 00. Mr. Nosenko, however, still feels quite strongly thatheis entitled to be reimbursed for the salary which the Agency did not provide him over a five-year period. He understands, of coursé, that income tax wouldhawue¢ to. be, deducted from this back salary of $25,000.00 per annum. 9. In surmmary, the original oral agreement with Mr. Nosenko is fully documented and supports his claim; his resettle— ~ ment since 1967 has been relatively smooth, with no significant security problems having developed; and he continues to function at the present time as a highly productive and useful source of information on the KGB. In view of these various considerations, it is requested that this payment of $125,000.00 to Mr. Nosenko ~ be approved. These funds would be paid out of pit anewicn es oward LAG 8 ae Director of Security bnew et ORAM 95 SUBJECT: Retroactive Reimbursement of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko CONCURRENCE: © Coffey eputy Director for Support % Corrcrme » Ch ADs ae all, seaaatpty lol ita fa atte bn My Ss 9 fn tut Ladino ‘i . ee MLdp dow atuserl arsef HS Ta fd 1B 7U Thomas H. Karamessines (Date) ; peat Deputy Director a ba dee, he fondlane : ottauzad f | , | a G2? i E f CECA, start aiaraincrtrees William Colby (Date) Executive Director-Comptroller . ; a - bP : Any rent UAs- RSE Sg inase: a 9:is PogdsPat schateis acu’ ut DDP (iby ps aw o. : é 18 QcT 972 Richard Helms (Date) Director 96 Mr. Hetos. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Stokes, would you indulge me a moment, please. I would like to straighten something out. Mr. Craig tells me that he feels that I did Mr. Katzenbach an injustice in something that I said, and I would not want to do that, so let me just modify what I said this morning. Mr. Stokes asked me whether I thought Mr. Katzenbach’s state- ment to this committee regarding our meeting was untrue. I be- lieve I replied in the affirmative. All I meant to say was that I couldn’t count on Mr. Katzenbach’s memory. I wasn’t questioning either his judgment or his integrity. I just want to make this point. The meeting did occur but I didn’t mean to imply that he testified untruthfully before this committee. Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Helms. Mr. Stokes. Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I could just follow up at this point in an area that gives me some concern, that is, if I understand you correctly, I believe you said you still even today don’t really know whether Nosenko is bona fide or not; further, it is your recollection you don’t believe the agency ever arrived at that determination, particularly when you were there. Let me ask you this: If it were clearly proven that Nosenko’s statements concerning Oswald were untrue, what significance would you attach to such a finding insofar as the broader question of his overall bona fides are concerned? Mr. HeEtns. I think, Mr. Stokes, that is just the point. This is the issue which remains, as I understand it, to this very day, that no person familiar with the facts, of whom I am aware, finds Mr. Nosenko’s comments about Lee Harvey Oswald and the KGB to be credible. That still hangs in the air like an incubus. I think, there- — fore, this tends to sour a great deal of one’s opinion of all the other things that he may have contributed to the knowledge of the intelligence community about Soviet affairs and Soviet agents and so forth. I do not know how one resolves this bone in the throat. And therefore, if I sit here before you and say, Mr. Stokes, I believe that Mr. Nosenko is a bona fide defector and you can rely on everything he says, I am in effect saying now, Mr. Stokes, you can rely on what he says about Lee Harvey Oswald. And I would not like to make that recommendation to you. That is where this thing les and it is a most difficult question even at this late date. Chairman Stokes. Then doesn’t this raise a question, then, of a further part of the dilemma, that if he was not bona fide, the only alternative, then, is what the CIA suspected, and that was that he might have been a KGB plant sent here for the purpose of deceiv- ing the United States? Mr. HEts. That is correct. Chairman STOKES. Doesn’t that logically follow? ae Heutms. That is certainly true, and that was foremost in our f minds. Chairman Stokes. So it leaves you with the conclusion, then, } that if Nosenko was lying about Oswald, that Oswald would in fact } be left as being an agent of the KGB? Mr. HEtos. By implication. 97 Chairman Sroxes. Right. If just the basic Nosenko story were fundamentally disproved without our taking the next step and saying Oswald is a KGB agent, what significance would that have on the overall assessment of Nosenko’s bona fides? Mr. Hetms. Mr. Stokes, I find this extraordinarily difficult to say. As one works this backward and forward, as you have been doing with great skill, it is, I find, rather dangerous for me to sort of jump from one assumption to another assumption and then extrapolate from these things to judgments which might be very alarming and which could not be demonstrated. I am sorry, and I recognize that it is absolutely central to the investigation of this committee, which has worked very long and very hard on this subject to try to resolve this issue. But I can give no more help than I have already given. Chairman Stokes. Then that leads to to my next question, which is whether you can tell us to what extent, if any, Nosenko’s story concerning Oswald changed in 1968 from the story he had been telling earlier about Oswald. Mr. HeE.ms. I didn’t recall that there was all that much change in his story by 1968. I may be wrong. I have not studied this matter in the depth that would be required to answer that statement accurately. Mr. Hart has been all through the records. He might have found something which may be helpful on this. But I can’t be helpful on it. I don’t know at what point any longer, at what date Mr. Nosenko began telling us about the additional files which were in the KGB. First he said there was only one file, then he said there were seven or eight files on surveillance, and I believe there were modifications of this story that came later. If that was in 1969, I accept that, I am not arguing about it, I just don’t recall. Chairman StTokEs. Are you in a position to tell us today whether any independent investigation ever confirmed Nosenko’s story about Oswald? Mr. Hews. I don’t know of any, sir. There may have been, but I am not familiar with it. Chairman Stokes. Are you aware of the fact that Nosenko was given three polygraph tests in 1964, 1966 and 1968? Are you aware of that? Mr. Heutms. I was aware of it and I read it recently in the documentation which I have been shown. Chairman STokEs. Can you give us some idea as to why he was given a polygraph test on three separate occasions? Mr. HE.tMs. I want to be clear, Mr. Stokes, that in testifying in answer to this question that I am not depending on my recollection from 15 years ago. I am depending on what I have read recently. I believe one polygraph test was designed as a sort of psychologi- cal trick on Nosenko to indicate that he wasn’t telling the truth. This was early on. I believe the latter two tests were an effort to find out about his credibility, whether he was telling the truth, his questionable behavior. I must confess when I was reading the results of the second polygraph; there is a statement from some polygraph expert in the ‘United States who was brought in independently, but I didn’t understand his quotations, I didn’t understand to what they re- lated. I couldn’t figure out whether he was saying this was a good 98. polygraph test or it was a bad one or whether Mr. Nosenko was lying or wasn’t lying. I am sorry, but I just couldn’t figure it out. Chairman Stokes. Did you learn that he had failed his first two polygraph tests and that he passed the third? Mr. HeE.tos. Yes. This assertion I saw in the record. Chairman Sroxes. Did you learn further that with reference to the test that he passed this test which was given to him approxi- mately 1 month prior to the issuance of the 1968 report by a security officer, and this was where the report concluded that he was a bona fide defector? Mr. Hetms. Yes, I am aware that there was a relationship be- tween that last polygraph test and the recommendation that we resettle him in the normal way of handling defectors. I would like to point out though, Mr. Stokes, that I don’t believe anyone contends that the polygraph or lie detector is anything more than an aid to interrogation. I don’t think when one says one passes or fails a polygraph test this is an accurate description of the phenomenon involved. When you take a polygraph test you are asked various questions and the operator has to make a judgment as to whether you are answering the questions accurately or whether you are lying—I don’t mean accurately; whether you are answering the questions to the best of your knowledge and there- fore honestly, or lying. But I don’t believe anyone including courts of law accept poly- graph examinations as a final judge. They are simply aids in attempting to establish whether a man is telling the truth or not. Chairman Strokes. I would concur with you in terms of the law, that the law accepts them as merely an investigative tool at best and they have no real reliability in a courtroom. Yet we know that it is an investigative tool that has fairly wide usage. So when we see and our investigation reveals the fact that your agency con- ducted three polygraph tests, obviously the question is raised by us as to why they polygraphed him on three different occasions. Cer- tainly not just for the fun of it. Then when we look further we realize that with him having failed two tests and we see that the third one is conducted in 1968 just prior to the issuance of the report which said he was bona fide, obviously it raises the question in our mind someone said: Uh huh, if we’re going to come out and say he’s bona fide, we better get a test that supports that. Is that a logical conclusion? Mr. Hews. I think the conclusion which is logical is that in trying to wrap up the case and come forward with a recommenda- tion that a polygraph test and all other kinds of investigative techniques would have been brought to bear in an effort to make a good tidy package. In other words, I don’t think the officers wanted to come forward with this proposal that he be resettled and then have the question asked: How does he react on the polygraph these days, and so forth. And they would have to say: Well, we never tested him. But you know, Mr. Stokes, and this is perhaps not relevant to this inquiry, but I think in some respects it may be. I don’t know where the polygraph role stands in Mr. Nosenko’s case. We discov- ered there were some Eastern Europeans who could defeat the 99° polygraph at any time. Americans are not very good at it, because we are raised to tell the truth and when we lie it is easy to tell we are lying. But we find a lot of Europeans and Asiatics can handle that polygraph without a blip, and you know they are lying and you have evidence that they are lying. I don’t know in which category—— Chairman STOKES. Mr. Nosenko falls in that category? Mr. Hetms. In some category. Chairman Stokes. I am advised that the CIA used polygraph tests on all its employees. Mr. HE.Ms. It works very well with Americans. Chairman SToKEs. Let me ask you this. We have learned further through our investigation in the first two polygraph tests, that Nosenko was asked numerous questions, numbering somewhere in the neighborhood of 80 or 40 questions, relative to Oswald. We have learned, further, that in the 1968 tests he was only asked two questions about Oswald on that polygraph test. Can you tell us why that occurred? Mr. Hens. I could not answer. I have no idea. In fact, I can’t even give you a rational explanation at this late date. I may have been able to give one at the time. I may have known, but I am sorry, my memory is blank. | Chairman Stokes. At any rate, the questions revolved around Oswald wouldn’t be any less important in 1968 than they were in 1964 or 1966. Mr. HE.tMs. No, sir, they wouldn’t have been less important. But by 1968, there was a clear objective in mind of trying to do some- thing about the resettlement of this man, that this case simply had to be resolved. That was determined, and therefore I was prepared to accept many obstructions or obstacles, and so forth, and still probably would have said I think we better go ahead and resettle that man. There is no other option, there is nothing else we can do. Chairman Stokes. I would like to get to a further comment in this area. From what we have heard from you regarding the poly- graph and from what we have heard from Mr. Hart, we have a conflict here that the committee must in some way resolve. Mr. Hart told us when he testified here, representing the head of the CIA, that the polygraph was not utilized for the purpose of ascer- taining the truth of this man’s statements. It was used to intimi- date him, it was a part of the whole process of breaking him. Let me just quote some of the things he said to us so we can then ask you your opinion. He said: The agency’s activity was devoted to breaking Nosenko, who was presumed, on the basis of the supposed evidence given by Mr. X that Nosenko was a dispatched KGB agent to mislead the United States. It is with this in mind that we have to approach everything that happened from 1962, after the first contact with Nosenko terminated, and the time Nosenko was turned over to the CIA Office for Security Reinvestigation. The polygraphs themselves must be evaluated in the light of their use, not to get at truth, because they were not used as an instrument of getting at truth. They aor as an instrument of intimidation of one sort or another, in one way or anotner. Now, again on the handling of Mr. Nosenko, the belief among the small group of people running the Nosenko case, a very limited group of people, was that he was 100 part of a plot of the type outlined by Mr. X, which was so horrendous that therefore not many people could be made privy to this investigation. Then at another part of his testimony—and I am skipping parts to get at pertinent parts—he said: In addition to that, the operator was guilty of some provocative remarks. He told, before the polygraph examination, one of the polygraph examinations began, he told Nosenko that he was a fanatic, that there was no evidence to support his legend, and “your future is now zero.” Then, if I recall his testimony correctly, he went on to explain that in a polygraph test obviously you do not make comments of this sort to a man prior to him being given the test. Then he says in further quotes: * * * The chief of SB and the Deputy Chief of SB, the fact that the man was, except for extraordinary lengths of time strapped into the chair, all of these add up in the estimation of the CIA examiners who have gone over this series of tests, to an invalid polygraph. Now in the handwriting of the Deputy Chief, SB, who is a day-to-day supervisor of the activity which I have been describing, it is—there is an admission which is implied fairly clearly that there was no intention that this 1966 series of polygraphs would be valid. I read here a direct quotation which exists in writing and most of it is in the handwriting of the Deputy Chief of SB. Speaking of the aims to be achieved by the 1966 polygraph examinations, he writes, “To gain more insight into points of detail which we could use in fabricating and ostensibly confession insofar as we could make one consistent and believable event to the Soviets, a confession would be useful in any eventual disposal of Nosenko.” Now, he does not clarify what he means in this document by disposal, but it is apparent that—— And then Mr. Sawyer interrupted and said, Excuse me. Did you use the term eventual disposal of him? Mr. Hart. I used the term eventual disposal, yes, sir. Now, Mr. Helms, I think it would be important to this committee to have your comments on Mr. Hart’s testimony with reference to why the polygraph was being utilized in light of your own. My understanding is that the first polygraph examination that he was given was designed not to elicit the truth; it was designed to be used as a pressure tactic on him to see if he would confess. Mr. Hetos. I thought the only polygraph or the only two poly- graphs that were given in the normal polygraph way by examiners who had nothing to do with the interrogation were the last two. I think the first one, it has been admitted, was for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear on him. As to those lurid comments about the disposal, I have already addressed myself to those. I knew nothing about these comments; I knew nothing about a written confession; I knew nothing about anything of those things at the time. They may have been writen down by the Deputy Chief of Soviet Bloc Division, but I have not seen his notes. All I know is that I was never aware of this, and therefore there was never any indication on the part of anybody in a position of responsibility in the management of the Agency to do anything with Mr. Nosenko except to try to establish his bona fides somehow. Chairman StTokEs. So if these things were being done while you were in the capacity which you have described here, it was never brought to your attention? Mr. Hens. It was not. Chairman Strokes. The responsibility for handling Nosenko was initially given to the SR branch or the SR division. Did the SR 101 division enter into a situation as the neutral party, or did the SR division think from the very beginning that Nosenko was not a bona fide defector? Mr. HEtos. I think early on their conviction was that he was not a bona fide defector. That is my impression today. Chairman Stokes. When the security officer began his investiga- tion did he enter the situation in a sort of neutral capacity? Mr. HE.tos. I don’t know whether he entered it, sir, in a neutral capacity or whether he felt the SR division fellows had been wrong and that a different treatment with Nosenko would elicit a differ- ent result. I am inclined to think that was the status of the affair. In any event, by that time it was clear that the hostile interroga- tion was getting nowhere. Chairman Strokes. At that point you were aware, of course, of the hostile interrogation; is that it? Mr. HeEutms. Yes. Since I indicated a decision was made to try that after his behavior—his thinking was such there was no way to get him to talk at all except to confine him. Chairman STOKES. How would you characterize, by the way, your own reaction to this whole situation? Was this frustrating? Or were you just content to go along with this in this whole period of time? Mr. Hetms. I don’t think there has ever been anything more frustrating in my life. This would have been resolved very rapidly if it involved anything except the assassination of President Ken- nedy. I don’t suppose I would be sitting here today if he hadn’t been assassinated either. Chairman SToKEs. I think you testified earlier today that you told or communicated the fact to Chief Justice Warren that this man’s bona fides generally could not be established, that he was not believable. When you met with Chief Justice Warren for the purpose of clarification did you tell him specifically the agency had been unable to resolve the issue of Nosenko’s bona fides, or did you ms oth that the Agency did not think that Nosenko was bona ide? Mr. Hens. I believe, and it is my recollection, that what I said to the Chief Justice was that we don’t know what this man repre- sents but we cannot vouch for him. In other words, we cannot vouch for him positively, and therefore I think the Warren Com- mission should take into consideration the fact that we cannot vouch for him and therefore we cannot sign off, if you like, on what he has said as being true, and that in all fairness to the Commission this obviously sets in question the statement which the FBI passed to the Warren Commission about Nosenko’s comments right after his defection about Oswald, and that I took as close to a middle position as I could. In other words, I didn’t use any excessive language, I didn’t attempt to dramatize this. I just said we can’t establish his bona fides. And that is our responsibility and I am sorry. Chairman Strokes. Yesterday I put into the record an exhibit which was a report to the Warren Commission that had been °ompiled as a result of testimony taken from Nosenko by the FBI, 4 fairly extensive document which the Warren Commission had in ts files. I did not see such a document with reference to the CIA. van you tell us what the substance was of what you told the 102 Warren Commission or Chief Justice Warren of Nosenko’s story about Oswald? Mr. HEtns. Sir, I am not sure I quite understand. Are you asking me is there a document in existence of what I told Chief Justice Warren? Chairman StTokgEs. Yes. It can be answered twofold. No. 1, I am asking you, is there such a document? No. 2, tell us what, if anything, was said, whether there is or is not a document. Mr. HeEtms. I don’t know; I don’t think there is a document. I don’t recall ever having written a document about it. Whether Chief Justice Warren himself wrote a document or whether it is incorporated in the proceedings of the Warren Commission, that I don’t know either, sir. Chairman STOKES. Can you give us the benefit of what you told him about the substance of Nosenko’s story? Mr. HE.s. I don’t believe that at this meeting, at least as I now vaguely recall it, that I went into the substance. I simply stuck to the fact that I couldn’t vouch for the man and therefore whatever he had said they would have to judge in that light. Chairman StToKEs. Can you tell us what Chief Justice Warren’s reaction was? Mr. HExtms. I don’t think he was pleased to hear this. He was perfectly reasonable about it and said, thank you, and I will inform my colleagues on the Commission about this; I appreciate your having told us, and we will be guided accordingly. Chairman STOKES. Did the Warren Commission themselves or| staff ever make a request to interview—— Mr. HE.Ms. I am not aware of it, Mr. Stokes, if they did. | Chairman STOKES. Did you inform the Warren Commission in April of 1964 that Nosenko was then being placed in solitary confinement? Mr. HeEtos. I don’t remember any more what the Warren Com-} mission was told about the circumstances of Mr. Nosenko’s living } conditions or handling. I don’t have any recollection of that at all. } Whether any of my colleagues sought to provide it, I just don’t} know. Fifteen years is a long time to remember. | Chairman StokEs. Let me ask you this. Is it something that you} think they should have been told about? . Mr. Heutos. I have a hard time answering. I think we were all preoccupied with getting at what Mr. Nosenko knew about Oswald and the details had been given them, and it would seem to me} those were the relevant things. Chairman Stokes. Wouldn’t it have been either a responsibility of you or Mr. McCone to advise the Commission of the extraordi-} nary action being taken with reference to this affair? Mr. Hetos. I don’t think there is anything particularly extraor- dinary about the manner in which the Warren Commission was sitting. Chairman Strokes. You misunderstood my use of the word “‘ex- traordinary.” It seemed to me at the point where you are getting} ready to put a man in solitary confinement—under conditions} under which he was confined is not a normal American situation. Mr. Hewns. I understand that. 103 Chairman STOKES. So I put it in that sense. Don’t you think they should have been advised of this extraordinary situation? Mr. Hetms. Maybe my recollection is faulty, but during the time that we were attempting to resolve his bona fides in order to help the Warren Commission, the fact that he was being kept alone and isolated and so forth, I don’t think that would have come as a surprise to anybody. This is the way we handled all defectors. Chairman Strokes. That was standard operating procedure; is that it? Mr. Hetms. Of course. What would you do with them, put them in the Hilton? Chairman Stokes. Whose decision was it, Mr. Helms, to place him in solitary confinement? Mr. Heums. I think it was the decision arrived at by those involved in the case that this was—well, it was a kind of a decision jointly arrived at, | am sure, on the recommendation of the individ- uals who were going to do the interrogating, and at the original point of departure obviously he would have been kept alone and an effort would have been made to interrogate him on successive days. The fact he was held so long is something that came afterward. That didn’t have much to do with the Warren Commission once their report had come out, but we still were under this necessity to try to resolve the case; but a lot of people were involved in this decision. This is probably not the kind of decision an individual makes all by himself. Chairman Stokes. What I am trying to do is have the record clear as to who made this decision as of April 4, 1964, to place him in solitary confinement. Mr. HEtMs. I don’t know who exactly made the final decision. I assume it went to the Director for his approval. I don’t know this as a fact. I would assume that the agency records might show this. If they don’t, my recollection is not that clear any more. I was a party to the decision, I am sure of that. I don’t want to duck anything around here. I don’t want any of you gentlemen to think that like so many witnesses which come before congressional com- mittees nobody can be found who is prepared to stand up and say they were there; but I was there. It would not have been my final decision to make. Chairman STOKES. So that the committee then, following up on your last words, so they can properly assess it, what specifically was your input? Mr. Hetms. I assume my input would have been to agree this should be tried, the hostile interrogation should be tried. I obvious- ly had no idea at that time that this was going to drag on so. Chairman Strokes. Mr. Helms, let me refer you once again to page 147 of the declassified transcript. The question posed to you on that page. Mr. Hetms. 147, Mr. Stokes? Chairman STOKES. 147. Mr. Hetms. Is this where I say, “I certainly agreed to the fact shat this should be tried.’’? Chairman Strokes. No. I would like you to refer to line 17 and shen I want to ask you this question. 104 Mr. Hens. I see line 17. It is where Mr. Goldsmith asked me a question. Chairman Stokes. The question asked of you by Mr. Goldsmith, “Please describe to the best of your knowledge the conditions under which Nosenko was placed when he was put in solitary confine- ment.” Answer: ‘He was put into a small house in the countryside where he had a perfectly sanitary and satisfactory living condition. They were just not particularly spacious or padded, let us say. His bed was perfectly adequate, his chair was perfectly adequate, the © lighting was pefectly adequate, but it was not particularly comfort- able in the normal American sense of the terms.” Was that question asked of you and was that your answer? Mr. Hens. Yes. If that is not an accurate description of the first place he was held after his defection, then I was misinformed. I never went to visit the place myself. This is simply what I was told. Chairman Stokes. So my understanding now is the testimony here today would not be the same as it was on that day. Is that what you are saying? Mr. Hetos. No, I am not, sir. I am simply saying that I believe he was held in different places in this period of time. As to the first place he was held, it is my understanding this is an accurate description of it. If it is incorrect, I am sorry. But I would just do my best to describe what I understood. Is it not correct? Chairman SToKEs. Let me ask you this. What do you understand; — the conditions changed from what you have described? | Mr. Hetms. Some months later when another facility was cre- | ated specifically to hold Mr. Nosenko, I believe that was somewhat later on—it must have been later on because it had to be arranged. Chairman SToKEs. I am having a little problem understanding. On that occasion if you were under the impression Mr. Goldsmith was asking you about one particular place and you had in mind another place. Why didn’t you indicate that at that time? Mr. HeEitms. That is quite conceivable, Mr. Stokes. I am sorry if when he says the place he was in solitary confinement, if that referred to the later installation, I didn’t understand it that way. He was in solitary confinement from the time he was brought over. Chairman Stokes. At the point he was put into solitary confine- ment, then, can you describe the conditions that existed then? Mr. Heutms. Now in “solitary confinement,” are you referring to the installation in which he was later held, which was constructed for this purpose? Is that the one you are talking about? Chairman Strokes. Let me put it this way, so that there is no } mistake about it: He was put in solitary confinement April 4, 1964; is that right? Mr. Hetms. He was subjected to hostile interrogation. Is there a | magic to solitary confinement, aside from the fact that is kind of } buzz word in the United States? I mean, he is living alone in a house; is that solitary confinement, or do you have something else in mind? That is all I am trying to get after. | Chairman Stokes. How many times was his position, where he was headquartered at a house, changed? Mr. Hews. I don’t know. I don’t know where he was first put } when he arrived in Washington. I don’t know if that is the same } 105 place he was kept until he was moved to a later place. I am not sure of these details anymore at all. Chairman STOKES. Well, are you able to describe any of these places where he was kept for us? Mr. HE.tns. The place, the installation, which he was later taken to, |saw many years afterward. Have you seen it? Chairman SToKEs. No, I have not. Mr. Hews. I guess it still exists. Chairman STOKES. Can you describe that place for us, the condi- tions that he experienced there? Mr. Hewtms. I never visited the place when Mr. Nosenko was there. It was quite some years after he had left there that I went to see it. At the time it was constructed, I believe I sent an officer or a couple of officers in whom I had confidence to go down and examine the place and see if it was too rigorous or whether it was proper for the purposes and so forth; and I was assured that it was all right. Perhaps I should not have taken their word. Maybe I should have gone down myself, but the fact remains that I have seen it once; but I can’t describe the conditions under which he was held because I never visited him when he was there. Chairman Stokes. Mr. Helms, prior to April 4, 1964, when he was put in solitary confinement, hadn’t he been on vacation in Hawaii with some of the CIA agents for over 2 weeks? Mr. HEtMs. Well, I knew he was drinking in Baltimore; he was in Hawaii. There were various devices being used to try and take care of him, and talk to him, and so forth; so it may be that it was in April precisely that he was put in solitary confinement or that he was confined. Let’s put it that way. Chairman SToKEs. He was confined as of that date? Mr. Hetos. After all, he was in the custody of these individuals, as soon as he arrived in the United States. | am not sure when he was confined, but if it was in the same house in which he was living in Washington, or whether it was or not, I am sorry, I just don’t have these details, Mr. Stokes. Chairman Stokes. But even the place which you described in your previous testimony—you don’t know when that was, do you? Mr. Hews. I thought this was the first place he was put when the serious interrogation began. When I was down here before— and I guess it is in this book somewhere—Mr. Nosenko himself, I believe, gave this committee an affidavit, describing the fact that he was held in two different places. That was the basis on which I assumed he was accurate about it; but if this is now coming down to a question of my veracity about this testimony, then I must have misunderstood the question. I would rather withdraw it and not describe at all how Mr. Nosenko was held. I think that would be better for the record. Chairman STokEs. Is that your preference? Mr. Hetms. Yes. Then there won’t be any question about it. Chairman Strokes. I ask, Mr. Chairman, that the clerk mark another exhibit in her possession as JFK F-446. I request that the witness be provided a copy of it and that this exhibit be entered into the record at this point. Mr. Preyer. Without objection, JFK exhibit No. F-446 will be admitted into the record at this point. [The information follows:] 106 JFK Exuisit F-446 In accordance with a request of the staff of the Committee ‘ (House Select Committee on Assassination), I make the following statement describing the conditions of my se igo Ae a April of 1964 till the end of 1967. On April the 4th of (1964 I was taken for a phy steal: aiedulgy t | and a test on a lie detector somewhere in a house. A doctor had given ae physical check-up aia after that I was taken in another room for the test on a lie detector. After finishing the test an officer of CIA GMM has come in _the room and talked with a technician. cE started to shout that I was a phoney and immediately several guards entered in the room. The guards ordered me to stand by the wall, to undress and checked me. After that I was taken upstairs in an attic room. The room had a metal bed attached to the floor in the center of this room. Nobody told me anything how long I would be there or what would happen to me. After several ofa two officers of CLA GRR CEES started interrogations. _I tried to cooperate and even in evening hours was writing for them whatever I could recollect about the KGB. These officers were interrogating me about a month or two. months. The tone of interrogations was hostile. Then they stopped to come to see me until the end of 1964. I was kept in this room till the end of 1964 and pees ont of 1965. The conditions were very poor and difficult. I could have a shower once in a week and once in a week a could shave. I was not 107 oe aes a i Ered 7 ae . Eesa ts Ras soy given a fosth ‘brush and a tooth paste and food given to me was very poor (I did not haveenough to eat, and was hungry allthe . time). I had no contact with anybody to‘talk, fe could not read, - 3 Sy a: ioe Se HE teksty FUE I could not SOK » and ven even could not have fresh air or to see oaoe IS - = -— cs » anything from this room (the only window was screened and boarded). The only door of the ‘room had a metal screen and outside in a corridor two guards were watching me day and night. The only furniture ¥ the room was a single bed and a light bulb. The room was very very hot in a summer time. - | , In the end of 1964 there were started again interrogations by several different officers. The first day they kept me under 24 hours interrogation. All: interrogations were done in a hostile manner. At the end of all those interrogations when I was told that it was the last one and eben what I wanted to be relayed to higher ups I said that I was a.true defector and being under arrest about 386 days I wanted to be put on trial if I’ was found guilty or released. I also asked how long it would continue. I was told that I would be there 3860 days and even more. i This evening I was taken by guards blindfolded and handcuffed in a car and delivered to an airport and put in a plane. "I was taken to another location where I was put into a concrete room Atk \ bars on a door. In the room was a single steel bed and a matress (no pillow, no sheet, and no blanket). During winter it was very cold and I asked to give me a blanket, which I received after some time. Except one day of interrogation and one day of a test on a lie detector I have not seen anyone besides guards and a doctor (guards were not allowed to talk with me). After ‘my constant. ‘complaining that Tr needed fresh air - at the end of. eredal i was,, taken almost A A day for 30 minutes exercise Me * “.¢icgens to a small area attached to this, cell. The area was surrounded by eae a chain link fence and by a.‘second fence that I could not see~ ey through. -‘The only thing i could see was the sky. Being in ehis os i cell I wis watched day and night through TV camera. Trying to pass | the time a couple of times I was making from threads chess set. id every time when I finished thosecsets immediately guards were - entering in my cell and taking them from me. I was desperately | wanting to read and once when I was given a tooth paste I’ found in a tooth paste box a piece of paper with déscription of components of this tooth paste. mT was trying to read it Caner blanket) but pao noticed it and again it was taken from me. Conditions in both (first and eerondy Tacartors were analogical. : , | I was there till November of 1967. Then I again was transferred blindfolded and handcuffed to another location. In this new place I had a room with much better conditions. And me (CIA officer) started questioning me every day (excluding Suntara} touching all questions concerning my biography, carrier in the KGB and all cases of the KGB known to me. I was imprisoned for the whole 5 years. And I started my life inthe USA in April of 1969. August 7, 1978 Steels YP 3neg uy aech deel BIAS echit979 109 Chairman Stokes. I request further, Mr. Chairman, that in the vent I did not request that JFK exhibit F-537 be made a part of he record, that it be made a part of the record at this point. Mr. PREYER. Without objection, JFK exhibit F-537 is entered into he record at this point. [The information follows:] JFK Exuisit F-537 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 _ Office of Legislative Counsel 1 September 1978 Mr. G. Robert Blakey Chief Counsel § Director House Select Committee on Assassinations Washington, D.C. 20505 Dear Mr. Blakey: Forwarded herewith are answers to the interroga- tories received at close of:business on 28 August 1978. Sincerely, = Mice an, . > / Seo eoie ae 2 eee Sees ep a Nay ees Pei ee S.D. Breckinridge Principal Coordinator, HSCA Attachment 2S ae —JFK Emer F-54347 — 41-373 O- 79-8 110 Question #3 Define Nosenko's present and past employment arrangements with the Central Intelligence Agency. Include: a. the dates and nature of his employment b. the services rendered by Nosenko Cc. itemized accounting of all compensation received by Nosenko d. an account of the roles of Richard Helms and John McCone in authorizing Nosenko's employment and compensation arragements with the CIA. Prior to Nosenko's defection on 4 February 1964, he was promised $50,000 for previous cooperation, $10,000 for his identification, in 1962, of a particular espionage agent, and $25,000 a year compensation for future service: Mr. Richard Helms approved the foregoing on 17 February 1964. Although © no effort was made to fulfill the promise until some five years after Nosenko's defection, the original promise formed the basis for the eventual employment arrangement and other monetary remunerations. Following acceptance of Nosenko's bona fides in late 1968, Mr. Helms approved an arrangement which resulted in Nosenko's employment as an independent contractor effective 1 March 1969. This first contract called for him to be compensated at a rate of $16,500 a year. As of 1978, he is receiving $35,327 a year (see attached annual compensation table for years 1969-1978). lll In addition to regular, yearly compensation, Nosenko was paid for the years 1964-1969 in November 1972, in the amount of $25,000 a year less income tax. The total amount paid was $87,052. He also received, in varying increments from March 1964-July 1973, amounts totalling $50,000 to aid in his re- settlement on the private economy (see attached table for breakdown). The total resettlement figure, in effect, satisfied that portion of the above 1964 promise to pay Nosenko $50,000 for previous cooperation. In 1976 Nosenko was paid $10,000 to satisfy that part of the above promise relating to his identification of an espionage agent. Further, he was compensated in the amount of $28,500, representing the difference between the $25,000 a year promised and the actual amount paid to him during the period 1 March 1969- 1 March 1975. Since 1969, the Agency has contributed to Nosenko's hospitalization insurance premiums. The Agency has also compensated him for certain unusual medical and dental expenses. To date, Nosenko continues to work as an independent contractor, with the compensation provision being periodically amended. ‘His work for the Agency includes consultation with ‘both the Agency and the FBI on certain matters of current interest concerning Soviet iritelligence activities and personnel 112 From time to time he is also both in the U.S. and abroad. of the Agency on current Soviet consulted by various elements He has been and continues to developments and requirements. at counterintelligence courses be used as a regular lecturer FBI, Air Force OSI, and others. of the Agency, the Mr. John McCone played any Our records do not show that Nosenko's employment and compensation role in authorizing arrangements with the CIA. 113 ANNUAL COMPENSATION TABLE Effective March 1969 $16,500 year Eitective March 1970 $18,500 year Effective March L971 $19,500 year Effective March 1972 $21,000 year Effective March 19.73 $22,250 year Effective March 1974 $23,750 year Effective March 1975 $25,250 year Effective March We as) $26,513 year _ Effective October 1976 $28,103 year Effective March cias $33,000 year Effective October 1977 ERY year 1978 $55,008 year 114 RESETTLEMENT FEE TABLE March 1964 $2,000 April-May 1969 $8,000 (furniture and auto) June 1970 $25,000 ($20,000 for down payment on house; $5,000 for additional furniture, moving expenses, and other costs incidental to the purchase of new home ) July 1973 $15,000 (balance of resettlement figure promised) 115 12. What was the CIA's position from 1964 to 1968 on the question of whether Nocenin is bonafide? 13. What is the CIA's position today on the question of whether Nosenko is bonafide? The point is that CIA, per se, did not reach an agreed position on Mr. Nosenko until late 1968. Various persons within CIA entertained serious doubts about his bona fides, believing in fact that he was a dispatched agent. Had the Agency, as distinguished from those employees, so concluded he could simply have been turned back. The final conclusion was that he is a bona fide defector, a judgment that has been reinforced convincingly by 14 years accumulated evidence. Mr. HeEtns. I have the document. Chairman SToKEs. Mr. Helms, when this committee interviewed Nosenko, during the course of the testimony we took from him I made a special request that he provide this committee with an affidavit which set forth with preciseness exactly the way he was treated while a member—while in custody by the CIA. I want to read this exhibit at this time: In accordance with the request of the staff of the committee, the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I make the following statement describing the condi- tions of my imprisonment from April 1964, to the end of 1967. On April 4, 1964, I was taken for a physical checkup and a test on a lie-detector somewhere in a house. A doctor had given me a physical checkup and after that I was taken in another room for the test on a lie-detector. After finishing the test, an officer of CIA has come in the room and talked with the technician, started to shout that I was a phoney, and immediately several guards entered in the room. Guards ordered me to stand by the wall, to undress and check me. After that, I was taken upstairs in an attic room. The room had a metal bed attached to the floor in the center of this room. Nobody told me anything, how long I would be there or what would happen to me. After several days, two officers of CIA started interrogations. I tried to cooperate and even in evening hours was writing for them whatever I could recollect about the KGB. These officers were interrogating me about a month or 2 months. The tone of interrogations was hostile. Then they stopped to come to see me until the end of 1964. I was kept in this room until the end of 1964 and beginning of 1965. The conditions were very poor and difficult. I could have a shower once in a week and once in a week I could shave. I was not given a toothbrush and a toothpaste, and food given to me was very poor. I did not have enough to eat and was hungry all the time. I had no contact with anybody to talk to. I could not read. I could not smoke. I even could not have fresh air or to see anything from this room. The only window was screened and boarded. The only door to the room had a metal screen, and outside, in a corridor, two guards were watching me day and night. The only furniture in the room was a single bed and a lightbulb. The room was very hot in the summertime. In the end of 1964, there was started again interrogations by several different officers. The first day they kept me under 24-hours interrogation. All interrogations were done in a hostile manner. At the end of all those interrogations, when I was 116 tole that it was the last one and asked what I wanted to be related to higher-ups, I said that I was a true defector and being under arrest about 386 days, I wanted to be put on trial, if I was found guilty or released. I also asked how long it would continue. I was told I would be there 3,860 days and even more. This evening I was taken by guards, blindfolded and handcuffed, in a car and delivered to an airport and put in a plane. I was taken to another location where I was put into a concrete room with bars on a door. In the room was a single steel bed and a mattress, no pillow, no sheet and no blanket. During winter it was very cold and I asked to give me a blanket, which I received after some time. Except 1 day of interrogation and 1 day of a test on a lie-detector, I have not seen anyone besides guards and a doctor. The guards were not allowed to talk with me. After my constant complaining that I needed fresh air, at the end of 1966 I was taken almost every day for 30 minutes’ exercise to a small area attached to this cell. The area was surrounded by chain-linked fence and by a second fence that I could not see through. The only thing I could see was the sky. Being in this cell, I was watched day and night through TV camera. Trying to pass the time a couple of times, I was making from threads a chess set. Every time when I finished those sets, immediately guards were entering in my cell and taking them from me. I was desperately wanting to read. Once when I was given a toothpaste, I found in the toothpaste box a piece of paper with description of components of this toothpaste. I was trying to read it under blanket, but guards noticed it and again was taken from me. Conditions in both first and second location were analogical and illogical. I was there until November of 1967. Then I again was transferred blindfolded and hand- cuffed to another location. In this new place I had a room with much better conditions, and CIA officers started questioning me every day, excluding Sundays, touching all questions con- cerning my biography, career in the KGB and all cases of the KGB known to me. I vee in prison for the whole 5 years and I started my life in the USA in April of 1969. Dated August 7, 1978, signed by Nosenko, Y. I. This affidavit was taken by counsel for this committee, Kenneth Klein, as a result of my request. Having heard this affidavit as I read it, can you tell me whether or not that was a bona fide statement of Mr. Nosenko about the way he was treated by the CIA? Mr. HeExtms. Mr. Stokes, I have no means of agreeing or disagree- ing. I have no basis for agreeing or disagreeing. I didn’t visit him during the time he was being held. After that affidavit was read to me back in August, I inquired of one of my former associates who had to do with the holding of Nosenko. He said that he was certainly held under difficult conditions but I don’t think that his testimony about the food that Nosenko has—he made the point that the doctor examined him once a week and that certain of these statements would seem to be somewhat exaggerated. But I have no independent basis for saying that. You can bring this officer in here anytime you like and ask him. I just don’t know whether it is correct or not. Chairman Stokes. Did anyone working under you ever request permission to give him drugs? Mr. Hetms. My recollection is that there was a request made to use the kind of drugs that were considered to be aids in interroga- eae the truth drugs, such as, I believe, sodium pentothal, is one of them. I don’t recall exactly what was proposed, but I made it clear on that occasion that he was to be given drugs under no circum- stances; and I also made it clear from the very outset that he was not to be mistreated physically. To the best of my knowledge, he was never given drugs and never mistreated physically and regu- 117 larly was checked by doctors to check his state of health. The doctor who did the checking was a medical doctor as well as a psychiatrist. Chairman Stokes. When Mr. Hart testified here a few days ago, in substantially every detail in Mr. Nosenko’s affidavit, Mr. Hart verifies that this is the way this man was treated, and he verifies that from 6 months compilation of records of the CIA, compiled, researched, and studied by him and four assistants, with that knowledge. Do you still say that your position being what it was with the Agency that you knew nothing of these Spartan conditions? Mr. Hetms. I knew that he was being held under Spartan condi- tions. I am simply saying I am unable to attest to the details that he has in here, because [ never went to visit him during this time. The reports were made to me that he was being held in Spartan conditions; that is why we had the doctor go down to examine him. Chairman SToKeEs. With reference to his diet there, is it your statement that you said that statement was exaggerated? Mr. HeEtms. The gentleman with whom I spoke a few days ago told me the one thing he insisted on was that Mr. Nosenko got enough food. He told me this. I can only attest to what he told me, but he is available if you want to talk to him. Chairman STOKES. We have the statement of the CIA that peri- odically during this time his diet was modified to the extent his portions of food were modest and restricted. That is their state- ment to us. Mr. Chairman, I think I have maybe just one or two final questions. : The conditions that we have just talked about obviously began April 4, 1964; is that right? 3 Mr. HEtMs. That is what you say, Mr. Stokes. Chairman SToKEs. I am not the witness here. Mr. Hetms. I am going with your time schedule from now on. There is no sense in my getting all confused and delaying this hearing. I will accept what you say, that it started in April 1964. Chairman STokKEs. You will accept it. The report of the Warren Commission was not issued until December—September of that ‘year. Mr. HEtns. I am sorry, sir—did you say September or December? Chairman Strokes. I originally said December, and I was wrong. [t was September. Mr. Hetms. September? Chairman Sroxes. Right. It would seem to me that that would Nave been ample time for the Warren Commission to have been advised of the conditions under which a defector who professed to lave important information about Oswald was being kept. If I understand your testimony correctly, the Commission was dae of these conditions under which this defector was being cept? _ Mr. Hens. I don’t recall their having been told; they certainly new that we had the defector in our custody, because that was the »urden of what I told the Chief Justice. The precise circumstances inder which he was being held, if they were identified to the Narren Commission, I am not aware of it. 118 Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Mr. Helms. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. PreyER. This may be a good place for us to break, if you have completed your questioning, Mr. Chairman. Let me suggest that the committeee recess until 1:30. Would that be agreeable to you, Mr. Helms? Mr. HELMs. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Preyer. Is that agreeable with the committee? The committee stands recessed until 1:30 today. (Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the hearing was recessed, the commit- tee to reconvene at 1:30 p.m. of the same day.] AFTERNOON SESSION Mr. PREYER. The committee will resume its session. The Chair recognizes Congressman Dodd for such time as he may consume to resume the questioning. Mr. Dopp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Helms, before I begin my line of questioning, I would like to ask you if you might not want to clarify one of your statements. I received some calls over the lunch break from some constituents from my home State of Connecticut who were listening to the testimony this morning. They mentioned to me your response ear- lier regarding Eastern Europeans and Asians with their propensity to be able to pass polygraph tests, and it occurred to me that you might want to rephrase your statement. | I understood you to mean trained agents from those parts of the world rather than Asians and Eastern Europeans as ethnic groups. I thought you might want to take a minute to clarify that. TESTIMONY OF RICHARD HELMS—(Resumed) Mr. Hetms. Mr. Dodd, if my generalization caused offense, I had no intention of doing this. What I, in effect, was trying to say was that there is an occasional individual who lives in that part of the world who has spent his life lying about one thing or another and therefore becomes so good at it that he can pass the polygraph test. | But this would be 1 individual in maybe 1 million or a 100,000,} something of that kind. | I imagine Americans, if they set their minds to it, could do it as} well. I meant no offense to Eastern Europeans as a category or any} individual Eastern European. ) | Mr. Dopp. I thought I would clear that up. Mr. Hens. I am glad you did. I am sorry if any of your constitu- ents felt I was being disrespectful, but I had no intention of being} that way. Mr. Dopp. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to ask the clerk to show to the witness JFK exhibit F-418A. This is a letter dated April 3, 1964, from Lawrence R. Houston, general counsel, that Mr. Helms} pede with him this morning and had, I believe, inserted in the record. This is the only copy. Would you please show that to Mr. Helms. Mr. Hews. I have it in front of me, Mr. Dodd. Mr. Dopp. Mr. Helms, I noted in looking at the exhibit during} the lunch break that there was no signature on that letter. There 119 is an initial. I am not sure it is even Mr. Houston’s initial but it was not signed by anyone. I would like to, if I could, address some questions to you with regard to Mr. Houston and the credibility of that statement. This morning you supplied the committee with this memoran- dum which was ostensibly written by Mr. Houston, the former CIA General Counsel, regarding meetings with the Justice Department officials about Nosenko. That was the substance anyway, as I un- derstood it, of the memorandum. Is that correct? Mr. HE.LMs. Yes, sir. Mr. Dopp. Is this the same Lawrence Houston who on May 7, 1962, along with Sheffield Edwards, also of the CIA, briefed Attor- ney General Robert Kennedy about the pre-Bay of Pigs CIA Mafia plots? Mr. HeExms. I believe it was the same Mr. Houston. He was General Counsel of the Agency for many years. Mr. Dopp. I am looking here at the report from the Intelligence Committee on page 131, the bottom paragraph: ‘Briefing of the Attorney General on May 7, 1962.” An entry in Attorney General Kennedy’s calendar for May 7, 1962, states, “1 o’clock Richard Helms. At 4 o’clock the Attorney General met with Houston and Edwards to be briefed on the CIA operation involving Maheu, Rosselli, and Giancana.”’ Mr. Hetos. That would be the meeting. Mr. Dopp. That satisfies your recollection? Mr. Heums. That satisfies my recollection. I have been ques- sioned about that calendar on many occasions. That appointment shat I had with the Attorney General that day at 1 o’clock appar- ently was canceled, so I was never there. But I believe Edwards and Houston did keep their appointment. _ Mr. Dopp. Isn’t it true that at that meeting both Mr. Houston and Mr. Edwards told the Attorney General—on May 17, 1962— what the CIA-Mafia plots no longer were in any existence, were -erminated? Mr. Hetos. That is my understanding of what they told him, Mr. Jodd. I believe—wasn’t that contained in a memorandum for the -ecord written after their meeting? Was it written by Colonel ‘dwards? I don’t recall; someone wrote it. Mr. Dopp. I will quote for you the bottom paragraph, bb, on page 32 of this report. It says, “And that Kennedy was told the activity iad been terminated as of that time.” Mr. Hews. I assume that is what they told him. Mr. Dopp. In fact, I will read a direct quote here I have on page 33 of this same report, footnote 4 referring to the italicized para- raph at the top of page 1383: The Attorney General was not told that the gambling syndicate operation had lready been reactivated, nor as far as we know was he ever told that CIA had a mtinuing involvement with U.S. gangster elements. That is from the Inspector General’s report, page 65. That is ‘here the italicized words come from. And then the fourth footnote eferrring to this general line of questioning, it says, footnote 4: Houston testified that Kennedy insisted “There was not to be any contact of the afia without prior consultation with him.’ 120 Isn’t it also true to your knowledge that in 1967 the CIA Inspec- tor General’s report concluded that Sheffield Edwards had, in fact, lied when they and Houston had told the Attorney General that these plots no longer existed? Mr. HeEtMs. Does it appear in the Inspector General’s report that Edwards lied? | Mr. Dopp. Well, maybe semantically we could—— Mr. Hews. I’m not caviling, I just don’t recall any more. Mr. Dopp. On page 134 of this same report, I am reading from the first full paragraph at the top of page 134, which reads as follows: As concluded by the CIA itself and the Inspector General’s report, Edwards’ statement that he was not aware of these developments is implausible. Do you have any disagreement with that statement? Mr. Hes. I don’t know how to judge it one way or the other. I did not recall the statement as I was sitting here, and I am just unable to help with it. If the Inspector General thought it was implausible, I guess he thought it was, but I don’t think any final judgment was made about it. It was part of a very long report which was directed at some other things as well, and I don’t recall this ever became an issue that anybody had attempted to define, or refine, let me put it that way. Mr. Dopp. The reason I raise it is the credibility of Mr. Houston with regard to the memo, and I thought maybe you might be able to shed some light on why that was not signed. Was that a normal operating procedure not to sign something with your name type- written underneath it? Mr. He tos. I don’t know. What we are dealing with is a Xerox, | or if it isn’t a Xerox—maybe I shouldn’t use a company name— } let’s say a copy. I don’t know whether it is a copy of the original | memorandum Mr. Houston wrote or a copy of a copy that was made at the time that he wrote the memorandum. I don’t know who put the signed LRH down here. In other words, I think that we need some help from the agency as to the exact circumstances, but I can’t conceive that Mr. Houston wouldn’t be glad to speak for himself. He is still alive and well and living here in Washington. Mr. Dopp. Thank you very much. This morning I believe I heard you testify that you gave all of | the information you believed pertinent to the Warren Commis- } sion’s investigation—to the commission promptly. Am I recalling [ your statement correctly there? / Mr. Hews. I said—I believe I testified, Mr. Dodd, that I believed | this to be the case although I had learned in recent years that one} must never make a flat statement about anything, so there may] have been certain cases in which they did not get information] promptly. But I believe our effort was to give it to them as] promptly as possible. | Mr. Dopp. Alright, I would like to proceed, if I could, for the next} few minutes and ask you to respond to questions surrounding the] so-called assassination plots that were ongoing during the periodf from 1961 on. And so I would like to have you focus your attention] on that particular aspect of your inquiry here today. 121 My first question is, to your knowledge, was any member of the Warren Commission, or its staff, ever informed by the Central Intelligence Agency of the CIA’s anti-Castro assassination plots? Mr. HeE.tms. I assume that you are referring to the one that is most frequently characterized as an assassination plot which in- volved the Mafia? Because the other assassination plots I don’t accept as assassination plots. And so again we have a definitional problem. Mr. Dopp. Let’s start off and ask whether the Warren Commis- sion was ever informed of any of these attempts on the Cuban regime whether on the person of Fidel Castro or an effort to overthrow his government, or an effort to knock him off personal- ly—whatever they fall into. In any of those to areas your knowl- edge was the Warren Commission, members or their staff, ever informed of these efforts? Mr. Hewtms. I don’t know what the Warren Commission knew, Mr. Dodd. I didn’t inform them of these things, but they had among them as members Mr. Allen Dulles, who was certainly aware of what had been going on with respect to Cuba; Senator Russell of Georgia, the chairman of the Oversight Committee, who was also aware of what was going on with respect to Cuba; Mr. McCone, who was director at the time, also knew what was hap- pening. What the Commission knew from those gentlemen I don’t know. I never spoke to them myself about it. Mr. Dopp. But you never did personally? Mr. HE.Ms. I never did. Mr. Dopp. I would like to draw your attention if I could to page 22 of your now declassified August 9, 1978, testimony before this committee written, you stated and I will quote—do you have a copy of the report in front of you? Mr. Hetos. Yes, I do. What page is this? Mr. Dopp. Page 22. Mr. Hetos. I am on 22. Mr. Dopp. On line 9. Doe. your copy read, “The only assassina- tion plot that had any semblance of substance to it’’—I am quoting your response now to Mr. Goldsmith’s question—‘‘was one involv- ing a couple of Mafia chieftains and which were supposed to have taken place before the Bay of Pigs.”’ Is that an accurate reflection of your views? Mr. Hes. As far as I know, it is an accurate statement. I would nake essentially the same statement today. Mr. Dopp. Before proceeding with the line of questioning on that, nay I ask who these Mafia organized crime chieftains were? Mr. Hes. My recollection—I would like to point out that there vere two times in which different people were in touch with the Mafia. One happened before I was aware that this was going on ind which was the episode that was referred to by Colonel Edwards ind Mr. Houston when they saw the Attorney General. The second one, which I never characterized as an assassination lot because as far as I knew it never went anywhere, was a second me involving the Mafia, the one which I have on public television 1pologized for and said it was the greatest mistake of my life to lave had anything to do with it and I am sorry about it. But I have 122 never had any convincing evidence from any human being today that this plot ever went anywhere. I think just to make myself quite explicit here, I would want to see the information that said that I had any indication from Wil- liam Harvey that his operation with Rosselli ever produced any- a thing in Havana. I would like some evidence of this. I would like statement under oath from somebod y other than a Mafia chieftain . Mr. Dopp. I will go back to my question again. The first relation- ship existed prior to your direct involvement, is that right? Mr. Hens. That is right. Mr. Dopp. This is prior to the May 7, 1962, meeting referred to by Colonel Edwards and Mr. Houston? Mr. Hes. That is right, and therefore I don’t know the details of it. Mr. Dopp. Am I correct in assuming that the names referred to in the report Mr. Rosselli, Mr. Giancana, that those were the principals involved. Were there others that you were aware of? Mr. Hetms. I believe there were others. I thought there was a fellow named Trafficante involved but I am not sure about that. He maybe came into the picture later. Mr. Dopp. I do recognize that you have made a public apology and I preface my questions to you with that in mind. But could you tell this committee who the individuals were that you happened to be involved with on the second set of circumstances involving Mafia chieftains or organized crime figures? Mr. Hexos. As far as I am aware in that particular situation it was William K. Harvey who was in touch with John Rosselli, and it was Harvey and Rosselli who were attempting to find, if I understood it correctly, some channel from Florida into Havana. | I also understand that there was a question of poison pills which } were supposed to be transported to Havana. There was never any } evidence they were ever transported there or ever left the United } States. There was never any evidence that this plot ever left the | Florida mainland. If it was indeed an assassination plot, it was | misadvertised to me, because I had understood it was an effort to | see if a connection could be made between the Mafia in Florida and | the Mafia in Havana. To the best of my knowledge, the connection | never was made. Mr. Dopp. Other than Mr. Harvey and Mr. Rosselli, was there } anyone else that would fall into the character of being members of | organized crime that you had direct contact with? | Mr. Hes. I had direct contact with none of—the only gentle- man I had direct contact with myself was Harvey, who was a staff} officer. I never met Mr. Rosselli. I never met Mr. Giancana. If I | met a Mafia chieftain, I wasn’t aware of it. Mr. Dopp. Am I to understand that Mr. Giancana was also involved in this second—— Mr. Heuos. I don’t think he was. It was not my understanding} that he was. But then I have no way of demonstrating that, Mr. Dodd. The Mafia has its own internal organization, and who Ros- selli talked to I don’t know. : Mr. Dopp. Going back again to the statement that I read from} page 22 of your declassified testimony before this committee, “The only assassination plot that had any semblance or substance was} 123 the one involving a couple of Mafia chieftains.” I would like to, refer to JFK exhibit F-527. I would ask the clerk to supply Mr. Helms with a copy of that exhibit. And I would ask you, Mr. Helms, if you would take a look over this exhibit with particular emphasis on the last paragraph of what is page 2 of the exhibit, page 3, to the top of page 4, ending with the paragraph that ends at the top of page 4. Take a minute to look at that. I am not asking that you read it out loud but just that you familiarize yourself with the contents of this exhibit. Mr. HEtos. I have read that now. Mr. Dopp. Is it fair to assume you recognize this document? You have seenit before? | Mr. HE.Ms. Yes, I have. Mr. Dopp. Am I correct in stating this is the CIA’s Inspector General’s report done in 1967—— Mr. Hes. The one that I asked to have done. Mr. Dopp. The one you asked to have done as DCI, Director of the Agency? Mr. HE.Ms. Right. Mr. Dopp. I don’t intend to read all of this but beginning at the last sentence on page 2 of the Inspector General’s report it reads as follows: We can identify five separate phases in agency assassination planning although the transitions from one to another are not always sharply defined. Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing government attitude toward the Cuban regime. Without reading each one of them, the Inspector General’s report prepared at your request, then outlines in separate paragraphs, from A to E, five separate phases, as they describe, and using their language again, in “agency assassination planning.” I would like to know, first of all, how you can explain that we have in a report prepared for you in 1967 what appears to me to be five separate areas of assassination planning and how that can be distinguished from your statement to this committee in executive session where you talk about basically one or the semblance of one assassination attempt involving organized crime figures. Can you please enlighten the committee as to how you.can reach two sepa- rate—— Mr. HeEtns. Yes, I can. I think this is rather lurid language that has been used in this report. As I read through it, this looks like the efforts that were made during this time to upset the Castro regime. If one identifies that as assassination planning, I don’t think that is a proper description of it, and if somebody will come forth with all the items that are supposed to have been in that planning, I would be delighted to hear it. Mr. Dopp. They identify here one period beginning prior to August 1960. That is the first one. The second one is August 1960 to April 1961. The third is April 1961 late 1961. Mr. Hes. Aren’t those all the same one? Mr. Dopp. That is my question for you. The Inspector General ‘seemed to distinguish between the various phases here, and accord- ing to your testimony before us, is this what you were referring to? Is this what you are calling one, what they call five? 124 Mr. HeEtms. That is right. I became involved with this business sometime in 1962 after I took over as DDP. I’ve forgotten what month. Anything prior to that I didn’t have anything to do with. I would assume this was one plot but maybe there were others. But if there are, in all the time I spent with the Church committee and all the time I have spent endlessly for the last 3 or 4 years, it seems to me, about these matters, I haven’t had anything else brought to my attention. And if you gentlemen have something, I would like to know it. But I don’t know what it is and I am sorry I can’t help. Mr. Dopp. Did you take issue with this report 11 years ago at the time it was issued? Mr. Hetos. Mr. Dodd, when I got this report I had some prob- lems with respect to reporting to President Johnson about certain points that he was particularly interested in. I did not attempt to parse it or analyze it or get it changed or do anything with it except use it as a fact-finding document. I want to say right now that I never expected to see the docu- ment in the public domain declassified for the appetites of all those who wanted to make the most of it, and therefore if I had known this, I obviously would have edited the report and changed it rather substantially, put it in the hands of lawyers and had it entirely rearranged. Mr. Dopp. I say to you, Mr. Helms, with all due respect, it is not being put into evidence to satisfy the voracious appetites of anyone but merely to try to clear up a point we are trying to resolve here. I hope you don’t understand—— Mr. HEtos. What is the point you would like to resolve? Mr. Dopp. As someone who is just confronted, I am not an expert in these matters but I read your transcript and you said, “The only assassination plot that had any semblance of substance was the one involving a couple of Mafia chieftians.”’ Mr. HEts. And that is what I believe to this date. Mr. Dopp. I am confronted with an Inspector General’s report which was not written to satisfy the appetites of anyone I presume. It is a declassified document which says, “We can identify five separate phases.” I am merely asking you to clarify that in light of the earlier statement. That is the only purpose for this being brought into testimony. Mr. Hens. I am sorry. For example, it says here that particular many eT scheme? Is this the Mafia thing that we are talking about’ Mr. Dopp. That is correct. Mr. Hetms. And was again pushed vigorously in the area of Mongoose and in the climate of intense administration pressure to do something about Castro and Cuba. Are we talking about the same Mafia thing here as well? If that is a lot of plots, I regard it as one and the same operation. And if I am misleading you in some fashion—— Mr. Dopp. Maybe I can help you. Is it one and the same in your mia because it involved Cuba and Fidel Castro, and that was one entity’ Mr. Hetms. The only one that I know about that was serious or that seemed to have been taken seriously was the one involving 125 Rosselli and Harvey. I believe the Church committee brought out— found a wetsuit, a clam shell, various things that were on the shelf in the agency that were regarded as things that might be used in possibly killing Castro, or being used against him, which never came off the shelf, were never used. If that is a plot to have created this, then I will back up and say we ought to enumerate every single item that conceivably had to do with the invasions of Cuba which we were constantly running under government aegis. We had task forces that were striking at Cuba constantly. We were attempting to blow up powerplants, we were attempting to ruin sugar mills, we were attempting to do all kinds of things during this period. This was a matter of American Government policy. This wasn’t the CIA alone. Now, if those things taper over into assassination plots, maybe so. I find the semantics the English incendiary but not very clear and not very clarifying, and not very specific. Mr. Dopp. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that exhibit JFK F-527 be entered into the record at this time. Mr. Preyer. Without objection, JFK F-527 is entered into the record at this point. [Whereupon exhibit JFK F-527 was received in evidence. ] 41-373 O-79 -9 126 JFK Exuisit F-527 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 Office of Legislative Counsel 20 September 1978 Mr. G. Robert Blakey Chief Counsel and Director House Select Committee on Assassinations Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Mr. Blakey: Attached you will find pages 1-8, 14, 17-18, 24-25, 37-39, 62a-63, 94, 118, 130-133 from the report by the Inspector General on plotting against Castro. These - pages have been sanitized and declassified in compliance with a request by Mr. Goldsmith, and may be used by you in your hearings. It should be noted that it is Agency policy to not release reports of the Inspector General outside the Agency, in order to protect the unique fact-finding advisory function that they fulfill within the Agency. Were the internal confidentiality of the reports to be compromised the.effectiveness of the function could be impaired. Because so much of the information from the. 1967 report was placed officially in the public domain by the ‘interim report of the Church Committee, Alleged Assassi- nation Plots Involving -Foreign Leaders, it can be released in this form on this special occasion. Sincerely yours, TS OAD S. D. Breckinridge Principal Coordinator, HSCA encl. 127 25 April 1967 ~ MEMORANDUM This reconstruction of Agency involvement in plans to- assassinate Fidel pes is at best an imperfect history. Because ~ of the extreme sensitivity of the operations being discussed or Prtenpted, as a matter of principle no official records were kept of planning, of approvals, or of implementation. The few written | records that do exist are either Neely eancentiey to the rain Wrents or were put on paper from memory years afterward. Willian Harvey has retained skeletal notes of his activities during the years in question, and they are our best source of dates. "of the Office of Medical Services, has a record of whom he met and when and cryptic references to the subjects discusseds of TSD, has a record of two or three dates that are pertinent. . and a. were involved in only the technical aspects of ta omeryecey planetnet and their participations were short- lived. Although fragmentary, their records are a help in establishing critical time frames. Operational files are useful in some pecans” because they give dates of meetings, the substances of which may be inferred from collateral information. For the most part, though, we have had to rely on information Given to us orally by people whose memories are fogged by time. Tneir recollections of dates are particularly hazy, and some of them 128 are no longer able to keep the details of one plan separate from those of another. We interviewed everyone whom we could identify as likely to be knowledgeable, with the exceptions of Mr. Dulles end iCeneeat Cabell. A complete list is attached at Tab f,. We did not go on fishing expeditions among the mere Poecities: To have done so would have risked making witting a number of employees who were previously unwitting and, in our estimate, would have added little to the details available from those directly involved. There are inconsistencies among the yarious accounts, but most of them can be resolved by collating the information furnished by all of the identifiable participants in a particular plan and by then checking it against specific dates that can be fixed with fair certainty. We believe that this reconstruction of what happened and of the thinking . associated with it is reasonably sound. If there are significant inaccuracies in the report, they are most likely to occur in faulty ordering of the sequence of events. People still remember much of what happened, but they can no longer recall precisely when. . It became clear very early in our investigation that the vigor -with which schemes were pursued within the Agency to eliminate Castro personally varied with the intensity of the U.S. Government's efforts to overthrow the Castro regime. We can identify five separate phases in Agency assassination planning, although the transitions from one 129 to another are not always sharply defined. Each phase is a betta of the then prevailing Government attitude toward the Cuban regime. a. Prior to August 1960: All of the identifiable schemes prior to about August 1960, with one possible exception, were aimed only at discrediting Castro personally by influencing his behaviour or by altering his ‘appearance. b. ‘August 1960 to April 1961: The plots that vere hatched in late 1960 and early 1961 were eggressively pursued and were viewed by at least some of the participants as being mereite one aspect of the over-all active effort to overthrow the regime that culminated in the Bay of ipa , c. April 1961 to late 1961: A major wchene that was begun in August 1960 was called off after the Bay of Pigs and - remained dormant for several months, as did most other Agency operational activity related to Cuba. | ad. Late 1961 to late 1962: That particular scheme was reactivated in early 1962 and was again pushed vigorously in the era of Project MONGOOSE and in the climate of intense admini- stration pressure on CIA to do something about Castro and his Cuba. | e. Late 1962 until well into 1963: After the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 and the collapse of Project MONGOOSE, the 130 ie dmiene i scheme that was begun in August 1960 and revived in April 1962 was finally fprenaied. in early 1963. Two ather plots were originated in 1963, but both were impracticable and nothing ever came of then. We cannot Overemphasize the extent to which responsible Agency officers felt themselves subject to By ren ree severe pressures to ao something about Castro and his regime. The fruitless and, in retrospect, often unrealistic plotting should be viewed in that light. Many of those we interviewed stressed two points that are so obvious that recording them here may be superfluous. We believe, | though, that they are pertinent to the story. Elimination of Ai vie. etre figure in a government, even when loyalties are held to him personally rather than to the government as a body, will not , ‘necessarily cause the downfall of the Sate, This point was stressed with respect to Castro and Cuba in an internal CIA draft paper of October 1961, which was initiated in response to General Maxwell Taylor's desire fora contingency plan. rete took the positicn that the demise of Fidel Castro, from whatever cause, would offer little opportunity for the liberation of Cuba from Communist and Soviet Bloc control. The second point, which is more specifically relevant to our investigation, is that bringing about the downfall of a government necessarily requires the removal of its leaders from = it 131 positions of power, and there is always the risk that the perbiet= pants will resort to assassination. Sas Wa tik) GE Pe etar cat of -a-Mossadeq-or ‘the flight-of-a-Batista ela not cause one_to. Daerah the- killings of a~Diem or of'a:- iheparer es | forces.encouraged. but not controlled Dy. the- U.S. Government. There is a third point, which was not directly made by any of those we interviewed, but which emerges clearly from the interviews and from review of files. Tne point is that of frequent resort to synecdoche--the mention of a part when the whole is to be understood, “or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated references to phrases such s "disposing of Castro," which may be read in the narrow, literal sense Of assassinating him, when it is intended that it be read in a e the broader, figurative sense of dislodging the Castro regime. Reversing the coin » we find people speaking vaguely of “doing somze- thing about Castro" when it is clear that saat they have specifically in mind is killing him. In a situation whe Rete those speaking may not have actually meant what they seemed to say or may not have said what they actually meant, they should not be surprised if their oral shorthand is interpreted differently than was intended. ras suggestion was made to us that operations aimed at the assassination of Castro may have been generated in an atmosphere of stress in intelligence publications on the possibility of Castro's 132 demise and on the reordering of the political structure that would follow. We reviewed intelligence publications from 1960 through 1966, | . The NIE's on “The Situation and Prospects in Cuba” es + +8 have brief paragraphs on likely successor governments if Castro were to depart the scene. neepee ree le co oe ‘ - —_— In each case the treatment is no more nor less than one would expect to find in comprehensive round-ups such as these. We conclude that there is no reason to believe that the operators were unduly influenced by the content of intelligence Ye publications. Drew Pearson's column of 7 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro. Pearson also has stirovindla city as yet unpublished, to the effect that there was a meeting at the State Department at sninecls assassination of Castro was discussed and that a toningeceiia ray landed in Cuba with pills to be used in an assassination attempt. There is basis in fact for each of those three reports. |a. A CIA officer passed an assassination weapon to an Agency Cuban asset at a meeting in Paris on 22 November 1953. The weapon was a ballpoint pen rigged as a hypodemsic syringe. 4 -6- 133 The CIA officer suggested that the Cuban asset load the syringe with Black Leaf 40. The evidence indicates that the meeting was under way at the very moment President Kennedy wae shot. b. There was a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's conference coke on 10 August 1952 at which Secretary McNamara ee enettine subject of liquidation of | Cuban leaders. The discussion resulted in a Project KONGOOSE action memorandum prepared by Edward Lansdale. At ge Shane Special Group meetingon 31 July 1964 there was discussion of a recently-disseminated Clandestine Services information report on a Cuban exile plot to assassinate Castro. CIA had refused the exile's request for funds and had no involvement in the plot. ec. CIA twice (first in early 1961 and again in early 192) supplied lethal pills to U.S. gambling syndicate threfhe i working in behalf of CIA on a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro. The 1961 plot aborted and the pills were recovered. Those furnished:in April 1962 were passed by the gambling syndicate representative to a Cuban exile leader in Florida, who in tur had them sent to. Cuba about May 1962. In June 1962 the exile leader reported that @ team of three men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the Operation. If the opportunity presented itself, the team would make an attempt on Castro's life--perhaps using the pills. 134 detail; puts them This report describes these and other episodes in and reveals, that while the events described by into perspective; and are subject to being patched together Drew Pearson did occur , causative as though one complete story, the implication of a direct relationship among them is unfounded. 135 Gambling Syndicate The first seriously-pursued CIA plan to assassinate Castro lsd its inception in August 1960. It involved the use of members of the criminal underworld with contacts inside Cuba. The operation had two phases: the first ran from August 1950 until late April or early May 1961, when it was called off following the Pay of Pigs; the second ran from April 1962 until February 1963 and was merely a revival of the first phase which had been inactive since about May 1961. ; ; S Ganbling Syndicate - Phase 1 August _1960 Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans, asked Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, if Edwards could establish contact with the U.S. gambling syndicate that was active in Cuba. The objective clearly was the assassination of eaaten elthouga Edwards claims that there was a studied avoidance of the term in his conversation with Bissell. Bissell recalls that the idea originated with J. C. King, then Chief of im Division, althougk King now recalls having had only limited knowledge of such a2 plen and ata much later date--about mid-1962. rah DsNe 136 same way. A memorandum for the record prepared by Sheffield Edwards on 14 May 1962 states: "No monies were ever paid to Roselli and Giancana. Maheu was paid part of his expense money during ‘the periods that he was in Miami.” (Giancana is "Gold."”) ees 1. was introduced (in true name) to Roselli as an employee of Naheu, the explanation being that ~~. -,would handle the case for Maheu, because Maheu was too busy to work on it full time himself. No one else in the Office of Security was made witting of ane operation at this time. Eavaras himself did not meet Roselli — Z until the summer of 1962. | At this point, about the second half of September, Shef Edwards told Bissell that he had a friend, a private investigator, who had a contact who in turn had other contacts through whom syndicate : elements in Cuba could be reached. Tnese syndicate elements in Cuba would be willing to take on such an operation. As of the latter part of September 1960, Edwards, = and Bissell were the only ones in the Agency who knew of a plan against Castro involving U.S. gangster elements. Edwards states that Richard Helms was not informed of the plan, because Cuba was being handled by Bissell at that time. With Bissell present, Edwards briefed the Director (abies Intics) and the DDCI (General Cabell) on the existence ofa plan involving members of the syndicate. The discussion was circumspect; Edwards sh. = 137 deliberately avoided the use of any "bad words.” -The descriptive term used was "an intelligence operation.” Edwards is quite sure that the DCI and the DDCI clearly understood the nature of the operation he was discussing. He recalls describing the channel as being "from A to B to C." As he then envisioned it, "A" vas Maheu, "B" ae Roselli, | and "C" was the principal in Cuba. Edwards recalls that Mr. Dulles merely nodded, presumably in understanding and approval. Certainly, there was no opposition. Edwards states that, while there was no formal approval as such, he felt that he clearly had tacit eae Ly to use his own judgment. Bissell committed $150,000 for the support ° of the operation. | (Comment: In the light of this description of the briefing, it is appropriate oc conjecture as to just. what the Director did jee It is safe to conclude, ‘elven the men participating and the general subject of the meeting, that there vas little ’ likelihood of misunderstanding--even though the details fers deliberately blurred and the specific intended result was oe stated in unmistakable language. It is also ecnorab la to conclude that the pointed avoidance of “bad words” emphasized ~ to the participants the extreme sensitivity of the operation.) During the week of 25 September 1960, "__ und Maheu went to Miami where Roselli introduced only Maheu to "Sam Gold” at a meeting 1B! 138 tying it to a recollection that Castro frequently drank tea, coffee, or bouillon, for which a liquid poison would be particularly well suited. January - February 1961 Deshite the decision that a poitéon in liquid form would be most desirable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in the form of small pills about the size of saccharine eqbiata: remembers meeting with Edwards and . in Edwards' office to discuss the requirement. The specifications were that the poison be stable, soluble, safe to handle, undetectable, not immediately acting, and with a firmly predictable end result. Botulin comes nearest to . meeting all of those requirements, and it may be put up in either | liquid or solid form. ~" __ states that the pill form was chosen because of ease and safety of handling. (Comment: The gangsters may have had some influence on the choice of a means of wd sddatidtton — gays that in his very early discussions with the gangsters (or, more preci sely, Maheu's discussions with them) consideration was given to possible ways of accomplishing the mission. Apparently the Agency had first thought in terms of a typical, gangland-style killing in which Castro would be gunned down. Giancana was flatly opposed to fens seeps Fieek 139 use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job, because the chance of survival and escape would be negligible. Giancana stated a preference fora lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food or drink. Trafficante ("Joe, the courier”) was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters was then -— eh ae eee inside as a oe ‘who named their man -- ° . —) eas i - -- - =—---=e - . os - - were ee = ~ar The gangsters said that: _—ihad_ once been in a position to receive kickbacks from the gambling interests, had since lost that source of income, and needed the money.) When Edwards received the pills he dropped one into a glass of water to test it for solubility and found that it did not even disintegrate, let elone dissolve. 2 ot; _.took them back and made up a new batch that met the requirement for solubility. Edwards at that point wanted assurance that the pills were truly lethal. He called on’ __. to make an independent test of them. Edwards gave “money to buy guinea pigs as test animals. 5 + has a record of a conversation with = —--on 6 February 1961. It may have related to the tests, but we cannot be sure. What appears to have happened is that tested the pills on the guinea pigs and found them ineffective. toh 140 Gambling Syndicate - Phase 2 illiam Harvey, Chief of = ‘was briefed in rentcary 1951 (by authority of Richard Bissell) on phase one of the gambling Syndicate Speba tion That, briefing wasin connection with a sensitive operation that Bissell had assigned to Harvey. ‘Harvey describes it thus: Early in the Kennedy administration, Bissell called him in to discuss what Harvey refers to as an Executive Action Capability; i.e., a general stand-by SACS Lite to carry out assassinations when rege reds Harvey's notes quote Bissell as saying, "The White House has twice | urged me to create nA a capability." Bissell recalls discussing the question of developing a general capability with Harvey. He mentioned the Edvards/gambling syndicate pas against Castro . in that context, but he now thinks that the operation was over by | then and that reference to it was in terms of a past eae sede a case in point. It was on this basis that Harvey arranged to be briefed by Edwards. Harvey's fixing of the Bathe as February rapepsatee after review of events both preceding the briefing and following it. He says now that it might have A Ge Fron as late January or as late as March 1961. | | After some discussion of the problems involved ri developing an Executive Action Capability, Bissell placed Harvey in charge of the effort. Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain aspects - 37 - 14] of the problem with sem de witogqand wk thy Stony dae ante} Since was already cut in, Harvey used him in developing the Execuiive Action Capability, although never with respect to eee We did not question = —_—_—ion his knowledge of the program for creating an Executive Action Capability, but Harvey's mention of him in.this connection may explain a notation bys 03 -: :ithat Bacay Becricceans : (to discuss techniques with ss +without noteer ® the discussion with the Castro operation. ey Harvey states that after the decision was made to go ahead with the creating of an Executive Action Capability, and while he was still discussing its development with Bissell, he briefed Mr. Helms fully on the general SbricBpt sont without mention of the then ongoing . plan Be Seeanarndte Castro. ; Sia’: out ue The Executive Action program came to be known as ZRRIFIE. Its principal asset jas an agent, QJWIN who had been recruited earlier by: 3 . for use in a special operation in the Congo -Labree assacsination-of-Patrice~Lumunbs} to be run by __ er | ' made a survey of the'scene, decided he: eee no part in fe- a assassination attempt, and asked to be released--which Bissell Granted.) The project name, CARI FLE» first appears in the files in May 1951, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962. The new DD/P (Helms) on that date authorized Ilarvey, by - 38 - 41-373 O - 79 - 10 142 memorandu, to handle the project on a special teri Accouniad for expenditures wid to be by general category and on Harvey's certifi- cation. The initial approval was, for $14,700, consisting of $7,200 for QJWIN's annual salary and $7,500 for operational expenses. Project ZRRIFLE was covered as an ___—_ operation (ostensibly to develop a capability for entering safes and for kidnapping couriers). It continued on a course separate from the Eéwards/gambling syndicate operation against Castro aneel 15 Novenber 1961. Harvey has a note _ that on that date he discussed with Bissell the application of the _ ZRRIFLE program to Cuba. Harvey says that Bissell instructed him to take over Edwards' contact with the criminal syndicate and thereafter to run the operation against Castro. Harvey adds that, asa completely unrelated development, shortly after this discussion with Bissell he j - was told by Helms that he was to be placed in charge of the Agency's Cuba task force. late 1961 - Early 1962 : Harvey recalls that he was‘ very busy with a@ mumber of things in the period that followed the discussion with Bissell that led to his taking over Edwards’ Castro operation. He was turning cai his responsibilities iri ey 2S: Herwas working with NSA on the Martin/ Mitchell defection case. He was reading in on Cuba operations and = 39 = 143 briefed the DDCI, General Carter, who said he understood the situation and in due time might brief the Director, Mr. McCone. It beste chown whether General Carter did or did not brief Mr. McCone. There is no indication that General Carter was further briefed on the full details of the assassination plot against Castro. ay 1952 The Attorney General obviously was told of CIA's operational involvement with gangster elements, because he requested a ‘briefing on the details. On 7 May 1962 Sheffield Edwards and Lawrence Houston met with Attorney General Robert Kennedy and, as Edwards pate it > "priefed him all the ggay." Houston says that after the briefing Ye Kennedy “thought about the problem quite seriously." The Attorney General said that he could see the problem and that he could not proceed against those involved in the wiretapping case. He spoke quite firmly, saying in effect, "I trust that if you ever try to do business with organized crime again--with gangsters--you will let the Attorney seneral know before you do it." Houston quotes Edwards as replying that this was a reasonable request. Edwards says that among the points covered was that of Roselli's motivation. The Attorney General had thought that Roselli was doing the job (the attempt at assassination of Castro) for woney. Edwards corrected that impression; he was not. - 62a- 144 Houston recalls that during the meeting with the Attorney General the latter asked for a memorandum record of the meéting. Edwards believes that the request was made later and by taketnenes A memorandum was prepared and was See by Edwards. Both Edwards and Houston recall having had a hand in writing it. A transmittal buck~ slip from Houston to Kennedy notes that the request was made on a May, which suggests that Edwards is correct in his belief that the request was made by telephone after the 7 May briefing of the Attorney General. The memorandum is dated 14 May 1962. It was typed in two - copies only, with the original being sent to Attorney General Kennedy | and the other copy being retained by the Director of Security. It was typed by Edwards’ secretary, __|. It does not state the purpose of the operation on which Kennedy was Bereta but it does . make it clear that the operation was against Castro and its true Satie may be cece from the memorandum. ' Edwards states that the briefing of the Attorney General and the forwarding of a memorandum of record was carried out eats briefing the Director (John McCone), the DDCI (General Carter), or the DD/P (Richard Helms). He felt that, since they had not been privy to the operation when it was under way, they should be protected fo involvement in it after the fact. As noted previously, Houston had briefed the DDCI on the fact that there was a matter involving the - 63 - 145 out of the meeting, ‘ and AmiiSl* were informed that President Kennedy had been assassinated. |. ‘was visibly moved over the news. He asked, "Why do such things happen to good people?” The contact report does not state the time nor the duration of the = AMLASI meeting, but it is likely that at the very moment ce + President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in. Paris and giving him an assassination device for use égainst Castro. x th states that he received an OPIM cable from FitzGerald that night or early the next morning telling him that everything was off. We do not find such a cable in the AMLASH file. There is a record in the file that ~ _ "was due to arrive back in Washington at 1810 hours, 23 November. . The AMLASH project was probably about as widely kaown within ‘ the clandestine Services as any other project of a similar nature. However, we can identify only four people who know of the just- described episode involving a hypodermic syringe and Black Leaf 40. “: knew all of the story, | _ _knew most of it, and knew much of it. FitzGerald did not mention this aspect of the AMLASH_ Opezation when he first briefed us on it. When we went back to him later with specific questions, he said he remembered something about Black Leaf 40, but nothing whatever about a device for administering it. __. said he had the impression that FitzGerald ~ Of - . *aucp UW99q SAY Spoarte AV aSousp ayy 4nq ‘WISN pue fasuazeq 24849 ‘yp 04 popasAroZ GaTdoo wots pastoxs 194eT SBA esvryd Duppuasjo su, ‘szopeat FO woTPepyNotT Suptuusetd tos UWOTZOG YIO 04 BSutTustsse sTepsusy £q tmMpusrowsm uotzos *possnostp SSOOONCH B@ UF PINSOT PTY FI “uoTPEUTSSUSSE 4B s4dwsz70 OT SPA OL4SBD JO UOT PeUTSSUSSB OY} WOTUA 4e qonyoe Awe oF PazBTEAIM st 4F Inq ‘ZgsT F9NBny “sent JO yuUsmacdsd sy. 7B SUT}OOW B Suh oTsUZ Uo vivig 1v BuTZoom wv 4G pastes sua joafqns syuL o4B4g Lupanp ut Ques ato9K ‘UOT eUTSSUSSB ‘CAL OSU UT UTePe pus sugO sseud atem OA YsBvOT GY ‘ONAL ou} UT es AoF BqNO OF JUSS OTOK4 STTTd STITGA 8u> 3BUX TITSsou fq poz STHeyed peysFTqnauy (*196T WAIN UT seBaA SUI UT FITEsOd UIA Fou uos FATEH ut *Apauusy QuspyTssig 4Bu3 S20N)- °*y2t0s Aus jo uotpeurtyuco quapusdsp qsuyese yotdzaqzunoo B dn paxood sAey OF Ok DARBY df,‘UOTPeVOLASzUT JYOotTO srOpun soutddtt tug “MTU TTT4 0% Zutyoes sea VIO paytoder st oH - 118 - sui UT. £q p24ejs SBA COSTS YI *suoT ee aU} SASTTO OF FSBET 4B YZNous psurveT O13sSe) -TZSOAUF UOSTIIVD oy} UF QMO ouloOo SBY Atpeytodar stur 146 *0red} STU} STF poTzed Stuy Suyinp suotynooxs pues sarngdeo poounouue su} fo guoy ‘peyoqyedstp ATTenjzoe sr3K fauy 3eq3 Food ou DALY of, ‘wey. OF Ppeueddey easy AVM ZCYA TOU SOTFTIUSPT “GAND SpTSUT SBM Us seryy FO. *uostad uy SupyspnZusT 20, cf IZSYL MOUH YOU OP 9H Cnc Wort UOT PsutoJUT IO sfseq eyy Uo pasoddns [TTS SF TOATAINS SuoT GB SL9yK m39} 8 4GUR AToeumsard ‘2g6T eunt Te uo ADALBY pemrosuyt TITssow BUBAUH UT FUSNBD StOMK sUTSSBSSB Petty seatUL *.0Td ayy yno Ar1Ed 04 ‘ont pozpnrosz ATTeNnjzoe ot3K SOInZTJ pTtomtepuy $ *qoTd uot zeUTssessse ‘OMI, aSBUG UO PSTeTIQ YOU SBM SY *LOAO SUA YF 19zTB SU savy Avm Apsuusy yroqoy us poaordde ostug-aztoTpuds DuTTquep uo payetzq sek sy *ent} JON *onzy] ‘or4seg JZo yoouy 0} ZOTd B payozey YID out Wau, ACU Si SY sZ0BT SUL STHSZEd PSUsTTand RYOLS NOSUVGE Mae an 147 him on the Pearson story. | d. Pearson, Anderson, and Greenspun (in Las Vegas) are newspapermen with a newsworthy story. Pearson has already published much of it. e. Maheu does have gocd reason for not vanting the story aired further. Unfavorable publicity might cause him to lose his lucrative client, Howard Hughes. There might be some value to be gained. from endorsing his puseeghion that he approach a” ‘and perhaps Roselli and urge discretion. What en do other components of Government know about this operation? er a ta Kormer Attorney General Robert Kennedy was fully briefed by Houston and Edwards on 7 May 1962. A memorandum confirming the a oral briefing was forwarded to Kennedy on 14 May 1962. The memorandum does not use the word "assassinate," but there is little room for misinterpretation of what was meant. Presumably the original of that memorandum is still in the files of the Justice Department. It ‘should be noted that the briefing of Kennedy was restricted to Phase One of the operation, which had ended about a year earlier. Phase Two was already under way at the time of the et eranee but Kennedy was not told of it. As far as we know, the FBI has not been told the sensitive - 130 - 148 operational details, but it would be naive to dssose that they have not by now put two and two together and come out with the right answer. They know of CIA's involvement with Roselli and Giancana as a result of the Las Vegas wiretapping incident. From the Chicago newspaper stories of August 1963, and from Giancana's ow statement, it appears that they know this fenatda to Cuba. When Roselli'’s story reached them (Roselli to_ _ to Pearson to Waterett!':to Rowley to the FBI), all of the pieces should have fallen into place. They should by now have concluded that CIA plotted the assassination of Castro and used U.S. gangster elements in the operation. There is some support for this thesis in the conversation I had with Sam Papich on 3 May 1967 when I told him of the expected meeting between Roselli and Harvey. Sam commented that Roselli and Giancanst have CIA "over a barrel” nied ice of "that operation." He said that he doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about either Roselli or Giancana because of "their previous activities with your people.” Can we plausibly deny that -we plotted with gangster elements to assassinate Castro? No, we cannot. We are reasonadly confident that there is nothing in writing outside of the Government that would confirm Pearson's 149 story of the gamoling syndicate operation, but there are plenty of non-gangster witnesses who could lend confirmation. : . a. Maheu can confirm that Shef Edwards told Roselli that Edwards had told the Attorney General of Roselli's activities on behalf of the Government. b. Ec. Date tert eer, o can confirm the pill and three-man team elements of the story. c.. ean confirm the pill element of Phase One. ad. If an independent investigation were to be ordered, the investigators could learn everything that we have learned. Such an investigation probably would uncover details unknown to us, because it would have access to the non-CIA participants. ° Can CIA state or imply that it was merely an instrument of policy? Not in this case. While it is true that paaee Two was carried out in an atmosphere of intense eanteale administration pressure to do something about Castro, such is not true of the earlier phase. Phase One was initiated in August 1960 under the Eisenhower administration. Phase Two is associated in Harvey’s mind with the Executive Action Capability, which reportedly was developed in response to White House urgings. Again, Phase One had been started and abandoned months before the Executive Action Capability appeared 2130", 150 on the scene. When Robert Kennedy was briefed on Phase One in May 1942, he strongly admonished Houston and Edwards to check with the nttelney General jn advance of any future intended use of U.S. criminal elements. This was not done with respect to Phase Two, which was ~ already well under way at the time Kennedy was briefed. The Pearson story, which is now causing us so much distress, includes one Getail that is found only in Phase Two: the three-man team. What measures might be taken to lessen the damage? We see little to be gained from personal approaches now to Maheu,” " —_, or Roselli. Maheu has much to lose and might be able to prevail upon a ce Roselli not to spread the story further. , It is questionable whether any such urging would be effective with Roselli, because Roselli stands only to gain from having the story of his CIA connection known and accepted. We cannot now suppress the story, because it is already out and may boil up afresh froa -the Garrison case. If we were to approach any of the participants and urge Ciscretion upon hin, and if this became known, it would merely lend credence to a tale that now sounds somewhat improbable. - 133 - 151 Mr. Dopp. Mr. Helms, did John McCone, former Director of Central Intelligence Agency and your immediate supervisor, know about—I gather you don’t care for the word assassination plots and I am trying to find some words you and I can agree on. Let’s call them efforts to get rid of Fidel Castro. Does that satisfy you? Mr. HELMS. Fine. Mr. Dopp. Did John McCone know about the agency’s efforts to get rid of Fidel Castro? Mr. HeEtms. He certainly was on top of all the operations that we mounted against Cuba. He was in the vanguard of this. He attend- ed most of the committee meetings, he pushed certainly as hard as anyone in the administration to see if we couldn’t topple the Castro regime. I believe he has testified to the effect that he did not know of what he called specific efforts to kill Castro. I don’t know wheth- er he knew about it or not. I will accept his word. I have no reason to argue with him about it. There was a big flareup at the time of the Church committee hearings over whether I had told McCone about this or whether I had told Harvey not to say anything about it. I don’t have any clear recollection any more of the events surrounding that particular detail, so I cannot help you on it. I would be glad to if I could. Mr. Dopp. So you don’t know when he would have been in- formed, if he had been? . Mr. HEtos. Then I believe he had Mr. Elder, who was his execu- tive assistant his— Mr. Dopp. I am having a hard time hearing. Mr. Hexms. I am sorry. During the Church committee hearings Mr. Elder, who had been his executive assistant, swore out an affidavit that he had been instructed by McCone to tell me that anything smacking of assassination was not permissible to Mr. McCone. Mr. Elder gave his testimony under oath. I never had any conversation with Mr. Elder like that, that I ever recall. As I have Said on previous occasions and on the record, I have great regard for Mr. McCone. He was my boss. I would have no doubt whatso- ever, if he had expressed himself in this fashion through one of his subordinates to me, that I would have remembered it. I think I would have remembered it. So the issue is unresolved. Mr. Dopp. For the purposes of clarity can we talk about these efforts to get rid of Fidel Castro in terms of pre-Bay of Pigs and ) Pegoey of Pigs? I think for our purposes that might be of some elp. Mr. Heis. Certainly. Mr. Dopp. Did I understand you to say that you are not sure he knew about either the pre-Bay of Pigs or the post-Bay of Pigs efforts or that he knew about the pre-Bay of Pigs and didn’t know about the post-Bay of Pigs or knew about both? : Mr. Hets. I thought on one occasion I told him about the pre- Bay of Pigs episode because my recollection is that something appeared in a newspaper—I think in the Chicago Sun Times— about it, and I went and spoke to him about it and told him what Was involved. As to the post-Bay of Pigs, I don’t know what he knew. You know, Mr. Dodd, I am not looking for refuge in these matters. I am 152 prepared to stand here and take my beating in any form that you gentlemen want to administer it. Mr. Dopp. We are not out to beat anyone. We are just trying to get at the facts. Mr. Hews. I am delighted to hear you say that. But let me just explain as Director of the agency Mr. McCone had every opportuni- ty to find out anything in the agency that he wanted to find out. He had an inspection staff, he had excecutive assistants, he had all kinds of people around him. So what he knew and what he didn’t know on a given date I can’t possibly attest to, but I do want to- make the point that nobody was stopping him from finding out anything he wanted to find out. Mr. Dopp. In the Church committee report which I have marked here as JFK exhibit F-539, reading at the bottom: Mr. McCone testified that he was not aware of the plots to assassinate Castro which took place during the years in which he was DCI, Director of Central Intelligence, and that he did not authorize those plots. He testified that he was not briefed about the assassination plots by Dulles, Bissel, Helms, or anyone else when he succeeded Dulles as Director in November 1961. Do you take issue with that? Mr. Hetms. No, I am not going to take issue with it. I would simply end up in a lengthy hassle between me and Mr. McCone. I have better ways to spend my time. Mr. Dopp. So you would agree with Mr. McCone’s testimony that he was not briefed? wee Hetms. I have no basis for agreeing or disagreeing, Mr. odd. Mr. Dopp. Can you think of any reason why you might not have briefed him? Mr. Hetms. When he came aboard as Director I was not the Deputy Director of Plans. It was Mr. Bissell who was the Deputy Director of Plans, and Allen Dulles was the Director. Dulles left, McCone took his place, and Bissell continued on as Deputy Director of Plans for a time. Mr. Dopp. When you became Deputy Director of Planning in 1962, can you think of any reason why you would not have told Mr. — McCone? Mr. Hens. The episode, the pre-Bay of Pigs episode, I did talk to him about one day, I know. Mr. Dopp. So you did inform him of the pre-Bay of Pigs effort? Mr. Heiss. Yes. That was not when he came in 1961; it was after that, so I guess if you parse the statement, the statement is accurate. Mr. Dopp. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that JFK exhibit F-539 be entered into the record at this time. Mr. Preyer. Without objection, JFK exhibit F-539 is entered in the record at this point. (Whereupon, JFK exhibit F-539 was received in evidence.] [The information follows:] 153 JFK Exuisit F-539 8 o” - 4 “y a tec’ - ¢"% THexewiden car dicatescthat-the , -mesting-bebwean et zDUleSSBiswly, — _Edomplagan Cabellzoccurredsometimesj-in; the; ?=of;1960,. . blyrinslate*Sentember2The minutes of ga Ta ths Special —- TO:“>, * . “ Grou on November 3,.1960, reflect the. following remarks: ca - = ee :...> =:3 Finally, Mr.*({Livingston] ‘Merchant (Under Secretary of State for Political’ Affairs] asked whether any real planning had been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderiess and probably brainless. He conceded that it would'be necessary to act against all three simultaneously. General Cabell. pointedsoutethatyactionsof:this-kind- fs: uncertaimof results:and‘highly’dangerous : in conception7and; execution; because the: instruments must{be+Cubans2He: felt, . that, particularly: because-of-the necessity -of-simultaneous:action; it would -haveg . to be concluded-that: Mr= Merchant's‘ suggestion is: beyond our‘ capabilitiesa (Spe-- cial Group Minutes, 11/3/60) 5) 44 ie EX Bess S - eee eee EY Exactly what.the term “direct positive action” meant to the speaker or those listening is uncertain. Merchant was ill and unable to testify;.. others present at the meeting could not-recall what. the words meant at the time they. were uttered, although 4 ian some have testified that theyae could refer to asSassination.! Bissell was also asked about the minutes of the November 3 meet- - ing. After reading the reference to “direct positive action,” Bissell said, “I find it difficult.to understand.” (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 18) He then was asked; -~° | x . ‘ ia *. 4 Qistauniavine Q. Do you, in light of the November 3 minutes remain firm that Cabell was. knowledgeable (of the assassination plots)? —- wee vin A. It casts some doubt on that in my mind. ---- - % ~ When asked if it cast “some significant doubt in light of (Cabell’s)- character,” Bissell answered, “Yes.” (Bissell, 7/17/75, pp. 22-23) - _ (c) Did John McCone Know of or Authorize Assassination Plots “Sere a _ The CIA considered several assassination plots against Castro dur-- inv McCone’s tenure as Director. Harvey initiated his contact with Rosselli in April 1962, and that operation continued into early 1963. [n early 1963 the CIA looked into the possibility of assassinating Castro with an ex loding seashell and contamin diving suit. AM/ — [.ASIL was offered w poison pen device in November 1963, and caches of arms were delivered to Cuba for his use in the following years. (t) McCone’stestimony.—McConé testified’ that he was not aware of _ the plots to assassinate’ Castro which took: place during ae area whichhe wis DCI; and, that hedid not‘authorize those:plc ~ &cCone, “00. Dp. 33, 44-45)? He: testified that heewas-not:briefed’about-the ' assassination plots by’ Dulles, Bissell, Helms,or anyone;else-when he? Trrvevled Duttes as Director in, November“1961;(McCone, 6/6/75, pp.. wa are oe gees iatddo> “ee , : read el4ce dl 1 PA? De you Reel Castro and Che ivercrui vie pom te ache as meaning killing (Fidel Castro. -\ (xentd rend tt that way, yes. (Lansdale, 1/8/75, p. 108) tar * s * © would r you a Bree that the words ‘ ‘d t positive action’a’ appear ito question See ree been uny planning in connection with assassinating (the Castros and- A tar ya schink the phrase ‘positive action’ could include assassinations, but * * * I’m not BM stone “sin Mr. Merchant’s mind.” (Gray, 7/9/75. p. 9. Mey it hag (otifed that he first learned of the Rosselli operation in August 1963, long ad been terminuted. See discussion infra, pp. 107-108. “64, 1, aay ena ifhe hed evere cn neeed,ahouk the shewhe would” - have disapproved: McCone testified : oo eS ee a Sas e ~TI had no. knowledge « of ‘any- authorized ‘plan. or planning that might lead to a-.: k request for authorization. Of.course, during those: days it was almost common ~ for one person or another to say, “we ought to dispose of Castro” * * * (bJut at. no time did anyone come to me, or come to other authorities to my knowledge, with a plan for the actual undertaking of an assassination. (McCone, Nagi is ; P- 3). rented?eaetsciT. eos TE <3 met ae mh GOSS eo: | o pc a SE. ta ahd ral oh :McCone also testified © "58 Lon Wee TE, ag oe a 2) a Re abe lay Tes fete & J a ” Senator: Hart of ‘Colorado: “Dia you.‘everrdiseasethe ores a5assassinations - with your predecessor, Mr. Dulles?. +: 0.5). .-sates, aS ity Fi eages aessie. McCone: No, I.did not.* wigreesatetenp soo eee ee aecite a laaieias (i) na, of Helms, Bissell; resiSaher Subordinate “Ac saa% Emp —Bissell"was’DDP: under McCone for three. mouths} from . Navenbee: 1961 until February 1962. Helms assumed the duties-of: DDP from Bissell and served throughout the balance of ease: s- _ terms: as Director.<)<— 0 80 = es in oe Soe Bissell testified about MeCone’s knowledge asfollows = nasiousA Q. Your: “nated is. that. syou never a assassinations with, Mr. McCone? - : ’ PS, eee we A. That is correct.* 3} fs : og < BGS: Q. * * * [Did you tell. McConesina GregPa: that epearen tian with Mr: . Harvey in which you at least told him to take over the ae ee with the: criminal syndicate? ; . AT don’t 1 remember so doing. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 19) : a eet! | satiny asst om met ove discussed the assassination plots with McCone while the plots_were_continuing.’ When asked whether McCone was. aware 2»of the assassination # yh against Castro, Helms testified: + at ~ No, it isn’t my impression that I told him, at least I don’t mre any readin -unfortunately * * *. Mr. McCone is an honorable man. He has done his own testifying, and all I can say is that I do not know specifically whether he was '. aware or not. (Helms,,6/13/75, pp. 90,101-102) _ - : : Helms further testified: . his OD a7 y: = ~ Senator Monpatz. I believe Mr.:McCone testified that he never healed of any: of these attempts when he was Director. Would you have any reason to ano 7)Fs with his testimony? Hews. Sir, I have always liked McCone ‘and I don’t want to get into an afterce! . tion with him. He had access to Harvey and everybody elec ‘So the way I had oe he had ila access to the Attorney General. oi) ; wis Pr P- . a ae aeet ste =a * ec 53 :. rey at Pe Rare = e.= enator Monpate. If you. were a member of this Committee wouldn't you as- sume that Mr. McCone was unaware of. the assassination attempts while ther were underway? ... se Herma. I don’t know how to answer that,aanueee Mondale. He was. involved in this up to his scuppers Just the way everybody else was that was in it, and I just don’t know. L have no reason to impugn his integrity. On the other hand, 1 Walt Elder, McCone’ 3 Executive Assistant, testified that Dulles gave McCone frou! te to twelve informal briefings between September and November 1961. He also said that Dulles and McCone travelled together on a bri %trip to. Europe to enable McCone. g get “up to speed” on CIA activities. (Elder, 8/13/75, p. 13) 2 Helms testified that he first informed McCone about the plot oes underworld figures in Angust 1963. See discussion supra at p. 107. ~ ~ nag . ee 155 Mr. Dopp. If I told you August 3 or August 1963 is when Mr. McCone believes that he was informed by you of the pre-Bay of Pigs efforts, would you argue with that date? Mr. HE.ms. Is that when that story came out in the Sun Times? Because that is the only thing I can key it to. Mr. Dopp. That is what he states, and I just wondered if you would argue with that. Mr. HeEtos. No, certainly not. Mr. Dopp. Mr. Chairman, I will ask that JFK F-538 be entered in the record at this time as well. Mr. PREYER. Without objection, JFK exhibit F-538 is admitted into evidence at this point. [Whereupon, JFK exhibit No. F-538 was received in evidence.] [The information follows:] 156 92 {ieeithat:the- plonsnvolvedeassassinatiowzalthoughe Bissell ended “wards. insist that the reaL meaning must have-been-understood:.Certain =, aaRabbioniés; tneplots Halmstheangement with Mr, Rankin personally that would take care of their needs and ours “ag a frank< discussion of the equities. eat ce recommended that the DDP in persozor viaa designee, preferably the former, discuss the/ — situation on a very restricted basis with Mr, Ravkin at his ‘ earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters, Until axe takes Pence it is not desirable to. lee Te in writing. ' Attachments ce: | my ae 164 MEMORANDUM FOR: pret SUBJECT General : Debriefing off ’ iets: Specific : The Oswald Casa 4 ? . REFERENCE :_“- Blind Memorandum dated 05 May 1964 - ———— —_——-=— :> 1. ‘Reference is mace toa telephone conversation yesterda day with Chief, | Staff concerning this matter. 2. Because 1 am net arvyars of the information already At available to the Commission investigating the Oswald Case or * . furnished by the Agency, my debriefingaf the Source has been based on the questions prepared by the| Staff an/l on what the Sourcs answers haye sugge eaeisball be glad ty pursus any ‘other topics suggested by | Stait, + hed 3. The Following information in addition to thatin the” im > tae: ee_reierennce might be of interest: : iS iy tm ee a, Luisa CALDERON, since she returmedto Cuba, > * has been paid a regular salary by the DGi even though ske has > | not parformed any services. Her home is in the > Vedado eS where the rents are birch. , -b. Source has known CALDERON for saveral years. 8) Q O A) ing to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior erty 1a8.2 in the departmen? which was known as the #impresa rH - Transimport”, Her title was Secretary Genera: of the Communist . Yoxrth in the department named in the previous sentence. ec. Luisa CALDERON was transferred directly ifrom hor positica in HEE Ministry of Exterior Commerce to a rost in México, a matter of Surprize to the Source. a. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (DCI pseudo MOR2008), shortly before he left Cuba for Mexico on or adcut 15 April 1964, sav CALDERON. | st 13, 2 Taare 165 Pronosed. Cussticons. om Oswali Gase REFERENCE: Debriefing of dated 5 May 1954 ol -_ 1. ~“T2s scurcs saya that prior to October 1963, Oswald visitsd the Gubaa P=obaasy fs Maxicn OL; on Ovo oF theresa oeeasiona.. In . is publiz ota eitbe vAS in MMextes dating tha neviod eae to 10542638 ia z Bat es - -- A} When dla soures leaen of thase visits - ove ox after - the asaassi=mation?. Pisasye daxcriba inde aoeerrr: ms of «°° - tender which sonssa leazmed his itaaene ties and identities tha cerscas iavelyed.. Hema tas ' 3B} Dis Thy viaits taka vloce dmring the aioz=exmantionad ~ - pariod o- Is thea senses saferring to peevyicus vinits. Li the issc,,i=y7 t= 32? mors ssesitice denis regarding these tzips 2% ead tha Pract ot is aces eS ere reee The soars states tint bafors, staring, Eres these visitz — Osrela waa in coninst with Me EG spacifieally inlaa- 9-2 CALDEZON, Liamssi VESA Poere|en and Roszalin RODRIGNES Lopes. TAis sronld anosar to maan that ose or more coniitts were fon mess niter Orwald seitomed ts ths Unlted Stains Le, betveen 10~3-53 and 21-22-53, é oi fi} ler does sourra ova by conmett? 3} Can}ha teas doom these contacts by th= Saeciiic ing el ctyta=ai nates, pinces and type of coninet, and date of 166 E}) if Oswald dia;not know tha intelligence aiiilinticns of- Hose eae ideals, what pvetexts, Liany, ware emsloyed in connciizg him? _/ ole 3 - #) Did source evys> seo any documentary =2toria! onany » of thess carinchs, or any correspondence iniilated by or addressed t Oswald? G) Dla Ss DSI aver employ physical suxvelliamce|a, . Sg cee oor devises or camer Pape RaEe coves theses connects, HE) The source cain he ies moe imow dinethes tha Sonans sexvless used Oswald in any agent canasity o> otharvisa. This coyiously makes it more imoorinat ta check oct what the - SOussa vant in cuastion ome. ; — SS ede 3. DIA tee DGI ever initlate an Investigation of Oswald? wai 4! as Whatwas the reases far packaging Res at DEL pores eee and fisla ofilzes after news of ths assassination was recelyed? Source was asked whather any proyoeative material was | deliberately fabricated by ths Cubans {Question 9) ie corinss the investigation of Cawald, Tha reoly attributed to him was, - “the only fabrication known is the special matter by Fitelk- CASTRO previsusly mentlonsd."" Please clarify. 3, 167 —_——— — MEMORANDUM FOR: ext — eee = one SUBJECT General Debriafing of/ Specific Tie Oswald Case * . REFERENCE : A. Blind Memorandum cated 65 May 1964 B. Blind Miamorancum date2 C7 May 1962 C. Conversations betveen/ Staff and 1. When ths Oswald Case first was discussed wit the Sours? tke specific questions prepared by| Staff were pcsead. The answers - given by the Source wereee SIRted in Reference A. That memorandum WhichI dictateitoal Staff Ssenog ears apoears accurate excert for sentence 79 which should!hay said that the only possible 'fabrication" known by Source? was the srecific denial by Fidel CASTRO, ona television Ses of 25, Cuban knowledge osOswald. 2. On 07 and 08 Maay 19341 further disaeeat reeseeases with the Scurca in order to clarity exactly whathe knew and what he ked beard. In the light of the explanationgiven by him, I believe that a clearer understanding of what ke knows c can be reached ET 3 record his lnowledg2 withou!: using the question and answer formai. Accorcingiy, in the following caragraphsI shal! resort ali the information given.by the Source? paraphrasing his explanations and comments. — \ de baye no personal knowledge of Les Harve; OSWALD or his tivities and I do not mow that OSWALD was an agent of the ce General de inteligencia (DGI) or any other directorate cr department of the Cuban |Gover nment. “ I Zirst heard af COSWALD :citer the assass ination of President Ken Bea when news media carried the name of OSWALD. . Personnel in the DCI first commented acdcut the case, so fares Il can recall. one day after lunch when a ersoup of officars, of whom I was one, were chatting. The officers prresent 1yere about. ten including Roberto SANTIZSTESAN, Nore arto HERN "ANDEZ, ce Curbelo, Andres ARMOMNA, Pedro FARINAS Diaz and Ease Ap dry gaz! wie ¥/ 168 Manuel VEGA Perez, Manvel VEGA Perez orevicu siz had been assignedto Mexico in tne paca Consulate where hea was the princiaal intelligence officer cf the DG. VEGA mentioned that OS$VALD had gone to the Cuban Consulta two or three times in connection witha visa application _ during the time that VEGA w as in Mexico. I gathered, - although I do not know that VEGA mace any specitic statement to this effect, that VEGA personally had seen OSWALD. I well could have reached this conclusion : becausa normally VEGA and his assistant in Mexicofor - the DGI, Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Locez, would see persons acplying far a visatc goto Cuba. This is because D& officars ara charged with expediting the eranting of visas .- of agents of the DG. Such agents on appearing atthe - <> - Consulate use a special phrase to indicate their relationship with the DGI. (i donct know the particular pbrase used in every case. I do Imowtrat hoauee from Kl Salvador in requesting visas always made mention of the names "Mauricio ) The DG orficers a a Consulete interview visa applicanis te find out if they are agents. If the visa avolicant cees not usa one of the ainsi phrases, the DG@ officers instead ci grenting the visa immediately, tell the anplicant to return in - afewdays. Tre officer then notifies Habana and reaqnests .-_ authority for the visa. I cannct recall if VEGA even mada the statement that he had requested permission toissusavisata . OSWALD, bui I fes] sure that he would hava done so betause VEGA had said that OSWALD had returned several times and this would be the usual procedure. 2 J believe that Rozelio RCDRIG SUEZ Loovez also would havea seen OSWALD because ke workedwita VeGA and also would have screened yisa BRPuEsnS . a { thought that 7 Luisa CALDERON migat have had contact with OSW. ALD jbecause I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly beicre I made a trip to Me:dco. that she had hee involved with an Americaanin Mexico, The information to whichI refer was ic | .by a DGI case officer named Norberto HERN ANDEZ ds Curbelo. | of 169 t3 HERNANDEZ had |ereerranin neve CALDERON, This was because, during the tim : She was in Mexico, tha DG had intercected a inter to her by an Amarican who signed his nama as CW/ER {phonetic} ‘or Something similar. .As you xnow, the promuncintion of Anglo-Saxon names is ditticul: in Spanish sai am nex» sure of how ths name mentioned by BERNANDEZ should 6 ‘ ae. It could have iet “Howard” or something different - As I understocd the matter, the Istter from tre American - was 2 love leer but eas that thers was 2 Clandestine - prefessional relaticnshio between the writer and Luisa. CALDERON, | HERNANDEZiteat _ after the interception of the letter she had been Jollosed . and seen in the company of an American. Ido not know ii... this could have been OSWALD, jet tote” ewe ee ~ , = . The only other person about woom you asked ime in connection with this, whom Itreeaii is eek DURAN and i EnOw very little about her. / | Us hte ee ie ret ce tai2 We saw a pretty Bit stan ea at the end ot| th2-reception room, ‘and someone asked who she was 6% the groun Said it was Sylvian DURAN 170 A i recall that. aftex the news of the assassination of President Kennedy reached the DGI, orders were issued for all offics of the DG, at Headquarters and in the field, to sort and package all documents according to whether they were "muy secrsto” (very secret), "secreto”’ (secrez), or “importante’”’ (important). The material, once packaged, was to be held pending further instructions. All travel by DGI officers and all! DGi pouchsas were suspendad temporaril; In addition, I recall that DGI Headquarters cersonnel were - instructed either to remain in the DE Headquarters oitices or to keep the DGl aware of their whereabouts So that they - could be reached immediately. I do not know the reason for these meeasures but I celieve it logical tt they were winine? because of the possibility that the United Siate might taka”. - some type ao? action against Cuba and the DG! aifices. As oe nearly as I can recall. we were abla to unpaskags DG files and use them normally about the chien December 1983.'” = het —— Mr. Hetos. Why would it have? Mr. GOLDSMITH. Yes, sir. Mr. Hens. I believe at some point a decision must have been nade that Oswald was perhaps a matter of continuing interest and ere the information which we held on him should be put in e file. I would like to suggest to the committee that when a Govern- nent agency receives mail it has to do something with it, and one f the things that you do with it is to try to categorize the type of nformation it is and where it would best be filed so that if you eed it at some future date you can get it back. Mr. GoupsmitH. I would ask that Mr. Helms be shown JFK ‘xhibit F-534. For the record, that is a Department of State tele- ram dated October 31, 1959. Would you please read to yourself that telegram. Mr. Hews. Yes, Mr. Goldsmith, I have read it now. Mr. GoLpsmiTH. This telegram makes reference to Oswald indi- ating his intention or desire to defect, and it says that Oswald has ffered the Soviets any information he has acquired as an enlisted 186 radar operator. My question to you is whether information con-_ tained in this particular telegram would normally lead to the opening of a 201 file? Mr. Hetns. I just don’t know how to anwer the question. I would have thought so but, on the other hand, maybe a decision would be made that this was something that involved the Marine Corps and that this was their concern. After all, the Department of Defense has a very large Defense Intelligence Agency and then it has intelligence units in the Army, Navy, and Air Force and they do have jurisdiction over their people and their security. Mr. GoupsmitH. Mr. Helms, I would ask you to refer to your previous testimony to this committee on page 75, specifically to line 15 response to the question posed by me: Mr. GotpsmitH. Would the information contained in this telegram normally lead to the opening of a 201 file? , We are referring to the same telegram. Would you please read the response that you gave that day? Mr. HELMs. Mr. Hetms. I would have thought so, an American who was defecting to the Soviet Union would have been of counterintelligence interest and that would have been quite sufficient to have caused the Agency to open a file. . ia GOLDSMITH. Mr. Chairman, I move for the admission of this exhibit. Mr. PrREYER. Without objection, the exhibit is ordered into the record at this point. [Whereupon, JFK exhibit F-534 was received in evidence:] 187 | SRO Ee —JFK Exner F-53534 — ape epic EBA Departisets of State : Sai - 35 Aas Action - : Control: 20261 er e BEER tess Rec'd: OCTOBER 31, 1959 ids MOSCOW E T2359 : AM t Info L TO: Secretary of State , '% “no: !30%, OCTOBER 31, 1 PM. rl DR eR : ig ie FOR PG Minera? _ | oe Batis i a! 4 "o — SCHC CLES bese OSws'O, UNMARRIED AGE 20 PP 1733242 IssUED TStA “SEPT 10. 1959 APPEARED. AT EMB TODAY TO RENOUNCE AMERICAN| SCS CITIZINSHIP, STATED APPLIED IN MOSCOW. FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP SY. FOLLOWING ENTRY USSR FROM HELSINK! OCT 15- MOTHER'S — ADORESS AND H!S LAST ADDRESS US 4936 COLLINWOOO ST., ie, FORT. WORTH TEXAS. SAYS ACTION CONTEMPLATED,-LAST TWO YEARS. MAIN REASON "[ AM MARXIST". ATTITUDE ARROGANT AGGRESS!VE.. RECENTLY DISCHARGED MARINE CORPS. SAYS HAS |-° QFFERED SOVIETS ANYINFORMATION HE HASACQUIRED AS. (_) “ENCTSTED RADAR OPERATOR. _ . IN ViEW PETRULLI CASE We PROPOSE CELAY EXECUTING RENUNCIATION UNTIL SOVIET ACTION KNOWN OR DEPT ADVISES. DESPATCH . FOLLOWS. PRESS INFORMED. | FREERS JR UNLESS “UNCLASSIFIED” i, REPROOUCTION FRO! THIS Sb 8 CaaS eeey ee COPY IS PROHIBITED. JFK Exuisit F-534 188 Mr. GotpsmitH. Mr. Helms, when, if ever, is it permissible to | remove a document from a 201 file? Mr. Hetms. I don’t really know what the regulation of the Agency is any more about the removal of documents. I would have thought it was not a common practice to remove documents from a 201 file, but whether there were specific cases under which this might have been done for some particular reason, I suppose there were. Mr. GoipsmitH. When a document is removed from a 201 file, is any record of this event required to be kept? Mr. Hetms. Normally I would think that an entry would be made that such-and-such a document had left the files, so anybody who was reviewing that file would then realize it was not complete. But I am so far away from these matters anymore, Mr. Goldsmith, that I am really not a good witness on these technicalities, and I am sorry about that. But I am not and I would not like the vagueness of my memory to mislead anybody. Mr. GoupsmiTH. I would ask Mr. Helms be shown JFK F-523. I might indicate this is a form that is used to initiate the opening of a 201 file. | Mr. Helms, in whose name was this 201 file opened? | Mr. Hetms. The name is Oswald, Lee, and the middle name} Henry. Excuse me, I stated December 9, 1960. Is that correct?} Mr. GOLDSMITH. Yes, sir. | Mr. HeEtns. I just wanted to be sure I can read it. | Mr. GoutpsmiTH. Did the Agency ever initiate inquiry as to why} the file on Oswald was opened under the middle name of Henry} instead of Harvey? | Mr. Hes. I don’t know the answer to that, Mr. Goldsmith. I] believe that it caused a great deal of controversy at the time it was} discovered after President Kennedy’s death. But what the resolu- tion of the matter was and whether any logical explanation was found, I do not know. Mr. Gotpsmitu. Did you ever see a written report dealing with} this issue? Mr. HeE.tns. If there was one I don’t recall seeing it, but I have no doubt that somebody must have made an effort to explain it. Mr. Gotpsmitu. You made reference earlier to the date of thi particular document. It is December 9, 1960. The State Departmen telegram which we showed you earlier was dated October 31, 1959.f That is the document that made reference to Oswald intending defect and to give military information to the Soviets. | Why after the receipt of this State Department telegram in} October of 1959 would it have taken more than a year to open 4 201 file on Oswald? Mr. Hens. I have no explanation for that, Mr. Goldsmith, I ¢ sorry, I just don’t know. Mr. GotpsmitH. Would a routine name trace for Lee Harvey} Oswald have resulted in a reference to the file opened under the name Lee Henry Oswald? | Mr. Hens. I believe that the procedure in the Agency was wher traces were being run of this kind that all the Oswalds would hav been run and certainly all the Leo Oswalds would have been run] 189 It was probably at that time it was discovered there was a mistake here. Mr. GoupsmiITH. I take it, your answer then, is yes? Mr. HELMS. Yes. Mr. Go.psmiTH. I notice under the section in the middle of the page where it says other identification, the initials AG are insert- ed. Do you know what the initials AG stand for? Mr. HE.ns. I am sorry, I am not with you. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Please look down the right-hand side of the page. There is a column marked other identification and within that the initials AG appear. Do you know what that term stands for? Mr. HE.Ms. I don’t know what that is. I am not familiar with it. I am sorry, I just don’t know. Mr. Go.LpsmiTH. I understand. I note by looking at the bottom of the page that Oswald’s file was restricted. Do you know why Os- wald’s file would have been restricted? Mr. HExms. No, I don’t. Mr. GotpsmiITH. Is that unusual in any way? Mr. Hetms. Maybe because he was an American, but I don’t literally know the reason. Mr. GoLpsmITH. Is it unusual to restrict such files? Mr. HeEtms. I wouldn’t have thought so. But the Agency was loaded with different kinds of classifications and classification pro- cedures and special arrangements, and so forth, to take care of unusual circumstances, so I don’t think that was unusual. Mr. GotpsmiTH. Are 201 files ever maintained on a covert basis or is there ever such a thing as a fake 201 file? Mr. HeE.ms. I don’t know. You brought to my attention the fact that you had discovered one in the Agency. I was not aware of the phenomenon myself prior to your having brought it to my atten- tion. Since you did find one, then I concede that I guess there was such a thing, but I was not aware of the one that you brought to ) my attention and I am not aware of any others. Mr. GotpsmiTH. Let’s examine that particular one at this point. I ) would ask that Mr. Helms be given JFK F-522. What was the ZR rifle project? ) Mr. Hetms. My understanding from the hearings of the Church ) committee, I believe the ZR rifle originally started out as an indica- tor for a project which was supposed to cover a man who in turn had been taken on to have available an operational capability to kill people. This man was hired before I was aware of these things. [have this in hindsight but I believe that is what the ZR rifle was supposed to be and then I believe later it metamorphosed into something else. But anyway, after I became Deputy Director for Plans, I put on the shelf for good any and all use of his capacity for killing people. We didn’t need that, so that was the end of that. If the ZR rifle continued after that, it was in another context and [ don’t remember precisely what the context was. I can read what you have given me here, that it was to spot, develop, and use agent assets for Division D operations. My recollection of Division D was that it was the operational staff in the Agency which attempted to procure code and cipher materials overseas for use by the National )Security Agency. 41-373 O - 79 - 13 190 Mr. Gotpsmitu. In fact, that form which you were just reading, the reference to Division D, has no bearing at all upon any execu- tive action-type problem, any type of assassination program? Mr. HEts. I would not have thought so. If that was in Division D, maybe it was there for convenience. Maybe they didn’t know where else to put it, and I can’t blame them. Mr. Gotpsmitu. Is it also possible the person writing these notes was writing that aspect of it to mislead people to cover the fact that this was assassination activity? Mr. Hets. I don’t know whether that was the idea or not, Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Gotpsmitu. Let’s take a closer look at this particular docu- ment. This document consists of handwritten notes. The notes are in the handwriting of two different individuals. Mr. Hetms. Yes, I notice here on one of the pages, “It should have a phony 201 to backstop this.” Mr. GotpsmitH. You are reading from which page, sir? Mr. Hetns. I am sorry, they are not numbered, Mr. Goldsmith. I am not trying to be difficult. It is 1, 2, 3—this is page 4. Mr. GotpsmitH. You are referring to the bottom of the page where it says, ‘should have phony 201 in RI’? Mr. Hetms. That is it. | Mr. Go.LpsMiTH. The document indicates, ‘‘should have phony 201 | in RI to backstop this. All documents therein forged and backdated. Should look like” —I believe that says a “CE file.” Mr. Hewns. I think that must be what it means. Mr. GoupsmitTH. Let’s refer your attention now to page 6, two pages further. Mr. HE.Ms. Right. Mr. GotpsmitH. At the bottom right-hand portion of the page approximately five or six lines up, the person wrote in, “Never mention the word assassination.” Is that true? Mr. HE Ms. Yes, that is what it says. Mr. GotpsmiTH. Would you turn to the next page. Does that page say “No projects or papers except for cover’? Does it also say “cover file create from RIS”—the rest of it not really legible? Does it contain that language? Mr. HELMs. Yes. I don’t know, I can’t read it either. It is so cut up and excised, and so forth, it really doesn’t make much sense. Mr. GotpsmiTu. In any event, Mr. Helms, do these handwritten notes contain any indication that this particular project contem- plated the use of fake files? Mr. Hetms. That is what it says here. I don’t know any more about it than that, if this is the item I mentioned a moment ago that you had brought to my attention and I concede that is what this says. But I find it awfully difficult to deal with these matters so totally out of context and excised and sanitized, and so forth. My recollection is as I have told you, that the ZR rifle project was an individual who was supposed to kill people. He never killed any- body and he was never used for that purpose after I had anything to do with it, and any further business the ZR rifle was involved in was something else’s entirely. 191 Mr. Go.psmiTH. Mr. Helms, I would ask you to refer to page 86 of your prior testimony which is given at a time when you had access to the complete document. Mr. HE.s. Is the top of that page supposed to have been cen- sored by the Agency or is that somebody else’s lining. Mr. GoupsmiTH. No, sir, that was not intended to be sanitized by the Agency. I believe your lawyer will confirm that. [Witness conferring with counsel. | Mr. Hetms. Excuse me, Mr. Goldsmith, I was confused by what I was looking at here. [Witness reading from prior testimony. | Mr. GoLpsmITH. The question to you: Mr. GoLpsmiTH. In any event, would you agree that here is a case where at the very least agency personnel were contemplating the use of a fake 201 file and possibly a fake operational file? Will you please read your answer? Mr. HE.LMs [reading]: Mr. HeEtms. Yes, it looks like that. But then his boss would have known about this. He would have had to get permission to do that. Somebody would have known about it. Is that as far as you want me to read? Mr. GoLpsmiTH. Yes. I have one more exhibit to show you, Mr. Helms. I would ask Mr. Helms be given JFK F-524. While that is being done, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that JFK F-522, F-524, and F-526 be entered into the record. Mr. PREYER. Without objection, the exhibits are entered into the record at this time. Mr. GoutpsmiTH. In addition, I would ask that JFK F-525, F-512, and F-523 also be entered into the record. Mr. PREYER. Without objection, the exhibits are entered into the record at this point. [Whereupon, JFK exhibits F-512, F-522, F-523, F-524, and F-526 were received in evidence:] 192 JFK Exuisit F-512 ye eke ae 5t2 AFFIDAVIT JOSEPH H. LANGOSC H, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, being duly sworn, makes oath as follows: That this statement is made freely, voluntarily, and without threats, promises, assurances, or remuneration from any source. That from January 5, 1955 until approximately August 1968 I was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency. That during 1963 I functioned in two capacities as a CIA officer, the first capacity being as Special Assistant to the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff and the second capacity being as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff. That during 1963 the Special Affairs Staff was the CIA staff responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence Services. That as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, I was responsible for safeguarding the Special Affairs Staff against penetration by foreign intelligence services, particularly the Cuban Intelligence Services. That I was further responsible as the Chief of Counter- intelligence for the Special Affairs Staff for initiating and Supervising counterintelligence operations designed to penetrate the Cuban Intelligence Services. 193 That during the latter half of April 1964, in my capacity as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, I became acquainted with an intelligence officer of the Cuban Direccion General de Inteligencia (DGI) . That the Cuban intelligence officer with whom I became acquainted had defected from the DGI while in Canada and subsequently entered the United States and maintained an operational relationship with the CIA under the cryptonym ChyATauy™ That io - after his defection, provided the CIA. with certain DGI documents and. that none of these documents concerned or referred to either the assassination of President Kennedy or Lee Harvey Oswald. CLYATOM YM That during May ate | . reported information to me concerning the reaction of the DGI in Havana, Cuba to the assassination of President Kennedy and that this information Pe rand in a memorandum dated May 8, 1964 which I prepar:=-1 for the Chief of CIA's Counterintelligence Staff and thaz this memorandum accurately reflects the information CayPTouym. reported to me by/ | ‘= That the above-referenced memorandum of May 8, 1964 Cry¥prony a's recording | _.'s information states that Luisa Calderon Carralero, also known as Luisa Rodriguez Calderon, was being paid a salary by the DGI, that she might have had contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, that during the time she was in Mexico the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who Signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something similar, that 194 after the DGI's interception of the letter she had been followed by the DGI and seen in the company of an American and that a DGI officer in Havana: Cuba named Roberto Hernandez de Curbelo believed that Luisa Calderon Carralero had been recruited) 1 by the Central Intelligence Agency. : KaPonrT That I do not recall ever reviewing a CIA ke of or being informed about a conversation which transpired on November 22, 1963, approximately three hours after the assassination of President Kennedy, in which Luisa Calderon Carralero may have expressed foreknowledge of the assassination of President Kennedy. That during 1965 I prepared a memorandum for the Chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division for Cuba, entitled P | _. .‘Allegations," which concerned security problems with the AMLASH operation. = That I prepared the following statement at page 3, paragraph 3A(3) of the memorandum entitled . Allegations": "Assassination, obviously, is a dangerous game, not merely to the plotters in a physical sense, but to a | sponsoring government aren may suffer severe political repercussions at home and abroad if its involvement is made known." That the government referred to herein is the Govern- ment of the United States and that the plotters referred to herein were persons connected with the AMLASH operation. That the AMLASH operation was initiated and supported > by the CIA. 195 reat J Py Spa ed the care dum,ohHe aly ¥" Allegations, are AMLASH Seep cgi an insecure operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy o November 22, 1963. aorghtbm That the AMLASH oat phon been an insecure operatio prior to the pai of President Kennedy because it was pape gaan that as of 1962 the Cuban Intelligence Service had knowledge of the CIA's association with persons involved in the AMLASH ian pein including AMLASH-1, also known as That the, of the AMLASH operation prio ' to the assassination of President Kennedy was kanewn to senioz level CIA officials, including Desmond Fitzgerald. That the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was characterized by the Special Affairs Staff, Desmond Fitzgerald and other senior CIA officials as an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the CIA. I understand that this affidavit may be introduced and received into evidence by the Select Committee on Assassinations of the United States House of Representatives, and may lead them to make various findings of fact, and the statutes applicable to Congressional investigations, including but not limited to those concerning false statements, obstruction, or misleading, would subject me to criminal penalties for not telling the whole and complete truth in this affidavit. Further affiant saith not. Sworn and subscribed to before me on this [ft aay of September, 1978. will 7 —— NOTARY PUBLIC cee Ser , ROBERT F. MITCHELL, JR, an “. NOTARY PUBLIC gel: _ MY COMMISSION EXPIRES MARCH 31, 15982 wy y } \:, My Commission Expires: p> 4 197 JFK Exuisit F-522 iar ah OU ey ee ne ‘SRR Bece I etifioedae ANA pesca RON Ce ap Dat Dae he ee ing eas oa a econ 4 Len Aa erhetag ie he pocice ilt_ he onsid fei &2 he : E: aaa fate Aintatinse toil pea Ea | _ Bae 62a a! — an ee —S=— La ae apinioniesnaitiee kaaes cubensis iret ociecea SSC Athena Rees RICHARD HELMS ° Deputy Director (Plans) 205 Shy 19 February 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR: .- William K, Harvey SUBJECT: Authorization of ZRRIFLE Agent Activities 1. For the purpose of ZRRIFLE activities, you are here- by authorized to retain the services of Principal Agent QJWIN and such other principal agents and sub-agents as may be ‘required. This authorization will continue to be in force through 31 December 1962, subject to renewal at that time. 2. As established by contract with him, QJWIN's salary will be $7,200 per annum. Accounting for the expenses of QJWIN and other agents involved in this activity will be in the form of receipts for funds received by them, and these receipts will be retained in the ZRRIFLE covert operational file. Because of the sensitive nature of this activity, accounting for funds will be by general category and by your certification. In addition to the salary established for QJWIN, you are authorized the expenditure of $7,500 through 31 December 1962. If further funds are necessary, they will be provided. . 3. This memorandum is to be considered in lieu of pro- ject and constitutes authorization for all travel, per dien, operational and other expenses. 4. It is requested that this activity be handled et strictly on an EYES ONLY basis. Richard Helms Deputy Director (Plans) 41-373 OW es 79 =%4 “ e seer “es . { ; ~ - j ° ; ee cae, PERSONALITY (201) FILE RE “VESTA” en SOMES ot: pre : oats ° = a Me Sommeed — eee rs e re D ar * 70 . - : clicas g ite ROADS JARTEAS,| _—— - i Form curt be typed or printed in block Letters. INSTRUCTIGNS: If the iden- aviden name, if epplicedte) oust be Listed. SECTION $2 All zeovn alieres and variant» (ircluding Write Wixiouy for items you are unsdis tifying date varies with the alies used, 2 acporste fora must be used. A : . es to complete... - : =. ' | an Its] - 43 _- SECTION EC ART E = Le ~}: 5 : “— JFK SeeT108 THI: To be densiated in all cesses. = d SECTION | BKC MES | ee eau eR zt 2S a ED VARVANT WARE J me (Firat) | (Middle : "so ¢TAthey TORR TA . (Last) 2 7 ae Ls 5 ras os = ie . ? a oe . one: - *. s - - . 4 P . he - - eS a a. . ‘ “. . 5. CITY OR Torn GF B1aTH 7- OTHER LOSHTIFICATICN ~ PxucTs &. afrth OATE ves Li7 me fot Te Vole RG Nes Oo, hee A Gre OO 7= : a oe 5S y occrPo3.. coud OCCUR ATION/7PQS1 TION bi 5 tata tin VebAs UG Marne CcayPTONYM (EL Se Ag eae 6 el Te DES Te Sal et" ahaoe i PEIWANENT OFAIGE Restaictzo 2/32 /| SIGHATURE . 2 _~ i neo a) ! F : c = | “vas | ei rom 8312 | -, RECORD gary 30 JFK Exuisit F-523 207 —JFK tExneT i -5Z4 ar THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 Office of Legislative Counsel 19 September 1978 Mr. G. Robert Blakey Chief Counsel § Director House Select Committee on Assassinations Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Mr. Blakey: Forwarded herewith is an unsigned memorandum > dated 20 February 1964 concerning a machine listing . of documents for the Oswald 201 file. This document was not released earlier under FOIA, but has’ been declassified in the light of new considerations. It formerly bore the classification of Secret and the handling restriction of Eyes Only. Mr. Goldsmith requested this statement for use of ee the document in the public hearings, as the classifica- tion and handling restriction had been removed when the document was approved for release under FOIA. Very truly yours, ae - ;* ‘- ; ¥ Fe Lk, S.D. Breckinridge - Principal Coordinator, HSCA encl. JFK Exuisit F-524 208 - 20 February 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, | SUBJECT: : Documents Available in OSWALD's 201 File : 1. A machine listing of documents officially recorded as being in OSWALD's 201 file was requested and is attached. The actual _ machine work of this type was begun in 1963, but a few items of previous ~ ‘dates were also recorded. 2. A comparison of the documents physically available in the 201 file and those recorded as being in the 201 file has shown that 37 documents which should be in the 201 file are not available init. This_ . total is made up of: : nti 2 dispatches 7 memoranda from the FBI 1 CSCI 2 State Department documents 25 cables. 3. Machine inquiries for the location of these documents have e A not been made.- D :5 ‘By 2 locument Number a - for FOIA Review on JUN 1975 + .=e" ee 5 209 JFK Exuisit F-526 JFK Emer F-52646 ae Encit. 2 er axing Xm, coal igi . sae 3 ’ a q ee ere ae Distzioution§ §' . ; ; § : |e | ins a —e : is e ~ | e Ss > | : rm - < vs ; = 2 . | > . \ ry =~ oe ' 7 ty i: a pet pti Me Z o> SA ae Fe Document Mumzer ee we) 2 Bcf iy’ =) pe - ———* for FO! Paver dj S35 AIG : fy A Ay Dec 1963 NEL is gree 210 | 25 November 1963. SUBJECT: Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald ~ § | As ahd Zora ‘1. %It makes little difference now, bat} had at one time an interest in Oswald. As soon as I had heard Oswalf’s nance, I recalled that as - gic A had discussed -- sonetine in Suzmer 19560 -- with | | . Hien . _ the layang on of interview(s) through} OT other Suitaable channels. "At the moment I don’t recall if this was discussed while Oswald and his samt were en route to our Boa of if it was after their ETN ala - r pom eenben that Osvald’s unusual behavior in the USSR haastxuck me fromthe moment-I had read the first SiATS ‘dispatch on hin, and I - told. my subordinates something amounting to "Don’t push toa hard to get = the information we need, because this individual looks o¢d.”} We were — particularly interested in thesin?9 Oswald night provide on the Minsk =. 5° 24%) factory in which he had been employed, on certain sections of the city itself, and of course we sought the torts Seieige might help develop|. : Foraign: ;personality dossiers. BS GRAPHIC heres Ue 3. I was phasing into ny next ‘cover Pats ela, TL ee geet ss the tine; Thus, I would have left our country shortly after Oswald’s arxival, I do not “know what action developed thereafter, 2 ; | T | |’ enantie Neiitageeteead Addendun . : o ee bere 4. As an afterthought, I recall also that at the time I was becoming increasingly interested in watching develop a pattern that we had discavered in the course of our bio and research work s the musber of Soviet wd women marrying foreigners, being permitted to: leave the USSR, then eventually divorcing their spouses and settling down abroad without returning "home". The! case was among the first of these, and we cesta turned ° up something like two dozen similar cases.“ vote ag ae becam2 interested in the ‘developing " trend ire Raa come across. It was partly out of curiosity to lear if Osweld’s wife would actually accompany |hin to our country, per tly out of interest in Oswald's own experjenced in the U SSR, that we shoved = intelligence interest in the Aarvey story. . ; ' > ¢ 211 Mr. GoLpsmMITH. The first page of JFK exhibit F-524 is a letter from Mr. Breckinridge to Professor Blakey of this committee. I would refer your attention—why don’t you read both pages. Mr. Hetms. I have had a chance to read not only Mr. Brecken- ridge’s covering memorandum to Mr. Blakey but also the attached memorandum which is unsigned and just says “To Chief,’ I don’t know what. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Does this memorandum make reference to 37 documents being missing from Oswald’s 201 file? Mr. HELMs. Yes, it does. It says that: In 1964, February 20, a comparison of the documents available in 201 file and those recorded as being those in the 201 file has shown 37 documents which should be in the 201 file are not available in it. And there is a breakdown of what seems to be missing. ahd GOLDSMITH. Was this document ever brought to your atten- tion‘ Mr. Hens. I can never remember it having been brought to my attention. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Were you ever informed that at some time there were at least 37 documents missing from Oswald’s 201 file? Mr. HeEtms. No; I doubt that would have been brought to my attention. I would assume somebody in charge of the registry would have gone looking for the documents. | Mr. Go.psmiITH. Is the information contained in this document particularly sensitive? — sib HELMs. You mean sensitive operationally or in a security sense’ Mr. GOLDSMITH. Sensitive in the sense that the Agency normally attributes to that term. Mr. HEtos. I wouldn’t have thought so. Mr. GoLpsmiTH. In light of that, why would this document have carried the classification of “secret’’ and the restriction “for eyes only” prior to its declassification? Mr. Hens. Sir, I am sorry but I don’t see ‘eyes only” on it nor do I see “secret” on it. F Mr. Go.psmiTH. I understand that. I said prior to its declassifica- ion. os reread the letter to Professor Blakey from Mr. Brecken- ridge. Mr. Hews. I don’t know. Maybe it was overclassified. A lot of documents in the agency were. Mr. GoupsmiTH. Thank you, Mr. Helms. I have no further questions. Mr. GotpsmitH. Mr. Chairman, there are a number of other exhibits which relate generally to the subjects of Mr. Helms’ testi- mony, but with respect to which there was not sufficient time to ask specific questions. They have been marked for identification as JFK F-513 through F-517, F-519, F-521, F-525, F-528, F-530, and F-533. May they be admitted into evidence at this time? ; Mr. Preyer. Without objection, they may be admitted into evi- ence. [The exhibits referred to above follow.] ACC) Lr) CTVGs pAVERT CAN “are | SAB 7 ee ee Ee ae Soha f. sat HE AT. SOVENS ONUesal.< ee, eee Nauome SE ne _———— , oe bsAe a= he cite : ats ERTTY VLADIMTsovics VITH CONSUL WHOM HE 8RELIEVED; RENYALER l ~~ - | > VHEN [SEPT EN SPOKE Si wOSrivd?, SUB ASKED Sov GUARD IVAN : 93 ED xOM} r > IF.THERE | 3°) s rh —is oe a3 ANYTHING MEM RE TELEeRs¥ TO WASHINGTON, | ro ae ee 9 Spot Mtn aN NOTHING RECEIVED. YET, BUT REQUEST HAD) PEEW SENT. tot. WaveBt: PHOTOS MALE j: ; ipca §. FEET, REnEDINS HAISLIBE , Gp ine TOP. YORE KHAKIS — = cae Oh Defaioe oes scument Numsar —— for FOIA Review on BF 36453 homme © , wy Ww tes es | . < Csey Ns. REPRODUCTION 8Y OTHE2 THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PQosiohe JFK Exuisit F-513 213 JFK Exuripit F-514 aN @ Sette co eee WTC:mfd , ; FN fs ES oe Py ae MEMORANDUM March st Thay SUBJECT: Mexico - CIA Dissemination of Information on Les Harvey Oswald on March 24, 1964 The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin (Commission Document No. 631) in which it set forth the dissemination of the information on Lee gaan Oswald. [I realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 15, 1964 and I nplechat the complete answers will give Besa G4 au adetee ne ees we requested.. | We would like to know just when |got the information with respect ta Lee Harvey Oswald | and what was the information and how was it obtained. How iid the information get from Mexico to the CIA in Washington, ind in what fom did it come? , ‘ At what point was the information that’ the Lee larvey Oswald was probably the Lee Harvey Oswald who had lefected and was married to a Russian developed so that when. he telegram went from the CIA in Washington to the various gencies it contained such information. In other words, T, Ould like to know whether this was information available in 214 Mexico or did. this additional information get in the message only after 1. reached Washington ee She information was being disseminated to the various agecies. As you know, we are still trying to get an explana - tion of the photograph which the FBI showed Marguerite Oswald soon after the yee sesna tren: I hope that paragraph 4 of the memorandum of March 24, 1964 sent Mr. Ranicin by the CIA is not the answer which the CIA 2ntends to give us as to -this inquiry. We should also determine why the Navy never furnished the CIA with copies of the most recens photographs of Oswald. - 215 SES RRO! PERO ODES TE, — JFK Exhey F-515 — 5 March 1964 Raae) Iwfernn | Meme tn ve pastage +, Dick: A Peat Age > Corer te oe ov e@uc Seeet waG ML Y re pe, y TY dian te Netret ee We have a pronls ers for your determination, <= This is responsive to paragraph 3 of Rankin!s letter (see refarence tab), JA does not desire to respord directly to paragraph Z of that letter which made a levy for our material which had gotten into the hands of the Secret Service since 23 November, We found that, except for three telegrams, all that the Seeret Service had was matsrial we had sent to McGeorge Bundy at the White House, Apparently, he had simmply passed it to the Secret Service as a matter of internal _. _infarmation, Unless you feel otherwise, (*) would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2, If e they core back on the point he feels that you, or someone from hsre, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the materials rather than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest, We have either passed the material in substance to the Commission in response to earlier levies, or theitems refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous six photo— graphs which were not of Oswald, and the passenger manifest on an airline which also did not pertain to Oswald, If you desire to take note of the levy in paragraph 2, we would recommend that you indicate in the attached proposed memorandum solely that we will takes care of it separately. (*) - Staff employee Document Number 579-asdo for FOIA Review of = JUN 1975 JFK Exuisit F-515 vitegec Roe. BRS nef % } mo f sty te ° t : ft ; Eye CF eB aL S he 2°71 ah, yee) (ee origPte thes 1S i|: w é5 7 rl Bes Ea: nl (2 , - hs Bae 9. tht A Be a ae aS OxISITSD, z kee | MO Be Bra: ASE | SZ 1 8atfeeos s 4 BSE HS ON Aen Q 7 Tie Vv =e lov | “OA Cae aa ; Af Fal 9 cr Ds 2 | k Li ae— Wb Ge. pe Ae =f at : be | z in aT =* 3 at i “| _ wo! re H Wo =. Fe A ag)Be} [a \ “eM F-516 aace ed (4 Boos ) a: ~s ,fe Le OB A be: jw od | fe cy. p 2 i [3qc.e 5 EXHIBIT >. Ye: ms Q : MH ow ff Mate SaPwy eer ((5 v4 Ge Wels |e: 216 “< : fs [A yt acd Hoy : mal bal ) wl It .B- [ 2 a es OF 7 a ‘atl if tas : BS ILE IN CS FILE MO. SY OTH a JFK \ : Eanas. R e2200UCTION 3 i Ie ye) Zz 0 a az7icz2 RLLTaAsine 2=2CTO 2~ orals c 4 5 : eh PA Vo MAAN VIG 19} | ie NE Sighs tyne eae e a oe {Geer etic ee Fi! ht WRw, Set: = it loguingy. uolns pen: ? ; Oe . ‘ : . Jee et GS Boag li hee IL . fore Oo eh — 2ADS ITN ' = 2s SORZ=ED as EETat pf SS RI ReHF A a OS PS OR ¢ _NABEIED oN meadrom ABE PAD az3 HE se 3 nce SRSSR YS. ores = oie RAs’ca) 70 2 us EX - voscow STa7=D Sosa St pte UNION 2Fay ob 2. way “LATEST EDGS INvO =ZAS| | REPOST ; -* “3. STATS -_ —--> = Semon x fat = S£YING! EaD DSTSSS NSD! OSF4i0 TS) Stes cS CYrssaan Zar ‘ye Pots 52 AND ais SOTEET cian DAYS Bole Peres SND. DsoT SEST= ; f‘ . : COGROAIMATING OFFICERS % « ~RELEsSING artic = ‘ “) _ seTHeNeicenixG a. t sag A { ri GericzR ete" ' Cr RePRCOUCTIO’ y OTHER THAN THE ISSUING CFFICE JPROMISITED. » Cony No. =a Tr —_ wey - ~ —— >< —— a i ae , sas bere aie hind “cata = : >. . eta tt re Dara ae : . : nee ER ot aay “S- belt 4 éTe CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ; SS 12-82 ae hPa : Fea ROUTING a Cl INDEX PeeXTeS se O NO INOEX ~ OATE : i O FILE IN CS AILE NO. TO 3 FROM: DIRECTOR CONF: -. | | SHOULD PASS: DYrO-Ea7 AND-PARA ONE | LOCALLY. igsen.PARAS. ‘ TRO AND THESE onIcINaTEs WIE i be chgaiee < na toe: ay : <0 5. REP: AND‘POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION ‘EBING DISSSMINATED “, "| PLS KZEP HDS ADVISED oN any FURTHER CONTACTS ‘OR POSITIVE IDENTITICATION OF OSWALD. is ee ae . A ; eigen te oaEND OF MESSAGE WH CHT: *According+¢ American xzale s1 Oct, an mame Lee Oswald (phonetic) stated he at Sov Emb on 28 Sept Saez spoke with Consul. He discussed Sending a telegram to Washington. No local Disseminaticen had 3seen made. nariv—m— : Ay i eee i oe ADDP COORDINATING OFFICERS | - SeCwHD i > RELEASING OFFICER AUTHENTICATING a ; OFFICER oe i: Nes REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN -THE- ISSUING OFFICE IS pee walters. N 3 oi San 5 —— wee ee : > st \ 219 JFK Exuisit F-517 eee tt L—.: it ' ( tear. fea é ies ROUTING =: * 0 INno=x ONO Index 3963 CO FILE IN CS FILE NO, 1O. .: S25 SELoyv FROM: 2 Ase eee SS ae ae CSNTES%, be IMTSELLIGEY — JFK Eeuatr FL 517 ‘DEpARTEENT: oF: sTaTaeee 3, 2S 5 {FEDERAL BUZEAU 5 OF: INVESTIGicTox ON 1 ocroaz2, 1933] “EEEICO REVORTED TEI TE ay AMERICAN Laz, 2, | “TDENTIE 4 nogBee” spate ten SSR oa - q ay : as[z= -Gszatin;" corms acTED eS ‘SOVIET EEBISST ay . BS weeico Car sNouz2 i Shao age puissr Han 3D ELGETTES EB ees aoe rCaN sie=ipee 5 : fis Ait¥S- >, ; y “s bg 5 B eed a “3: So a > Re J | g07. SELES OLD, WITS. aNseE = SyC. BE +, et ". oh Aa * we a” sh ced is BSLISTSD THAT osmaLD yay BE IDEN rca,201 at: ie) ee : g¢ ss “"70- a5 je Taz os#aLD, BO2s O89 13 CCTCBa2 1939 IN NES ORLEANS. LOUISEAN2 eee aes io™ | A FORUER U.S. MARINE Woo DEFECTED 50 THE sovisz ONTOy IN Gite. test S re) . ae x - 7 dhe oe . oe COTCBI2 1959 AND LaT=R BADE azo NecENTS TEROGCE 7.SEZ UNITED > OG: ‘STATES EMSASSY IN MOSCOW TO RETURN TO TEE UNITED STATES WITH ETS RUSSTAN-EOUN WISE, MARINA NISOLSEYNA PUSAEOTA. AND THET?, : ais — {CONTINUED}. e atleasinge wid oFzi rtd Mais LOL o7Ftcza P is . : AUTHENTISATI AS i i i ; : 2 OFFics2 Kf 4 : é. 4 : / REPROSUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMI2ITED. » Copy Na 220 : ) CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ee ak ‘j CO INOSx ~ : i ONO INDEX O FILE IN'CS FI ‘ Soe Sin : es cae pe: ; ai " ; ae . reser TroN roy pagacnard oxz is REING DISSEMINATTD SES he DGosloess x The ame See - @ Pah we eines: a, co CrEY- ; ANT FURTHER. INFORUATELOW"3! Pes Bez TO FouR BaraE ce Saat“TSS Ege pes Se oe“er ON TEES SUBIZCE : TLL, He FURNISHED YOU _ TEES:INFORUAT ' ae eee dg * sqety Sacer ess Berne “yap AVATEAET™ TO TES ‘suezgeation anD MaueaLqzar ION« END OF MESSAGR .. eeeg ear oe , SEER Soe ee " em seor7) | COCASINATING OFFICERS is zi ~~ RELZASLUG OFFICER f : — “AUTH EMTicaTizne ; wer, hc | * - +. [OsFIGee om ma REA “SUCTION Y OTHER THAN THC ISSUING OFFIC, : PROH 138 Pear 221 JFK Exuisit F-519 CERTIFIED TRUE COPY SED PETES EE LLG, CLL IIE EET LGA LOGIE, SF —JFK Emaar F- 519 — tr 5S May 1964 Subject— Censral: tae ---= Specifics Gwald CASS fie THE SCURCE DOES lCT HAVE DIRECT xGWIEDGS oF ISS HARVEY GS¥ALD ORHES ACTIVITIES SUT WAS ABES TO PSOVIUS ITESS OF Dr=sest s faw _. .. CUBAN DNTeLLIcsyeg OFFICSES ASSIGNED TO THE DISSECTION GSIE2aL DE.IMTEtIcmycrs, . | _\THS DIFCRMATION APPSARIG BELOW WAS FURNISSED BY THS SCURCS 2M IS ZEXED TO QUESTIONS SUE PMITT=D Sy 1. Price to October 1963, CSWALD visited ths Cuban Eabassy in Mexico City on teo ce titmee cecasiors. Bafcrs, desing and after these visits, Guild was in contact with tee DISSCCiCa GCL DE INTELICGaECLa (Dat), Sree tate wits Inisa CALDDERCS, Hamel Yoo! Persea amt ose POCRICUEZ Lovet. VEGA waewee Coban imalligence Seemed is FABCSS 1s the current CubanIS chief? in Mexico. Ha recently fas had a tour of duty in Habana, price te which he held the same post as mowas CubanIS chiag in Hexico. ~ RODRIGUSZ is a Cuban IS staf? officer in Mextco. Us Sess See SULA intelligence Me ps ek Ecards, Casiairo and Jose Antonio. , The precise relaticnship of Inisa CALDERGH to the DGT is not clex. é She spent about siz months in Haxico from which she returmmed to 2 carly in 196k. COMMEIE - {has the following refererces concernins Inisa ~ CALOERON Carzalero: Shs was assigrsd to the commercial offics of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, and she had arrived in Hexica on 16 Jamary 1963 and on 31 Decenter 1963 made a reservation to return to Cuba om Cubare Airlinss | She left Hexctco City for Rayana on 15 December 1963 using passport Z/S3/7° [+3 | Another refersocs \said that her iseadof arrival in texico was 19: Jamrary 1963 and that she had renlaced Rosaria VAZGIEZ, -@ Hextecan secrstary in the commercial office. Other refers=ces anparemtly con~ . cerning tke scbject ars tad which do uct csopearto add aything of interest to that given above. 2. The source does not tmcw whether or not the Cuizm Services used CSHAID ‘in any agers capacity or other manner. : 3. 4 2 Ott, i 8. Did the Soviets nrogese any tyce of acticn or investigation ta the pay & | Cuban intelligence services following the news of Peeee aa ie feel j . assassinetion? ; e . | 9. “Was any provocetive material deliberately fabricated by the Cubexn services or others. ad sent to the United States to camfuse the ~ investigation of the CSWALD cass? ati ee | ‘10.. Was Jeck RUZEXSTSIN eke Jacke RUBY known to the Cuben intelligence services? ee per in what way? : sh i. P:Does subject know a $5 OE |who eet ae on gaecsint alte _ 23, 1963 et Neuvo Laredo, Texas and four deys later proceded to Havena by special plane.’ He was 23 years old and cerried a : ieosls US. pessnort. Ee also hac a Mexican tourist permit. | Develop: *. or ell informetion you cem on this individual. ! ees ‘Spemtnke sh mem i ee ee i ae 5 oe Latem aoe -- -- =— ; Ae Yranelinoni in 0138 at ONES ty Cabs CONES RRS EG ate a eke — . oe le .- - - -- ore ere me lee - : : : anF 224 JFK Exuisit F-521 TO : a : Soa eas oe 5 EI a FROM: | erat sae" susJ : | ‘ 1. Ca 15 May 1964, we nrovided the President's Comission wita a ame or our paar sas or een ea orl oi ack the aes inte lizgens? sérvices is any mannar. ne a tdigtos Mr. Howard P. Willens of the Commission asked if be could see tue questicns used in the interroegatian. 2. Oa 18 June, I took the questions end source's responses to the Commission and showed them to tir. Willens. de studied than and returned the questious to me with the osservaticn that they wer @ very thoroush and fully satisfied his requirements. 2 said that8 “saw no need to pursue this angle any further. The cuestions and answers exiibited to Mr. Willems ere attached. At no sine during qur contacts with tha Commission did we disclose tae source's identity 5 3. Mer. Willers indicated that the Cammissicn was winding up its investigation. He was highly comolimentaryoo> Civ; referring to the ezsency personnel he emcounteread here and in Mexico as "real provessicnals."” Mr. Willens asked thet I convey his cast cr regards to you. Docurrent sopipealia een for FOIA Review oS’ JUN 1976 eae = 225 SOURCE EVALUATION: The Source is believed to be very reliable. We have established through independent evidence and cross- checking that the major part of the intelligence information furnished by him is unquestionably true. For example, we knew independent of this Source that Manuel VEGA Perez and Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez were Cuban intelligence officers in Mexico. 226 Proposed Questions on Os"eld Case ENCZ: Debriefing of Cuban Source dated 5 May 1964 Tae source says that prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or tarse occasions. It is public tmowledge he vas in Mexico during the period 9-25-63 to 10-3-63. A) When did source learn of these visits - before or after shea assassination? Please describe in detail the circumstance under which source learned this information and identities of the persons involved. B) Did these visits take isplace during 1s the aforementioned period or is the source referring ta orevious visits. Tf the latter, .try to get more specific details regarding tress trigs and the origin of the source's inform2ticn. The source states that oefore, during, and aftar these visits “ntas bGlsyhsnecttieslly;: tnisa CALDERCN, Manuel VEGA Fere “would appear to mean thamat one or more comtacts were made after Oswald returned to the United States i.e., between 10-3-43 and 11-22-43. A) Woat does source meen d7. contact? B) Can ne oreek down these contacts by the specific individual named, place and tyse of ccntact, and date of occurrence -~ & Suse ? C) Did Oswald “mow or nave reason to suspect the intelli geics conmectiens of these sersons? ) whet was the purpose of these ccentacts? =) “IP Ostmald did not im w the intelligence affiliations or th ase 2 individuals, what re) 3 retexts, if any, were employed in ya 2} vig ~ sAicce =~ ae i sver -*39° ste = any - cocussatary a 2232334: mater alean .enyG. A ri ne ate Pian 2 : hes? contacts, cr any correspondence initiated by or addressed a of erara Ws Mir ‘ | 2.3 wy f a°¢ iis ’ wy ioe wt e2 227 G) Did the DGT ever employ physical surveillences, technical devices or camera equipment to covar these contacts |A H) The source says he does not know whether the Cuban © services used Osweld in any agent capacity or otherrise. This obviously maxes it more important to check out what the source meant in question one. . Did the DGI ever initiate en investigation of Oswald? Wnat was the reason for packaging files at DGI headquarters and field offices after news of the assassination wes received? -Source wes asked whether any srovocative material was deliberately fabricated by the Cubans (Question 9) to confuse tne investigation of Oswald. The reply attributed to him wes, "the only fasricetian known is the special matter by Fidel CASTRO. previously menticned."” Please clarify. Aédandum 18 jime with reference to 4; The only possible sical ccna ymown oy source was the specific denial oy Fidel CASTROon 2 TV progran of any Cuban imovledge of Oswald. 228 5 May 1964 Subject - General: Debriefing of Cuban Source Specific: OSWALD Case d 7 7 : . The source does not have direct knowledge of Lee Harvey OSWALD or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based on Cuban intelligence officers assigned to the Direccion General De Inteligencia. The information appearing below was furnished by the source and is keyed to questions submitted. l. Prior ta October 1963, OSWALD visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, OSWALD was in contact with the Direccion General De Inteligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa CALDERON, Manuel . VEGA Perez and Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez. VEGA whose Cuban intelligence pseudonym is MARCOS is the current Cuban IS chief in Mexico. He recently has hada » tour of duty in Habana, prior to which he held the same post as now as Cuban IS chief in Mexico. . RODRIGUEZ is a Cuban IS staff officer in Mexico. He has three Cuban intelligence pseudonyms, Eduardo, Casimiro and Jose Antonio.. The precise relationship of Luisa CALDERON to the DGIis | not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964. 2. The source does not know whether or not the Cuban Services used OSWALD in any agent capacity or other manner. 3. A. When news of the assassination of President Kennedy reached the DGI, it caused much comment concerning the fact OSWALD had been in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. In addition, orders were issued for all headquarters and field officers of the DGI to sort and package all documents according to whether they | , 4 é 229 and 1 7 \ t were ''Muy secreto" (very secret), ''secreto'' (secret), and "importante’’ (important). The material once packaged was ta be held pending further instructions. In addition, all travel by DGI officers and all DGI pouches were suspended temporarily. B. When the news that OSWALD was the assassin reached the DGI, there was no immediate comment but, when Fidel CASTRO spoke on television to deny Cuban involvement, there was considerable comment concerning OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. At this time VEGA, who has been mentioned previously, was in Cuba and commented to a group of DGI staff officers that OSWALD had come to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico to request a visa but had been refused. VEGA did not give any details and the subject was not pursued. 4. It is not known whether information on OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico in September 1963 was relayed to any Cuban service. ‘ 5. Itis not known if the Cuban intelligence services had contact with the New Orleans' Fair Play for Cuba Committee. 6. The only Molina who is recalled ig 'The Hook", the Cuban who was convicted in New York City for the murder of a young girl during a clash between two Cuban groups. The DGI staff officer who had been in the United Nations in New York, SANTIESTABAN traveled to Cuba "with "The Hook'' and with another Cuban named ORINUELA and upon arrival in Cuba tried to obtain employment for both individuals. The names Pedro Charles and Peter have no known significance. / 7. The reaction of Soviet officials in contact with the Cuban intelli- gence services is not known. 8. Nothing is known about Soviet proposals following the news of President Kennedy's assassination. 9. The only fabrication known is the special matter by Fidel CASTRO previously mentioned. 10. Nothing is known about Jack RUBENSTEIN aka Jack RUBY. 12. OSWALD's photo was seen in the newspapers but nothing is Known about him other than what appeared in the press. 230 1 MAY 1964 Proposed Questions on Oswald Case Ll. Was Lee Harvey OSWALD known to the Cuban intelligence services before 23 November 1963? If so which service? 2. Were the Cuban services using OSWALD in any agent capacity, or in any other manner, before 23 November 1963? 3. What was the reaction of the Cuban intelligence services to news of President Kennedy's assassination? To the news that OSWALD was the assassin? . . 4. Was information on OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City in September 1963, relayed to any Cuban service? If so, what action was taken? 5. Was there any contact between the Cuban intelligence services and the New Orleans' Fair Play for Cuba Committee? o~ e Has subject ever heard of Mario del ROSARIO Molina, or Pedro Charles known also as "Peter''? “) How did the Soviet officials in contact with the Cuban intelligence services react to news of the assassination? a@ ® Did the Soviets propose any type of action or investigation to the Cuban intelligence services following the news of President Kennedy's assassination? 9. Was any provocative material deliberately fabricated by the Cuban services or others and sent to the United States to confuse the investigation of the OSWALD case? 10. Was Jack RUBENSTEIN aka Jack RUBY known to the Cuban intelligence services? If so, in what way? | ll. Does subject know, who entered Mexico on November 23, 1963 at Neuvo Laredo, Texas and four days later proceded to Havana by special plane. He was 23 years old and carriedaU.s. passport. He also had a Mexican tourist permit. Develop all information you can on this individual. 12. Attached is a photograph of OSWALD,| SD A NET S.A.Stern/ow/3-2T-64 | ec: wr. Rontin ae Ckae ; oe. ur. Stern | March 27, 190) an | Files ; wide i f ME DRADU es > Mr. Ren'cin — JFK Exner aa Die Prot = S.LA~* Sucre a SUBJECT: CIA File on Osa 3 iaanoprenn sn ery Today, Pridsy, March 27, 1964, I mat at CTA hecdgquartars with ti. Rocca ta revicv the CLA filo on Lee Exsyey Omald. Fie Mle -conteins thase materials furmishked to us previously by CIA. In : eddition, it. contains the following maitcrials: ae Cable renorts from the CIA station in Mexica af Movenber 22 end 23,. 1953 relating to vhotcgranhs of 2 verson tho bed victted the Cuban ond Soviet Exbossics in Moxico City during October and Novexber. 1953; and reports on these cables furnished on Eoverbe 23 by CIA to the Secrets Service. These messaces ere aceurstely parcphrosed in the attachacnts to the CIA mexorondim of March 2k, 195% (Comssioan Locunant s674). be. Cable of Cctober 10 from CIA Mocico City ctation to CIA bestquarters reporting on Oswald eontact at Soviet Exbassy, and October 10, 1963 messase from CIA headsuarters to Mexico City station of background informction on Oswald. ‘hese messages are occurately xseporced in the CIA mororandum of Janvery 31, 1964. I did not review any moteriols later then Novenber 23 ¥ 1963. Iie. Rocea also showed me the “printout” of the references to Oswald @ocuzents in the CIA electronic data storage systen. There was no itea listed which we have not been given cither in full text -or pParenhmsed. ~ ; Ss When I evidenced en interest tn the CTA clectronic ects processing systen, Hr. Rocca seid that he vould arranse a detailed explanation at = future visit. ‘ JFK Exuyisit F-525 232 JFK Exuisit F-528 cok ae 13 april 19k, a £02) PERT re abe AAS is 523 —- recerding his Rua with Allen Delles onn Saturday pats april re CLL assistazce to the Warren Comdssion.. In essenca, the conversation dealt with questiors .wadck the Warres Comission wi direct to CIA... Copy follews? 29 . ales oa OPS Bitlet x ay “ad “has sugsested that natiins further be.dane’re preparation © “ef an analysis of the OSWALD affair pending receist of tke questions thom _the Cammissicn. Answerirg ttese eben Riskt make it an aa ts - | prepare an amiysis. . Wie). , : Ly - ; — : : s Z me Fae 4 asked that we prepare, on a priority basis, 2 Pebie to i? the FBI oh gies cea containing two reports om the CS=ALD case irom : Nasenks. | is handlins. oe Jaret [ROSVERS zed= to see it in” ; draft. ze Re” : ——— oa sates canal eae iSrw . - dineS pes. |"also returned ta me the several items of Osada: procactian : borrowed on iu April, - Docume? Number Crane (57-831- for Fara Raviawcg. SUA S76 a > 2: BYS o— 233 13 April 1964 j ae - SESE FORs Deputy Perici abs Plans fue Fe PASH He : aes oS SUBIECT >. ; i on Viscussions with Mr. Allan 3 Duiles 5 ee Pw ans OR the Uswald Case sa {i te ‘ AY TO" pea eee EOTESO LUMO RT : > ng - - . ate es ~-—-+ ‘ania ~i ae > s- - 1. ‘At the instructions of ‘che ODP, in visited ee ha . ~-- Dulles on 12 April te discuss ‘with his cartain- questions}AE which Mr. Duliss feels the Narren Comission: may pase to ed CIA. Mr. Dulles explained that whils the Comsission 2:2: Res wished to clarify certain aspacts.of the Osyals case ine = which = rpsponsa Exsom CIA seamad necessary it. was notisura Fe how thy queasticas skould be posad nor how CIA shnvikd ME Ove Mr. Boilies hooed that. cur discussions would eanzbie: him toss, advise the. Commission escnts pacters ha sirit raised: thea: => allegasion that Oswald was.a CIA ageaat. Ha nentionsditwe 25"- sources for this accusation. Ona-was Mrs. Harguerits sz:igh its Oswald, Lee Harvey Oswald’?s movthar, and the other was-r * Mars Lane, Mrs Oswald"s attorney... He suggestad thatthe : fs © Comission; 3n asking us this quastison,night well forvard= a summary or pertinent hinetcae ef the tastiaony concerning © this matter. Ha noted, however, that Hrs. Uswald’s tesri- mony was so incsonerent "that it would be difficult Le Bap Rs(le Pie pertinent excerpts, thus it would be better Sey tha Con- . . mission to. sunaarize the testinony. pe RUE ther xa See oe . é os +e 3 CRRA oe, rr i + z. ica Dulles then suggested that the respons" ae this! question could be in the fora of sworm teastiznony bef SMeieas Commission by 2 sanior CIA af fistal or a2 latter or aifidavis = He recalled that the Director of the FBI had replisd byx. ~ PE: letter to a similar questioa, In any event, Mx. Dulles. . > Felt the repiy. should be straightforward and to ths points: °-- He thought langusge which mad= it clear that Lee Hazvey~ fee. Oswald was naver an exployee or agent of CIA would Stee soca MWe should alss state that neithsr CIA nor.anyom acting .-.. e cn CIA’s bek2l£ was ever in eee Or communication with: ae Oswald. NMre Dulles did not think it would be 2 gaod idea ~.'- te cite CIA proeedures Zor agent assessment and handling «= -— to show that it would have been wlikaly ror Oswald to have been chosan as.2 CIA agent to enter Russias. There are always exceptions to every rule and this might be misunderstood by members of the Coasissico with little background in activity: or this sort. If agreed with him that a carefully phrasad denial of the charges of involvement with SEEN seexncd _most appropriate. fetk Pe Aires ne - 4 Tg ee eeee 234 -Z- 3. Tha next question concamed the posstniriey of Pitre Oswald’s having besn a Soyist agent. viz. Dulles suggsstad_ that the Commission's quasticn an this natter be phrased sonewhat 23 follows: “In the knowledge or judgnanz of CIA . Was Lee Harvey Oswald an agent of tha Soviet intelligences servicss or the intallisencs services of other coanunisz. ‘states at any tine prior ta 22 Noyeadar 1963, or was Oswald solicited by these intelligences services to became suck an agent?” (7 respondent, had told him that a senior official of the oso Soviet Embassy in Washington, perhaps the Minister Coun— ~- selor, had told hin ‘two or three weeks ago that Mme Furtseva, then a member of the Presidium of the CC/CPSU, had interceded on Oswald's behalf after the latter had been rejected by another Soviet agency, and as “Minister of Propaganda” had supported him because the Soviets did not want the adverse publicity -- and hampering of future “~ dufections -- which would accompany any aSa ta accept him in tho USSR. f 1a ata Ke PoWe (Note: This story checks with part of “-" - NOSENKO’s, and like NOSENKO’s - ~ _ story, is supported by an entry .- - tn Oswald*s “Historical Uiaelty 26 to the effect that after his my suicide attempt Oswald was —a handled by an entirely differ— _ ent set of people.) 239 4. 7- Chief, SR/CIreported that, in Commission's request, response to the we have tested, in the Soviet Embassics in Stockholm and Helsinki, the time required to get a Soviet tourist visa, and find that 2-3 days is Chief, SR/CI_ - Attachments: _ As Stated 240 JFK Exuisit F-533 ot MEE Pay 37 Jul <¢ —SFK CxHBIT Ae Did Sy Taek & get Ftsas ieeeags ° TEN PREPSRED FOR THE WARREN COMMIsstoy | wutitia EELSIVED aD SToCeaOL, 196L" | ee rem < A memo from the Commission to CLA aated25 May 196: incuired after — ' information relating to the relatively showt period of tims in which. ‘OSWAID acprired a tourist visa in Helsinki. Tte first attacked itan, ‘a memo to the Commission dated 1 July 196k, provides suck information : |. @& we could obtain om CSWALD's reconstructed timetable for travel ir. seoeeas ta Helsinici- The second attached item, dated 31 July 195k, 2 ee comments oz Sea oftinsAaa to obtain ; a tourist visa— ra 241 317 ale a MEMORANDUM FOR: Mo. J. Lee Zanxin "ceay e Gensra2i Counsel . | Presidant's Commissica on ere oe == 1 ra he! chais Pai of President: Kamaedy = =..° we Trek eanpOh ont ae TN Lamgth ofTime ghee (on panesSaves<" |. Teoustst Visas in Helsicki and Stockholm, 1964 = es é puts Se eh a ones ae AS nis ms " if,: = se mSSRE supe Sexe ras;onse « to.a talesaoce inquiry made in July 1964 :ae ae i Pahoa the time required for iaseancs cia Soviet visafora.- fo) TS cosinessrmanm, ths Soviet comscl fm Belsinki stated thathe cool - issee a trasai? visa fvalid for 24 heeurs) in Ryve =i: fess Sant that ine “i: . @ lomger sty he would need about a week to processa visa appplication. . "and Save Intorist arrange for lodzings. Se iesaiiaa? thar the main MoM reasom for bie Be ia het issuances Basa aera less space pin AS ress - 2. A Fienish pea S{oacy sspseses ss sad PN Toa oe thar he is able to ostain Scvie? tcuris? visas for nis ata oven - eraia7 te if be pushes the matter. —=s- e« 3. ‘f& teleskome chack with the Soviet consulate inStocthelm in Joly i964 revealed that normal visa processingih2re takes seven days but that this cas be shortened to five days ‘in excesticmal cases." The Soviet official receiving the teleshone call smited that it pas impossible to get a visa within tvo or three days. f+. A Soviet officit tor FEA Review on SUM 5 242 4. A Soviet siiicial in Sicekanoim indicazad in early 1354 that visa processing iar fsreiuners wisaing ts visit ta USS2 -Bormally mikes siz eight days in Stochhol= ict t= visas foe Swedish businessmen and other perscnaliiies ci special interest {not defined) can Se processed dcizecily By the Soviet emoassy in Stsexnolm without sefersal to Mcaecow. é = : -_ = - - i “a * - & s fee i . : “a 3 2 as ‘ . oy ee - ca : Me - awe en - - - - :s.6 - 2 ‘ ” = < + =, A a = - > —?- = Orig. & 2 — Addressee : — 1 - DDP : po he saad GAME Soauistanlacil atdeans ~ 29 Jaly 1964. 243 Mr. PreyYeER. It has been a long afternoon and I imagine Mr. - Helms would be ready for a recess period. I think we are very close to finishing. We have one other member who wishes to ask ques- tions. I know you are anxious to finish. Would you prefer to take a 10-minute recess at this time or would you like to attempt to finish up? Mr. Hetos. If you don’t mind, Mr. Chairman, I would like to go right along. I would like to finish if we possibly can as soon as we can. Mr. PrREYER. The Chair recognizes Mr Sawyer. Mr. HEtms. Good afternoon, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. SAwYER. Good afternoon, Ambassador. First I would like to clear up what I think was a combination of misstatements about what Mr. Hart testified to vis-a-vis Nosenko. He did not say that we should not believe the veracity of what Nosenko said. He said he believed that but that he felt, because of the size and compartmentalization of the KGB, he would not at all necessarily know whether they had contact with him or not, and for that reason I am quite puzzled with this combination of not having accepted the bona fides of Nosenko and yet putting him on the payroll as a consultant. How can you possibly get any value out of information supplied with someone when there is a belief or at least a strong possibility that he is a double agent, there for the specific purpose of deceiv- ing? Mr. Hews. Well, sir, this is the constant and continuing hazard in all intelligence work of this kind. There isn’t a statement that is made by any defector that comes to the United States that goes unchecked. We take all the statements and then they are checked out and there is an effort made to find out if they are true and they are examined and research work is done on them, and so forth, because this is a very difficult and untidy problem, I am sad to say. And it is particularly untidy given the importance of the -Nosenko case. ___I have been told he gave useful information to an agency of the US. Government about certain Soviet operations overseas and cer- tain information about the KGB. I can’t personally attest to this, and I am sorry; but I believe that certain of high information was believed to be of value. _ Mr. Sawyer. It seems to me, looking at the facts of this thing here he was incarcerated under horrible conditions for a period of “some 5 years or approximating 5 years, and then apparently the gProject was given up as not being able to resolve the question, at j least to everyone’s satisfaction. There are memorandums indicating It would be now a great catastrophe to release this man presum- ably after what had been done to him here in the country; it would be devastating if he talked much about it. There was even a memo- randum of the director of the Soviet bloc group or division, discuss- ing the possibilities of disposing of him and elaborating on that to mean either liquidation or drugging him to a point where he became incomprehensible so he couldn’t tell anybody anything, or Just putting him in an insane asylum and just throwing away the key apparently. 244 It would just seem to me after what you people did to Nosenko here in this country, without any color of law at all, that you really only had two choices: One was dispose of him as suggested—— Mr. Hetms. That was never considered, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. Sawyer. Well, I am talking about what your division chief of the Soviet bloc wrote down that was being considered at least by him. Mr. Hetos. He was the Deputy Division Chief and maybe he did write these things down, but I say these things were never brought to my attention, the suggestion was never made to me, this was never an option that was considered. Mr. Sawyer. You have testified about your considering assassi- nating people along with the Mafia. It is nothing new to you people apparently to assassinate somebody? Mr. Hews. That is your statement, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. Sawyer. Well, I thought that was what you have been testifying to here about willingly becoming a party to an assassina- tion either by syringe, by gun, or by poison pills of Castro. So once we get in the acceptance of that line, it doesn’t seem to me so out of line that would be one of the things you would consider, and apparently your deputy division chief did consider it. It seems to me the only other option would be to pay him off and handsomely enough so he would keep quiet about this when you let him go. You obviously couldn’t deport him very well at this point in time, and it just appears to me as I look at that it is perfectly plain that you exercised the option of paying him off. Do you dispute that? Mr. HE.Ms. Yes; I dispute it. Mr. Sawyer. You said you paid over a period of time some half a million dollars, is about what it amounts to as I quickly add it up, both in lump-sum payments and in monthly stipends to a guy that the Agency never decided wasn’t, in fact, there to mislead it and give it false information. You paid that as a consultant and you say the motivation was not at all to pay him off. Is that your position? Mr. Hews. No, sir. I am counting 10. That is what my mother taught me to do under these circumstances. Mr. Sawyer. You are doing what? Mr. HEtMs. I am counting to 10. Mr. Sawyer. Well, I will be patient if it takes that long. Mr. Hetms. The effort in Mr. Nosenko’s case and the only option that we had available to us in my opinion was to resettle him and give him a new identity and handle him in such a way he would have a chance to make a life for himself on the American scene. It has been 5 years since I had anything to do with his case. I don’t know what has been done to him since. Mr. Sawyer. You said you could not just put him out on welfare. What do we do with most immigrants that come in either from Indochina that are refugees or regularly admitted immigrants? We may provide them some educational help in the language, and that sort of thing, but we don’t pay them off. Here you are talking about sums of money that wouldn’t be mentionable in the same breath as welfare, and I just say as I look at this thing, taking all these facts you have testified to into account, it would just seem to 245 me on the face of it that it was a payoff. I am surprised to hear you deny it. Mr. Hews. I believe that under the Constitution you are entitled to your viewpoint and I am entitled to mine. Mr. Sawyer. Well, you did, in fact, plead guilty to having with- held information from the Senate committee, didn’t you? Mr. HE.tMs. No, sir, I did not. Mr. Sawyer. I thought you had. Mr. HE.ns. I did not. I pleaded nolo contendere. Mr. SAwYER. So that you just don’t contest it, then, which is the legal equivalent of a plea of guilty, is that correct; except that it can’t be used as an admission against you in a civil case; right? Mr. HEtos. I am not a lawyer, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. Sawyer. But I am sure you were advised by a lawyer before you entered a nolo contendere; were you not? Mr. HELMs. I was advised by lawyers. Mr. SAwyER. Something else bothers me. When you put Nosenko into solitary you obviously intended to hold him a very long time; did you not? Mr. Hens. I don’t think that was the intention at the time. The intention was to hold him. no longer than it took to find out whether he was bona fide or not or to satisfy ourselves on this. Mr. Sawyer. But you invested in building a whole separate vault and building around it, and so forth, for the purpose of accommo- dating Nosenko; did you not? Mr. Hewns. I asked this morning if anybody from the committee had looked at the building. It was no vault, as I recollect it. I don’t think it was a very expensive building at all. Mr. Sawyer. Where was it located? Mr. HEtns. It was located in Virginia. Mr. Sawyer. Was it on a military base? Mr. HE.Ms. I believe those items are classifed, and I was told by re agency to go into executive session if you wanted to discuss chis. Mr. Sawyer. Do they still use this? Mr. Hetos. I don’t know. Mr. Sawyer. Was it ever used for anyone else other than Nosenko? Mr. Hews. I don’t know. I don’t think so. Mr. Sawyer. Apparently it was a reinforced steel box that was lescribed by Mr. Hart as being like a bank vault, and he then lescribed that a house had been built around it to accommodate she interrogating staff and guards, and what not, and then sur- -ounded by a linked barbed-wire fence. You wouldn’t do that just to put somebody in it for a couple of nonths, would you? Mr. Hes. It would have depended on the circumstances. And after all, this was a very important case to us, so I would think the juestion of the amount of money that the installation cost really ‘arely came up. Mr. Sawyer. What was the purpose of moving him from what Vas apparently a secure place of confinement into this so-called safe house? What was the purpose of building another facility and noving him out of there into that? 246 Mr. Hets. I assume because those safe houses are much more complicated to administer, it take more guards, and things of that kind. I think there were practical considerations involved. Mr. SAwYER. Wouldn’t it be a fair deduction if you went to the trouble of building a separate facility of this type that it obviously was going to be quite a long-term incarceration if that is specifical- ly for what it was built? Mr. Hetms. Well, I just said, sir, this was not the intention. The intention was to try to find out whether this man was bona fide and that was the objective, and when we had done that we would have let him loose and if this was a mistake in building this house, then I guess it was a mistake. Mr. Sawyer. You said, too, that you didn’t subject Nosenko to physical abuse. As I have both talked to Nosenko and listened to the CIA official spokesmen define it, it was a partial starvation, being subjected to cold weather without being provided a blanket, not being allowed fresh air during the heat of the summer for over a year. Don’t you consider that, just those items alone, as being physical torture actually? Mr. Hetms. I cannot verify those items. I don’t know whether they are true or not. You have told me today they are true. Mr. Sawyer. You were the man in charge when he had been without any legal process or trial, just incarcerated in solitary confinement. You were in charge of the Agency that was doing that, weren’t you? Mr. Hews. I wasn’t in charge at that time. Mr. Sawyer. During part of that time you were. | Mr. Hetns. I became in charge later. Is there any evidence when I was Director these things happened to him? I didn’t know any- thing about it at the time. I hear conflicting stories about how he was treated. You'll have to use your stories, I’ll use mine. Mr. Sawyer. Mr. McCone could have found out anything in the Agency that he wanted to find out. You said that right here, you remember? Mr. HEts. I said that. Mr. Sawyer. So I presume as one of the people in charge of this having occurred to the man, you could have found out anything about what was happening to him that you wanted to, couldn't you: Mr. HeEts. I never was told any tales—— Mr. Sawyer. Well, you knew he was in your custody? Mr. Hetms. That is correct. Mr. Sawyer. And you never made any inquiry about what was happening to him over this 4- or 5-year period? Mr. Hens. Of course I did. Mr. Sawyer. Did you find out then what they were doing to him, what you were doing to him? Mr. Hetms. I was never told of these details of his being kept in a room so hot he couldn’t stand it, or any of those things. Those were never brought to my attention and I never got those in answer to any inquiry. If this is the truth I am genuinely sorry about it, but I was not aware of it at the time. Mr. Sawyer. You said about Oswald when he came back from Russia that you wouldn’t have had really any particular jurisdic- 247 tion or interest because he was a marine. As I understand it, he had been discharged from the Marine Corps, and for how long a period of time does military service retain intelligence jurisdiction over a person? Mr. HE.s. I don’t know. I really don’t. Mr. Sawyer. When you were interviewed apparently by a Mr. Lardner, George Lardner of the Washington Post after your excu- tive testimony here, you said in effect to him—the article is in the Washington Post of Thursday, August 10, referring to your appear- ance here on August 9: “Your questions are almost as dumb as the committee’s.”’ Does that fairly reflect your personal opinion and attitude? Mr. HeEtns. I don’t recall talking to Mr. Lardner after the hear- ing the other time. I was chatting in the hall with a newspaperman around lunchtime. I don’t recall such an acerbic remark as that, and of course I withdraw it if I did make it. I never even saw the article, so it must have been the first edition of the Washington Post. The article I saw the next day didn’t have anything like that in it. It teaches you never to talk to the press. I mean that’s the only lesson, if they quoted me accurately. If they didn’t quote me accurately, then I shouldn’t have made off-the-cuff remarks. But I don’t feel that way. I think this inquisition has been admirably handled. Mr. Sawyer. If you didn’t read the article, let me give you the benefit of the applicable part of it. It says: Helms told reporters during a break that no one would ever know who or what Lee Harvey Oswald, named by the Warren Commission as Kennedy’s assassin, represented. Asked whether the CIA knew of any ties Oswald had with either the > KGB or the CIA, Helms paused and with a laugh said, ‘I don’t remember.’ Pressed Jon the point, he told a reporter, ‘Your questions are almost as dumb as the + committee’s. You don’t recall any such statement? Mr. HeEtns. I recall an exchange about Oswald because I don’t chink we are ever going to find out what Lee Harvey Oswald’s role was until we get the Russians’ KGB files. That is what I was referring to. Mr. Sawyer. You did allude to the representation in Mr. McCone’s letter or affidavit that there was no formal connection »detween Lee Harvey Oswald and the CIA. Did the use of the word ‘ormal intend to exclude any other type of relationship or contact? Mr. Hetms. No, Mr. Sawyer. I am sorry. I was trying to use a short cut, I think. But in the documents I was given in preparation vefore this hearing the actual affidavit of Mr. McCone is there dresent and I think should be permitted to stand on its own feet. In other words, I would not want to say I was attempting to add or subtract from it. Mr. Sawyer. But there was no specific connotation? Mr. HeEtms. No, sir. I am sorry if in my effort to make a short entence I didn’t go all through the various points that were made ‘n there, because as | said earlier this afternoon, I never found the slightest evidence that the Agency had anything to do with Lee darvey Oswald, and I was just hoping that maybe this hearing vould put that rumor to rest. 248 Mr. Sawyer. In your long time with the Agency, have you ever known of any example where anything remotely similar to what was done to Nosenko was done to someone else here in this country? Mr. Hetms. No; I know of no other case comparable, nor do I know of any case that confronted us where a man might have information having to do with the assassination of the President of the United States. The answer to your questions specifically is I know of no compa- rable case and I believe there never was one. Mr. Sawyer. Whereas I recognize your disclaimer of being a lawyer, you certainly know that the police, even with the assassin himself, could never have done anything like this, would never have been permitted to do anything like this. You understand people’s rights enough for that, don’t you? Mr. Hetns. Oh, yes, I understand people’s rights. Mr. Sawyer. Holding a man in solitary confinement under these kinds of conditions without a trial and subjecting him to both physical and mental torture—even with an assassin himself. There is no way the laws of our country permit that kind of thing. You knew that, didn’t you? Mr. Hetms. Well, I rather thought that the legal status of Mr. Nosenko in those days was in a very gray area and if I am wrong about it I wish you would correct me now, Mr. Sawyer, because I am prepared to be corrected. Mr. Sawyer. Well, he was a human being, wasn’t he? Mr. Hens. I believe so. Mr. Sawyer. You know in most States even treating an animal like this will land you in jail. I have no further questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Preyer. Are there any further questions? Mr. Dodd. Mr. Dopp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Helms, you made a point earlier in your testimony today with regard to the testimony of Mr. Hart before this committee. You commented on the fact that he didn’t really share with us any specific knowledge about the substance of our inquiry; that is, in [ connection with whatever connection there may have been between | the KGB and Lee Harvey Oswald, and to that extent what informa- | tion the Agency had with regard to that specific information. } I have to agree. In fact, Mr. Hart mentioned here that he had stated specifically to the Agency that if he were to be expected to f talk about Lee Harvey Oswald, then it was pointless of the Agency to send him up here because he had no intention of talking about Lee Harvey Oswald. If this committee were to ask you who would be a good witness | or several good witnesses that we could talk to either presently} employed at the Agency or former employees of the Agency whof could shed additional light on that particular aspect of our investi-} gation, who would you suggest? | Mr. Hetos. I would suggest the Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division} and the Deputy Chief who have been maligned here. I think they} might come before this committee and answer for themselves as tof 249 the reasons behind the way the interrogation was conducted. I think that would be good for openers. Mr. Dopp. Who are these people again? I am sorry. Mr. Heutms. The gentlemen who were Chief and Deputy Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division at the time of the Nosenko interrogation. Mr. Dopp. Could I go back a minute. Counsel asked you some questions about this 201 file that existed on Lee Henry Oswald, I believe. Mr. HE.tos. That is right. Mr. Dopp. There is some confusion I think in the committee’s ‘mind as to how that file was opened. What kind of file is it? What is a 201 file? Mr. HE.s. It is nothing but a personality file. We might open a ‘file—we get pieces of paper like this and if they refer to Christo- -pher Dodd, we would open a file on Christopher Dodd. They just happen to be called a 201 file because we had a numbering cate- gory files of different kinds used in different parts of the Agency. There is no arcane significance at all; it is just a number. It might have been called 5-type files or X-type files. Mr. Dopp. You said it takes something to trigger it? Mr. HELMs. Yes, it takes a form like this to be filled out. Mr. Dopp. I wanted to get clear in my own mind. Can you tell the committee what it was specifically that triggered the opening of the 201 file on Lee Henry Oswald? Mr. HE.tms. I don’t know what happened, sir, I don’t know how they got the name wrong. I have no idea any more, if I ever knew. I don’t know whether it was a clerical error, a mistake, or just what. I recognize in 1978 when you look back 15 years, Lee Harvey Oswald was not a household name. It may have been somebody thought it was Henry and read it wrong and it was Harvey. But I think it got straightened out very quickly, at the time of the dissemination of reports to the Government when he visited the Soviet and Cuban consulates in Mexico City. Mr. Dopp. Mr. Chairman, may I request that we suspend for a couple of minutes. I think I can get down to the bottom line very quickly. The mere existence of a 201 file does not suggest in any way, does it, that the person who is the subject of a 201 file is in any manner, shape or form an employee, agent, operative of the Agency? Mr. HeEutos. No, sir; it does not. It simply is a device for holding information. When an individual gets into special categories of relationships with the Agency, then the whole file business is changed. Mr. Dopp. So the existence of a 201 file on Lee Henry—or Lee Harvey Oswald in the Agency would in no way indicate that he is in fact a paid employee of the Agency? Mr. HeEtms. It means absolutely nothing. As a matter of fact, there were files in the Agency on Congressmen and Senators, but they had newspaper clippings. If you are going to file a newspaper clipping, you have to put it someplace. Mr. Dopp. Fine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. S a HeExtms. Thank you for making that point of clarification, Mr. odd. 250 Mr. Preyer. Thank you. I have no questions. I think the ground has been very thoroughly covered. I do just want to take my few minutes to make a brief statement about the hearings that we have had today and yesterday. I think the past 2 days of testimony have shown the CIA did things 15 years ago or so which shock us, sometimes shock us profoundly today. I fe someone at the luncheon recess conclude from this testi- mony that America is a lawless society because one of our institu- tions broke the law some years ago. Well, this is certainly not a lawless society. Russia is a lawless society, where a handfull of people control things and where you cannot change it unless a revolution or a war comes along. I think the past few days’ hearings here have indicated that we can change things. The kind of testimony Mr. Hart of the CIA gave, criticizing his own institution, your testimony today, it is impossible to conceive of a KGB agent, for example, ever admitting that anything they did 15 years ago was wrong. I don’t think it was wrong to bring out these horrors of the past. I think the old adage that “the truth can make you free” is true here. The truth about these things, I think, will free up the CIA from past mistakes and it will free up all of us. And that is the second point I want to make. I think when we view these actions of some time ago today, we have to realize that at that time when these acts were committed there was a national consensus that this Nation’s security was in peril. So I think we would want to be very careful how we make retroactive scapegoats. There are those who betrayed one trust, their trust of office, the trust of power; but they did so to preserve another trust, the trust of national security. In all of these hearings, Mr. Helms, in all of the inquiry situa- tions that you have been subjected to lately, I don’t think anyone has ever suggested that you ever betrayed that other trust, of the national security. I think in judging the actions of individuals in the past, we want to consider who it was who called up those actions. In large measures, the American people at that time were calling up these measures out of fear that our national security was in peril. Mr. Helms, we appreciate your being here with us today and answering all of these questions. At the conclusion of the testimony of our witnesses, we allow each witness 5 minutes to make any statements that he may choose to make. You have testified at some length today, but if there is any matter you wish to clear up, any statement you wish to make, we will be glad to hear from you at this time. Mr. Hetos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, I would like to say I deeply appreciate the remarks you have just made at the conclusion of this hearing. I thank you for them. I thank you for your courtesy as chairman. I have no othe comments. Mr. Preyer. If there is no further business today, the committe stands recessed until 9 o’clock Monday morning. [Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, the com mittee to reconvene on Monday, September 25, 1978, at 9 a.m. 251 INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1978 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, Washington, D.C. The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:15 a.m., in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the select committee) presiding. Members present: Representatives Stokes, Devine, Preyer, McKinney, Fauntroy, Sawyer, Ford, Fithian, and Edgar. Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; I. Charles Mathews, special counsel; Kenneth Klein, assistant deputy chief counsel; Michael Goldsmith, senior staff counsel; Robert Genzman, staff counsel; Ms. Jacqueline Hess, chief re- searcher, and Ms. Elizabeth Berning, chief clerk. Chairman STOKES. The committee will come to order. At this time I would like to make brief opening remarks. This morning, the Select Committee on Assassinations begins a final week of public hearings on the death of President John F. Kennedy. As I indicated when the committee opened its public hearings on September 6, 1978, the committee has identified three main issues to investigate in order to fulfill its legislative mandate, which is found in House Resolution 222. First, who assassinated President Kennedy? Second, how well did the agencies perform? Third, did the assassin or assassins have assistance, that is, was there a conspiracy? In the past several weeks, the committee’s hearings have moved through two general phases. First, evidence was received on the facts and circumstances surrounding the President’s death and the connection, if any, between those facts and circumstances and the alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald. Second, an effort has been made to evaluate the performance of the various Federal agencies, Secret Service, the FBI, the CIA, and the Warren Commission. Today, and the rest of this concluding week, the committee will hear evidence focused directly on the third question: Was there a conspiracy? But let me first make one point explicit. The committee will be hearing testimony this week dealing with what the committee has found. In presenting this evidence to the committee, the staff will not be trying to prove or disprove any particular theory. The purpose of these hearings is not to try to establish or refute partic- ular theories, but to consider the evidence available on the various (251) 252 points. That evidence may either prove it, disprove it, or be insuffi- _ cient to make a judgment either way. Nevertheless, because these hearings are legislative in character, and not a judicial trial, the committee has a duty to make what it has learned public, even if it falls short of what everyone might wish to know on the crucial question: Was there a conspiracy involved in the assassination of President Kennedy? Let me make another point. The evidence that the committee has heard in these past several weeks—and will hear this week—in fact bears on more than one question. For example, when the committee heard testimony dealing with its neutron activation analysis project, the results dealt with the question to whose gun the bullets found in the car and at Parkland Hospital might be linked, the performance of the FBI in conducting such tests in 1964, and the possibility that more than one assassin may have fired at President Kennedy. In fact, the committee will have held 17 days of hearings on each of the three key questions, even though the principal focus of a particular phase of the hearings or of an individual day may have been some aspect of one of these ques- tions. Let me say it another way. Although these hearings have been structured in an organized fashion, we have not compartmen- talized them in a restrictive way, as if to indicate this is only conspiracy week, last week was only agency performance week, and so on. As I said, in each day of hearings we are attempting to settle all three questions in our mandate. Let me make another important point. It may be helpful for those following our hearings if something is also said here about the quality and quantity of evidence available to the committee as it has moved through each of these three phases of its deliberations and the need to recognize how to use each kind of evidence. In general, during the first phase of our hearings—what happened in Dallas—the committee has had available to it the hard stuff of science. The quality and quantity of the evidence available to the committee was, therefore, unusually high. As the committee turned to assessing the performance of the agencies, less scientific evi- dence was available to the committee, and it was necessary to rely more on documents and human memories, principally those of public officials. Now, as the committee’s attention turns directly to the question of conspiracy, it will be necessary to move further away from the hard evidence of science and documents and con- sider more and more oral testimony. We do have available to us the aid of science and documents here, but the shifting nature of the balance ought to be explicitly noted and commented on. Those who follow our hearings must, therefore, recognize the difference in the quality and quantity of the evidence available to resolve issues in this most difficult area. Human perception and memory, to say nothing of bias or motive to lie, sharply qualify human testimony, making it less reliable than scientific analysis or docu-f ments written, not for litigation, but as an accurate record off actual events. Granted, when we examine conspiracy, science has something to say, and documents are available to us. But much of our delibera- tions this week will depend on recorded conversations. While they may well be reliable, they must be carefully interpreted, lest erro- 253 neous conclusions be drawn from them. I would note that we are also dealing in many instances with remembrances now 15 years old, so I would caution that great discrimination is required in making final judgments. Finally, those who follow our hearings might also find helpful some comment about the law of conspiracy and the special difficul- ties associated with its proof. Mr. Justice Holmes once succinctly defined a conspiracy as “a partnership in criminal purposes.”’ That definition serves well enough here. Unless evidence is adduced, from which “a partnership in criminal purposes” can be inferred, a conspiracy cannot be said to exist. A suspicion suspected must always be distinguished from a fact found. Let me say concretely what I mean. Basically, the Warren Com- mission concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin of President Kennedy because it concluded that he was a loner. In short, because he had no significant associations, it was not possi- ble, the Commission found, to conclude that there was a conspiracy involved in the assassination. What the Warren Commission right- ly recognized was that conspiracy is first rooted in association. But no association, no conspiracy. Because the Commission concluded there was no association, it was not forced to deal with the difficult questions posed by evi- dence of conspiracy, for it is a fundamental principle of American law that guilt cannot be inferred from association alone. To be sure, conspirators seldom shout their intentions from the roof tops or publish their thoughts in the newspaper. Conspiracy must, therefore, usually be inferred from circumstantial evidence: associ- ations, plus. But herein lies the difficulty in all conspiracy investi- gations, whether they are trials or legislative hearings dealing with conspiracy questions. Mr. Justice Jackson once observed of conspiracy trials: A defendant in a conspiracy trial occupies an uneasy seat. There generally will be evidence of wrongdoing by somebody. It is difficult for the individual to make his own case stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who are willing to believe that birds of a feather flock together. If he is silent, he is taken to admitting and if, as it often happens, codefendants can be prodded into * * * contradicting each other, they convict each other. What Mr. Justice Jackson said about a conspiracy trial applies even more strongly in the context of a congressional hearing. As I mentioned in my opening statement, these proceedings are not a criminal trial. There is no indictment, and there is no defendant. There is no prosecutor, and there is no defense counsel. The normal rules of evidence do not apply. Because none of the ele- ments are here present, a special burden is imposed on this com- mittee as evidence is introduced before it, and on those who follow Our proceedings, not to take the evidence so introduced beyond what it fairly establishes or to sensationalize it. This caution is particularly apt when evidence of association is introduced. I repeat: Conspiracy is founded in association, but more than association is required to establish conspiracy. Reasoning that guilt goes hand in hand with association—the principle of guilt by association—is to be abhorred in a free society. Let me give two examples of just how that mode of reasoning can be misused: 254 Jacqueline Kennedy, the President’s wife, had a passing ac- quaintanceship with George DeMohrenschildt, a friend of Lee Harvey Oswald. Would anyone seriously suggest that because Jacqueline Kenne- dy was somehow associated with Lee Harvey Oswald that she was, therefore, somehow involved in the assassination? The Volkswagen was a centerpiece in Hitler’s Nazi Germany. It was to be the people’s car, a proud product of national socialism. Today, thousands of Americans drive Volkswagens. Would anyone seriously suggest that by so doing they have become somehow associated with the aims and goals of Nazi Ger- many? I would caution, therefore, those who follow our hearings or read our record, evaluate the evidence that we will hear this week as carefully as the committee itself will, reserve judgment until all the evidence is in, and do not reach conclusions beyond what the evidence itself fully justifies. Anything else would be bad logic. It could only lead to what none can easily contemplate: more suspi- cion and doubt in an area already much too much troubled. It would also be unfair to all concerned. The committee calls Mr. McNally. Mr. McNally, you have previously been sworn in this hearing ae bee Chair would admonish you that you are still under that oath. Mr. McNALLy. Yes, sir. FURTHER TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH McNALLY Chairman Stokes. The Chair recognizes Mr. Ken Klein, counsel for the committee. Mr. Kuen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McNally, you testified before the committee on Thursday, September 14; is that correct? Mr. McNA.ty. I did. Mr. Kien. What is your occupation? _ Mr. McNatty. I am an examiner of questioned documents, that is more commonly referred to as a handwriting expert. Mr. Kien. Are you testifying today as a representative of the handwriting panel? Mr. McNA ty. I am. Mr. Kietn. What would you estimate to be the total number of documents examined by the members of the panel during the course of your careers as questioned document examiners? a McNA tty. I would judge somewhere in the tens of thou- sands. Mr. Kern. Could you approximate for us the total combined years of experience that the three members of the panel have as questioned documents examiners? Mr. McNatty. Considering the other two are contempories of mine, I would assume we have more than 100 years’ experience. Mr. Kien. Is each person’s handwriting unique to that person? Mr. McNA zy. It is. Mr. KEIN. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the document JFK F-399 be received as a committee exhibit and shown to the witness. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be received and made a part of the record at this point. (Whereupon, JFK exhibit F-399 was received. | ar e Pela at ye Reetaet! SAE Sar Sragttest date prig " gsatyory b eq } drusueztaro pexyoasz| $s 6s6T eae.“€ BED pep *s*n uoptzeretoeq Butysenbez ‘ *2adas . o$0s-d SSATYOIY pred soTAzres ec ada 2 | | BATIOSTSS UO ,PTRMEO *H ©2T, endo devi & pe gs ee 8 7 oe * seaTYoIW wI0g SGGTe REA. UOTIEARSTHOY SATROOETESSOTAIS cine soabatbaes none aasrnas = S80 Sema ee ee ee eee . ’ Fy ee RE Le EDA ne ae ae SEE : dete eeermmetertea + to anicoleiomnace es : ; = - geazyoOIW ebzeyosta 6s6T ‘TT *ades Le a SOTAISS pedebtTqoO JO eoTION 3 . = aoa XOpur pue 6S6T ‘TT ades : rors : quowejeqs uot IeuTUASL AyTaznoes SS etemntmneteames 829 cytmesiesiionemn—= b-on -oabeneter TOO Ye whee, meee cr1o08 «iGe demas Saveeeatinka +56 . . a ed 3 6S6T ‘OT ae . snr beats ed ahieee - . 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Mr. McNally, do you recognize that document? Mr. McNA ty. I do. Mr. KEIN. Does that document contain a listing of all the docu- ments examined by the panel that were allegedly written or signed by Lee Harvey Oswald? Mr. McNALty. It does. Mr. Kuiern. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would ask that the documents marked JFK F-478 through JFK F-510 be received as committee exhibits and shown to the witness. I should state for the record these documents are either the originals or the best existing copy of the documents listed on JFK F-399 and were obtained from the Navy Department, the Archives, the committee offices, and the FBI. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered and made part of the record at this point. (Whereupon, JFK exhibits F-478 through F-510 were received.] 260 JFK Exuisit F-478 nn” RECORD OF EMERGENCY DA‘ SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE MAKING ENTRIES ; ‘3 2 SERVICE NO. 4& SERVICE 1. DESIGNATOR’S LAST NAME—FIRST NAME—MIDOLE NAME 465323 UTMC OSWALD Lee Harvey 5. MARITAL STATUS 6, FULL NAME OF SPOUSE Not Married 8 CHILDREN (List each child of any marriage. If none, so state) FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME—LAST NAME ADORESS [sex _| pare oraire | 9. NAME OF f-)FATHER OR oO MALE GUARDIAN 10, ADDRESS IF LIVING—IF DECEASED SO STATE Robert E. Lee OSWALD Deceased 1.936 Collinwood St., Fort Worth, Texas 11. NAME OF [A MOTHER oR ayeee GUARDIAN . 12 ADORESS IF LIVING—IF DECEASED SO STA Marzuerite (Slaverie) OSWALD IN THE EVENT THAT 1 AM NOT SURVIVED BY A SPOUSE OR ELIGIBLE CHILD | DESIRE THAT PAYMENT CF 6 MONTHS’ DEATH GRATUITY BE MADE TO THE RELATIVE SHOWN BELOW. (The name of father or mother must be repeated if it is desired that he or she receive payment) 13, FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME—LAST NAME 14, RELATIONSHIP 1S. ADDRESS Margeerite OSWALD Mother £936 Collinwood St., Fort Worth, Texas 16. ALTERNATE RELATIVE 17, RELATIONSHIP 13, ADDRESS tep=. John Edvard PIC Brother 4936 Collinwood St., Fort Worth, Texas 19, IN THE EVENT THAT 1 AM LISTED AS MISSING OR OTHER MILITARY CIP-CUMSTANCES PREVENT ME FROM TRANSMITTING FUNDS TO MY DEPENDENTS. IT IS MY DESIRE THAT FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME—LAST NAME RELATIONSHIP “arcuerite OSYALD Mother ADDRESS RECEIVE EACH MONTH 4.936 Collinwood St., Fort Worth, Texas 100 PERCENT OF MY PAY 20. | REQUEST THE FOLLOWING COMMERCIAL INSURANCE COMPAN:ESS BE OFFICIALLY NOTIFIED IN CASE OF MY DEATH IN ACTIVE SERVICE NAME OF COMPANY 21. DESIGNATION OR CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY—SERVICEMEN’S INCEMNITY (PL 23, 82d Cong.) (Does not operate as a designation or change of dencficiary of any insurence contracts issued by Uniled States Gorernment) ALL PREVIOUS DESIGNATIONS OF PRINCIPAL AND CONTINGENT BENEFICIARIES, IF ANY. UNDER SERVICEMEN’S INDEMNITY ACT OF 1951, ARE HERESY CANCELED, AND IT IS DIRECTED THAT SAID INDEMNITY BE PAID TO: RELATIONSHIP . SHARE OF AMOUNT YO EACH BENEFICIARY Marcuerite “CSWALD Mother WITNESSED BY (Signcture on all copies) SIGNATURE OF SERVICEMAN (Sign all copies) ne wale) &. PPODSC : Ohh ett Zr GRADE OR RATE OF WITNESS SERVICE tid. DATE SIGNED Cavtain 9520383 2h, October 1956 FcaM : D D 1 FES 52 9 cad Replaces DD Form 8, 1 Jul 50,which may be used. 23 Ee La —JFK Enmair F- 418 261 INSTRUCTIONS (Items for which no instructions are printed below are self-expi.untory) This form will be completed and maintained current by Item 21.—The indemnity is payable only to persons within all officer and enlisted personnel in accordance with Navy: the following classes: BuPers Manual Art B-2312; Marine Corps Manual Par 11223; USCG Pers Cir No. 30-50; AFR 35-38; ANGR 35-38. (1) Spouse (husband or wife). — ¢ All items must be completed. In the event you, the desig- (2) Children.—The term “children” includes natural nator, become a casualty the persons named in items 6, 8, children, stepchildren, adoptive children. Illegitimate 9, and 11 will be notified. If notification is not desired due, children are included only if designated. to’ health or other reason state in remarks. If there are no (3) Parents—The term “parents” includes natural living relatives, the name and address of a friend may parents, stepparents, adoptive parents or persons who be entered in remarks. Continue any item in remarks if stood in loco parentis to the insured et any time prior to necessary. entry into the active service for a period of not less than Item 4.—Enter one of the following: USN, USNR, USMC, one year. Unless designated otherwise by the serviceman USMCR, USCG, USCGR, USAF (for Air Force add “Res” the term “parent” includes only the mother and father or “ANG” as appropriate only if not in active military who last bore that relationship to the serviceman, service). (4) Brothers and sisters ——The term “brothers and sis- Item 5.—Enter single, married, widowed, divorced, or ters” includes those of the half blood and those through legally separated. adoption. Item 6.—Spouse to whom alimony or support is legall If the designated beneficiary or beneficiaries do not survive payable must be shown even if divorced or legally separate the insured, or if none has been designated, the indemnity will be paid to the first eligible class of beneficiaries accord- Items 9 and 11.—If the person entered is in the class of ing to the order set forth above and in equa! shares if the guardian, indicate whether stepparent, foster parent, loco class is composed of more than one person. If this order is parentis, guardian, or adoptive parent. in accord with your wishes state “No Designation.” If-the order is not in accord with your wishes you should name the Items 18 and 16.—If you do not desire to designate anyone person or persons in the class to receive the indemnity. Any enter “I decline to designate any person to receive this pay” person so named will be considered a principal beneficiary in your own handwriting. Only designated relatives are unless specifically designated as a contingent. eligible to receive payment without proof of dependency. Item 19.—The “Missing Persons Act” provides that pay DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS and allowances continue to accrue to the pay account of any service member for the period he is missing or captured and Navy: Original to BuPers, Washington 25, D. C. Attn.: may be paid to the dependents for support. This item reflects Casualty Branch. 2% your desires and is used as a guide in disposition of your pay. Duplicate—same as original. Allotments to dependents and insurance companies initiated prior to entering a missing status are continued in effect Triplicate—file in service record at duty station. unless unusual circumstances indicate changes. “Marine Corps: See Marjne Corps Manual Par 11222. Item 20.+Completion of this item will insure that insur- ance companies listed are promptly notified when necessary. Coast GUARD: See Personnel Circular No. 30-50. Accuracy in entering policy numbers will facilitate prompt settlement. Arr Force: See AFR 35-38 or ANGR 35-38. REMARKS ©. d. KOVERNMERT PRINTING OFFICE 16—67402-1 262 Se | UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS mara (20(a) Bh: : “ENLISTMENT CONTRACT AND RECORD .= == rwe4D, waDeWe WDD (== <3 ? - 24ARTAOct 1956 ry 52 6& PLACE OF BIRTH (City) (State or country) |7. REUGION New Orleans Louisiana 10, HOME OF RECORD AT TIME OF ENLISTMENT STREET AND NUMBER OR R. F. D. NUMBER CITY OR TOWN COUNTY OR PARISH STATE OR COUNTRY 14936 Collinwood Street — Fort Vorth Tarrant Texas IL, PLACE AT WHICH ENUSTED (City, county, and Siate) . 12, EFFECTIVE DATE OF ENLISTMENT 12 CONTRACT Lratranion (if any) ye pay MONTH YEAR RS Dallas, Texas 2h Vetober None ENTRIES AS TO PREVIOUS SERVICE 21. RANK TO WHICH APPO:NTED OR 22 TRANSFERRED : z to USMC RDev, San Diego, California 23. Examining Surgeon's Certificate. (This certification no longer used.) 24. For and in consideration of the pay or wages due in the grades which may from time to time be essigned me Hering the contin- uance of my service, I do hereby acknowledge to have voluntarily enlisted in the (strike ~ one)_(1) United States Marine Corps (2): Recorventthe Hairat-Stotes-Merie-Liepy, as a private, and I agree to and with_tte Se v=o an oflicer of the United States Marine Corps (RésérveXas follows: (Nase of recruiting officer) 25. To enter the service of the United States Marine Corps and to report to such post or station of the Marine Corps as I may ’ be ordered to join, and to the utmost of my power and ability discharge my several services or duties end be in everything con- formable and obedient to the several requirements and lawful commands of the officers who may be placed over me. 26. I oblige and subject myself to serve un- word FIGURE (Word and jigure to less sooner discharged by proper authority YEARS YEARS te : “27. In the event of war or national emergency declared by the President to exist during my term of service, I oblige and subject myself to serve until 6 months after the end or that war or national emergency if so required by the Secretary of the Navy unless I voluntarily reenlist or extend my enlistment. 28. I am of legal age to enlist; I have never been found guilty of a crime except as stated by me to the recruiting officer; I have never deserted from any ot the Armed Forces of the United States, and have never been discharged therefrom for any reason other than recorded herein. ‘ 29. I understand that upon enlistment in the Reserve of the United States Marine Corps, or upon transfer or assignment thereto I may not be ordered to active duty without my consent except in time of war, or when in the opinion of the President a national emergency exists, or when otherwise prescribed by law, and that I may be required to perform active duty during such periods. 30. I HAVE HAD THIS CONTRACT FULLY EXPLAINED TO ME. I UNDERSTAND IT, AND CERTIFY THAT NO PROMISE OF ANY KIND HAS BEEN MADE TO ME CONCERNING ASSIGNMENT TO DUTY, OR PROMOTION DURING MY ENLISTMENT. 31. Oath of Enlistment: I do sclemnly swear (or affirm) that | will. bear true faith and ollegiance fo the United States of America; thet t will serve them honestly and fcithfully agains? all their encmies waomsoever; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Milita Justice. And | do further swear lor cfirm) that all statements made by me, as now given in this record, are correct. SIGNATURE Subscribed and sworn to before me thi 7 EM day of ___Octoher ._ AL 1956-5 SIGNATURE AND RANK OF RECRUITING OFFICER ...$5. : EIEIO @. 6. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE §=©16—64393-8 —— | 1 oe — SFK Exner F-49795 JFK Exuisitr F-479 263 7 ee UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS ; Bea nl _¢ eat is 09-40 (surtesepes Careuh AYE ne (DD a ENLISTMENT CONTRACT AND RECORD > Ory. 0), WOH WALL 84 USED) 24 Oct 1956 leas , 10, HOME OF RECORD AT TIME OF ENLISTMENT 7% CL 29 2. STREET AND MUMBER O8 R.F. D, NUMBER CITY OR TOWN COUNTY OR PARISH STATE OR COUNTRY 4936 Collimsood Street Fort Worth Tarrant Texas ML PLACE AT WHICH ENLISTED (City, county, and State) 12, EFFECTIVE DATE OF ENLISTMENT 1, CONTRACT LIMITATION (if any) DAY | MONTH YEAR IS¥C_RS Pallas Texyags 2), O etoher Q 19541! Mone : ENTRIES AS TO PREVIOUS SERVICE 18. DATE DISCHARGED 16. REASON =< 18 be BRANCH OF 19, SERVICE NO. 20. TYPE OF RICCHARGE a I| a a ky hee a | Zi. RANK TO WHICH APPOINTED OR 22 TRANSFERRED C REAPPOINTED Ladepee ti, a 23, Examining Surgeon’s Certificate. (This certification no longer used.) 24. For and in consideration of the pay or wages due in the grades which may from time to time be assigned me during the contin- uance of my service, I do hereby acknowledge to have voluntarily enlisted in the (strixe one) (1) United States Marine Corps P ote : as a private, and I agree to and with_ 2, x, JO°i o.ted ocates Afarine Uorps ( aise} as follows: Name of recruiting officer) 25. To enter the service of the United States Marine Corps and to report to such post or station of the Marine Corps as I may be ordered to join, and to the utmost of my power and ability discharge my several services or duties and be in everything con- formable and obedient to the several requirements and lawful commands of the officers who may be placed over me. . e 26. I oblige and subject myself to serve un- — |WORD FIGURE (Word end frws to less sooner discharged by proper authority AI Ar O YEARS YEARS Rowdieritina:) 27. In the event of wer or national emergency declared by the President to exist during my term of service, I oblige and subject myself to serve until 6 months aiter the end of that war or national emergency if so required by the Secretary of the Navy unless I voluntarily reenlist or extend my enlistment. 28. I am of legal age to enlist; I have never been found guilty of a crime except as stated by me to the recruiting officer; I have never deserted from any of the Armed Forces of the United States, and have never been discharged therefrom for any reason other than recorded herein. 29. I understand that upon enlistment in the Reserve of the United States Marine Corps, or upon transfer or assignment thereto, I may not be ordered to active duty without my consent except in time of war, or when in the opinion of the President a national emergency exists, or when otherwise prescribed by law, and that I may be required to perform active duty during such periods. 30. I HAVE HAD THIS CONTRACT FULLY EXPLAINED TO ME. I UNDERSTAND IT, AND CERTIFY THAT NO Die ni eapumarenr ein BEEN MADE TO ME CONCERNING ASSIGNMENT TO DUTY, OR PROMOTION iy Say . ° 31. Octh of -. «sent: § do sclemnly swear (or affirm) thet I will bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America; tha? I will sve “sem honestly and faithfully against all their enemies whomsocver; and that I will obcy the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to reguiations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. And I do farther swear (or afirm) that oll statements made by me, as hel ae in this record, are correct. Lehane eae Al SLE INSTRUCTIONS’ SS oe THO Ow AZUL DICATE? oe van. (frtenwating cirenmatances surrounding offense. in lune dates, component, 21, WAS THE OFFENSE FOR WHICH CONVIC , and former eerie nuinher, if applicant claima any prior sercive im any branch of the O civik [ | CRIMINAL | Avmel Lorces bevel eatimate ofapplicant's potential calue for military service, and other a of *he State tn which | pertincat mformatton! 2. WAS THEOFFENSE FOR WHICH CONVICTED OR ADWUDICATIL «Applying Lawe or wt () Fetony (_] isoemeanon peuimayency 2h AGEOFAPPLICANT AT TIMEOFOFFENSES y 24 CITY AMO STATE IN WHICH OFFENSES WERE COMMITTED A MAME OF COURT IN WHICH TRIED ATE 3A. FOUND @UILTY, WAS COURT ACTION DEEMED ADJUDICATION AS A JUVEMILE DELIWQUENT, [D) comnerion (_) Yoprnrut orrenoen on warwaro Miwon, ie 2. OFFEXSE FOR WHICH APPLICANT WAS CONVICTED OR ADAJDICATED IS PUNISHABLE BY (Apply laws ef the Stale imwhich tried: if thelength ofsentence was indefinite or indeterminate, state the mazimum punishment provided for the offense tn the law under which conricted): MR DATE OF RELEASE FROM COMPINEMENT DATE OF RELEASE FROM PAROLE. PROBATION -- 30. INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED BY 33. I CERTIFY that I have personally questioned the icant Pg > perma ay, een Oe ar na that he is fully ualified, in accordance with existing instructions, for enlistment in the Marine Corps waenaeutbocamicir (RaER@DCM Provide ; and that he signed the foregoing questionnairein my presence. FIRST ENDORSEMENT FROM: COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS TO: 1. Returned. Enlistment [] [(] oT authorized provided physically and otherwise qualified. "y direction SF ee ee ——————— ee > 4 10—86443-3 US. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1995—-O-33882~_ « “4 + RENE NE SE oe 266 JFK Exuipit F-481 LOYALTY CERTIFICATE FOR PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED FORCES uthority to establish procedures implementing the national policy relating to L. PROVISIONS. The Department of Defense bas the a This has bzen determined by proper authority to include restrictions as to loyalty of persons entering on duty with the Armed Forces.atbetic association with, certaim organizations. certain standards of conduct and membership in, or symp .. . STANDARDS OF CONDUCT (c) Advocacy of revolution or of force o violence to altec the existin consti- 1. Conduct which may be considered as establishing reasonable tutional form of government of the United States; advocacy revolu- rey for imposing appropriate penalties shal include but is not tion or of force or violence to bring about economic, political, or social imited to, one or more of the following: change. reparations therefor, or intimate and (2) Sabotage, espionage, of atcempts or (d) Intentional unzwthorized disclosure to any person under circumstances sympathetic associations with or voluntary assistance to persons who the which may indicate disloyalty to the United Staces, of documents or subject of investigation has reasonable cause to believe may be spies or information of a classified or nonpublic character, saboteurs. (b) Treason, sedition, o¢ writings and acts which can reasonably be con- (e) Acting, attempting to act, or knowingly failing to act when such con- sidered 23 intended to encourage seditious or treasonable opinions or duct is calculated to serve the interests of another government in prefer- ence to the interests of the United Scates of America. actions. MEMBERSHIP IN OR ASSOCIATION WITH CERTAIN ORGANIZATIONS ments when such denial is attempted by force, violence, or intimida- 2. Associations which may be considered as establishing reason- tron, Of; able grounds for imposing appropriate penalties include but are not (2) Alteration of the existing form of government of the United States limited to membership in, afhliation with, or sympathetic associa- or territory subject to its jurisdiction, or of the existing economic, tion with, any foreiga or domestic organization, association, move- social, or political order within it when such alteration is through ment, group or combination of persons having the following or with the aid of force, violence, of intimidation. characteristics: (5) Which is disclosed by investigation, of is designated by the Atcorney General of the United States to totalitarian, fascist, communis, or sub- (a) Which practices, seeks to practice, or advocates either: vecsive, oc as having adopted 2 or of advocatirg o¢ zpproving the commission of aces of force or vio lence to deny persons theie cights i under (1) Denial, to any person, group of persons, or class of persons within the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alters the form of the United States or territory subject co its jurisdiction, of any right government of the United States by unconstitutional means regardless of or cights which the Federal Constitution guarantees or protects preneaers advocacy, or nonadvocacy of any of the cenets set forth in 1 (a) against encroachment by either or both Federal and Stare overn- and 1 (5) above. 3. Organizations designated by the Attorney General, pursuant to Executive Order 10450, are listed below: Communist Party, U. S. A., its subdivisions, sub- American Polish Labor Council. . Cervantes Fraternal Society. sidiaries and affiliates. American Polish League. China Welfare A 1, Inc. Communist Political Association, its subdivisions, American Rescue Ship Mission (a project of the Chopin Cultural Center. subsidiaries and affiliates, including— United American Spanish Aid Committee). iti Committee to Free Earl Browder. Alabama People’s Educational Association. American-Russian Fraternal Society. zens Committee for may Bridges. Florida Press and Educational League. American-Russian Institute, New York (alse Citizens Committee of the Upper West Side (New Oklahoma League for Political Education. known as the American Russian Institute for York Ciity). People’s Educational and Press Association of Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union). Citizens Emergency Defense Conferen-e. exas. American Russian Institute, Philadelphia. Citizens Protective League. _ American Russian Institute of San Francisco. Civil Liberties Sponsoring Committee of Virginia League for People’s Education. Young Communisc League. American Russian Institute of Southern California, Piusburgh.* f r Abr2ham Lincoln Brigade. Los Angeles. Civil Rights Congress and its affiliated organiza- Abraham Lincoln Schouol, Chicago, Mlinvis. American Siav Congress. tions, including: Actica Committee to Free Spain Now. American Women tor Peace. Civil Rights Congress for Texas. a iewas: American Association for Reconstruction in Yugo- American Youth Congress. Veterans Ajtainst Discriinination of. Civil Rights slavia, Inc. American Youth for Democracy. Congress of New York. American Branch of the Federation of Greek Mari- Acmenian Progressive League of America. Columbians. time Unions. Associated Klans of America. Comite Coordinator Pro Republica Espanola. American Christian Nationalist ie, Association of Georgia Klans. Comite Pro Derechos Civiles. _ f oe Committee for European Workers’ Re- Association of German Nationals (Reichsdeutscbe Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland. ief. V ereinigung). Commnittee to Aid the Fighting South. Spy eee! Committee for Protection of Foreign Associstion of Lithuanian Workers (also knows Committee to Defend che Rights and Freedom of mm. as Lietuviu Duarbininku Susivienijimas). Piusburgh's Political Prisoners. American Committee for the Secclement of Jews in Ausland-Organization dee NSDAP, Overseas Commitee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy. Birobidjan, Inc. Branch of Nazi Party. Committee foe Conscitutional and Political American Comuinittee for Spanish Freedom. Baltimore Forum. Freedom. ; American Coramittee for Yugoslay Relief, Inc. Benjan.in Davis Freedom Committee. Committee for the Defense of the Piccsburgh Six. American Committee to Survey Labor Conditions Black Dragon Society. Committee for Nationalise Action. in Europe. Boston School for Macxise Studies, Boston, Committce for the Negro in the Arts. Ameria Council for a Democratic Greece, for- Massachusetts. Commitee for Peace and-prottrerinvod Vestival in merly known as the Greek American Council; Bridges-Kobercon-Schmidt Defense Committee. Philadelphia. Greek American Committee for National Unity. Bulgarian American People’s League of the Committee for the Protection of the Bill of Rights. American Council on Soviet Relations. United States of America. Committee for World Youth Friendship American Croatian Congress. California Emergency Defense Committee. Cultural Exchange. American Jewish Labor Council. California. Laboc School, Inc., 321 Divisadero Committee to Defend Marie Richardson. American League Againse War and Fascism. Street, San Francisco, California. Committee to Uphold the Bill of Rights. American Leacue fur Peace and Democracy. Carpatho-Russian People’s Society. Commonwealth College, Mena, Arkansas. American Lithuanian Workers Literary Aysociation Central Council of American Women of Croatian Congress Against Discrimination, (also known as Anpterikos Lietuviu Darbininku Descent (alse kuown as Ceittral Council of Congress of the Unemployed. _ ¢ Literaturos Draugija). American Croatian Women, National Council ef Connecticut Committee to Aid Victims of the American Nations! Labor Party. Croatiun Women). Smith Act. American National Socialise League. Central Japanese Association (Beikoku Chuo Connecticut Stace Youth Conference. American Nacional Socialise Party. Nipponjin Kai). Congress of American Revolutionary Writers. American Nacionalise Party. tral Japanese Association of Southem Congress of American Women. American Patriots, Inc. California. Council on African Affairs. American Peace Crusade. : Centeal Organization of the German-American Ce-ncil of Greek Americans. American Peace Mobilization. LH National Alliance (Deutscbe-Amerikaniscbe Coracil for Jobs, Relief, ard Housing. American Poles for Peace. ; Einbeitsfront). Sourcil for Pan-American Democracy. 267 Croatian Benevolent Epepricty : ; Kyffhacuscr, also known as Kyfthacusee League Pittsburgh Acts Club. Dai Nippon Butoku Kai (Military Virtue Society (Kyffhaenser Braud), Kyffhacuser Fellowship Political Prisoners’ Welfare Committee. of Japan or Military Art Saciety of Japan). (Kyffhbaeuser Kameradscbuft). i Polonia Society of the IWO. Daily Worker Press Club. Kyffhacuser War Relicl (Kyffbacuser Krieghshilfs- Progressive German-Americans, also known as Danicls Detense Committee. werk). Progressive Geiman-Americans of Chicago. Dante Alighicri Society (Between 1935 and 1940). Labor Council for Negro Rights. Proletacian Party of America. Dennis Defense Committee. Labor Kesearch Association, Inc. Protestant War Veterans of the United States, Inc. Detroit Youth Assembly. Labor Youth League. Provisional Committee of Citizens for Peace, East Bay Peace Committec. M League for Common Sense. Southwest Arca. Emergency Conference to Save Spanish Refugees League of American Writers, Provisional Committee onLatin American Affairs. hepa body of the North American Spanish Lictor Society (Utulian Black Shirts). Provisional Committce to Abolish Discrimination id Committee). : Macedonian-American Peuple’s League. in the State of Maryland. Families of the Baltimore Smith Act Victims. Mario Morgantini Circle. nag Rican Comite Pro Libertades Civiles Families of the Smith Act Victims. Maritime Labor Commitice to Defend Al Lannon. Federation of [calian War Veterans in che U. S. A., Maryland Congress Againse Discrimination. Puertorriquenos Unidos (Puerto Ricuns United). Inc. (Associazione Nazionale Combattenti Massachusetts Minute Women for Peace (not con- ad City Committee for Peace. Italiani, [ederatione degli Stati Uniti d’ ee with the Minute Women of the U.S. A., censbridge Tenants League. America). nc.). Revolutionary Workers League. Finnish-American Mutual Aid Society. Maurice Braverman Defense Committee. Romanian-American Fraternal Society. Frederick Douglass Educacional Center. Michigan Civil Rights Federation. Russian American Socicty, Inc. Freedom Stage, Inc. Michigan Council for Peace. Sakura Kai (Patriotic Society, er Cherry Associa- Friends of the New Germany (Freunde des Neuen Michigan School of Social Science. ‘ale en composed of veterans of Kusso-Japanese Deutschlunds). Nanka Teikoku Gunyudan (Imperial Military ar). Friends of the Soviet Union Friends Group or Southern California War Samuel Adams School, Boston, Mass. Garibaldi American Fraternal Society. Veterans). a F Santa Barbara Peace Forum. Seoese Washington Carver School, New York National Association of Mexican Americans (also Schappes Defense Committee. ity. known as Asociacion Nacional Mexico-Ameri- hneiderman-Darcy Defense Committee. German-American Bund (Amerika-deutscher cana). School of Jewish Studics, New York City. Volksbund). P National Blue Star Mothers of America (not to be Seattle Labor Schvol, Seattle, Washington. German-American Republican League. confused with the Blue Scar Mothers of America Serbian-American Fraternal Society. German-American Vocational League (Deutsche- organized in February 1942). ed Serbian Vidovdan Council. Amerikanische Berufsge-meinscehaf!). National Committee for the Defense of Political Shinto Temples (limited to State Shinto abolisbed Guardian Club. Prisoners. in 1945). Harlem Trade Union Council. National Committee for Freedom of the Press. _ Silver Shire Legion of America. Hawaii Civil Liberties Committee. National Committee to Win Amnesty for Smith Slavic Council of Southern California. Heimuska Kai, also known as Nokubei Heieki Act Victims. Slovak Workers aan Gimusha Kai, Zaibel Nihonjin, Heijaku National Committee to Win the Peace. Slovenian-American Nationat Council. Gimusha Kai and Zaibei Heimusha Kai National Conference on American Policy in China Socialisec Workers Party, including American Com- (Japanese Residing in America Military Con- and the Far East (a Conference called by the mitee for European Workers’ Relief. scripts Association). Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy). Socialist Youth League. Hellenic-American Brotherhood. National Council of Americans of Croatian Sokoku Kai (Fatherlaud Society). Hinode Kai (Imperial Japanese Reservists). Descent. 5 Southern Negro Youth Congress. Hinomaru Kai (Rising Sun Flag Society—a group National Council of American Soviet Friendship. Sutko Sha (Reserre Officers Association, Los al lapanese War Veterans). National Federation for Constitutional Liberties. Angeles). Hokubei Zaigo Shoke Dan (North American National Labor Conference for Peace. tacuse Women for Peace. Reserve Officers Association). National Negro Congress. om Paine School of Social Science, Philadelphia, Hollywood Writers Mobilization for Defense. National Negro Labor Council. Pennsylvania. Hungarian-American Council for Democracy. Nationalist Action League. Tom Paine School of Westchester, New York. Hungarian Brochechood. Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico. Trade Union Committee for Peace. Independent Party (Seattle, Washington). Nature Friends of America (Since 1935). Trade Unionists for Peace. Independenc People’s Party. Negro Labor Victory Committee. Tri-State Negro Trade Union Council. Independent Socialist League. New Committee for Publications. nian-American Fraternal Union. Industrial Workers of the World. Nichibei Kogyo Kaisha (The Great Fujii Theatre). Union of American Croatians. International Labor Defense. North American Committee to Aid Spanish Union of New York Veterans. International Workers Order, its subdivisions, Democracy. United American Spanish Aid Committee. subsidiaries and affiliates. North American Spanish Aid Committee. United Committce of Jewish Societies and Lands- Panese Association of America. North Philadelphia Forum. manschaft Federations, also known as Coordi- japanese Overseas Central Society (Kaigai Dobo Northwest Japanese Association. nation Committce of’ Jewish Landsmanschaften Chuo Kai). Ohio School of Social Sciences. rs & and Fraternal Organizations. Ee Overseas Convention, Tokyo, Japan, Oklahoma Committee to Defend Political Pzis- United Committee of South Slavic Americans. oners. United Defense Council of Southern California. Japanese Protective Association (Recruiting Original Southern Klans, Incorporated. United Harlem Tenants and Consumers Organiza- rganization). Pacific Northwest Labor hool, Seattle, tion. fenike School of Social Science, New York City. Washington. United May Day Committee. le wish Culrure Society. Palo Aito Peace Club. United ore and Allied Veterans of America. wish People’s Committee. Partido dcl Pueblo of Panama (operating in the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Jewish People’s Fraternal Order. Canal Zone). Voice of Freedom Committee. Peace Information Center. Walt Whitman School of Social Science, Newark, Jikyoku Lin Kai (The Committee for the Crisis). Peace Movement of Ethiopia. New Je x i Johnson-Forest Group. : People’s Drama, Inc: Washington Bookshop Association. . Johnsonites. People’s Educational Association (Incorporated ee Committee to Defend che Bill of Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee. under name Los Angeles Educational Associa- ights. — Council of Progressive Italian-Americans, tion, Inc.), also known as People’s Educational Washington Commitee for Democratic Action. inc. Center, People’s University, People’s School. Washington Commonwealth Federation. Joseph Weydemeyer School of Social Science, St. People’s Institute of Replies Religion. Washington Pension Union. is, Missouri. Peoples Programs (Seattle, Washington). Wisconsin Conference on Social Legislation. People's Radio Foundation, Inc. Workers Alliance (since April 1936). ’ Kibei Seinen Kai (Association of U. S. citizens of Workers Party (including Socialist Youth Japanese ancestry who have returned to America People's Rights Party. League). after studying in Japan). Philadelphia Labor Committee for Negro Righrs. Yiddisher Kultur Farband. Knights of the White Camellia. Philadelphia School of Social Science and Art. Yugoslav-American Cooperative Home, Inc. Ku Klux Klan. Photo League (New York City). Yugoslav Seamen's Club, Inc. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONS TO AND DELETIONS FROM THE ABOVE LIST ARE ANNOUNCED: ADD: ELSINORE PROGRESSIVE LEAGUE EVERYBODY'S COM‘ITT2E TO OUTLAW WAR IDAHO PENSION UNION MASSACHUSETTS COMMITTES FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONS TO AND DELETIONS FROM THE ABOVE LIST ARE ANNOUNCED: (CONTINUED) \-o s nents ’ 5 j i 3 ' 4 . ee os Il. DECLARATION. (Concealment of, misrefresentation as to, or failure to divulge in full, conduct or associations of the char- discharge, separation, acter set forth in the provisions at the time of execution of this certificate may constitute grounds for court martial, or other disposition of personnel, Penalties for making a false statement may be very severe. +Pager Constitutional privilege part of any against self-crimination, i.e., the making of a statement which will expose you to criminal trial, is claimed about all or any is claimed” conduct, membership, or association in question, you may so claim’ under Remarks below, "Federal Constitutional privilege or "Federal Constitutional privilege is Cimed as to... 9” describing the specific part of any conduct, membership, or association about ( ; which claim is made.) ; 5 " CERTIFICATION I certify, a5 regards the standards of conduct, or membership in or association with, certain organizations, shat: 1. I have read the provisions applying to standards of conduct and membership in or association with certain organizations and I under- stand them, 2. If I bave engaged in any such conduct, 1 bave so indicated the nature thereof under Remarks below, : 3. | have entered under Remarks below, the name(s) of the organization(s) from the above list of which 1 am or have beenamerzber, or by which I am. or have been employed, or which I have attended or been present at, or exgaged in, or, anizationc! or social activities or activities which they sponsored, or for which I have sold, given away or distributed written, printed, or otherwise recorded matter publishzd by shem, or with which I have been identified or associated in some other manner, 4. If 1 fave not engaged in any such conduct, or have not been associated in any manner with listed organizations, or have never been a member or participated in the activities of any pro-communist, pro-Nazi, or pro-Fascist orgaxizations im foreign countries, I bave so indicated by writing "NONE" or "None to my knowledge” under Remarks below. 5. L understand thasifwhat I state below is found to be incorrect, incomplete, or misleading in any important particular, I may be subject to prosecution and punishment under the appropriate laws of the United States. 6. | understand the meaning of the statements made in the certifications above. a REMARKS (Use the space provided below and attach additional sheets, if necessary, for a fall detailed statement. If associated with any @ listed organizations, specify ae ps extent of association with each including dates, places, py Sele now or formerly ud es - TYPED FULL NAME OF PERSON MAKING CERTIFICATION SERVICE NO. (If any) SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING CERTIFICATION Cc . 4653230 ne | OSWALD, Lee Harvey IV ooA4; CLAS Lie Fae C2 - g —ti“7 - GIVEN UNDER MY HAND THIS Z2hth pay of October 199 50 at tiewe ae 4. toyas Fi TYPED NAME, GRADE AND ORGANIZATION OF WITNESSING OFFICER SIGNATURE OF WITNESSING OFFICER R. K. JONES, Captain, USMC,ARO ilo DD sires 98 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OB8SO. 4% U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING CFFICE : 1955—-0-355363 (Vd 269 JFK Exuisit F-482 im ae 2‘ BR M ED LEAVE THIS rige ae ey, i apr Sh} Ane FORCES [377 (io Fe eet SER ws a FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME IK Dear F482 r) “hs \ ce fe? ran Ssoy 5 {7% Se t/ 3 / a = PLACE OF ENLISTMENT, APPOINTMENT, ETC. SERVICE "A GDS 25 PLACE OF BIRTH “RS DALLA; TEXAS 2 Sienresong. UMS User DATE OF ENLISTMENT. APPOINTMENT, ETC. COLOR OF EYES LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK ) my yy -arzel 2 DRED ts WP, 21, OCTOFSY 1956 SCARS AND MARKS COLOR OF HAIR Seon WEIGHT "9 Le Sra BY OFFICIAL TAKIN FINGERPRINTS 5. RIGHT LITTLE LEFT THUMB RIGHT THUMB UR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY tug ZB Ky aL : 4, We: “ helWG 41-373 O- 79 - 18 270 Betget Buscee No. 73 eee ae A= ies bai & Approve! Erpow co x ¥ & 7 Ze “Ald LN NW Sc616S 190 as i < ae ea Ths eigienae ed ve bS-SH/ Hie roe ied ye ; ‘Dear Sir: . who claims to have resided at _.....-..-..-_- Pacee SS deeb Fa aa4 oe £596) a 80 to and personal and whose fingerprints ve It is sdescription are recorded hereofj¥an applicant for enlistment in the United States —..._._-_______-___-_-_-- is inclosed for your srequested that the following information be furnished from your files. A return envelope “convenience. b L*sg ? Very truly yours, -1 Inclosure pn ¥ Return Envelope got, © 1 Sn. e TE ee Bete ee Q _—, “ey. J (Recruiting Oficer) ‘ HAS APPLICANT A POLICE OR JUVENILE RECORD? (other then minor traffic violation ) C) ves (J no IF “YES,” WHAT WAS THE OFFENSE OR CHARGE, DISPOSITION. ANO SENTENCE? x : 5 Es Se SS pates ed » aei HISAPPLICANT ROWUNDERGOING CouRT ACTION oFAnyKimo? [_]Yes Clwow “ves,” Give veTaLs ee Fe pe . a : ike Crctctater can [lve C) no__m “ves.” sreciry : 1S APPLICANT [) wanero_() seranaren () viworceo LC) woowen () sincur CL)mansran STATUS UNKNOWN _ R10 Vey ac lak:Se eae Tope eek ee 271 JFK Exuisit F-483 =e ys ? rN “9a, - & - +. ~ MISCELLANES ES MFORMATIGH Anu’ DEX Dap bat! = ee we etme ee, ~ MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION Socin c, 3 Ai‘eeur YO Age eal -?A27 ‘ WEGHT DATE i é8 eacaies er fasel 24 Oct 2956 a eee TD PHYSICAL PROFILE ANNUAL ~. ADMINISTRATIVE AUDIT COMPLETED J, : mOct oral 54 alfstaAqoe Keime pt ZL momma lstLt. uSsxc bt Metall fee SdS00 Vg FF 2ndit_—s iZ ee tnt EEL SS : fy Ps ey ee re eer , : Pk Bt Pe Ey OPP OS eat tas ee RES “ MOP BN bee ead | : ot ft nis erbeie reac ; TOTAL SEAAND FOREIGN DUTY REENUSTMENT BONUS: : £ YEARS: MONTHS: f\ (a) Paid $ slewe reenlistment bonus . for reenlistment. § DATELIKITS TAL LAST ReTURKED OFU.S. coxnnen- |esoetso pevo f A/Ge 9 nner) ; 43 (6) Prev pd sNiwe total amt of reenl bonuses to one: ea reenlistment. z org apap serch ve skeet SIGNATURE: CR hb kectic - : eG EE same ican Oana aa . > C51. 69886 BSIAT 5 ; » ~— - ' Articles UCMJ Ebel tomethisdate || Articles UCMJ lh on to me this date 5 BLO00 ‘4 . as required by vie UCM. as required by Article 137, UCMJ. GAS MASK SIZE: { a Og DEPOSIT RECORO BOOK NO: shea 24 Causralld | 4a Lnel | ae CLASS SWIMMER: Z pose eee ee —E——EEEE zs os a cog. gape : , - aati aga DOCUMENTS INSERTED (Continued) INITIAL. ENLISTE:ENT CONTRACT ps WR i, La a a RECORD OFSERVICE pug serge, IK Le ENE COL CARD Yay eat ae | FITNESS REPORTS SUBMITTED NAVMC 118(4)-PD frend at PROMOTION AND REDUCTION MAVMC 118(5)~?0 hae Scape apeie RR nk INDIVIDUAL TRAINING RECORD SK navMé 118)-PO ale WDdic ill a Mea idecs RgTiter SE Vth OT 2 aielatlaal oe ee ne mg ee ee -—CN OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY AND EDUCATION NAVMC 118(8)-PD _ COMBAT RECORD—MEDALS NAVMC 118(9)-PD ADMINISTRATIVE REMARKS NAYMC 118(11)-PD OFFENSES ANO PUNISHMENT NAVMC 118(12)-PD COURT MEMORANDA RAVMC 118(13)-PD EMERGENCY DATA DD FORM 3 LEAVE RECORD NAVMC 118(16)-PD SEA AND AtR TRAVEL MAVMC 118(17)-PD RECORD OF INOIVIOUAL RIFLE NAVMC 116(20)~SD KAVMC 16(21)-SO et te mee etn ee em DOCUMENTS INSERTED 5 pateie ss ane arent; Consent tJ 4 * 4, - he Ke DID | a eee a7 we ee Coo poeon | ‘2 fi. wate (Last) (Firat) (Middle) is a ee ea ——————— — Lee’ Ms wales Mir T6S8<250_ BAVC 318(1)-PD (RCV. 10-53) (REPLASES FREVIOUS EDITISN, WHICH IS OSSOLETE AND WILL NOT EZ USED) 16-7 110s-1 @. S. GOVERNMENT Parstina OFFICE a ee erywent —IFK Exner F- 4Q4 ee ee ee ee e+ te 272 JFK Exuisit F-484 SECURITY TERMINATIUN STATEMENT OF NAV FORM 5511-14 HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS SQUADRON U. S. MARINE CORPS AIR STATION EL TORO (SANTA ANA) CALIFORNIA 1. I hereby certify that I have conformed to the directives contained in the U, S. Navy Security Manual for Classified Matter and Registered Publication Manual in that I have returned to the Naval Establishment all classified matter which I have had in my possession. 2. I further certify that I am not retaining or taking away with me from my place of employment (dutz) any document or thing containing or incorporating information affecting the National Defense of other natter Classified, Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential to which I obtained access during my employment (duty), in any manner whatsoever. ; 3. I shall not hereafter in any manner reveal or divulge to any person any in— formation affecting the National Defense, Classified, Top Secret, Secret, or ’ Confidential, or which I have gained Knowledge during my employmens (autz), except as may be hereafter authorized in writing by officials of the Naval Establishment empowered to grant such authority. (If any of the above statements cannot truthfully be made, the word "not" shall be stricken out of the appropriate sentence and a full statement attached hereto indication in detail the circumstances which prevent the making of the state— ment in its original form, includint the names of the persons authorizing the particular handling of classified matter) hers LEE HARVEY OSMALD 1653230 have been informed and am aware that 18 U. S. C., 1946 ed., Sup. IV, 792-797 end the Internal Security Act of 195) pre- scribe severe penalties for unlawfully divulging information affecting the National Defense, I certify that I have read and understand appendices B, D, E, F, and H of the U. S. Navy Security bianual for Classified Matter, I have been informed and am aware that certain categories of Reserve and Retired personell on inactive duty can be recalled to duty, under the pertinent pro- visions of law relationg to e-ch class for trial by court-cartial fcr unlawful disclosure of information. I have been informed and am aware that the making of a wilfully false statement herein renders me subject to trial therefore, as provided by 18 U. S. C., 1946 ed., Sup, IV, 1001. Samal LES 3295 Officer in Charge Separation Section 11 Seotember 1959 Date i 2 O22 ee ~ITRK cawsir F- Fou cme i 273 - NOTICE OF OBLIGATED SERVICE thx , - 4 MAVMC 10278-PD (REV. 10-56) +s ; E : : (SUBERSEDES (REV, 2-53) conde WwHicn ie ee eee eee 4 INSTRUCTIONS Prepare in quadruplicate Original to Service Record Book Duplicate to CMC (Code DGH) Triplicate to member « ; Quadruplicate to district director concerned . KX out those words which do not apply Sib, EE |PFC E-2 RANK 1. You, having assumed the —_—-year military service obligation prescribed by law upon your (j (enlistment) in the U. S. Marine Corps KUM S,on 24, October’ SS, 192, (Branch of Armed Forces initially entered) y and having served in the United States Marine Corps LULL) too 24 October 1927, i nn September ; 19-9, are hereby (released from active duty and transferred to the Marine Corps Reserve) ablddbhk hid;Kb bl ehbe/; hhh Mor the remainder of that 6 -year period iehicli ends on _8 December 19. 62 unless sooner discharged. During that period you are deemed by law to be a member of the Marine Corps Reserve and will be subject to such training and service as is now or may hereafter be authorized by law for members of the Marine Corps Reserve. 2. You are (assigned to) dbekbhdy; th /the (Ready) Mthkdhh/Reserve, Class Aff (III). You are further (transferred to)” kekbbdl #hthe : Marine Air Reserve Training Command (Unit or district) “address of which is: Naval Air Station, Glenview, Tllinois (Unit or district address) 3124 West 5th Street You have given your future mailing address as: Forth Worth, Texas 3. This Notice of Obligated Service executed for and on behalf of the United States Marine Corps at: 3% on Jt Septenber Pc HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS SQUADRON MARINE CORPS AIR STATION EL TORO (SANTA ANA), CALI FORNIA By Pe of officer executing notice) as > IRy ht., USMCR 4. I hereby acknowledge receipt of this Notice of Obligated Service. SIGNATURE OF MEMBER BO ea ee This is to certify that a copy of this Notice of Obligated Service was fk bEbES) (delivered to) the man named above. SIGNATURE G2 fb A G. AYERS, JR. E454ii JFK Exuisit F-485 274 JFK Exuipit F-486 : Eos aN: sia ¢ tif co at) asians oF fel 3% PF FL Ops rh RES é# rae ni ney tod et 2 He ssion sii 275 ape pe nee ne ~ ue. n Poite oot Pi Fg, ae ails Aud Saks aa}uu attivib umdys intts 2 ON sk ssbb La onsey> ea ee yin ‘popsed *esu{jop. JO 900. o9ep Jos'3; o/ : JazJ0ys u Oy}mana >otyt ‘ Woss - 8. B. fens wbs SiUaA De IVNS, TENG no; nanib a8) ; t B. 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(revise, Basti _ dexege zaxid npre {22d indeed om « e a N SaniGA i ihaaa we tN Let eae 284 JFK Exuisit F-487 First Maldie - SELECTIVE SERVICE NUMBER 1. NAME IN FULL Lisit OSWALD iteeand NumberHarve . | eS Street y. #5 By GARD) or RED) Route | 3. DATE OF MIRTH Oseh1-193 >PLACE OF RESIDENCE Fi ck West On Sth StelGece Zone County Bib State ‘ 4 PLACE OF BIRTH City. Town. or Village H Fort Worth —-—“‘(ws 7? Tarrant Texas | New Orleans, ; Las } MAILING ADDRESS (If different from place of resideme) Street nd Number or RFD Route City, Town, or Village Sects ape cae i neers ees |pete SO eS eee ea I PERSON WHO WILL ALWAYS KNOW YIH'R ADDRESS 6. NAME AND ADDRESS OF Robort Oswald, 7313 Davenport St., Ft. Worth(3rcther) = ____ OF BUSINESS. SERVICE RENDERED. OR CMIEF PROmie fT OCCUPATION kK. NATURE * Unemployed _ 9. FIRM OR INDIVIDUAL BY ®HOM EMPLOYED 10. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR BUSINESS ; SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM f Form Approved REG}STRATION CARD Budget Bureau No. 33-R099.7. piss MST “Ese No. } (Revised 6-11-58) (over) SSS Form / _2eng> -? Ci 5 a ee Ll. Active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States or a cobelhgerent nation since Sept. 16, 1940: NO. DATE OF ENTRY DATE OF SEPARATION 165 3230 2h: Oct 56 1l Sep 59 SERVICE NO. DATE OF ENTRY 1653230 ORGANIZATION “4102 y I affirm that I have verified the foregoing answers and that they are true: Glenview, ijl KG MM Cie ei / ae 3 a (Signature of regritrant) DESCRIPTION OF REGISTRANT 13. Color of eyes Sore Color ot hair SLOW! Complexion ; med Height (approx) > bl ( approx.) 159 _._......Other obvious physical characteristis that will aid in identification: __....2..-.. -.---- Weight one None. .... ne SO ee ere FT art rrr cr is alee that my answers are true; that the person registered has read or has had read to him his own answers; - yo Pt witnessed his signature or mark and that al! of his answers of which | have knowledge are true, except ere LOsINi snOW Lede los. h ae Be ee Ba ee : Se ecco c er esse ~ , ~~ \ Saget - ‘a \ La Se eeatlas Lope tenes sa dnonae sence asa ae eae PA WEN \ 2 Waa ee ate of registration) \ \ (Signature o registrar} 114 Fort Worth ~* exas Registrar for Local Board (Number ) (City 6r county) (State) GPO 1958 OF — 469390 285 sion Exhibit No. 244 Dov. 3 1757 SNE JFK EXHIBIT F-488 286 phy SRO ey dete ds79S9 : 23 i 15 seid ain ur wrth yp anckeatls,’ PROT « 75h re es 73 HH AEPORE TS SENT , ‘an Roof! “2/9 wage SZ. pi, 04 STS Se whaT yor do ow tobwdds To WuR Ch gh pa or ke ee yA d. oe wart! 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LPIVES wl oll wre e, ph E So Can oftat; AY b1VE TeYo Pay, ‘copy of The PFPRWH M ptM , PHM EC$C 7. 3 Treave 7 LeyICR FRO need porT MY Wile Wy CHSC OF ae naorntr , Pleg@rg W gup APRIL 314 “e Howes ¥ , BPE LY ogee date | Menahe USSR, Dooseorig 12, 10h: | MMeaecw , SSK «. | | ae JFK Exuisit F-492 orn ge oe oe ee Se SO + * Pe “ see te? 7 = > Ps ta : a Se ah ee JSPR ERRIBIRC E tq 2 JFK Exuisit F-493 316 JFK Exnuisit F-494 oe ee Ee ee oe n : hibit woe. l Lif gsi Lela eam aa ; ow sie ais: aT Sis LO & 3o0b LF a / NWEw eS ety ) eas - Az Qr~w ote By ee Ag ui Lohe sey let Sar . i )isfey X32, Zu py <7 1 “4 Bees iin, Texte ete. pas Lon. fe —. wpe troihe 9 Th ot es Sa gale BAP in Sgt ; tom frnden? wf UE ; aa os. OEP ae “ew ee Te bas wo, Cnt Cpe OE ZOE chet a a Bt EP aw tana vs Bie Oe 2 orf —e We ME 6% The re. LO. ee he ; i eae Se - LZ dpias 5's a a,/ Me yao e LO ; ‘ rrOatees yar? : it #) EYfe m Ponta tte er o> Gt y bia at if EC roy 9 ¢ a : Bint. ay ay tL, iebo 2 OWN fete PB an ~ at yp lie a MMF, Fimo ike ap Poe Ne seein Sy o ree =. rte —JEK Expire 317 i ee ree eo oe Pea ~ 49 . rt fe Fytag es eget Lote, ae WS = a Pe i IsJ Aaa ? ee - GF Fae wf Kees st aa Lime te L246 aa 4 A, Johnson Exhibit #1 41-373 O- 79 - 21 : x Fs we th ‘air aa i HEE <2. EVERYONE . “WELCOME! PS J ue “a TF de le ns ee inet ew Sn anhee FS ini!BOX 1 {9 DATE BOX CLOSED BOX NO. FOR POSTMASTER io POST OFFICE BP | CA2S- USE ONLY Completion of this application signifies your willingness to comply with all postal APPLICANT PLEASE NOTE: rules relative to the renting and use of Post Office boxes. NAME OF APPLICANT (Print or type) 7 Sew Pat Zef ~ — wo A/ ’ of either) NAME OF FIRM OR CORPORATION (If box ie rented for use FAL fT Fore CUE LCognn*7e e& ; Ce. , Aes irs os Sd KIND OF BUSINESS ta BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., str and sone) ra [{- 22-3 HOME ADDRESS (No., street, and sone) B67. We Sal PAYA Sts pint pf IC JFK Exuisit F-495 320 PosTsyST =p Ranh Se Te DATE BOX OPENED DATE BOX C BOX NO. PostFOROFFICE abo B. bias OLT 9 - 1852 iss bly Si LEASE NOTE: Completion of this application signifies your willingness to comply with all postal potgota I rules relative to the renting and use of Post Office boxes. NAME OF APPLICANT (Print or type) KEL YW. “Stole. sd NAME OF FIRM OR CORPORATION (If box ie rented for use of either) ~ = KIND OF BUSINESS ~ Wrrr- BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., street, and sone) - | (D-/2- HOME ADDRESS (No., street, and sone) B59 FmarICne BY. 7 HERS SIGNATURE OF Al Yee WEI BOK I 22. For Post Office Use Only » R INITIALS OF CLERK INITIALS OF CARRIER ENTERED IN DIRECTORY Ver <2 She ot3 —_— THE FOLLOWING MUST BE COMPLETED AND SIGNED BEFORE P.O. BOX IS ASSIGNED DELIVER MAIL IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CHECKED BELOW ALL EXCEPT SPECIAL ALL INCLUDING SPECIAL ONLY MAIL ADDRESSED TO BOX IS TO BE PLACED IN IT. DELIVERY IN BOX DELIVERY IN BOX ALL OTHER MAIL TO BE DELIVERED AS ADDRESSED. Cc] OTHER INSTRUCTIONS (Explain) SPECIAL DELIVERY MAIL ONLY (Deliver as checked below) [_] DELIVER TO LOCAL RESIDENCE AT [_] DELIVER To LOCAL BUSINESS ADDRESS AT (No., street, and zone) (No., atreet, and sone) NAMES OF PERSONS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE MAIL THROUGH BOX (If box is rented to a firm, inolude the full name of each of its members whose mail is to be placed in bor.) Salt p- 22-03 HAVE READ ITEMS 1 THROUGH 5, ABOVE AND X WILL COMPLY WITH THEM. Signature of applicant) ran roam 4109 APPLICATION FOR POST OFFICE BOX U.S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—47420-7 wT, =- ff 7 JFK Exuisit F-496 321 JFK Exuisit F-497 . - Eswe@r vo 2 i ss’ ey on dege set ar sw Lge) 26 ~~ Lex, Yfinlby ar rus Oe aes em bend are2 i EB. A i ate Sore Dim btuty BOS. Ovefhe ila on Q . eo y Jos f- we ius a % PERE Se ite ek rad fare 27 Aceh bg gow ee), uy a eee) Wien ie pa teian 2 Mais pinrts tbs _tetigs wf fo ee en Ee Ed a se a7 ce SA ata Ae ppp KoA = athe PSS es ene mew) Jalan char fi, a ee Di gs Canrdy© Cth bg oo oe eeom te oe sede Lf. else, mo Pes deoteanlns fe pt BL AL aie Sess D 322 es: “ae aay tte Lyf ated rk ry de why i? A te fe amG): aah oe eae A ths Sige. D ite KC 072is pe MS NeeR 3fo be Eeghb 2 po 2 peek band Le AP NS. OE ef dee he SY per ak om Lae eee (Bes id eo. WE erA Hae hn heater : Sh Se s GREATER - ar he“ GELS N, T. 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Srwas unable to rexein taMexico indefinily because of ny texican pina restrict!fons which was tor5 days onlys I could et take a chance as ‘i on regesting a nev visa unless tused ny real manor | 0 a retured to.the - yee Sy . Urited. States ° - is Ae: , SA Sa ay aa not planned to contast theSoviet cabansy in Mextco- so they : oe whieh‘I was sooretary in a New OBLeana(state bowdetana) 0 since r noeager eed te ; Pod yeatde: inthat state. Howevery ‘the | PB.I. has visted ushere in Dallas,tases,, : Bie ca eae a the United |Stateswader7.3.Ie *protaationty that Le, chesould = 2038 #5 ve Be ae ta cone... ie 180 thie Ls is to titsorm you of the,peiace ‘0 tob 20 ntl,“ ASX MARINA O5¥Bis tin 2 DALL rehyenOs | or ee ae Pe “- Ree y. é , r JFK Exuisit F-502 Le jo ET of Y35-S# é i JFK Exuisit F-503 332 | i © i 4.2 ' es Le 1 { ' }. t ' ' i @ JFK Exuisir F-504 41-373 O - 79 - 22 ot Bieon ttnoe okt ented adieeeh slit Y an. comes 00 2 Pr “8 ‘S4ONO4 NVAVE Le ®) 1 ¥ (A Apreuoriew ) NACI AUVS NOLLVOALP ©) & 8 hf (8 534 “Am!ut = Ov-kwry-o1e-ey wiropy mroot-.4.47-029 : . -_—— Mae VS0S-4H LaInxy 334 f ' FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE NEW ORLEANS CHAPTER ~~ oe ee L7H? OSWALD . ‘| ee YW. Qernbl/ ee ae re ee me oe Whi k ee me ee ees ae ANTS 196807 Hietetl. iivetse aad Chapter President (Reverse side is blank.) 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A als ae OF pe TOR Veale hy where abe an gh EAs LY : GCOatahaor 7 Cie ee oe he — ‘’ Tre ao te DA es OE Sad tne Le t1eYVE Tite Aryas 7a "7 bia =~ A7 »} Sore aea? a Aerie RAT Lz —S ae “95 0 F : Pe Lika t aeee wat nes 7A Se SOI A er Se AIP-RALS 7 PEON YG FN Aad aad id et The aa Jy * PO Ve C724,; wy wee Jie ue (of ed yer be 347 ted a Tn erate ar ee erper ye san 348 JFK Exuisit F-509 my PAYEE MUST ENDOxs® BELOW ON LINE MARKED “PAYEE” D TO ANOTHER OWNERSHIP wv, THIS ORDER MAY BE TRANSFERRE NAME OF SUCH PERSON OR FIRM 'F THe PAYEE WILL WRITE THE PERSON OR FIRM ON THE LINE “ARKED “PAY TO” BEFOR E W ITN NA**” ON THE SECON D LINE. MORE THAN ONE é HIS OWN DE MENT IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. BANK. AMPS ARE NOT REGAR ENDORSEMENTS. PAY @ First National 3 THIS ORDER BECOMES. iN THEREAFTER NO CLAIM FOR | x 349 che-¢202, 130,462 Gals laatls AOMUM VA NOT VAL'D DO NOT OR MORE THI.N CASH IF me PLTERED Corr 41-373 O - 79 - 23 350 JFK Exurisir F-510 heYman) ual bzw, WA hop hick caddhe te. ytulhe feu i | : 351 Weck pra Me ZH et no-cd bede dete ga TAS. Ay Apt ChiSpoct.MMb tll Of¢jafll 772 al a74 IR? UM He Mast Syuotl AU¢ bath He (CocHhed 3. Arg. A rpedrotumr&o Ah? Jepubl. 7, MeKpMraphur AO Pok yenint J70Xoadmec# @ Cutt hee Heate yxut Ole & ,~ Yorce >| . Mo m F. do pecedbe BREECeri tt crnote KoSutt of uct 7ede uw Kyo otter Kype ak mokhe ese porkA (Red CRs (10-0 Moku ) 10. % OtMaSeF Tele de btu Kak A. ea2 bod 7), 1% TARet athl Yuctp el A Ato #U4FR ets pet btn IWF HeIHn. eye” Ih Re Ttop4 Huk ot 2opar Kote ll paps unur po- Kok ie ton? tloc 600)e- seabed EEi Yep es Mpnropdtu. d Mb&? Zopocter bet dHate ao a tY fetaa a ae ee io deo vy YPC PEO RB AtO0. 352 Mr. Kem. For the record, there are certain documents in that group of documents which have already been introduced as com- — mittee exhibits, and they are JFK committee exhibits F-183, F-184, F-400A, F-401, F-402, F-407, and F-408. Mr. McNally, do you recognize those documents? Mr. McNALLy. Yes; I do. Mr. Kien. Did the entire panel have an opportunity to view those documents? Mr. McNA tty. They did. Mr. Kuetn. Did the panel members after examining those docu- ments come to any conclusions with respect to those documents? Mr. McNALLY. Yes; they did. Mr. KEIN. Would you please tell the committee what they con- cluded. Mr. McNAt-y. The conclusion of the panel was that the writing on all of these original documents was all done by the same indi- vidual. That also included a number of photographs and photo reproductions. We also concluded these were done by the same individual. However, a word of caution must be introduced here because there are four or five of these documents which were only photo reproductions or photographs examined and compared with the other writings. These photographs of course cannot be exam- ined with the same detail that the original document can be, and there is always some possibility that there are some alterations or something on these particular photographs which cannot be deter- mined because they are not the original document. There is only one document on which we jointly could not arrive at any specific conclusion, and that is the so-called note, JFK exhibit F-506. That particular document is a very fuzzy reproduc- tion and that particular reproduction we could not make any defi- nite determination as to whether or not it was the same writing as all the other writings examined and compared and determined to be from the same individual. Mr. Kuern. Mr. Chairman, I should state for the record that in every case the staff attempted to get an original document for the f panel, and only in those cases where no original existed or an § original could not be located were photocopies used. Mr. McNally, is it the conclusion of the panel that in all cases §f where original documents were provided they were written by the same person? Mr. McNALLyY. It is. Mr. Kern. At this time, Mr. McNally, I would like to draw your attention to the following documents. In each case I would ask that you take the document out of the group of documents before you. First the examination of the applicant by the recruiting officer, which is marked JFK F-480 and dated October 24, 1956. Mr. McNALLy. Right. Mr. Kuetn. Second, the declaration requesting U.S. citizenship be revoked, JFK F-488, dated November 3, 1959. Mr. McNALLyY. Right. Mr. Kuen. Third, the New Orleans Police Department finger- print card, JFK F-400, dated August 9, 1963. Mr. McNALLy. Right. | 353 Mr. Kuen. Four, the application for Cuban visa, JFK F-408, dated September 27, 1963. Mr. McNALLyY. Right. Mr. Kue1n. Last, the application for employment, JFK F-503, dated October 15, 1963. Mr. McNA Ly. Right. Mr. Kuern. Mr. McNally, the first document was signed when Lee Harvey Oswald joined the Marines in 1956. The second docu- ment was written and signed when he was in the Soviet Union in 1959. The third document was signed when he was arrested in New Orleans in August of 1963. the fourth document was signed when he was in Mexico City in September of 1963, and the fifth docu- ment was signed when he returned to Dallas in October of 1963. All of the documents are signed either Lee Harvey Oswald or Lee H. Oswald. In the opinion of the panel, were all of these documents signed by the same person? Mr. McNA Ly. It is. Mr. Kuemn. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the following blowups marked JFK F-480A, F-488A, F-400A, F-408A, F-503A be received as committee exhibits and shown to the witness. Chairman Sroxes. Without objection, they may be received. [JFK exhibits F-480A, F-488A, F-400A, F-408A, and F-503A are enlargements of JFK exhibits F-480, F-488, F-400, F-408, and F-503 which were previously entered.| Mr. Kuemn. Mr. McNally, perhaps if you walked over to the easel it would be easier for you to see these blowups. Do you recognize these blowups, Mr. McNally? Mr. McNa ty. I do. Mr. Kern. Are they fair and accurate representations of the original documents examined by the panel? Mr. McNALtty. They are. Mr. KiE1n. Would you please explain to the committee, using the blowups, why the panel concluded that these five documents were written by the same person. | Mr. McNaLty. We examined and compared the signatures on all five of these particular documents. In the examination comparison of these particular signatures the first part of the examination was a determination as to whether or not all of these signatures agreed in their general characteristics. That would be insofar as the skill of the writing is concerned, the slant of the writing, the propor- _ tions of the letters one to each other, particularly the small letters, in height as to the capital letters, the lateral placement of the letters within the names which make up the particular signatures, the alinement of the various names of the signatures in relation- _ ship to each other. What is more, specifically, we examined and compared the indi- ~ vidual letters which make up the signatures, Lee Harvey Oswald and Lee H. Oswald as to whether or not they agree essentially in design, form, and their configuration. Throughout all of the signatures we found that, first of all, insofar as the general writing pattern of the signatures was con- cerned, those characteristics that were mentioned, all of these sig- natures agreed. 354 In the second part of the signature comparison, a much more specific examination as to individual letter design, we found also that the signatures agreed. There are some variations which occur among all of these signa- tures, and this is to be expected in normal handwriting, particular- ly handwritting written over a period of time that stretched from 1956 all the way over here on this particular document from 1959 and 1963. There is a slight variation which occurs, of course, as I men- tioned, indicating normalcy, but the writings are consistent one with the other. The writing of the first name Lee on the 1956 document and here the writing of “Lee” in 1959, one is the same as the other. _ The fluent writing pattern that we have in 1956 is repeated in 1959, repeated in 1963, and again over here in 1963. There is some slight variation between the capital “H” of Harvey here and the capital “H” of Harvey in the 1959 document. Howev- er, the basic construction of the “H” in the interior formation here, particularly at the lower right in 1956 and 1959 agreed. The same construction of “H” in 1963 in the New Orleans fingerprint form, and this is similar to the writing of the “H’” on the 1959 document. We have that same construction of “H” over here on the Cuban visa in 1968, and the same construction back over here in 1963 on the employment application. On two of these documents we have the name Harvey written out, that is in 1956, and in 1959 and the interior construction of “a- r-v-e-y”’ of the 1956 document and the 1959 document agrees. There is some slight variation here in the 1956 document. We have a comeback on the lower loop of the “y”’ and here in the 1959 document the “y” just goes straight down, but this is a normal variation, nothing inconsistent about it. In the writing of Oswald on the 1956 document the construction here in the writing of that particular word agrees with those in 1959. Again, a slight variation in the fact that the “o” continues on to the “‘s” in the 1956 document, and there is a slight hiatus between the “o” and “s’” in the 1959 document. When we come to the fingerprint form, here we have the same construction on this fingerprint form. The “o” joins the “s”, flows right into the “s’”, as found on this form in 1956. We have that followed through, the same as the 1956 form, the “o” joins the “s” on the Cuban visa, and the same thing occurs on the employment application. The slight hiatus between the “o” and “s’” on the 1959 form is a normal variation of the individual’s handwriting. In all of these you will note the ending “I-d” combination. On all five of these combinations the “1” is always smaller than the “d”. The “d” is an odd form in 1956. Here the “d” comes back a little farther down to the line of writing, again a normal variation. Here we have the “d” in 1963 in a fingerprint form akin to the “d” over here in the 1956 form. The writing of the “d” again here agrees with the “d” as written on the fingerprint form in 1956, and here we have an affectation on the employment application where there is a little flourish on 359 the “d” but again the basic construction of this “d’ is taller than the preceding “]” and largely agrees with the other four signatures. Since all of these signatures conformed in both general and specific characteristics—there are no significant differences among them—we came to the conclusion that all five of these signatures were written by one and the same individual. Again with that slight caveat here, that this is a photograph of an original signature. We did not have the opportunity to examine and compare the original. However, from this photograph and the examinations that can be conducted of it, the writing pattern is free, fluent, easy, no indications of abnormalities, no hesitation, no tremor, is in basic agreement with the other four signatures, and therefore we conclude that all five signatures emanate from the same individual. Mr. KLeEIn. For the record, the caveat you are speaking of was applicable to the Cuban visa application? Mr. McNALLy. That is right, because it is not an original docu- ment and cannot be examined microscopically. Mr. Kern. Is there any evidence to indicate any of these docu- ments were forged or altered? Mr. McNALLy. There is none. Mr. Kein. At this time would you please be seated, Mr McNally. ~ I would now direct your attention to exhibit JFK F-504, which is a microfilm reproduction of an order form to Klein’s Sporting Goods Co. for a rifle, plus the envelope in which the order form was sent; and JFK F-509, which is a money order made out to Klein’s Sporting Goods Co., both of which documents have the name Hidell on them. Mr. McNALLy. I have both of them. Mr. KLEIN. JFK F-504 and F-509; do you recognize those docu- ments? Mr. McNA Ly. I do. Mr. Kern. Did the entire panel have an opportunity to examine those documents? Mr. McNAtty. They did. Mr. Kern. Did the panel reach a conclusion with respect to those documents? Mr. McNatty. They did. Mr. KLEIN. What was that conclusion? Mr. McNAtty. That JFK exhibit F-504 and F-509 were written by the same person, again with the caveat. JFK exhibit F-504 is a photo reproduction of a microfilm. Mr. Kie1n. The document, which is marked F-509, the money order, is an original document; is it not? Mr. McNALLy. It was; yes. Mr. Kern. And your conclusion is they were written by the same person who wrote the other documents? Mr. McNALLyY. That is right. Mr. Kuen. I would ask at this time, Mr. Chairman, that blowups marked JFK F-504A and F-509A be received as exhibits and shown to the witness. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be received in the record at this point. 356 [JFK exhibits F-504A and F-509A are enlargements of JFK ex- hibits F-504 and F-509 which were previously entered. ] Mr. KieIn. Once again, Mr. McNally, would you go to the easel, please. Do you recognize these blowups, sir? Mr. McNALLy. I do. Mr. Kuen. What are they blowups of? Mr. McNALLy. These are blowups of the original photo reproduc- tion. In the case of this particular blowup here, this is an enlarge- ment of JFK exhibit F-504, and this enlargement of the postal money order in an enlargement—— 7 Mr. Kuen. Is that the money order? Mr. McNALLy. Yes; F-504, and the money order is F-509. Mr. Kuen. Are these blowups fair and accurate representations of the documents examined by the panel? Mr. McNALLy. They are. Mr. Kietn. Using the blowups, would you explain why the panel reached its conclusion? Mr. McNaA. ty. We examined and compared the writings on the microfilm reproduction with the original postal money order issued as payable to Klein’s Sporting Goods. The same process, of course, was involved, an examination and comparison of the general writ- ing characteristics which appear on this microfilmed reproduction, versus the writing which appears on the U.S. postal money order. The writing pattern on both of these documents is the same, the same degree of skill, the same slant pattern. The writing has a continuity and a cohesion, a continuous flow in the formation of “Hidell”, “Dallas, Texas,” “Klein’s,” “Chicago, Illinois.” It flows right along in the same manner, as we have in the writing flow on the postal money order. The individual letter designs that occur in the writing of the name and the address and the names and addresses on the micro- film reproduction and the writing of the various letters on the postal money order correspond. In both instances on the microfilmed reproduction here we have a parallel, the writing of “Hidell” here in the top of the microfilm and the “A. Hidell,” which occurs over here on the postal money order. The writing construction in both instances is the same, just a slight variation in the “H” in “Hidell” in the microfilm reproduc- tion, but the rest of the writing conforms to the writing “A. Hidell”’ on the U.S. postal money order. } In the writing of “Dallas, Texas,” this particular writing pattern here in the upper left-hand corner agreed with the writing of “Dallas, Texas,” over here on the U.S. postal money order. The variation occurring here is that in the return address on the postal money order a small “‘t’”’ has been used versus a capital ‘“T”’ utilized down here. In this “Texas” here in the writing of the “x-a-s” right in this portion here just following the “x” there is a slight hitch almost like a small undotted “i”. That same formation occurs over here just before the “a” here a little hitch in the writing pattern. The overall writing on both the microfilm and on the postal money order correspond to the extent that we came to the conclu- sion both were written by the same individual, again with that caveat that this is a reproduction. As a matter of fact, this if from 357 a microfilm, and it has been blown up from the microfilm itself so that it lacks clarity and detail. But the impression gotten from examining this particular document and comparing it with the writing of the original document, the postal money order, is that the writing flows. The line quality of that on this document and that on the postal money order corresponds; the letter designs correspond. There is no significant difference between the writing on the microfilm and the writing we have in the money order or the writing we have here, for instance, on the employment applica- tion. Further, the hand printing on this particular form here, which was laid over the envelope when it was recorded, this hand print- ing, “A. Hidell, Post Office Box 2915, Dallas, Texas,” corresponds to that which we have in this employment application and also a letter which backed up this employment application, specifically some writing in the lower left-hand corner of that letter. We did conclude again (with that slight caveat) that the writing of the microfilm in both the script writing here and the hand print here were written by the same individual who wrote out the postal money order and the employment application. Mr. Kern. Was there any evidence to indicate that either of these documents were forged or altered? ~ Mr. McNAtty. From the examinations that could be made, abso- lutely no evidence. Mr. KieIn. At this time I would again ask that you be seated. I would direct your attention to the document marked JFK F-506, dated November 8, 1963. Mr. McNa ty. I have it. : Mr. KLEIN. Do you recognize that document? Mr. MCNALLy. I do. Mr. Kern. For the record could you read that document, please? Mr. McNA zy. In the upper right-hand corner is the date Novem- ber—N-o-v 8, 1963: “Dear Mr. Hunt: I would like information con- cerning’’—c-o-n-c-e-r-d-i-n-g—‘‘concerning my position. I am asking only for information. I am suggesting that we discuss the matter fully before any steps are taken by me or anyone else. Thank you. Lee Harvey Oswald”. Mr. Kietn. Mr. Chairman, I should state for the record that a copy—not the original but a copy—of the document was sent in 1975 to an author of a book on the Kennedy assassination. It was sent anonymously and he allowed the panel to see the copy that he had of that document. I would ask that the blowup marked JFK F-506A be received as a committee exhibit and shown to the wit- ness. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it has been received as a committee exhibit and entered into the record at this point. [JFK exhibit F-506A is an enlargement of JFK exhibit F-506 which was previously entered. | Mr. KuEIn. Is that a fair and accurate representation of the document you have before you? Mr. McNALLy. It is. Mr. Kern. Once again I would ask that you walk over to the easel, please. 358 Using the blowup, will you explain why the panel could not reach a conclusion with respect to that document? Mr. McNatty. The reason we could not reach any conclusion regarding this particular document is, number 1, this of course is a photo reproduction. It is a peculiar type of photo reproduction in the fact that we have a photo reproduction, yet at the same time it has some of the characteristics of being photo reproduced from a microfilm enlargement which was originally out of focus. So that on this particular document here—and I made the original slide from which this enlargement was made—the photo reproduction was quite fuzzy. This is an extremely good reproduction of that particular fuzzy original photo reproduction. | In this particular case it is so fuzzy that an accurate examination - could not be made of it. The feature about this document—as it relates to the other documents as written containing the name Lee Harvey Oswald and all the other writing that we have here—is that this document itself, although the writing pattern or the overall letter designs are consistent with those as written on the other documents, this is much more precisely and much more carefully written. There is no great deviation from the writing of Oswald insofar as individual letter design forms are concerned. However, it is the method of writing that is so precise and so careful, it is a little bit out of the ordinary from most of the writing that I have seen. Strangely enough, getting down to the signature of this particu- lar document, a part of the signature agrees with the signature of Oswald or the other writings we have signed “Lee Harvey Oswald,” and part of it does not agree with his. Insofar as the original or the beginning writing ‘Lee’, that corresponds to “Lee” as written by Lee Harvey Oswald throughout the bulk of the signatures we have seen. In the writing of the middle name Harvey, to begin with, the “H” comes way over here to the left-hand side and is sort of | pointed. It comes to a type of triangle which is flattened at the top, and that particular type of “H” we do not find in any of the signatures of Lee Harvey Oswald. Another peculiar feature here also is the fact that though not all of the signatures of Mr. Oswald are signed ‘Lee Harvey Oswald,” there are seven or eight where we do have the name “Lee Harvey | Oswald” signed in full and in none of them do we have a mispell- ing. In this particular signature “H-a” and we have a little slurring off here and a “v” and a “y”. So that part of this signature is missing, and that does not occur in any of the other Oswald signa- tures. Again in the writing of the latter part of “Oswald,” very unusual in all of the Oswald signatures that we have seen. In this particu- lar instance the “d” is smaller and much more precise than the preceding “1.” This is another characteristic which does not occur consistently in the other Oswald signatures. So a suspicion is aroused by the fact that this is an extremely precise type of writing even though it does agree basically with the overall writing charac- teristics of the previous Oswald writings. And a suspicious circum- stance in the fact that that middle name “Lee Harvey’ differs significantly in the “H,” in the misspelling of the word, and a 359 slight aberration in the lower part of the “y” and in the latter part of the signature “Oswald.” And for these reasons we were unable to come to any firm conclusion regarding this particular document. It is suspicion, although we are not able to accurately determine that it is specifically a forgery and at the same time not able to accurately determine whether or not it corresponds to all of the other writings that we have identified. Mr. KuEIn. Thank you. | Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. Chairman SToKEs. Thank you, counsel. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer, for such time as he may consume. Mr. SAwyeEr. Well, I assume with the exception of the document that is now being displayed, the Hunt letter, the committee, or the panel, was unanimous on all of these other decisions. Mr. McNALLy. They were. Mr. Sawyer. Were there some of the panel who felt that that Hunt letter was written by the same person as the others were? Mr. KuieEIn. No; we were pretty much in agreement on that; not sure of it, suspicious of that particular document. It stood out, quite frankly, like a sore thumb. Mr. Sawyer. There was unanimity in the suspicion, I assume? ~ Mr. McNALty. There was. Mr. Sawyer. I think that is all I have. Thank you, Mr. Chair- _ man. Chairman StToKEs. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer. Mr. Preyer. No questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman StToxEs. The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McNally, I simply have two questions. The first is: In the handwriting analysis which you have done on the first three docu- ments you have pointed up, to what extent might handwriting machines reproduce signatures that would defy detection? Mr. McNA ty. I do not think they defy detection. What you get with a handwriting machine is actually an imitation—— Mr. Fauntroy. Certainly. Mr. McNALLy [continuing]. Where you get—it has to have a model to follow, so that actually what would occur is that you get a slavish imitation of, say, an original signature. But with ali of these writings we have a normal variation, there is no slavish imitation. As a matter of fact, you don’t even get a situation among these particular signatures, where if you wrote like 5 or 10 signa- tures in a row you get a very, very close similarity. In these particular cases here we have a very good sample of an inconsist- ent pattern of handwriting which is actually very consistent. It all tends to follow a certain theme of writing. There is no—none of these signatures, which are actually very much like the other signature in the fact that they fit together—there is no deviation whatsoever. There is always that slight variation there, which is strongly indicative of normality and authenticity. 360 Mr. Fauntroy. So that you conclusion is that it could not have been done using machines, otherwise you would have detected the precise copying of the signatures as on all three documents? Mr. McNatty. Right. It has in there a carelessness about it which you do not see in any machine-made signature. Mr. Fauntroy. All right, thank you. The second question has to do with the Hunt letter there. Assum- ing that that is a forgery, how would you put together such a forgery? Is it possible for a person to so analyze the writing of another person as to reproduce it in reasonable facsimile? Mr. McNALLy. Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, we had a famous case some years ago where there was pages and pages of writing repro- duced in the so-called Irving-Hughes situation back in the seven- ties. It was very difficult at that time to determine whether it was good or bad. Mr. Fauntroy. What is the peculiar capability required to do that? Are there persons who are particularly skilled at forgery in that kind of detail, that kind of length? Mr. McNALty. Yes, there are. As a matter of fact, they exist all over. You have them in the criminal field where, let’s say with a quick study you could turn out something like this, particularly since Oswald’s general writing pattern is simple and tends to be rather legible, and to turn out something like that would be not particularly difficult. The strange feature is that if you turn out something like that, then to get down into one of the more impor- tant aspects of the signature and turn up with a misspelling. Mr. Fauntroy. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Sroxss. The time of the gentlemen has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney. Mr. McKinney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief. I just wanted to emphasize the points you © made on the signature. Looking at the various different exhibits that we have that show the signature Lee Harvey Oswald, most of them from the Marine Corps, loyalty oaths, so on and so forth, Harvey is always spelled correctly. Right? Mr. McNa zy. It is. Mr. McKinney. And in full. And in fact in looking at them as a novice in this, there isn’t even really a runoff from one letter to the other. Each letter is quite distinct. Mr. McNA Ly. Generally there is, yes, sir. Mr. McKinney. Isn’t it also true that in almost every signature that we have, when Oswald is written the “d” is at least, say, a fourth higher than the “l” at the very end, at the crown of the dss or whatever you call it? aia McNALLY. Yes; it tends to rise disproportionately above the Mr. McKinney. Whereas it does not appear—— Mr. McNALty. It is quite smaller. Mr. McKinney. That is all I have. Chairman Srokgs. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. FirHIAn. Thank you. I have but one question. On balance, this Hunt letter, do you find more similarities or dissimilarities overall in comparison to the 361 other writings or letters, words that all seem to agree in the other documents? Mr. McNALty. The peculiar feature about this is in the situa- tion—which arouses suspicion—is that it is better than most of the others. It really is, like almost a classic example, particularly the body of the letter, the writing on the other Oswald letters, except written much better and much more precisely. In effect, what I am trying to say is that what you have here is a great deal of care was taken in the writing of this particular document, whereas most of the writings that I find in all of the other previous writings, they are quite carelessly and sloppily written. There are no significant dissimilarities in the body of this particular letter, the context, until you come down to the signature. Mr. FirH1An. And are you saying, then, you are unable to render a decision on this? Mr. McNA Ly. That is right. In this particular case the original would necessarily have to be checked. It could very well be a situtation where this thing has been patched together from original writing of Oswald. It can be done using a photo reproduction process. Mr. FirutAn. Is it your opinion that it is a fake? Mr. McNA Ly. No; I am not certain on this particular document. ~ Mr. Firutan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SToKkEs. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. McNally, now as you are concluding your testimony before this committee, you are entitled under our rules to a period of 5 minutes, if you so desire, to explain or expand upon your testimony in any way. I extend to you such time, if you desire it at this time. Mr. McNA ty. I will take only a minute. Chairman STOKES. Sure. Mr. McNAtty. What we have here and what we have examined and compared was writing which covered a period from 1956 until 1963. And over that period of time in all of these particular docu- ments and just to restate what I have said before, it was our - considered opinion, all three members of the panel, that all of the original documents were written by one and the same individual. _ The photo reproductions with the exception of the so-called Hunt letter, in our opinion again, with the caveat that they are photo reproductions and cannot be microscopically examined, that we feel that these letters were written by the same individual; in other words, Lee Harvey Oswald. The Hunt letter, because of the circum- stances surrounding it, it is extremely poor reproduction, and also because of the circumstances surrounding—the suspicion surround- ing the signature we were unable to make any definite decision regarding that particular letter. Chairman Srokes. Thank you very much, Mr. McNally. On behalf of the committee, I want to express our appreciation both to you and to the other members of this destinguished panel on which you served for the services that you have rendered to the House and to this committee. We thank you very much for your service. Mr. McNa tty. Thank you, sir. Chairman STokEs. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. 362 Mr. Biakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Another way the com- mittee has tried to shed light on the so-called two-Oswald mystery is by comparing photographs taken over the years of the man identified as Lee Harvey Oswald, photographs taken when he was in the Marines, after his return from the Soviet Union, and during the period he was detailed at the Dallas police headquarters on November 22 to November 24, 1963. To try to determine if the photographs in question show the Same person, the committee asked a panel of anthropologists to study them, to see if the shape and structural features of the face match from photo to photo. Mr. Chairman, before proceeding with an analysis of the photographs, it is necessary that we note and take testimony on an issue that has been raised about one of them, the photograph of Oswald when he was in the Marines. In it, the head, appearing before a height chart, appears to be disproportion- ate in length, leading some critics to claim it had been doctored. Sergeant Cecil Kirk, director of the mobile crime lab of the Metro- politan Police Department in Washington, D.C., is here to discuss that aspect of the photo in question. Sergeant Kirk will also address alleged differences in Oswald’s height as he appeared in different photographs. The committee will recall that Sergeant Kirk has already testified in these hearings. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Sergeant Kirk. | Chairman Sroxgs. The committee calls Sergeant Kirk. Good morning, Sergeant Kirk. You have previously testified and you have been sworn—— Sergeant Kirk. That is right. Chairman STokEs [continuing]. In these proceedings and you un- derstand you are still under the same oath? Sergeant Kirk. Yes, sir; I do. | Chairman Stoxgs. Thank you. The Chair recognizes counsel Mi- chael Goldsmith. Mr. GotpsmitH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. FURTHER TESTIMONY OF SGT. CECIL KIRK, DIRECTOR, MOBILE CRIME LABORATORY, METROPOLITAN POLICE DE- PARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C. Mr. Goxpsmitu. Sergeant Kirk, I would ask you to refer to what has been marked as JFK Exhibit F-166, which is the enlargement showing Lee Harvey Oswald on the left, and I would like to ask you, what issue did this photograph present to the photographic evidence panel? Sergeant Kirk. Yes, sir. This is the photograph that was taken by the U.S. Marine Corps induction center at the time Lee Harvey Oswald was inducted into the Marine Corps. And the photographic panel was asked to examine the photograph to see if: (1) It could be determined whether it was a faked or composite photograph; and (2) to make a determination of whether the apparent disparity in the height chart and the head length, could be explained. Mr. GoupsmiTH. I would ask you at this time. Sergeant Kirk, to refer to what has been marked as JFK F-564, which is the exhibit on the right, and I would ask you to explain how the photographic | | 363 oes panel addressed the issue of Oswald’s purported 13-inch ead. Sergeant Kirk. Well, the exhibit on the right is a demonstration conducted at Metropolitan Police Headquarters. It depicts a Metro- politan Police officer, W. W. Lee. The photograph on the extreme left of the three photos shows Officer Lee with his back against a height chart. It indicates that he is a little over 69 inches tall. The second photograph shows Officer Lee, who has walked away from the wall, a mere 7 inches. The height scale to Officer Lee’s right, your left as you look at it, shows that Officer Lee still stays 69 inches tall but the height scale in the background, which is 7 inches away from the gentleman, shows he is starting to grow in height. Indeed, in this photograph he has a 13-inch head, if you count the inches in the background, but when you count the inches that are next to his head, his head size stays the same. The photograph on the right of the exhibit, Officer Lee has now moved out 14 inches away from the height scale, he has grown considerably taller, if you look at the height scale in the back- ground, and his head has also increased in length, but as the height scale that has moved out with Officer Lee shows he remains at 69 inches tall and his head size has not changed. Mr. GoxpsmitTu. I realize you have indicated that the subject in the photographs has moved away from the height chart. Are you able to explain in more detail what factors account for the appar- ent 13-inch head in one of these photographs and also for the disparity in his indicated height? Sergeant Kirk. Yes, sir. It was determined that at the time these photographs were taken, an ID camera, much used in the military as well as other types of the Government, was a type of camera that was mounted on a dolly, with the lights and the camera and the numbering chart affixed where it could be pushed out of the way when not in use. So if Mr. Oswald was brought into the induction center to be photographed and told to stand next to the height chart, it didn’t really make any difference to the photogra- pher whether or not Mr. Oswald was standing next to the height chart or not, because he could move the camera up or away from Oswald to get the photograph that he wanted. This chart on the right demonstrates the fact that unless Mr. Oswald was standing directly with his back against the wall and the camera was at the correct distance, it would not be an accurate recording of his true height. Mr. GotpsmiTu. I am sorry, I did not catch your last sentence. Sergeant Kirk. It is unreasonable to assume that this photo- graph is the actual recording of his true height. I should add if it is an actual recording of his true height, then it would be an inaccu- rate recording of his head size. Mr. GotpsmitH. How common is the use of height charts in pictures today, mug shots today? Sergeant Kirk. It is very uncommon, mainly because law en- forcement plus industrial security work, where they take these types of photographs, they have found very often the photographer, rather than the following the rules and making sure the subject is standing in the right place, that the camera is at the right height, the photographer either tilts the camera to compensate for the 364 pero not standing in the right place or changes focus, and so orth. Mr. GotpsmiTH. Did the photographic evidence panel find any evidence of composition with regard to the photograph of Oswald? Sergeant Kirk. No; we did not. Mr. GotpsmitH. Sergeant Kirk, you work for the Metropolitan Police Department in its crime lab section; is that correct? Sergeant Kirk. Yes. Mr. GoLpsmiTH. And as part of your work you are associated with the records identification division of the police department? Sergeant Kirk. Yes, sir. Mr. GoLpsmiTH. Let me ask you this, then: Is it unusual for per records to report disparate heights for any particular indi- vidual? Sergeant Kirk. No; it is not. Mr. GOLDSMITH.’ Why not? Sergeant Kirk. We have found—and the Air Force has conducted studies to bear out the same point—that people are almost an inch taller in the daytime, in the morning, than they are in the after- noon. Also, studies conducted both by the Air Force and by law enforcement people, when they would ask people to describe their height, roughly one-third of those interviewed said they were 2 inches taller than they actually are, and the other two-thirds said that they were at least 1 inch taller than they actually are. In other words, the American male sees himself as being from 1 to 2 inches taller than his actual height if he is asked. Mr. GoupsmiTH. I have one final question, Sergeant. In a mug shot, is it possible for the length of the head to appear to be the same and yet for there to be a significant difference in the indicat- ed height as reflected in the height chart? I am positing now a situation where you have a series of photographs. Sergeant Kirk. Certainly. We don’t know if the subject is bare- footed, wearing 1l-inch or 2-inch heels, we don’t know if he has some type of back condition that makes him stand in a slouchy position. Certainly this wouldn’t change the head size itself. Cer- tainly his stature, the skeleton, the way he is standing would make it appear he is shorter or taller than he actually is. Mr. GotpsmiTH. Are you willing to provide this committee with an exhibit demonstrating that the head size can remain the same in the photograph while the length of the body is different? Sergeant Kirk. Yes; I am. Mr. GotpsmitH. Thank you, Sergeant. I have no further ques- tions. Chairman Stokes. Thank you, counsel. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian, for such time as he may consume. Mr. FirHIan. Sergeant, I would like to just ask, reask, a similar question to that of counsel. Is it my understanding that you said that because of these variations in most cases in industry and law enforcement agencies and others have gotten away from the photo with the height chart? Sergeant Kirk. Yes, sir. Mr. Firnian. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions of this witness. 365 Chairman Strokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer. Mr. Preyer. I would only say that we have always heard that statistics don’t always lie but they seldom voluntarily tell the truth, and I think we can add photographs to that now also. Thank you, Sergeant, for your testimony. Chairman Sroxgs. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut. Mr. McKinney. No questions. Chairman Srokgs. The gentleman from Pennsylvania. Mr. Epaar. No questions. Chairman Sroxes. Sergeant Kirk, I believe this now concludes your testimony before our committee. Under our rules, as a wit- ness, we can now extend to you the 5 minutes if you so desire to make any comment upon your testimony before our committee. I extend to you that time if you so desire. Sergeant Kirk. Thank you. I would just like to acknowledge the input of the 19 other members of the photographic panel and to express the feelings of the photographic panel to thank you for your confidence that you expressed in us, and we hope we have served you well. Chairman Stokes. You certainly have, and on behalf of the Committee we certainly appreciate the time and energy and exper- tise provided this committee by both you and the other members of this distinguished panel of photographic experts with which you served. So we thank you very much for the help you have given us. Sergeant Kirk. Thank you. Chairman Stokes. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The anthropology panel was asked to address two additional issues that involved photo identification. Early in its existence the Warren Commission was presented with a problem by an Associat- ed Press photograph taken head-on of the presidential limousine in Dealey Plaza at about the very instant of the first shot. Standing in the doorway of the Texas School Book Depository was a man whose facial characteristics were markedly similar to those of Lee Harvey Oswald, so much so that at least one major metropolitan newspaper captioned the photo with a question: Is it Oswald? Obviously if Oswald had been in the doorway at that moment, he could not have been the assassin. The Warren Commission deter- mined that the man in the doorway was Billy Nolan Lovelady, another School Book Depository employee. Lovelady himself, the Commission reported, confirmed it. But many critics refused to accept the explanation. Mark Lane, in his Rush to Judgment said: There was insufficient basis for the Commission’s statement. Lovelady did not appear before the Commissioners and no evidence suggests that his picture was ever shown to them. Sylvia Meagher, in her “Accessories After the Fact”: The Commission presents no supporting visual evidence by which one can ap- Praise the resemblance between Lovelady and the man in the doorway, although nothing less hangs on the accurate identification of the doorway man than Oswald’s innocense in the assassination. 41-373 O - 79 - 24 366 The committee asked the anthropology panel to compare the AP photo with pictures of Lovelady and pictures of Oswald, and to try to come to a decision as to which one it is. Now on the two other photographic issues that will be addressed by the anthropology panel. Shortly after the assassination, an arrest was made by Dallas police of three shabbily dressed men who had been discovered in a railroad car not far from the grassy knoll that was to become famous for the fact that many witnesses thought they had heard shots coming from its vicinity. Press photos were taken of the tramps, as they came to be called, and publication of the photos caused considerable controversy, es- pecially since the tramps had been released without being booked or otherwise identified. For years the “tramps” photos were little more than conversation pieces, but in 1975, in a book called “Coup d’Etat in America,’ Michael Cranfield and Alan J. Webermann proposed that two of these three tramps were none other than Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis who had been involved in the Watergate prosecutions. An identification of the third tramp, one who has earned the nickname “Frenchy”’ due to the European look of the cut of his clothing, has also been suggested by critics con- necting him to individuals whose names have come up in private investigations. Critics have dug up another AP photo taken on the date of the assassination and found an elderly white-haired man they alleged to be a well-known right-winger named Joseph Mil- teer. In a tape recording of a conversation with a police undercover agent in Miami on November 9, 1968, Milteer was heard explaining how an assassination of President Kennedy could be accomplished: Milteer: From an office building with a high-powered rifle. Informant: They are really going to try to kill him? Milteer: Oh, yes, its in the working. Milteer, who is now deceased, was questioned by the FBI but was never known to be an actual suspect in the Kennedy assassination. The implications of these questions is enormous, about a Watergate burglary and a former long-time CIA officer who directed the 1972 break-in might have been involved in the assassination or that a militant conservative who had talked of killing President Kennedy was standing along the motorcade route. These implications are, of course, of a conspiracy. The committee therefore asked its panel of anthropologists to compare the photos in question with known photos of the men they allege to show. The members of the anthropology panel are Ellis Kerley, profes- sor of anthropology, University of Maryland; Steven Rosen, asso- ciate professor of anthropology, University of Maryland; Clyde | Collis Snow, Chief of Physical Anthropology Research, Civil Aero- | medical Institute, Federal Aviation Administration Aeronautical Center, Oklahoma City, Okla. | Dr. Snow, who will be our witness this morning, received a B.S. degree in zoology from Eastern New Mexico University in 1950, an M.S. in zoology from Texas University in 1955, and a Ph. D. degree in physical anthropology from the University of Arizona in 1967. é It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Dr. now. Chairman Strokes. The committee calls Dr. Snow. 367 Good morning. Would you please stand and raise your right and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you hand give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothin g but the truth, so help you, God? Dr. Snow. I do. Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated. The Chair recognizes counsel Robert Genzman. Mr. GENZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. TESTIMONY OF DR. CLYDE COLLINS SNOW, CHIEF OF PHYSI- CAL ANTHROPOLOGY RESEARCH, CIVIL AEROMEDICAL IN- STITUTE, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AERONAUTI- CAL CENTER, OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLA. Mr. Genzman. Dr. Snow, would you state your full name and occupation for the record. Dr. SNow. Clyde Collins Snow. I am a physical anthropologist. Mr. GENzMAN. Would you briefly state the purpose of your testi- fying today. Dr. SNow. Yes. I am here as a spokesman for the anthropological consultants to the committee to address certain identification issues posed by photographs of various figures involved in the Kennedy assassination. Mr. GENzMAN. Dr. Snow, would you define forensic anthropology. Dr. SNow. Forensic anthropology is a subdiscipline of physical anthropology, in which we attempt to apply the physical anthro- pologist’s knowledge of human biological variation, age variation, sex variation, stature, physique, to problems of legal medicine. Mr. GENZMAN. How many forensic anthropologists are there in the United States? | Dr. Snow. Approximately 30. Mr. GENzMAN. Are each of the panel members forensic anthro- pologists? Dr. SNow. Yes, sir; they are. Mr. GENZMAN. Could you estimate the combined years of experi- ence of all three panel members? Dr. Snow. I would say fairly close to somewhere between 40 and 50 years. Mr. GENzMAN. Would you briefly describe the kinds of studies forensic anthropologists undertake. Dr. Snow. They generally revolve around the issue of human identification. A large proportion of our cases involve the identifi- cation of skeletal remains that come to the attention of police or medical examiners, and then also from time to time we are asked to compare living individuals to see whether or not they are one and the same person. Mr. GENzMAN. What kinds of determinations can you make from examining the human remains of skeletons? Dr. SNow. The skeletal remains, we can look at the bones and determine such features as age at death, sex, stature, physique, old diseases, injuries, abnormalities—all the things that are more or less embedded in the bone that serve to make each individual unique and hopefully lead to identification. Mr. GENzMAN. What method did the panel follow in its studies for the select committee? 368 Dr. SNow. We were presented with a number of photographs of, as I indicated before, various individuals. And based on our mea- surements of these photographs of the faces shown, we attempt to compare them in terms of the morphological features, such fea- tures as the shape of the ears, nose, mouth, things of that sort— wrinkles, scars, and other features. Then we also, in addition to the morphological traits that we study, we also take a series of mea- surements from the facial dimensions of the individual and com- pare those. Mr. GENZMAN. How exact is this approach? Dr. SNow. It can vary largely. The exactness of the approach depends to a large extent on the quality of materials that we are given. If the photographs are of poor quality or if there is variation in the subject’s pose or the apparent age and features of that sort, we are apt to be less firm in our conclusions than we are if we are given good quality photographs of the individual and uniform poses. Mr. GENZMAN. How certain can you be of your findings? Dr. SNow. Again, it varies with the kind of materials we are given. In some cases, for example, if we are given photographs of individuals to compare with very little variation in the position of the subject’s head in the photograph and of good quality, we can, in some cases, come up with positive identification, or positively ex- clude the individual beyond reasonable doubt. In other cases we have to qualify our opinions, using such language as probable or possible. Mr. GENZMAN. For example, what if you were given photographs of identical twins; could you differentiate between them? Dr. SNow. I doubt very seriously whether we could. There are undoubtedly differences, even in identical twins, but whether our measuring techniques are refined enough to discern such differ- ences, | would doubt. Mr. GENZMAN. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would ask that the exhibits marked as JFK F-556, F-557, and F-558 be entered into the record. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point. [The exhibits follow:] 369 ORLEANS lA» 723 > ate JFK Exuisit F-557 370 2 Lovelady bas yar Backyard SIZE DISTANCE Russia if:Marine Oo /-New Orleans I 2 3 4 +) 6 SHAPE DISTANCE JFK Exuisit F-558 Mr. GENZMAN. Dr. Snow, would you walk over to the exhibits. Dr. SNow. Yes, sir. Mr. GENZMAN. Dr. Snow, would you briefly identify these exhib- its. Dr. SNow. Yes, sir. These two exhibits are a series of 11 photo- graphs of Lee Harvey Oswald arranged roughly in chronological order from the time he entered the Marine Corps, the three here taken while he was in Russia, two taken sometime in the spring of 1963, there are enlargements of the famous backyard photographs, two, later that summer when he was arrested in New Orleans, and three taken on the day on the apprehension of Mr. Oswald in Dallas. We included a 12th photograph here of Mr. Lovelady who, as indicated, bears a strong physical resemblance to Mr. Oswald, and we wanted to enter that in for comparison. Mr. GENZMAN. What was the issue before the panel of anthro- pologists? Dr. SNow. The issue given us was to morphologically and metri- cally analyze these photographs to see if we could determine whether there was any indication that they were not photographs of one and the same individual, whether or not one or more of these people could represent a double or an imposter. Mr. GENZMAN. What is the panel’s conclusion? Dr. SNow. Our conclusions were that there was no evidence that there was an imposter or a double involved on the basis of what we could measure from the photographs; that they are consistent with the photographs of a single individual. Mr. GENZMAN. Would you briefly explain the graph marked as JFK exhibit F-558. | 371 Dr. Snow. Yes, sir. I indicated that we take a number of mea- surements on the photographs. It is convenient to be able to reduce those, that mass of numbers into some single entities that allow us to compare the overall similarities in shape and size that we see. We have done this. It is a rather involved statistical technique developed by a British biometrician named Penrose back in the 1940’s, and it is widely employed in other areas of anthropology. Essentially what we have done here is, using the measurements of the three Dallas photographs as our base line, quantitatively com- pared the other sets of Oswald photographs here. Theoretically, if everything were perfect—which it never is—we would find that two objects or sets of photographs exactly duplicat- ed in every detail in terms of the measurements. The Dallas photo- graphs, the points when they are plotted would be down here at the zero point of the graph. You can see that they do cluster very closely to that zero point. This variation reflects differences, we feel, in measurement error and technique. Mr. Firuian. Let me ask you to move that chart about a foot to the right. It is blockout out—we can now see it. I am not sure the panel members on the left-hand side ‘can. Dr. SNow. Yes, sir. Would it help to move it back here? Mr. Firutan. Yes. Thank you. Mr. GENZMAN. Thank you, Dr. Snow. At this time please refer to exhibits F-559 and F-127. Exhibit F-127 was previously entered into the record. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that exhibit F-559 be entered into the record at this time. Chairman. Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this time. ; [The exhibit follows:] JFK Exuisit F-559 Mr. GENZMAN. Dr. Snow, would you identify these exhibits. Dr. SNow. Yes, sir. This is a photograph referred to by Mr. Blakey of the motorcade taken shortly after the first shots, or the shots, were fired, showing this figure standing in the textbook depository entranceway and who has been alleged to be Lee Harvey Oswald. Mr. GENZMAN. Would you identify the second exhibit marked F-558. Dr. SNow. Yes, sir. This is an enlargement given to us by the committee of that figure in the doorway. On this side we have a photograph, one of numerous photographs of Mr. Oswald that we examined, and then here are two of Mr. Billy Lovelady, taken— these two Lovelady photographs were taken, this one a few months I believe before the assassination, this sometime after the assassi- nation, within a few months. Mr. GENZMAN. What was the issue before the panel of anthro- pologists? Dr. SNow. The issue was to analyze the photographs to deter- mine whether or not the figure in the doorway was indeed Lee Harvey Oswald or Mr. Lovelady. Mr. GENZMAN. What is the panel’s conclusion? Dr. SNow. Our conclusions were that it is highly improbable that this individual is Lee Harvey Oswald. It is considerably more prob- able that it is Mr. Lovelady. Mr. GENZMAN. Can you give an example of the observations which led to this conclusion? 373 Dr. SNow. Yes, sir. We based it primarily on the hairline. As you can see, this photograph permits very little in the way of accurate measurements. We dosee one facial feature, however, if you will compare Mr. Lovelady with Mr. Oswald. He tends to have a some- what longer face in relation to its breadth, and rather prominent breadth across the cheekbones here. We can get an indication of that configuration in this photograph. In other words, the general facial outline resembles Mr. Lovelady more than it does Mr. Oswald. Another feature we noticed was that in photographs of Mr. Oswald taken about the time of his arrest, he had begun a little insipient lateral pattern of baldness, but in Mr. Lovelady this same type of baldness was more extensively developed at that time. And judging from the hairline in the photograph, the general pattern resembles that seen in Mr. Lovelady more than it does in Mr. Oswald. Another feature we noted was that Mr. Lovelady has a widow’s peak, an extension of the hair beyond the main hairline here, and it is sort of eccentrically located, shifted to the right. And we also get a suggestion of that, this widow’s peak displaced to the right in the figure in the doorway. Mr. GENZMAN. Thank you, Dr. Snow. _At this time would you please refer to exhibits F-131, F-172, F-173, and F-174. Exhibit F-131 was previously entered into the record. Mr. Chairman, I would ask at this time that exhibits marked as JFK F-172, F-173, and F-174 be entered into the record. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point. . : [The exhibits follow:] 374 TRAMP A VALLEE CARSWELL JFK Exuisit F-172 375 STURGIS ; TRAMP B JFK Exuisit F-173 376 TRAMP C wok e CHRISMAN JFK Exurisitr F-174 Mr. Genzman. Dr. Snow, would you briefly identify these exhib- its. Dr. SNow. Yes, sir. This first set of photographs are some of the several supplied to us by the committee Showing the three va- grants, the three tramps who were apprehended close to the site of the assassination sometime very shortly after it happened and are being led away by the Dallas Police officers. These tramps we have arbitrarily identified as tramp A, B, and C, according to their position in the line. These exhibits compare enlargements of the heads of the three tramps with certain figures who have been alleged to have been’ involved in the various conspiracy theories at one time or another. 377 Mr. GENZMAN. What were the issues before the panel of anthro- pologists? Dr. Snow. We were asked, again, using the best available infor- mation and the best available materials, to metrically and morpho- logically compare these photographs with those of the tramps to see whether or not any of these individuals could be identified as one or more of the tramps. Mr. GENZMAN. What are the panel’s conclusions? Dr. SNow. Our conclusions were that none of the individuals who have been alleged to have been tramp A are indeed tramp A; that the individual alleged to have been tramp B is not that tramp; and of the two individuals alleged to be tramp C, this one, Mr. Hunt, is not the tramp, but this one, Mr. Chrisman, his measurements are consistent with the face of tramp C. Mr. GENzMAN. Are you able to make a positive determination as to whether Mr. Chrisman is tramp C? Dr. SNow. We cannot positively identify him as tramp C. Mr. GENZMAN. Thank you, Dr. Snow. At this time would you please refer to exhibits JFK F-124, F-560, F-561, F-562, and F-563. Exhibit F-124 was previously en- tered into the record. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that those exhibits marked as F-560, -F-561, F-562, and F-563 be entered into the record. Chairman Strokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point. [The exhibits follow:] JFK Exuisit F-560 378 JFK Exuisit F-561 JFK Exnuisit F-562 JFK Exuisit F-563 Mr. GENzMAN. Dr. Snow, would you identify these exhibits and explain the issues involved. Dr. SNow. Yes, sir. These exhibits, starting here, is another photograph of the motorcade in Dallas as going down Houston Street shortly before the Presidential limousine made the left turn onto Elm Street. : A figure, whose head appears here immediately next to a some- what taller man in a black hat, is the figure that some people have Claimed to have a strong resemblance to Mr. Joseph Milteer. The other photographs show various enlargements of the spectator pho- tograph, compared to photographs made available to us of Mr. Milteer. And these refer to some analysis of heights that we did, Calculating the height of the spectator in order to compare it to the height of Mr. Milteer. Mr. Genzman. Is the enlargement of the individual in exhibit F-560 the original enlargement or is that a flip version? Dr. SNow. Yes; we found that this is a reverse of the print. He is facing to his left, whereas—it is a reversal of the print. We did that deliberately in order to show the relative strong resemblance in general facial configuration to this photograph of Mr. Milteer, to show that there is a fair degree of resemblance in the general facial shape. _ Mr. Genzman. What has the panel of anthropologists concluded? Dr. SNow. We concluded that the individual in question is not Mr. Joseph Milteer. Mr. GENzMAN. What was the basis of this conclusion? 380 Dr. SNow. The basis of our conclusion was that, first, although you can see this is very little material to work with, we found one feature of interest, in that there is a suggestion here that this individual had rather full lips, whereas in this photograph and others of Mr. Milteer we found that he is relatively thin-lipped. We also found a series of photographs of Mr. Milteer, some taken before the assassination, this one I believe in 1957, others several years later, that show that he, at least in 1957, was abundantly endowed with hair and as late as the early 1970’s he also has hair, whereas in the photograph of the spectator we see an indication of extensive balding with an almost fully exposed crown here. So unless it could be demonstrated, I believe that Mr. Milteer habit- ually wore hairpieces, I think we could rule him out on that basis. Mr. GENZMAN. Did the panel take any additional steps on this issue? Dr. SNow. Yes; we did. Looking over the photograph, we found that the alleged Milteer appears to be standing on a curb here, arrayed along Houston Street, alongside a number of other specta- tors. In comparing his apparent stature with those of the other spectators, we felt like we would be able to take information from that photograph and develop some statural estimates of Mr. Mil- teer. We approached this in two ways. We had some information supplied to us by the staff that Dallas City regulations in 1963 specified that these signs that you see in the photograph here, the lower edge of these signs, were to be placed 80 inches above the sidewalk. After analysis of the perspective, we were able to extend, in our imaginations, of course, the signs up here to where such a sign would be if Mr. Milteer was standing directly in front of it. We know the dimensions for the signs, 18 inches, here, 80 inches from — the pavement. And using that, it becomes a matter of simple proportions to calculate this distance, subtract it from 80 inches, | and we concluded that the figure is approximately 5 foot 10, plus or minus an inch, tall. We were able to compare that estimate with an estimate furnished us by the committee from an FBI investiga- tive report of Mr. Milteer which indicated that he was rather short. It gives his stature as 5 foot 5 inches. So there is a 6-inch discrepancy here. We took this a little further, since the signs are no longer there and the actual signs can no longer be measured, by comparing him in relation to other figures arrayed along the sidewalk on either side of him. We have some good information on the average stature of U.S. adults during this period. And using that and looking at the photograph, as we have done here and you see on this overlay, we selected a segment of the spectator line consisting of 7 males, aside from the alleged Milteer, and 16 adult females. And we asked our question then, or we posed the hypothetical of: What are the prob- abilities that a 5 foot 4 inch man would, by chance, find himself in a crowd of 16 adult females and 7 males? Of the adult females he is clearly taller than all 16 of them and he is clearly taller than at least 4 of the 7 males. And using the population of the statural statistics that we have available, and assuming that this is sort of a random collection of Dallas spectators, we concluded that the prob- 381 abilities of this man being 5 foot 4 inches taller—the odds against it are several thousand to one. ay GENZMAN. Would you demonstrate how the overlay was made? Dr. SNow. Sorry. This is an enlargement of the motorcade photo- graph. And we simply made the overlay here to display the specta- tors that we compared. Mr. GENZMAN. Thank you, Dr. Snow. Would you please return to your seat? Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. gunanman STOKES. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from In- iana. Mr. FITHIAN. I wonder if Dr. Snow would remain at the easel for a few questions before he sits down. I would like the staff to put back up the picture of the three tramps. While they are doing that, Dr. Snow, just for clarification. Are the terms insipient lateral evidence of balding and my own prob- lem of receding hairline the same thing? Dr. SNow. Yes, sir. But it refers to a type of balding that begins down here at the side of the head rather than in the middle. Mr. FITHIAN. From just a quick glance at that picture of Sturgis and tramp B, from here there doesn’t seem to be all that much difference. I wonder if you could tell me a little more specifically how you went about arriving at your conclusion that they were in fact different people? Dr. SNow. OK. Mr. FitrHI1An. Would you provide Dr. Snow, with a pointer? Dr. SNow. I think we should point out that in addition to this photograph, we examined about two dozen other photographs of Mr. Sturgis and also several photographs of tramp B. Some of the features that we noticed were that in terms of the overall facial configuration, Sturgis—and this is much more apparent on some of the other paragraphs—is fairly typical of what anthropologists would classify as a Mediterranean type, whereas this individual is more typical of individuals of northern European extraction. Among other features noted, tramp B has slightly wavy hair, and in all the photographs we have seen Mr. Sturgis’ hair has a very crisp curl. The hair color of tramp B shows up as rather light and in the photographs of Sturgis show him as deeply brunette. The hairline of Mr. Sturgis is fairly low, giving him a low fore- head, whereas in this and other photographs of the tramp B we see a fairly high hairline. Mr. Sturgis has a massive lower jaw, whereas the lower jaw of the tramp is relatively narrow. Also, Sturgis has a very massive square chin, whereas this individual’s chin is smaller and more pointed. Those are some of the morphological features that we found that served to distinguish Sturgis and tramp B as different individuals. Mr. FirHiAn. Could you give me a quick summary of why you ruled out Hunt and tramp C, or whatever basic measurements led you to the conclusion you have there? Dr. SNow. Yes; again working with not only this photograph but others, we find that Mr. Hunt differs in facial configuration. His nose, especially seen in profile, is very sharp and angular, whereas 41-373 O - 79 - 25 382 that of the tramp is large and more bulbous. There is a difference of lip thickness, Mr. Hunt being rather thin-lipped, the tramp being thicker lipped. Also there are some differences in the configurations of the ear. We also noticed that there is a small scar over the right eye of tramp C, and we were unable to find such a scar in any of the Hunt photographs we examined. Mr. Firuian. If you would, just the last one, tramp A, and his counterparts. Dr. Snow. Tramp A and Mr. Vallee we ruled out primarily on the basis of the upwardly flaring nostrils of Mr. Vallee. We do not see this trait in tramp A. There is also an indication that Vallee had a concave nasal profile. The nasal profile of tramp A is straight. Comparing tramp A with Mr. Carswell, the latter has a longer narrower face and a somewhat narrower nose. The antihelix of Carswell’s ear is poorly developed whereas there is a strong antihe- lix in tramp A. there are also differences in the form of the lobe. Mr. Carswell’s ear lobes are what we call “welded”, that is, directly attached. Whereas tramp A has a slightly free lobe. Mr. FirHiAn. Are you confident that the three tramps that you just described are not by your measurements and analysis any one of the three characters we have been talking about here? Dr. SNow. Yes, sir, I am. Mr. Firu1an. And the only one that you have any uncertainty about is Chrisman? Dr. SNow. Yes, sir. Mr. Firuian. Is that because there are sufficient similarities of measurements? Dr. SNow. Yes. Of course, we only have one photograph of Mr. Chrisman for analysis, and it was taken several years after the assassination. However, the few measurements that we could take from this photograph do seem to be consistent with the correspond- ing measurements of tramp C. Mr. FirHIAn. It is my understanding that the CIA and the FBI conducted their own analyses of the tramp photos that attempt to identify the individuals. Did you get into that? Dr. SNow. We didn’t participate in either of those analyses. However, after being called in as consultants to this committee, we were furnished copies of the reports of the CIA and FBI analyses. Mr. Firnian. Did you then study those reports? Dr. SNow. Yes, we have looked them over and we found that although they varied in method from our approach to some extent, they came to the same conclusions: That Mr. Sturgis was not tramp B nor was Mr. Hunt tramp C. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you. Let me ask the staff if we have any other information on Chris- man that I am not aware of. Mr. GENZMAN. For the record, Mr. Chrisman, now deceased, was implicated by the Jim Garrison probe into the Kennedy assassina- tion, and it was claimed that he had CIA connections. It was later determined that Chrisman was a confidence man who frequented the New Orleans area around 1962 and 1963. Mr. FiruH1An. Thank you. 383 _ Let's stay with the Dallas scene for a minute on the Milteer issue. You seem to have assumed the individual in JFK exhibit F-124 was standing on the same level with the spectators around him. What basis do you have for that? Dr. SNow. We were supplied information by the committee based on other views of this same scene, specifically I think frames taken from either the Muchmore or Bell films that show the same array of spectators before they are obscured by the Presidential limou- sine at a much greater distance, so we cannot use it for analysis. But they do show that the alleged Milteer and the spectators arrayed immediately on either side of him were standing along the edge of the curb. Mr. Firu1an. And the person that has been alleged to be Mil- teer—— Dr. SNow. The alleged Milteer. Mr. FiTHIAN. They are all standing on the sidewalk? Dr. SNow. Yes. Mr. FirHIAn. No Coke boxes around? Dr. SNow. I don’t know about Coke boxes or beer boxes. Mr. FitH1AN. What evidence do we have—I wasn’t sure that I caught that—that Milteer was as short as you said he was. Dr. SNow. This comes from an FBI investigative report that was furnished to the committee, and that is all the information that I personally have. Mr. FITHIAN. Let’s turn now to the analysis that you made of the Oswald photographs. On the basis of your measurements and your analysis, can you positively identify or state that the series of Oswald photographs shown on exhibits JFK F-556 and F-557 are indeed those of Oswald? Dr. SNow. No, sir; we cannot. We cannot on the basis of the measurements alone positively state that all of those photographs are indeed of Oswald. However, we can say that they are all consistent with the hypothesis that all of the photographs are of Lee Harvey Oswald. Mr. FiTH1An. Would the staff put back up the chart and graph which I was blocked from seeing at the first part of the question- ing. In your work how do you compensate or adjust for plastic sur- gery that might be done on an individual? Dr. SNow. In the Oswald photographs specifically we saw no evidence of any plastic surgery. But this does not mean that there might not have been some there. Mr. FITHIAN. You say you saw no evidence of it? Dr. SNow. We saw no evidence of plastic surgery in the Oswald photographs. Mr. FirHian. Any other evidence of any kind of disguises that might have been used? Dr. SNow. We saw one interesting feature in Mr. Hunt. Compar- ing his photographs apparently taken in the midfifties with some taken later in the midsixties, there is some indication that Mr. Hunt underwent some plastic surgery. He has rather protruding ears and in later photographs they have been brought back closer 384 to his head, and that suggests some sort of surgical correction. Of course, we don’t know the date. Mr. FiruHian. Would you direct your attention to the chart. The first three right down where the two lines intersect, or very close to it, all seem very tightly arrayed. But the backyard photo seems to have slipped out of orbit somehow or other. Dr. SNow. Yes, sir. It is most divergent from the cluster. Howev- er, if you will recall those photographs of Oswald, with the excep- tion of the backyard photographs most were of good quality with fairly crisp images. The backyard photographs differ from the rest of the series in that they are rather fuzzy and also they vary in the lighting. They are the only two photographs of the series where the lighting is coming from overhead, and we feel that this introduces measurement errors using our technique and would account for this discrepancy. Mr. Firn1an. What are you trying to tell us by putting the Lovelady dot? | Dr. SNow. We used Mr. Lovelady’s measurements and plotted them to serve as a sort of control and demonstration of the other results of the technique. In Mr. Lovelady we have a person who admittedly has a strong physical resemblance to Mr. Oswald, so we felt it would be interesting to take his measurements and see how they compared with Oswald’s using this method. So here we have a point for Mr. Lovelady that falls far outside the Oswald cluster, and yet is a point of a person who is very similar in facial configu- ration to Mr. Oswald. Mr. FiTHIAN. I am not sure I followed that. He shows up far outside of the Oswald cluster. Does that tend to prove that he does look like Oswald? Dr. SNow. No. The further away, the less he resembles Mr. Oswald. As I say, we plotted it just as a demonstration of the sensitivity of the method to see where a person who was not Oswald would fall. Probably if we used your face or my face and plotted our measurements it wouldn’t even be on the graph. Mr. FirHian. So it proves at one and the same time there is enough distinction that you are comfortable that the two faces are distinctly different but enough similarities that they at least end up on the same chart; is that what you are saying? Dr. SNow. Yes, sir. Mr. Firuian. I have just one more brief line of questioning. Would you put up JFK exhibits F-556 and F-557. Dr. Snow, as I understand it, the two backyard photos, the center and lower right of exhibit—what is that, F-556, for the record? Would you explain again in a sentence or two why those photos would, when you get through measuring, put the spot or the dot outside that very tight cluster on your chart. Dr. SNow. Again, I believe when you look at the photographs you see, compared to the rest of the photographs of Mr. Oswald that we analyzed there, that these two are much fuzzier and blurrier and also there is a variation in the direction of the light. This is going to influence the errors that are going to be introduced in our measurements that we take off the photographs. In other words, we simply cannot measure these photographs with the same degree of accuracy that we can in the better quality photographs. 389 Mr. Firuian. Dr. Snow, as to the results of all these measure- ments and analyses, and so forth, you are submitting a report for our record; is that correct? _Dr. Snow. Yes, sir. We will be preparing a detailed report on the photograph analysis on all of these issues. | Mr. FiTHian. I am sure you realize that scientific evidence that is presented to the committee will be a great deal of interest to others who have studied the assassination of President Kennedy, and in fact over the years created quite a school or quite a number of schools of thought. Will other individuals in years to come be able to duplicate your methodology? Dr. SNow. Yes, sir. I believe in our final report we will be able to present our method here in such a way that it could be replicated by other scientists, provided with the same materials. Mr. Firuian. These methods of measurement that you use have come to be the standards of measurement? Dr. SNow. The facial measurements that we employ are quite uniform throughout the discipline area of physical anthropology. Mr. Firuian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further ques- tions. Chairman Strokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar. Mr. Epcar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just a few ques- tions. Actually, these questions I think probably go to counsel at this point. Do we have any evidence of the identities of any of the three tramps? Mr. GENZMAN. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Edgar. Mr. Epcar. Have we reviewed pictures in the Dallas area in terms of photographs of people who have been arrested? I recognize these three tramps were not booked. But has there been analysis by staff of that? | Mr. GENZMAN. Mr. Edgar, this is an ongoing project of the staff. It is continuing at this time. Mr. Epncar. So we are continuing to review and to analyze those pictures to try to come up with their identities? Mr. GENZMAN. Correct. Mr. Epcar. Even as a result of our sharing these now as evi- dence in these public hearings, someone might step forward and identify themselves as being one of the three individuals. Mr. GENZMAN. That is possible. Mr. Epaar. Dr. Snow, it has been interesting to listen to your analysis of the pictures here and to review the chart, and I look forward to your final report. Are there any special characteristics of the Oswald face that stand out as being unique or different? Dr. SNow. None in terms of features that you would really consider abnormal. In my opinion he has a fairly average face in terms of the measurements and the morphological features. Mr. Epcar. There is nothing that stands out as a distinctive feature that would in essence be unique to Lee Harvey Oswald? Dr. SNow. I don’t believe so, sir. Mr. Epcar. The earlier witness, Sergeant Cecil Kirk, testified it is quite common for records of an individual’s height to vary by 386 several inches. As a physical anthropologist, Dr. Snow, what have you observed on this issue of height? Dr. SNow. I have had a wide experience in examining skeletal cases where we estimate the unknown individual’s height from his bones then compare those with police records of missing individ- uals. In reviewing many police records, I find that it is not uncommon to have discrepancies plus or minus 1 or 2 inches in height report- ed between one arrest record and another. Mr. Epcar. Would that also vary in the type and method of determining the height of the particular prisoner? Dr. SNow. Yes, sir. It varies a great deal with the technique used to measure him, the time of day, and many other variables that influence the height. Mr. Epaar. Thank you. I have no further questions. Chairman Strokes. Are any other members seeking recognition? [No response. ] Chairman Stoxes. Dr. Snow, at the conclusion of the testimony of many witnesses before this committee, under our rules he is entitled to 5 minutes in which he may comment upon his testi- mony or in any way change his testimony or expand upon it. I | would extend to you at this time 5 minutes for that purpose if you so desire. Dr. Snow. I would just like to point out that the anthropology consultants will be presenting a detailed final report on our find- ings for publication by the committee. Also I would like to say— and I speak for my colleagues too—it has been a pleasure to work with the very fine young people that you have on your staff; and that if their energy, efficiency, competence, and enthusiasm is any indication of the kind of talent you can draw on in the Congress, then I think the country is in a lot better shape than a lot of people think it is. Chairman Stoxes. Thank you very much, Dr. Snow. On behalf of the committee, we certainly thank you and all of your panel for the work you have done for this committee, and we look forward to your final report. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. STATEMENT OF MR. BLAKEY Mr. Buakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are other photographs, both still and motion picture, that were taken at the scene of the assassination that suggest to critics a conspiracy. These don’t show alleged accomplices or masterminds who possibly could be identified. Rather, they show shapes or blurred images that critics have contended are gunmen. Most of these gunmen are in the vicinity of the grassy knoll. In the years since the assassination, significant progress has been made in the field of photographic enhancement. New chemical and computer processes have been developed that record and improve picture quality. The select committee assembled a group of photographic consul- tants to conduct a thorough analysis of photographic materials to see if there is, in fact, visual evidence of gunmen in Dealey Plaza. The members of this panel are scientists from leading educational 387 institutions and private corporations whose field of specialization is photographic enhancement. Representing the panel today is Dr. Bob R. Hunt of the Universi- ty of Arizona. Dr. Hunt received a B.S., cum laude, in aeronautical engineering from Wichita State University, an M.S. in electrical engineering from Oklahoma State University, and a Ph. D. in systems engineering from the University of Arizona. He has been an adjunct professor of electrical engineering and computer science at the University of New Mexico and an alternate group leader at the University of California’s Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Currently, he is an associate professor of systems and industrial engineering and optical sciences at the University of Arizona. Dr. Hunt is a member of the Optical Society of America and the American Society of Photogrammery. He was the recipient of the NEDA Fellowship in 1964 and a NASA Traineeship in 1966. Dr. Hunt is the author of numerous publications. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Dr. Hunt. Chairman SToKEs. The committee calls Dr. Hunt. Will you please raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? TESTIMONY OF DR. BOB R. HUNT Dr. Hunt. I do. Chairman Stokes. Thank you. The Chair recognizes counsel Mi- chael Goldsmith. Mr. Go.tpsmiTH. Before I proceed, I would like to offer for admis- sion into the record JFK F-166 and F-564, which I neglected to do earlier this morning. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record. [The information follows:] 388 KODAK SaetTY Paces > xoban SAP is E ke 6oag KOUAR Satety Faw 8009 JFK Exuisit F-564 389 Mr. GotpsmiTH. Dr. Hunt, what was the photographic evidence panel asked to do with the various pictures and films that have been alleged to show gunmen in Dealey Plaza? Dr. Hunt. We were given two tasks. The first task was to apply modern technology in the enhancement of imagery. The second task, of course, was to interpret the results of that processing and to bring results of our interpretations and conclusions to the select committee. Mr. GoutpsmitH. What methods were used to clarify the available photographic evidence so that the best possible images could be used for analysis and interpretation? Dr. Hunt. There were three different methods utilized by the photographic panel. The first method was common photographic enhancement or photo-optical enhancement, sometimes referred to as darkroom techniques. The second method of technology utilized was that of digital image processing, and a third area, that of autoradiographic en- hancement? Mr. Go.psmitTH. Would you go into detail as to the photo-optic enhancement? Dr. Hunt. This process refers to the printing or recopying of the negative by different types of copying papers or films, using differ- ent darkroom developers and times, and which results in a feature which was more detailed by expanding the dark and light regions of the image. Mr. Go.tpsmiTu. I would ask at this time Dr. Hunt be shown JFK exhibit F-149. I would ask that you step to the easel to examine this particular exhibit. 7 You made reference earlier to the term “digital image process- ing.” Using this exhibit, please explain what you meant by this term. Dr. Hunt. The first obstacle is to overcome the difference in what a computer uses and what an image is. An image is a repre- sentation of light which we see with our eyes, but a computer only - works with numbers, sequences of digits. So the basic problem is to convert that representation of light into a sequence of numbers. The way of doing that is to first of all have a source of light. That source of light is imaged through an opaque mask onto a photographic negative. Light passes through the negative and it is then observed and collected by a photocell, which is really no different than you would see guarding the doors of an elevator, except it is a scientific instrument. From the photocell, we generate electric current, which is meas- ured by the computer. That photocell is then measured by the computer. The computer converts that electric current into numbers and the numbers are then manipulated in the computer. The end result of all this is a set of numbers which measure brightness or the darkness of the image in the particular position where the spot is at and then we reposition the spot everywhere 390 over the photographic negative of the image itself so as to extract tinent information. fs ser haat tat Are you able to state, when a negative or piece of film is scanned, how many spots are actually scanned—let ve rephrase that: How many spots actually receive assignment o bers to them? +Dr: pone The number of spots to which you have assigned numbers is a thing that is governed in a fairly precise mathe ical way by the nature of the image itself. For example, of the photographic material we dealt with and which was provided to an by the committee, the number varied from, say, 16,000 to a different numbers all the way up to as many as a quarter of a ili illion numbers. vi chet gory ercethewaet Mr. Chairman, I move for introduction into the d of JFK exhibit F-149. ee } YeGhaivitien STOKES. Without objection it may be entered into the record. [JFK exhibit F-149 follows:] Simple Diagram of Computer Scan of Image Light which Passes Through Spot_ Shining on Negative the Negative Photocell ilies Electric Current Spot of Light Photographic. Neg ative Numbers, which Measure Brightness or Darkness of the mass at the Position of the Spot. JFK Exuisir F-149 Mr. GoLpsmitH. Now you made reference earlier to digital image processing as an enhancement technique, a technique to improve the quality of the photo image. How are the numerical values that you obtained used to improve the quality of the image? | Dr. Hunt. Well, every type of image forma tion process, even one which results in degradations of the image , every type of image formation process can be described by mathematical models, math- ematic equations which, if you substitute the numbers into them which represent the image, can be solve d and the solutions of those equations gives you an enhanced or impro ved version of the image. Mr. GoupsmitH. Once a negative has been subjected to digital image processing, how is the resulting image actually displayed? Dr. Hunt. There are two different methods display or recreate the numbers and bring by which you would forth an image out of the numbers as they exist in the computer. 391 One of those methods could be exemplified by the diagram I have here except that, instead of putting a negative in the position which I show here on the chart, we would put an unexposed piece of film there. We would then simply reexpose that piece of film by varying the strengths of the light which is shining through onto the film. That one method is referred to as hard copy because it produces a tangible thing, namely, a piece of film which has been exposed and can then be developed. A second method of recreating imagery for the purposes of view- ing it is to use what is referred to as soft copy. In soft copy the numbers which exist in the computer are not used to generate film. In soft copy those numbers are written into a computer memory, the nature of that being such that you can use it to position a beam of light on a TV tube and by very rapidly scanning that TV monitor screen, a display screen is what it is usually referred to, you would get a display of the image which appears for all intents and purposes just like your home television set, with one exception; it is of much higher quality. Mr. GoLpsMITH. Does the computer display that you refer to as soft copy lend itself in any way to analytical work? Dr. Hunt. Yes; because if you can use the computer to manipu- late the numbers which are in the memory which are causing that “TV picture to be created, as you manipulate those numbers you can see the results of it instantaneously and bring what is usually referred to as human feedback, begin to achieve better and better enhancements without having to wait for the process of film devel- opment and wet chemistry, as it is usually referred to. Mr. GoLpsMITH. When you manipulate the numbers, does the image on the computer display actually change in any way? Dr. Hunt. Yes. You can see it change as you manipulate the numbers. Mr. Go.tpsmiTH. And can you describe generally what ways it might change? Dr. Hunt. For example, you might be able to change the overall brightness and darkness of the image so that things which were in deep shadows become very visible by bringing up the deep shadows into something that would be brighter and then they would show up on your original negative. Mr. GoLpsMITH. When the committee’s photographic evidence panel examined materials that had been subjected to digital image processing, did they rely upon soft copy or hard copy for their analytical work? Dr. Hunt. Most of our analytical work was done with soft copy. A Mr. Go.tpsmiTtH. And where was that analytical work actually one? Dr. Hunt. There were three different contractors which carried out the analytical work: the University of Southern California-Los Angeles; Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory in New Mexico, and the Aerospace Corporation, also in Los Angeles. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did each of those facilities have soft copy facili- ties available for analytical purposes? Dr. Hunt. Yes, they did. In fact they had some of the finest equipment in the world for those purposes. 392 Mr. Go.tpsmiTuH. Is there any change in the quality of the en- hanced photographic image when it is taken off the computer display and converted into hard copy? Dr. Hunt. Yes; there is a change. Mr. GoLpsmiTH. What is the nature of that change, Dr. Hunt? Dr. Hunt. The nature of the change is usually that soft copy will look better than will hard copy. The reason for that is modern technology, in cathode ray tube displays, what we usually refer to as TV monitors. That modern technology is so good that you can produce more light, more vivid colors, and equally as good resolu- tion as you would expect on a piece of photographic film. Mr. GotpsmitH. How has this change in quality affected the hard copy exhibits that will be discussed today? Dr. Hunt. We will show some hard copy exhibits today which will probably lack some of the colors and the vividness of the colors which we would see if we were able to bring a cathode-ray tube display or TV monitor into this room. We would also see, because of the processes of reenlarging some of these images, some loss in sharpness as well. Mr. GotpsmiTH. But again for purposes of clarification, the pho- tographic evidence panel’s analytical work was based largely upon the computer display? Dr. Hunt. That is correct. Mr. GoLpsMITH. I would ask you at this time, Dr. Hunt, to refer to JFK F-150 and F-151. ; Mr. Chairman, I move for the admission of these two exhibits. Chairman Stokes. Without objection they may be entered into the record at this point. [The information follows:] 393 JFK Exursir F-150 OEM SPRING 197 a en REBEL LID LLDCS, JFK Exuisit F-151 Mr. GoutpsmitH. Dr. Hunt, what are these two exhibits designed to demonstrate? 394 Dr. Hunt. These two exhibits demonstrate the type of enhance- ment routinely carried out using an image processing system. The first one which I am pointing to now shows an image which, if you were to look at it, your distinct impression would be there is nothing there. If you could see it closer up you would see there is some structure in it, namely there is some variation in black and white within the image. The problem is the blackest parts are almost the same color of gray as the lightest parts. So there is very little of the property usually referred to as contrast visible in it. By measuring that image and putting it into the computer and manipulating the numbers in the fashion I described earlier, to stretch the contrast of the image, that is to say make the portions which are dark much darker, to make the portions which are light much lighter, you end up with the image you see over here on the right which happens to be a dormitory building on the university campus. That is an example of what is referred to as contrast enhance- ment. Mr. GoLpsmiTH. What about the other exhibit, Dr. Hunt? Dr. Hunt. The other exhibit is an example of what is usually referred to as image deblurring. The photograph on the left was taken by a camera shifted in motion during an interval which the weg was open. The result of this is quite a bit of distortion and blur. For example, none of the letters which you see in the upper portion of this exhibit are visible. You would have, I think, a great deal of difficulty recognizing any of the letters. What we do, after converting that picture into numbers, is put together a set of equations which describe the process of blurring, solve that set of equations, and the new numbers which come out are represented by the picture on the right. You can see how we have sharpened up the edges of all the letters and, most importantly, the fine details in the letters at the tip of the picture are quite visible. You can read things, for exam- ple, that this is a project financed by the Zion First National Bank of Salt Lake City. Mr. Go.tpsmitH. Dr. Hunt, are there any limitations on the extent to which the quality of an image can be improved through digital image processing? Dr. Hunt. Yes; there are. There are fundamental limitations essentially referred to by the engineers as noise. Mr. GoLpsmitH. Let me show you JFK F-152 and I would ask you to describe those limitations in some detail for us. Dr. Hunt. Certainly. Anybody who has ever lived in a fringe television reception area realizes that if he turns on his TV set he is likely to see a picture cluttered by quite a bit of salt and pepper effect. The colloquial terminology for that is snow. The upper picture in this exhibit represents an image in which we have a very poor quality of the image and it is cluttered by a great amount of this noise which we refer to as snow. We try to enhance the quality of that image by, first of all, if you wish, smoothing out the snow or noise which exists in it and trying also to sharpen up the edges and details in it in a fashion very similar to the previous exhibit. We were not able to do that with any great 395 success. Some things are more visible in the image. But by and large, the limits of noise, or snow if you wish, have stayed with us througout the enhancement process and we are not nearly as satis- fied with the enhanced image as we would like to be. Mr. Go.LpsMITH. Does the ability to improve the quality of an pees depend at all upon the initial quality of the film or nega- tive’ Dr. Hunt. Oh, yes. For example, if you are not presented with an original negative, suppose somebody hands you a copy on a piece of paper, the process of copying itself will cause a loss of information of a kind that will be detrimental to the process of enhancing it. Mr. GoLpsmiITH. Is the quality of the enhancement affected at all by the quality, for example, of the motion picture? Dr. Hunt. Oh, yes; yes, that too. In fact it is possible to degrade an image beyond which it cannot be recovered, the information in it cannot be recovered. | Mr. Go.LpsmiIrTH. If a film has good quality to begin with, in other words a relatively clear picture, is it easier to enhance that film than a film which was of relatively poor quality to begin with, one that is fuzzy and shaky to begin with? Dr. Hunt. It is; yes. Mr. GoLpsMITH. What would the reason for that be? Dr. Hunt. The reason for that would be that there would prob- ably be less severity of the extent of the blur or fuzziness with respect to the amount of noise which had been included in it by the process of forming the image. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Fine. You made reference to the term “autoradiographic enhance- ment.’ Would you define that process for us? Dr. Hunt. Yes. Autoradiographic enhancement is the use of a ‘radioactive chemical which fixes itself to the image surface. Every photographic image is composed of small silver grains, literally grains of silver, the same silver we would know as a jewelry component. What we would do is to affix to the silver grains a chemical, which is radioactive and consequently emits a small amount of radiation such as X-rays. You place that radioactive film next to a piece of X-ray film and the picture literally takes an X- ray of itself, which is the source of the term autoradiography. Mr. GoLpsMITH. I would ask you to refer to JFK F-154. Please describe the effects of autoradiographic enhancement. — Dr. Hunt. Certainly. There is a picture prepared by Stanford Research Institute, which is the corporation which has developed the autoradiographic process, and pioneered most of it. The upper picture shows an aerial photograph, that is to say a picture taken from a plane flying overhead and looking down at the ground. That aerial photograph has been underexposed by a factor of 12, that is to say there is 12 times less light available in that exposure than there should have been in the optimum case. The lower image shows the result of using this radioactive chemical to intensify the image and then taking an X-ray of itself. You can see quite a bit of features have shown up; some of it looks like a harbor area, tanks, airplanes, and so on. Mr. GoLpsMITH. What types of photograhic materials can this process be applied to? 396 Dr. Hunt. It can only be applied to black and white film. Color film is not applicable. Mr. GoupsmiTH. Mr. Chairman, I move for the admission into the record of JFK F-152 and JFK F-154. Chairman Stokes. Without objection they may be entered into the record at this point. [The information follows:] as _ i * NS SS ee ee na Bee = nl $5.5 JFK Exuisit F-152 397 ~ SRE INTERNATIONAL AUTORADIOGRAPHIC ENHANCEMENT OF PHOTOGRAPHIC IMAGES : | | (a) AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH, UNDEREXPOSED BY A FACTOR OF 12 SHOWN IN (a) Type R x-ray film, 48-hr exposure. MP-319583-53A JFK Exuisit F-154 Mr. GoutpsmiTH. Dr. Hunt, in general what types of photographic naterials did the panel subject to these various types of enhance- aent methods? | Dr. Hunt. We subjected original color slides, black and white yegatives, a black and white Polaroid print and color motion pic- wires. | Mr. GotpsmitH. What was the reason for limiting your work, our enhancement efforts to original materials? *373 O - 79 = 26 398 Dr. Hunt. As I stated earlier, every time you carry out a copying process you lose information. Therefore, we wanted to have the best information available to go into the enhancement process to make sure we got the best product coming out. Mr. GotpsmitH. I would ask you at this time to refer to JFK exhibits F-121, F-153 and F-157. Mr. Chairman, 121 has already been admitted into the record. I move for the admission of JFK F-153 and F-157. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record. [The information follows:] sesterge prea aR RT ows JFK Exuisit F-153 400 JFK Exuisit F-157 Mr. GoLpsmiITH. Thank you. Dr. Hunt, would you identify these exhibits? : Dr. Hunt. Yes. F-121 is a split view in which the upper portion shows the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository, the lower portion of it being an enlargement of the open sixth floor window. This is taken from an 8 millimeter motion picture film which is usually referred to as the Hughes film. Exhibit F-153 also shows the School Book Depository but it is a black and white image taken by a photographer by the name of 401 Dillard. The lower portion of the photograph as it was originally on the negative, the upper portion is the increased or enlarged scale of that centering on the sixth floor window. Exhibit—I can’t see the number—F-157 is a third photograph of the Texas School Book Depository. Again the object of interest is the open sixth floor window in the lower portion. This is the original 35 millimeter slide, the print made from the 35 millimeter in the lower portion. The upper portion is the result of a computer enhancement of the contrast as well as computer recoloring the information to bring out extra detail. Mr. GoutpsmiTH. Of these three exhibits, the only one that shows enhancement work I take it is JFK F-157. Dr. Hunt. That is correct. Mr. GoupsmitH. And there only the top photograph has been enhanced, is that correct? Dr. Hunt. That is correct. Mr. GoLpsMiITH. Do you know the time sequence that separates these three photographs? Dr. Hunt. Yes. The Hughes film, for example, from which exhib- it F-121 was taken, that is a motion picture film which follows the Presidential caravan as it proceeds down the street and makes a left turn directly in front of the School Book Depository. That is about, not about, exactly 88 frames of 8 millimeter motion picture imagery. We know from the position of where the Presidential car turned that it terminates approximately 5 seconds prior to the first, what is believed to be the first shot, and that therefore gives us a time span for those 88 frames of about 10 seconds before the first shot to about 5 seconds before the first shot. Now the second picture, the Dillard picture, was taken from a press car which was following the Presidential caravan. I believe testimony that Dillard gave before the Warren Commission indicat- ed that he took that picture just a few seconds, his own term I believe, after the last shot was fired. And finally this third image, taken by Mr. Powell, is believed to have been taken, on testimony by Mr. Powell, 1 to 2 minutes after the last shot was fired. Mr. GoLpsmitH. What issues were raised by these photographic materials? Dr. Hunt. The issues principally concern themselves with what is visible within the sixth floor School Book Depository window. I am pointing to the window on the sixth floor and there is evident there a rectangular shape. If you view this motion picture, the Hughes film, for example, as I am pointing to now, if you view this in a motion picture sequence, one notices several things. First of all, the image formed at this window positions itself near the top left edge of the frame and then, as the camera pans, following the Presidential car, that image begins to drift and move in toward the center. As you watch it do that, you get the distinct impression there is some sort of motion or a change of the object within the window. So the issue, of course, is exactly what are we looking at there? Is that the potential assassin? That is the issue presented by the Hughes film. 402 Mr. GoupsmiTtH. Dr. Hunt, before you proceed to the Dillard photograph, was any other issue presented by the Hughes film aside from the motion in the alleged assassin window? Dr. Hunt. Yes. There is another set of windows over here imme- diately to the left and off of this particular print which was made which shows another set of windows in the School Book Depository and there have been assertions or allegations that something can be seen with respect to a person or persons in that window looking out. Mr. GoLpsMITH. Please proceed now to the Dillard exhibit. Dr. Hunt. OK. The Dillard exhibit, since it has been taken presumably just a few seconds after the last shot was fired, if we look at an enlarge- ment of that image, the question we concern ourselves with is the following: There are some objects very definitely visible in front of that window. There is a box, what we interpret to be a box, an- other box sitting over there. But behind the window there is a great deep shadow. The question is, within that deep shadow is it possible to see things by contrast enhancement techniques of the kind that I described earlier? Mr. Go.LpsmiTH. That is essentially the same issue that exists for the Powell photograph? Dr. Hunt. That is correct, essentially the same issue, namely to look inside, what is the deep shadow in that window. Mr. GoLpsmiTH. What type of enhancement method was applied to the Hughes film? Dr. Hunt. The Hughes film was enhanced in the following way: We took the 88 frames which were available to us from the original film recorded by Hughes and the process of digitizing those 88 frames, as I described earlier, was carried out. After it was carried out, the following things were done: We recognized there was a change in contrast in each frame of the film. By that we mean that the overall brightness and darkness of the image seemed to change from frame to frame which, incidentally, is not an uncommon thing to have occur. So the first thing we did was to use the computer to equalize the contrast in each frame. By that we mean that the same values of brightness and darkness were forced on the image by the computer. The second thing we noticed was there was a change in focus from frame to frame occasionally as the camera takes its picture and the film moves around slightly in the focal point. We changed those scales slightly to compensate for the change in focus. Once that work was done, we then went into the process of trying to determine what was happening in the way of motion. The way we did that was to put this picture on a soft copy computer TV display of the kind that I described. Once it was on that display, an operator has the ability to position the small dot anywhere in the picture which is given on that display. He positions that dot in the center of the object which we see and then, once the dot is positioned, the computer records the coordinates of that dot and from that sequence of dot positions we can ask ourselves the question what motion is seen or not seen. Mr. Gotpsmitu. At this time I would ask that Dr. Hunt be shown JFK F-159 and F-159A. 403 Mr. Chairman, I move for the admission into the record of these two exhibits. Chairman SToKEs. Without reo they maybe entered into the record. [The information follows:] HUGHES FILM 6TH FLOOR END WINDOW NEAR END OF SEQUENCE ' “y , _ NEAR BEGINNING - OF SEQUENCE CHANGES IN SHAPE AND POSITION AT 1/8 SEC INTERVALS CHANGES IN POSITION OF CENTER OF SHAPE OVER ENTIRE FRAME Sequence: [55] [57] [58] 61 FILM SEQUENCE JFK. F-1S? JFK Exuisit F-159 NEAREND OF SEQUENCE —” NEAR BEGINNING OF SEQUENCE JFK Exuisit F-159A 404 Dr. Hunt. These two exhibits try to depict graphically the actual form of the motions perceived as a result of this computer proc- esses which were carried out. It is a very cluttered exhibit and we apologize for it, but I think the fact that this exhibit is cluttered indicates something about it. What we have tried to show here is the direction of motion of the center of this object as it was perceived in each frame, and also the length of the arrow indicates the rough extent of the motion itself. For example, we start here in the beginning of the motion se- quence, we move up like so, over to the right and down, to the right and down some more, like so around, and it goes around like that until it ends up finally at the 85th frame where the motion perceived, position of the object perceived is right there. Mr. GoLpsmiTH. What does the length of each line in that exhibit F-159A indicate? Dr. Hunt. The length of the line exhibits the extent of the motion of the object in the window. Mr. GoupsmitH. Before I ask you to describe JFK F-159, I want to have it moved a little bit so that it is in better view. Dr. Hunt. This exhibit combines the same information on the large blowup of 159A. But in addition to that, we have isolated on three or four frame sequences, frames 55, 57, 59, and 61 in that film, and show you the change in position at %-second intervals. To most graphically demonstrate that, we put that in color. Red indi- cates the shape of the object in the window at frame 55, green at 57, blue at 59, and yellow at 61. I guess the important point is you see quite a great degree of motion change occurred at ¥%-second intervals. Mr. GOLpDsMITH. Was the panel able to attribute that motion to any human object? , Dr. Hunt. No, we were not able to do that; at % second intervals we are seeing quite drastic changes in shape and if you look at them they are not all that consistent. For example, from red we move to the green to a position there, we immediately pop down in the blue and then pop way back up again in the yellow. Mr. GoLpsmiITH. In that case, to what was the motion attributed? Dr. Hunt. The panel’s conclusion was that the motion which is perceived if you view the movie is attributable to photographic artifacts, namely the change in contrast frame to frame, the change in focus as the image of the window moves around in the frame of the film. | Mr. GoupsmiTu. Is it possible there was a human object in that window but it simply was not perceptible on the film? Dr. Hunt. It is very possible that there was a human object there, but it would be beyond the perceptibility of the imagery as recorded on film, is the panel’s conclusion. Mr. GoLpsmiTH. What would be the reason for that? Dr. Hunt. The reason is that it was simply—well, there are several reasons. First of all, at the edge of a film frame the image is never as good, never as sharp or as crisp or conveys as much information as at the center. Unfortunately, most of these images are captured at the edge of the film frame. That is the position where you have a 405 number of optical distortions that occur which cause a loss of sharpness and information. Mr. GotpsmiTH. Is that also explainable in part by the quality of the camera? Dr. Hunt. Yes, that is, a real high quality motion picture camera of the type that would be used by commercial photography would have much better image retention features in the edge of the frame than would a sort of off-the-shelf hobbyist home product. Mr. GotpsmiTH. What did the panel conclude about the presence of motion in the adjacent window on the sixth floor? Dr. Hunt. Those adjacent windows were examined also even though they are not visible on this particular blowup we have. We found no perceptions in motion or even forms in those windows. Mr. Go.psmitH. Now the ITEK Corp. reported that, in that adja- cent window, there was something that they characterized as a transient anomaly; in other works, motion of some kind. To what would that type of motion be attributed? _ Dr. Hunt. First of all, the ITEK Corp. did not carry out any of the elaborate procedure for controlling the contrast that we did, which means they were much more subject to a false perception of ‘motion as a result of contrast failures. By that I mean the follow- ing: What you see as an object, if it is in both shadow and light, is ‘strictly dependent upon the photographic processes resulting in the ‘contrast of that object being recorded on film. If there were changes in contrast there would be a much greater probability of ‘motion being perceived. We, of course, tried to hold the contrast ‘constant by our processing. Mr. Go.LpsmiTH. Are you saying then that such motion would be characterized as caused by photographic artifact? Dr. Hunt. Photographic artifact, photographic anomaly. Mr. GoLpsMITH. What type of enhancement method was applied ‘to the Dillard pictures? Dr. Hunt. The Dillard pictures being in black and white, being in black and white negative, and one in which we had a deep ‘shadow which we wanted to examine, was an ideal picture to use ‘the autoradiographic enhancement technique on. It was given to Stanford Research Institute, to apply that technique to it. __ Mr. Gotpsmitu. Let me show you at this time JFK F-156. Please describe the results of that analysis. Dr. Hunt. F-156 shows two versions of an autoradiographic en- thancement of the image as seen by the panel after the work at SRI. The lower image is one in which the work has been carried ut for 17 hours, the upper one, for 138 hours. That is the time in which the radioactive film was in contact with the X-ray film. It is unfortunate we do not see what the panel was able to rceive on the enhanced negatives themselves. In this open fifth- oor window the enhancement process was quite successful in seeing into the dark shadow. On the enhanced negatives you can ctually see a light fixture which is hanging from the ceiling of this fifth-floor window. You can perceive the light bulb which is mounted in the middle of that light fixture. Mr. Go.tpsmiTH. In light of the presence of that light fixture in he fifth-floor window, is that the reason why the sixth-floor indow was studied under the technique? 406 Dr. Hunt. That is correct. Once we were able to perceive the enhanced detail within that fifth-floor window, we believed we were justified in using this technique in the open sixth-floor window as well. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Was the panel able to make a finding as to the presence of someone at the sixth-floor window? Dr. Hunt. Yes. The enhancement of the sixth-floor window shows there was no one at the window. Mr. GoLDsMITH. What type of enhancement work was done with the Powell slide? Dr. Hunt. The Powell slide, being a color slide, was enhanced by a computer contrast enhancement technique which would be very similar to the one I showed a previous exhibit on, yet it was done in color. We had a color film so we applied the contrast enhance-. ment in color. You can turn the colors inside out in some cases. | What was a very deep or black area has become a white area in the enhancement. The important point is the following. Again, looking within that window, you see no details of a human form or face. Mr. Go.tpsmiTu. I ask that Dr. Hunt be shown F-155, F-129, and F-161. While that is being done I would request that F-156 be admitted into the record. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this point. [Whereupon, exhibit F-156 was received. ] 407 iy : ’“ail EEEEE EEegapE ‘a ~ oh : ‘ he A hs ‘ 4 Nh hd antl g JFK Exuisir F-404 Mr. GeNnzMAN. Mr. Witt, can you identify the photographs on JFK exhibit F-130 on the left? Mr. Wirt. Can I identify them in what—— Mr. GENZMAN. Can you identify for instance the two pictures of the man in the top two photographs of that exhibit, with the arrows pointing? Mr. Wirt. Yes. That seems to be me. Mr. GENZMAN. In the bottom left corner there is an item in red. ‘Can you identify that? Mr. Wirt. That would be the umbrella. Mr. Genzman. In the bottom right corner can you identify the person sitting? Mr. Wirt. I am sure that is me. I would have to say that is me. Mr. Genzman. In the other exhibit, which is JFK F-404, can you identify either of those men sitting? Mr. Wirt. Yes. The one on the right is definitely me. Mr. GENzMAN. Is the one on the left the man whom you were ‘talking about earlier? Mr. Wirt. I really don’t know. It could be or it might not be. I ‘really don’t know. I don’t recall ever actually looking at this ‘person. I don’t know if I ever replied to what he said. I could have, | 436 just kind of speaking automatically, maybe agreeing with what he said or something like this. 7 Mr. GENZMAN. Did this man have a walkie-talkie, or a radio, or any device of any sort? Mr. Wirt. I don’t recall the person carrying anything, although I would say this, that they could have been carrying something and it would not have registered on me at this particular time. Mr. GENZMAN. Did he act in any peculiar manner? Mr. Wirt. Not that I recall. | Mr. GENZMAN. Did you ever see him before or after that day? Mr. Wirt. No. Mr. GENZMAN. What happened next, after you were seated and after you had heard these voices? Mr. Wirt. I continued to sit there for some period of time and I don’t know how long I was there. I don’t know if it was say a minute or 2 or 3 minutes or longer. I doubt if I stayed there very long. The only other thing that comes to my mind that I can definitely remember is while sitting there in all of this commotion going on around me, I just recall looking at my left and there was a policeman standing up there with a drawn gun. He was holding the barrel of the gun up in the air. Mr. GENZMAN. How long did you stay in the area? Mr. Wirt. There again, I really do not know as to the number of minutes. I am sure I did not stay there very long. | Mr. GENZMAN. When you left, did you go back to work? | Mr. Wirt. Yes. Mr. GENZMAN. When did you find out the President had in fact been assassinated? Mr. Wirt. When I went back into the building into the depart- ment where I worked. Someone in there had a transistor radio. The first thing that was said when I walked in, “Did you hear about the President being shot?” I said something to the effect of I was down there in all that. Mr. GENZMAN. Mr. Witt, some assassination critics have alleged your actions with your umbrella were a signal to an assassin or to | assassins to fire or a signal that the President had in fact been hit. | Were you signalling to anyone besides the President? Mr. Wirt. No; no one. Mr. GENZMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would ask the exhibit marked as JFK F-406 be entered into the record. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record. [The information follows:] \ Z on oR ‘ \ . ‘ \ My ‘ :‘ \‘ ‘ ’ ite) ve Flying Dreger Wy THE PIECE JFK Exuisit F-406 Mr. GENZMAN. I would like to correct that to exhibit 406. Chairman STOKES. It may be so corrected. Mr. GENZMAN. Mr. Witt, exhibit 406 is a copyrighted diagram drawn by assassinations critic Robert B. Cutler which shows two umbrellas with rocket and flechette attachments. Mr. Witt, do you know what a flechette is? Mr. Wirt. I do now. I did not prior to our interview yesterday evening. Mr. GENZMAN. Did the umbrella in your possession on November 22, 1968, contain a flechette, or a rocket or a dart? Mr. Wirt. No, it did not. Mr. GENZMAN. Has exhibit 405, the umbrella, ever contained a flechette, rocket, or dart? Mr. Wirr. No. Not since it’s been in my possession. Mr. GENZMAN. Did the umbrella in your possession on November 22, 1963, contain a gun or weapon of any sort? 438 Mr. Wirt. No. Mr. GENZMAN. Has exhibit 405 ever contained a gun or weapon of any sort? Mr. Wirt. This umbrella? Mr. GENZMAN. Yes. Mr. Wirt. No. Mr. GENZMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Witt. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. Chairman Stokes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy, for whatever time he may consume. Mr. Fauntroy. Will you tell us where you lived November 22, 1963? Mr. Witt. My home address? Mr. FauntTRoy. Yes. Mr. Wirt. 7209 Embassy Street. I still live there. Mr. Fauntroy. And where did you work at that time? Mr. Wirt. I was working for the Rio Grande National Life Insur- ance Co. They were located at 51 Northview Street, at the corner of Elm and Beal. Mr. Fauntroy. Do you still work there? Mr. Wirt. No, sir; that company merged with a company in Kentucky in 1968, and that is when I left the insurance company. Mr. Fauntroy. Do you recall what kind of day it was on the 22nd in terms of its—the weather in the morning when you woke, when you got up at home? Mr. Wirt. I don’t recall the early part of the day. I only know what the weather was around the noontime area. Mr. Fauntroy. I see. Did you keep your umbrella at home or did you keep your umbrella at work? Mr. Wirt. I don’t—the umbrella could have been either place. I tried to keep an umbrella in the car, or it would either be at work. Unfortunately it always seemed if I was in the car in the parking lot and it was raining the umbrella was at work. And I never seemed to have it at the right time. That morning I don’t know if I took it from the car to work or if it was already at my place of employment. Mr. Fauntroy. Now, when you left—so you don’t know whether you took the umbrella from home to work and thence to the Ae or whether the umbrella was at work. You don’t recall that: Mr. Wirt. I don’t recall; no, sir. Mr. Fauntroy. All right. Now, when you left—let’s assume that it was at work. When you left for lunch, is it your testimony that it was your intent to utilize the umbrella to heckle the President? Mr. Witt. Yes; that is true. That was the only reason I was carrying it. sate FauntTROY. So that you weren’t just going for a walk at unch? Mr. Wirt. Well, I did go out for a walk every day. Mr. Fauntroy. I see. Mr. Wirt. Every day that the weather was not extreme, either raining or excessively hot. This day I took the umbrella along and 439 going out, if it was handy for me to do my little act of heckling, ‘then that was my plan, yes. _ Mr. Fauntroy. So it was your intent to use the umbrella if you happened to be on the route that the President was traveling during that day? Mr. Wirt. That is correct. Min FAuNTROY. But you did not know exactly what that route was: Mr. Wirt. I knew in general because all of the parades and this type of thing usually went down Main Street. Mr. Fauntroy. I wonder if you would care to tell us a little more about your understanding of the significance of the umbrella, and py: you felt that it would heckle the President to raise the um- rella? Mr. Wirt. I know the generalities of the thing. It had something to do with the—when the senior Mr. Kennedy was Ambassador to England, and the Prime Minister, some activity they had had in appeasing Hitler. The umbrella that the Prime Minister of Eng- land came back with got to be a symbol in some manner with the British people. By association, it got transferred to the Kennedy family, and, as I understood, it was a sore spot with the Kennedy family, like I said, in coffee break conversations someone had men- tioned, I think it is one of the towns in Arizona, it is Tucson or Phoenix, that someone had been out at the airport or some place where some members of the Kennedy family came through and they were rather irritated by the fact that they were brandishing the umbrellas. This is how the idea sort of got stuck in my mind. Mr. Fauntroy. Is it true that what you felt was that Mr. Kenne- dy would be sensitive because of the appeasement image of the umbrella as related to his father? Mr. Wirt. Not the appeasement thing. It was just—excuse me—I just understood that it was sort of a sore spot with them and this was just one thing. I personally never thought too much of liberal politics in general. In this case the Kennedy family just happened to be in office. Mr. Fauntroy. I see. And it had no relationship in your own thinking between Mr. Kennedy’s posture with; say, the Russians? Mr. Wirt. No. No. No. That was not it at all. Mr. FAuntTroy. But someone had—no—you had read in the paper that someone had used an umbrella to heckle the President nd that it was a sore spot, and that was the reason—— Mr. Wirt. Not read in the papers. Mr. FauntrROy. Someone told you? Mr. Wirt. Yes. This was in a conversation somewhere at work. I ish that I could remember now who brought the subject up and out this idea in my head. I am sure that I would have taken that mbrella and clouted him over the head somewhere in this last 2 or 3 weeks. Mr. Fauntroy. OK. Now, Mr. Witt, I wonder if you would again how us what happened, what you did? As I understand your testimony, you found your way into Dealey laza because there were not many people there, and you thought you would have an opportunity to in fact see the President and 9erhaps even heckle him. 440 Now, do you recall seeing tne motorcade approach Dealey Plaza? Mr. Witt. Yes. As a matter of fact, it was only—it was traveling west at the time I saw it. Mr. Fauntroy. All right. Now, where were you at that time? Mr. Wirt. I was sitting somewhere in the grassy area there in Dealey Plaza. Mr. Fauntroy. All right. May we suspend for just a moment? [Discussion off the record.| Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the brief interlude here. Mr. Witt, I was—as we suspended momentarily, I was asking you to recall the turning of the motorcade, and the car in which Presi- dent Kennedy sat, into Dealey Plaza. Can you recall that? Mr. Wirt. Yes, sir. Mr. Fauntroy. And you at that time, you were telling me, were sitting down probably on the grassy knoll? - ‘Mr. Wirt. Yes, sir; that is correct. Mr. Fauntroy. Now, describe to us what happened and what you did when the car turned into the Dealey Plaza? Mr. Wirt. Well, after I became aware of its presence, I got up and took the umbrella and started walking toward the street and opening the umbrella at the same time. Mr. Fauntroy. So that to the best of your recollection you—as you approached the sidewalk, you were opening the umbrella? Mr. Wirt. Yes, sir; that is correct. Mr. Fauntroy. All right. And the car is now passing and you— describe to us what happened. Mr. Wirt. Well, as I was moving forward opening this umbrella, it was somewhere at—excuse me—it was somewhere at this point that I heard the shots, and I continued to move forward and eventually brought the umbrella up over my head. I think by this time I had already—by the time I got the umbrella up over my head, I was at the retaining wall and standing on it. Mr. Fauntroy. All right. Now, the car is moving beyond you now. Are you aware that the President has been hit at this point— after you hear these firecracker-like shots? ~ Mr. Wirt. No, sir. I—my view of the car during that length of time was blocked by the umbrella being open. And my—the next time I saw the car after I saw it coming down on my left traveling west, the next time I saw the car was when this activity of the car stopping, one car rushing up on another, the motorcycle patrolman stopping, there was this screeching of tires, this sort of thing. One thing I recall there was a movement in the President’s car. By this time—I don’t recall seeing the President. He must have—I am sure he was down. The only thing I recall was the—there was a sort of a pink movement, and it was—that was Jackie Kennedy, I think, wearing a pink dress or something. This pink thing stood out in my mind, and all of this happened in very rapid order. The—as soon as the one car ran up behind this one, a man jumped off and I think the Hae car was pulling out about the time he had jumped on the ack. Mr. FauntrRoy. Your testimony is that you then sat down where you are pictured there? 44] Mr. Wirt. Yes, sir. Mr. Fauntroy. In the exhibit? Mr. Wirt. At this point I was aware that something terrible had happened. Mr. FauNntTrRoy. Something terrible had happened? Mr. Wirt. Yes. At the time that I was moving forward with this umbrella in front of me, I was not aware of what was happening, even though I had heard the shots, until the movement, all this activity with the cars. That was my first awareness, and it was at this point that I just sat down. Mr. Fauntroy. And as you sat, you recall that—two things. One, that you recall seeing a couple covering their children, you say, off to the side? Mr. Wirt. Yes, off to my right. Mr. Fauntroy. And you recall the presence of someone sitting beside you, is that true? Mr. Witt. That is correct. Mr. FauntrRoy. Any someone from behind you saying something? Mr. Wirt. Yes. I don’t know which of these came first, but the eon sitting to my right said something to the effect that “They done shot them folks,” something like that. I think it was repeated about two or three times. It was repetitious. I don’t know if they meant to be talking to me, or if they were just talking out loud to themselves. | As I testified before, I don’t think I ever actually looked directly at this person. I don’t recall ever, say, just turning and taking a good look at the person. I think what I was doing, I was—at this point I was somewhat stunned, and I just heard this while sitting there. At about this same time—I don’t know if it was before I heard this or after— about this same time there was this female voice up behind me shrieking and saying, “They have shot those people. They shot those people.” I think she may have said “They shot those people before my eyes’ or something like this. There were a number of people—I sould hear crying in the background, this sort of thing. Mr. FAuNtTROY. So that your description of your emotions after sitting down would be that you were stunned. Is that true? eS Wirt. Yes. Once the realization—the realization that some- -hing—— Mr. Fauntroy. Terrible had happened? Mr. Witt. Had happened, yes, I was stunned. Mr. Fauntroy. I must admit that my reaction to the picture by hich you were ultimately identified was one of a very cool cat. [hat is, you look rather cool there to me. But you were—— Mr. Wirt. I can assure you I was not all that cool. I think one of ny reactions was knowing that I was there with this stupid um- mrella and heckling the President and—of course, I didn’t know that the President had been killed. As a matter of fact, I didn’t snow he had been shot. I just knew that something had happened »y the activity and what seemed to be in the air around me. But I think my own thinking may have been at the time that—I would have to describe it as a—kind of like a bad joke that had 442 gone sour, or a practical joke you pulled on someone that had gone sour, since I was there with this thing, and for that purpose. Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Witt, is it your testimony that at no time did the Dallas police or the FBI contact you about your presence at Dealey Court Plaza at this time? Mr. Wirt. No. In later years—after all this came up, I have © always wondered why they didn’t, but no one ever—so far as I know, no one ever made any attempt to find out who I was or why I was there. ; Mr. Fauntroy. When did you find out that you were a subject of suspicion; that is, that the umbrella man was somehow involved in the assassination? Mr. Wirt. When the committee sent these things to the newspa- pers, and it was printed in the local papers, in the Dallas paper there. As a matter of fact, I didn’t see it on the day that it came out. We take the afternoon paper, the evening paper. I didn’t see it on the day that it came out. I saw it later, after I had taken the newspapers to work, because I wrapped small parts in it for ship- ping, and it was at this point that I saw the thing and read the thing, and was then aware that someone was looking for me, so to speak. Mr. Fauntroy. So that—is it your testimony that you did not learn that somebody was concerned about the umbrella man until 10 or 15 years after, until 1978—only in 1978 were you aware? Mr. Wirt. Well, as far as I know, no one was concerned with me. Mr. Fauntroy. So that explains, therefore, why you did not yourself contact the FBI or the police—Dallas Police Department, because you did not—you were not aware that someone with an umbrella in Dealey Plaza was an object of interest? Mr. Wirt. No. As a matter of fact, I wasn’t aware that I was an object of interest. As a matter of fact, I have found out since— within the last few weeks, that there have been countless numbers | of books and all sorts of controversies over this thing. But I drifted | along all of these years and I have never seen one of these books because I have never been a fan of this assassination thing. I don’t go out of my way to read anything about it. Se it sort of all has gone over my head up until the last few weeks. _ Mr. Fauntroy. Now, is it your testimony that you did in fact see this picture in the papers in July of this year? Mr. Wirt. I saw this picture right here, the blurred picture in the lower right-hand corner. Mr. Fauntroy. And did you recognize it as yourself? Mr. Wirt. After I read it, yes. Mr. Fauntroy. Why didn’t you come forward then? Mr. Wirt. Quite frankly I didn’t at this point—I certainly didn’t want anybody to know who I was. Mr. Fauntroy. Uh huh. Mr. Wirr. And I would say further that, had you never found me, | would have been far happier than I am right at this moment. Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Chairman, I will suspend at this time in the event there are other members who have questions for the witness. I should like to reserve just a little time. Chairman Sroxes. The Chair will protect the gentleman’s time. 443 Mr. Witness, the umbrella which lies before you on the witness table, did you bring it here today? Mr. Wirt. I brought it from Dallas and I turned it over to Mr. Genzman yesterday. Chairman Stokes. And has that umbrella been in your posses- sion from November 22, 1963, until today, Mr. Wirt. Yes; it has. Chairman Strokes. It has never left your possession for any reason—— Mr. Wirt. Well, I would have to—— Chairman Stokes. Other than here when you gave it to Mr. Genzman? Mr. Wirt. No. As a matter of fact, the day that I went back to work this umbrella was just tossed back on the rack where the raincoats and other umbrellas would have been. It could have been used by any number of people. There were quite a number of people who worked in this department, young boys who went out on errands, they could have taken this umbrella any number of times in or out. Chairman STokEs. OK. Now, I note that when Congressman Fauntroy was questioning you, it had been his intent to ask you to demonstrate the way in which you had held the umbrella on that specific date, but he was informed by counsel for the committee you had made a specific request that you not be asked to make such a demonstration; is that correct? Mr. Wirt. That is correct. Chairman SToKEs. OK. And is that still your request to this committee? Mr. Wirt. Yes, sir. I—my line of thinking is that since we are not in the same area, we couldn’t exactly duplicate what I did there. The only thing my doing that, it would just be more fodder for an overeager press back in Dallas to show this off and continue to embarrass me and my family, more so than we have already been embarrassed. Chairman STOKEs. Certainly. Mr. Wrrt. We—I would add at this point that we have been through quite a bit. I brought it on myself, but nevertheless, we have been through quite a bit already. - Chairman Stokes. Well, I certainly understand that, and I am _ sure this committee is going to respect your wishes in that respect. I have one concern though, and that is that if the committee does _ not cause the umbrella to be opened up, it may lend once again to more speculation that the reason we didn’t open it was because _ there was such a dart gun in it. For that reason I am not going to ask you to do it, but I think that it is important that committee _ staff open this umbrella so we can ascertain there is no dart gun in it. Mr. Wirt. As far as I am concerned, they are certainly welcome Chairman Stoxss. All right. Can we have someone from the staff do that? Miss Cynthia Cooper of the committee staff. 444 Maybe you ought to turn that way with it [indicating toward press and cameras]. [Laughter. ] [Photograph depicts what occurred when Miss Cynthia Cooper opened umbrella.] Chairman STOKES. I guess there is no gun in it. Thank you very much. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. Mr. Devine. Mr. Witt, we understand your reluctance to be here. We appreciate very much your coming forward. Just for the record, would you tell the committee what you did when you saw your picture in the paper? To whom did you report, or what did you do? Mr. Wirt. When I saw the picture? Mr. DEVINE. Yes. Mr. Wirt. I didn’t do anything at that time. I was working at the time I saw it and was aware that I was wanted for questioning by this committee. I didn’t do anything. I didn’t make any effort to contact this committee or anyone else. I just did nothing. Mr. Devine. How did you become revealed publicly as the person with the umbrella? Mr. Witt. As I understand it, one of my good friends went to the press. As a matter of fact, a couple of guys—reporters—came to where I work and started barraging me with questions, and I knew it was just a matter of time until they would have my name in the paper and then it would be known. For me it was just a matter of waiting until somebody came along and said, “I want to talk to you. Mr. DevINE. Getting back to the time and the place. I think in your original testimony in response to a question from counsel you said you heard a shot or something when you were sitting or standing there by the grassy knoll. Could you tell where this 445 disturbance or this shot came from in relation to where you were standing? Mr. Wirt. No, sir, really couldn’t. Of course, there were a number of shots and they all seemed to be just rapid—just very close spaced. As to the direction, I couldn’t say. Mr. Devine. You do not know, you cannot recall from what direction they may have come? Mr. Wirt. No, sir. I am sorry, I can’t be of any help there. Mr. DevINnE. We recognize it has been 15 years nearly. Can you tell this committee how many shots you thought you heard? Mr. Wirt. I really couldn’t say. Just remembering—I would have to say three or more. Mr. Devine. Three or more. Were they in rapid succession? Mr. Wirt. Very. As I recall, very rapid. Mr. DEvINE. Unless you have some objection, would you demon- strate by rapping your knuckle on the table about the time inter- val you feel you remember the shots were fired. Mr. Wirt. I don’t know if I could really give you a good example, but it was just [witness wraps three times rapidly on table]. Mr. Devine. As I recall, when the President’s motorcade was moving toward you, you were standing. Did you run the umbrella up and down as a symbol of Neville Chamberlain or did you just hold it up or did you point it in his direction? What did you do, specifically? Mr. Wirt. I really don’t recall. I could have moved the umbrella up and down but I just don’t recall. Mr. Devine. Then when the disturbance occurred and the Presi- dential motorcade moved out, you sat down? Mr. Wirt. Yes, sir. Mr. Devine. And there was someone beside you as indicated by that lower right-hand picture? Mr. Wirt. Yes. I still don’t know if they were sitting there when I sat down or if they moved to that point later. I don’t remember. Mr. DevINE. Did you say you saw people running then, after you were seated? Mr. Wirt. No; at one point the person that I mentioned before as running was a man who jumped off the second car and ran and jumped on the President’s car. Mr. Devine. I am talking primarily about spectators. Was there any movement among the spectators that you noticed? Mr. Witt. Not as I recall spectators. There were people who seemed to run up from the street to that grassy knoll, but some- where along the way I heard these were Secret Servicemen or plainclothesmen. Mr. Devine. When you say running up the grassy knoll, you mean in the direction away from the President’s car? Mr. Witt. Away from the street, and it would be up to the side of that schoolbook depository building. Mr. DeEviINE. You mentioned you saw a police officer with a revolver, or a handgun, in a raised position? Mr. Wirt. This was after some time had elapsed. Mr. Devine. Are you talking about seconds or minutes? 41-373 O - 79 - 29 446 Mr. Wirt. More in minutes. This was after I had sat down. As a matter of fact, it was somewhere about the point where I guess I was getting ready to leave. Mr. Devine. After the motorcade moved out and the crowd was milling around you, you just casually went back to your place of employment? Mr. Wirt. I don’t know if casually describes it. I did pick up the umbrella and go back to the building where I worked. One end of the building was on Elm Street. Mr. DEvINE. That is the first time you learned the President had been shot? Mr. Wirt. After I got back in the building, yes. Mr. DEVINE. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. Mr. Forp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to be very brief. Mr. Witt, in light of what Mr. Fauntroy and the chairman have mentioned to you earlier, I would like to know if for the last 15 years you have kept that umbrella at your home and your business place or some other place? Mr. Witt. Yes. Mr. Forp. You know, just looking at it, even though I know it flapped over when the young lady opened it up a minute ago, that umbrella is in pretty good shape, wouldn’t you say? Mr. Wirt. I suppose. Mr. Forp. Other than flipping on the wrong side. You can buy a new one and it will flip over. Why did you keep it 15 years? Did you have any reason for keeping that umbrella that long? Mr. Wirr. Not particularly. The only thing that the umbrella survived that long—like I say, this was in use because it was thrown in there with all the others—the only reason I can figure out it lasted this long is because of the size. You take this thing out and it’s big and it’s clumsy, whereas I had other umbrellas and would wear a raincoat and wouldn’t use this one. Mr. Forp. How many others do you have? Mr. Wirt. I have no idea. Over the years I have no idea. Mr. Forp. Do you think you could have picked up the wrong one and brought it here from Dallas? Mr. Wirt. It is quite possible. The only reason I believe with almost 100 percent that is the very same umbrella is the fact that it’s a big umbrella, and I am almost positive that is the one. Mr. Forp. You said some of the other office people used the umbrella when you carried it to your job. Could they have walked out with your umbrella and brought this one back, a completely different umbrella from the one you used on the day John Kenne- dy was assassinated? Mr. Wirt. That is entirely possible, but I really don’t think that happened. _ Mr. Forp. In your house there are two, three, or four umbrellas; is that correct? Mr. Wirt. I wouldn’t know how many are there. There are some in the back closet. I usually have one in the car. The other day I stumbled over one in the garage. 447 Mr. Forp. You did not identify that one 15 years ago and say, “I am going to keep this umbrella here’’? Mr. Wirt. No; at that particular time I placed no significance on that umbrella. Mr. Forp. When this committee’s staff made contact with you, did you go to your closet and identify “This is the one I had on November 23, 1963”? Were you able to say that to yourself? Mr. Wirt. Yes; when Mr. Moriarity was at my house there in Dallas he asked me if I still had the umbrella. I said, “Yes, I have an umbrella that I believe is the exact same umbrella.” Mr. Forp. You didn’t have to look at the other umbrellas in your closet? Mr. Wirt. No; the other umbrellas I believe are little stubby things. Some of them may be folded up. Anyway, they are not big and clumsy like this thing. Mr. Forp. So you buy a lot of umbrellas; is that correct? Mr. Wirt. No; not particularly. I am 53 years old. You collect a lot of stuff in that period of time. Umbrellas are not a particular hobby of mine. It is just that over the years—although God knows, it may seem it is. Mr. Forp. My final question, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Witt, what do you think an umbrella, is used for? Is it used to keep the sun off you, the rain, or just to carry along with you to match a topcoat or something? Mr. Wirt. Well, an umbrella sure can be used for many things. I am sure you would use it to keep the rain off, keep the sun off, and in this case you can ‘use it to—as I did for that purpose that I named. Mr. Forp. Why are you using it today? Why did you come to Washington today with the umbrella? For what purpose? Mr. Wirt. Why did I? Mr. Forp. Yes. Mr. Wirt. Because I was subpenaed. Mr. Forp. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time. Chairman SToKEs. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. Firuian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, for the record, I would like to ask permission of the Chair to write a two-page historical memorandum on the tenure of Ambassador Kennedy in England and the Neville Cham- berlain episode. I am afraid perhaps some might not get the clear significance of the umbrella as the symbol. Ambassador Kennedy took a rather merciless treatment subsequent to his placing his own belief in Neville Chamberlain’s policies. These of course came in great disrepute after Winston Churchill became Prime Minister and after the Munich Conference broke down. I think it might be helpful if at this point in the record we had a somewhat clearer historical explanation than we have. I won’t burden you with it now but I would like permission to write such. Chairman Stokes. We would be happy to take advantage of the gentleman’s expertise in the area of history and have it for the benefit of the committee’s files. 448 Mr. FirHIANn. It is very hard 30 years hence to understand how much the symbol of Neville Chamberlain became associated with an umbrella. Mr. Witt, in 1963, you said you were a conservative and you did not care much for liberal policies and you didn’t care much for liberal politicians; is that correct? Mr. Wirt. Yes. Mr. Firn1an. Do you remember what groups or organizations you belonged to in 1963? Mr. Wirt. None. Mr. FiruHian. Not even any civic organizations or clubs? Mr. Wirt. At that time; no. Mr. Firn1an. Have you ever belonged to organizations such as the White Citizens Council or Ku Klux Klan? Mr. Wirt. No; I am just not a joiner of organizations in general. I am certainly not a joiner of organizations either to the left or the right. Mr. FirHiAn. I just wanted to make sure. I think Mr. Devine questioned on the shots but you really at this date, even thinking about it all this time trying to reconstruct it, as I am sure you must have many times, you can’t help the committee at all as to ener the direction the shots came from or the number of shots ired‘ Mr. Wirt. No; I really can’t. The only thing that I can recall is the rapid fire, their close spacing. Mr. FITHIAN. I have no further questions. | Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. Is anyone else seeking recognition? The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney. : Mr. McKinney. Mr. Witt, it is a pleasure to see you in person. I know it is not a pleasure for you to be here and I really don’t blame you, but I have been looking at that picture for so many years. It is a pleasure to see you in person. You did hear gunfire, correct, and you saw several shots in rapid succession? He Witt. No, sir. I really. can’t place them at any particular place. Mr. McKinney. You mentioned a policeman standing beside you on the grassy knoll with a gun, I guess sort of pointed up this way [indicating]. Did you notice anything more than normal activity of police or anyone running around looking for people or as if they were looking for people? Mr. Wirt. No. Not that I recall. Mr. McKinney. I never disagree with my colleagues on this committee, particularly the member from the District of Columbia, since I am one of his most ardent supporters. But I think you have a rather stunned look on your face in the picture in the lower right-hand corner. You are just sort of staring across the street. You testified, you didn’t even look at the guy next to you? Mr. Wirt. Yes. This is correct. One of the gentlemen up there described me as being very cool. I am afraid—— Mr. McKinney. I think your jaw is a little too low to look cool. Mr. Wirt. I was definitely stunned. This is why there are some things I don’t remember. The things that I do remember are the 449 things where there was repetition, the multiple shots, this person repeating themselves, the woman repeating herself. Naturally the activity of the cars, that sticks with me. If I said anything to the person sitting to my right, I don’t recall what it was. Mr. McKinney. One of the strange things about this assassina- tion is that a few people were right about the picket fence or the retaining wall, and the committee has had to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to find out what went on. They have made a lot of money out of a few words and we have spent a lot of money trying to figure out whether what they said is true or not. Did you notice anyone or anything going on by the picket fence or by the retaining wall in Dealey Plaza up at the top of the grassy knoll? Did you see anyone peering over the fence or jumping over the fence or chasing anyone, or did you hear or see anything from that particular area? Mr. Wirt. No, sir, I did not, because at no point was I ever facing that direction. Mr. McKInney. Since that area was quite close to you in com- parison to the book depository, do you feel in your own mind that if a shot had come from the grassy knoll picket fence retaining wall area, that you would have been aware of where that shot had come from? In general, you were not aware of where any of the shots came from but that area was quite close to you? Mr. Wirt. I don’t know if I would have been aware of a shot that would have come from the area that you mention or not. Mr. McKInney. It is an unfair question because it asks for an assumption. I am nota lawyer, so I am allowed to get away with that sort of thing. Did you notice the reaction or the movement, or anything else, of any of the other eyewitnesses across the street or around you? Mr. Wirt. No, sir, I did not. Mr. McKinney. In fact, you really didn’t turn around to look at the guy who sat down next to you? Mr. Witt. No, sir, I didn’t. Mr. McKinney. You stated earlier that you did not look at the picket fence or at the retaining wall. So obviously if I ask you, did you observe anyone behind them, it is a slight redundancy. But did - you observe anyone at any time wandering around that fence or PL apenere you opened the umbrella or before you left the grassy noll’ Mr. Wirt. No, I did not. The only time that I would have looked in that direction, if I even looked at all, would be when I was walking out into the middle of this grassy area. At no other time would I, because it would have been to either my back or my side. I really don’t know how it is laid out down there. The picket fence, I don’t even know where it is. Mr. McKinney. I really think this is very unfair for me to do this for you because I have trouble summarizing my own thoughts. But I would like to, if I could, summarize what I think you have said and, get you to agree with me or not. That is, you were sitting there waiting for the President to come by in an area where you were somewhat by yourself so that you could be noticed and so you could brandish the umbrella. As you opened the umbrella, your visibility of the scene was obstructed. When you held the umbrella 450 up, you became aware that something and something pretty bad, had happened. You had heard shots, you had seen a Secret Service man leap on the back of the other car, you had seen the pink blur of Mrs. Kennedy sort of scrambling on the back of the car. You closed the umbrella, sat down, dropped the umbrella on the sidewalk and realized that what had started out as a, quote, ‘‘joke,” somehow or other had turned into something that hadn’t worked, that was sour. Is that a pretty fair summary? Mr. Wirt. Yes; that is correct. I think that sums it up. Mr. McKinney. Mr. Witt, I thank you very much for coming. I know you are an extremely private person and that this has been an extremely painful situation for both you and your family, and I for one, who feels quite often that my privacy and my family’s privacy gets invaded for no good reason, sympathize with you and admire your willingness to answer questions that have been hang- ing around for 15 years. Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar. Mr. Epacar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I have been listening to Mr. McKinney’s conversation with you about your recollection, I am reminded of the fact that my wife just a few weeks ago witnessed a very tragic accident and her first impression or expression was of shock when she saw the accident occur. But after the shock subsided she had the presence to go and say to the policeman who eventually arrived that she would be willing to act as a witness, give whatever testimony she could about who was or was not involved and exactly how the accident occurred for purposes of later investigations. Did it ever occur to you, as someone who literally sat down in front of where the President was assassinated, that you might have a bit or piece of evidence that might be a contribution to the authorities looking into the death of President Kennedy? Mr. Wirt. I don’t really know if this ever occurred to me or not. Had it occurred to me, I seriously doubt that I would have gone forward to volunteer any information. Mr. Epcar. Were you frightened about the fact that you had deliberately set out to cause a scene or an embarrassment to the President? Mr. Wirt. Not frightened as such, but at that time there was a great deal of what I would have to describe as hysteria in the Dallas area about the President being killed. It could have been extremely unwise for me to have volunteered and become known at that time. It could have been dangerous to me or my family. Mr. Epcar. In what way would it have been dangerous to you or your family? Mr. Wirt. Well, you would have had to have lived in the city to be aware of how things were then, in that everyone—I really wouldn’t know how to describe it. I really don’t know, but never- theless I would say that I would not have made it known. Mr. Epcar. Were you afraid to go privately to the Dallas Police Department and share the information of what you saw with a police officer in the privacy of a room at the police station? Mr. Wirr. I really don’t know. I really think if I had any real thought on this—and I can’t recall one way or the other—it would 451 be my guess that my line of thinking was I really had nothing to offer other than just having done a foolish thing. Mr. Epcar. Were you concerned about the foolishness of your act or vfs you concerned about the retribution that might come to you: Mr. Wirt. I don’t know what my line of thinking was. But I think it would have been both. Mr. Epacar. I appreciate the fact that you have come forward now in response to the picture that we have shown. It is difficult many years later to piece together all of what happened in Dealey Plaza. You do have a contribution to make, as has been exhibited by your presence here today. I hope that others who may see various events like this stop and think about making a contribu- tion by notifying whatever authorities are there of what they see even if it isn’t very important to them or if it looks insignificant to them. It may play a part in unraveling a very complicated story. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SToKEs. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. Sawyer. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to request that when the gentleman from Indiana submits his historical analysis of the attribution of the umbrella as a symbol of Neville Chamberlain and the senior Mr. Joseph Kennedy, who was then Ambassador to the Court of St. James, I be allowed to submit one page on the subject of Scotch. Mr. FirHiAn. If the gentleman would yield, I meant to say for the benefit of the witness more than anyone else the sensitivity of the late Kennedy on this point stems not only because of the close family relationship but because he was secretary to his father the ambassador during a part of that tenure, and I think it was all the more kind of a personal thing, and he went on, of course, to write the award-winning thesis at Harvard entitled ‘While England Slept,” and a lot of people believe that was again sort of his own trying to wrestle with this bad taste that was left in the mouth of the American people because of Ambassador Kennedy’s interpreta- tion of the German-British pact at Munich. Mr. Sawyer. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Fauntroy. I have one more question for Mr. Witt: You have indicated that you have learned over these years now that the umbrella man was considered a factor; that even someone has suggested the umbrella was a gun and that it may have been a signal. You may want also to know and, therefore, to help us, that the person sitting beside you has been alleged to have been a Cuban and that other pictures taken in the plaza suggested that he may have been talking on a two-way radio while he was sitting beside you. It would have been of great interest to us to identify who that person sitting beside you was. For that reason I simply ask, is there anything that you can recall about the person that would enable us to find him, even as we found you, because your story sounds plausible? Mr. Wirt. I wish that I could give you more information, but I am sorry I can’t. Now, as for him talking on a—— 452 Mr. FauntrRoy. Two-way radio. Mr. Witt. Two-way radio, while sitting beside me, I feel sure that I would have been aware of that even though I was stunned and I don’t recall ever looking directly at the man, but I believe that anyone who was sitting that close, as the picture shows him, I feel sure that I would have known if they were holding—because those walkie-talkie things are fairly large, they are certainly bigger than a person’s hand. I feel like I would have remembered that. I can’t say with 100 percent certainty that I would have remembered that, but somehow I just feel like I would have. One thing—there are two things in having been shown these pictures where my memory was different from what the pictures showed. No. 1, the couple that was covering the children, I remem- ber them as being up close to me, as being fairly close, because I saw them doing this, and in later years I have thought how ridicu- lous it was of me standing up with gunfire going on, and standing there like a tourist, and here these people had the presence of mind to cover these children. The other thing is in’ my memory I don’t remember a person sitting that close to me. The person that I remember as saying what he did and repeating it a number of times, I don’t remember having been that close. I don’t know if these pictures are taken at an angle that makes it look like that or if my memory is playing tricks on me. | Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Strokes. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just one question for the purpose of the record, Mr. Witt. This appears to have been somewhat of an impulsive act on your part. Is there anything in your history that you have been a demonstrator or picket or engaged in symbolic acts in the past, or is this a single incident in your life that you wish had never happened? Mr. Wirt. Never before. This is the only time. True, I wish it had never happened. I am not a person who wishes to bring himself into notice, and I think this very fact is what put me down there in this area, in this street I went down. There were all those people. Had I broke out this big oversize umbrella, there would have been people standing on either side of me and probably questioning what the heck was I doing. By continuing my little walk, I do not know how long I continued to maintain the idea I was going to do this, but I have the feeling when I was headed back in the direction of where I work, that I saw this area down there and an open space where there were not all this many people around. So I would think it would be my particular personality of not wanting to be questioned by people or putting on a show in front of people that led me into that particu- lar location. _Mr. Devine. For the record, this is the first and probably the last time you have engaged in a demonstration such as this? Mr. Wirt. Indeed; the first and the last. Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Stokes. Mr. Witt, I would just like to say what is probably equally tragic with the event which occurred on that date 453 has been the rumors and theories which have grown up around such a tragic event in our history. Indeed, one of the reasons this particular committee was constituted by the House of Representa- tives is so that we might once and for all investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of President Kennedy ae report to the American people the true facts as we have found them. It is in that respect that even though this has been perhaps an unfortunate event for you, one that has caused you and your family some concern and indeed some embarrassment, I want to say that I think you have performed for the American people a real service today, by coming forth and dispelling another one of the rumors which have for now some 15 years caused great uneasi- ness in the American people. Indeed, over the years many people have profited in continuing to form rumors around one of the most tragic events in our history. Additionally, since it has been in a rather somber vein, you have been a very candid witness and one who has lent some degree of levity to our proceeding to give us some relief from this. I indeed applaud you for coming forth and giving us your testimony today. Additionally I would extend to you 5 minutes for any comments you may wish to make, to which you are entitled under our rules. Mr. Wirt. I do not think I have any comment. I cannot really think of anything else that I could offer the committee which would be of any help to them. If I could, I certainly would. I would like to thank everyone for their courtesy. The only two people I have had direct dealings with was Mr. Moriarty who interviewed me in Dallas, and Mr. Genzman, who interviewed me last night. Both of these men have been very thorough, I would say, in their questioning, very businesslike, but at all times very courteous, and I do appreciate that. The only other thing that I would care to say is that I think if the Guinness Book of World Records had a category for people who were at the wrong place at the wrong time, doing the wrong thing, I would be No. 1 in that position, without even a close runner-up. Chairman Strokes. Thank you very much, Mr. Witt. You are excused now, sir. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. Mr. BLAKEy. A widely held belief that has been fostered by some of the critics is that the death rate of individuals connected in some way to the assassination has been improbably high. The editor of a weekly newspaper in Midlothian, Tex., Penn Jones, started it all by publishing his mysterious death theory in a book, “Forgive My Grief’, in 1966. Jones assembled details of the deaths and of the connections of the deceased to the assassina- tion—an attorney for Jack Ruby, Oswald’s landlady, newsmen who had covered the assassination, a noted columnist who had inter- viewed Ruby, and so on. Other critics picked up on Jones’ thesis. In Accessories After the Fact, Sylvia Meagher writes: Viewed subjectively, the witnesses appear to be dying like flies. But an authorita- tive opinion on the mortality rate of those involved directly or marginally in the assassination and attendant events remains to be rendered by some actuarial 454 expert. It may be that the deaths are within the normal rates, despite the appear- ance of an epidemic, or it may be that they are radically out of line. Mr. Chairman, Jacqueline Hess, the committee’s chief of re- search for the Kennedy assassination investigation, has been in charge of the mysterious deaths project. Her report, on which she is prepared to testify today, contains the findings of the project. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Ms. Hess. Chairman STOKEs. The committee calls Miss Hess. Stand and raise your right hand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? TESTIMONY OF JACQUELINE HESS Ms. Hess. I do. Chairman Stokgs. Thank you. You may be seated. Ms. Hess. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. The issue of mysterious deaths, that is, that a statistically improbable number of individuals with some direct or peripheral association with the Kennedy assassination died as a result of that assassination, there- by raising the specter of conspiracy, was first brought to national attention as the result of a promotional campaign for the movie “Executive Action” which was based on Mark Lane’s novel, “Rush to Judgment.” Mr. Chairman, I would direct your attention to JFK exhibit F-544 and ask that it be admitted into the record at this time. Chairman STOKES. Without objection. [The information follows:] 455 JFK Exnuisit F-544 An Edward Lewis Production EXECUTIVE ACTION FACTS BEHIND THE MAKING OF THIS FILM Introduction ‘EXECUTIVE ACTION?” is a film of fiction—based on fact. This does not purport to be a definite docunient on the assassination Ten years ago—on Friday, November 22, 1963, at 12:30 P.M.— of JFK. It is solely a bibliography for the film which deals with only President John F. Kennedy rode in an open limousine through the limited aspects of the event. streets of Dallas. At a place known as Dealey Plaza, he was shot to death. The dialogues in the film are, for the most part, fictional. However, This event, which abruptly and severely altered the course of history, substantial portions are based upon the documented material. has been the source of intense and continuing controversy. The haunt- ing questions still remain. “Who did it?” “Why did they do it?” “How References to the Warren Commission Report (WCR) its testimony was it done?” and exhibits, will be made by citing the number of the Volume (there are 26 in all) and the page number. For example, 19H102 would refer The official answers have never satisfied a majority among us. A to Volume 19 of the Hearings’ published record, page 102. Gallup Poll on the Warren Report asked, “Do you think one man alone was responsible for the assassination of President Kennedy or do you Further citations will use Commission Exhibit numbers (for example, think others were involved?” CE 399) or Commission Document numbers (e.g. CD 7). Many of 64% of those polled believed that others were involved. these documents are available in the Archives. Some are still classified. Only declassified evidence available to the public will be cited in these This film dramatizes the story of how a conspiracy to assassinate pages. . President Kennedy could have taken place. This bagkground material came from many sources. Exhibits and Additional source materials cited are available in public libraries and newspaper files. testimony gathered by the Warren Commission, the FBI, the CIA, the State Department, the Secret Service, the Dallas Police Department and Scenes in the motion picture based on historical facts are noted. Other Sheriff's office. Newspaper and magazine articles. Radio and television scenes taken from actual films of events are noted as ‘matters of his- tapes. Evidence uncovered by private investigators. torical record.’ PRESIDENT JOHNSON | DOUBTS WARREN REPORT CONCLUSION JFK’S ADMINISTRATION David Wise, author of The Politics Of President Kennedy's administration was Lying made the following eerie regarded as a strong contendet for re- “Three interviews were filmed for CBS Sore in 1964, His intention to review at the LBJ ranch in Texas in September Oil Depletion tax allowance and October, 1969, When the third John- eae to reduce it, his opposition to certain son intérview was shown on May 2, 1970, mergers under the anti-trust act, his inten- it included this message about thirty sec- tion to shut down domestic military bases onds into the program: “Certain material and some overseas, his support of the has been deleted from this broudcast at Black Movement, his support of a Nuclear President Johnson's request, mr te on the ‘Test-Ban Treaty and subsequent establish- grounds of national security.’ During the ment thereof, and his intention to remove filming of the interview Johnson had ex- all U.S. forces from Vietnam are all mat- pressed some misgivings about the Warren ters of historical record.(3) Commission's central finding that Lee Harvey Oswald, acting alone, had killed President Kennedy. Johnson indicated to Cronkite that he stiretained some doubts PREVIOUS and that, possibly, a conspiracy had been ASSASSINATIONS involved. Discussion of previous assassinations Later Johnson apparently thought the and attempted assassinations of President's better of these remarks, but he did not ask Lincoln, Garfield, McKinley, Theodore to delete them until several weeks had and Franklin Roosevelt, are all a matter gone by. Cronkite, backed by Richard S$. of historical record, Salant, president of CBS News, opposed the deletion, arguing that the request had come too late, But they were overruled, PROTECTION OF possibly by CBS president Frank Stanton Cronkite, a newsman of great integrity PRESIDENT AND OTHER| and high professional standards, had been HEADS OF STATE unhappy from the start with Johnson's Reference is made to the protection of right to edit the tapes. In this case he felt President de Gaulle durmg his motor- that Johnson was misusing his nght to cadey. These details are true as described make deletions, since it was difficult to see by the Director of the French Secret Serv- how, six years after the assassination, any ice.{4) The conditions of protection dur- ‘national security’ was involved."( 1) ing the motorcade of President Kennedy Leo Janos, former aide to President in Dallas on November 22, 1963 are indi- Johnson, now a correspondent for Time cated by the records of the U.S, Secret Magazine, said that Johnson told him in Service for that trip(5) and observed as a conversation at the LBJ ranch a few vastly less secure than with the de Gaulle months before he died, “I never believed motorcade from the tograph supplied Oswald acted alone.”(2) by the French Secret Service (right) when compared with the precautions and escorts PRESIDENT KENNEDY as seen in the photograph of James Alt- ARRIVES AT EL PASO, gens, Associated Press, of the Presidential motorcade in Dallas. THE PRESIDENT GOES TEXAS TO TEXAS President Kennedy's arrival at El Paso THE “INTELLIGENCE” President Kennedy was extremely re- Airport June $, 1963 is a matter of his- torical record. COMMUNITY luctant to go to Texas but was convinced The mood of the Central Intelligence he bad to go in order to mend warring Agency after the Bay of Pigs flasco was political factions within his own party, THE MEN OF THE bitter and, according to Roger Hilsman, namely Governor Connally and Senator suspended were and the second time tor curs- VIRGINIA “GROUP” Assistant Secretary of State, the President caused many changes to take place in- Yarborough, or risk losing the State in the 1964 elections(8). Kennedy went over ing at an officer.( 15) F The characters of the group of men who cluding the resignations of the Director He later * dis- the objectionsof his closest advisers. Con- assemble tn a Virginia Mansion ure ficti- and (he Assistant Director of the CIA.(6) nally disputed these accounts in an article, tious, their personalities and professions The characterization of the spy world is Stating he objected to the trip(9), in no way based upon actual living per- described according to the disclosures of wrote onSeptember 3,1959 saying he had sons. Portions of their dialogue are based former intelligence agents and others, (7) been treating Mrs. 5, 1959.(17) JFK MOTORCADE AND APPEARANCE AT is passport shorty. on September 10, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 4959. “pe IN WASHINGTON that he A matter of historical record. (410) sia, with the State Department's approval (20) Analysis of Oswald's financial situation LEE HARVEY OSWALD- shows no record of large savings and ¢sti- mates indicate he bad no more than $350 BACKGROUND at the time he sailed from New The descriptions of Lee Harvey Oswald are all supported by documents which were published in the record of the Hear- ings and Exhibits of the Warren Comnys- sion of $700.00,(22.) $100. Oswald arrived in Moscowon October Apart from the biographical data( 11) 16, 1959,(23) and upon being ordered itis significant that Oswald did have a to leave wrap bei attempted suicide “CONFIDENTIAL” security clearance by cutting and was taken to (42) and was authorized to handle Confi- Botkinskaya H: ra ema dential material while in the Marine Corps week later.(25) In an effort to remain in less than a year. He was sent to Atsugi, , the Japan where he had access to radar and bassy on October 31, and stated his deter- radio codes and also new MPS-16 height mination to remain =, and Rida d Wise,me aecs Of Lyinga ek (4) tees with reece? Andre Ducret Pierre — With Kennedy, p. 19 (14) 19H707, webaieeseex: dom [OUSE, 5} by Stephea Jaffe, June, 1968. g - (1S) 1911708, ee a @ Atlan M i) Tras-600, T7HSO1- 617, cb 3,cD Eve Lintotn., K & Johnson, (New York, Holt Rinehart & Winston, Ue aass posi (6) Roser Hilsman, To Move A Nation — (1968) p. 205. (8) IG ass (New York, eeeroes & Co. Inc. U.S. News &World Report 1/2/67 1967, p. 80). New York Times 1/8/67, p. | (20) these: cote D882, pid, eee Harper& how: 1965}. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The New York Times 1/9/67, p. ue Reger Hilsman, To Move A Nation, invisible Government. (New York, Ran- iste ange1/11/67, p *s Sve Mondeo, eeieorlee fter the ean York, Doubleday +ee Inc. dom House, Inc. 1964). Andrew. Tully, CiA—The inside Story (9) Life “Why eltahedWent to. Hie~ (Bobbs-Merritl € Inc., New. ae Texas” ty leh oedaily, 11/28/67. oy he ag ‘York, Fawoett Crest, 1962, p. 214). (10) F 10, 1963. reas) 107, p.7, p.41 (8) how Manchester, Death of A 12) CD 972, 19H ‘esther, acres ed Row. New Y. (8), passe CBM, << D6, 1967) p. P51 us 457 american Crtizensmip as well as turning macist, age 19. Six weeks later they were “Classified” information over to the Rus- to Washington, D.C. to meet with Rankin fadar operations that he had acquired i married and on February 15, 1962, their and Commission staffers. informed while in the Marine Corps., Oswald's new sians.(26) daughter, June Lee Oswald was born in _ Oswald's Marine Corps Commanding was issued 24 hours after | Minsk.¢36) dia ‘is a ation was filedin New Officer, Capt. John E. Donovan, testified Although he had writtento hi about the Classified information. He said, June 25, 1963.(53 & 54) that he would never leave Russia No review or consideration of denying “We received word he (LHO} had showed in Moscow. This necessitated a lot of $200 a month starting in September 1962 Oswald this was made despite p:eet of aircraft call signs, codes, radio Pea eed eso dee opal sci Soe the fact that he indicated on the applica- frequencies. He had the access to the loca- was aha my in the Texas tion that. his had been fon of all bases in the West Coast area, all Theater (on November 22, 1963)...” dieser ofCaghactel tettocrtin’ radio frequencies for all squadrons, num- ber and type of aircraft in a squadron, who A Secret Service the was the commanding officer, the authen- tication code of entering and existing the ADIZ, which stands for Air Defense Iden- tification Zone. (27) From October 31, 1959 until April 9, wrote a letter to the Soviet Embassy re- the Criminal Division of the Dallas questing visas for both himself and 1960 there were no U-2 flights over the approved. (39) voce pn of ‘ USSR. Francis Gary Powers, U-2 pilot Marina.(56) $63 Les te The U.S. Embassy gave Oswald a pass- ai + 1963, someone using On August 9, 1963, Harvey whose flight was shot down on May I, good only for the United States and 1960, strongly implies thar Oswald's the alias “A. i Hidell” mail-ordered a 38 wald, who was later to seek a visa to Cuba, him $435 for traveling expenses(40) Smith & Wesson pistol from Seaport was handing out “Fair Play For Cuba” knowledge thus transferred to the Russians the Oswalds passed through United may have resulted in the incident(28). leaflets on Canal Street in New Orleans. i mmigration on June 13, 1962, en (57) One CIA document explored Oswald's For Worth, Texas. (41) rt é The address on one of the leaflets listed pelle as the oftice for the “Fair Play For Cuba Traveler's Aid Society, Profes- $32 223 EE cadens Committee” was 544 Camp Orleans, Louisiana.{58) t, New had an extensive pre-assassina- Oswald's pro-Cuban FPCC organiza- tion dossier on Oswald (43). In fact, when hon was the target of criticism and Oswald Oswald wrote tothe U.S. Embassy re- Oswald was arrested in New Orleans, in- questing revocation ofhis citizenship.(31) & 3a 2 3 5 himself was to get into a fight that day for which he was arrested, The FBI learned that an anti-Castro organization, “The Cuban Revolutionary Council”, worked out of an office at 544 ature in Dallas,Texas. (51) Camp Street( 59) and that Guy Bannister, On a 24, 1963, Lee tne a former FBI agent, associated with anti- applied for a new passport in New Castro Cubans, had an office at 53) Lafa- Orleans (32) yette St., New Orleans(60) On January 5, 1960, Oswald was given Due to the FBI's misleading reports, the ere ene a Warren Commission never discovered 5,000 rubles and assigned to work at the The Attorney General of Texas, Wag- Belorussian Radio and Television Pactory that both addresses, 544 Camp Si, and goner Carr, telephoned them to report S31 Lafayette St., were for the same build- ip Minsk. (34) pass; a On January 8, 1960 Oswald was wel- ing on the corner of Camp and Lafayette effect that he wished to renounce his US. Streets, Oswald's FPCC office and Ban- comed by the Mayor of Minsk.(35) “undercover Citizenship and affirm his allegiance to the On March 17, 1960 Oswald met Marina nister’s office, thus, were in the same agent™ on the payroll of the FBL.(46) Soviet Union as well as offer them all in- building(61) Nikolaevyna Prussakova, a graduate phar- The two Texas officials were summoned formation he had in his possession on On August 16, 1963, Lee Harvey Os- wald hired two men at $2.00 per hour & piece to help him distribute the Fair Play For Cuba Committee literature. (62) Following this distribution of titerature Oswald appeared on radio and in televi- sron newsreel clips. The footage in the film ty taken from an actual interview with Oswald (63) When Ovwald was in jail, after his arrest on August 9th tor fighting with three anu- Castro Cubusns, he requested the FBI inter- view which was granted(64) FREEDOM MARCH ON WASHINGTON D.C.- AUGUST 28, 1963 250,000 Americans marched on Wash- ington and formed in [ront of the Lincoln Memorial on August 28, | 963 t hear the lamous speech (“1 have a dream ...") by by Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. After the gathering President Kennedy met with the leaders Of the march at the White House telling them, “This nation can properly be LL proud.” (65> TEST BAN TREATY WITH LET. USSR DEBATED President Kennedy made speeches during August, 1963 urging Con- several oon . . ~ F —a - gress to pass the Test Ban Treaty with the a0 peer of +! USSR Many authorities from the military and This building at 544 Camp Street in New Orleans housed the detective agency of scientific communities appeared before the Senate Committee considering the Treaty Guy Banister and the headquarters of Sergio Arcacha Smith's anti-Castro organization. in August to oppose, vehemently, Presi- dent Kennedy's words of support for the It was also the address given by Lee Harvey Oswald for his Fair Play for Cuba group. measure( 66) (26) 18H259. * (Oswald meets Marina); 1H9S, 2H73, 446) Ibid. (27) 8H297-298. (58) 26H783, p. 10. ISH138, 18H606, 22H748, 26H4 (Mar- (47) Ibid. (59) 22H820, FBI Report 11/25/63, by SA (28) Francis Gary Powers, Operation Over- fiage); 1H9S, 161567, 22H75S, 22H748 (48) CD 320, SS control number 767. flight (New York, Tower Books, Ernest C. Wall, Jr, New Orleans Bue (Birth of Oswald child). (49) I6HSI!, 22HI16, 26H700, WCR Pp. reau Office. _. Pp. 364). (37) CD 206, p. 336, CD 206, p. 352. 172-174, (60) Ibid. (29) CD No, 931, “Oswald's Access to In- (38) 22H62, 22485. (30) 7H295, 7H256, 17635, 17677, (61) Rosemary James and hack Wardiow, (39) 22H13, 22H115, 23H419, 25H806, WCR Pp. Piot or Politics’, Pelican Publishing (40) 22H47, 22H122, 24H335, 18H182, 118-122. Howse, New Orleans, 1967, p. 116, 26H4. (Si) 20HS11, 10H87-88, 22796. (photograph). (41) 22H204. (52) 22H12, 24HS09, 26H177 (62) 10H64, 21H139, (42) 26H5-8. (33) WCR, Chapter VII, Appendix XU and (63) August 21, New Orleans, La. WDSU- (43) CE 834 (FBI Dossier). Appendix XV, SH311. TV (44) 4H438, 10H56, 26H9S-99, (54) 24H509, (64) 26H95-99, WCR p. 407. 35) WCR p. 697, CD 1, p.51. (45) Geratd Ford, Portrait of the Assassin, {55) 19H283, WCR p. 710. (65) Arthur M, Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand ed cD i,a 51. {(Ballintine Books, New York, 1965, (56) 16H30. Days, p. 337. (36) 22H120, 22H748, 18H602, 23407 p. 16). (57) 26H348, 22H820, WCR pp. 728-729. (66) A matter of Historical record. 458 FIRST ANNOUNCEMENT UNREST IN SAIGON OF JFK’S PLANNED Amid riots, immolations. and terrorin Saigon, President Diem attempted to calm DALLAS VISIT | the agitated people. There were demon- On September 13, 1963 the Dallas strations, police attacks on Buddhist Times-Herald newspaper announced that priests, several of them were jailed, a President Kennedy would visit the city one immolated himself in protest.(83)— but made no detatis of the forthcoming ‘visit available other than the cities to be visited. On September 26, 1963 both Dallas “OSWALD” REQUESTS newspapers indicated that the President would visit the city on November 21 or RIFLE REPAIRS Two ladies, Mrs. Gertrude Hunter and Novenrber 222 (67). Mrs. Edith Whitworth testified that Os- wald, his wife and two daughters had OSWALD STARTS WORK come into the furniture storeof Mrs. Whitworth looking for a gunsmith, as a AT BOOK DEPOSITORY result of having seen a signin the window Lee Harvey Oswald started work at the Which said “Guns.” Mrs, Whitworth had Texas School Book Depository on October forgotten to remove the sign when a gun- 16, 1963, (68) smith, indeed, formerly worked there.( 84) “Oswald” said that his daughter had been born on October 20 and, according to the MOTORCADE ROUTE View of the Grassy Knoll Jafie testimony, wanted to repair the firing-pin or “plunger” of his rifle. He was carrying PLANNED FOR DALLAS an object I5 inches Jong. She directed LUNCHEON AT TRADE him to the Irving Sports (35) Mrs, Hunter corroborated Mrs. Whitworth’s MART - account of the incident, (86) President Kennedy's ibvancs Man” Gunsmith Dial Ryder worked at the was concerned with planning the trip and irving Sports Show.(87) He and the ‘his main objective was often to produce owner of the shop, Mr. Charles Greener, large crowds to denionstrate the popu- could not recall Oswald from his photo- larity of the President, (69) graph but they did have a repair ticket Jerzy Bruno, who was the White House with the name Oswald on it in their store. aide filling that position, was also con- The ticket had no date on it but they esti- cerned with security since his plans were mated the date tobe November 4ih to often those ultimately accepted and em- November 8th. They do not recall making ployed by the Secret Service.(70) the kind of repairs that from photographs Fhe most direct route through Dealey were made on the sight of the Mannlicher- Plaza was down Main Street, which was Carcano which was shogetry Oswald's the street the motorcade would already rifle. (88) = be faking through downtown Dallas, This An anonymous hing cailtoa television route enabied the motorcade to travelto newscaster beg Base“Oswald had had a the Trade Mart over boulevards(71) in- rifle sighted on Thursday, November 2}, stead of by the Stemmions Freeway, there- ata gun shop on 2/1 of 212 irving Boule- fore giving more people a chance to sev vard in Irving, “had led Detective F. M. the President and satisfying the objective Hg! to the gunshop of Mr. Greener. of Mr. Bruno by having more crowds { 3 along the streets to show the President's If this was Oswald it would mean that strength among ‘the people, The travel Marina Oswald committed perjury when time difference between the two routes “View from behind the fence on the Grassy Kroll she testified denying the entire incident was negligible. Tnitially there were two locations under But somehow or other that word never got through. We heard back from Texas OSWALD ATTENDS (90). lt would further suggest the culpa- bility, if not the complicity. on her part in consideration for the luncheon speech of the President, one was the Women’s Build- iat the Secret Service had GK." the STEVENSON UNITED a crime which Oswald planned to commit. had she knowingly accompanied him on ing. 2 “sprawling auditorium which could Trade Mast as acceptable from a security point of view,” Bruno said(74). NATIONS DAY SPEECH an expedition to repair 4 rifle. after the seat four thousasd.” Bruno states, and the On November 13, 1963 Bruno got the In contrast to Oswald's activities of the alleged attempts on General Walker and other was the Trade Mart which presented news from Kenny O'Donnell, the Prest- night before, he allegedly attended the’ Richard Nixon and her testimony that she Serious security risks in comparison, was dent's Special Assistant, that they would United Nations Day Speech on October threatened to turn Oswald in if he ever closed off and — not fit the desires of the let the Trade Mart be the site. Reluctantly, 24,1963 of Ambassador Stevenson where showed signs of repeating such adven- President. (72 O'Dennell told Bruno, “We're going to let Stevenson was actually struck by one of tures{91). If it wasn’t Oswald (who was “There — another point about the Dallas go, Ferry."(75) the picket signs carried by a demonstrator at work at the Texas School Book | Women's Building site that didn't seem and several others had to he forced to ftory all the afternoons of the month) important 10 anyone at the ume. If Ken- “it struck me at the time that this was one of the few fights like this i had lost. I leave by police(79). then the alternative is that someone was nedy had been going there instead of to impersonating Oswald, thereby incrimin- the Trade Mart, he would have been swas ne inner counselor to John Kennedy OCTOBER, 1963 or anything like that, but usually, if I ating him by linking him direetly fo ‘the traveling two blocks farther away from Agught hard enough, | could generally get : HiePrior totheassassination. the ‘Schoo! Book Depository — and ata much faster rate of speed. At that speed my way aboin what sites he would do best “VIETNAM TROOP PULL- and distance, it would have been almost impossible for a sniper to hit him from the at politically. On things like this my judg- ment was usually taken. This time it wast. "( 76) OUT” ANNOUNCEMENT. nieITALIAN tory,” Bruno states. (73) A White House statement announced in Bruno wrote that there was a political October that President Kennedy was going difference over the selection of the lunch- to withdraw 1,000 U.S, military personnel ¢on site and therefore the final decision OSWALD AT PARKLAND — fromt South Vietnam which was, perhaps, s was left open until laier than it would have normally been planned. HOSPITAL his last formal executive order, thus fre- ducing the U.S. troop strength there to 7 The Women’s Building was a better Oswald went to Parkland Hospitai ‘on approximately 14,500 men.(80) choice from the standpoint of security and October 21, 1963 to see his wife and their Kennedy's desire to speak to as many of new baby born the previous night.(777 the people of Dallas as possible, including “ALL Gls OUT OF different factions inciuding labor groups. Chicanos, Women and Blacks, all of which OSWALD AT GENERAL VIETNAM BY XMAS"—JKF cece etal by teot is in The Basic. Walter H. B. eked Military would have been able to be present in the larger auditorium. The Connally-Johnson EDWIN A. WALKER RALLY Secretary of Defense McNamara made -@ public statement that all American per- Small Arms, asmoh eh mi weapons in comparison with United States, British, supporters wanted the smaller Trade Mart Oswald attended General Walker's” sonnel would be brought back home fromGerman, or Russian equipment. Bh site which would restrict the luncheon to “USA Day Rally” on the evening prior to Vietnam by 1965. His announcément _ And by a magazine which 5) Dallas’ wealthy party backers. Ambassador Adiat E. Stevenson's sched- came from the White House(81). Presi- decided fo use his influence and uled address in the same auditorium for -_ Kennedy told Kenneth O'Donnell in the argument of better security to get the “United Nations Day.” The audience was the Spring of 1963 of his determination Secret Service to finally rule that the well attended by people who were ¢x- + to withdraw American forces from Viet- — Women’s Building would be the site, tremely conservative in their political oo meyeg singh after his\reeleg- | itduring “4 asked Jerry Behn. the head of the views according to the signs which were “In t " the President said, “I'll World War IE, was known as “‘‘the Secret Service at the White House, to pass carried by some of them and the text of damned pias sees as a Communist. humanitarian rifle’ on the grounds thatit the word to the Texas agents to wrap it up. General Walker's talk.( 78) appeaser, but {don’t care."(82) could not hurt anyone on purpose.”(95) (67) WCE p. 40. (75) Ibid. Johnny We Hardly Knew Ye (Little (68) WCR p. 738; 3H214, 22H 162. (76) Ibid. Brown, New York, 1972) Pp16. (69) Jerry Bruno and Jeff Greenfield, The {77} CD20, p. 5, 22H236, 22H746, 3440, (83) Historical recard. Advance Man, (William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York, 1971, p.28). 11H291, 26H694, (78) 2H403, 20H272, SH396. -11H40}, tet i1H262-275, a 11H279. : ee 4H. (93) — i Rush te Joteteat tak: (70) Bid, p. 92. CD 213, p. 16, WER p.7 5 pias TA2s3-261, & Winston, New York, 1966, (71) See Dallas Strect Map. {79} 2H4i2 (87) 24H, 252-25: Piz). ti (72) — } The Advance Man, pp. 89-92. ith Historical tia 81} Historical reco: (88) a 23H499, 2411328, ch 1066, ) 65Beebe Mlustrated, ‘October, 1964. sap Accessories raunceThe (74) Bruno, The Advance Man, p. 92. {s3} Kenneth O'Donaall and David Powers, (89) Hive’-Meaghst, Accessories After The act Fact, p. 367, 459 “OSWALD” AT THE USED OSWALD INTERROGATION Mr. Garland G. Slack testified, along with others, that a mar who he identified CAR LOT—DALLAS— Captain Fritz did pot call for a steno- as Oswald was at the Sports Drome Rifle NOVEMBER 9, 1963 grapher, court reporter, or tape recorder to have Oswakt's invaluable interrogation Range on November $0, 1963 and that Someone identifying himself as Lee he became involved in an altercation with properly recorded( 111). Fritz kept notes, “Oswald” because he was firing at his Harvey Oswald appeared at the autome- and his notes are the best evidence of bile sales and used car lot of Downtown (Slack’s) target.(116) what Oswald told him before others who Lincoln Mercury on November 9, 1963, observed the interrogation, including FBI according to an employee there, Albert Guy Bogard(96), Bogard identified the agent Jim Bookbout, Homicide officers, OSWALD’S ADDRESS atk frepector Kelly, of the Secret Service. man as Lee Oswald and said that Oswaid (Pt2) me BOOK CONTAINED FBI tested a car with him driving at high speeds on the Stemmons Freeway. Sales Captam Fritz continued, "He (Oswald) told me that he understood photography AGENT’S NUMBER Manager, Frank Pizzo, suggested that the real well, and that in time, he would be Although the Secret Service had no hairline of Oswald, according to photo: able to show that it was not his picture, record of Lee Harvey Oswald in its files, Braphs shown him, did not match that of and that it had been made by someone seca in the Protective Research the man who was at the lot, (97) elve. At this time he said that he did not Section which determined whether or not The story of Bogard was supported in want to answer any nore questions and he a person might be a threat to the President, a by Pizzo and by Oran Brown and ~ returned to the jail about 7:15 p.m.” {117) Oswald was well known to. the FBI gene Wilson, salesman at the lot. Brown The name, auto license number and tele- (113) _ number of FBI agent James P. wrote the name “Oswald” on a paper which both he and his wife remem losty tens in Lee Harvey Oswald's as being in his possession prior to the as- MOTORCADE ROUTE FOR address book( 118) and Hesty had inter- sassination, (98) Bogard took a lie-detector test, or a NOVEMBER 22, 1963 viewed Marina Oswald and Ruth Paine (119) as close to the date of the assassin polygraph test as it is otherwise known, VISIT OF PRESIDENT ation as October 29, November November Sth as well as their neighbors. Ist, and and his answers were consistent with someone who was telling the truth. (99) DISCLOSED The Warren Commission was not able to Agent listed in Oswald book According to Bogard, “Oswald” made a On November 16,1963 the Dallas explain how Oswald learned of Hosty’s comment about returning to Russia and Times-Herald and Dallas Morning News auto Hcense or why he had this informa- PROTECTIVE RESEARCH tion in his address book. Apparently none also said that he would be coming into some money shortly, enough, evidently, to announced the November 22nd visit of the President, details of the motorcade route of the FBI's extensive information on SECTION OF SECRET buy the car he was considering. (100) and indicated it would pass through Oswald was passed on to the U.S, Secret Service { 120) SERVICE IN DALLAS Dealey Plaza and continue on to the Trade As of November 8, 1963, a check of Mart, (114) the Secret Service Files reveaied there was OSWALD PHOTOGRAPH WHITE HOUSE SECRET hot one person considered to be a threat WITH RIFLE AND “OSWALD” AT THE SERVICE CHIEF REMAINS to the fife ef the President in the entire Dallas-Fort Worth area, despite the earlier HANDGUN RIFLE RANGE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. assault on Ambassador Stevenson.{ 122) An incriminating piece of evidence in Someone who was recognized imme- White House Secret Service detail diately following the assassination as being Chief, Gerald A. Behn remained in Wash- the case against Lee Harvey Oswald was a photograph discovered by police among identical with Lee Harvey Oswald ap- ington. D.C, during the President’s Texas DALLAS MOTORCADE the possessions which were allegedly Os- peared at the Sports Drome Rifle Range in Dallas on several occasions in Septem- trip and Special Agent in Charge Roy Kellerman went to Dallas with the Presi- LEAD CAR wald's at the home of Ruth Paine. This The lead car of the President's motor- photegraph was not listed on the report o1 ber, October and Novernber 1963,(115) dent instead, (121) cade carried Dallas Police Chief Jesse E. the Dallas Police itemizing all of the pos- Curry, Secret Service SAIC Forrest Sar- sessions(i9?} even though a number of rels, SAIC Winston G. Lawson Sheriff items, inciuding’ photographs, were de- Bill Decker( 123}. Preceding them was the seribed in the testimony of the officers pilot car, also a hard-top, carrying Deputy regarding who discovered the photo- Police Chief G. L, Lumpkin, Detective graphs. (102) F. M. Turner, Detective BL. Senkel. The photograph was published as the advance man Jack Puterbangh, and Army cover of Life Magazine on February 21, Lt, Col. George Whitmnayer. (124) 1964 several months before the olficial investigation of the Warren Commission was completed( 103). lt was published, ia fact, in magazines and newspapers all over SECRET SERVICE the world described as “Lee Harvey Os- AGENTS AT FORT WORTH wald with the weapons he used to kill President Kennedy and Officer Tippit,” BAR UNTIL LATE HOURS (104) Nine special agents of the Secret Service The photograph apparently supplied were, according fo their own reports{ more than simply the evidence to link Os- and that of the Secret Service Agencyt 124 wald with the weapons allegedly used in in charge of the Presidential detail both homicides, it provided evidence of a Texas, present at The Cellar nightclub in motive since the newspapers in the hands Fort Worth, some of them until 3:00 a.m of the person allegedly photographed as the night before the assassination of the Oswaid, were the radical publications of President, In specific violation of the “The Worker” and “The Militant”.( 105) Secret Service’s own regulations (U.S Testimony was introduced to show that Secret Service Manual, Section 10, Chap- the photograph had been retouched prior ter 1, page 7,(127) some of the agents did fo publication( 106) and it was alleged assemble and consume intoxicating bever- that the photograph was a composite, or ages.(}28) a false photograph as well.( 107) Research has been done since the time this photograph, and another similar “WANTED FOR photograph were allegedly found (both designated as Commission Exhibits 133 A TREASON”: &B) (103) which indicates that both photographs are composites, falsely por- JOHN F. KENNEDY traying Oswald. This poster was widely distributed Oswald, himself was asked about the throughout the city of Dallas on the day photographs while he was being interro- of President Kennedy's visit, by anti- gated by Dallas Police Captain Wil Fritz. Kennedy persons.( 129) 109) ) “I showed Oswald an enlarged picture of him holding a rifle and wearing a pistol. PRESIDENTIAL PLANE This picture had been enlarged by our Crime Lab from a picture found in the ARRIVES AT LOVE FIELD, warage at Mrs. Paine’s home. He (Oswald) DALLAS said the picture was not his, that the face According to the records of the Secret Was his face, but that his picture had been Service, public accounts and journals, made by someone superimposing his face, President Kennedy's plane, Air Force the other part of the picture was not him One, touched in Dallas at Love Field at at all and that he had never seen the pic- 11:40 a.m. ¢.s.t. on Friday, November 22, ture before.” (110) 1963,(130) (96) 621450-452, 10H 352-356, (104) Life Magazine, 2/21/64. 21457, (113) 24H269. (123) 2411249, 244324, 7H335, 24H285. (97) WCR 320-321. 21H458, 21H460. (414) WCR pp. 39-40. (124) 21HS78. (98) Sylvia Meagher, Accessories Ajter The (105). 21H460, WCR 125, 287, 289. (125) 10H357-373, 241304. (125) 18H682-690, 18H666-668, CE 1019, Fact, p. 352. (106) 21H449, 21H450, 21H455, 21434-38. (116) }0H378, 26H680. (126) 18H682. (99) WCR, p. 840. (107) 2134-38, (117) 2H109, WOR 318. (127) 18H665, (100) CE 3078, CE 3091, CE 3902, 10H352- (108) 16H3i0. (118) 16H64, (CE 18, p. 76). (128) 18H682.690, 356, 24454, (109) 24H264-270, 19) 4H456, 4H449, 4453. (129) CE 996, 18H646, 17H627, (101) 241H332-346, Stovall Exhibit B. (110) 24H269. ) 2H109, (130) 2H67, (102) 7H209, 7H215, 7H194, 7H231. (111) WCR 180, ) 2H63, 2H105, (104) WCR, CE 334, (112) 241269. ) 2H108, 17H530-532. 460 THE SHOOTING: THREE The legal definition of a “conspiracy” is simply, “two or more persons acting in THIRD SHOT: Struck President Ken- nedy in the neck. (143) biti aaa lence tosupport that contention. ASSASSINS SHOT AT JFK concert to commit an illegal act.” FOURTH SHOT; Struck the Main St. According to the FBI reports on the FROM THREE DIRECTIONS The FBI determined that the 6.5 Mann- licher-Carcano rifle had a minimum time curb ricocheting up and cutting the face of James Tague.(144) capability (the minimum operation)ofthe weapon, the five shots would require 9.2 Arlen Specter, District Attorney of of 2.3 seconds(136). That is, the mini- FIFTH SHOT; Struck President Kennedy seconds. Since the entire span of time Philadelphia, was the attorney who han- mum time during which the rifle could be in the head, causing him to thrust vio- covered by the actual shots was deter- died the investigation of the shooting for fired, the bolt opened and closed (thereby lently backward and to the left.(145) mined to be a maximum of 5.6 seconds, the Warren Commission. He made the ejecting the shell and pushing a new bullet Governor Connally testified that he the only possible conclusion is that there statement( 131) that of all the witnesses at into the chamber), and fired again was 2.3 heard the first shot but was not hit, there- was more than one gunman, firing from the scene of the shooting which numbered seconds. That does not include the time it fore the first shot either missed or hit Pres- itions in frontof the President to cause in the hundreds, “Governor Connally was would take to aim again since the opera- ident Kennedy. Since Secret Service Agent is anterior neck wound and shot in the perhaps the most important witness. To tion of that bolt would take the focus of Roy Kellerman testified that the President head which propelied him backward, as aceept the conclusion that Goyernor Con- the aim of a porn away from its original cried, “My God, I am hit,"(146) after the well as two guomen firing at the President nally and President Kennedy were hit by osition( 137). FBI expert Robert A. first shot, and he could only have done so ee Connally from the rear, separate bullets is synonymous with saying razier was able to fire within the 2.3 sec- if he had not been harmed by a later shot (153) , there was more than one assassin.” (132) onds when he tested it although he fired which struck him in the throat, it is likely The Zapruder film shows the entire span And yet that conclusion, that the two men not at a moving target, as Oswald was to assume that President Kennedy was of the shots as a sequence of timed photo- were hit by separate bullets, was precisely alleged to have done, but at a stationary struck by the first bullet in the back (see graphs which compose it. It was deter- the conclusion that Governor Connally target, When asked what would have hap- autopsy diagram) (147) as described by mined by the FBI that the camera ran at testified to before the Warren Commission, pened to his ability to fire the rifle that the two FBI Agents who witnessed the 18.3 frames per second (154). Therefore Mrs. Connally has always corroborated fast had he used moving targets as Os- autopsy of the President. (148) the 2.3 second minimum operating time of her husband’s testimony. (133) wald was alleged to have done, Frazier The second shot struck Governor the rifle would be equivalent to 42.09 Connally testified: “It is not conceivable responded, “It would have slowed down Connally as described above and he so frames in order to fire two shots. me that I could have been hit by the the shooting.”( 138) testified. Governor Connally specifically identi- bullet.” (134) Oswald, it should be noted, was no The third struck the President in the fied his earliest possible hit as Zapruder Connally further testified: “Well, in my match for the experts who tested the rifle front of the neck.(149) film frame #234( 155), and it was officially judgment, it just couldn’t conceivably have since he was qualified only one point The “miss” which hit the curb on Main accepted that President Kennedy was hit been the first one because I heard the above the minimum for the Marine Corps St. and ricocheted upward cutting James by Zapruder frame #225 and not before sound of the shot. In the first place, I (139). Oswald was further described by Tague's check came ai some point during #210(156). Therefore there was an inter- don’t know anything about the velocity of Marine Corps Lt. Col, A. G, Folsom, Jr., the sequence of the shots which, it was val(157) of 24 frames or“approximately this particular bullet, but any rifle has a head Records Branch, Personnel Dept determined, lasted from 4.8 to 5.6 seconds 1.3 seconds, or enough time to establish velocity that exceeds the speed of sound, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, as “a (150). For the sake of explanation only. that the two men could not have been hit and when I heard the sound of that first tather poor shot,""( 140) we will treat it as the fourth shot although by the same bullet(158) as indicated by shot, that bullet had already reached Breaking down the number of shots it might have come at any time after the Governor Connally’s sworn testimony, but where I was, or it bad reached that far, which were fired at the two victims, Pres- first shot and before the last. far too short a period of time for the wea- and after I heard that shot, } had the time ident Kennedy, and Governor Connally, The final shot, as graphically depicted pon to fire two shots with the 2.3 second to turn to my right, and start to turn to by the evidence to support the number in the Zapruder film and according to the minimum time. my left before I felt anything.” (135) which could be accounted for, there were testimony of witnesses, struck President There is support for only one conclu- The reason Governor Connally’s testi- possibly five shots, enumerated as follows: Kennedy in the head, driving him back- sion; there were at least two gunmen mony is so crucial to the determination of FIRST SHOT: Struck President Kennedy ward and to his left. His head movement, firing from behind the President and the how many assassins there were is that he in the back and did not exit.( 141) according to medical specialists, was faster Governor( 159). From the angle of trajec- could determine best whether or not he SECOND SHOT: Struck Governor Con- than can be explained as a neuro-muscular tory established for the wounds it is prob- was hit by the first bullet which was fired nally in the back, exited through his reaction. (151) able that one of the assassins shot from If he was not, as his testimony indicates, chest after shattering his fifth rib, pene- It is not clear if there were two shots the Texas School Book Depository and then the assassination was the result of a trated his right wrist and ultimately which hit the President in the head almost another from the roof of the County conspiracy. lodged in his left thigh. (142) simultaneously or not, although there is Records Building (160) 3 Dealey Plaza (131) “A. Matter of Reasenable Doubt", (141) CE 397, CD 7, PBI Report of Agents 5H6§2, SH59-60. , 82-114, CHFE Magazine, 11/25/66. Francis X. O'Neill, Jr. and James W. (144) 21H478-483. (153) FiteMagazine 11/25/66; Thompson, (132) bid, p. 38; Norman Redlich, Assistant Silbert, 11/26/63; 2H93. (14S) 18H1-79 (Z-Frame 313). Six Seconds tn Dallas, p. 115-140, Counsel, Inguest, p. 43. (142) 48136, CD 381, CDS (FBI Repon (146) 2H73, 18H724, 18H1-79. (133) 4H135-136, 11/29/63. (147) 17H45, CE 397, (154) SH160. (134) bid- {143) Statements by Dr. Malcolm. Perry, (148) CD 7, Silbert/O'Neili, FBL (155) Life Magazine 11/25/66, (135) 4H136. CBS, Los Angeles Times 11/23/63 (149) N.Y, Times, 11/23/63. 17H4, NY. (156) Ibid; 15H696-697; Thompson, 6.35. £136} (137) WER 97, 5SH153, 3H407. Ibid. interview with Dr. Cyril Weebt, by Times 11/27/63. (157) Ibid. (138) 31407, Josiah Thompson, May 26, 1967; (150) WCR 117. (158) Epstein, Inquest, p,43. (£39) WCR 191. §H55, 17H29; Aliso: 3H370, 3H368, (15L) Thompson, Six Seconds In. Dallas, eH Ibid. ; e ng RRC E ep) 6H42, 6H33, 6H6O, 616, SH60, . 82-114. 160) Pate CD 827, Thompson,p.129- (140) Thid. (352) Focurecn, Six Seconds In Datias, POLICEMEN RUSH INTO JACK RUBY IS THE BOOK DEPOSITORY PERMITTED TO ENTER BUILDING BASEMENT AND SHOOT “Immediately following the shots Dallas OSWALD Policeman M. L. Baker rushed into the Jack Ruby testified that he entered the Roy Truly, confronted Lee Harvey Os- basement of the Dallas Police Station on inking a coke on the second floor, November 24, 1963 and shot Lee Harvey Oswald to death(176). He said that he entered through the Main St. ramp al- though there was an officer of the Dallas Police specifically stationed in that ramp, PARKING LOT BEHIND which was a little wider than a car width, THE GRASSY KNOLL~ to keep anyone who hadn't been able to present the proper identification of being ESCAPE either police of press, expressly out of that A key witness in the assassination was basement(177), NJ. Daniels, himself a Lee J. Bowers, Jr. who testified that he former police officer on the Dallas Police saw: “something occured in “we particular Force, happened to be in the area and pinpointing the spot behind the fence Stopped to see his friend, Officer Vaughn, ys Grassy Knoll behind which he who was guarding that entrance. Shorily ' watched from his tower( 162). He con- before the shooting, Daniels saw Officer Vaughn acknowledge a man and allow “At the time of the shooting, in the him to pass into the basement without i where the two men 1 have stopping him or asking him for his cre- desoribed were, there was a flash of light dentials. This man appeared to Daniels of, as far as I am concerned, something to be holding a hard object like a gun, in Dallas Police Station —- Main St. ramp Jaffe his pocket, yet Vaughn did not stop him. I could not identify, but there was some- ge Dageoaa occured which caught my eye A few minutes, if not seconds later, im this immediate area on the embank- “{ Saw One Mian run towards the pas- tion occured: Some of the most powerlul Oswald was shot, Daniels later identified ment."'( 163) senger cars on the railroad siding after men in the administration were out of the man who he had seen walk past S. M. Holland, an employee of the the volley of shots, This man had a white touch including, Secretary of State Dean Vaughn and into the basement as Jack Union Terminal Company (in charge of dress shirt, no tie, and khaki colored Rusk, Treasury Secretary Dougias Dillon, Ruby.(178) the railroad track area behind the Grassy trousers, His bair appeared to be long and Interior Secretary Stewart Udall, Labor Knoll) gave an interesting description of dark and his agility running could be Secretary W. Willard Wirtz, the Chairman what he saw behind the fence: about 25 years of age. He had something of President Kennedy's Council of Eco- “And [ got over to the spot where I saw in his hand, I couldn't be sure but it may nomic Advisers, Arthur Heller, and Presi- the smoke come from and heard the shot; have been a head picce.” dential Press Secretary Pierre Salinger Iwas looking for empty shells or some in- He later said: “the mao was carrying (173) dication that there was a rifleman or some- something in his right hand” which “could When the teletype aboard the plane of one over there. Well, you know it'd been have been a gun.”( 167) the Cabinet members carried the earliest raining that morning and behind the sta- wire notice that the President had been tion wagon from one end of the bumper shot in Dallas, there was a moment of to the other, [ expect you could've counted four or five-hundred footprints down OFFICERS RUSH TO THE panic but then, fearing an international plot, and with specific codes and proce- there. And on the bumper, oh about GRASSY KNOLL AREA dures to take effect in such an emergency, twelve or eighteen inches apart, it looked Two motorcade officers rushed up the the Secretary of State and Press Secretary like someone had raked their shoes off; Grassy Knoll after the shooting, ap- to the President attempted to contact the ‘there were muddy spots up there, like parently in pursuit of gunmen( 168), The White House to confirm the shocking re- ote had been standing up there.” officers, Hargis and Haygood testified that port. They were able to do so, but pro- (164) —— they thought that was the direction from hibited from making certain confirmation ‘Holland continued: J which shots had been fired. (169) of data because the ofhiciai Code Book “Just to the west of the station wagon... was not aboard the plane. After 2 long there were two sets of footprints that left period of searching for it and not finding ++I noticed these two footprints leaving; it, the Secretary of State was forced to now they could have stepped out between MEN POSING AS SECRET break procedures designed specifically to the second and third cars on the gravel or they could've got in the trunk compart- SERVICE AGENTS SHOW protect against such interference codified communications, break the code with ‘Ment of this car and pulled the lid down, IDENTIFICATION and communicate with the White House bere would have been very, very easy,” The Secret Service and the official re- in plain English.(174) (165) ss indicate that there were no Secret LC. Price who saw the assassination from the roof of the Terminal Annex vice ageuts in the area of Dealey Plaza LEE HARVEY OSWALD ilding across Deaiey Plaza said in an after the shots were fired( 170). And yer three police officers were given Secret DECLARED PUBLICLY THE DEATH OF 18 ‘afladavit filed November 22, 1963. 166) Service identification by men who were HE WAS A PATSY MATERIAL WITNESSES on the Grassy Knoll and in froor of the Texas Schoo! Book Depository Building As the world watched an television. Lee IN A SHORT TIME Harvey Oswald got one of his rare chances (171) These alleged Secret Service Agents In the past decade more than 40 people to speuk publicly during a transfer down a were never accounted for in Secret Service who were directly, or indircetly connected ey a hallway in the Dallas Jail at Potice Head- eager Sat aaeaiena iam Naeem teports and were never seen again. quarters, He was asked if be had shor the with the assassination, cither as ‘witnesses je a ee ~ tae a4 or participants in the lives of those in- President, which he denied, suying at 7:55 volved, have died strangely( 179}. A fist of THE PHONES GO OUT IN p.m. on Friday, November 22, 1963, “fm just a patsy."( 175) 18 “material witnesses,” that is, people WASHINGTON D.C. who could have been called to testify in the event that Lee Harvey Oswald had Jn a crucial and astonishing breakdown stood trial, perished in a shorter period in communications systems the telephone of time. The list, and the methods which system ‘went out immediately after the caused the death of these witnesses, pro- shots were fired in Dallas, but the break- vides some inrportant data down didn't occur in Texas, it occured “Of the 18 witnesses, 5 died of natural in Washington D.C. Senator Ted Ken- deaths, and 13 were the victims of acci- nedy, brother of the President, was forced dent, suicide or murder. The unnatural to go from house to house asking to use causes Constitute 71.5 per cent of the total. Strangers’ phones before he realized that There were 6 murders, 1 manslaughter, the phone system was out.(172) 2 suicides, 3 moter vehicle accidents, and 1 presumed accident (or suicide) by a fall CABINET PLANE OVER through a plate-glass window.”{ 180) An actuary of the London Sunday THE PACIFIC—CODE Times computed the life expectancy of 15 BOOK MISSING of the deceased witnesses and concluded that on November 22, 1963 the odds Another crucial coincidence was that against ‘all 15 being dead by February most of the members of the Cabinet were \ As were 100,000,000,000,000,000 to 1 on their way to Japan when the assassina- “| 'm just @ patsy” (181) (161)3H249, 17H224, 17H501. (168) 6H295, 61209, p. 193-195, p, 224. Pierre Salinger, i, 0, TH, Midlothian Press. Ibid With Kennedy, Good Housekeeping GIRS ‘ Sottaet td.tatapedinionertiow w bork by Ma (170) WCR $2. Magazine, p. 61 (180) Meagher, Accessories Afier Tie Fact, 299. Lane, 3/31/66. Rush To Judgment, (171) FHIOT, 6312, 7HS35. (175) 20H366, Kantor Ex. 3, psp. 32. (1723 Wilham Manchester (Harper & Row. (176) SH181-213, 14H504-570, (i8i) Pisin Sunday Times, Feh 26, 1967, (164) Josiais Thompson interview, Nov. 30, New York, 1967, p. 198), Death Of (4177). 12H357-372. Appendix of supportive material _. 1966, 6245-246. A President, pp. 198-199. (178) Interview of N. J. Daniels by Stephen ie by Stephen Jaffe. 165) interview, 11/30/66. (173) Les Angeles Times, Nov. 18, 1963, Jaffe, August, 1973. 12H225-234, Special research by With Kennedy, Pierre Salinger, p. 3- Lane, Rush To Judgment, pp. 221-226, Martin Gates and David Lifton. (167) Lane, Rush To Judgment, p. 33. (174) Manchester, Death Of A. President, (179) Penn Jones, Jr, Forgive My Grief, "41-373 O - 79 - 30 In the three-year period which followed the murder of President Kennedy and Lee Harvey Oswald, eight- teen material witnesses died— six by gunfire, three in motor accidents, two by suicide, one from a cut throat, one from a karate chop to the neck, three from heart attacks, and two from natural causes. An actuary, engaged by the London Sunday Times concluded that on November 22, 1963, the odds against these witnesses being dead by February, 1967, were one hundred thousand trillion to one. A BURT 7:5) LANGASTER ,/ ‘ROBERT RYAN WILL GEER They are the conspirators in the piot to assassinate an American President. An Edward Lewis Production EXEGUTIVE AGTION Probably the most controversial film of our time! Sreniy DALTON TRUMBO: Based onNovelty MARK LANEandDONALD FREED coPoducesty DAN BESSIE aad GARY HOROWITZ - ProducedbyEDWARD LEWIS - Sirectedby (AVID MILLER: COLOR A National General Pictures Release @ [PGI nasa ctw soccer <> Seer debt fay NOKteeSARS fororetnervagere 463 Ms. Hess. It is a blowup of an advertisement for the movie Executive Action. As you can see, it states that an actuary engaged by the London Sunday Times concluded that on November 22, 1963, the odds against 18 material witnesses being dead within a 3- year period were 100,000 trillion to 1. Since the publication of that figure, it has turned up in articles, letters, books, and conversation as anywhere from 1,000-to-1 to 1 billion-to-1. Very few people seem to know what it is that they are quoting, but they do have a sense of some enormous odds existing with respect to the deaths of a group of Kennedy-assassination-related witnesses. Illustrative of the widespread concern over this issue is the query President Fidel Castro made during the interview of him by this committee in Cuba on April 3, 1978: If I may ask you, is there anything true, or how much could be true about those publications which state that many people who could have had a part in Kennedy’s death have died in accidents and things like that? On April 27, 1978, the committee obtained a copy of an article printed in the London Sunday Times on February 26, 1967. Mr. Chairman, at this time I ask that the article be admitted into the record as JFK exhibit F-541, and I direct your attention to the enlargement of the article which is on the easel. The chart in the article lists 19 individuals as being the victims of mysterious deaths, including Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby. The article states that the London Sunday Times asked an actuary to compute the life expectancy of 15 of these individuals. It further states that the actuary concluded that on November 22, 1963, the odds against all 15 being dead by February 1976 were about 1 in 10 to the 29th power, or 100,000 trillion to 1. On April 28, 1978, the committee sent a letter to the London Sunday Times requesting a copy of the actuarial study and of all documents used in the preparation of the study. I would now ask that that letter, JFK exhibit F-542, be admitted into the record. Chairman Stokes. Without objection JFK exhibits F-541 and F-542 may be entered into the record. (The information follows:] THE SUNDAY TIMES, 26 FEBRUANY 1967 William Whaley 4. D. Tippit jainst : : eft = ll: #| et nee £ Hi ie ;afil: any nH ; it -the Ken ceteslnaiiont bebieteac tiiapene pend ‘as $3 z § onene® 5 # i fetia se 3 iis i EE ERE ilNs hfe iis i E situation. 0 § zi a pitt JFK Exuisit F-541 464 : LOUIS STOKES, OIC, CHAIRMAN RICHARDSON PREYVER, N.C. SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO WALTER E, FAUNTROY, D.C. STEWART B, MCKINNEY, CONN, YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF, CHARLES THONE, NEBR. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH. Select Committee on Assassinations HAROLD E. FORD, TENN. FLOYO J. FITHIAN, IND, ROBEAT W. EDGAR, PA. (202) 225-4624 G.S. Bouse of Representatibes 3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515 April 25, 1978 Librarian London Sunday Times Pay Os BOX // 200 Gray's Inn Road London, England WCIX 8E2 Dear Sir: In connection with its investigation into the circum- stances surrounding the death of President Kennedy, the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U. S. House of Representa- tives requests a copy of the actuarial study referenced in the attached February 26, 1967 London Sunday Times article and of all documents relating to the preparation of the study. Thank you for your prompt attention to this request. We appreciate the cooperation of your Washington and New York offices, particularly that of Ms. Katherine Grayson of the Washington Office. . Sincerely, A bloer Cobre. G. Robert Blakey Chief Counsel and Director GRB: jhd Enclosure cc: Katherine Grayson JFK Exuisit F-542 Ms. Hess. On May 19, 1978, the committee received a response from the London Sunday Times. I direct your attention again to the easel, to JFK exhibit F-543, an enlargement of that letter. I would now like to read that letter into the record. It is directed to Mr. G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and director, Select Committee on Assassinations, and it is entitled, Kennedy deaths statistics— The Sunday Times, February 26, 1967. The Editor has passed me your letter of 25th April. Our piece about the odds against the deaths of the Kennedy witnesses was, I regret to say, based on a careless journalistic mistake and should not have published. This was realized by The Sunday Times’ editorial staff after the been first edition—the one which goes to the United States and which I believe you have—had gone out, and later editions were amended. There was no question of our actuary having got his answer wrong: It was simply that we asked him the wrong question. He was asked what were the odds against 15 named people out of the population of the United States dying within a short period 465 of time, to which he replied—correctly—that they were very high. However, if one asks what are the odds against 15 of those included in the Warren Commission index dying within a given period, the answer is, of course, that they are much lower. Our mistake was to treat the reply to the former question as if it dealt with the latter—hence the fundamental error in our first edition report, for which we apologize. None of the editorial staff involved in this story can remember the name of the actuary we consulted, but in view of what happened you will, I imagine, agree that his identity is hardly material. Yours sincerely, Antony Whitaker, Legal Manager. Even though the London Sunday Times had not structured its actuarial inquiry properly and, therefore, the 100,000 trillion to 1 odds were invalid, the committee staff looked into the possibility of conducting a valid study, contracting with our own actuarial firms here in the District of Columbia: Edward H. Friend & Co., Towers, Perrin, Forster & Co., and the Wyatt Co., We then had meetings with representatives of each company and each subsequently sub- mitted a proposal, addressing both the general issue of which actu- arial principles did or did not apply, and the specific issue of the practical problems which would be encountered in attempting to apply those principles to this particular case. As a result of these conversations and of a review of the proposals, we determined the following facts concerning the validity and feasibility of attempting to apply actuarial odds to the group of deaths. One, to compute valid actuarial statistics, one must be able to determine to a reasonable degree of specificity, the universe of individuals to which the specific group is being compared. In other words, we would have to determine the total number of individuals who exist in each of the categories into which those individuals who have mysteriously died, fall. This means that we would need to establish the number of individuals who in any manner could be considered witnesses to the assassination of President Kennedy and Lee Harvey Oswald, the number of individuals who had any con- tact with Oswald or Ruby or with Ruby’s nightclubs, the number of individuals who professed to have material knowledge of the case or of the major figures in the case, all news reporters who had expressed interest, taken interviews or investigated the case, and all Members of Congress who sought to introduce legislation con- cerning the investigation of the case. This, as you can imagine, would have been an impossible task. Two, in addition, for each of the individuals identified in the groups I have just listed, we would have to establish age, sex, race, occupation, geographical location, and any other extraordinary fac- - tors which have to be taken into consideration in order to compute mortality rates. Again, this was judged to be an impossible job. Three, we would need to determine the number of individuals in these categories who have, in fact, died and the number of individ- uals who, according to actuarial mortality rates, should have died. We had thus established the impossibility of attempting to estab- lish, through the application of actuarial principles, any meaning- ful implications about the existence or absence of a conspiracy. Despite the fact that an inference of conspiracy, as here postulated by the critics, did not exist, we nevertheless decided not to dismiss the cited deaths out of hand, but rather, to look more closely at the nature of certain specific deaths to determine whether or not they 466 could individually be considered mysterious or in some other manner, a reflection of some sort of conspiracy. In an attempt to investigate the circumstances of the deaths individually, we did several things. First, we compiled a more comprehensive list of those individuals whose deaths were consid- ered by the critics to be mysterious. In some cases, it proved difficult to determine which deaths the critics considered mysteri- ous. In many cases, instead of statements of fact, we found unsub- stantiated inference and innuendo, with little concrete information provided. For example, David Goldstein and FNU Levens are both included in Sylvia Meagher’s book, ‘Accessories After the Fact,” as mysterious deaths. Goldstein is described as having helped the FBI trace the revolver used in the murder of Officer Tippit. Levens is decribed as a Fort Worth burlesque theater operator who employed some of the same entertainers as Jack Ruby. Meagher notes that both of their deaths have been officially ascribed to natural causes and lists the places of death as unknown. No conspiracy theory which would include Goldstein and Levens is put forth; it is un- clear why their deaths are to be considered mysterious. And while Ms. Meagher may have had no way of knowing it, the FBI’s file on the Kennedy case includes dozens of reports and letters from citi- zens offering clues in the identification of the revolver in question, as, of course, there are undoubtedly a number of persons who would have employed some of the same entertainers as Ruby. Penn Jones, in his book, “Forgive My Grief,’ volume I, states that Earlene Roberts, the manager of the roominghouse in which | Lee Harvey Oswald lived at the time of the assassination, died. He then states that she had important evidence to contribute. The implication is that Mrs. Roberts’ death is mysterious. While it is clear that Mrs. Roberts did indeed have important evidence to contribute, there is no indication in the records relating to her death, or in Mr. Jones’ book, as to what exactly was mysterious about a 61-year-old woman with large calcium deposits and a case of pneumonia, dying of acute heart failure. The same is the case with other deaths cited in the same book, for example, Dr. Nicholas Chetta, the coroner who served at David Ferrie’s death, and thomas Howard, Jack Ruby’s attorney, both of whom died of heart attacks. Despite this problem, we compiled a list of individuals from the books and articles of Meagher, Jones, Bernard Fensterwald, David Martindale, and David Welsh. We added to the list Sam Giancana and John Roselli, both of whom had died too recently to be includ- ed in most of the critical literature. We then asked the Library of Congress to compile all newspaper articles which had appeared concerning any and all of the individ- uals. We further asked them to give us their evaluation of the critical literature and the press accounts on each individual and to make recommendations with respect to further investigation in each case. Independently, we sent requests to the Bureau of Vital Statistics, the medical examiners’ offices and the police depart- ments in the jurisdiction in which each death was believed to have occurred, for the death certificates, medical records, police reports, and any other documents which might exist concerning the death. Because there were many cases in which there was no information 467 indicating the appropriate jurisdiction, we sent letters to the perti- nent offices in Dallas and Fort Worth, Tex., in New Orleans, La., and in Miami, Fla., listing all the names on which we desired information. In the case of some of the individuals, information was requested from Federal investigative agencies. In the cases of Roselli and Giancana, we requested and received a briefing on the Justice Department investigations of those deaths. In the cases in which further investigation was deemed necessary, it was initiated. Our final conclusion on the issue is that the available evidence does not establish anything about the nature of these deaths which would indicate that the deaths were in some manner, either direct or peripheral, caused by the assassination of President Kennedy or by any aspect of the subsequent investigation. Chairman SToxkgEs. Is your report completed? Ms. Hess. Yes; it is. Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. ‘ Mr. Forp. I have no questions. I will yield back my time to the hair. Chairman STokgs. The gentleman from Indiana. Mr. FITHIAN. Just one question. Miss Hess, is it your feeling, _having gone through this, there is no statistical significance to this? Is that what I am to understand? | Ms. Hess. That is correct. Mr. FirutAn. Is it possible, then, that any death which is remote- ly related to this gets reported more than others, therefore there is an appearance of a kind of unusual gathering of deaths? Ms. Hess. It is possible. That is one of the bases for the develop- ment of the issue; yes. You understand the problem in establishing the statistical inference is that you cannot establish any type of universe. While it may seem like these people come from a very small group of people, they come from a very, very large universe of people. Mr. Firutan. I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. Mr. Devine. No questions, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar. Mr. Epcar. Will you provide for the record a detailed listing of the 21 names and the evidence you have found relating to their deaths? Ms. Hess. Yes. Do you want me to read them for the record? Mr. Epcar. It might be helpful. Ms. Hess. Edward Benairdes, Albert Guy Bogard, Hale Boggs, Lee Bowers, Jr., Bill Chesher, Nicholas J. Chetta, David Goldstein, Thomas Hale Howard, William Hunter, Clyde Johnson, Dorothy Kilgallen, Thomas Henry Killam, Jim Koethe, FNU Levens, Nancy Jane Mooney, Teresa Norton, Earlene Roberts, Harold Russell, Marilyn April Walle, a.k.a. Betty McDonald, William W. Whaley, James R. Worrell, Sam Giancana, John Roselli. Mr. Epaar. Thank you. I think it very helpful for the record that those names be included. eee you indicate why Mr. DeMohrenschildt’s name was not in- cluded? 468 Ms. Hess. His was one of those which deemed further investiga- tion and became part of a great investigative effort. Mr. Epcar. That was not part of the exact study? Ms. Hess. It was in terms of the compilation of data. I compiled the data on his death and any police reports, et cetera, as part of this project. But then in terms of subsequent investigation that was done by the investigators. Mr. Epaar. I think it would be helpful in terms of our final analysis to have a chance to review the material you compiled. I thank you for your report. Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Sawyer. Mr. SAwyER. No Questions. Chairman Strokes. There being nothing further, Miss Hess, thank you very much for your testimony. You are excused. The Chair will suspend for just a moment. [Brief recess. | Chairman STOKES. Because of a heavy schedule tomorrow of wit- nesses, along with the fact the committee must vacate the room at an early hour for an affair to be held in this room later tomorrow evening, the committee today will adjourn until 8:30 tomorrow morning. | [Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to recon- | vene at 8:30 a.m., Tuesday, September 26, 1978.] ; 469 INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1978 HOouSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, Washington, D.C. The committee met at 8:50 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the committee) presiding. Present: Representatives Stokes, Preyer, Fithian, Edgar, Devine, and Sawyer. - Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; Gary T. Cornwell, deputy chief counsel; Elizabeth Berning, chief clerk; James E. McDonald, staff counsel; Donald A. Purdy, Jr., staff counsel; I. Charles Mathews, special counsel; and Howard Shapiro, attorney. Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. NARRATION BY G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you noted yesterday, the question of conspiracy has been with us since the beginning of these hearings which opened nearly 3 weeks ago, although it was addressed more specifically here yester- day. It can be argued that the theories examined yesterday seem to break down under careful inspection, but that is one of the pur- poses of these hearings—to weigh the validity of the evidence. Today, however, other more substantial theories will be exam- - ined, if only briefly. , , But before the committee continues to look into various conspir- acy theories, it may be helpful to note that none of them wholly originated with this committee’s investigation. Most of the leads or allegations that the committee has examined have heretofore been the subject of some public discussion, the subject of earlier investi- gations or of books and articles. No claim is advanced here to originality or special insight. What the committee has done is to apply in its own investigation hopefully more sophisticated techniques of examination than those used or available to those who have preceded us or themselves raised the questions, some of which were demonstrated yesterday. Beyond scientific analysis of the evidence, the committee has also employed investigative tools that were disregarded in earlier inves- _ tigations of the Kennedy assassination. (469) 470 The committee, for example, has made an extensive use of immu- nity grants and interrogation under oath in executive session. Files have also been widely read, using only the most tenuous theories of relevance. Another approach that must be mentioned here is the use of a carefully thought-out investigative plan that employed a detailed reconstruction of conspiracies that might have occurred, in order to determine if, in fact, they had any bearing on the actual events in Dallas. The committee did not just run out leads in hand, the typical law enforcement approach and the one principally utilized by the FBI in 1963 and 1964. Over the next 3 days, we will be looking into a couple of conspir- acy theories that the committee felt warranted its fullest attention. This is not to say that these are possible plots that are the most likely ones to have led to the assassination, if, indeed, any of them did. What is being said is simply this: There are a couple of conspir- acy theories that cannot be readily dismissed, as those we consid- ered yesterday may possibly be, and this is the way in which they were investigated. This is, therefore, a status report on the investi- gation, the full findings and conclusions of which will be detailed in the final report. Obviously, all that was done cannot be ade- quately portrayed here. First, the theory that anti-Castro Cubans conspired to kill the President will be examined and summarized in this narration. Then, it may be appropriate to hear testimony on an aspect of the concern that other, perhaps more sinister forces, may have been behind the assassination. Mr. Chairman, in light of the time pressures the committee is operating under today, I would like to ask permission that the na Pion on the anti-Castro Cubans be inserted in the record as if read. Chairman STokeEs. With objection, so ordered. Mr. Buakey. Why anti-Castro Cubans? For several reasons. From the evidence available to them in 1964, two staff attorneys for the Warren Commission, David Slawson, and William Coleman, went so far as to speculate that Lee Harvey Oswald, despite his public posture as a Castro sympathizer, was actually an agent of anti- Castro exiles. Pressing for further investigation of the possibility, they wrote a memorandum which, in part, said: The evidence here could lead to an anti-Castro involvement in the assassination on some sort of basis as this: Oswald could have become known to the Cubans as being strongly pro-Castro. He made no secret of his sympathies, and so the anti- Castro Cubans must have realized that law enforcement authorities were also aware of Oswald’s feelings and that, therefore, if he got into trouble, the public would also learn of them. Second, someone in the anti-Castro organization might have been keen enough to sense that Oswald had a penchant for violence. On these facts, it is possible that some sort of deception was used to encourage Oswald to kill the President when he came to Dallas. The motive of this would, of course, be the expectation that after the President was killed, Oswald would be caught or at least his identity ascertained, the law enforcement authorities and the 471 public would then blame the assassination on the Castro govern- ment and a call for its forceful overthrow would be irresistible. Some critics of the Warren Commission have termed the period Oswald lived in New Orleans, the summer of 1963, the ‘Cubaniza- tion of Oswald,” implying there were sinister motives for his insert- ing himself into the Cuban controversy. They point out that, aside from letters he wrote to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New York, Oswald’s known Cuban contacts in the United States were with anti-Castroites. There are other reasons the committee’s attention has been drawn to the anti-Castro area. The Warren Commission files reveal, for instance, that there were numerous reports from Dallas and Miami immediately after the assassination which linked Oswald with Cuba. Yet, when the FBI checked out the reports, in almost all cases they had come from anti-Castro sources, some militant enough to deserve suspicion themselves. It comes down to this: In a homicide investigation, any individual or group is suspect, if it has the motive, opportunity, and means to commit the crime. There is no doubt that certain anti-Castro groups had all three. - It is difficult, these many years later, to appreciate the political and emotional impulses of the Cuban exile communities—in Miami, New Orleans, and Dallas—when John F. Kennedy was President. | The hopes and expectations of the exiles had been on a roller coaster ride; their relationship with the U.S. Government had dete- riorated. They were puzzled by the often conflicting policies of various Federal agencies toward them and their objectives, the main one being to get rid of Castro. The anti-Castro groups were frustrated, bitter, and angry. And the focal point of their resent- ment was President Kennedy. It began with the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. Since January 1959, when Castro marched triumphantly into Havana, the more than 100,000 Cubans who had fled the revolution lived in anticipation of its overthrow. These Cuban exiles were not only encouraged in this hope by the U.S. Government, they were organized, directed, and almost totally funded by its agencies. The training camps, the arms and weapons, the instructors, the ships and landing craft were all supplied by the U.S. Government. The invasion plan itself was formulated by the Government. The Cuban exiles came to feel that the Government not only promised them success, it guaranteed it. When what has been touted as “the glorious march on Havana’’ turned into a tragic rout, the Cuban exiles, unappreciative of Presi- dent Kennedy’s inherited role in the invasion, reacted with in- et cue disbelief and anger that he would allow the operation to ail. Intensifying the exiles’ reaction was the fact that Kennedy him- self insisted on taking the blame. In executive session before this committee, Manuel Antonio Varona, in 1961 the head of the united exile organization, the Revolutionary Democratic Front, told of a tense and emotional encounter with President Kennedy at the White House as hope for the invasion as fading. 472 We were not charging Mr. Kennedy with anything. We knew he was not in charge of the military effects directly. Nevertheless, President Kennedy told us he was the one—the only one responsible. Varona may have sympathized with Kennedy’s position, but most anti-Castro Cubans didn’t. The noted attorney, Mario Lazo, in his book, ‘(Dagger in the Heart,” put it very directly: The Bay of Pigs defeat was wholly self-inflicted in Washington. Kennedy told the truth when he publicly accepted responsibility * * *. The heroism of the belea- guered Cuban Brigade had been rewarded by betrayal, defeat, death for many of them, long and cruel imprisonment for the rest. The Cuban people * * * had always admired the United States as strong, rich, generous—but where was its sense of honor and the capacity of its leaders? The mistake of the Cuban fighters for liberation was that they thought too highly of ene United States. They believed to the end that it would not let them down. But | Tena President Kennedy was well aware of the bitter reaction to the - Bay of Pigs debacle. Far from abandoning the Cuban exiles, he set out to convince them of his loyalty to their cause. Perhaps the most ironic event of his relationship with the Cuban exiles occurred on December 29, 1962, at the Orange Bowl in Miami. He had come to welcome the survivors of Brigade 2506, the 1,200 men who had been ransomed from Cuba after almost 20 months in prison. The President was presented with the brigade flag in a dramatic and emotional scene. But the euphoria was false and misleading. Although the Cuban exiles cheered President Kennedy that day, there also coursed through the crowd a bitter resentment among some who felt they | were witnessing a display of political hypocrisy. Later, it would be claimed that the brigade feeling against President Kennedy was so strong that the presentation nearly did not take place, and it would | be alleged, incorrectly, as it turns out, that the brigade flag given to Kennedy was actually a replica. That intensity of anti-Kennedy feeling by Cuban exiles was the result of events between the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion and the ceremony in the Orange Bowl. It is not possible to know fully how the Bay of Pigs defeat changed President Kennedy’s attitude toward Cuba, but when jour- nalists Taylor Branch and George Crile wrote in Harpers magazine about a massive infusion of U.S. aid to clandestine anti-Castro operations in the wake of the Bay of Pigs, they titled their article, “The Kennedy Vendetta.” What is known is that the period between the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 can be accurately charac- | terized as the high water mark of anti-Castro activity. Miami, the center of the exile community, became a busy staging ground for armed infiltrations into Cuba. While not every raid was supported or even known about in advance by Government agencies, the United States played a key role in monitoring, directing, and sup- porting the anti-Castro Cubans. Hundreds of Cubans were set up in proprietary corporations established by the U.S. Government to support the massive covert operation. And although this effort was cloaked in secrecy, there were very few Cubans in the exile com- munity who did not know what was happening and who was sup- porting the operation. 473 That was a time of great activity and exhilaration in the Cuban exile community. American arms and weapons flowed freely through south Florida. Miami’s “Little Havana” was a beehive of gossip about the latest infiltration operations or paramilitary mis- sions. Raiding parties that left from small secret islands in the Florida Keys had the “green light” from the U‘S. Government. Then came the Cuban missile crisis and negotiations that ended it. The anti-Castro groups felt as if the rug had been pulled out from under them. The Cuban exiles were initially elated by the possibility that the crisis would provoke a showdown with Castro. But President Ken- nedy made a deal for the removal of the missiles. Only later did the exiles come to feel full force the impact of Kennedy’s agree- ment with Khrushchev and Castro. The word was soon passed; newspapers reported a basic turn- around in the Kennedy policy. For example, the raids that were being conducted by Alpha 66, one of the most aggressive exile organizations, were abruptly condemned by Washington. The State Department asserted that it did not sanction such attacks. In December, 2 months after the missile accord, 13 anti-Castro guerrillas were arrested at a training camp in the Florida Keys and their arms and explosives were seized by U.S. Customs agents. In March 1963, another Alpha 66 raid brought a statement from President Kennedy himself. “The raids,” he said, “served no useful purpose.” An attack on a Soviet ship in Cuban waters led to the formal issuance of a policy pronouncement on March 31. Kennedy said, in no uncertain terms, “We intend to take every step neces- Sary to assure that such raids are not launched, manned or equipped on U.S. territory.” On April 5, the New York Times noted that the United States was throwing more planes, ships, and men into its effort to police the straits of Florida against anti-Castro raiders. Throughout the spring and summer of 1963, the crackdown on guerrilla activity continued, causing frustration and resentment on the part of the exiles. They could not grasp how they could be supported and aided by one U.S. agency and then be slapped down by others. In August, the FBI seized a cache of explosives at an anti-Castro training camp in Louisiana. Just weeks later, the U.S. Coast Guard cooperated with the British Navy in a raid on an exile base in the Bahamas. | Then, U.S. Customs cracked down on a group of anti-Castro pilots in Miami. The Secret Service arrested a Cuban exile leader for conspiring to counterfeit Cuban currency, destined for forces inside Cuba. The brunt of that anger fell on President Kennedy. The Cuban exiles came to think of the missile crisis deal as a “betrayal.” Mario Lazo called it a “soul-shattering blow.” Jose Miro Cardona, the head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, an exile organization put together by the U.S. Government to unite fragmented exile groups, resigned in disgust. In the major enclaves of anti-Castro Cubans—in Miami, New Orleans, and Dallas—the once glittering image of President Ken- nedy had turned dark. 474 So, the motivation for anti-Castro Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination was based not only on a schism in political and ideological viewpoints, but also on a disposition growing out of a pragmatic realization that Castro probably would survive. Despite the recommendations of Slawson and Coleman, the Warren Commission largely ignored the mood of the exiles in its final report. It distilled the subject down to a nine-paragraph review entitled, ‘Alleged Association With Various Mexican or Cuban Individuals.”’ | This committee opted to approach the possibilities in a more open-minded way. It decided to examine in depth those exile groups which, besides motivation, had the capability and resources to be involved in an assassination—in other words, the action groups. The committee also attempted to determine if Oswald sought to utilize or exploit resources of the exile groups or if they may have tried to use him. The first step was, of course, to define the action groups. The committee examined public records; it instituted requests for file reviews from every Federal agency in contact with the groups, including the CIA, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Customs Service, the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Secret Service, and so on; it delved into the records of local law enforcement agencies in Miami, New Orleans, and Dallas. The committee also © sent field investigators into Cuban exile communities on an explor- atory mission, to talk to former members of the action groups. From these sources, the committee discovered there were a few hundred militant anti-Castro exile organizations founded between the Castro revolution and the Kennedy assassination. Most did not stay in operation for long, but at one time, 105 of them could be identified from local police files alone. The committee finally boiled the list down to 20 key anti-Castro Cuban groups which had the motivation, capability, and resources to assassinate the President. They will be named and discussed in detail in the committee’s final report. Suffice it to say now that the committee closely scruti- nized the history of the groups and it looked very carefully at the activities and associations of their key leaders. _The committee conducted dozens of field interviews, it took depo- sitions, and it cross-examined witnesses in executive session. In its investigation of two of the main action groups, the commit- tee found indications of a possible connection with figures named in the Kennedy assassination, specifically with Lee Harvey Oswald. The two anti-Castro Cuban exile organizations of special interest to the committee are Alpha 66 and a group named Junta Revolu- clonaria Cubana, or JURE. Alpha 66 was founded in Puerto Rico in the summer of 1962 by Antonio Veciana Blanch, a soft-spoken, mild-mannered former Havana accountant, a church-going family man who had fled Cuba in 1961. Two months after he left, Cuba’s government-controlled press named Veciana as the ringleader of an unsuccessful assassi- nation attempt on Castro. On founding Alpha 66, Veciana declared he was forming the group because the Cuban exiles needed a new, coordinated effort to topple Castro and to counteract the do nothing attitude of Presi- 475 dent Kennedy toward the Castro regime. Dramatic action was re- quired, he said, announcing there would soon be a series of signifi- cant hit-and-run attacks on Cuba. Although most of the original members of Alpha 66 were also former accountants, Veciana put together a tough commando unit. Veciana, as the chief spokesman, fundraiser and coordinator, claimed no political aims other than the overthrow of Castro. Alpha 66 was uniquely independent, generally having little to do with other exile groups whose members were often at odds over the hierarchy that would follow Castro’s overthrow. When Alpha 66 acted, it did so with a flourish. One of its first faults was the shelling and machine-gunning of a British ship and two Cuban vessels off the north coast of Cuba. At a press confer- ence following the raid, Veciana issued a “declaration of war’ against Castro and any ships that were carrying Cuban goods. The British Government filed a strong complaint with the State Depart- ment, but Veciana promised more raids. Throughout the rest of 1962 and into the summer and early fall of 1963, Alpha 66 struck often, quickly gaining the reputation as the most militant of the exile groups. In the middle of the missile crisis, it had the audacity to pull a raid. By March, 1963, the Alpha 66’s unceasing hit-and-run attacks provoked direct public criticism by President Kennedy. Veciana was not cowed. “We are going to attack again and again,” he declared. Veciana had made an old friend, former Castro army major, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, the military leader of Alpha 66. But Veciana himself was the strategic organizer, the public spokesman and fundraiser of the organization. At least, that’s what a review of the newspaper files of the time has reflected. Yet, in September 1962, the New York Times attributed to Ve- Clana a cryptic statement. He had called a press conference to announce five raids in 60 days. Then, in the body of the story, Veciana was quoted as saying that all the planning for the raids was done by leaders “I don’t even know.” As the years went by and the military operations of the Cuban exile groups, including those of Alpha 66, lapsed, Veciana himself remained very active in anti-Castro operations in Latin America. From 1968 to 1972, he used La Paz, Bolivia, as his base. There, he was ostensibly working as a banking consultant, though he spent most of his time planning anti-Communist subversive operations. He was, in fact, on the U.S. Government payroll. Nevertheless, in 1971, he organized an attempt on Castro’s life. Then, in March 1976, a staff investigator for Senator Richard Schweiker, a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelli- gence, approached Veciana in Miami to talk about the relationship of U.S. intelligence agencies to anti-Castro activities. The Kennedy assassination was not mentioned. Veciana told the investigator of his anti-Castro activities. Then, when asked, he said that, yes he had been in touch with certain Americans on those activities. In fact, he said, there was one American who had directed him in all his activities, including the Castro assassination attempts in 1961 and 1971. Veciana said the man told him, when they first met in the Havana bank in which Veciana was working in 1960, that his 476 name was Maurice Bishop. Veciana believed that to be a false name. Veciana said Bishop never told him he was an agent of a USS. intelligence agency and, in fact, avoided a direct answer when asked. But, Veciana recounted, Bishop was obviously a man with strategic contacts, both in the United States and Latin America. Veciana said that Bishop had broken contact with him in 1973, that down through the years he had never initiated contact with Bishop, and he didn’t know how that could be done. Bishop had always contacted him. He had met with Bishop at various loca- tions, on the average of several times a year, between 1960 and 1978. | He met him in Miami often, in Las Vegas once, in Puerto Rico many times, in Washington, D.C., in La Paz, in Caracas and in a few other cities. And, yes, said Veciana when asked, he had met Maurice Bishop a few times in Dallas. As a matter of fact, he recalled one meeting there in August 1963, when he was scheduled to rendezvous with Bishop in the lobby of a large office building. When he arrived, Bishop was there talking with a young, slightly built American. Veciana did not recall whether he was introduced to the man by name, but after the Kennedy assassination, he immediately recognized Lee Harvey Oswald as the man with Mau- rice Bishop that day in Dallas. Antonio Veciana’s story has been of considerable interest to this committee, which has gone to great lengths to asess it. The com- mittee has spent many hours with Veciana, who has provided it with details of his relationship with Bishop. There are still leads which cannot now be revealed, but which the committee is pursu- ing. The committee has, of course, taken sworn testimony from Ve- ciana and other key witnesses. Its investigators have tapped sources from as far as Venezuela and Cuba. Numerous files which have been requested from the CIA, the FBI, and the Department of Defense are still being reviewed and analyzed. In addition, the committee is probing the possibility that Bishop may not have been associated with a U.S. intelligence agency. On July 30, 1978, the committee released a composite sketch of Bishop, produced from a detailed description provided by Veciana. _The committee cannot be conclusive, but it can say that Ve- ciana’s allegations remain undiscredited and that the committee has obtained an indication of the existence of a Maurice Bishop, or someone using that name. The meaning of this story remains, as yet, indeterminate. The other anti-Castro group of special interest to the committee was JURE. JURE was formed in September 1962, as an outgrowth of a split in another anti-Castro group, the Revolutionary Move- ment of the People, or MRP. The founder of JURE was Manolo Ray Rivero. JURE was considered a relatively “leftist” Cuban exile organization, and many of its detractors accused it of “Fidelism without Fidel.” Ray and his group were mistrusted by the right- wing elements of the exile Cuban community. Aithough JURE was supported by the CIA, the Agency had to prod other exile organizations to accept JURE into the Cuban Revolutionary Council, their umbrella organization. Ray kept his 477 group in the CRC for only 3 months, during the period of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The largest and most active JURE chapters were in Miami and Puerto Rico, but other chapters were located throughout the United States and in Latin American countries. One was in Dallas, and one of the members of the Dallas chapter was Silvia Odio, a 26-year-old, recently divorced mother of four, whose husband had abandoned her in Puerto Rico. Educated in the United States and raised in an upper class Cuban environment, Mrs. Odio was the eldest daughter of Amador Odio, once one of Cuba’s top trucking executives. In 1961, Castro’s officers, arrested Silvia Odio’s mother and father for harboring a confederate of Antonio Veciana in the Octo- ber Castro assassination attempt. The Odio children had left Cuba, and several of them lived in Dallas. One of Silvia Odio’s sisters, Serita, attended the University of Dallas and was acquainted with a socialite named Lucille Connell, who was active in civic and charitable activities. Mrs. Connell made arrangements in early 1963 for Silvia to come to Dallas, and further arranged for her to receive psychiatric treatment at South- western Medical School, where she became a patient of Dr. Burton C. Einspruch. According to Mrs. Connell, Silvia suffered from a condition which caused blackouts when reality became oppressive. Silvia Odio testified to the Warren Commission that a man she identified as Lee Harvey Oswald, in the company of two Latin men, visited her apartment in Dallas in late September 1963. The two Latin men identified themselves as members of JURE. It should be noted that Silvia Odio was not unknown in the Cuban community of Dallas. She had attended JURE meetings, and in the summer of 1963, a large photograph of her sisters, Annie and Serita, had appeared on the front page of the Dallas Morning News, along with a human interest story about the Odio family. Silvia’s name was mentioned. Mrs. Odio testified before the Warren Commission in September 1964. She said that one of the men identified himself as Leopoldo, and she assumed from his accent that he was Cuban. A second man, possibly named Angelo, was also Spanish speaking, but, she said, he looked Mexican. The third, a white American male, was introduced to her as Leon Oswald. Later, Annie Odio, who was at her sister’s apartment that even- ing, would corroborate Silvia’s story to the FBI. She said she opened the door for the visitors. Silvia Odio, who said she declined to help the men because she didn’t trust their credentials, said that Leopoldo called her 1 or 2 days later. In this telephone conversation, she said, he mentioned his American friend, and said that Leon had remarked that the Cubans should have killed Kennedy after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. When Mrs. Odio learned of Kennedy’s assassination, she had one of her blackouts. She regained consciousness in a hospital room where her sister Annie soon visited her. Earlier, watching Oswald on television, Annie had independently recognized as someone she had seen before. When she mentioned it to her older sister, Silvia reminded her of the first of the three men to her apartment. 41-373 O - 79 - 31 478 Emotionally shaken, the women decided not to mention the inci- dent to anyone. They did, however, tell their sister Serita, and Serita mentioned it to Lucille Connell. On December 12, 1963, the FBI interviewed Silvia Odio. She admitted the visit and positively identified Lee Harvey Oswald as the Leon who had come to her apartment with the two Latin-looking men. A week later, the FBI interviewed Dr. Einspruch who said, that, although Silvia had had some emotional problems, she was a thoroughly credible person. Silvia Odio’s story ran contrary to other evidence which the Warren Commission had compiled. The had documentation that Oswald had traveled to Mexico City by bus and had registered at a hotel there on the morning of September 27. The Warren Commission ordered an investigation, to be conduct- ed principally by the FBI, of Mrs. Odio’s allegation. It represented a glaring inconsistency in the movements of Oswald, as the Com- mission was prepared to report them. In the summer of 1964, the Warren Commission pressed the FBI to dig more deeply into the Odio allegation. On July 24, Chief onset J. Lee Rankin, in a letter to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, stated: * * * the Commission already possesses firm evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald was on a bus traveling from Houston, Tex., to Mexico City, Mexico, on virtually the entire day of September 26 * * * This so-called firm evidence was based on an analysis of Oswald’s — travel during the time period of September 24-27 by Assistant Counsel David Slawson. J. Wesley Liebeler, the assistant counsel who had interviewed Mrs. Odio, disagreed with this analysis and sent a memo to Rankin citing fallacies in the Slowson analysis. | On August 23, Rankin again wrote to Hoover and said, “It is a — matter of some importance to the Commission that Mrs. Odio’s | allegations either be proved or disproved.”’ Rankin requested that — the FBI attempt to learn the identities of the three visitors, by contacting members of anti-Castro groups active in the Dallas area, as well as leaders of the JURE organization. He asked the FBI to check the possibility that Oswald had spent the night of September 24 in a hotel in New Orleans, after vacat- ing his apartment. Portions of this investigation, which were inconclusive in sup- porting the Warren Commission’s contention that Odio was mistak- en, were not sent to Rankin until November 9, at which time the final report had been completed. Back on September 19, Liebeler was extorting Howard Willens, another Warren Commission attorney, to tone down the write-up of the Odio incident. Liebeler contended in that memo: “There are problems. Odio may well be right. The Commission will look bad if it turns out that she is.” The FBI did attempt to alleviate the problems. In a report dated September 26, it produced the story of Loren Eugene Hall, who claimed he had been in Dallas in September 1963, accompanied by two men fitting Odio’s general description, and that it was they hs had visited Silvia Odio. Oswald, Hall said, was not one of the en. Within a week of Hall’s statement, the other two men Hall had named, Lawrence Howard and William Seymour, had been inter- 479 viewed. They denied ever having met Silvia Odio. Then, later, Hall himself retracted his statement. Despite the fact that the Commission could not prove Oswald took a bus to Mexico City, and despite the fact that Loran Hall’s story was an admitted fabrication, the Warren report was pub- lished, with this explanation of the Odio incident: While the FBI had not yet completed its investigation into this matter at the time the report went to press, the Commission has concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was not at Mrs. Odio’s apartment in September 1963. This critics of the Warren Commission have been quick to pounce on this conclusion. In her book, ‘Accessories After the Fact,” Sylvia Meagher wrote: The Commission’s failure to get to the bottom of this affair, with its inescapble implications, is inexcusable. If the Commission could leave such business unfinished, we are entitled to ask whether its members were ever determined to uncover the truth. Indeed, the Commission did not even give an honest account of such facts as were established. Its own exhibits expose the evidence presented in the report as a tissue of evasion and deception which discredits more than it justified the conclusion that Oswald could not have visited Mrs. Odio. The committee is continuing to investigate the Odio allegation. The approach has been two-pronged. First, the committee has en- deavored to interview everyone connected with the allegation. Ad- ditionally, the committee has made intensive efforts to identify the two Spanish-speaking men who visited Mrs. Odio. Interviews and depositions have been conducted with the princi- pals: Silvia Odio, Annie Odio, Amador Odio, Lucille Connel Light, and Dr. Burton Einspruch. The staff also arranged a conference telephone call between Dr. Einspruch in Dallas and Silvia Odio in Miami, during which they recalled the period when Mrs. Odio was under the doctor’s care and related to him the visit of the three men. Mrs. Odio and Dr. Einspruch concurred that the relation of this event came shortly after its occurrence and prior to the President’s assassination. | Loren Hall testified before this committee in executive session on October 5, 1977, and Howard and Seymour were interviewed by the investigative staff. From a review of the FBI files, the committee secured a list of persons who belonged to the Dallas chapter of JURE, and the committee is continuing its attempts ot locate and interview these individuals. Additionally, staff investigators interviewed the leader of JURE, Manolo Ray, now residing in Puerto Rico. Further, the committee secured photographs of scores of pro- Castro and anti-Castro activists in 1963 who might fit the descrip- tions of the two Latins who Mrs. Odio says visited her. The com- mittee also utilized the services of various Government agencies to run a computerized check on all individuals who used the war names of Leopoldo and Angelo, or names basically similar. An extensive search produced the names and photographs of three men who might possibly have been in Dallas in September of 1963. These photographs were shown to Mrs. Odio, but she was unable to identify them as the men she had seen. 480 The committee has determined, as did members of the Warren Commission staff, that Silvia Odio’s story still is credible. Over the period of the past 15 years, only minor details have changed, and one important one remains consistent—Silvia and Annie Odio are adamant that “Leon” was Lee Harvey Oswald. While this committee has gone much beyond the Warren Com- mission’s investigation of the Odio story, it, too, has, as yet, an undetermined meaning. I would note that it summerizes those factors which led the committee to conclude that perhaps some groups within the anti- Castro community may have had the motive, opportunity and the means to be concerned with the death of the President in Dallas. It also outlines several specific instances which may tend to show some link between Lee Harvey Oswald and particular groups. Let me turn now to a second area of concern, the so-called Cubanization of Lee Harvey Oswald occurred during the time he lived in New Orleans in 1963. It is a puzzling period and a mysteri- ous career, moreso for the gaps in the record of his activities, as the Warren Commission was able to document it. New Orleans was Oswald’s hometown. He was born there Octo- ber 18, 1939. In April 1968, he moved back, having lived in Fort Worth, in Dallas since his return from the Soviet Union the previ- ous June. He spent the first 2 weeks job-hunting, staying with the Murrets, Aunt Lillian, and Uncle Charles or “Dutz,’ as he was called, the sister and brother-in-law of Oswald’s mother, Margue- rite. After being hired at the Reiley Coffee Co., as a maintenance man, he sent for his wife, Marina, and their baby daughter, and they moved into an apartment on Magazine Street. In May, Oswald wrote to Vincent T. Lee, national director of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, expressing a desire to open an FPCC chapter in New Orleans and requesting literature to distrib- ute. He also had handouts printed, some of which were stamped ““L. H. Oswald, 4907 Magazine Street,” others with the alias, “A. J. Hidell, Post Office Box 30016”, still others listing the FPCC address as 544 Camp Street. Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate to enter into the record ‘and display at this time JFK exhibits F-595, F-597 and F-596. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point. [Whereupon, the above-referred-to exhibits, JFK F-595, JFK F-597 and JFK F-596, follow:] | 481 HANDS HANDS. OFF ‘OFF CUBA! Join the Fair Play for CUBA! Cuba Committee Cuba Committee NEW ORLEANS CHARTER NEW ORLEANS CHARTER MEMBER BRANCH MEMBER BRANCH Free Literature, Lectures Free Literature, Lectures LOCATION: LOCATION: Be OSWALD | AJ HIDELL P.O. BX 30016 NEW ORLEANS, Ln: NEW ORLEANS, LA, EVERYONE Commission WELCOME! Exhibit 2966 A EVERYONE WELCOME! Commission eed lll — 5a ae NT - GARNER EXHIBIT 1 Ha Tee JFK Exnuisit F-596 Mr. Biakey. These exhibits illustrate Mr. Oswald’s activity at this time. The Camp Street address has been a riddle to investigators, official and otherwise, over the years, because the only Cuban activity known to have been based there was an anti-Castro sort. Oswald lost his job in July, and his efforts to find another were futile. It is known through the rest of the summer he filed claims at the Unemployment Compensation Office. The FPCC campaign, however, attracted attention, since Oswald was perhaps the sole overt supporter of Castro in a city where the Cuban community was strongly opposed to his regime. It also got him into a fight with three anti-Castro Cubans, resulting in Oswald spending a night in jail, but earning him some publicity, neverthe- less. On August 17, he was interviewed on the radio and on August 21, he appeared in a television debate. Oswald virtually passed out of sight, however, from August 21 until September 17, the day he applied for a visa to Mexico. He is known to have written letters to left-wing political organizations and he and Marina visited the Murrets on Labor Day. Marina has Pane he spent his free time reading books and practicing with is rifle. There is evidence, however, that Oswald was busier than Marina has admitted, or perhaps was even aware, and that in his activities, he was perhaps possibly associated with some highly improbable individuals. Six witnesses in all, each corroborating the others, have testified before this committee in executive session that Oswald was in Clinton and Jackson, La., in late August and early 483 ma et seeking employment at the East Louisiana State Hospi- tal. At this time, Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate to enter into the record JFK F-598 and JFK F-599, which is the map of Louisi- ana and a display of David Ferrie. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they will be entered into the record. [Whereupon, the above-referred to exhibits, JFK F-598 and JFK F-599 follow:] SOUTHEASTERN LOUISIANA JFK Exuisit F-598 484 JFK Exuisitr F-599 Mr. Buakey. Some of that testimony about Clinton and Jackson place Oswald there with two men, both now deceased, who had been charged by New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison with conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination. One of them, David W. Ferrie, represented by JFK exhibit F-599, died before he was brought to trial. The other, Clay L. Shaw, was aquitted. The fashion in which the Garrison investigation was conducted, and the character of the Shaw trial, have served to complicate an already complex case. It may be that the full story of Oswald in New Orleans will never be told, for added to the problem of de- ceased witnesses and fading memories is the unfortunate fact that 485 the evidence has been tarnished by the way in which it was han- dled in the Shaw prosecution. Nevertheless, the critics of the Warren Commission have argued that there was more to be learned about what Oswald was up to in New Orleans and with whom he was associated. There may be something to this, and the committee will have the opportunity in its final report to lay out in full the details of the New Orleans situation. The committee can, for example, present its conclusions about Oswald’s alleged association with David Ferrie. It has been suggest- ed that the testimony that Oswald and Ferrie were together in Clinton and Jackson is, despite the Garrison prosecution, impres- sive. The implications of such an association may be serious, at least on the level of association, for David Ferrie worked as an investiga- tor for Carlos Marcello, who has been identified over the years as the organized crime boss of Louisiana and Texas. On the day of the assassination, he was with Marcello in a Federal court room in connection with legal proceedings against the alleged mafia leader. Of the forces that may have conspired to assassinate the Presi- dent, organized crime, itself, therefore, deserves great scrutiny, and the committee has indeed examined organized crime for its motive, opportunity and means to assassinate President Kennedy. It has also studied in depth the alleged mafia associations of both Oswald and Jack Ruby. Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate at this time to view the single greatest justification for this effort to look anew at organized crime. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the next exhibit, JFK F-594 be viewed at this time and entered into the record. Chairman Strokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this point. [Whereupon, the above-referred to exhibit, JFK F-594, was re- ceived into the record.| _[JFK exhibit F-594, a film clip, is retained in committee files.] Mr. Buiakey. I would also note this film clip was obtained through the courtesy of the NBC’s live coverage of the events in Dallas. If we could have the lights, please. [Film clip presentation:] Mr. Biakey. Mr. Chairman, that film clip, in the most simple, direct and forceful way, explains why, understandably, the Ameri- can people are disturbed by the Kennedy assassination. They might well accept one lone assassin in November in Dallas, but two surely asks for more than many have been willing to accept. When Ruby shot Oswald in the basement of the Dallas Police Department on November 24, 1963, the Nation was shocked by a nationally televised murder of the accused assassin of the Presi- dent. In addition, the American people and history were deprived of the best single source of evidence in the case. When evidence was so put beyond reach, as it was in the assassination of Oswald, pe first order of an investigation is to seek the motive for that illing. 486 First, what do we know about Jack Ruby? Is there anything in his background that sheds light on why he murdered Oswald? Ruby grew up in Chicago in a lower middle-class surrounding. ~ His early life was disrupted by family disputes. In 1923, after his parents had separated, he was placed in a foster home, when a court found that he, two brothers, and a sister were not receiving proper care. | He moved to California in 1933, then returned to Chicago in 1937 to become a union organizer. He moved to Dallas in 1947, where he operated a string of nightclubs. The last one he owned, the Carou- sel, was a burlesque house. Ruby was known as idiosyncratic, a man of contradictions, given to occasional bursts of violent temper. | When President Kennedy was assassinated, Ruby was at the Dallas Morning News, arranging for an advertisement for the Car- — ousel. In a swirl of activity that culminated in the shooting of | Oswald, Ruby, it has been alleged, seemed to be shadowing, or possibly stalking the accused assasin. He was present when Oswald met the press on Friday evening and he was at the Dallas County Jet on Saturday afternoon, waiting for Oswald to be transferred there. The transfer was postponed until Sunday. Ruby telephoned sev- eral friends to express his grief over the murder of the President. Some of them reported he would lapse into periods of sobbing. He prowled the streets at night, lamenting the decision of nightclub owners to stay open in the aftermath of tragedy. The Carousel was closed, out of respect. On Sunday morning, Ruby went to the Western Union office on Main Street, next door to the Dallas Municipal Building and police headquarters. At West- ern Union, he sent a $25 money order to an employee and then, 4 minutes after the money order was time-stamped, he somehow entered the basement of the police headquarters. As Oswald was being led to the awaiting car, as the committee has just seen, Ruby fired one fatal shot into him. Ruby was tried and convicted of first-degree murder and sen- tenced to death. An appellate court, however, reversed the convic- tion on evidentiary grounds and a new trial was ordered. Before it could begin, he contracted cancer and died of a blood clot in Janu- ary 1967. Our objective here today is to learn more about Jack Ruby, his character, career, and associations, as they might pertain to a motive for shooting Oswald. For that purpose, we have three wit- nesses who knew Ruby, each of them, a close relative, a police officer and perhaps tomorrow a gambler, encountered a distinct facet of the Jack Ruby character. The first witness is Earl Ruby, Jack’s younger brother. He was born in 1915 and has spent his career as a businessman. Mr. Ruby is, at present, the proprietor of Cobo Cleaners in De- troit. He is a resident of Birmingham, Mich. Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate before calling Mr. Ruby to take a short sit-down recess while the film is reset since there is a clip that we would like to show Mr. Ruby during the course of his testimony. [Prepared statement of Prof. G. Robert Blakey follows:] 487 PREPARED NARRATION OF Pror. G. RoBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR As you noted, Mr. Chairman, the question of conspiracy has been with us since these hearings opened nearly 3 weeks ago, although it was addressed more specifi- cally here yesterday. It can be argued that the theories examined yesterday seem to break down under careful inspection, but that is one of the purposes of these hearings—to weigh the validity of the evidence. Today, other, more substantial theories will be examined, if only briefly. Nevertheless, before the committee continues to look into conspiracy theories, it may be helpful to note that none of them wholly originated with this committee’s investigation. Most of the leads or allegations that the committee has examined have heretofore been the subject of some public discussion, the subject of earlier investigations or of books and articles. No claim is advanced here to originality or special insight. What the committee has done is to apply in its own investigation more sophisti- cated techniques of examination than those used or available to those who have preceded us or raised questions, some of which were demonstrated yesterday. Beyond scientific analysis of the evidence, the committee has also employed investi- gative tools that were disregarded in earlier investigations of the Kennedy assassi- nation. The committee has made extensive use of immunity grants and interroga- tion under oath in executive session. Files have been widely read, using only the most tenuous relevancy theories. Another approach has been mentioned here before is the use of a carefully thought out investigative plan that employed a detailed reconstruction of conspiracies that might have occurred, in order to determine, if, in fact, they had any bearing on the actual event in Dallas. The committee did not just run out leads in hand, the typical law enforcement approach. Over the next 3 days, we will be looking into a couple of conspiracy theories that the committee felt warranted its fullest attention. This is not to say these are the plots that are the most likely to have led to the assassination, if indeed any of them did. What is being said is this—here are a couple of conspiracy theories that cannot be readily dismised (as those we considered yesterday can be), and this is the way they were investigated. This is a status report on the investigation, the full findings and conclusions of which will be detailed in the final report. Obviously, all that was done cannot be portrayed here. First, the theory that anti-Castro Cubans conspired to kill the President will be examined and summarized in this narraton. Then it will be appropriate to hear testimony on an aspect of the concern that other forces may have been behind the assassination. Why anti-Castro Cubans? For several reasons. From the evidence available to them in 1964, two staff attorneys for the Warren commission, David Slawson and William Coleman, went so far as to speculate that Lee Harvey Oswald, despite his public posture as a Castro sympathizer, was actually an agent of anti-Castro exiles. Pressing for further investigation of the possibility, they wrote a memorandum which, in part, said: “The evidence here could lead to an anti-Castro involvement in the assassination on some sort of basis as this: Oswald could have become known to the Cubans as being strongly pro-Castro. He made no secret of his sympathies, and so the anti- Castro Cubans must have realized that law enforcement authorities were also aware of Oswald’s feelings and that, therefore, if he got into trouble, the public would also learn of them * * * Second, someone in the anti-Castro organization might have n keen enough to sense that Oswald had a penchant for violence * * * On these facts, it is possible that some sort of deception was used to encourage Oswald to kill the President when he came to Dallas * * * The motive of this would, of course, be the expectation that after the President was killed Oswald would be caught or at least his identity ascertained, the law enforcement authorities and the public would then blame the assassination on the Castro government and a call for its forceful overthrow would be irresistible* * *” Some critics of the Warren Commission have termed the period Oswald lived in New Orleans, the summer of 1963, the “Cubanization of Oswald”, implying there were sinister motives for his inserting himself into the Cuban controversy. They int out that, aside from letters he wrote to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in ew York, Oswald’s known Cuban contacts in the United States were with anti- Castroites. There are other reasons the committee’s attention has been drawn to the anti- Castro area. The Warren Commission files reveal, for instance, that there were numerous reports from Dallas and Miami immediately after the assassination which linked Oswald with Cuba. Yet, when the FBI checked out the reports, in almost all 488 cases they had come from anti-Castro sources, some militant enough to deserve suspicion themselves. . It comes down to this: In a homicide investigation, any individual or group is suspect, if it has the motive, opportunity, and means to commit the crime. There is no doubt that certain anti-Castro groups had all three. It is difficult, these many years later, to appreciate the political and emotional impluses of the Cuban exile communities—in Miami, New Orleans, and Dallas— when John F. Kennedy was President. The hopes and expectations of the exiles had been on a roller coaster ride; their relationship with the U.S. Government had deteriorated. They were puzzled by the often conflicting policies of various Federal agencies towards them and their objectives, the main one being to get rid of Castro. The anti-Castro groups were frustrated, bitter and angry. And the focal point of their resentment was President Kennedy. It began with the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion in April, 1961. Since January 1959, when Castro marched triumphantly into Havana, the more than 100,000 Cubans who had fled the Revolution lived in anticipation of its overthrow. The Cuban exiles were not only encouraged in this hope by the U.S. Government, they were organized, directed and almost totally funded by its agencies. The training camps, the arms and weapons, the instructors, the ships and landing craft were all supplied by the U.S. Government. The invasion plan itself was formulated by the Government. The Cuban exiles came to feel that the Government not nly promised them success, it guaranteed it. When what had been touted as “the glorious march on Havana” turned into a tragic rout, the Cuban exiles, unappreciative of President Kennedy’s inherited role in the invasion, reacted with incredulous disbelief and anger that he would allow the operation to fail. Intensifying the exiles’ reaction was the fact that Kennedy himself insisted on taking the blame. In executive session before this committee, Manuel Antonio Varona, in 1961 the head of the united exile organization, the Revolutionary Democratic Front, told of a tense and emotional encounter with President Kennedy at the White House as hope for the invasion was fading. “We were not charging Mr. Kennedy with anything,” Varona said. ‘““We knew he was not in charge of the military effects directly. Nevertheless, President Kennedy told us he was the one—the only one responsible.” Varona may have sympathized with Kennedy’s position, but most anti-Castro Cubans didn’t. The noted attorney, Mario Lazo, in his book, “Dagger in the Heart,” put it very directly: “The Bay of Pigs defeat was wholly self-inflicted in Washington. Kennedy told the truth when he publicly accepted responsibility * * * The heroism of the beleaguered Cuban Brigade had been rewarded by betrayal, defeat, death for many of them, long and cruel imprisonment for the rest. The Cuban people * * * had always admired the United States as strong, rich, generous—but where was its sense of honor and the capacity of its leaders? “The mistake of the Cuban fighters for liberation was that they thought too highly of the United States. They believed to the end that it would not let them down. But it did * * *” President Kennedy was well aware of the bitter reaction to the Bay of Pigs debacle. Far from abandoning the Cuban exiles, he set out to convince them of his loyalty to their cause. Perhaps the most ironic event of his relationship with the Cuban exiles occurred on December 29, 1962, at the Orange Bowl in Miami. He had come to welcome the survivors of Brigade 2506, the 1,200 men who had been ransomed from Cuba after almost 20 months in prison. The President was presented with the Brigade flag in a dramatic and emotional scene. But the euphoria was false and misleading. Although the Cuban exiles cheered President Kennedy that day, there also coursed through the crowd a bitter resent- ment among some who felt they were witnessing a display for political hypocrisy. Later, it would be claimed that the Brigade feeling against President Kennedy was so strong that the presentation nearly did not take place, and it would be alleged CAC ene: as it turns out) that the Brigade flag given to Kennedy was actually a replica. That intensity of anti-Kennedy feeling by Cuban exiles was the result of events between the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion and the ceremony in the Orange Bowl. It is not possible to know fully how the Bay of Pigs defeat changed President Kennedy’s attitude toward Cuba, but when journalists Taylor Branch and George Crile wrote in Harper’s magazine about a massive infusion of U.S. aid to clandestine anti-Castro operations in the wake of the Bay of Pigs, they titled their article, “The Kennedy Vendetta’. 489 What is known is that the period between the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 can be accurately characterized as the high water mark of anti-Castro activity. Miami, the center of the exile community, became a busy staging ground for armed infiltrations into Cuba. While not every raid was support- ed or even known about in advance by government agencies, the United States played a key role in monitoring, directing and supporting the anti-Castro Cubans. Hundreds of Cubans were set up in proprietary corporations established by the US. Government to support the massive covert operation. And although this effort was cloaked in secrecy, there were very few Cubans in the exile community who did not know what was happening and who was supporting the operation. That was a time of great activity and exhilaration in the Cuban exile community. American arms and weapons flowed freely through South Florida. Miami’s “Little Havana” was a beehive of gossip about the latest infiltration operations or paramili- tary missions. Raiding parties that left from small secret islands in the Florida Keys had the “green light” from the U.S. Government. Then came the Cuban missile crisis and negotiations that ended it. The anti- Castro groups felt as if the rug had been pulled out from under them. The Cuban exiles were initially elated by the possibility that the crisis would provoke a showdown with Castro. But President Kennedy made a deal for the removal of the missiles. Only later did the exiles come to feel full force the impact of Kennedy’s agreement with Khrushchev and Castro. The word was soon passed. Newspapers reported a basic turn-around in the Kennedy policy. For example, the raids that were being conducted by Alpha 66, one of the most aggressive exile organizations, were abruptly condemned by Washing- ton. The State Department asserted that it did not sanction such attacks. In Decem- ber, 2 months after the missile accord, 13 anti-Castro guerrillas were arrested at a training camp in the Florida Keys and their arms and explosives were seized by U.S. Customs agents. In March 1963, another Alpha 66 raid brought a statement from President Kennedy himself. “The raids,” he said, “served no useful purpose.” An attack on a Soviet ship in Cuban waters led to the formal issuance of a policy pronouncement on March 31. Kennedy said, in no uncertain terms: “We intend to take every step necessary to assure that such raids are not launched, manned or equipped on United States territory.” On April 5, The New York Times noted that the United States was throwing more planes, ships, and men into its effort to police the straits of Florida against anti-Castro raiders. Throughout the spring and summer of 1963, the crackdown on guerrilla activity continued, causing frustration and resentment on the part of the exiles. They could not grasp how they could be supported and aided by one U.S. agency and then be slapped down by others. In August, the FBI seized a cache of explosives at an anti- Castro training camp in Louisiana. Just weeks later, the U.S. Coast Guard cooperat- ed with the British Navy in a raid on an exile base in the Bahamas. Then, U-S. Customs cracked down on a group of anti-Castro pilots in Miami. The Secret Service arrested a Cuban exile leader for conspiring to counterfeit Cuban currency, destined for forces inside Cuba. The brunt of that anger fell on President Kennedy. The Cuban exiles came to think of the missile crisis deal as a “betrayal”. Mario Lazo called it a “soul- shattering blow”. Jose Miro Cardona, the head of the Cuban Resolutionary Council, an exile organization put together by the U.S. Government to unite fragmented exile groups, resigned in disgust. In the major enclaves of anti-Castro Cubans—in Miami, New Orleans and Dallas—the once glittering image of President Kennedy had turned dark. So, the motivation for anti-Castro Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassina- tion was based not only on a schism in political and ideological viewpoints, but also on a disposition growing out of a pragmatic realization that Castro probably would survive. Despite the recommendations of Slawson and Coleman, the Warren Commission largely ignored the mood of the exiles in its final report. It distilled the subject down to a nine-paragraph review entitled, “Alleged association with various Mexi- can or Cuban individuals”. This committee opted to approach the possibilities in a more open-minded way. It decided to examine in depth those exile groups which, besides motivation, had the capability and resources to be involved in an assassination—in other words, the “action groups”. The committee also attempted to determine if Oswald sought to utilize or exploit resources of the exile groups or if they may have tried to use him. The first step was, of course, to define the “action groups”. The committee examined public records; it instituted requests for file reviews from every Federal 490 agency in contact with the groups, including the CIA, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Customs Service, the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Secret Service, and so on; it delved into the records of local law enforcement agencies in Miami, New Orleans and Dallas. The committee also sent field investigators into Cuban exile communities on an exploratory mission, to talk to former members of the “action groups”. From these sources the committee discovered there were a few hundred militant anti-Castro exile organizations founded between the Castro Revolution and the Kennedy assassination. Most did not stay in operation for long, but at one time 105 of them could be identified from local police files alone. The committee finally boiled the list down to 20 key anti-Castro Cuban groups which had the motivation, capability and resources to assassinate the President. They will be named and discussed in detail in the committee’s final report. Suffice it to say now that the committee closely scrutinized the history of the groups and it looked very carefully at the activities and associations of their key leaders. The committee conducted dozens of field interviews, it took depositions, and it cross- examined witnesses in executive session. In its investigation of two of the main action groups the committee found indica- tions of a possible connection with figures named in the Kennedy assassination, specifically with Lee Harvey Oswald. The two anti-Castro Cuban exile organizations of special interest to the committee are Alpha 66 and a group named Junta Revolucionaria Cubana, or JURE. Alpha 66 was founded in Puerto Rico in the summer of 1962 by Antonio Veciana Blanch, a soft-spoken, mild-mannered former Havana accountant, a church-going family man who had fled Cuba in 1961. Two months after he left, Cuba’s govern- ment-controlled press named Veciana as the ringleader of an unsuccessful assassi- nation attempt on Castro. On founding Alpha 66, Veciana declared he was forming the group because the Cuban exiles needed a new, coordinated effort to topple Castro and to counteract the “do nothing” attitude of President Kennedy towards the Castro regime. Dramatic action was required, he said, announcing there would soon be a series of significant hit-and-run attacks on Cuba. Although most of the original members of Alpha 66 were, also, former account- ants, Veciana put together a tough commando unit. Veciana, as the chief spokes- man, fund-raiser and coordinator, claimed no political aims other than the over- throw of Castro. Alph 66 was uniquely independent, generally having little to do with other exile groups whose members were often at odds over the hierarchy that would follow Castro’s overthrow. When Alpha 66 acted, it did so with a flourish. One of its first assaults was the shelling and machine-gunning of a British ship and two Cuban vessels off the north coast of Cuba. At a press conference following the raid, Veciana issued a “declara- tion of war’ against Castro and any ships that were carrying Cuban goods. The British Government filed a strong complaint with the State Department, but Ve- cilana promised more raids. Throughout the rest of 1962 and into the summer and early fall of 1963, Alpha 66 struck often, quickly gaining the reputation as the most militant of the exile groups. In the middle of the missile crisis, it had the audacity to pull a raid. By March 1968, the Alpha 66’s unceasing hit-and-run attacks provoked direct public criticism by President Kennedy. Veciana was not cowed. “We are going to attack again and again,” he declared. Veciana had made an old friend, former Castro Army Major, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo the military leader of Alpha 66. But Veciana himself was the strategic organizer, the public spokesman and fundraiser of the organization. At least that’s what a review of the newspaper files of the time has reflected. Yet, in September 1962, the New York Times attributed to Veciana a cryptic statement. He had called a press conference to announce five raids in 60 days. Then, in the body of the story, Veciana was quoted as saying that all the planning for the raids was done by leaders, “TI don’t even know”. _ As the years went by and the military operations of the Cuban exile groups, including those of Alpha 66, lapsed, Veciana himself remained very active in anti- Castro operations in Latin America. From 1968 to 1972, he used La Paz, Bolivia, as his base. There he was ostensibly working as a banking consultant, though he spent most of his time planning anti-Communist subversive operations. He was, in fact, on the U.S. Government payroll. Nevertheless, in 1971, he organized an attempt on Castro’s life. Then in March 1976, a staff investigator for Senator Richard Schweiker, a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, approached Veciana in 491 Miami to talk about the relationship of U.S. intelligence agencies to anti-Castro activities. The Kennedy assassination was not mentioned. Veciana told the investigator of his anti-Castro activities. Then, when asked, he said that, yes, he had been in touch with certain Americans in those activities. In fact, he said, there was one American who had directed him in all his activities, including the Castro assassination attempts in 1961 and 1971. Veciana said the man told him, when they first met in the Havanna bank in which Veciana was working in 1960, that his name was Maurice Bishop. Veciana believed that to be a false name. Veciana said Bishop never told him he was an agent of a US. intelligence agency and, in fact, avoided a direct answer when asked. But, Veciana recounted, Bishop was obviously a man with strategic contacts, both in the United States and Latin America. Veciana said that Bishop had broken contact with him in 1973, that down through the years he had never initiated contact with Bishop, and he didn’t know how that could be done. Bishop had always contacted him. He had met with Bishop at various locations, on the average of several times a year, between 1960 and 1973. He met him in Miami often, in Las Vegas once, in Puerto Rico many times, in Washington, D.C., in La Paz, in Caracas and in a few other cities. And, yes, said Veciana when asked, he had met Maurice Bishop a few times in Dallas. As a matter of fact, he recalled one meeting there in August 1963, when he was scheduled to rendezvous with Bishop in the lobby of a large office building. When he arrived, Bishop was there talking with a young, slightly built American. Veciana did not recall whether he was introduced to the man by name, but after the Kennedy assassination, he immediately recognized Lee Harvey Oswald as the man with Maurice Bishop that day in Dallas. Antonio Veciana’s story has been of considerable interest to this committee, which has gone to great lengths to assess it. The committee has spent many hours with Viciana, who has provided it with details of his relationship with Bishop. There are still leads which cannot now be revealed, but which the committee is pursuing. The committee has, of course, taken sworn testimony from Veciana and other key witnesses. Its investigators have tapped sources from as far as Venezuela and Cuba. Numerous files which have been requested from the CIA, the FBI and the Depart- ment of Defense are still being reviewed and analyzed. In addition, the committee is probing the possibility that Bishop may not have been associated with a US. intelligence agency. On July 30, 1978, the committee released a composite sketch of Bishop, produced from a detailed description provided by Veciana. The committee cannot be conclusive, but it can say that Veciana’s allegations remain undiscredited and that the committee has obtained an indication of the existence of a Maurice Bishop, or someone using that name. The meaning of this story remains, as yet, indeterminate. The other anti-Castro group of special interest to the Committee was JURE. JURE was formed in September 1962 as an outgrowth of a split in another anti- Castro group, the Revolutionary Movement of the People, or MRP. The founder of JURE was Manolo Ray Rivero. JURE was considered a relatively “leftist”? Cuban exile organization, and many of its detractors accused it of “Fidelism without Fidel’. Ray and his group were mistrusted by the right-wing elements of the exile Cuban community. Although JURE was supported by the CIA, the Agency had to prod other exile organizations to accept JURE into the Cuban Revolutionary Council, their umbrella organization. Ray kept his group in the CRC for only 3 months, during the period of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The largest and most active JURE chapters were in Miami and Puerto Rico, but other chapters were located throughout the United States and in Latin American countries. One was in Dallas, and one of the members of the Dallas chapter was Silvia Odio, a 26-year-old, recently divorced mother of four, whose husband had abandoned her in Puerto Rico. Educated in the United States and raised in an upper-class Cuban environment, Mrs. Odio was the eldest daughter of Amador Odio, once one of Cuba’s top trucking executives. In 1961, Castro’s officers arrested Silvia Odio’s mother and father for harboring a confederate of Antonio Veciana in the October Castro assassination atempt. The Odio children had left Cuba, and several of them lived in Dallas. One of Silvia Odio’s sisters, Serita, attended the University of Dallas and was acquainted with a socialite named Lucille Connell, who was active in civic and charitable activities. Mrs. Connell made arrangements in early 1963 for Silvia to come to Dallas, and further arranged for her to receive psychiatric treatment at 492 Southwestern Medical School, where she became a patient of Dr. Burton C. Eins- pruch. According to Mrs. Connell, Silvia suffered from a condition which caused blackouts when reality became oppressive. Silvia Odio testified to the Warren Commission that a man she identified as Lee Harvey Oswald, in the company of two Latin men, visited her apartment in Dallas in late September 1963. The two Latin men identified themselves as members of JURE. It should be noted that Silvia Odio was not unknown in the Cuban community of Dallas. She had attended JURE meetings, and in the summer of 1963, a large photograph of her sisters, Annie and Serita, had appeared on the front page of the Dallas Morning News, along with a “human interest” story about the Odio family. Silvia’s name was mentioned. Mrs. Odio testified before the Warren Commission in September 1964. She said that one of the men identified himself as “Leopoldo” and she assumed from his accent that he was Cuban. A second man, possibly named Angelo, was also Spanish speaking but, she said, he “looked” Mexican. The third, a white American male, was introduced to her as “Leon Oswald”. Later, Annie Odio, who was at her sister’s apartment that evening, would corrobo- rate Silvia’s story to the FBI. She said she opened the door for the visitors. Silvia Odio, who said she declined to help the men because she didn’t trust their credentials, said that Leopoldo called her 1 or 2 days later. In this telephone conversation, she said, he mentioned his American friend, and said that “Leon” had remarked that the Cubans should have killed Kennedy after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. When Mrs. Odio learned of Kennedy’s assassination, she had one of her blackouts. She regained conciousness in a hospital room where her sister Annie soon vistited her. Earlier, watching Oswald on television, Annie had independently recognized Oswald as someone she had seen before. When she mentioned it to her older sister, Silvia reminded her of the visit of the three men to her apartment. Emotionally shaken, the women decided not to mention the incident to anyone. They did, however, tell their sister Serita, and Serita mentioned it to Lucille Connell. On December 12, 1963, the FBI interviewed Silvia Odio. She admitted the visit and positively identified Lee Harvey Oswald as the “Leon” who had come to her apartment with the two Latin-looking men. A week later, the FBI interviewed Dr. Einspruch who said that, although Silvia had some emotional problems, she was a thoroughly credible person. Silvia Odio’s story ran contrary to other evidence which the Warren Commission had compiled. It had documentation that Oswald had traveled to Mexico City by bus and had registered at a hotel there on the morning of September 27. The Warren Commission ordered an investigation, to conducted, principally by the FBI, of Mrs. Odio’s allegation. It represented a glaring inconsistency in the movements of Oswald, as the Commission was prepared to report them. In the summer of 1964, the Warren Commission pressed the FBI to dig more deeply into the Odio allegation. On July 24, Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin, in a letter .to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, stated, “* * * the Commission already possesses firm evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald was on a bus traveling from Houston, Tex. to Mexico City, Mexico, on virtually the entire day of September 26 * * *” This so- called “firm” evidence was based on an analysis of Oswald’s travel during the time period of September 24-27 by Assistant Counsel David Slawson. J. Wesley Liebeler, the Assistant Counsel who had interviewed Mrs. Odio, disagreed with this analysis and sent a memo to Rankin citing “fallacies” in the Slawson analysis. _ On August 23, Rankin again wrote to Hoover and said, “It is a matter of some importance to the Commission that Mrs. Odio’s allegations either be proved or disproved’. Rankin requested that the FBI attempt to learn the identities of the three visitors, by contacting members of anti-Castro groups active in the Dallas area, as well as leaders of the JURE organization. He asked the FBI to check the possibility that Oswald had spent the night of September 24 in a hotel in New Orleans, after vacating his apartment. Portions of this investigation, which were inconclusive in supporting the Warren Commission’s contention that Odio was mistaken, were not sent to Rankin until November 9, at which time the final report had been completed. Back on September 19, Liebeler was extorting Howard Willens, another Warren Commission attorney, to “tone down” the write-up of the Odio incident. Liebeler contended in that memo: “There are problems. Odio may well be right. The Commission will look bad if it turns out that she is.” _ The FBI did attempt to alleviate the ‘‘problems.” In a report dated September 26, it produced the story of Loran Eugene Hall, who claimed he had been in Dallas in September 1968, accompanied by two men fitting Odio’s general description, and 493 that it was they who had visited Silvia Odio. Oswald, Hall said, was not one of the men. Within a week of Hall’s statement, the other two men Hall had named, Lawrence Howard and William Seymour, had been intervie wed. They denied ever having met Silvia Odio. Then, later, Hall himself retracted his statemen t. Despite the fact that the commission could not prove Oswald took City, and despite the fact that Loran Hall’s story was an admitted a bus to Mexico Warren report was published, with this explanation of the fabrication, the Odio incident: “While the FBI had not yet completed its investigation into this matter at the time the report went to press, the commission has concluded that Lee Harvey Mrs. Odio’s apartment in September 1963.” Oswald was not at The critics of the Warren commission have been quick to pounce on this conclu- sion. In her book, ‘“‘Accessories After the Fact”, Sylvia Meagher wrote: “The Commission’s failure to get to the bottom of this affair, with implications, is inexcusable. If the Commission could leave its inescapable such business unfinished, we are entitled to ask whether its members were ever determin ed to uncover the truth. Indeed, the Commission did not even give an honest account of such facts as were established. Its own Exhibits expose the ‘evidence’ presente d in the Report as a tissue of evasion and deception which discredits more than it justifies the conclusion that Oswald could not have visited Mrs. Odio.” The committee is continuing to investigate the Odio allegatio n. The been two-pronged. First, the committee has endeavored to interview approach has everyone con- nected with the allegation. Additionally, the committee has made intensive efforts to identify the two Spanish-speaking men who visited Mrs. Odio. Interviews and depositions have been conducted with the principals : Silvia Odio, Annie Odio, Amador Odio, Lucille Connell Light and Dr. Burton Einspruch. The staff also arranged a conference telephone call between Dr. Einspruc h in Dallas and Silvia Odio in Miami, during which they recalled the period when Mrs. Odio was under the doctor’s care and related to him the visit of the three men. Mrs. Odio and Dr. Einspruch concurred that the revelation of this event came shortly after its occurrence and prior to the President’s assassination. Loran Hall testified before this committee in executive session on October 5, 1977, and Howard and Seymour were interviewed by the investigative staff. From a review of FBI files, the committee secured a list of persons who belonged to the Dallas Chapter of JURE, and the committee is continuin g its attempts to locate and interview these individuals. Additionally, staff investiga tors interviewed the leader of JURE, Manolo Ray, now residing in Puerto Rico. Furthermore, the committee secured photographs of scores of pro-Castr Castro activists in 1963 who might fit the descriptions of the two o and anti- latins who Mrs. Odio says visited her. The committee also utilized the services of various Govern- ment agencies to run a computerized check on all individuals who used the “war” names of Leopoldo and Angelo, or names basically similar. An extensive search produced the names and photographs of three men who might possibly have been in Dallas in September of 1963. These photographs were shown to Mrs. Odio, but she was unable to identify them as the men she had seen. The committee has determined, as did members of the Warren commissi on staff, that Silvia Odio’s story still is credible. Over the period of the past 15 minor details have changed, and one important one remains consisten years, only t—Silvia and Annie Odio are adamant that “Leon” was Lee Harvey Oswald. While this committee has gone much beyond the Warren commission’s tion of the Odio story, it, too, has as yet an undetermined meaning. investiga- The so-called “Cubanization of Lee Harvey Oswald” occurred during lived in New Orleans in 1963. It is a puzzling period in a mysteriou the time he s for the gaps in the recored of his activities, as the Warren Commissi career, more so on was able to document it. New Orleans was Oswald’s home town—he was born there October 18, 1939. In April 1963 he moved back, having lived in Fort Worth and Dallas from the Soviet Union the previous June. since his return He spent the first 2 weeks job hunting, staying with the Murrets, Aunt Lillian _ and Uncle Charles, or “Dutz”, as he was called, the sister and brother-in _ Oswald’s mother, Marguerite. After being hired by the Reily Coffee -law of Co. as a mainte- _ hance man, he sent for his wife, Marina, and their baby daughter, and they moved _ into an apartment on Magazine Street. In May, Oswald wrote to Vincent T. Lee, national director of the Cuba Committee, expressing a desire to open an FPCC chapter in New Fair Play for _ requesting literature to distribute. He also had handouts printed, Orleans and some of which ¥v 41-373 O - 79 - 32 494 were stamped “L. H. Oswald, 4907 Magazine Street”, others with the alias, “A. J. Hidell, P.O. Box 30016”, still others listing the FPCC address as 544 Camp Street. The Camp Street address has been a riddle to investigators, official and otherwise, over the years, because the only Cuban activity known to have been based there was of the anti-Castro sort. Oswald lost his job in July, and his efforts to find another was futile. It is known that through the rest of the summer he filed claims at the unemployment office. The FPCC campaign attracted attention, since Oswald was perhaps the sole overt supporter of Castro in a city where the Cuban community was strongly opposed to Castro. It also got him into a fight with three anti-Castro Cubans, resulting in Oswald spending a night in jail, but earning him some publicity. On August 17, he was interviewed on radio, and on August 21, he appeared in a television debate. Oswald virtually passed out of sight from August 21 until September 17, the day he applied for a visa to Mexico. He is known to have written letters to left-wing political organizations, and he and Marina visited the Murrets on Labor Day. Marina has claimed he spend his free time reading books and practicing with his rifle. There is evidence, however, that Oswald was busier then Marina has admitted, or even may be aware, and that in his activities he was associating with some highly improbable individuals. Six witnesses in all, each corroborating the others, have testified before this committee that Oswald was in Clinton and Jackson, La., in late August and early September, seeking employment at East Louisiana State Hospital. Some of the testimony about Clinton and Jackson place Oswald there with two men, both now deceased, who have been charged by New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison with conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination. One of them, David W. Ferrie, died before he was brought to trial. The other, Clay L. Shaw, was acquitted. The fashion in which the Garrison investigation was conducted, and the character of the Shaw trial have served to complicate an already complex case. It may be that the full story of Oswald in New Orleans will never be told, for added to the problems of deceased witnesses and fading memories is the unfortunate fact that evidence has been tarnished by the way in which it was handled in the Shaw prosecution. The critics of the Warren commission have argued, however, that there is more to be learned about what Oswald was up to in New Orleans and with whom he associated. There may be something to this, and the committee will have the ORDORAUIEY in its final report, to lay out in full detail the situation in New rleans. The committee can, for example, present its conclusions about Oswald’s alleged association with David Ferrie. It has been suggested that the testimony that Oswald and Ferrie were together in Clinton and Jackson is, in a word, impressive. The ImpuEaHOnS of such an association may be serious—at least on the level of associ- ation. David Ferrie worked as an investigator for Carlos Marcello, who has been identi- fied as the organized crime boss of Louisiana and Texas. On the day of the assassi- nation, he was with Marcello in a Federal courtroom in connection with legal proceedings against the alleged Mafia leader. Of the forces that might have conspired to assassinate the President, organized crime itself deserves great scrutiny, and the committee has examined organized crime for its motive, opportunity and means to assassinate President Kennedy, and it has studied in depth alleged Mafia associations of both Oswald and Jack Ruby. _ Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate at this time to view the greatest single justification for this effort to look into organized crime. [Film Clip.] Mr. Chairman, understandably, the American people might well accept one lone assassin in November in Dallas, but two surely asks for more than many have been willing to accept. When Ruby shot Oswald in the basement of the Dallas Police Department on November 24, 1963, the Nation was shocked by a nationally televised murder of the accused assassin of the President. In addition, the American people were deprived of the best single source of evidence in the case. When evidence is put beyond reach, as it was in the assassination of Oswald, the first order of an investigation is to seek the motive for that killing. First, what do we know about Jack Ruby? Is there anything in his background that sheds light on why he murdered Oswald? Ruby grew up in Chicago in lower middle class surroundings. His early life was disrupted by family disputes. In 1923, after his parents had separated, he was placed 495 in a foster home, when a court found that he, two brothers and a sister were not receiving proper care. He moved to California in 1933, then returned to Chicago in 1937 to become a union organizer. He moved to Dallas in 1947, where he operated a string of night- clubs. The last one he owned, the Carousel, was a burlesque house. Ruby was known as idiosyncratic, a man of contradictions, given to occasional outbursts of violent temper. When President Kennedy was assassinated, Ruby was at the Dallas Morning News, arranging for an advertisement for the Carousel. In a swirl of activity that culminated in his shooting Oswald, Ruby, it has been alleged, seemed to be shadow- ing, or possibly stalking, the accused assassin. He was present when Oswald met the press on Friday night, and he was at the Dallas County Jail on Saturday aftrernoon, lai for Oswald to be transfered there. The transfer was postponed until unday. Ruby telephoned several friends to express his grief over the murder of the President. Some of them reported he would lapse into periods of sobbing. He prowled the streets at night, lamenting the decision of nightclub owners to stay open in the aftermath of tragedy. The Carousel was closed, out of respect. On Sunday morning, Ruby went to the Western Union office on Main Street, next door to the Dallas Municipal Building and police headquarters. At Western Union, he sent a $25 money order to an employee, and then—4 minutes after the money order was time stamped—he somehow entered the basement of police headquarters. As Oswald was being led to an awaiting car, Ruby fired one fatal shot into him. Ruby was tried and convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. An appellate court reversed the conviction on evidentiary grounds, however, and a new trial was ordered. Before it could begin, he'contracted cancer and died of a blood clot in January 1967. ’ Our objective today is to learn more about Jack Ruby, his character, career and association, as they might pertain to a motive for shooting Oswald. For that pur- pose, we have three witnesses who knew Ruby, each of whom—a close relative, a police officer, a gambler—encountered a distinct facet of the Jack Ruby character. The first witness is Earl Ruby, Jack’s younger brother. He was born in 1915, and he has spent his career as a businessman. Mr. Ruby is, at present, the proprietor of Cobo Cleaners in Detroit. He is a resident of Birmingham, Michigan. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Ruby. As well as Earl Ruby might have known his brother in their early years, they spent much of their adult life apart. Earl Ruby is particularly limited when it comes to commenting on Jack’s life in Dallas, since Earl was not there. To learn more about Jack Ruby’s life in Dallas, the committee has turned to the Dallas Police Department. It has for two reasons: Ruby was on friendly terms with many officers of the DPD; and because there are questions still about the shooting of Oswald at Dallas Police Headquarters. Our next witness is Captain Jack Revill of the Dallas Police Department. He has been a member of the DPD since 1951 and is currently in charge of the Internal Affairs Division of the Department. In 1963, Captain Revill was a lieutenant assigned to the Criminal Intelligence Section of the Special Service Bureau. Later, he was a member of a special investi- gative unit charged with determining how Ruby entered the police headquarters basement on November 24, 1963. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Captain Revill. The question of whether Jack Ruby acted alone in the shooting of Oswald has not been answered by his own assurances that he did. This is what he told the Warren commission, which subjected him to a polygraph test for verification. But when this committee asked its panel of experts on polygraphs to examine the results of Ruby’s test, it declined to come to a conclusion, explaining the polygraph procedures of 1964 were of such poor quality as to preclude a judgment. In addition, many critics of the Warren commission insist it did not go far enough in examining Ruby’s associations, to see if any of them give support to the suspicion that he was part of a conspiracy. Noting that the Warren commission had discov- ered that Ruby had been in contact with an array of less than respectable charac- ters—gamblers, ex-cons and henchmen of some underworld bigwigs, the committee decided to investigate these connections further, to find out if they might support a conspiracy finding. There were three steps in the committee approach: First, the files on the individuals under investigation were reviewed, files from Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. Second, selected individuals were interviewed, deposed or questioned at executive session hearings. 496 Third, Jack Ruby’s 1963 long-distance phone calls to his associates were analyzed. The Warren commission had access to long-distance telephone records, but it did not make the fullest use of them. The committee took the records the Warren commis- sion had, gathered additional ones, and then analyzed all of them, using a House Information Systems computer. The objective was to categorize Ruby’s phone con- tacts with an eye to discerning patterns. During the Warren commission investigation, on February 24, 1964, staff attor- neys Burt Griffin and Leon Hubert recommended that immediate steps be taken to obtain and preserve the phone records of Jack Ruby and numerous associates. In a lengthy memorandum, Hubert and Griffin recommended that the FBI be instructed to secure the records, and that commission chairman Earl Warren address a letter to telephone companies to secure preservation of existing records. Some records that were specified in the Griffin-Hubert request were obtained, but the extensive preser- vation they had envisioned was not carried out, an investigative step that Hubert and Griffin ultimately agreed to. Griffin has said that commission General Counsel J. Lee Rankin vetoed the recommendation on grounds that it was too far-reaching and would create too great a burden. In another memorandum, dated April 4, Griffin and Hubert said they needed additional assistance in evaluating the phone records that were available. Though it was suggested by Rankin that Chief Justice Warren’s security guard might be able to devote some time to the project, the project envisioned by Griffin and Hubert was never conducted. In a subsequent memorandum dated May 14, the adequacy of the Ruby investigation was discussed, but ultimately compromises were worked out and the commission’s work was com- pleted. Utilizing various phone records still available, including those of Jack Ruby’s phone calls in 1963, the select committee has developed a computer project for the purpose of detailed analysis of them. Using the computer technology of the Legislative and Committee Systems Divi- sion of the House Information System, House Administration Committee, the phone records analysis took shape. An Amdahl 470 V-5 computer was utilized, backed up by two IBM 370-158 central processing units. Various programs were run, using the master data base developed from the various phone records obtained by the commit- tee. Additional programs are still continuing. The telephone calls of Jack Ruby in 1963 were given top priority in the project. In recent years, Ruby’s alleged associations with organized crime have been raised anew. In particular, it has been said that he was in repeated contact with a number of underworld figures in the months just before the assassination of President Kennedy. A response to these charges has been, however, that any contact by Ruby with such people may well have resulted from his attempts to seek assistance in a labor dispute. In programing a chronological consolidation of the telephone calls made by Ruby from five business and home telephones, the committee discovered a significant upsurge in the number of calls in October and November 1963. As can be seen from the month by month plotting of these calls on the graph in exhibit F-545, the number of calls soared from an average of 25 to 35, in May through September, to 75 in October, and 96 in November. (That is, 96 calls up to November 24, the day he was imprisoned for shooting Oswald.) To fathom the possible meaning of the upsurge in Ruby’s calls in October and November, the committee closely evaluated his activities during that period. It considered who it was Ruby was calling and being called by; why he was in contact with these people; whether or not he had contacted them previously. The committee He ek * careful to examine the circumstances surrounding Ruby's labor problems in The labor dispute involved Ruby’s competition with other owners of clubs in the Dallas area. Specifically, he was involved quarreling with other owners over wheth- er amateur striptease dancers—nonunion girls from the local area—could perform in Dallas nightclubs. Ruby had been prohibited by the American Guild of Variety Artists from featuring nonprofessional local strippers in his club. The hiring of local girls in weekend shows, in what were usually billed as “amateur nights”, was a source of profit for him. Ruby was further angered by the fact that at least one of his competitors reportedly had been allowed to use nonunion talent. The exact circumstances of Ruby’s labor difficulties in 1963 are too complex to be dealt with in detail, but one aspect is relevant. In analyzing the dramatic upsurge in calls in October and November 1963, the committee was able to isolate a significant number from the main body of calls. It determined that these particular calls were made in conjunction with Ruby’s efforts to seek acceptable mediation or settlement of his dispute with AGVA. 497 As can be seen from the second line of the graph in exhibit 545, which plots the calls made by Ruby in connection with his efforts to solicit advice from AGVA, increase in these union-related calls corresponds, to a considerable degree, with the the increase in the total body of Ruby’s calls during the same period. The analysis shows that Ruby’s labor difficulties were in fact related to much of the increase in calls made by Ruby in October and November 1963. But in going one step further, it became apparent that to attribute all of Ruby’s increased telephone activity in October and November to his AGVA dispute might be an inaccurate oversimplification, for a closer look at the specific calls he made in 1963 raised questions that could not be readily or easily dismissed: Ruby had, in fact, placed calls to a number of individuals who have been identified as being in some way associated with organized crime. Exhibit F-546 is a printout of these calls. Although it may again be noted that these particular calls also correspond some- what to the upsurge in the main body of Ruby calls in the weeks prior to the assassination, and even though some of the individuals in question have said that Ruby was in contact with them to seek help in his labor difficulties, the committee felt that more detail on the backgrounds of these persons was essential. Extensive file reviews were therefore conducted, and the following picture emerged. Between June and August of 1963, Jack Ruby placed seven long distance calls to one Lewis J. McWillie. McWillie was a close Ruby associate, as Ruby told the Warren commission. In 1959, Ruby had visited Lewis McWillie in Havana, where McWillie was working in an organized crime controlled casino. Jack Ruby’s phone calls to McWillie occurred on June 27, September 2 (two calls), September 4, September 19, September 20, and September 22, The first two calls were placed to McWillie’s home number, the remaining five calls were to McWillie’s place of business, the Thunderbird Casino in Las Vegas. On the afternoon of October 26, 1963, Jack Ruby placed a long distance phone call to Irwin S. Weiner in Chicago, with whom he spoke for 12 minutes. Weiner was and is a prominent bondsman in Chicago, who has been closely linked with such figures as James Hoffa, Santos Trafficante, Sam Giancana, Paul and Allen Dorfman. Weiner, according to Federal and State law enforcement files, is alleged to have served as a key functionary in the longtime relationship between the Chicago Mafia and various corrupt union officials, particularly during Hoffa’s reign as President of the Teamsters Union. Additionally, Weiner has been involved in a business relationship with two men long identified as executioners for the Chicago Mafia—Felix “Phil” Alderisio and Albert “Obie” Frabotta. In the immediate days following President Kennedy’s murder, the FBI sought to question Weiner about the call he had received from Ruby on October 26. According to an FBI teletype of November 28, 1963, Weiner refused to respond to questioning by FBI Agents in Chicago with regard to his contact with Ruby, and he declined to assist the investigation in any way. Other information received by the FBI during the investigation indicated that Weiner had been acquainted years earlier in Chica- go with Ruby’s brother Earl. Though the Warren commission was aware of Ruby’s phone call to Weiner, the commission never sought to have him questioned. Additionally, neither Ruby nor “Uae Earl, were ever asked by the commission about their relationship with einer. In executive session testimony before this committee, Weiner was questioned about his contact with Ruby. He testified that he had gone to high school with Ruby’s brother, Earl, and had been distantly acquainted with Jack. Weiner said he had little or no contact with Ruby in later years, and had not heard from him in at least 10 years at the time Ruby called him in late October 1963. Weiner declared the purpose of Ruby’s call was to seek assistance in the labor dispute he was having with his Dallas nightclub competitors. Ruby asked for aid in putting up a bond related to his attempt to file for an injunction against his competitors. Weiner testified that he declined to assist Ruby, and had no further contact with him. The committee has examined testimony and documentation relating to Ruby’s labor difficulties, in particular his dispute with AGVA. Nevertheless, the committee has not found another reference to an effort by Ruby to put up a bond in connection with seeking an injunction against his competitors. In his appearance before the committee, Weiner further testified that he had lied to a reporter when he said in a taped interview that Ruby’s phone call to him on October 26, 1963 had had nothing to do with labor problems. Weiner testified he had refused to submit to FBI questioning about Ruby in the weeks following the ac-- sination because he believed Bureau agents had harrassed 498 his daughter by implying he might be connected to the assassination. Weiner stated he could not specifically recall where he was on the day of the assassination, or on the day Ruby shot Oswald, though he believed he was on a visit to Miami. At 9:13 p.m., October 30, 1963, 4 days after his call to Irwin Weiner, Jack Ruby placed a call to the Tropical Court Tourist Park, a trailer park in New Orleans. The number Ruby called, 242-5431, was listed as the business office of the Tropical Court, and the duration of the call was one minute. In a partial compilation of numbers called by long distance by Ruby, transmitted to the Warren commission by the FBI in early 1964, a notation was made indicating that this Ruby call to the Tropical Court went to N. J. Pecora. The Warren commission did not, however, interview or investigate Pecora and made no reference to him in its Report. Nofio J. Pecora, alias Joseph O. Pecoraro, was the owner of the Tropical Court Tourist Park. He ran the park from a one-man office located on the premises, the office Ruby had called on October 30. Pecora, a former heroin smuggler, was alleged to be a close associate of Carlos Marcello. The FBI, Justice Department, and Metro- politan Crime Commission of New Orleans have identified Pecora as one of Marcel- lo’s three most trusted aides. Law enforcement surveillance reports have indicated a particularly close Marcello-Pecora relationship during the early 1960’s, with Pecora always close at hand at Marcello’s Town and Country Motel headquarters on the outskirts of New Orleans. In fact, it was noted in the select committee’s computer phone project that Marcello himself placed a call to Pecora on June 24, 1963, at the same trailer office number that Ruby called four months later. Earlier this year, when committee investigators sought to question Pecora about the October 30, 1963 telephone call from Ruby’s office to his own, Pecora declined to respond. Earlier this month, however, Pecora did agree to respond to questions put to him by committee investigators. Pecora stated that he does not recall receiving any telephone call from Ruby. He said he did not know Ruby or have any knowledge of him. Pecora stated that he believes that he was probably the only person who had access to his Tropical Court telephone in 1963, but that he may well have taken a phone message, suggesting the call from Ruby may have been for someone else in the trailer park. The committee has established that Ruby did in fact have an associate who lived at the Tropical Court Tourist Park in 1963. He was a New Orleans nightclub manager named Harold Tannenbaum, now deceased, who was himself a friend and colleague of Pecora, having run several Bourbon Street clubs controlled by the Marcello interests. In his recent interview with Committee investigators, Pecora stated he had been acquainted with Tannenbaum, that Tannenbaum was a neighbor in the trailer court. Pecora said he was not aware that Tannenbaum had been a friend of Ruby. Harold Tannenbaum met Ruby in the summer of 1963 and discussed going into business with him. The computer telephone project has established that Ruby and Tannenbaum were in frequent contact from June to October 1963. The project has also established that an hour after the October 30 call was placed from Ruby’s office to Pecora’s office, Tannenbaum placed a call to Ruby. On Nobember 7, 1963, Ruby received a collect call from Robert G. (Barney) Baker of Chicago. The call lasted 17 minutes. Baker is said to have been a top lieutenant and reputed “enforcer” for Teamster President James Hoffa. A former boxer and ex-convict, Baker was perhaps Hoffa’s best known assistant during the McClellan committee investigation of labor racket- eering in the late 1950’s. The Senate investigation, coordinated by then chief coun- sel Robert iy. Kennedy, had detailed Baker’s role as Hoffa’s personal liaison to various leading Mafia figures. In his McClellan testimony, Baker recited a long list of Mafia hit men with whom he had been associated. In 1960, Robert F. Kennedy wrote of Baker, “Sometimes the mere threat of his presence in a room was enough to silence the men who would otherwise have opposed Hoffa’s reign.” _ Barney Baker was questioned by the FBI in Chicago on January 3, 1964, regard- ing his contact with Ruby. Baker stated that Ruby was a complete stranger to him until the very day he spoke with him, November 7, 1963. Baker explained that Ruby had called him earlier that day and that, in his absence, his wife had taken a message to call Ruby’s nightclub in Dallas. Baker told the FBI that Ruby had not used his real name, but had instructed him to ask for “Lou”, which he did, placing a collect call to Ruby’s number. (It might be noted that this is the only instance the committee has come across in which Ruby has used a false name or alias.) In his 1964 interview with the FBI, Baker stated that the purpose of Ruby’s call was to seek assistance in the labor dispute. According to the FBI report, Baker said he had : concluded the conversation by firmly declining to offer any assistance in this matter.” While in his FBI interview Baker “advised that * * * he had many 499 friends (who) were * * * high-ranking hoodlums”, he stated that he had had no prior association with Ruby, and he had no knowledge of any Ruby connection to such hoodlums. On November 8, 1963, the day after he received the call from Barney Baker, Ruby placed a call to Murray W. (Dusty) Miller at the Eden Roc Hotel in Miami. The call lasted four minutes. Dusty Miller was another key lieutenant of Teamster President James Hoffa, and as head of the powerful southern conference of the union, he was regarded as a possible successor to Hoffa. Miller, who had been a teamster leader in Dallas, was associated with numerous underworld figures. In a recent interview with this committee, Miller stated that he had no contact with Ruby prior to being called by him on November 8, 1963. Miller said Ruby complained of labor problems and asked Miller for help. Miller testified that Ruby said something to the effect, “Barney Baker gave me your number and told me that maybe you could help me out.” Miller stated that on hearing the reference to Baker, he quickly ended the conversation, explaining he viewed Baker as a man with questionable associations. At 5:22 p.m., November 8, 1963, 31 minutes after he called Dusty Miller, Jack Ruby placed a call to Barney Baker in Chicago. This call lasted 14 minutes. It occurred on the day after Baker telephoned Ruby in Dallas. As noted earlier, Baker told the FBI on January 3, 1964 that he had terminated his November 7 conversation with Ruby by “ * * * firmly declining to offer any assistance” to Ruby. In his FBI interview, Baker made no mention of the fact that Ruby had called him back on November 8, 1963. In fact, he indicated that he had no further contact with him. The committee has extensively questioned Baker about his past contacts with Jack Ruby. When asked why he did not tell the FBI of his second lengthy conversa- tion with Ruby, Baker said he must have forgotten about the second call. The committee has noted several other areas of telephone contact or relationship that are of probative interest. Three examples: 1. In testimony before the Warren commission, Jack Ruby’s sister, Eva Grant, said that her brother had called Lenny Patrick in Chicago sometime during the summer of 1963. Mrs. Grant stated that Ruby had had some difficulty in locating Patrick’s number, but he had told her he had finally found it and had, in fact, called Patrick in Chicago. Patrick is said to have been one of the Chicago Mafia’s leading assassins, responsi- ble, according to Federal and State law enforcement files, for the murders of over a dozen mob victims. Patrick had grown up in the same Chicago neighborhood as Ruby and had been slightly acquainted with him. Later, Patrick became, it is said, senior lieutenant of Chicago Mafia leader, Sam Giancana. 2. A call made on September 24, 1963 by an investigator for New Orleans Mafia leader Carlos Marcello to a woman in Chicago, who was present with Ruby on the night before the assassination. The committee found that David W. Ferrie had called the number of Jean Aase West and had spoken for at least 15 minutes. On November 21, 1963, Miss West visited Ruby in Dallas, accompanied by a mutual friend, Lawrence Meyers. Miss West and Meyers had drinks with Ruby shortly before midnight on November 21 at the Cabana Motel. 3. The committee found that Barney Baker had placed a telephone call to another onetime associate of Jack Ruby on the evening of November 21, 1963. The person Baker called was David Yaras of Miami. Yaras was a close friend and partner of Lenny Patrick. He had also been acquainted with Ruby during their early years in Chicago. Like Lenny Patrick, Dave Yaras has served, it is alleged, as a key lieuten- ant of Chicago Mafia leader Sam Giancana, reputedly as an executioner. In an FBI interview in 1964, Yaras stated that he had last seen Ruby over 10 years prior to the assassination. Once again, the ultimate meaning of these facts and circumstances remains as yet indeterminate. Chairman Stoxgs. OK. Mr. Buakey. It would be appropriate, now, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Ruby. Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. Earl Ruby. Would you please raise your right hand to be sworn. You solemn- ly swear the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Rusy. I do. 500 Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated. The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. James McDonald. Mr. ApELSON. My name is Alan Adelson, South Field, Mich. Mr. McDona.p. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ruby, for the record, would you please state your full name? TESTIMONY OF EARL RUBY Mr. Rusy. Earl Ruby. Mr. McDona.p. And are you represented by or are you accompa- nied by an attorney today? Mr. Rusy. Yes, I am. Mr. McDonaALp. Sir, would you, for the record state your name? Mr. ApELSON. Alan Adelson. Mr. McDona.p. Thank you. Mr. Ruby, what is your address and your present occupation? Mr. Rusy. My address is 4380 Stony River Drive, Birmingham, Mich. Mr. McDona.p. And Mr. Ruby, for the record, are you the broth- er of Jack Ruby? Mr. Rusy. Yes, I am. Mr. McDona.p. Would you please give us a brief description of some of your other brothers and sisters in the Ruby family? Mr. Rusy. Well, my oldest brother, Hyman, died several years ago of cancer. He passed away. Approximately 4 weeks ago, my oldest sister passed away from a heart attack. ‘ Mr. McDona.Lp. How many brothers and sisters did Jack Ruby ave’! a Rusy. Four sisters and three brothers, making a total of eight. Mr. McDona.p. Would you move the microphone a little closer to you? Thank you. And where did you and your brother Jack spend his youth? What city did he grow up in? Mr. Rusy. Chicago, II]. Mr. McDonatp. And would you please tell the committee the kind of relationship you had with your brother Jack? In other words, did you associate in the same circle of friends when you were growing up in Chicago? Mr. Rusy. No, not really, because Jack was 4 years older than I was at the time and he traveled with fellows that were older than I was. Mr. McDona tp. So, did you have an opportunity to associate with anyone—did you know who Jack’s friends were during those years’ Mr. Rusy. Yes, some of them. Mr. McDona tp. Mr. Ruby, directing your attention to 1947, did Jack leave Chicago and move to Dallas? Mr. Rusy. Yes, he did. Mr. McDonap. What caused him to do that? Mr. Rusy. Jack, my brother Sam, and myself were equal part- ners in a company called Earl Products Co., a company that orga- nized after I came out of the service, and as they came out of the service I made them equal partners. In any event, Jack was with 501 us for a year or so and we had a disagreement and we decided to buy Jack out. During that time, my sister Eva, who was at that time living in _ Dallas, was in touch with Jack and had been asking him to come down to Dallas. We did give Jack at that time approximately $14,500 as his share and he left for Dallas. Mr. McDona.p. To your knowledge, had Jack ever been to Dallas before 1947? Mr. Rusy. I don’t think so. Mr. McDona.p. During the ensuing years between 1947 and 1963, what kind of contact did you have with your brother Jack, in other words, how often did you see him? Mr. Rusy. Can you repeat that again? Mr. McDona.p. During the years after Jack moved to Dallas, and before the events of November 1963, how often and what kind of contact did you have with Jack? Mr. Rusy. Well, we were in somewhat friendly contact because we were on a friendly basis and he visited Chicago on more than one occasion, I think, and I visited him in Dallas once or twice. Mr. McDona vp. Mr. Ruby, we have a technical problem, that is, our cameras can’t focus on you properly. If you could switch places with your attorney. Perhaps both of you could move a little bit more to my left and to your right. OK, thank you. So, you say you visited Dallas how many times during those years? Mr. Ruy. Twice, I think. Mr. McDona.p. And you say Jack visited you in Chicago on a number of occasions? Mr. Rusy. Well, he had to visit or come to Chicago at least two times that I remember. Mr. McDona.p. Well, what I am driving at, over those years, were you Close to Jack, did you keep up contact? Mr. Rusy. More or less, yes. Mr. McDona .p. Did you telephone each other? Mr. Ruy. Yes. Mr. McDona.p. Write letters? Mr. Rupy. Occasionally. I don’t think we corresponded much. Most of our contacts were by telephone. Mr. McDonap. Would you say you lost contact with Jack during those years, or you kept pretty good contacts up over the distance involved? ag Mr. Rusy. I would say I never lost contact with him. _ Mr. McDona cp. To your knowledge, during the years leading up to 1963, how was Jack doing financially? Mr. Rusy. Well, at one time in the fifties he wasn’t doing very well at all and he returned to Chicago very depressed and at that time I tried to help him out financially, even to try to find him a ‘business in Chicago, but I don’t remember, but for some reason he went back to Dallas again because Eva was there. Mr. McDona.p. Did you have occasion to make loans to Jack? Mr. Rusy. Yes, I did. Mr. McDona.p. How many times? Mr. Rusy. Several times. 502 Mr. McDona.p. And how much did you loan him? Mr. Rusy. Well—— Mr. McDona .p. Total? Mr. Rusy. The total was approximately $15,000, but the last amount that I sent him was $6,000. That was to be an investment more than a loan in a nightclub. Mr. McDona.p. Do you recall the nightclub? Mr. Rusy. I think it was the Carousel. At that time though, it was the Sovereign. They changed the name. Mr. McDonaLp. When you made the investment you were invest- ing in the Sovereign Club? Mr. Rusy. I think so. Before I knew it they were bankrupt. I think they overspent the money on furnishings and business just didn’t materialize as they had planned, and so then I was more or less out of the picture. Mr. McDonaALp. When you say they, who are you referring to? Mr. Rusy. I think Jack and a gentleman by the name of Slayton and probably Ralph Paul. Mr. McDonatp. And you say the Sovereign Club went of of business? Mr. Rusy. Well, it was reorganized, I think. Mr. McDonaALp. Reorganized into the Carousel Club? Mr. Rupy. I think so. Mr. McDonaA Lp. The same physical plant? Mr. Rusy. I think, I am not sure, but I think it was the Carousel then. Mr. McDona cp. Did you ever get paid back for the loan? Mr. Rusy. No, I never in fact received any of the amounts of money that I had loaned or invested. Mr. McDona pn. Did you press Jack for payment? If he closed the Sovereign Club and opened up the Carousel Club, did you express a oe to have an interest in that club in order to get your funds ack‘ Mr. Rusy. No, I did not, and he had other investors from what I understand in opening of the Carousel. Mr. McDona.p. And you say, Mr. Ruby, you went to Dallas how many times during the years? Mr. Rusy. I remember at least twice. Mr. McDona tp. It it possible you went more than that, twice in 16 years? Mr. Rusy. It could be one or more at the most but I am not sure. Mr. McDonatp. And where did you stay when you went to Dallas to visit with Jack? Mr. Rusy. I stayed with Jack in his apartment. Mr. McDonatp. And while in Dallas did you have occasion to frequent his club? Mr. Rusy. Oh, yes, many occasions. Mr. McDona.p. How many times would you say? Mr. Rusy. Well, I am sure every day that I was there I more or less went wherever he went. When he went to the club I went with him because I had nothing else to do. Mr. McDonatp. When you went to Dallas did you take any other members of your family with you? Mr. Rusy. On those visits, no. 503 Mr. McDona.p. How about on other visits? Mr. Rusy. Well, the other visits were during during the trial. That is what I am speaking of. Mr. McDona p. Did you have occasion when you were with Jack in Dallas to meet any of his friends, acquaintances, or business associates? Mr. Rupy. Yes, I did. Mr. McDona.p. Can you recall who were? Mr. Rusy. I remember meeting Ralph Paul. Mr. McDona.p. Anyone else? Mr. Rusy. He introduced me at one time to a prizefighter, a heavyweight champ of Texas, but I don’t remember his name. Mr. McDona_p. Mr. Ruby, the loan you made to Jack, to the Sovereign Club, was it in 1959; is that correct? Mr. Rusy. I think so. I am not even sure. Mr. McDona Lp. Well, that is the year. In general, can you recall what was Jack’s financial situation in that year? Mr. Rusy. Well, he seemed to be getting along. He needed the money to refurbish the club or hire entertainment. Mr. McDona_p. So you made the $6,000 loan but then the club _went out of business, the Sovereign? Mr. Rupy. Yes. Mr. McDonatp. And then Jack reopened the same business premises and it was called the Carousel Club? Mr. Rupy. Yes. Mr. McDonatp. You were not included among the group of controlling owners? Mr. Rusy. Correct. Mr. McDona_p. What kind of protest did you register with Jack? Mr. Rusy. Well, I complained but he said he had no alternative but to make these arrangements, new arrangements. Mr. McDona cp. In 1959, were you aware of your brother Jack taking a trip to Cuba? Mr. Rupy. Yes, I was. Mr. McDona tp. How did you become aware of that? Mr. Rusy. Jack told me about it. Mr. McDona_p. What did he say? Mr. Rusy. He said he was going to visit a good friend of his by the name of Lew McWillie. Mr. McDona p. Did he say how he was going to get there? How was he going to travel to Cuba? Mr. Rupy. As far as I know he flew there in a plane. Mr. McDona _p. Did he have any other comments, was he going there strictly for vacation? Mr. Rupy. Yes. Mr. McDona.p. Now, this was in 1959 when you advanced him the $6,000 loan. Did you have any questions in your own mind as to how he was going to finance a trip to Cuba? In other words, at the time did it strike you as unusual for him to be going to Cuba? Mr. Rusy. No, because I don’t think I learned about it until after he had returned. My counsel tells me that the trip was paid for by Lew McWillie. Mr. McDona_p. And it is your testimony that he went to visit McWillie as a personal vacation? 504 Mr. Rusy. Yes. He thought very highly of McWillie and it was more or less of a friendship visit. Mr. McDona.p. Do you know, did Jack often take vacations? Mr. Rusy. Yes, on occasion he would go to Vegas, I know. Mr. McDona.p. And how often would he go there, do you know? Mr. Rupy. I really don’t know. Mr. McDona.p. Thinking back on Jack, do you remember, was he a smoker, did he smoke cigarettes, pipes, cigars? Mr. Rusy. Very seldom would he smoke a cigarette. Mr. McDona.p. How about drinking, did he drink. Mr. Rupsy. Drank very little, if any. Mr. McDona tp. How about gambling, did he gamble? Mr. Rusy. He gambled a little bit at Vegas; yes. Mr. McDona.p. What did he tell you about the trip after he got back? Mr. Rusy. You mean the trip to Cuba? Mr. McDona .p. Yes. Mr. Rusy. Nothing. Mr. McDona.p. Do you know how long he stayed? Mr. Rusy. No, I don’t even know how long he stayed. Mr. McDona.p. Now, you were deposed by this committee, is that correct, Mr. Ruby, we took a deposition of you in Chicago a few months ago? Mr. Rusy. Yes sir. Mr. McDona.p. On page 838 of that depostion you told the com- mittee that you knew of McWillie, Lewis McWillie in 1959, but you have never met him until a few years ago, is that correct? Mr. Rusy. That is correct. | Mr. McDona.p. Precisely how did you come to learn of this person, how did you know about this guy McWillie? Mr. Rusy. Jack had told me about his friend in Cuba. Mr. McDona.p. And he told you about him in 1959? Mr. Rusy. I don’t remember exactly when he told me but he mentioned his name on more than one occiasion. Mr. McDona.p. What was the perception or understanding of who McWillie was? : Mr. Rupsy. Just a good friend of his. Mr. McDona.p. You are saying that Jack talked to you about him over the telephone or when? Mr. Rusy. I don’t remember how the conversation came up but I know he mentioned his name to me on more than one occasion. Mr. McDonatp. Why would he do this? Why would he mention a friend you had never met to you over the phone on more than one occasion? In other words, let’s recall—— Mr. Rusy. Probably because he had gone to Cuba to visit him and that was a long trip, I would think. Mr. McDonatp. What else did Jack say about the trip to Cuba? Can you recall any specific comments, did he talk, did he like the weather or—— Mr. Rusy. No; he mentioned to me that he was going to visit his good friend McWillie. Mr. McDona p. That is all he said? Mr. Rupy. Well, that is the gist of it. 505 Mr. McDona.tp. When was the first time you learned of Mr. McWillie, before Jack went to Cuba or afterward? Mr. Rusy. I don’t recall—it was so long ago. Mr. McDonatp. Did you or McWillie ever have any mutual business associates or friends? Mr. Rusy. No; I had never met McWillie until last year. Mr. McDona_p. How did you finally meet McWillie? Mr. Rusy. The wife and I were driving to California. We stopped in Vegas and I looked him up and talked to him for a few minutes. Mr. McDona tp. And where did you look him up? Mr. Rusy. He works in one of the gambling casinos there. 7 Mr. McDona.p. And how did you know he was working there? Mr. Rupy. I had talked to either Toni Zoppi or a fellow we called Stoney who had been a friend of the family for many years and one of them told me where he was working. Mr. McDona.p. What is Stoney’s name? Mr. Rusy. I have got it written down. I can’t think of it. We always called him “Fat Stoney.” I would have to look it up. Mr. McDona pn. How about Toni Zoppi, who is he? Mr. Rusy. He was the good friend of Jacks in Dallas. He wrote a night club column for one of the newspapers in Dallas, and, of course, Jack was in touch with him for that reason and they were very close friends. Toni Zoppi also testified at the trial in behalf of Jack and I saw Toni on many occasions during the trial. Mr. McDonatp. And you have maintained contact with him since the trail? Mr. Rusy. Yes. Mr. McDona_p. So it was Zoppi that told you where McWillie was? Mr. Rusy. Zoppi or Stoney, either one. Mr. McDona_p. And when was this trip? Mr. Rusy. The summer of 1977. The spring or summer. Mr. McDona.p. What happened when you met McWillie, what transpired? Mr. Rusy. Well, we talked for 5 minutes, he mentioned all the . problems he had because of Jack, and that the gun Jack had sent him, which he never even picked up, and that was about it. Mr. McDonanp. What gun are you referring to? Mr. Rusy. Jack had one time sent him a gun, he was threatened or something, he asked Jack to send him a gun, and Jack mailed him a gun from what he told me, he was afraid to go and pick it up at the post office, or whatever. Mr. McDonatp. And what casino did you locate McWillie at, what casino in Las Vegas? Mr. Rusy. I have that written down. I can give it to you later, if you want it. Mr. McDona tp. Have you been to Las Vegas often, do you go there often? Mr. Ruy. No, not really. I hadn’t been there for sometime prior to that and I haven’t been there since then. Mr. McDona.p. What caused you to try to look up McWillie when you were there? 506 Mr. Rusy. Well, I realized he was involved with Jack and so much had been said about the gun Jack had sent him I thought I would stop and say a hello to him. Mr. McDona.p. Mr. Ruby, directing your attention to 1963, were you then the owner of Cobo Cleaners? Mr. Ruy. Yes, I was. Mr. McDona.p. Cobo Cleaners is where, in what city? Mr. Rusy. The address is 18135 Livernoyne, northwest part of Detroit. Mr. McDona.p. During that time and up to the present, especial- ly at that time, and some of the questions I am going to ask you, you have already given us in deposition, but we are going to go through them again today, at that time, did you normally utilize telegrams in the course of your business? Mr. Rusy. On occasion; yes. Mr. McDona.p. What would the occasions generally be to use telegrams? I think you testified at the deposition, congratulatory notes, things of that nature. Mr. Rusy. Yes. Mr. McDona.p. During the last 15, 16 years, approximately how many times do you think you have sent a telegram? Mr. Rusy. Probably—I have no idea. I would say five or six times. Mr. McDona bp. Five or six would be at the outside? Mr. Ruy. Yes. Mr. McDonaLp. You are aware that on April 1, 1962, a telegram was sent from Cobo Cleaners to Havana, Cuba, and you testified during the deposition when I asked you was that a normal occur- rence, or it was not a normal occurrence, and your testimony was no; correct? Mr. Rupy. I didn’t understand you. Mr. McDona.p. In other words, sending a telegram to Havana, Cuba, is not a normal occurrence? Mr. Rusy. That’s correct. _Mr. McDona.p. And also in your testimony during the deposi- tion at page 86, you stated that you would have been the person sending such telegram or any telegram, for that matter; is that not correct? Mr. Rupsy. I don’t—— Mr. McDona p. In other words, if anyone sent a telegram from Cobo Cleaners, it would have been you, not a shirt presser or someone out in the back doing the laundry. In other words, you would have been the one to have sent the telegram? Mr. Rusy. Not completely. Mr. McDona p. Perhaps the bookkeeper? Mr. Rusy. Bookkeeper, the manager, I always have a manager. Could have been one of the office help. Mr. McDona.p. During the deposition, it was your testimony that at that time, you said you would normally—— Mr. Rusy. Normally, yes. Mr. McDona tp. I think as we went on in the deposition, you also said, I think it was agreed in 1962, no one else in Cobo Cleaners would have sent a telegram, especially to Cuba. Mr. Rupy. Correct. | 507 Mr. McDona.p. Again, I am referring to the deposition at page 87, again, speaking about this telegram to Cuba in 1962, which we noted was 1 year after the Bay of Pigs incident, in April of 1961, and this was a time when the United States has broken diplomatic relations with Cuba and you said during the deposition that such a telegram certainly “looks suspicious,” that’s a correct reflection of what occurred at the deposition. Mr. Rupy. Yes. Mr. McDonatp.. And also at the deposition, you said you couldn’t explain it, couldn’t explain the telegram. Mr. Rusy. Correct, because I never remembered sending the telegram because I couldn’t explain it. Mr. McDona.p. Subsequent to the deposition in Chicago, you sent us a letter? Mr. Ruy. Yes. Mr. McDonaALp. Just give me a minute. It is a letter dated August 17, 1978, addressed to this committee, which we have given JFK No. F-554. I am going to quote from your letter in part, where you said, “Regarding telegram alleged sent to Cuba in 1962, I’, referring to yourself: checked with post office here and learned that there are six Cubas in the United States, and now I am sure the telegram in question was sent to a Cuba here in the United States and not to Havana, Cuba, or any other place in Cuba. I, therefore, must go on record as stating that at no time did I ever send a telegram to Havana, Cuba, or any place in Cuba. There is a Cuba in each of the following States: Alabama, Illinois, Kansas, New Mexico, New York, and Ohio. Does that accurately reflect your letter? [Witness nodded head.] Mr. McDona.p. Mr. Ruby, have you ever had any business con- tacts or accounts from Cobo Cleaners in Cuba, Ala.; or Cuba, IIl.; or Cuba, Kans.; Cuba, N. Mex.; Cuba, N.Y.; Cuba, Ohio? Mr. Rusy. No. However, if I remember correctly, on the billing, telephone bill, I don’t think it said Havana, Cuba. It read Cuba with a “T’’, after it. . Mr. McDonaALp. Cuba with a ‘“‘T”’. Mr. Rusy. Followed by a “T’’, which would indicate that it was a telegram. Mr. McDona.p. Unfortunately, we don’t have a copy of that telegram. But I am going to read to you from JFK exhibit F-565, which was also introduced into the Warren Commission record and it was given the number C.E. 2978. 2978 is a copy of an IRS, Internal Revenue Service, audit report reflecting an IRS audit of you in 1964. I am going to read some pertinent portions of that record to you because this IRS report, which is the best record that we have now, since the telegram doesn’t exist, specifically speaks to a telegram being sent not to Cuba in any other State, but Havana, Cuba. This is a report dated January 7, 1964, and it was prepared by and IRS revenue agent, and then his report was incorporated into this one. And it reads as follows: Internal Revenue Agent, R. Anstet, has completed checking the books and records of the taxpayer’s novelty and drycleaning business. With exception of a telegram to Havana, Cuba, on April 1, 1962, his examination has disclosed no other leads. Up to January 6, 1964, no attempt was made by Agent Anstet to question Earl Ruby about the Havana telegram or the various long distance calls in 1962 and 1963, first, 508 because his audit concerns only the years 1961 and 1962, and, second, any questions on this line may have disrupted the cooperative attitude and caused an unnecessary delay. However, on January 6, 1964, an opportunity arose for Agent Anstet to question Earl Ruby about certain partnership deductions which had the appearance of possible personal expenses, included among the questionable items were various long distance toll charges in 1962. Concerning these, the taxpayer made the follow- ing comments. The report then lists in one column to the left “Area Called” and then on the other side, it has ‘“Taxpayer’s Comments,” and they have quotes around the comments because, as I understand IRS policy, when they interview a taxpayer, they also bring along a tape recording machine and they record the complete interview, that way they have a complete record of what has been said. Mr. ApDELSON. At that time, I was present at all these interviews. There were no tape recording machines, nor would—— Mr. FITHIAN. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, would the attorney use the mike, please? Mr. ApDELSON. In 1964, there were no tape recording machines used by the Internal Revenue or were tape recording machines available as they were today. I was present at those meetings and there was no tape recording done. Mr. McDona.p. Nevertheless, the agent then took notes, we know that, because we have his report in front of us. His report reflects the taxpayer’s comments on what was said about the var- ious different toll records and he goes down, he starts out with a call to Evanston, IIll., and the taxpayer’s comments, ‘‘That’s where my partner used to live. He moved about 6 months ago to Glen- view. And the agent said, “Rochester, N.Y.’”’ Again, we are referring to telephone calls. And the taxpayer’s comments: “That’s where our superintendent used to live and work.” Then Havana, Cuba. “‘That’s a telegram, isn’t it?” Then the report indicates dot, dot, dot, dot, “I don’t remember.” And then it goes on, Van Nuys, Calif.; Ansonia, Conn., a number of other ones. What is rather curious is his comments after. He has a series of these telephone charges. _The interview regarding the toll charges was in the form of an informal discus- sion while paging through the telephone bills. Comments were offered easily and freely until the item of the Havana telegram. After a brief pause in the conversa- tion, Agent Anstet specifically requested a comment on this item. after another pause, the above-mentioned comment was made. Do you recall that interview, Mr. Ruby? Mr. Ruy. I think so. It is so long ago. Mr. McDonatp. When the agent asked you about, according to his report, he just said as he was going down the list of telephone calls, he said Havana, Cuba, and you said, “That’s a telegram, isn’t it,” and then you couldn’t remember. Mr. Rusy. The reason I said it was a telegram is because a “T” followed Cuba and that indicates it is a telegram. Reae McDonap. And you said to him, then, you couldn’t remem- er’ Mr. Rupsy. Correct. Mr. McDonatp. Did you send a telegram to Havana, Cuba? Mr. Ruy. As I stated before—— 509 Mr. Apetson. Mr. McDonald, at the time, Mr. Ruby was examing the bills with the agent. I also was present at that time, and he was looking at the various telephone bills as they come on a separate sheet and it did have a “T’’, after it, and Mr. Ruby was only asking, “Isn't that a telegram,” or ‘“That’s a telegram, isn’t it,” with a question mark. So, the knowledge of it was not known to Mr. Ruby at that time, and he merely indicated that’s a telegram because the bill had indicated it was a telegram. Mr. Rusy. In answering your question, I never sent a telegram to Havana, Cuba. Mr. McDona.p. On page 91 of the deposition, we discuss this point, and you said that Jack might have asked you to send it, but you didn’t remember whether Jack asked you to send it, is that correct? Mr. Ruy. That’s possible. Mr. McDoNnNaALp. So, it is possible, you are saying it is possible then, that Jack might have asked you to send a telegram to Havana? Mr. Rusy. No, that’s not what I mean. In addition, concerning this telegram, I took it upon myself to call Western Union. Mr. McDona.p. When did you do this? Mr. Rusy. After the deposition, and learned that during that time, since we were on such unfriendly terms with Cuba, it was practically impossible to send a telegram directly to Cuba and that they were channeled through London, also. I think that had I had any reason to send a devious type of telegram to Cuba, I surely wouldn’t have sent it from my own phone number. Mr. McDona tp. Is it possible that Jack might have sent the teleenamn and charged it to your number for some reason unknown to you: Mr. ADELSON. Once again, Mr. McDonald, the telephone bill indi- cated the telegram originated from the telephone number of Cobo Cleaners. It was not charged from another number. It would indi- cate that on the bill. Mr. McDonaALp. You raise an issue which you say you went and checked with Western Union after the deposition 2 months ago in Chicago, but one of the puzzling things about this is that you said in deposition that after the telegram was brought to your attention in January 1964, you never went back and checked out if it was a valid telegram, whether it was a mistake, whatever. I would like to quote you from deposition at page 92, and the question was put to you, “After the agent showed it to you back in 1963-64, did you go back and check with your employees?” You answered: “No, I didn’t think anything of it. Couldn’t imag- ine any of my employees sending it because they never talked about going to Cuba.” Then, the question was: “Did you take any steps after leaving the IRS agent to go back and check your records at your company?” “No, because I thought it was a mistake or something. I just couldn’t imagine what it was.” And the question was put to you, “But didn’t you check to see?” And the answer was, “No.” 510 In other words, it is a telegram that appears completely out of the ordinary at a time when telegrams, as you just said, were not being sent regularly, probably not at all, and the issue, when raised to you 14 years ago, you did not check it. Mr. Rusy. Because I was questioned about it by the Warren Commission and I assumed they were going to check it out, and I realized that I didn’t send the telegram. There was no reason for me to check it out. Mr. ApeEtson. Mr. McDonald, I also want to point out, according to the terminology used by the telephone company and the tele- graph company, a telegram is a domestic letter as opposed to a cablegram. Anything that would go overseas on a bill would be called a cablegram. It appears this telegram probably was a domes- tic item. Mr. McDona.p. Mr. Ruby, directing your attention to November 1963, when did you first learn of your brother’s involvement in the murder of Lee Harvey Oswald? Mr. Rusy. I was at my plant on that Sunday morning with an electrician and one of my drivers, and the reason the electricians were there on Sunday because, at that time, we were working 6 days a week and he had to perform some electrical work and it couldn’t be done on the other days, so he came in Sunday morning and one of my best friends, Mike Nevsen, was in the hospital having had a serious operation and I thought since I was there and waiting while they were working on the electrical work, I called him and as I was talking to him, he suddenly said, “I have to hang up now; somebody just shot Oswald,” and he hung up. And I told my people what had happened, and shortly thereafter, Jim Stewart, one of the drivers that was there, and I left in my station wagon, and as we were driving, taking him home, I had the alee the news came through that Jack Ruby had just shot swald. Mr. McDona.p. Did you have any contact with Jack over the days after the President’s assassination but before he shot Oswald? Mr. Ruy. Yes. Yes. Mr. McDona _p. What kind of contact did you have? Mr. Rusy. Well, I actually heard that he had—he hadn’t talked to me, he called me and I wasn’t home and he called my sister and told her how upset he was, and something to the effect that he was so upset and so disgusted with what happened in Dallas that he even considered leaving there, for some reason. Mr. McDona cp. Leaving Dallas? Mr. Rusy. Yes. Mr. McDona.p. Which sister did he talk to? Mr. Rusy. Eileen. Mr. McDona pn. Eileen. What was her last name? Mr. Rusy. Kaminsky. 5 Nabe McDona p. Did you personally speak with Jack during those ays’! Mr. Rusy. No. Mr. McDonatp. Upon learning that Jack shot Lee Harvey Oswald, what did you do? Mr. Rusy. Well, as I told you, I was in the station wagon, I drope-7 off Jim Stewart at his home, and then I went home, and 511 shortly thereafter I think I called Chicago, where all my family lived, and then Loyola and they were all upset, and by that time it seemed that they were being or trying to be contacted by the news media, and they asked me to come there that day. I did go there that afternoon. My brother, Hyman, as I mentioned before, who since passed away, picked me up at the airport, and we went to the house, and if I remember correctly, in front of the house was surrounded by news people, and we saw them from the corner. We parked and I think we went in the back door. Of course they were ringing the bell trying to get an interview. However, shortly thereafter, someone knocked at the door and said they were FBI, and I said something to the effect that I would like to have proof, because they wanted to come in and talk to us, and he said, if I remember correctly, his name was Mr. White, “‘we will go up to the corner and we will make arrangements so that we will be verified,’ and I think someone called me from downtown and said to let these people in, they have authorization to come and interview you from the Government. Mr. McDona tp. This was on the day you learned that Jack had shot Oswald? Mr. Rusy. This was Sunday evening of the shooting. Mr. McDona tp. After Jack was arrested, did S'S speak with him over the telephone? Mr. Rusy. Yes. Mr. McDona.p. Where were you? Mr. Rusy. Many times. It seems he was permitted to make collect calls from the police station. Mr. McDona.p. What was said the first time that he called you? Mr. Rusy. I don’t remember exactly except—— Mr. McDona .p. Well, in general then, if you think back on—— Mr. Rusy. How bad he felt and this was a problem and things of that sort and—— Mr. McDona.p. Well, how bad he felt about what? Mr. Rusy. About the shooting. Mr.. McDona.tp. Which one, which shooting are we talking about? Mr. Rusy. The shooting of Oswald. Mr. McDonaA Lp. Did he say why he did it? Mr. Rusy. No; not at that time. Mr. McDonaA.p. What else did he say? Mr. Rusy. He not only talked with me at that time, he talked with I know my oldest brother, Hyman, and I don’t remember each word or—— Mr. McDona.p. Did you ever ask him when you talked to him over the telephone why he did it? Mr. Rusy. Not over the phone. When I saw him personally in Dallas I did ask him and he said when Oswald walked out of that doorway he had a silly smirk on his face as though it seemed to Jack that he really felt good about it, and that is when Jack lost control of himself and shot him. Mr. McDona.p. Did you ask Jack what he was doing in the basement that morning of the Dallas Police Department? 512 Mr. Rusy. We talked about it and he said he had gone to send a telegram and he saw the commotion in front of the police station and went over to see what was doing and went down in there, that is how it happened. Mr. McDona.p. Did you believe what he was telling you about the shooting? Mr. Rusy. I had no reason not to believe him. Mr. McDona.p. Did you ever ask him if he was involved with anyone else? Mr. Rusy. Yes. Mr. McDona.p. What did you say to him? Mr. Rusy. At one time when he was in the hospital, because it was much easier to talk to him there, we weren’t talking through the cell, and I asked him point blank if he had ever known or met Oswald before, and his words were absolutely not, ‘are you nuts.” Those were his words to me. Mr. McDona.p. Did you take that as an accurate response by Jack? Mr. Ruy. Yes. oo McDona pn. Did you ask him anything further, did you probe on it’ Mr. Rusy. No; not that I can think of right now. We talked at length many times but so many conversations about the trial and the attorneys and many times he was worried about my family and myself as to our well being and, in fact, one time he was surprised I even answered the phone. He thought I had been killed, for some reason or another. Mr. McDona .p. This was after he was in jail? Mr. Rusy. Yes; later on. Mr. McDona tp. You knew your brother pretty well? Mr. Rusy. I would say yes. Mr. McDona.p. Would you say he was an open type of person? In other words, let his feeling show? Mr. Rusy. Definitely. Mr. McDona.p. Would Jack be the kind of person who could keep a secret? Mr. Rusy. Not really. Because even Toni Zoppi at one time told me that it would be impossible for Jack to keep a secret of any kind because he was always bragging about what he did or was doing, so I would think that he would not keep secrets. Mr. McDona Lp. Well—— Mr. Ruy. He would tell somebody what he was doing. Mr. McDona_p. In your opinion, if Jack had been involved with anyone in shooting Oswald, do you think it would have been likely that it would have come out in conversation when you were alone with him or when he was with members of the family? Mr. Rusy. Well, he knew he was going to die when he learned he had cancer and if he had known anything it is possible he would have told me, because he said words to the effect that you have spent all this money and time getting me a new trial and now I have cancer. I can’t think of the term he used, jumping from the frying pan into the fire, was the words he used. _ Mr. McDonatp. Did he ever give you any hint that he was involved with someone else in the killing of Oswald? 513 Mr. Ruy. Absolutely not. Mr. McDONALD. It is your testimony because he was the kind of person that couldn’t or wouldn’t keep that kind of secret, or gener- ally would he keep secrets or was he open with you? Mr. Rusy. I would say he was more open, as you state. Mr. McDona .p. OK. Do you think it is possible that Jack did things that you weren’t aware of that he didn’t tell you? Mr. Rusy. Oh, sure, I am sure he didn’t tell me everything he did. Mr. McDona.p. You mean you think it is possible he didn’t tell you much about his trip to Cuba other than—— Mr. Rusy. Except that he went to visit his good friend Lew McWillie and Lew McWillie was a great guy and he went to visit him. Mr. McDona.p. And that is about all he told you of the Cuban trip? Mr. Ruy. Yes. Mr. McDona tp. Mr. Ruby, we are going to show you a film clip of your brother, Jack, making a statement. It was taken sometime prior to his incarceration. It is a film clip assembled by BBC, British Broadcasting Co., and we are going to show it to you right now and I would like you to view it on that screen. It is over there. Can you see? Mr. Ruy. Yes. Mr. McDona.p. After the lights go back on I want you to com- ment on it. Excuse me 1 second before we run it. If we could have the lights, when the lights are out, the projector. Mr. Chairman, may we have JFK exhibit F-555 entered into the record? Chairman SToKEs. Without objection, it may be entered and shown at this time. (Thereupon, a short film clip was shown. ] Mr. McDona pn. If we could have the lights, please. Mr. Ruby, could you understand what was being said? It was not good sound, at least from up here it wasn’t that good. Could you hear what was being said? Mr. Rusy. I got the gist of it. McDOonaLp. Jack is in a sense saying that there are things that he is not telling, he has got a secret and he is not telling anybody, no one will ever know. You heard what he said? Mr. Rusy. Yes. Mr. McDonaALp. What is your comment on that? Mr. Rupsy. I can’t answer. I can’t imagine what he had in mind when he said that. Perhaps he was confused, I don’t know. Mr. ApELson. Mr. McDonald, I represented the family of Jack Ruby from the inception of the shooting and actually I took over the matter after Jack died. In our investigation, our trial of the will contests in Dallas, many things came to light that were picked up by the Warren Commission because it was after the fact. Jack was still facing a trial at the time of the Warren investigation and after his trial and the problems that existed as a result of the trial 514 and his realization of the magnitude of what he had done, he developed what the psychiatrists called a paranoid state. He did not have phychomotor epilepsy, as Melvin Belli tried to put forward, but he did develop something after the trial and while he was languishing in jail. He believed that—— Mr. McDOonaALp. Sir, I appreciate your comments but you are not under oath. Mr. ApDELSON. Well, I will take an oath, if you want me to. I think I can assist this commission, this committee, considerably. I think that I probably know as much about Jack Ruby as anybody in this country. Mr. McDona.p. Well, that is up to the chairman, sir. Do you wish counsel to continue, Mr. Chairman? Chairman SToKEs. Would counsel approach the bench? [A short conference between Mr. Cornwell, Mr. McDonald, Mr. Blakey, and the Chairman. ] Chairman SToKEs. Counsel for the witness may proceed with his statement. Mr. ApeEtson. Thank you, Mr. Stokes. After the trial, as I said, Jack Ruby developed this paranoid state. I merely want to point out one significant aspect. When Jack Ruby was taken before the Warren Commission the second time he made statements to the effect “take me to Washington, I want to leave Dallas, can you take me out of here, can I go to Washington and talk to the President.” Now, this involves, as we saw on this film—this involves things that were going on in Ruby’s mind at the time. This psychological or psychiatric problem he was having developed possibly from his reading a book called ‘Exodus.’ He was kept on the, I believe, the sixth floor of the jail in Dallas, whereas the fifth floor was the Oe ward, and at night he would hear screams and even during the day. He developed this thinking that all the Jews in the United States were being taken into Dallas and systematically disposed of, where maybe he saw in Dallas the Warsaw ghetto from “Exodus,” and he believed that the Jews were being disposed of, and he believed that because of his paranoid state. He thought he had lost the trial, he had lost the concept that he had done something not right, but he had done something wrong. We are not saying he had done something right when he shot Lee Harvey Oswald. Certainly he did something wrong. But he didn’t believe that until after the trial and he believed President Johnson at the time was ordering this systematic elimination of Jews be- cause of him, and that he was the last one that was going to be eliminated, the last Jewish person to be eliminated, as Earl Ruby had testified here this afternoon, this morning. He said that he didn’t expect him to be alive when he called, and Earl answered the phone. He didn’t expect Earl to be there because he was being eliminated with the rest of the Jews in the country. The problem, as I said, he went before the Warren Commission, he wanted to go to Washington, to come here to Washington and speak to the President and tell him he was not involved in any conspiracy and to stop eliminating the Jews, in effect. That was basically what was on his mind. 515 Now, this was a type of thing that was picked up by the critics of the Warren Commission. They said, here he is trying to tell some- body something but he won’t do it in Dallas. The same with the film clip we played. He wanted to say something. Remember, he was always incarcerated after the shooting. He wanted to tell people, not people, he wanted to tell the President to stop this elimination of, systematic elimination of Jewish people. It was a paranoid state that he was in. Chairman StToxgs. Thank you, Counsel. Mr. ADELSON. Thank you. Chairman SToKEs. You may proceed, Mr. McDonald. Mr. McDona .p. Thank you. Mr. Ruby, I just have one more question and that is, getting back to the Cuban telegrams. Do you have any records at Cobo Cleaners pertaining to this telegram, any phone records still in your posses- sion? Mr. Rusy. No, I do not. Mr. McDona.p. And is there anything you can say that will enlighten us. You can see the problem we face. We have an inci- dent that has just not been explained and we are trying to find out exactly what happened. Mr. Rusy. I can only—— Mr. McDonaALp. Do you have anything earthen to say about that? Mr. Rusy. Again, I wish to state under oath I never sent the telegram. I have no idea what took place. It wouldn’t be the first time that there was an error in billing on our telephone. As coun- sel brought up something that I didn’t even think of, he said if it had been a telegram to Havana, Cuba, that it would have been listed as a cablegram. Also, again I wish to state that I had no idea or any thought of sending a devious type of telegram to Cuba for some reason or another. I would be very foolish to send from my own telephone, I could have gone to a local Western Union and done something like that. So, again I wish to state under oath I never sent a telegram to Havana, Cuba. I don’t know how it happened. That is about it. Mr. McDona tp. Thank you, Mr. Ruby. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Strokes. The committee will take a 5-minute recess before we start questioning by the committee. [Short recess. ] Chairman SToKEs. The committee will come to order. Mr. McDonald? Mr. McDona.p. At this time, I would like to move JFK exhibits F-554 and F-565 into the record. Chairman SToKEs. Without objection, they may be entered into the record. [The above referred to exhibits, JFK exhibits F-554 and F-565 follow:] 516 JFK Exuisir F-554 01090; F-/7- 75 cet Of pee ttt ting LEME ADD FELTRAE PERSE RIM OR es Sel 518 ~ze eval a abhs tineheatase Ladicatyae fede El 32 Noack Unita eat verdes Se ta ch pest hye Fy py oe a Sa so ; PAGE 3 “NG anta 03 [DUE AUG 24,1978 Tr363 0400 | 3 | LONG DISTANCE CALLS ‘- » TIME MIN DISCOUN See other side be CALL DETAIL FOR 663 0401 1 for billing ee i47 6 DL REDMOND WA 206 885 9400 223PM 2 aut isnadiccn Edt i! 713 D1 WASHINGTON DC 202 225.1910 9%25AM 4 di e ° |4 727 0 NORTHVILLE MI 3193 346 2950 107PmM 11 sscounts, Ba [} 747 D4 KASHINGTON DC 202 ges er byes - : PREY 0 CANS, Olin ea MI 0 313 269 6724 AM i | BAD 77] 0 | | 71810 AXE HTS HE AUBURN 517 748AM 4 Please return Rg 718 D1] CHICAGO™ IL 312 465 3280 238PH 3 ' enclosed card FA 4 72a D3 LAS VEGAS NV 702 734 6922 251PM 1 hi with payment. i? 724 D| BENTON HBR M1 616 926 2186 324PH 4 t Thank you is: {ir72d D |AUBURN ATS NI 313 852 4014 1010AmM 1 / ' f |} 724 0 |PONTIAC MI 313. 334 2644 1010AM—— 2 ' @) SS it 72a p! NORTHVILLE MI 313 348 1700 939AM) 2 : 46 & %§ 726 0 BENTON HBR MHI 616 926 2186 T42AM— 2 72 ie $4956 D BENTON HBR NI 616 926 2185 -954an 1 37 ef 3% 728.0, COMMERCE M1 313 698 3261 335PM 1 13 ; a et a worn Cee Pay a 5 PDR eee ye 1 e we, ond OP eran 6 ye Title Mane te ey : LONG DISTANCE ere TIME MIN DISCOUN ; See other side Ee ' 720 D PONTIAC 41 323 682 9580 1001AmM 1 (09 for billing } 722 04 ROCHESTER MI 313 651 4803 SO4PM 1 0 06 | ~ tenetions 4 722 D4 UTICA MI 313 731 3278 4iSPM 4 0 106 P: - 4 722 D4 ROCHESTER HI 313 375 9261 935AM 1 0 06 discounts, [a } 722 D4 UTICA HI 313 731 2583 425PmM 1 0 06 | key to calls, etc. FS } Tq O4 HARTLAND Mi = 313 632 5189 936AH 1 io 17 PI BB } 722 D4 UTICA MI 313 731 0168 93S5AH 1 0 06 ease return ; 72a D4 COMMERCE MI = 313 363 1212 952AM_ . it 2} enclosed card 722) DY ROCHESTER HI 313.375 9649 -920AmM - 2 0 Wi with payment. 722 D4 PONTIAC MI 313.335 1160 1190AmM *-1 10 (06 Thank t 722 04 HOLLY MI 313 634 9669 428PH 1 “fo TyaS Baie Stlbedet 722 D4 AUBURN HTS MI 313 652 3572 959AM 4 10 106 © 1 72a pa HOLLY ‘MI «=«-323 634 4169 355PH 1 0 "7 : 724 D ROCHESTER NI 313 651 0820 1141AN ix 09 | -724°D1 WASHINGTON DC 202 225 4624 233PH 13 CoD = PD, AUBURN HTS HE 313 652 S245 1226PM (atts. - 09 OF BILLING OR SEAVICE £"* 7 ' t el QUESTIONS CALL ——pe iP diac uF a: ‘ a8 MichigansBe TE tees fiero ae 2 mieWaipabe ey oktPre gente + ; PAGE 5 |JUL Oa = AUG 03 DUE ms 24, 1978 313,.863,,0400 | 5 | bib we 4i0K no! 7 ae Cheat SRTCATE RUT ers 2 9 67 So 1s 17; MI DISCOUNT, {| > Seeotherside oan: sff 616 D PONTIAC ML 315 335 7702 1231PH 8 cy Se e 4617 03 wlaMI FL 395 OTE 190M 102KAm 1 3 120 explanations, . 4 617 D3 MIAME FL 205 350 e111 1024AM 3 7 ng : wie = f 21 9 ROCHESTER Mi 313 651 7810 1001AM 1 ing | key to calls, etc. % Ke OL PONTIAC oT 323.335.9800 955AH— 2 ile g i &23 P| VRAYTONPLS ML 314% 674 4107 407PM_— 2. : oa Please return 3 iruey OF CHICAGO IL 312 465 3280 S4oPH 12 23 1'59 | enclosed card YD , ATAM] FL 305 756 S277 109A 8 116 1121 with payment. : i Ey ae. NG Atiw ARBOR M1 313 971 1114 1235PM 16 te 192 : 2 "71 OS SAW FRAN Ca &95 922 4213 1105AN 3 \7 ig Thank you. t #24 ul rASHINGTUN DC = 22 225 1910 933AN 4 (8 BUDS skuk LF TLL 312 ©73 2753 g22sPr 34 : t FRUM MAYFR MCH 313 651 3070 596 59} GY) . . ; 1 1cHnS SkUNIE ILL 3t2 673 2733 450PH 39 | : uM R e - 1 “one ney wheal The cide! Pah a Eg aa aM 4 : e re ' : a ore a passesSorts HEE Py Agitoning ‘e 3 iMichiganiBelletiotermio nsmiecvarisn aoe hee ee Tst Peri PaGe 4 a JUL irenpelaAUG 03 vue JUL 24,1979 3135863. shee tag LONG DISTANCE CALLS “TIME MIN DISCOUN See othaveive 619 O3 LOSANGELES CA 213 749 93514 1210°M SRI ti 612 D PLYMOUTH Hi 313 459 3051 Be 912M 2 : Se ears ae 612 0 GENTUN HBR M1 616 926 2166 1112AM = 3 07, }. aanlepeiane fa 614 © NORTHVILLE MZ 313 348 2950 213PM 1. ing h— discounts, a 614 0 HT CLEMENS MI 313 465 2826 305PM 1 key to calls, etc. i, 614 Dal LADUE MO 314 991 3600 1129Am 4 i ey 615 D |HOWELL MI 51t7°546 9886 1231PM 2 H Please return a ORAL Erte MI 4270| PONTIAC oren teers 13 693 4725 1249p 313 335 7702 lozern 40 oud wiepaal :a) ‘ 430} M1] WASHINGTON DC 202 225 1910 318PN 2 lath i 1 _ Thank you. 7 11 04 NORTHVILLE MI 313 348 2950 1239Pmq SUBTOTAL 863 0401 MICH 5.58 ALL CALLS . 9, | ce E EL EIE eem EIE LTREETTEETD EAT O a n a 4 H + COOTOAN eeoee ot Bo ae asym OA went a 519 ek Se ee ee eee aa 520 SER LES. FnOHMNE FACSIMILE 8/17/78 Select Committee on Assassinations U.S. House of Representatives 3331 House Office Building, Annex 2 Washington, D.C. 20515 Attention: Jim McDonald Dear Mr. McDonald: Enclosed are expenses incurred during my trip to Chicago to have my deposition taken. Total miles driven to Chicago and return to Detroit: 600 miles Motel: one night $25.00 Telephone calls - attached ph Pe i Food ae Regarding telegram alledged sent to Cuba in 1962. I checked with post-office here and learned that there are six Cubas in the U.S. and now I'm sure that the telegram in question was sent to a Cuba here in the U.S. and not to » Havana Cuba or any other place in Cuba. I therefore must go on record as stating that at no time did I ever send a telegram to Havana Cuba or any place in Cuba. There is a Cuba in each of the following states: Alabama 521 Page II Illinois, Kansas, New Mexico, New York and Ohio. I ordered the record, "The Controversy" which is about the Kennedy assassination and soon as I receive it, I'll send same to you. Sincerely, Earl Ruby 18135 Livernois Ave. Detroit, Mi. 48221 Tel: 313-863-0400 D22 JFK Exuisit F-565 Eat, een , pA aes Geers ea SENSITIVE CASE REPORT? ('>2 8 ue gee “Ronte Sequence) (_] Distelet Director Petroit District | insTRUCTIONS: Submit through channels to ARC [_) ARC- Cincirmati Regional Office (_) Director, Intelligence Division | concerned in an original and seven copies. National Offles , iashington, D. C. : 1.HAME OP CAS OR IDZNTIFICATION OF SITUATION @ CLASS OF TAX | SSISTANTNT REGREGIONAL COMPS Rit S.. EARL Fe RUSY ANTELLIGENCE be TAXABLE PEMOD 22575 Weedland Se Beal het See oe Case i eo . pee | Ol * SLa Fo &- et q Southfield, Hichisan . Tr eee ae _& AMOUNT OF TAX a: Aims Fe F Lad tone a « ae % Jit Bi | “ \ - : d. pockar MO., tr ANY ; on Bee ae ; t. PRINCIPAL !sSUES INVOLVED rr a nee! On 0 | , 2 ° a ee ee ° ‘ - Developing Infornation ? C2 TIS RRR ES ora i gt SD pate Cee ; cathe sr ene 3. "REASONS FOR SENSITIVITY The taxpayer is 2 biether of Jack Ruby, Hallas, Texas, «he allegedly -eorngsingatsd Lee Rarvey Oswald, the allegee asrasain of Prasident i <4 John F. Kennady. - ACTION TAKEN OR PROPOSED ~ I have completed en eralysis of long; distant telephone calls originating From the Earl Ruby. renidence iu Southfield, Michigan aed from the Eerl Fuby end Goorge Yorcus partnership, Cobo Clesners, Detroit, Michigan. Tha pericd covered was fron Uctoker 24, 1561 to December 2, 1963. A copy of the analysis is enclosed with this reaert for reference purposes, ; The analysis was compfled fron information furnished by tha Hichigen Fell Telephone Company and from availuble records of the Internal Revenue Ser - 3 Vice, Detroit, 4ichizar. , 1 . ach telephena number called wae scheculee as to origin, duration and time, syom ATES 5 forse dtov*a Sianetury}" Pe ae ye. SSDUTY Y. - DATE Aeft0d- Bee; cH Sd: fe JUD, ALLE ES “ OLA SWisyeD oT (District Darpetor’s Signature) SN SistRIcK- DETROTE Ce | OATE —F-LFEK U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT - INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RC CH! 4.1§ (1-69) 523 Subscribers were identified and In sore instances the ecceration and/or tone: of business vas determined, Tax raturns of of the -one -hundred seventy-five and tuenty Mich{gan persons ~ ’ called were checked. .Corporate’ returns were not Included, ‘They: failed to.” * disclose any personal transactions with Earl Ruby. However, some of the returns disclosed deductions for interest payments to J. L. Hudson Company on charge accounts. Sore: shewed enployment by Hudson's; by Farl Ruby and George Mareus, d/b/a Cobo Cleaners; er by firns handling cleaners supplies or equipment. The balance primarily disclosed various professional or ' skilled oacupations. Internal Raveaue Agent R, Anstett determined that Cobo Clesners has an ex- ~clusive coatract with.J. £. Hudson .Conpany, Datroit, Michigan, to furnish |:. > ‘“ custcn cleaning services Sch: thaip customars. -Hudson’s, being one of the’ ' largest departnent stores in the midwest, furnishes this service te nearly all of the areas called by Cobo Cleaners, In view of the Cobo - Hudson business relationship, coupled with the infor- nition reported on the available tax returns, it appears that the Michigan calls originating from Cobo Cleaners were. in connection with that business, ve we*4 » “-In ny last’ report,-dated December 11,° 1963;'I indicated that I woulda tempt “ to determine the following individuals background and/or relationship with Earl Ruby: “ge os “sek ge ' 1. Harry C. Futtermen _ 7207 E. Prairle _ Lincolnwood, Skexie, Illinols er oe : ee eu 2e 4 Cscar-A, Ruby ' POR. iyo ae yikes : a £6 ag pee yeh CP ce STR" 58 Lakeshore. Drive - « wegene, Seems ae ER aa eceagrny. R, hatngon ‘South Haven, Michigan weaP pon 5638 N. Bernard .,Chicazo.45,.Illinois .. . be taal os un but akl agit 9 Oe tad ‘, Noe ht pe ae de ee, wed . +. te i ~"° With the exception of checking the tax filing record of Oscar A. Ruby in . the Detroit district where no record was disclosed; I msde no request for any collateral investigations in this matter, It is my understanding that Tam not to initiate any third party inquiries relativete this case. | The Kovember 1963 billing from Cobo Cleariers (UN.3-0400), discloses that ‘four telephone calls were made to Dallas, Texas. The calls originated in Chicazo and were charged to the Cobo Cleaners number, ; 524 Kuaher Type of : Bate Called Call Duration SubserLber 21-26-63. 1.LA.6-6258 | Credit Card.)"*:) lo Minutes’? 2 Eva £2 Graiess4 7 “33599562! “LA. 6-6258 © Credit Card 3 Minutes 3929 Rawlins, Apt. . (Ruby's sister) 11-29-63 = RL 68-3325 Credit Card 3 Minutes Colle; Sullivan ; 1934 hain _ (Attorney) 11-30-63 © LA.8-4775 “Credit Card 17 Ninutes Oscar A. Robinson | iia sae” ee ee Ce ESS Se ee i, ae ok Oe ete a hE . : * eed we ‘i : : ¢ y *, is - ia ie: - i a “ rie ay “34074 Apts. 102°: | to. ERE + Oscar A. Robinson is unidentified. However, he and Oscar A, Ruby fron South Naven, Michigan and Chicago, Illinois, may be the sama person. It is suz— gested that a check on this person be considered, since there appears to be ‘no business connection with the texpayer's novelty or cleaning businesses. According to Revenue Agent R. Anstett, the following perzons or companies. -also do not appear to have any. business connection with Earl Ruby's: businesses, a5 but have received calls and may be OF some significance: l. asks Welch Conte teats Nanufacturer) Canbridge, Massachusetts (previously reported) 2. Dominico Scorta . 23205 Ww. Grand eget A Chheagos T2inois Ry ele 3. _Ansan Tool € fg. Co. (Auto Accessories) _ &7S0 H, Ronald ’ Chicayo,, Tllinois . ‘ e fe “Ownerst Anasi and Merio Unberto a an Arvin Futterman 1637 W. Fargo . Chicago, ss det SY Kirk Dubul. - 2331 Sheridan Road Fraternity House Horthvestern University - Chicago, Illinois 525 6. Plliot Schwartz 20026 - 33th Avenue _ Kew York, N.Y. (Queens) _ “. a 7 Triangle fy. Cozpany — Z 714 Division Streat Oshkosh, tisconsin (Freviously reported) g. Francis Lynch 109 South Land Drive Rochester, New York . ok ~ Kerry¢C, Pavtoiead Pr al 8 eo eo 720 E. Prairie. Lincolnwood, Skokie, Illfnois (previously reported) In view of the nature of this case, the selaction of the above parties for suggested background investigations and importanca, {is discretionary, ~ Internal: Revenue Agent R, Anstetthas cempletec checking the. books and records cf the taxpayer's novelty and dry cleaning businesses. With the exception of the telegram to Havana, Cuba on April 1, 1962, his examination has dis-= clesed no other leads. © _ ; Up to Janusry 6, 1964, no attempt was made Ly Agent 4nstett to question Earl ' Ruby about the Havana telegran or the various long distance calls in 1962 and 1968. First, because his audit concerns only the years 1961 snd 1962; and secendly, any questions on this line may have disrupted the cooperative attitude ard:caused an unnecessary delay.) | (20.6. Ee es -!: -* > -* . ~ ‘However, on January 6, -1964, an opportunity arose for Agent Anstett to questicn _ Eacl Ruby about certain partnership deducticns, which had the appearance of - possible personal expenses, Included among the questionsble {items were varfous ‘long distance toll charges in 1962, . Concerning these, the taxpayer rade the following comments: ~ we > Area Called TORN, ‘Se Taxpayer's Comments Evanston, Illinois -: s "That's where my partner used to live. ae ie Moved sdbout six months azo to Glen- view.” : : Rochester, New York “That's where our superintendent used to live and work,” 41-373 O - 79 - 34 526 Area Called Taxpayer's Fa Ks LD tsa Cozments ABLE oh lente Havana, Cubs fae te . .... “That's a telegram Isn't it? oo se a lb Pt nee ei oe, re. ¢ omer on= ie: renember," -: ee $ ae ete a a i te ee Rees _ Z ° Ven Nuys, California "ZY don’t reronber. > ‘ Ansoniader, Connecticut "ie vere thinking of buyinz some key chains, -- Cook Hfz. I pans but ve ended up buying calendars, Skckie, Illinois - "That's where my family lived untiz Se e ony teen eee pepelyi SP EAAto neSeb en Pe ae i Chicago eae ee EC | } "Suppliers" cA lah by Ohio Area "Suppliers ~ We try and buy all our supplies direct frem the manufacturers rather then through @ distributor.” Broken ALTOW, pees peach tet “I don't eiae tls bine ‘Warion, fndtaee® ers cu: sca Mity erties’ 5 rather plant: 1 : Benton Harbor, Michigan "Hy Spall other plant.” Grand Rapida, Michigan "Another plant - and a dry cleaning es |e convention.” ot Rew York Ky Soren! Ganka op DUDpLiera®, : NT ere Sa eae ee Eee aE a -" eee op ag! ¥ aDeeOee Suburbs “tour cleaning Yin Cokenee ss nh: _ The interview yegarding the toll charres. was in the form of an {nfornal . discussion while paging through the telephons bills, Cormrents were offered easily and freely until.the item of the Havana telegram. After a brief ‘pause in the conversation Agent Anstett specifically requested 2 coament on Shia, ptee ie BEEF euethey paserch ahove-mentionad cocment wes made. Aside for some nesta eeeaice na9 thieverrte, the audit examination has _ _ Aisclosed no DeFeet understatements of atectree or other indications of ‘fraud. : ° I propese no further investigation in this case, inasmuch as there is no criminal potential and all avenues for leads at the taxpayer's office ‘have been checked. Unless informed otherwise, I propose to close this 527 cere to the files of the Intelligence Division, with the recontondetion ‘that Internal Revenue Agent R, Anstett close his case on a civil basis, . During this investigation I had no personal: contact with the taxpayer ray - his representatives. All the interviews were conducted by Agent Anstett — in relation to his audit. im, ; This is the final sensitive case report in this case, 528 Chairman Strokes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from In- diana, Mr. Fithian, for such time as he may consume. Mr. Firutan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ruby, I am sure the committee’s questions today and the counsel’s questions today and, in fact, the deposition which was taken, reminds you, or has re- stored to your memory a very difficult time for you and your family. Mr. Rupy. Yes. Mr. Frruran. As I recall, the first thing you did when you re- ceived the word on the radio that your brother had shot the alleged assassin of the President was to immediately fly out to Chicago to try to give some sort of help or some kind of consolation, whatever, to your family in Chicago and sort of help them stave off the press and all the unwanted publicity; isn’t that correct? Mr. Ruy. Yes. Mr. Firuran. And then you got a call from your wife in Detroit and she was having the same problems with the glare of the press lights at your home, and she pleaded with you to come back there and sort of help her keep the door shut; is that correct? Mr. Ruy. That’s true. Mr. FirutAn. As I interpret from your testimony at the Warren Commission and your testimony in our deposition, which we have on file, and even the comments you made this morning, is that you and your brother were reasonably close as brothers go? Mr. Rupy. Yes. Mr. FiruiAn. And in your own way, you felt indebted to him for your having gotten a job initially. When his luck was down, you bailed him out and really never asked him any questions about where the money was going that you loaned him or took a note or took a mortgage on his car or his club or anything else. You just did that as a brotherly act to him; is that correct? Mr. Ruy. That’s correct, except for the last payment, of course, the last sum I sent him which, as I stated before, I understood was supposed to be an investment in a club that never materialized. Mr. FirHian. You are one of the few people in America that can help this committee get a better picture, biographical picture, of one of the key figures in this whole scenario that this committee is looking into, and we would like to know as clearly as you can help us, we would like to know more about Jack Ruby, what made him tick, what motivated him, what kind of person he was. So, let’s just start with the range of emotions that people have. Was Jack a sensitive person? Mr. Rusy. I would say exceptionally so. MN FITHIAN. Did he bruise easily, I guess, psychologically speak- ing? Mr. Rupy. Yes, and I say he was definitely sensitive. He took offense on any derogatory remark made about the Jews, also the Presidents of the United States, especially Roosevelt, and we know of one incident that took place in Dallas where a customer made an insulting remark about Kennedy’s wife and Jack threw him out of the club bodily. This was, of course, before the assassination. I heard, not from Jack mainly, but from many of his friends through the years, of different fist-fights he had in the service and out o the service regarding the Jewish people. 529 And he was quick to fight on any insult made about the Jews. And he was also involved in the 1930’s, he and his friends, in breaking up the Nazi bund meetings in Chicago. I didn’t go out on those because, as I say, I was 4 years younger and he went round with fellows that were older than I was, but I know he went on several of these meeting-breaking-up missions, or whatever you want to call them. Mr. Firn1an. Would you characterize Jack as kind of a loner? Mr. Rusy. I would say no, because he had so many friends. Mr. FirHIAN. Was he gregarious, did he like to have people around him all the time, sort of keep things bubbling, so to speak? Mr. Rusy. I would think so. Mr. Firutan. Did he ever really care a lot for anybody? Was he a man of compassion and love? Mr. Rusy. Well, I know he dated a young lady in Dallas that he liked very much. He spoke of her many times. In fact, I met her once when I went to visit him in Dallas. I know he liked her a great deal. Mr. Firuian. After the President’s assassination and after Os- wald’s assassination, did you have conversations with Jack then from that time on down to the trial? Mr. Rupy. Yes. Mr. Firuian. Think back, painful as it may be, to those conversa- tions and tell me why you think your brother killed Lee Harvey Oswald? Mr. Rusy. Well, I know he was quick-tempered and, as I men- tioned before, I did ask him in the hospital when he knew he had cancer and, in fact, he told me he was going to die, after all the money I had spent getting a reversal from the death sentence, again, I did ask him pointblank, when he was lying there in the bed, and he said—I asked him first, ‘Did you know Oswald at all?” And again, as I said before, he said, “Absolutely not. What, are you nuts?” And I asked him, “Why did you shoot him?” on one occasion, and he said, ‘Well, when I saw him coming through there with that smirk on his face as though he was very happy that he had killed the President, I just couldn’t control myself.” Mr. FirH1an. Did he ever tell you why he went to the police station in the first place? Mr. Rusy. Yes, as we know, he went to send a telegram to one of his entertainers, Little Lynn, and it was only a block or so from the police station. And when he looked that way and saw all the commotion over there, he walked over. Mr. Firuian. Did he tell you then why he had been over there before when he thought they were going to move Lee Harvey Oswald, I believe, at a different time, and he had gone down to the police station; isn’t that correct? Mr. Rusy. I am not familiar with that. Mr. FITHIAN. That is not correct? Mr. Rusy. I know that he did see Oswald the previous Friday night at the showup. Mr. Firu1an. Why would he have gone to the showup? Mr. Rusy. Well, I imagine it was the thing to do if you could get into there and he, having so many friends on the police force, that they let him in. That also leaves me to believe that he did not 530 really have any preconceived notions about killing Oswald because on Sunday, because when he saw him Friday, he had no idea that he was going to see him again on Sunday. So, it just don’t add up that there was any plan in J ack’s mind to actually kill Oswald, to my way of thinking. Mr. FirHIAN. So, it is your impression, then, that Jack went first to the showup because it was a magnetic sort of thing to do, and because he had certain connections with the police and he could get in and so on? And, second, that he went down on Sunday, again, just because of the attraction of the excitement—— Mr. Rusy. No; he went to send a telegram on Sunday. Mr. FirHIANn. Well, I know, but he did go from the Western Union office on down to the police station; there is a little distance there. Mr. Rupy. Yes. Mr. Firn1an. He went—let me just finish this, if I may. He went on Sunday sort of the spur of the moment, because I think you said in your deposition he never got up on Sunday morning usually until late in the afternoon, and, he only got up because he got a desperate telephone call from a little girl who was out of money, whatever. Then, he got down to the Western Union office and saw this commotion at the police department and walked on down there and somehow or another got inside the police station and that remains something of a mystery, but that the actual decision to shoot Oswald came only after he saw Oswald sort of smirking as though he was happy he killed the President, and so on, sort of an urge or a spontaneous action, he just pulled out his revolver and shot him, is that your best understanding? Mr. Rusy. Would you state that again? I got lost. Mr. FiruHian. In other words, however, he got to the police sta- tion, it was more or less by accident, if I understand your deposi- tion, not preconceived, didn’t decide in advance he was going to try to be down there when they moved Oswald; managed to get into the police station and then, if I understood you just a moment ago, it was the case of him, once he saw Oswald with the smirk on his face, he just kind of flipped out and out of anger or love for the President or some other very strong emotion, decided to shoot Oswald on the spot; is that your testimony? Mr. Ruy. Yes; I would think that’s correct. Also, I might like to add something to that that wasn’t brought to my attention, actual- ly, until just a few days ago by my counsel, Alan Adelson, that Jack used to practice shooting with the revolver. Yet, when he shot Oswald, he shot him in the stomach and, of course, I never thought to ask him because I didn’t know at that time, it seemed that he was aiming for his stomach, if the photos prove, because he seems to be aiming in a downward motion, and if he meant to kill him, he would have aimed, hit in the chest or the heart or the head. It’s never been explained and I just didn’t understand that. If somebody had brought that to my attention, I would have asked him. It is possible, then, in my thinking that maybe he didn’t plan to kill Oswald. He just meant, or wanted to wound him or make him suffer. Maybe that’s why he aimed for his stomach. 531 Mr. Firuian. I believe counsel wanted to say something a moment ago. Mr. ApDELSON. Thank you, Mr. Fithian. The morning of the kill- ing of Oswald, Jack received a phone call from Fort Worth. His telephone bill, it was a collect call, and his telephone bill reflected that telephone call from this Little Lynn. She was behind in her rent. If you recall, Jack had closed his club on Friday night and that was payday and these girls who were working for him didn’t have the money to pay the rent. She called him Saturday night, then again Sunday morning—he wasn’t there Saturday night—for him to wire her some money. Chief Curry of the Dallas Police Department had told the newspapers the night before, the media people, that if they would return around 10 o’clock, they would be able to see the removal of Oswald. Jack drove downtown and was checked in, stamped in at the Western Union at 11:14, I believe, was the exact time, 13 or 14. And he sent that moneygram to Fort Worth. Taking into consideration the fact Chief Curry had said, be back at 10 o’clock and we will move Oswald at that time, if Jack had to be there for any purposes, he would have been there by 10 o'clock. However, and what I was trying to point out, the Western Union office is attached to the same building that the police station is in, and there is just a sort of alleyway between them, and as he walked out of the telegraph office, he looked down the block and there was a commotion. Now, the police station where he would see it, all there was was a ramp and that was a down ramp that he would see. There was a police officer out there by the name of Napoleon Daniels, who was supposed to be directing traffic in and out of that ramp. At the moment Jack walked—and mind you, I made that walk many, many times to time it; it took approximately 4 minutes to walk from the telegraph office down the ramp—at that exact time, Pa- trolman Daniels walked out into the street because Lieutenant Pierce was removing a car that was in the way of the car that was going to move Oswald, and Jack just at the very moment walked down the ramp and he waved to Lieutenant Pierce, who he knew, and continued down the ramp. But it was just a matter of what have you. He just happened to be there at the moment Daniels was out in the street and was unable to stop him and he just walked out on the ramp. Mr. FiruiAn. Thank you. Mr. Ruby, in the conversations you had with your brother, did he ever indicate that any other person or persons had reason to hope that Oswald was dead? Mr. Rusy. I don’t understand your question. Mr. Firnian. Did he ever recount to you any conversation that he had with anybody else who suggested that the country would be better off, or for any other reason, made a suggestion that things would be better if Lee Harvey Oswald were dead? Mr. Rusy. He never mentioned that to me. Mr. FitH1ANn. Do you have any reason to believe that your broth- er contacted anyone pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald after the shooting of President Kennedy? Mr. Rusy. I don’t understand that question, either. 532 Mr. FirHian. You conversations with your brother and your own understanding of this story, is there anything in either of those that would lead you to believe that your brother contacted anyone about Lee Harvey Oswald after Oswald shot the President and before the Dallas Police Station incident? Mr. Rupsy. There is no conversation that I ever remember about that at all. Mr. Frru1an. Mr. Chairman, I would like to reserve some time a little later after other panel members have had their opportunity, but prior to doing this, I would like to ask the counsel, though he isn’t sworn, I am just curious, if I may, I would like to engage the counsel in a little dialog and then I have one comment to make that will not require any questions. But did you ever meet Jack Ruby? Mr. ApDELSON. No. Mr. Firuian. And so, how did you come to know about Jack Ruby’s so-called paranoid behavior? Mr. ApELSON. I represented Earl prior to the time of the shooting and I was in touch with Earl throughout the trial and throughout the whole period. As a matter of fact, I was involved in negotiating or preparing documents for the original byline story that was allegedly written by Jack Ruby that appeared in the newspapers and we had dialog throughout the entire matter. However, when Jack died, I then became counsel for the family | and represented the family in the dealings in Dallas and Detroit. I made it my business to talk to each person that I could that had anything to do with Jack Ruby in Dallas and learned as much as I could about the entire matter. I have met with, on national televi- sion and debated with, Mr. Mark Lane on the subject, if we can talk about that. I have made it my business to read every bit of materials that exists in this matter. Mr. FITHIAN. Well, to your knowledge, was any information on Jack Ruby’s psychiatric condition that you now describe provided to the court? Mr. ApELSON. Yes; Jack Ruby had prepared several wills and we had a will contest hearing in Dallas before Judge Robertson. At that time, we had psychiatric testimony and Dr. Jolian West, from the University of Oklahoma at that time was the psychiatrist, the last psychiatrist to deal with Jack Ruby and I had extensive con- versations with him in both Detroit and Dallas. Mr. FITHIAN. Was that after the trial? Mr. ApDELSON. This was before the trial of the will contest but, of course, after the trial of Jack Ruby. Mr. Frrutan. I am asking merely to sort of back your story up to the time Jack Ruby was on trial? Mr. ApELSON. Dr. West was not involved. There were several other psychiatrists that were involved in the trial. They were deal- ing with psychomotor epilepsy. Mr. Firu1an. Refresh my memory. What legal steps were taken to avail the psychiatric defense? Mr. ApELson. There was a psychiatric hearing before Judge Brown in Dallas. He was the trial judge of the murder case, and it was determined that Jack Ruby was not insane at that psychiatric trial hearing. However, Mr. Belli, who conducted the trial on 533 behalf of the defense, set forth the theory of psychomotor epilepsy and there was six or seven psychiatrists or psychologists who testi- fied at the trial, the full trial of Jack Ruby. Mr. Firuian. Well, I am neither a lawyer nor a psychiatrist. You are a lawyer. Have you had psychiatrist training as well? Mr. ADELSON. No; I haven’t had psychiatric training as such but ie done extensive studies in that area, as far as a lawyer might O. Mr. FITHIAN. Just as a layman, I don’t mean to be critical, it sort of strikes me as though we are putting together a psychological defense of Jack Ruby after the trial is over and perhaps he is dead. That is just my observation. One more observation, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ruby, can you tell us anything that would bear out what the counsel is saying about your brother’s psychological situation? Mr. Rusy. Well, I know we hired several psychiatrists who exam- ined Jack and they all testified at the trial, or most of them did, and that is all I can tell you, because I am not familiar with psychiatrists as such myself. Mr. Firut1an. Mr. Chairman, there is one thing that troubles me but I see no reason to further question the witness on it. But I just must make a quick summary of the telegram issue. I have read the testimony in the Warren Commission, I have read Mr. Ruby’s statements in the deposition to our attorney, Mr. McDonald, taken in Chicago, and I listened with care this morning prepared to intensively question Mr. Ruby on this. I see no reason to do this, but Mr. Ruby, I am sure you will understand my quandary when I find so many different responses to the telegram issue at different times. I find that in the Warren Commission days you simply said when asked if someone else could have charged it, you doubted it, and then you said this morning that you thought the Warren Commis- sion was looking into it so you didn’t look into it, and you never questioned this at the time of the income tax as to whether it was legitimate or not. It was a curious situation. Then, finally, more curious is your letter to the committee, in which you attest that it might have been a Cuba, New York, or Cuba somewhere else, when quite clearly the question was Havana, Cuba. As a matter of fact, if it had been a Cuba somewhere else in the United States it wouldn’t have raised any question in the first place because, as I looked over your telephone calls, you got calls from all over the United States where you do business, and there is nothing unusual about that. The letter to the committee, Mr. Chairman, seems to me con- trived. In answer to the counsel this morning, where the question was did you ever do any business in any of those Cuba, United States, the answer was no. I am having a great deal of difficulty squaring the variety of responses to the telegram issue, but I doubt that we will clarify it here this morning, so I yield back the balance of my time. Chairman Sroxss. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer. 534 Mr. Preyer. I have just a few questions of Mr. Adelson to make © sure I understand your testimony? ) I understand you never met Jack Ruby personally? Mr. ApELSON. That is correct. Mr. Preyer. And you never talked with him about his paranoia? Mr. ADELSON. No. Mr. Preyer. But that you learned of this from talking with members of the family who had talked to him? Mr. ADELSON. Yes. Mr. Preyer. And from psychiatrists who had talked with him? Mr. ADELSON. Yes, sir. Mr. PrReEYER. You mentioned a Dr. West, is that right? Mr. ADELSON. Yes, sir. Mr. Preyer. Is there any other psychiatrist or medical doctor that you talked to about his paranoia? Mr. ADELSON. Yes; at the will contest there were several doctors, I don’t recall their names at this point, but I do recall Dr. West who did testify then, too. Mr. Preyer. From your conversations with them, when was it that the paranoia developed? Mr. ApELSON. It was a slow process, as I understand, but it developed after his trial. Now, after the trial, and Jack Ruby was found guilty, this was a tremendous blow to him. He actually throught throughout the trial he had done a very courageous thing and all of a sudden it dawned on him that he was now sentenced to death as a result of the trial. Another factor, probably, according to psychiatrists, had a strong effect was his own attorneys, who represented him at the trial, were afterward taking pictures of him in jail, and we understand that this was for purposes of selling to Life magazine. Additionally, it was found out after the trial that the trial judge, Judge Brown, was also writing a book about Jack Ruby, and all of these things taken together gave him, as I understand it, a feeling that what is the use, nobody cares about him anymore, and he was | very upset. | Mr. Preyer. When did he read the book ‘Exodus’? Was that after the trial or was this earlier in his career? Mr. ApeLson. He was reading that book at the time of the essen alioD. He read it, he continued reading it while he was in jail. Mr. PREYER. Just one final question. His paranoia took the form of a belief that the Jews were being disposed of in Dallas because of his action, and you have made the statement that the reason he said, “Take me to Washington, to the Warren Commission,” was that he was to get that idea across to the President. Did he ever tell anyone specifically that that was the nature of his paranoia? did he ever say to anyone, “I think the Jews are being gathered together in Dallas to be disposed of.” Is that a conclusion from the psychiatrists? Mr. ADELSON. No; quite certainly he told that to members of his family, he was surprised that they were still alive when he saw them come to visit him, and he thought that they were annihilated the day before, in his mind he believed he saw Earl annihilated: 535 Mr. Preyer. And did he tell that to anyone of the psychiatrists that you have talked to? Mr. ADELSON. Only Dr. West. Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. | Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to direct a question to counsel. You have mentioned several times that you represented the family in the will contest. I presume the will contest had something to do relative to Jack Ruby’s competence to draw a will, is that correct? Mr. ADELSON. Yes, sir. Apparently there were two or three wills. I prepared one of them, and I say two or three because the one I prepared was never signed. There was a will that was written in the early 1950’s, a holographic will that he personally wrote out and named one Julius Mayer as his executor. Then there was a second will that he wrote while he was in prison where he gave his watch, his ring, his suit of clothes, to a jail guard by the name of Hooten. The competency to write the second will was the issue of the will contest. Could he write that second will giving whatever he had to this Mr. Hooten, and we had an extensive trial in Dallas over that issue, and that is why the psychiatric testimony was necessary at that time to show that he was not at that time competent to make a last will and testament. Mr. Devine. I think it is very pertinent to these hearings with the question of whether or not he was paranoid and so ferth. What was the result of the will contest? Mr. ADELSON. He was determined to be paranoid and not able to write that second will. Mr. DEvINE. Incompetent at the time it was written? Mr. ADELSON. Yes, sir. Mr. Devine. And you did not prepare that will? Mr. AveE.son. No; that was again a holographic will written by Mr. DEvINE. Who assisted in the preparation of that will in the Mr. ADELSON. We believe it was the jailer Hooten. Mr. Devine. No attorney involved in that that you know of? Mr. ApeELson. No attorney involved. Mr. Devine. He was found incompetent to have executed that will at that time? Mr. ADELSON. Yes, sir. Mr. DEvINE. By the court in Dallas? _ Mr. AveEtson. Yes, sir. Mr. Devine. The probate court? Mr. ApELSON. The probate court, Judge Robertson. Mr. DEvINE. Was there a written decision? Mr. ADELSON. No; there was no written decision. The probate court in Dallas was not a court of record so it was just an oral decision that the original will was admitted to probate and the Second will was removed. An appeal was filed and the appeal then was withdrawn on the Hooten will. Mr. Devine. The appeal was not ruled upon by the judge? 536 Mr. ApELSON. No, it was withdrawn, it never went any further than just the filing of the claim of appeal. Mr. Devine. Do you know, counselor, whether or not the judge that made the oral decision is still alive? Mr. ApeEtson. I don’t know. He was a young man, I might say that, if that means anything. I don’t know if he is still alive. Mr. Devine. No further questions. Chairman STokEs. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. Mr. Forp. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the time to the Chair. Chairman SToKEs. The gentleman yields back his time. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar. Mr. Epcar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to address my question to Mr. Ruby. I apologize for not being here during some of your testimony, but coming in at the tail end when Mr. Fithian was asking you some questions, I am a little bit confused and disturbed by some of your responses. I have the feeling, and it is just a personal feeling on my part, that some of what we’re hearing is somewhat of a posthumous way of justify- ing an act of your brother. I would like to try to clarify it a little bit. | You indicated, I believe, that you thought that your brother was aiming for the stomach and, therefore, he was not intending to kill Lee Harvey Oswald, is that correct? Mr. Rusy. Yes; in my thinking it is possible. I am not saying that that is what he did but actually my counsel here brought it to my attention just a few days ago. Had I known about it, as I said before, while Jack was alive or even thought about it myself, I would definitely have asked Jack, but of course—— Mr. Epaar. Isn’t it true that the police had to physically restrain your brother from attempting a second and a third shot? Mr. Ruy. I don’t think so because I also learned from mysister Eva, who was familiar with the gun that Jack used, that it was a defective gun, and it would only shoot once before it had to be set again, or whatever you call it. Mr. Epcar. Well, we have the physical evidence of the gun and we have the opportunity of ballistic analysis and the ability to check that particular weapon as to its ability to fire and how rapidly it can fire, but as I understand it, there was some physical restraint of your brother after the first shot and that there was some eyewitness report of that first shot that your brother was intent on completing the act through a second and third shot. Wewill probably receive some evidence later and we have some depositions that we have taken, but you are still convinced in your mind that the possibility exists that he was not aiming to kill with the deadly weapon he had in his hand? Mr. Rusy. I am saying it is possible. I had no chance to question Jack on that possibility. Mr. Epcar. You had also indicated that as a young person Jac would frequently go to disrupt Nazi meetings in the Chicago area. Mr. Rupsy. That is true. Mr. Epaar. Did Jack ever give you the indication that he sa Lee Harvey Oswald as a representative of that political ideology? Mr. Rusy. No. 537 Mr. Epcar. Did he ever indicate to you what he envisioned that Lee Harvey Oswald was doing in shooting the President? Mr. Rusy. Not to my knowledge. Mr. Epcar. If your brother was as sick as your counsel has begun to indicate he was after the trial, why do you think that some of the beginning signs, the symptoms of this sickness were not prevalent during the actual trial of your brother? Mr. Rusy. Well, in my humble opinion I think that they did begin to appear, because he was making the statements not too long after the shooting incident of the Jews being persecuted and eliminated. Mr. Epacar. When you visited your brother in prison, and later in the hospital, did you ever tape record those sessions? Mr. Rusy. We tape recorded only one session. Mr. EpaGar. Which session was that? Mr. Rusy. That is, I think that is on this tape, if I am not mistaken, but I am not sure because it was put into the form of a record and the record is called the controversy and we asked him many questions, if I recall correctly, about whether he knew Oswald and things of that sort. I didn’t ask the questions. We had present at that meeting Phil Burleson, one attorney from Dallas, and I think the other attorney was Elmer Gertz from Chicago. . Mr. Epaar. Is this tape in the possession of our committee? Mr. Ruy. Yes; I brought it here for that reason. Mr. McDonald asked me to get him a copy. Mr. Epacar. Thank you. Has our staff had an opportunity to listen to the tape as of yet? Mr. McDona pb. It is being introduced this morning. Mr. Epacar. That was the only time in which you used the tape recording to tape record your brother’s comments? Mr. Rusy. Yes, that I was involved with. I don’t know about any other tape at all. This is the only one that I am aware of at any time. : _ Mr. Epcar. And that is the only one that is in your possession at this time? Mr. Rusy. Yes, I have the record at home and this is a taping of the complete record. Mr. Epaakr. I see. Let me ask you a couple of additional questions, if my time is still with me. Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Epaar. May I have two additional moments? eet STOKES. Without objection, the gentleman is recog- nized. Mr. Epcar. Just let me ask you a couple of quick questions. Did your brother Jack Ruby call you at all between Friday, November 22 and Sunday, the day of the assassination of Lee ‘Harvey Oswald? Mr. Rusy. No, he did not talk to me. However, he did talk to my sister Eileen. He tried to call me but I wasn’t at home. Mr. Epcar. Getting back to my comment about the second and third shot, I am reminded by our counsel that there was testimony at the trial of Jack Ruby that the second and third shot comes 538 from trial testimony of policemen, who say Jack was contracting on the trigger while being constrained. I will just share that for the record and just ask one final question. - As you think back on the life of your brother and on the events leading up to his action of shooting Lee Harvey Oswald, is there anything that you can share with this committee that might be a_ help in our investigation and further investigation in getting at the | motive of why your brother, Jack Ruby, would assassinate Lee || Harvey Oswald? Mr. Rusy. I can’t add any more to what I already stated, what he told me. He saw Oswald walk out of the hallway, the area there, with a smirk on his face as though he were proud of having killed our President, and that’s what he told me. That’s when he lost control of himself and shot him. Those are his words to me. Mr. Epaar. I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. ApDELSON. Mr. Stokes, can I ask you a question? Chairman STOKEs. Yes, Counsel. Mr. ApELSON. Mr. Edgar indicated you have the pistol that Jack Ruby used; is that correct? Chairman STOKES. It is in the possession, has been in the posses- sion of the committee; that is correct. Mr. ApELSON. Thank you. Chairman StTokEs. Mr. Ruby, as a witness before our committee, when you have concluded your testimony, which you have just done—I am reminded by the gentleman from Connecticut, he has yielded back the balance of his time. Now that you have concluded your testimony, you are entitled at the end of your testimony, under the rules of this committee, to make a statement in any way clarifying or explaining your testimony, and I extend to you at this | eae? or to your counsel, 5 minutes for that purpose, if you so esire. Mr. Rusy. Yes, I would like to say something. Our family wishes to thank all of you. If possible, we would like—if the gun belongs to on family, we would like to donate the gun to the National Ar- chives. _ Some question has been brought up on several occasions why was it, or why did it seem so easy for Jack to enter the jail, why was he so friendly with so many policemen? Well, I would like to relate an incident, and I think it is in the Warren Commission. At one time, two officers of the Dallas police force were being attacked by several hoodlums. Jack went to the aid of the policemen and helped them subdue these hoodlums. And in that fight, one of the hoodlums actually bit off part of one of Jack’s fingers, and a statement from one of the officers involved later on said that Jack actually fought like a tiger to help them. Those were his words. And I would think from an incident of this that this is why or how Jack developed such a friendly relationship with the Dallas police force. That’s about all I have to say, Mr. Chairman. ; Chairman Strokes. Thank you. I might say with reference to your statement involving the gun, the gun was, we found, in the possession of an attorney in Dallas and through the process of subpoena and other legal process, w 539 were able to obtain that gun, and it was actually brought to the committee by Congressman Mattox, of Dallas, who the attorney was willing to relinquish it to for the purpose of bringing it to us. After the committee had performed the work they wanted to do with reference to the gun, we have now caused the gun to be returned to Congressman Mattox, to be returned to the attorney who has legal possession of it in Dallas. So, I suppose your lawyer would have to look into the process of procedure by which it could be obtained from the attorney in Dallas and donated as the family so desires. Thank you, sir. We have nothing further. You are excused. Mr. Rusy. Thank you. [Witness excused. ] Chairman SToKEs. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. NARRATION BY G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR Mr. Buakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As well as Earl Ruby might have known his brother in their early years, they, in fact, spent much of their adult life apart. Earl Ruby is particularly limited when it comes to commenting on Jack’s life in Dallas, since Earl was not there. | The question of whether Jack Ruby acted alone in the shooting of Oswald, moreover, has not been answered by his own assurances that he did. That is what he told the Warren Commission, which subjected him to a polygraph test for verification. But when this committee asked its panel of experts on polygraphs to examine the results of Ruby’s test, the panel declined to come to a conclusion, explaining the polygraph procedures of 1964 were of such poor quality as to preclude a judgement. In addition, many critics of the Warren Commission insist that it did not go far enough in examining Ruby’s associations, to see if any of them give support to the suspicion that he was part of a conspiracy. Noting that the Warren Commission had discovered that Ruby had been in contact with an array of less-than-respect- able characters—gamblers, ex-cons and henchmen of some under- world bigwigs, the committee decided to investigate these connec- tions further, to find out if they might support a conspiracy find- ing. There were three steps in the committee approach: First, the files on the individuals under investigation were re- viewed, the files from Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. Second, selected individuals were interviewed, deposed, or ques- tioned at executive session hearings. Third, Jack Ruby’s 1963 long-distance phone calls to his asso- Ciates were analyzed. The Warren Commission had access to long- distance telephone records, but it did not make the fullest use of them. The committee took the records the Warren Commission had, ‘gathered additional ones, where they were available, and then analyzed all of them, using a House information systems computer. The objective was to categorize Ruby’s phone contacts with an eye ‘to discerning patterns. 540 During the Warren Commission investigation, on February 24, 1964, staff attorneys Burt Griffin and Leon Hubert recommended that immediate steps be taken to obtain and preserve the phone records of Jack Ruby and numerous associates in a lengthy memo- randum, which, Mr. Chairman, I ask be incorporated into the record at this point. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it will be entered into the record. Mr. Buakey. As JFK F-448. [The above referred to exhibit, JFK exhibit F-448, follows: ] JFK Exuisit F-448 , ~ friv a Lire) : . << ‘ e _—— : : rj See FH! . ; j | February 24, ass4 P —€knibit # < ; a IOQARDUA, °° of ge E:E R“777 BaWtihens EF ar Pe Pe es4, gOe,enaat tele s Np de nisetaecers “503 yee Hama | . FREI: “Mr, Leon D. Hubert t, | . Mey Burt W. Griffin. 00 ere In ‘Durtherance “or your. eanvenestion ‘pith ur. ‘Grictin onribbed hs ~o0th an& our joint menorandum’of February'19, the following steps are i --.puggeated to be taken 88 scan as possible for obtaining and preserving telephone reocrds which Ey, be eke caeto the work of this Gomalsgion. " Some ‘of the isubcecticns may Snpose burdens upon mney parties , which ore not justified by the possible results -to be obtuined. If so, they should be rejected and the reason for such rejection recorded in ~ , order to assure future curtis that suck yates vere. o.carenily con= — rea Bec ee tanaNet ate walleck eres ene one ee : rer caniee one: too tan three sask Popa int umber s of honey ae “reasonably available" to Ruby ete ig a of calls wasnctes from phones * under Ruby's direct control. ; Pony Poragraph four seeks tclephone munbers of all’ phono reasonably available to eonstain bec geet : -. +\"Paregraphi five peeks enlypomes Listedtg orunderthe control otic Mo Se ae , ite ERcae Paragrngn Six vo ten are > deste to lay aaid for further shia sence Sah Pe : . 5 « Semdue ren The FBI chouta Lepaaretely obtein the telephone numbers ? remes - of subsersber, location and type of service of all phores reasonably fee available to Jack Ruby, : "Reasonsbly available” should include, but not be lintted to, subscriber and pay telephones at the ALL Right Porking ~ Garage, Adolphus Hotel, the Egyptian Lounge, Phil's Delicatessen, Cabsna Hotel, Sol's’ Turf Bor, Dallas City Hall ond Jail, Dallas Morning News, Radio Station KLIF, together with sny pay phones within reasonable walking distance of said places or any other places which Puby frequented. Nunbers and information concerning phones "reasonably available" to Ruby in Dalios may b2 obtained by ‘personal contact with subscribers or the telephone company.- Information o8 to phones avatlable outside Dallas LeREGS 3s not,paue ootane, wy pon-residents of pees ch Se -_ fest tees "7 - < ~~ eee te ym Rae, ont am a ak AS we - Stee.woe * “2 ae oe aN 541 Mr, Howard P. tillens . : February 4, a . . Ze wind FBI should immediately obtoin with respect to Jock Ruby, - \for the poriod August 1b to November 25,°1963, copies of all original © -*-.,. ‘ “telephone company Fecords bearing upon the dates, time, length of: col." callirg number, billing number, person calling and number called with respect to all telephone calls (including local ealls) utilizing any telephone listed to Jack Ruby or any of his Clubs, including pay phones . on or near’ the premises, If the telephone company hag no records vhich would provide ct gg ory concerning locsl .heen ; the FBI 1 pee oe i ae ON Sw Teds mmmecessary ‘at thie Pdi to.obtain call mae from all, - ‘=cos -- bones" reasonably available to Ruy” sinss malysis of cells fron such* phones would be impossitie tithout further information. Hovever, we : oe ' contemplate that if we establish a list of suspected intermediaries . between Ruby and Csyald, Lt would. be valuable to check telephones "avallabie” to Riby ngainst calls to the "intermediaries". In addition, it may be valusble to - examine records of telephores listed to or used regularly by suspected Sacsmaueeed tie for. calls to tie AGE UL ue - SP a Leagni _ . a . pas 0 Geis e- Ep * - = = Se] ef. peseanhend yx 3. With respect 3 mee‘Fecoraeteaeenbak tnstenamicha tro, Beate Fal should indicates in its report what telephons company personnel ‘were questioned, the questions asked and the ansvers recelved, in all investi- gations which were conducted, so that it may be determined thet the records obtained pre complete and accurate. ‘ie believe that the method. - of searching for recorés must be dctsiled since telephone inforrstion . Sea Se so far has been spotty and inaccurate, - ‘ Se os the extent not already provided, |~the Far shania be aericetaat to pamied for the Comission e list of slZ telephones (but not call Til records) reasonably available to the following persons since March 1, 1963: . - Andrew henstrong; 302. Dickson: aes Apartment C, Dellas; texas. ae een Berinett naariae aka ete Bennett Far] a, aka "Little Tyke”, * FOO? oink Sh ad Fort Worth,- "Texew. nee Carlin, Aka Bruce Kortin, 3809 Nsdoubrook, Fort Worth, Texas, Marion (ake Marian) Rubenstein Carroll, 1044 w. Ging Chicago, Tl. Eileen Rubenstein Kardnoky, 67240. Tolman, Chicago, Dlinois Levis J. NoWlilito, Lugs Vegas, Haveda ; <3 Ra hee Fubenstein, Ae We.» et Ee. > ke “- = seit (Rubenstein) iby, iene Janestomn Road, ‘Palles, Texas. - - . ~2— Aa. GBFe@ ._. an. ae 542 Mr, Movard P, Willens February 24 2964 — ? Foptfsbenstata) Buby 225. Hoodland Deve Southfield, Michigan : e¢ -_ ” a ee he Erp ene Sse EvaRubenstein ‘(wagia) reat ig39 pain, ‘Dadloo, Toias. a : Rolph Poul, arlington, Texs9 ? c/o Bert Dowmean; Copeland Rona, hxlington, Texas Masksa Podouh's Restourant, Arlington, Texas (access) : John W, Jackson, 1602 Browning, -Arlington, Texaa (aacataye a pata ? eras? =e: Bull,Pen. Drivestn, 39% East Atran, Arlington, -, Texas. (business) © ---: i - go P, athe, ok aa “Foe oy fiibenstcin veer, ‘Joss We Taya, cidenao,Diuinots, fear? edie : the date March 1 is. chosen because it establishea 3) pafe bess Ardy for inquiry prior to Oswald's trip to New Grleans. With respect to each - of the above persons, the FBI should provide numbers, to the extent ‘ possible, not only cf hone telephones but nearby pay phones, telephones _ of any businasses in which the individual is employed, telephones of business partners or other similar close business associates, tglaphoren 3 of iriends end relstives visited frequently, and telephones at restaurants ana other buginesses which the individual is known to frequent. For each | telephone the FBI ahould indicate the typs of service (pay phone, sub- ~ sceriber phone, limited service telephone), neme of subseriber, location cf phone, and reason for concluding the phone wes accessible to the . individual under investigation. This information should be obteined. © _ F primarily by exanining records which will not involva parsonol contact . with persons outside of the teLephona. cospanies and without commnicating - the -nanes of suspects to persors outside the FBI. Wo realize that such - - ‘9 meana of investicetion will not provide-a complete answer to our questions, but we believe other modes of Inquiry vould be unwise of this time. As . “to each Individual under investigation, tha FBI report chould indicate ~ what sources vere chacked and what other information os to possibly paressibis Sie nigh. be available y direst contact watt individuals. Det . its The FBI should obtain fron a telaphons company records chesk’ soe ‘personal, family and business phones of the piers: persons Guring the period Worch 1, 1963 to present: ; re Barnay Baker, 5900 Sheridan Road, opiease,: TLinoie Grose), Chicago Locp Auto Refinioning Co., Ina. - 3216 South Shiolds Ava., Chicago, TL1. (business) © Curtis LaVerne Crafard, aka Larry Crafard a a phones available - to.eeton.lg Slight, from Daliaa to eb eantd mowers Le . e sere ~ Pe a - - < ~3— 543 ite, Moward BP. vtLlers Yonrvary 24, 1964, _ Son Conca, 755 Crescent Drive, Polm Springs, Calif. Mex Gritbér, $222V,Olyzald; Los"Angales, Calit. (we 5-2082) °°. _ Frank Goldstein, 6/49 Torosita Boulevard, Sun Francisco, Calif. so as a (HU 97-7574) | — : ES “(ST 12-7343) - AS . Lawrence Meyers, 3930 4, isk Shore Driva, Chleago, Dinots (heme) % _ _ BroMig. Co-, 714West Nomoe, Chicago, D1, (business) on Boy Witliog Pike, tle Hickey Ryan, 234%Cammeoticut Lane, Abe Oc, - Pystapee pe! an eat a i Dalles, Texag ws * " nae "Anes Usborto, Chicago, U2inotg » tO Sel nice eitaiieby. +> Mario Usberto, Chicago, Idnolo 7 ty iy Sp Nelnstein, 11023 Westare Circle, Dallas, Toxas. > =* 6 6, The FBI stould confer vith the sppropriate officials of telophine ~” companies in Chisago, Dallas, Detroit, New-York, San Francisco, Los ; Angeles, and New Orleans to determine whet moons, Lf eny, are ayniloble for obtaining information ap to incomlne long distance telephone calls ts ~~ exy particular mucber if the nane of the caller is mimom. It is con ccivame, for exoople, thet comecting or trunk-Line telephone carriers may have sutoastic recor@ing devices which record the calling exchange .. end the dialed mucber with respect to callie which thay tronsmnit, Cx, At - pay be that most telephona comanies in large cities are na so Palys 462925, - sutocated that such information is contained on thelr IM calla ond these .- IB4 cords could be yun through a ccopnter or. other deryicg for evory ; telephore subscriber in the area co that such information could be dertyod mechanically without undnuo expense or personel effort. Information os to city or telephone company fron which a long distance call originated could .condelyably be mesningfel in light of other data which ve have. *| ton - <%,- Tae FBI shovld confer with teleohone comoany officials ef each ~* company serving Jack Ruby and the persons listed in parsersph four end Five to ascertain if that company has eny means of providing information, concerning 2ccal colts to or fron the phonas of those persons, Even if no records are maintained by such companies in the ordinary course of business, it may be that certain electronic, machanteal or other entries ore routinely made oither by telephone trananttting equimnent or in _ connection wlth business records ordinarily maintained by the telephone company so that by careful exanination of ouch dats inforantton con~ ' eeraing local, telephone activity on a particular telephone could be “obtained. To whatever extont information éan be obtained concoming - --. - local telephons octlyity, the Agent should repsrt to the Comission the °°" nature of the information which can be obtained and the means bz which it would be odtnined, This dota should be secured without nentioning particvlar naces or telephone mmbers. ; $ he 544 Mr. Howard P. Willens ; : February, 1964, 8. The FMI showld obtain a Mist of all telephonsa Stanton enc -the Chict. ne veh eeyins, thetele re OYgORS Oho ee = a2 oe o. . > Toxas " th ie re Nevada - Ios Angeles, California San Francisco, Californiqg ~ > Fa ‘ Loring ad Chicago, Tllinois . "3 Detroit, Michigan and arrwenrere muburbs in the Detroit natropalites, ; area, including Southfield, Michigan .. ; grees Massachusotts and adjacent suburbs; including Bolnonty Mase, fa “flew York metropoltten area,- spending canines rs ams Yad ay? Comeotleut ant New Jorsiy.. Side aca Wiemi, Florida Rt agg ees ns Woshingten, D. C. and ig subzrbs yop 2 lav EL OES. seria a ; ’ ee wing . *. aed OL ey ‘Rankin’ atoula ngdress |a letter oa the Chier Reactive: ‘ef? ench of the. telephone companies mentioned in paragraph elgnt requesting . that such companies not destroy unbil June 1, 1954 any records they: - * *. may have wlth respact to telephone service of o12 subseriberd.” The: - letter shovlé request that the source of this policy not be disclosed,.*- ' Retention of records on o Ddlanket basis would proserve security a& to tha thinking of the Commission ond will afford the maxiram essurence that telephone records will be preserved with respeat to persons not yet suspect. —: Ye realize that blanket retention may be so burdensom o» expensive as to : rake our. request seea utrecsonable, If there is any suggestion along — - dines, e Fanaa 1) vork out 8 resaonable Systen, Should be. suggested.’ ~*~ a : tBra.e™ 7h er Tel are = Met, & Sie S 16. orem‘soon a3 possible ote the Ruby trial oil after peeniite tion with the Cosmission, the FBI should obtain copies of original telephone records uncoyered os a result of the investigations requested in paragraphs four and five, These records should berh ey to deternine possible” Links to Ruby or Oswald. Thereafter, if deamed advisable, records of - phonss “reasonably available" to Ruby would be analysed for possible ~~ i calls to phones "reasonably available to snspected intermediaries between © Ruby and Oswald. MasaA Tarees ies - - te i a FAs a te eiaata | ie 4 tp Pathe? 2 . a : . ate ep. ts ‘ ; eels sy : °. . 545 Mr. Buiakey. In a lengthy memorandum, Hubert and Griffin recommended that the FBI be instructed to secure the records, and that Commission Chairman Earl Warren address a letter to tel- phone companies to secure preservation of existing records. Some records that were specified in the Griffin-Hubert request were obtained, but the extensive preservation they had envisioned was not carried out, an investigative step that Hubert and Griffin ultimately agreed to. Griffin has said that Commission General Counsel J. Lee Rankin vetoed the recommendation on grounds that it was too far reaching and would create too great a burden on private companies. In other memorandum, which I would ask be incorporated in the record at this point as JFK F-590. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record. [The above referred to exhibit, JFK F-590, follows:] 546 JFK Exnuisit F-590 | TRI PEM B277 FROf «Laon D, Fubart Dyrt t. Orictin 1. eu will recs? thas after the Steff acting oa Friday, ve otoyed ca with Me, Ronkin to discuss tho mbltor of giving va sagictance in Aven ¥. Tirce sub-ormis ors Lervwlved: 2, A checkout of noms, telonhona numbers, Mldressts, ete. found on Ruby’s papora. (See Aron "E") b, A chock-out of all mmure reletive to ponsitle associations betcoun ihiby and Osaela; and botwean Raby and the corentor Cloncut. (Ses area "r" is . c fn analysis of telephone oallts by Jack, Eva amd Eurt Ravy til by Auink Pawl, , 2. Me. Rankin told us to pet ik. Lenorandt (OM!ef tusticn esrron'’sc gusta) to do this xt. Eeemsse of the prass of tine and bes2ues pe éid not really put our sints to 1t at the sxsut, wr felled to op: to ite, Rankin that ooch sulb-nrea wihh require o ran work 72 Nw ths for a month. Tuto is no possibiitty that this york cm be peomerly - gon? o> os to be usefel is yeiting a soport even ff it ied & aeedtling d2te of Jura 25, 36 In-commeotion vith tha above sixt for the other reanong stated _ below, we do not think tha Bohy aopeat of the ease ohauld be fnclutea - in the Coadlasion'’s ropart, | Ae te Go BR aaceytabio vob on Ruby, it wld ba nosencsry . a) sake pavlic gtateniuts consercing his ehsrester, his background, ths possibility that ba vas lying about nie CaaS ae may basomint, hic motivation ond stute of * , vse te % Ife Suby's S-yy eosvietion = 1% « tv rafused est our report fs in ay t ariticiced for incuing a report witless impaired his right to f Lair trial. Gn the other hong, if tho resort Luee Support to Ruby's elready ststed version. the Pex: Soh Ecer would bo fuetified in exiticizire ua.” 547 c. Aside from tila, Lo 48 propor for o Commission of tho high reuk and prestige of thio Commission to coment extensively sbaut a peroomn hore cs24 fe on appcsh acd wil cupely pet to the United States Supra Cort? 2, Ye think thet the Comesion'’s resort could very pronariy gtiete thet conslusiow relative to my sspoct of Rahy or hie activities ate considared isproper hesimee of his ponding space] and thet a - repart will be mace lester, lt were Hubart/Crifflin/ $v/4-4-64 CC: Rubert chron file i, Rankin ir, Willens 548 Mr. BLAKEY. In another memorandum dated April 4, Griffin and Hubert said they needed additional assistance in evaluating the phone records that were available. Though it was suggested by Rankin that Chief Justice Warren’s security guard might be able to devote some time to the project, the project envisioned by Griffin and Hubert was never conducted. In a subsequent memorandum dated May 14, the adequacy of the Ruby investigation was dis- cussed, but ultimately compromises were worked out and the Com- mission’s work was completed. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that at this point, these memoran- dums, to which I have just referred, be incorporated in the record as JFK 591, 592, and 593. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point. [The above referred to exhibits, JFK F-591, JFK F-592, and JFK F-593 follow:] JFK Exnuisit F-591 3 ee -: = nee SO ee, p er PEAS ity Pe alias ay as iit OX Fe Stet we or “5. aa 33 Sab tee Meet. y ar gate « ee, ‘? . aa ¥ - ce MEMORANDUM Fe eet SN inci = come Om "RTOS Wicd Sa5Le J sats eF roms eae miterSy Ae a a 29 © 8 w@ %Mepe? of * ae 5 gE:Oe ee Linga oe ee ty: . ea Subject: Adequacy of Ruby Investigation o. .1. . Past Recommendations. -In memoranda data February 1 Suggestions 24, for .: February Fe zy <{, and March ll, we made various het ae ees extending the investigation initiated by ther... - PBL in connection with the Oswald homicide. Shortly after. .=.. . Horch i, 1964, we began preparation for the nearly 60 - -°2- |. _Gepositions taken in Dallas during the period March 2l-April 2; —- after we returned from Dallas we took the @eposition of C. L..:0- : Crafard (two days) and George Senator (two days), .worked on... editing the depositions taken in Dallas, and prepared for ..* o> >: ~ @nother series of 30 other depositions taken in Dallas during=~-. : ane perloc April.13-17. On our return from Dallas we con-..3">... : inued the editing of the Dallas deposition _ Dallas deposition exhibits for publication,s, an@ prepared the: 2-002 began : oa 2 draft of the: report in’ Arca V. As a consequence ofwWorlding-.. all of” ° this activity during the period March 11-May 13, we did not --. 2° :,.Press for the conferences and discussions referred to in the ©. . ha a memoranda. The following represents sur view at this ~ e with Pespect to appropriate further investigation. -- oe aan ee General Statement of Areas Not Adcequately ‘In pee a as vesticated.:.- : In reporting on the murder of Lee Osw y Jack Ruby, we. =. must answer or at iteast advert to these questionss.... 0 cm a) Why dia Ruby ‘iit1 Oswalas 0 02 es 8 ee PEA? b) Was Ruby associated with the assassin of a Ae President Kennedys 3.) eee Se ER J _.@) Did Ruby have any confederates arithe et ere a eal a pire pf Oswald? Chee ee We eg Sen gh 8 e an rae | It 1s our belicf that, although th: 1c ays 28 2) ene ee Coes not show ac consfi> ratoriough the evidence gathered so far al link between Ruby and Oswald, .””. or : between Ruby 3 and others ~ neverth elezss evidence should be. ccured, if possible, to affirmatively exclu de that: | F ", 049 a) Ruby was indirectly linked through others +e to Oswald; | Py esos b) Ruby killed Oswald, because of fear; or c) Ruby ‘killea Oswald at the “suggestion of aineras ‘a F: 3. Sumary of Evidence eter Further Investigation. Ses The following aohe Suggest e necess y ot Sel ae investi- — BS*tiss : ; ee nits “Ruby had eres to engage in eabeeentiny mativt tens ; in addition to the management of his Clubs. Ruby's night club _ business usually occupied no more than five hours of a normal working day which began at about 10:00 a.m. and ended at 2:00 a.m. It was his practice to spend an average of only. . .. one hour a day at his Clubs between 10:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. _ Our depositions were confined primarily to persons familiar -- with Ruby's Club activities. The FBI has thoroughly investi--~ vA gated Ruby's night club operations but does not sec Te inned down his other business The he ¢ materials do make reference to such other activities | bi (see p. 27 of our report of February 18), but these are Matinee ‘and collateral and were not explored to Ev ie whether they - - involved any underlying sinister purpose. Nor.were they probed in such a manner as to permit a BavermEnaltos as_ ‘cd how much cig Ruby's time they occupied. b. Ruby has always been:a person who tporee Pon eet ae money-making "sidelines." In the two months prior to - _November 22, Ruby supposedly spent considerable time pircnio tine: ‘an exercise device lnown as a “twist board.” - The "twist -.. ~ board" was purportedly manufactured by Plastellite Engineering,. a Fort Worth manufacturer of oil field equipment which has . : pers poor credit references and was the subject of an FBI investi-j .. 22: gation in i952. We know of no sales of this item by Ruby; _. nor do we imow if any "twist. boards" were manufactured for . °° ' sale. The possibility remains that the “twist boara" was a Les _ Lront for, some other illegal enterprise. “3 ren Ruby. has long been clo ersons | urs illegal Activities. Although Ruby had no known ideolcaiced orOe2 political interests (see p. 35 of our report of February18), there is much evidence that he was interested in Cuban matters, In early 1959, Ruby inquired concerning the smuggling of ie persons out of Cuba. He has admitted that, at that time, he negotiated for the sale of jeeps to Castro. In September 1959, Ruby visited Havana at the invitation of Las Vegas racketeer, Louis J. Ncvillie, who paid Ruby's expenses for the p and wno was later ezpelled from Cuba by Castro. HcWillie is 550 th Zhe Gescribed by Ralph Paul, Ruby's business partner, one as of Buby's closest fri » Ruby mailed a gun to McWillie in early 1963. in 1961,-it is reported that Ruby attended three meetings. in Dallas in connection with the sale of arms to Cubans and -. the smuggling out of refugees. The informant identifies an Ed Erunner as Ruby's associate in this endeavor. Shortly after. - his arrest on November 24, Ruby naméd Fred Brunner as one of . whe his expected attorneys. Brunner did not represent Ruby, ~ op ay however, Insufficient investigation has been conducted ta ~°- PS confirm or deny the report about meetings in 1961. When Henry: . ~ Wade announced to the Press on November. 22, 1953 that Oswald lala was a member of the Free Cuba Committee, Ruby corrected Wade te, by stating "Not the Free Cuba Committee; The Fair Play for". ' Cuba Committee. There is a difference." The Free Cuba Com - mittee is an existing anti+Castro organization. Earl Ruby, = -. brother of Jack Ruby, sent an unexplained telegram to Havana ae aes in April 1962.. So EPPS CTI ore Ce IPT PE ts. = that Ruby has maint Bi ; Pex ere: the extent necessary to participate jn gun sales or smuggling... "ds. Bits of evidence link Ruby to others who may have =o. * been interested in Cuban affairs. When Ruby's car was seized Paton ' on November 24, it contained various Tight-wing xadio_sertnts), *. issue by Ha d L. Hunt and _the - NOR bearing the mailing address of a man who has not yet been’ 0-02: - = identified. In May 1963, Earl Ruby, operator of a dry cleaning: ©. business, is known to have telephoned the Welch Candy Company .— -: _ {owned by the founder of John Birch Society). The purpose of - the call is unknown. Jack Ruby's personal notebook contained - - the Massachusetts telephone mumber and address of Thomas lk former Dallas resident, working at the Boston headquarters of --- — . the John Birch Society. Althouch it is most likely that all of > ~~ pease bits circ of umst evidence anti have innocent al explana= —- _- . @g »«6-Although Ruby did not witness the motorcade Dallas, he may have had a prior interest in the President's ty visit. A November 20 edition of the Fort Vorth Telegram showing .~ the President's proposed route through Fort Worth, and the --..-: November 20 edition of the Dallas Morning News showing President's route through Dallas, were found in the deere Ruby's car on. November 24,-. .. . -.. Bro SORA est Relea eee 4 £. On November 16 Jack Ruby met at the Carousel Club”. - with Bertha Check, sister of Hrs. Earlene Roberts, manager of — . Lee Oswald's rooming house. Hrs. Cheek said that she and Ruby’ discussed her lending Ruby money to open a new night club.. 501 = beter) : eae a3 ACES, Wetiea Caedinc a = eee aa “ee : =?ca ~. OS ce Bus - ic. . Ruby wss not questioned about this matter. On November 20, — 1963, @ woman, who may be identical to Earlene Roberts, was”) _ reported to be in San Antonio at the time of President . ors Kennedy's visit. ‘The possible identification of Mrs. Roberts Ruby might have killed Oswald out of fear that Oswald might _ Pio i implicate Ruby and his friends falsely or not in an effort tog? x. Save his own life. We think that neither Oswald's Cuban. _ - rare oe November21 to November 24, 1963 by Lawrence Meyers of Chicago... ™. Ruby also made... ,-+t° a long distance call shortly after the President's death to wa ; Alex Gruber in Los Angeles. Gruber had visited Ruby about the seme time as Meyers in early November. Both Gruber ana V Co Eeyers give innocent explanations. icyers claims he was in. Dallas enjoying life with a “dumb but accommodating broad." ' Gruber claims - Ruby called to say he would not mail = dog that . - day, a3 he had promised to do. Finally between 11:35 p.m. and 12 midnight, Saturday, November 23, Ruby made a series . Tor of brief long distance phone calls culminating with a call to - ci Ds entertainer Breck Wall at a friend's house in Galvesto claims Ruby called to compliment him. for calling off n. Wall... his al seas _.(Wall's) act at the Adolphus Hotel in Dallas. _ checks have not heen made on these persons. — h. In short, we believe that the possibility exists, kX ater based on evidence already available, that Ruby was involved in illegal dealings «— > with Cuban elements who might have had ee 7S contact with Oswald. The existence of such dealings be surmised since can only - the present investigation has not focused . on that area. mut 552 a 5 r i. We suggest that these matters cannot be left. onabetoe in the air.” They must either be explored further _ or a firm decision must be made not to do so supported by - stated reasons for the decision. As a general matter, we - think the investigation deficient in these respects: . ayy Substential tine-segmenta in Ruby's daily | routine from September 26 to November oe ero = “< not been accounted for.. a ; (2) About 46 persons who saw Ruby peter Novenbex 22 - ~ to November 24 have not teen questioned by statr -. -.. <. members, although there are FBX reports BF i: fa" oe ee ee eae with all these people. Sindee “ee Mnnire AbsYsgre. (3) Peersons who have AONE ars Po TE OO _... \gngwn associations with Rubygenerally have ~~ tey -. Rot_been investigated theuselves so that their” . truthfulne ss .The FBI reports: . can be evaluated. "#8. oo. specifically do not attempt evaluation. The. -= “resi in: "exception. has been that. where the FBI has been! _ :*". given incriminating evidence against Ruby, it: . * has made further investigation to determine .- ~.. -: whether others might also be implicated with. ~“: --"* Ruby. In every case where there was some --: ~ is . _ evidence implicating others, those other persons:-° were interviewed and denied the incriminating —-: aliegetions. Further investigation has hin hoeis ty me “npungertalken,: to resolve the conflicts .. rz a" . (4) Much of our Imowledge of Ruby comes from his” fay .., friends Andrew Armstrong, Ralph Paul, George - . _ + 2 i-.:7 Senator, and Larry Crafard. Investigations ? : tat not. berg Vor Sarene Ao!PF ERCCEEER Seana pas" ‘Specific Tnvestizative tRecommendations -meee at iad a. We should obtain photos of: all eae tate metre on” ort Ruby's person, in his car, or at his home or clubs, now in «©: ' 0": possession of the Dallas District Attorney. We. already have .-. _ photos of Ruby's address books, but no other items have been — : photographed or delivered to the Commission, These items include-.’: the H. L. Hunt literature and newspapers mentioned in psra- graphs 3d and 3e. ae a 553 ws. ” Z wa, me, . . foes as ri Zi = ¢*% ee : : i : : : pa, ? b. We should conduct staff interviews or teke ; depositions with respect to Ruby's Cuban activities of the | following persons: tA or } Ae i. Robert Ray McKeown. Ruby contacted McKeorm - in 1955 Z connection with the sale of jeeps ... - to Cuba. Tne objective of an interview or . deposition of McKeown would be to obtain Pk ae information on possible contacts Ruby would: —_. have made after 1959 if his interest in =§ | °° . @rmament sales continued. _ ee . ee “peg “di, Nancy Perrin, Perrin claims she met with Ruby | _-. three times in 1961 concerning refugee smuggling . and arms sales. She says she can identify the - - house in Dallas where meetings took place. Hy ~: Perrin now lives in Boston. Ruby admits he was*.. _ once interested in the sale of jeeps, at least, . -- seca - report based on a memorandum delivered to them March 12, 1964. covering Ruby's background including his possible Cuban Pe~ ss activities, but a reply has not been received as yet... oe d. We should obtain reports from the FBI based on: s_.. requested investigation of allegations suggesting that Earlene - Roberts was in San Antonio on November 21. | . - €. The Commission should take the testimony of the. . _folloying persons for the reasons Stated: bcd fees Ce Nas. 52.4, “Hyman Rubenstein 5005 gtiede c * All are siblings of Jack Ruby. Hyman is the oldest child and presumably will be the best witness as to family history. He j taiked to Jack on November 22, reportedly visited Jack the week- before the assassination, end participated in Ruby's twist . board venture. Eva lived with Jack for 3 years in California . prior to World War II, induced Jack to come to Dallas in 1947, and managed the Vegas Club for Jack in Dallas from 1959 to 1963. Earl wes a travelling salesman with Jack from 1941-1943; . & business partner 1946-1947, end made phone calls before | November 22, 1963 and afterwards which require explanations. 554 7 440% Henry Wade. Tnis person cen testify to the evelopment of the testimony by Sgt. Dean and Det. Arcner te a Ruby ana of seeing: Ruby om November 22 in the Police Department building ; ; iii. a ack Ruby af We shoula take the ‘depositions of the following ; persons ror the reasons stated: Tsk Tom Howards This person is one of Ruby's oS original attorneys, and is reported to have been 3! ‘jn the police basement a few minutes before * Oswald was shot and to have inquired if Oswald - "had been moved, He filed a writ of habeas. corpus for Ruby about one hour after the shooting of Oswald. He could explain these- activities and possibly tell us about the Ruby: if. : trial. , We should have eee, explanations. wag * yet Auent Hall’ this person tntomctepedcRity eas tor 2s hours on November 24 beginning at : approximately 12 noon. His report is contra— oy a@ietory to Sgt. Dean's trial testimony. He i- . also interviewed Ruby on December 21, 1963. :i Seth Kantor, This person was interviewed twice by the FHL and persists in his claim that he. saw Ruby at Parkland Hospital shortly before . or after the President’s death was announced, Ruby denies that he was ever at: Parkland : . Hospital. We must decide who is telling the ee . truth, for there would be considerable signifi-. - cance if it were concluded that Ruby is lying. Should we make an evetue without bapa a Kantor gure las te hiierd ay oa ‘Bill Dellar. ‘this person a to spit seen g - _ Oswald at the Carousel. Club prior to November 22,. and this rumor perhaps more than any other has - . . been given wide circulation. Shouid we evalu- | ~ ate DeMar's Gres hag ail solely on « the basis Of FBI reports? g. The PBI should re-interview the following persons. for the purposes stated: 555 8 i. Alex Gruber. To obtain personal history to establish original meeting and subsequent contacts with Ruby; to obtain details of visit - to Dallas in November 1963, including where he- stayed, how long, who saw him, etc. The FBI Should also check its own files on Gruber, ~~ 41. Lawrence Meyers (Same as ardberyy ps dii. Ken Dowe. -(KLIF reporter) To ascertain how he .- . happened to first contact Ruby on Novembe22. r . or 23; (Ruby provided information to KLIF - Paes, concerning the location of Chief Curry), and = _ Whether KLIF gave any inducements to Ruby to work: . for it on the weekend of November 22-24, 9. iv. Rabbi Silverman. To establish when Silverman: -. Saw Ruby at the Synagogue and obtain names of _ other persons who may have seen Ruby at the-.. . Synagogue on November 22 and 23. Silverman .°- states that he sew Ruby at the 8 p.m. service. .-_ on Movember 22 and at the 9 a.m. service on = November 23; but both of these services lasted. ~ | at least two hours and we do not know Whether-..- ...- _ Ruby was present for the entire services,..»..- °° - Silverman (and others) could “place” Ruby, or — > fail to do so, during critical hours. ~- Presa Vv. Micke an (Seme as Gruber plus employment * (ti Dellas—j . . bn ' - Vi. Breck Wall. ‘This person was an entertainer at -- oe the AdoiIphus Hotel, Dallas, at the time of yA _ President Kennedy's assassination. Ruby called: © _ him in Galveston at 11:47 p.m. Saturday, - November 23, 1963. He also visited Ruby at - -the County jail. A background check should be conducted as to this person. bs oy ea &- - vil. Andrew Armstrong, Bruce Carlin, Karen Bennett ~ Carlin, Curtis Tavenis Crafard, Ralph ‘Paul, nef George Senator, ~ a POE These six persons were Geposed at length hecause - of their friendship with Ruby, familiarity with a Ruby's personal and business life, end contacts = with Ruby on November 22, 23, and 24. in general, each has professed to have had no ; Knowledge of Ruby's activities during those three days. ; . 556 mrp 1 Andrey Armstrong was very active in the = operation of the Carousel and worked closely with Ruby for 18 months. His deposition covers Ruby's activities and emotional state generally- and particularly several hours on November 22 . and 23. A background check should be conducted as to this person and selected parts of his testimony should be checked out +2 test mis UA i Ree caren end Bruce ‘carlin were the SM reed +) pae a $25 money order bought by Ruby approximately 5 minutes before Ruby shot Oswald. ilarguerite , Oswald testified that she believed she knew . ~ Karen Carlin. .Background sel ge PuRULS DOinveat conducted on the Carlins. ie Crafard fled Dallas Se on ita ee -- “morming November 23. Although we tend to : believe his explanation, we believe a back- .. -. ground check on him plus verification of some = - r OF his activities on November 23 are warranted. Paul 4s Ruby's business partner. A background - check should be conducted as to kim end his. =: telephone calis during November a ea bats 3.54 28 checked out. eae George Senator, Ruby's Secmratatt heres fine a: Crafard to be a homoseXual, claims not to have : - seen Ruby except at ther apartment Sunday fe ' morning and for a few hours early Saturday es morning. Senator's background and own admi tted ‘FE a activities on November 22, 23, and 2h should ‘.,a be verified. Sn , ~ wer “Be Other ereas of Ruby. Inves nes niet are ‘not comletes ’ Various rumors link Ruby end Oswald which do not © appear cewr true; however, the materials we have are not ere tO discredit them Smart were Such rumors cludes .. ae ais a Cemine Paani arione of Ruby's ii. Oswald's use of a Cadillac believed LO = ree to sages 557 105. iii. After the depositions of Nancy Perrin, ag oe Robert MeKeown, and Sylvia Odio have been . taken, further investigation may be r 4m necessary with ae a to moat fgets: — associattLons. b. Ruby's notebooks contain numerous names, ee’ addresses, and telephone numbers. Hany of these persons have either not been located or deny Imowing Ruby. We believe’ ~ further investigation is appropriate in some instances; Sh.scnbante we have not yet evaluated the reports: now on hand. KS ve ‘ot We have no Geek evidence’ ‘as to Ruby's mental : condition; however, we will obtain Se saa of the npayetiatris. a testimony at the Ruby trial. . As * as : Other Investi ative S eentions, We rene ascaetea oe} _in earlicr’ menoranda that two sources of apart aia | ganttis been war Ste ty: ignored; . ’ ee _ = ae Radio, Ty and Movie ‘Recordings. Two ‘Dalles aS en " - stations tape recorded every minute of air tame on November: ee Pe 23, and 24.. We have obtained these radio tapes for all except. a portion of November 24, and the tapes include a number of =. interviews with key witnesses in the Oswald area. In addition,. .-. . the tapes shed considerable light on the manner in which Dallas: - public officials and federal agents conducted the investi- gations and performed in public view. We believe that similar video tapes and movie films should be obtained from NBC, CBS,. AEC, UPI, and Movietone News, and relevent portions should be a reviewed by staff members. Wherever witnesses appear on these’ ; “2 ' Yilms tho have been considered by the Commission in bp B: _ its report, a copy of such witnesses’ appearance should be - made a part of the Commission records by introducing then in evidence. If one person were directed to superintend and organize this effort, we believe it could be done without > unreasonable expenditures of Commission time and FOnSY's b. Hotel and motel registrations, airline passenger manifests, end Emigration and Immigration records. Copies of Dallas hotel and. motel registrations ‘ana airline ae manifests to and from Dallas should be obtained for the period September 25 to December 1, 1953. Similarly, Emigration and . inrigration records should be obtained for the period October l, 1963 to January 1, 1964. We believe that these records may . provide a useful tool as new evidence develovs sfter the Commission submits its report. We do not suggest that these records uecessarily be examined by the Commission staff at 508 LE rf the present time. But, for example, it is likely that in the. . - future, persons will come forward who will claim to have been . in Dallas during the critical period and who will claim to a have important information. ‘These records may serve to ~_- ' confirm or refute their claims. -'-° 0°: _ LHHubert/smh ~ . cc; .Mr./Hubert=7. | .. 559 June 1, 1964 MEMORANDTA 7: Messrs. Leon D. Hubert, Jr. end Burt W. Griffin FROM: Howard P. Willens SUBJECT: Adequacy of Ruby Investigation. As we'all know, your memoraniium dated May 1+, 1964, bearing the above title has been the subject of considerable discussion anongz the two of you, Hr. Rankin, Hr. Redlich and mee ; ; As a result of those discussions steps have been taken to implement most of the specific investigative recomsendations set forth in section 4 beginning on page 4. In fact, it appears to me that all of these requests are in the process of being implemented through. subsection g vi entitled Breck Wall, with the exception that no background investigation has been requested _xegarding Hr. Wall. As to the recommendation in subsection g vil that background investigation be conducted regarding the six named persons, it has been decided that no such general investigation is werrented. It was egreed, however, that any iuvestigative requests submitted by you regerding specific testimony of these persons, in order to test veracity, might be appropriate. On May 27, 1964 I discussed with Mr. Griffin the status of the investigation in Area 5. This discussion was prompted not only by your merorendim dated May V+, but also the discussion held in Mr. Rankin's office on the prior day, Hay 26, dealing with the initinl draft submitted by you relating to Ruby" s background. I requested Mr. Griffin to stop his current work on the first pebe and sutmit to me within the next few business days ev sin Snvestigative: request watch bebelieves 1 nacanauiy taeoaplaté he investigation in his arca. Mr. Griffin ogrced to this and I have today received approximately 10 such investigative requests, which have either Deen sent forward to Mr. Rankin for approval ond signature or, after discussion with Hr. Griffin, ore being revised. | If any additional requests are Sree cad I would like to he advised today. JFK Exuisit F-592 560 HAUT OR An DU reer ite, Moward P. P222en3 =the : Het: «—sLoon D. Abort, Ir. Burk 8. Griftin In rospanse to your mesicrondum of dent 1, 1964, te expect thet by sodmenday Juma 3, 1964, ol of the investigative requests Which — eve row opptopriate will haya been deliysral to you. Vita resptet to Breck Yall, ws belleve thet £$ uy leter be oppzopsints to Gqesticn bin, Joa Peterson, ona Ralph Penk through the FRE or ty @opcoition concerning the télephona calls Riby mate betvten 12316 p.n, ond 11:45 pom. on Sexturtay Novenber 23. Bere, > wo do not with to undertake soch qresticning util the results of Om Cfhes requesta hare been exaatnet, In atihition, it showld be. exphocicod that Diether investigative requests moy becone appropriste _ in the course of reading tha Ruby trial transcript, exonining-fircther eviceise to ba prncuced hy maby or his atiormyn, writing a Line? éraft, and £ ting. pots Honetheinss, we inv believe the estiza xeqerto tiv now wmytseyy a will sorve to corredk : v1 : pit <¢ presuse that our suggestions for obtsining redic toons, television tupps, hotel, sol motel records, end airings peosencer nenifests are of much o broad natore as to be ovtelée the scope af coy Tayrests by way of letters to the FBIs thctt we undorstamd thut consisemation has been given to thee cuygartions oni that a decision _ Will be mate fo the firture 6s to whether or not thove sugsestions wil? - b> implemented. , ; Griffin/ jv/6-1-64 CC: Griffin chron file ir, Rankin JFK Exuisit F-593 561 Mr. BuaAkeEy. Utilizing various phone records still available, in- cluding those of Jack Ruby’s phone calls in 1963, the select commit- tee has developed a computer project for the purpose of detailed analysis of them. Using the computer technology of the legislative and committee systems division of the House information system, House Adminis- tration Committee, the phone records analysis took shape. An Amdahl 470 V-5 computer was utilized, backed up by two IBM 370-158 central processing units. Various programs were run, using the master data base developed from the various phone records obtained by the committee. Additional programs are still continuing. The telephone calls of Jack Ruby in 1963 were given top priority in the project. In recent years, Ruby’s alleged associations with organized crime have been raised anew. In particular, it has been said that he was in repeated contact with a number of underworld figures in the months just before the assassination of President Kennedy. A response to these charges has been, however, that any contact by Ruby with such people may well have resulted from his attempts to seek assistance in a labor dispute. In programing a chronological consolidation of the telephone calls made by Ruby from five business and home telephones, the committee discovered a significant upsurge in the number of calls in October and November 1963. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that JFK F-545 be entered into the record and displayed at this point. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this point. (The above referred to exhibit, JFK F-545, follows:] JACK RUBY - TOLL CALLS - 1963 Suspicious foneWtWalVA MAMdMkrn : - APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEP OCT NOV JFK Exuisit F-545 562 Mr. BLAKEY. As can be seen from the month-by-month plotting of these calls on the graph in exhibit F-545, the number of calls soared from an average of 25 to 35, in May through September, to 75 in October, and 96 in November. That is, 96 calls up to Novem- ber 24, the day he was imprisoned for shooting Oswald. To fathom the possible meaning of the upsurge in Ruby’s calls in October and November, the committee closely evaluated his activi- ties during that period. It considered who it was Ruby was calling and being called by; why he was in contact with these people; whether or not he had contacted them previously. The committee was also careful to examine the circumstances surrounding Ruby’s labor problems in 1963. The labor dispute involved Ruby’s competition with other owners of clubs in the Dallas area. Specifically, he was involved quarreling with other owners over whether amateur striptease dancers, that is, nonunion girls from the local area, could perform in Dallas nightclubs. Ruby had been prohibited by the American Guild of Variety Artists from featuring nonprofessional local strippers in his club. The hiring of local girls in weekend shows, in what were usually billed as amateur nights, was a source of profit for him. Ruby was further angered by the fact that at least one of his competitors reportedly had been allowed to use nonunion talent. The exact circumstances of Ruby’s labor difficulties in 1963 are too complex to be dealt with in detail here, but one aspect is relevant. In analyzing the dramatic upsurge in calls in October and November 1963, the committee was able to isolate a significant number from the main body of calls. It determined that these particular calls were made in conjunction with Ruby’s efforts to seek acceptable mediation or settlement of his dispute with AGVA. As can be seen from the second line of the graph in JFK exhibit F-545, which plots the calls made by Ruby in connection with his efforts to solicit advice from AGVA, the increase in these union- related calls corresponds, to a considerable degree, with the in- crease in the total body of Ruby’s calls during the same period. The analysis shows that Ruby’s labor difficulties were, in fact, related to much of the increase in calls made by Ruby in October and November 1963. But in going one step further, it became apparent that to attri- bute all of Ruby’s increased telephone activity in October and November to his AGVA dispute might be an inaccurate oversimpli- fication, for a closer look at the specific calls he made in 1963 raised questions that could not be readily or easily dismissed. Ruby had, in fact, placed calls to a number of individuals who have been identified as being in some way associated with orga- nized crime. _ Mr. Chairman, I would ask that JFK exhibit F-546 be entered into the record at this point and displayed. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this point. [The above-referred to exhibit, JFK exhibit F-546, follows:] 563 SUMMAR 1 OF TELEPHONE CALLS TIME CALL DURATION TELEPHONE NO PEPSOH TYPE AUDIT AUDIT DATE PLACED OF CALL PLACING CALL CALLEO CALL NUMBER SUBSCRIBER NUMBER 05/12/63 006 MIN THUNDEF@IRD STATION 7702 FR RI72362 7843 CAROUSEL CLUB 1312 1/2 COMMERCE ST DALLAS TX 7. 007 MIN MCWILLIE LEWIS STATION 7702 FR RI72362 7843 sen cde CARGUSEL CLUB 1312 1/2 COMMERCE ST DALLAS TX 02/63 006 MIN MCHILLIE LEWIS STATION 7703 FR RI72362 7843 > hes CAROUSEL CLUB 1312 1/2 COMMERCE ST DALLAS TX 02/63 003 MIN THUNDERBIRD STATION 7703 FR RI72362 7843 one CAROUSEL CLUB 1312 1/2 COMMERCE ST DALLAS TX 08/04/63 005 MIN THUNDERBIFO STATION 7701 FR &H15601 7838 JACK RUBY 223 S EWING APT 207 DALLAS 1X 08/19/63 001 MIN THUNDERBIRO STATION 7701 FR WH15601 7838 JACK RUBY 223 S EWING APT 207 OALLAS TX 06/20/63 002 MIN THUNDERBIRO STATION 7701 FR WH1S601 7836 JACK RUBY 223 S EWING APT 207 OALLAS TX 06/22/63 007 MIN THUNDERBIRD STATION 7701 FR Witl5601 7838 JACK RUBY 223 S CHING APT 207 DALLAS TX 10/26/63 12:07 012 MIN WEINER IRWIN WEINER PERSONAL 7707 FR RI72362 7843 CAROUSEL CLUB 1312 1/2 COMMERCE ST DALLAS [Xx 10/30/63 21:13 001 MIN TROPICAL COURT STATION 7708 FR R1I72362 7843 CAROUSEL CLUB 1312 1/2 COMMERCE ST DALLAS TX 11/07/63 14:12 017 MIN CAROUSEL CLUB PERSONAL 7711 FR RA84O31 7628 ROBERT B BAKER SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE CALLS TIME CALL DURATION TELEPHONE .NO PERSON TYPE AUDIT AUDIT OATE PLACED OF CALL PLACING CALL CALLEO CALL NUMBER SUBSCRIBER NUMBER 5900 SHERIDAN ROSD CHICAGO IL 11/08/63 16:47 004 MIN EDEN ROC HOTEL DUSTY MILLER PERSONAL 7711 FR RI72362 7843 CAROUSEL CLUB 1312 1/2 COMMERCE ST DALLAS TX 11/06/63 17:22 014 MIN BAKER ROBERT STATION 7712 FR RI72362 7843 CAROUSEL CLUB 1312 1/2 COMMERCE ST DALLAS TX JFK Exuisit F-546 Mr. Biakey. JFK exhibit F-546 is a printout of these calls. Although it may again be noted that these particular calls also correspond somewhat to the upsurge in the main body of Ruby calls in the weeks prior to the assassination, and even though some of the individuals in question have said that Ruby was in contact with them to seek help in his labor difficulties, the committee felt that more detail on the backgrounds of these persons was essential. Extensive file reviews were, therefore, conducted, and the following picture emerged. Between June and August of 1963, Jack Ruby placed seven long- distance calls to one Lewis J. McWillie. McWillie was a close Ruby associate, as Ruby told the Warren Commission. In 1959, Ruby had visited Lewis McWillie in Havana, where McWillie was working in an organized crime-connected casino. 564 Jack Ruby’s phone calls to McWillie occurred on June 27, Sep- tember 2, two calls, September 4, September 19, September 20, and September 22. The first two calls were placed to McWillie’s home number; the remaining five calls were to McWillie’s place of busi- ness, the Thunderbird Casino in Las Vegas. On the afternoon of October 26, 1963, Jack Ruby placed a long- distance phone call to Irwin S. Weiner in Chicago, with whom he spoke for 12 minutes. Weiner was and is a prominent bondsman in Chicago, who has been closely linked with such figures as James Hoffa, Santos Trafficante, Sam Giancana, Paul and Allen Dorfman. Weiner, according to Federal and State law enforcement files, is alleged to have served as a key functionary in the longtime rela- tionship between the Chicago Mafia and various corrupt union officials, particularly during Hoffa’s reign as president of the Teamsters Union. Additionally, Weiner has been involved in a business relation- ship with two men long identified as executioners for the Chicago Mafia—Felix ‘Phil’ Alderisio and Albert “Obie” Frabotta. In the immediate days following President Kennedy’s murder, the FBI sought to question Weiner about the call he had received from Ruby on October 26. According to an FBI teletype of Novem- ber 28, 1963, Weiner refused to respond to questioning by FBI agents in Chicago with regard to his contact with Ruby, and he declined to assist the investigation in any way. Other information received by the FBI during the investigation indicated that Weiner had been acquainted years earlier in Chica- go with Ruby’s brother Earl. Though the Warren Commission was aware of Ruby’s phone call to Weiner, the Commission never sought to have him questioned under oath. Additionally, neither Ruby nor his brother, Earl, were ever asked by the Commission about their relationship with Weiner. In executive session testimony before this committee, Weiner was questioned about his contact with Ruby. He testified that he had gone to high school with Ruby’s brother, Earl, and had been dis- tantly acquainted with Jack. Weiner said he had little or no con- tact with Ruby in later years, and had not heard from him in at least 10 years at the time Ruby called him in late October 1963. Weiner declared the purpose of Ruby’s call was to seek assist- ance in the labor dispute he was having with his Dallas nightclub _ competitors. Ruby asked for aid in putting up a bond related to his attempt to file for an injunction against his competitors. Weiner testified that he declined to assist Ruby, and had no further con- tact with him. The committee has examined testimony and documentation re- lating to Ruby’s labor difficulties, in particular his dispute with AGVA. Nevertheless, the committee has not found another refer- ence to an effort by Ruby to put up a bond in connection with seeking an injunction against his competitors. n his appearance before the committee, Weiner further testified that he had lied to a reporter when he said in a taped interview that Ruby’s phone call to him on October 26, 1968, had nothing to do with labor problems. 565 Weiner testified he had refused to submit to FBI questioning about Ruby in the weeks following the assassination because he believed Bureau agents had harassed his daughter by implying he might be connected to the assassination. Weiner stated he could not specifically recall where he was on the day of the assassination or on the day Ruby shot Oswald, though he believed he was on a visit to Miami. At 9:13 a.m., October 30, 1963, 4 days after his call to Irwin Weiner, Jack Ruby placed a call to the Tropical Court Tourist Park, a trailer park in New Orleans. The number Ruby called, 242-5431, was listed as the business office of the Tropical Court, and the duration of the call was 1 minute. In a partial compilation of numbers called by long distance by Ruby, transmitted to the Warren Commission by the FBI in early 1964, a notation was made indicating that this Ruby call to the Tropical Court went to N. J. Pecora. The Warren Commission did not, however, interview or investigate Pecora and made no reference to him in its report. Nofio J. Pecora, alias Joseph O. Pecoraro, was the owner of the Tropical Court Tourist Park. He ran the park from a one-man office located on the premises, the office Ruby had called on Octo- ber 30. Pecora, a former heroin smuggler, was alleged to be a close associate of Carlos Marcello. The FBI, Justice Department, and Metropolitan Crime Commission of New Orleans have identified Pecora as one of Marcello’s three most trusted aides. Law enforcement surveillance reports have indicated a particu- larly close Marcello-Pecora relationship during the early 1960’s, with Pecora always close at hand at Marcello’s Town and Country Motel headquarters on the outskirts of New Orleans. In fact, it was noted in the select committee’s computer phone project that Marcello himself placed a call to Pecora on June 24, 1963, at the same trailer office number that Ruby called 4 months later. Earlier this year, when committee investigators sought to ques- tion Pecora about the October 30, 1963 telephone call from Ruby’s office to his own, Pecora declined to respond. Earlier this month, however, Pecora did agree to respond to questions put to him by committee investigators. Pecora stated that he does not recall receiving any telephone call from Ruby. He said that he did not know Ruby or have any knowledge of him. Pecora stated that he believes that he was probably the only person who had access to his Tropical Court telephone in 1963, but that he may well have taken a phone message, suggesting the call from Ruby may have been for someone else in the trailer park. The committee has established that Ruby did in fact have an associate who lived at the Tropical Court Tourist Park in 1963. He was a New Orleans nightclub manager named Harold Tannen- baum, now deceased, who was himself a friend and colleague of Pecora having run several Bourbon Street clubs controlled alleged- ly by the Marcello interests. In his recent interview with committee investigators, Pecora stated he had been an acquaintance of Tannenbuam, that Tannen- baum was a neighbor in the trailer court. Pecora said, however, he was not aware that Tannenbuam had been a friend of Ruby. ed 566 Harold Tannenbuam met Ruby in the summer of 1963 and dis- cussed going into business with him. The computer telephone proj- ect has established that Ruby and Tannenbaum were in frequent contact from June to October 1963. The project has also established that an hour after the October 30 call was placed from Ruby’s office to Pecora’s office, Tannen- baum placed a call to Ruby. On November 7, 1963, Ruby received a collect call from Robert G. (Barney) Baker of Chicago. The call lasted 17 minutes. Baker is said to have been a top lieutenant and reputed enforcer for Teamster president James Hoffa. A former boxer and ex-con- vict, Baker was perhaps Hoffa’s best known assistant during the McClellan committee investigation of labor racketeering in the 1950’s. The Senate investigation, coordinated by then chief counsel Robert F. Kennedy, had detailed Baker’s role as Hoffa’s personal liaison to various leading Mafia figures. In his McClellan testimony, Baker recited a long list of Mafia hit men with whom he had been associated. In 1960, Robert F. Kenne- dy wrote of Baker: Sometimes the mere threat of his presence in a room was enough to silence the men who would otherwise have opposed Hoffa’s regime. Barney Baker was questioned by the FBI in Chicago on January 8, 1964, regarding his contact with Ruby. Baker stated that Ruby was a complete stranger to him until the very day he spoke with him, November 7, 1963. Baker explained that Ruby had called him earlier that day and that, in his absence, his wife had taken a message to call Ruby’s nightclub in Dallas. Baker told the FBI that Ruby had not used his real name, but had instructed him to ask for Lou, which he did, placing a collect call to Ruby’s number. It might be noted that this is the only incident the committee has come across in which Ruby has used a false name or an alias. In his 1964 interview with the FBI, Baker stated that the pur- pose of Ruby’s call was to seek assistance in the labor dispute. According to the FBI report, Baker said that he had “* * * con- cluded the conversation by firmly declining to offer any assistance in the matter.’’ While in his FBI interview, Baker ‘advised that * * * he had many friends (who) were * * * high-ranking hood- lums,”’ he stated that he had no prior association with Ruby, and he had no knowledge of any Ruby connections to such hoodlums. On November 8, 1968, the day after he received the call from Barney Baker, Ruby placed a call to Murray W. (Dusty) Miller at the Eden Rock Hotel in Miami. The call lasted 4 minutes. Dusty Miller was another key lieutenant of Teamster president James Hoffa, and, as head of the powerful Southern Conference of the union, he was regarded as a possible successor to Hoffa himself. Miller, who had been a Teamster leader in Dallas, was associated with numerous underworld figures. In a recent interview with this committee, Miller stated that he had had no contact with Ruby prior to being called by him on November 8, 1963. Miller said Ruby complained of labor problems and asked Miller for help. Miller testified that Ruby said some- thing to the effect, “Barney Baker gave me your number and told 567 me that maybe you could help me out.” Miller stated that on hearing the reference to Baker, he quickly ended the conversation, explaining he viewed Baker as a man with questionable associates. At 5:22 p.m., November 8, 1963, 31 minutes after he called Dusty Miller, Jack Ruby placed a call to Barney Baker in Chicago. This call lasted 14 minutes. It occurred on the day after Baker tele- phoned Ruby in Dallas. As noted earlier, Baker told the FBI on January 3, 1964, that he had terminated his November 7 conversation with Ruby by ‘“* * * firmly declining to offer any assistance” to Ruby. In his FBI inter- view, Baker made no mention of the fact that Ruby had called him back on November 8, 1963. In fact, he indicated that he had had no further contact with him. The committee has extensively questioned Baker about his past contacts with Jack Ruby. When asked why he did not tell the FBI of his second lengthy conversation with Ruby, Baker said that he must have forgotten about the second call. The committee has noted several other areas of telephone con- tact or relationship that are of particular interest. Three examples: One, in testimony before the Warren Commission, Jack Ruby’s sister, Eva Grant, said that he brother had called Lenny Patrick in Chicago sometime during the summer of 1963. Mrs. Grant stated that Ruby had had some difficulty in locating Patrick’s number, but that he had told her he had finally found it and had, in fact, called Patrick in Chicago. Lenny Patrick is said to have been one of the Chicago Mafia’s leading assassins, responsible, according to Federal and State law enforcement files, for the murders of over a dozen mob victims. Patrick had grown up in the same Chicago neighborhood as Ruby and had been slightly acquainted with him. Later, Patrick became, it is said, senior lieutenant of Chicago Mafia leader, Sam Giancana. Two, a call made on September 24, 1963, by an investigator for New Orleans Mafia leader Carlos Marcello to a woman in Chicago, who was present with Ruby on the night before the assassination. The committee found that David W. Ferrie had called the number of Jean West and had spoken for at least 15 minutes. On November 21, 1963, Miss West visted Ruby in Dallas, accompanied by a mutual friend, Lawrence Meyers. Miss West and Meyers had drinks with Ruby shortly before midnight on November 21 at the Cabana Motel. Three, the committee found that Barney Baker had placed a telephone call to another one-time associate of Jack Ruby on the evening of November 21, 1963. The person Baker called was David Yaras of Miami. Yaras was a close friend and partner of Lenny Patrick. He had also been acquainted with Ruby during their early years in Chicago. Like Lenny Patrick, Dave Yaras has served, it is alledged, as a key lieutenant of Chicago Mafia leader Sam Giancana, reputedly as an executioner. In an FBI interview in 1964, Yaras stated that he had last seen Ruby over 10 years prior to the assassination. Once again, Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, the ultimate meaning of these facts and circumstances remains as yet indeterminate. The possible implication of these phone calls may be more fully explored in tomorrow’s proceeding but first, it may be helpful to 568 return to look at Jack Ruby in Dallas. To learn more about Jack Ruby’s life, the committee has turned to the Dallas Police Depart- ment. It has done so for two reasons. One, Ruby was on friendly terms with many officers of the DPD, and two, because there are still questions about the shooting of Oswald in the Dallas police headquarters. Our next witness is Captain Jack Revill of the Dallas Police Department. He has been a member of the DPD since 1951 and currently is in charge of the Internal Affairs Division of the depart- ment. In 1963, Captain Revill was a lieutenant assigned to the Criminal Intelligence Section of the Special Service Bureau. Later, he was a member of the special investigative unit charged with determining how Jack Ruby in fact entered the police head- quarters basement on November 24, 1963. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call on Captain Revill. Chairman Strokes. At this time, before calling the witness, the committee will take a 10-minute recess. [A short recess was taken.] Chairman STokEs. The committee will come to order. The committee calls Captain Revill. Please raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Captain RevILL. I do. Chairman StokgEs. Thank you, sir. You may be seated. Z ine Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. Donald urdy. Mr. Purpy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What is your full name and where do you live? TESTIMONY OF JACK REVILL, CAPTAIN OF POLICE, DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT Captain Revity. My name is Jack Revill. I live in Dallas, Tex., at 5204 Elk Ridge Drive. Mr. Purpy. What is your present occupation and rank? Captain Revit. I am employed by the Dallas Police Department. I am a captain of police, currently commanding the Internal Af- fairs Division. Mr. Purpy. What was your occupation, rank, and duties in the 1950’s and early 1960’s in Dallas? Captain Revit. I was a lieutenant of police, assigned to the Criminal Intelligence Section of the Dallas Police Department. Mr. Purpy. What was the responsibility of the Criminal Intelli- gence Section in the 1950’s and early 1960’s? Captain REvILL. Our primary function was the gathering of infor- mation on individuals and organizations involved in criminal activ- ities and extremist group individuals, and organizations. Mr. Purpy. Was the vice squad part of this unit? Captain REVILL. The vice squad was a part, an integral part of the Special Services Bureau which consisted of vice, narcotics, and intelligence, each unit commanded by a lieutenant of police. 569 Mr. Purpy. To what extent did members of the intelligence unit have access to information concerning criminal activity generally in Dallas in the 1950’s and early 1960’s? Captain RevILL. We had complete access to recorded information of criminal elements. Mr. Purpy. When did you join the intelligence division? Captain REvILL. In February of 1958, I believe. Mr. Purpy. What division did you work in prior to that time? Captain REvILL. Prior to that I was a lieutenant commanding the narcotics unit. Mr. Purpy. In your work with the intelligence division, did you gain access to information concerning all types of criminal activity or just specific types? Captain REvILL. All types of criminal activity. Mr. Purpy. Do you have any knowledge of specific criminal activities by Jack Ruby? Captain Revitu. Nothing specific. I knew Jack Ruby by reputa- tion. Mr. Purpy. Was prostitution common in the clubs in Dallas? Captain ReEvILL. It was not common. The Dallas Police Depart- ment has always had an aggressive enforcement policy toward protitution; but prostitution was available in certain clubs. Mr. Purpy. Did prostitution occur in any clubs run by Jack Ruby, to your knowledge? Captain REviL.. Not to my personal knowledge. Mr. Purpy. Was there any narcotics activity common in Dallas, in general, and the clubs in particular, in the fifties and early sixties? Captain Reviuu. Narcotics were available in the clubs, nothing specific as far as any organized groups or efforts on the part of the people to sell or dispense drugs in the clubs. Mr. Purpy. Did you have any information concerning the pres- ence of narcotics activity in any clubs run by Jack Ruby? Captain REvILL. No, sir, I did not. Mr. Purpy. Was gambling common in Dallas, in general, and in nightclubs, in particular? Captain Revit. Not general. Some bookmaking activities were conducted in clubs but again this was not an open thing. Mr. Purpy. To your knowledge, did gambling go on in any clubs run by Jack Ruby? Captain Revitt. I have no personal knowledge of Jack Ruby being involved in gambling or in his clubs. Mr. Purpy. Were organized criminal elements present in Dallas in the 1950’s and early 1960’s? Captain REviLu. I am sure they were. Mr. Purpy. To your knowledge, was Jack Ruby associated with such activity, generally, and in Dallas, in particular? Captain Revitt. Are you referring to organized crime, Jack Ruby’s involvement? Mr. Purpy. Yes. Captain Revit. I have no information that Jack Ruby was in- volved in organized crime in Dallas. 570 Mr. Purpy. Did you have any knowledge of Jack Ruby’s associ- ations with any gamblers or anyone else involved with illegal activity? Captain Revit. Jack Ruby was the type of person who would have been acquainted with persons involved in gambling activities and other criminal activities, but as far as Jack Ruby being active- ly engaged or a member of any groups, no, nothing to indicate this. Mr. Purpy. Did you have knowledge of any particular close associations between Jack Ruby and anyone associated with crimi- nal activity? Captain Revit. No information that would indicate that he was actively engaged. I am sure that he was acquainted with certain individuals who would have been involved in these type activities due to the nature of his nightclub business. Mr. Purpy. Did you know Lewis McWillie? Captain Revitu. I know Lewis McWillie by name. Mr. Purpy. What was his reputation in Dallas? Captain REvILL. Professional gambler, a bookmaker. Mr. Purpy. Were you aware of his relationship with Jack Ruby? Captain REvILuL. Not at that time. Mr. Purpy. When did you learn of that relationship? Captain Revit. Since this particular committee has been in session. Mr. Purpy. You didn’t learn of it pursuant to the investigation by the Dallas Police Department into the assassination? Captain REvILL. No, sir. Mr. Purpy. Did you know Jack Ruby personally? Captain ReEviLu. Yes, sir, I had known Jack Ruby since 1953. rsMe Purpy. What was the nature of your relationship with Jack uby? Captain REvILL. No relationship whatsoever other than a profes- St relationship of a police officer to an individual such as Jack uby. Mr. Purpy. Did you ever visit any of his clubs? Captain Revit. I was in one club in 19538, the old Silver Spur Club in South Dallas. That was the only occasion I was ever in one of his clubs. Mr. Purpy. What was your personal impression of Jack Ruby? Captain REvILL. Jack Ruby was a baffoon. He liked the limelight. He was highly volatile. He liked to be recognized with people, and I would say this to this committee: if Jack Ruby was a member of organized crime, then the personnel director of organized crime should be replaced. Mr. Purpy. Why do you say that? Captain Revitt. Knowing Jack Ruby to be a baffoon. Mr. Purpy. Was your impression of Jack Ruby shared by other members of the Dallas Police Department? ee REvILL. It was shared by members of the intelligence unit. Mr. Purpy. What was the source of your impression that Jack Ruby was a hothead? Captain Revi... Reputation. Mr. Purpy. Were there any specific instances that you were told about that led you to believe that the reputation was accurate? 571 Captain Revit. Where he had become involved in altercations at his clubs, where he had physically ejected people. Jack Ruby was hot tempered and was quick to fight or become involved in alterca- tions. Mr. Purpy. What was Jack Ruby’s reputation among the busi- ness community in Dallas? Captain Revitu. I don’t know that he had a reputation among the business community per se. He was probably known among the club owners who operated similar operations but as far as being mele among the business community, I dare say that he was not nown. ~Mr. Purpy. Would you say the Jack Ruby had an unusually close relationship with members of the Dallas Police Department? Captain Revit. Listening to testimony here this morning, it would indicate that Jack Ruby was known by all of the police officers. I take exception to that in that I have been there almost 28 years and my particular unit was housed in the Special Services Bureau section. Jack Ruby would have had to come to that office to renew licenses such as a cabaret license, beer license, et cetera, and I dare say that I would see him no more than maybe twice a year and I don’t recall seeing Jack Ruby in the Police and Courts Building that often. Mr. Purpy. Did Jack Ruby receive any benefits or favors from members of the police department in their treatment of him? Captain REvILL. I sincerely hope not. Mr. Purpy. Was there any problem with members of the Dallas Police Department performing or receiving favors from club owners? Captain REvILL. No, none that I know of. Mr. Purpy. Was there any problem with Jack Ruby in this respect? Captain Revitu. No, sir, I have no knowledge of Jack Ruby bestowing gifts and favors upon police officers. Mr. Purpy. Was Jack Ruby ever used as an informant by the Dallas Police Department? Captain REviLL. He was not used as an informant by the intelli- gence unit. Whether or not Jack Ruby was used as a source of information, and there is a difference, this I don’t know. Mr. Purpy. To what extent is it possible that Jack Ruby was the source of information to units other than yours? Captain REvILL. Jack Ruby could have provided information to the members of the vice section who called upon his club, who conducted surveillances or visits into his clubs, but I have no knowledge, personal knowledge of this occurring. Mr. Purpy. Have any officers told you that this exchange of information took place? Captain REvILL. No, sir. Mr. Purpy. Did the FBI provide the Dallas Police Department with the identities of or information concerning the FBI infor- mants in the 1950’s and early 1960's? Captain REvILL. No, sir, they did not. Mr. Purpy. Were you aware that the FBI had contact with Jack Ruby in 1959 to try to develop an informant relationship with him? Captain REvILL. No, sir. 572 Mr. Purpy. Would you expect that you would known that infor- mation? Captain Revit. No, sir. They would have not known my infor- mants and I would not have known theirs. Mr. Purpy. Approximately how many officers would you say knew Jack Ruby? You say they all didn’t. Approximately how many did know him? Captain Revitt. In 1963, we had approximately 1,200 officers with the Dallas Police Department. I would say that those officers who knew Jack Ruby were nonuniform personnel, with the excep- tion of the officers assigned to the various beats where his clubs were geographically located. Consequently, we are talking about members of the vice section, narcotics section, the intelligence section, approximately 60 men in that bureau. Members of the burglary and theft unit would probably have known Jack Ruby. Some members of homicide and robbery may have known him. So we are probably speaking in the area of 100 to 150 people, officers, who would have known Jack Ruby, and this includes uniform officers also. Mr. Purpy. As I am sure you know, Jack Ruby was present in the police headquarters on a number of occasions during the week- end following the assassination of President Kennedy. To your knowledge, was his presence ever challenged by any member of the Dallas Police Department? Captain REviL.. Not to my knowledge. Mr. Purpy. Why do you think this was the case? Do you think it was because he was known to so many officers? Captain Revitt. I have no way of knowing why he was not challenged except that the police and courts building was not se- cured during the day of the assassination of Mr. Kennedy. The following day, which was Saturday, November 23, it was not se- cured, and on the date of Ruby’s assassination of Lee Harvey Oswald, the only area that I have knowledge of that was supposed to be secured was the basement area where the transfer of Mr. Oswald was to take place. . Mr. Purpy. Was anyone punished for the lax security present in the police department headquarters during that weekend? Captain Revitt. Not to my knowledge. One man who currently serves aS my administrative sergeant feels that he was maligned due to his activities. This is Sgt. Roy Gene Vaughn, who at that time was a uniform patrolman who was assigned to the ramp on Main Street leading into the basement of the city hall, and Ser- geant Vaughn has told me that he feels that he was punished in that his efficiency, his personal evaluation, numerical score, was cut a couple of points, and that is the only thing I have ever heard. Mr. Purpy. So other than the issue of Jack Ruby’s access to the police basement on this Sunday morning, no one else was punished for the lax security that was in effect in police headquarters during that whole weekend? Captain Revitu. I have no knowledge of anyone being punished. Mr. Purpy. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, counsel. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer, for such time as he may consume. 573 Mr. Sawyer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am really substituting for Mr. Dodd, who has to be over testify- ing before the Rules Committee at this moment, so I have a list of Den ak he was going to ask and I will do my best to handle them. One thing I am particularly interested in, or Mr. Dodd is, is the access or how Ruby came to get into the basement of the police station at the time of the assassination. Do I understand correctly that the three officers in a car right at the ramp did not see him come down the ramp? Captain Revit. If I recall correctly, I believe there has been previous testimony from those particular officers. Sir, if I might explain something here or elaborate. As counsel said, I was as- signed by Chief Curry to an investigative team to determine how Ruby gained access to the basement of the city hall, to determine if there was any complicity on the part of any officers as to their involvement, and if I may elaborate on the findings of this particu- lar group, I would be happy to do so at this time. Mr. Sawyer. Yes, I would like to have that. Captain Revi... I believe the committee has a chart. This partic- ular chart represents a facsimile of the basement of the police and courts building and at the top left you will see what appears to be a ramp. Mr. FirH1ANn. Would it be possible to have him—— Captain Revit. This will be much better. Mr. FiruHiAn. There is a microphone over there. Chairman Strokes. Also, may we have counsel identify the exhibit? Mr. Purpy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask at this time that this photographic blowup of the Warren Commission diagram of the police basement be entered into the record at this time as JFK exhibit F-568. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this point. [The above-referred-to JFK exhibit F-568 follows:] 574 BASEMENT Dallas Police Department, Dallas, Texas MAIN STREET BASEMENT WALL STORAGE OPENING SIDEWALK (APPROXIMATELY 10° ABOVE _-— SUB BASEMENT FLOOR) See Be eae Nace ad enoe FIRST FLOOR OUTSIDE WALL a a DOWN: KAMP; >: VAKKING AREA +t OSWALD’S us: - L ROUTE = oO: FIRST AID a: STATION SCALE IN FEET JAIL n: 5 0 %S 10 15 20 2% 30 35 40 ELEV >: - WT 2 = STAIRS UP a; a a fo ELEVATORS SERVICE ELEV |, ‘. 4 . . OSWALD ” . : SHOT HERE |" "BOTH CARS, | ]*>1963 FORD GALAXIE A 7 pa 4-DOOR SEDANS j aS a a a J CHIEF PARKING PARKING AREA uP a 3 a e a s COMPARTMENTED Bi ARMORED TRUCK AREA a_i | MGs Coe _ meaetaoomn — — — —_8_ __ sn \ - | FIRST FLOOR OUTSIDE WALL SIDEWALK *—— TO ENGINE ROOM SIDEWALK ; (SUB BASEMENT) BASEMENT WALL COMMERCE STREET COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 2179 JFK Exuisit F-568 575 Mr. Purpy. It would be appropriate also at this time to enter into the record as JFK exhibit F-567 the report of the special unit on which Captain Revill served. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this point. [The above-referred-to JFK exhibit F-567 follows:] JFK Exuisit F-567 poe a TL REIL ie RS NOS ee seen oO ketal oF at Ddesea, “AES =3 Rr: coe past” gehen sttah, Gary Chief of Police Sir: Pursuant to your instructions of November 29, 1962, the unit assigned has completed an investigation of the Operational Security involving the transfer of Les Harvey Gswald on November 24, 1963. A sumary of the investigation, along with an indexed ‘B- complete investigative report, plus exhibits is for~- warded under separate cover. ee Respectfully submitted, Cdptain of Police OAJ snw 576 7 Ake - December 16, 1963 _ m: hes ae AEE pe rk aaa Og aie ap E. Curry. ee ats y oe ~ Chief of Police re eo = Selatan: are yainn. mor on -. rp 4 4 So — aoeels , / | Subject: Investigation of the Operational Security _ Involving the Transfer of Lee Harvey Oswald ~ on November 24, 1963. . - ~ oe Sot Sirs , é ; E | ae , ses ae a lat eo ' ‘The investigative team which you appointed on November 29, 1963, ° - to make this investigation wishes to submit the following report: — Security was set up in the basement parking area of the City Hall at approximately 9 a.m. on Sunday, November 2), 1963. (See attachnent s) . The basezient wes searched and guards placed at all entrances. “ALL unauthorized personnel were removed from the area. Security personnel and news media were then allowed to enter the basement. An armored truck was ordered and arrived at the Conmerce Street ~ ramp at approximately 11:00 a.m. It was backed onto the ramp. The truck did not have sufficient clearance to be taken to the bottom of the ramp, The driver believed the truck might stall due to the weight if it was placed on the incline. It was then decided to leava tha truck at the top of the Commerce Streat ramp with the rear wheels on the incline and the front wheels on the sidewalk of the Commsrce Street side of the City Hall. The Jail Office corridor outside the Jail Office and the ramp - area South of the Southeast comer of the Jail Office was - . cleared of everyone except security officers. Plans were changed and Lieutenant R, S, Pierce drove a squad _ cer out of the. basement area and out the Main Street ramp. He was accompanied by Sergeants J. A. Putnam and B. J. Maxey. They made a left tun on Main Street, a left turn on Harwood Street | and a left turn .on Commerce Street. They were intending to lead the amored truck to the County Jail. The armored truck was to be a decoy and the prison2r was to be transferred in a plain care. Detective Charles Brown drove a plein car on the Commerce Street ramp toward the armored truck. Detective C. N, Dhority then drove enother plain car on the ranp behind Detective Charles Brown's care 577 Page 2 Detective C, N. Dhority was in the process of backing the car he _ -- was driving into position adjacent to the Jail Office entrance, ~-- - when the prisoner was brought out of the Jail Office by Detectives J. R, Leavelle and L, C, Graves, preceded by Captain J. W. Fritz : and Lieutenant R, E, Swain, They were followed by Detective L, De Montgomery. The prisoner had. taken a few steps toward the car. Jack Ruby apparently was standing about 10 or 12 feet from the _ Southeast corner of the Jail Office, at the bottom of the Main . Street Ramp near the pipe railing. Ruby lunged forward from a position between acting Detective W. J, Harrison and Robert S, Huffaker, Jr., a newsman .for KRLD-TV. Ruby approached Lee Harvey Oswald with a revolver extended and fired one shot into Oswald below the rib cage on the left side. The shot was fired at approximately 11:20 a.m, Ruby was imedi- : ately arrested, Lee gts Oswald expired at Parkland CR ca at 1:07 p.m ’ . - This group ivedeaseated 123 persons during the course of this investigation. This included 20 patrolmen, 21 reserves, 30 detectives, 19 supervisors, 13 reporters, 11 cameramen and 9 civilians. Most of the officers were assigned to provide security end the reporters and cameramen were in the basement at the time of the transfer. Only one of the. civilians inter- rogated was in the basement at the time and this was Jack Ruby- ‘We have obtained the names of 10 newsmen that were in the base~ ment that we have not been able to interview. We were able to deterxine there were approximately 10 members of the news media jn the basement whose identity we have not been able to deter mine. It is believed these are newspaper correspondents repr e~ senting publicats ons from other areas of the country end even other countries, Time and monsy made the running dow of these seery jn2dvisable et this “time, particularly since it is not be~ lieved that eny of them could throw additional light on this matter. Jumerous side investigations which grew out of this Investigation were also mids, A separate report covering these incidents will bs subnitted, We are convinced that our investigation has established to a reasonable certainty that Jack Leon Ruby entered ths basement from the Hain Strest ramp and that no collusion existed between 41-373 O - 79 - 37 578 ‘him and any police officer or member of the .press; that_his aoaSa = entrance into the basement at this particilar time was the ‘~~ result of a series of unfortunate coincidences which caused. —- a momentary breakdown in the security measures adopted. We are also convinced that Ruby was in the basement for a- _ maximum of 2 minutes with a strong possibility that it was only 5 to 10 seconds prior to the shooting of Lee Harvey ' Oswald. : The following evidence led us to the above conclusion: I. Exhibit BB : A. Lieutenants Jack Revill and P. G. McCaghren inter= _ viewed Mr. Doyal Lane of 6549 Lake Circle, A1-0560 at the Western Union Telegraph Company located at Main and Pearl Expressway in Dallas, Texas. . 1. Mr. Lane is a supervisor for the Western Union Telegraph Company and was on duty at this. location on November 24, 1963. At 11:16 a.m. _Jack Ruby sent a $25.00 Money Order to an employee, Karen Bennett, Ft. Worth, ‘Texas and was given a receipt which. was stamped with the ‘time (11:16 a.n.) ' - 2. Mr. Lene was shown bait photogrephs and he readily picked the photograph of Jack Ruby from these and stated that he knew Jack Ruby inasmuch as Ruby had sent several telegrams in the past. II. Exhibit DD- 3 | ee meer’ A. Shows a distance of 339'6" from the Westernmost Goorway at the Western Union Office to the center of the ramp leading into the basement of the City Hall fron Main Street. 8B. Shows a Matehos of 99* from the center of the sidewald down the Hain Street Ramp to a line running East from the Southeast corner of the Jail Cffice. 579 Page -. ¥ ¢ a ee ee _— atees - _ =% —_ F. i-e- os" ~_—i. - oa ‘Shows: a aineate of ve from the asvbenseat point ' of line mentioned in B above to point where Leo rea” was shot. D. Totel minimuni distance Ruby would have to t eevee to . arrive at spot of shooting from ahaeice dsof Western Union equals 454,°6". III, Exhibit BB e Lieutenants Jack Revill and P. G. Pitacnren on November 29, 1963, checked the time required to walk from inside the Western Union Office to the spot of the ce in the ben, mig of the City Hall. 1. It takes 1 minute aha 13 seconds to Batt this distance to the entrance of the Main Street Yampe 2. It requires another 22. seconds to walk down the. ramp from Main Street to the location where Oswald was shot. 3. Total time required was 1 minute and 35 seconds. IV. Exhibit co A. Lieutenants C. C. Wallace and P. G. McCaghren used a stop watch checking time required to walk .from entrance of Western Union to location of Lee Oswald at time of shooting. Time required was 1 minute and 16 seconds. . B. It requires 10 seconds or more to go from the abe in the Western Union Office to the sidewalk outsids | the office. C. Total time required was 1 minute and twenty-six secomnds.s 580 Page 5 aT ee Leh G ‘Ve Tama of stShooting A, Patrolman Willie B. ‘Slack raged 91) paLeeat dispatcher for doctor and hen he ; aK Despavense called OtNeal Funeral Bens on Menke Line" for ambulance. : i 4 i (a) Funeral home logged call at 1s21 am, _Novenber 24, 1963. beds (b) Funeral Home advised dispatcher to radio Ambulance 605 who was on the air. 2. Dispatcher notified Ambulance 605 at 11: 22 AeMe November 24, 1963. (Exhibit BB) ‘(Exhibit EE) | B. Statements by Ruby — Attachment 90. 1. To Lieutenants Jack Revill and F, I. Cornwall : that he sent a telegram at 11:16 and did not speak to anyone in the basement Bias to the shooting. . ’ : 2. To Detective D. R. Archer (xteseticerts 2). "At this time P. T. Dean asked the suspect, Evby, tJack, how did you get in the basement?! Ruby replied, You guys'11 never believe this, but 2 little girl who works for me had called and asked that I send her some money to Ft. Worth. I bead left my apartment, gone to Western Union- at Vain and the Expressway, and wired her $25.00. I left there and noticed the crowd around the City Halle I walked up that way, thinking IL Might get a chance to see Oswald. As I reached the ramp that leads to the basement, I noticed Sam Pierce pull up from the ramp in.a black car. The officer standing there turned to either answer a question or say something to Sam.-I -Gon't know. As he did this, I walked down the ramp'," 2 . Mr. Forrest Sorrells of the U. S. Secret Service wes believed to be present at the time this statenent was made to Sergeant Dean. 581 Page 6. aaax oats a ee To DeidotioultBe:3. ‘Clardy pened Feae ‘“When asked why he shot Lee Oswald, Ruby replied, "Somebody had to do it, yar couldn't?, - He said it was e spur of the moment thing and it was a ‘million to one chance that he got dow there at the actual tine Oswald — was brought down." he To Sergeant P. T. Dean (Rita banesd 27). | “After Mr. Sorrells interrogated the subj eet I questioned Ruby as to how he had entered the basement and the length of time he had been. there. Ruby then stated to me in the presence of Mr. Sorrells that he had entered the base- ment through the ramp entering on Main Street. He further stated that he would estimte his total time as about 3 minutes before the detectives brought Oswald into his view, then he immediately shot him (Oswald).* : be To Detective T, D. McMillon(Attachment 74). "We talked to him when we got to the fifth floor. On the fifth floor Ruby was asked how he got to the basement. He replied that he cems from the Western Union Office where he - wired a girl in Ft. Worth some money. He said he saw Rio Pierce drive out of the basement. He walked past the policeman standing there. He said a policeman hollered at him, but he ducked his head and kept going. He said that he knew he could always act like a reporter. He also said, "Ya'll wont believe this, but I didn't have this planned. I couldn't have timed it so perfect.'! He said just.as he got there, Oswald was coming out." 6. To Patrolman W. J. Harrison (Attachment 45) "FYou all know m, I'm Jack Rubyt. One officer asked him why he did it, and he answered 'I hope I killed the 5.0. B. Li 082 Page 7 Se +. : ss . «onthe - ¢ z. a Dae Ls - 2 ob F> wm a Op eee Sian Se Se 2 — -_ _—— ES Zign's ’ ~ te we a Later VI, Car driven wrong a, up Main Street gets A. Lieuterant R, S, Pierce, Sefgeant Putnam and Sergeant wen were in CAI. Sha lair S5sh660e- - end 69.) . : 2 _ Ot ns 1. All 4p gl al state shooting occurred between time car left Main Street Ramp and arrival at - Commerce Street Ramp. Tieibentitd C, C, Wallace and P,. G, McCaghren ~ * 7 04 interviewed Mr. Fritz Kuler of KRLD-TV. Attach F Ia i ment 62) Mr. Kuler stated the video tape was pul . continuous. The time recorded on the vided machine/ of elapsed time from passage of Lieutenant Pierce's opi car in front of the TV camera until. the sound of the shot was 56 seconds. This was checked twice. VII. Officer R, E. Vaughn .~ Attachment 102. A. Assigned to Main Street Ramp of City Hall. B. Instrveted by Sergeant PT ‘Dean to guard the ee North. Rama. ts C. Officer Vauskn questioned several people. and admitted a city mechanic and 1 reporter, D. Steppad out into Main Street to stop traffic +f allow Lieutenant Pierce to make left turn onto Main treet. Saw thniet Officer ¥. J, Daniels at Nain Street Ramp. Saw former shine-boy from locker room, Wilbert shee Jones at Main Street Rann, G, Polygraph test showed truthful answers on all pertinent questions. VIII, Statement of N, J. Daniels ~ Attachment 23. A, Saw man enter Main Street Ramp, 583 tate es Te B. Cave denkracittod of mane C. Said man Stared between himself and Officer . Vaughn and the officer looked at him but did PKs stop hin. - D. Polygraph test showed Llbedenetivieey on all. ‘pertinent. questions that were answered. “cera of Wilbert Ray Jones ~ Attachment 57 Had gone aS parking lot at Gonmerce and Harwood at time of shot, Xe Statement ‘of Reserve Officer W. J. Ol od Attachment 79. ' Reserve Officer Newman saw someone running down the Main Street Ramp but could not définitely say the time. He believes’ it was about 1 minute before the shooting. Statement af Reserve Officer Sergeant Kenneth Croy + Attachment 21. This officer gives description of man a believes to have been Jack Ruby, that was at foot of Main Street Ramp a while before the shooting. (Investigeting. Officers have determined that Robert Huffeker, KRLD-IV newsman w2s in this area at the time, and his clothes were identical to the clothing described ty this officer.) XII. Staterents of Detectives B. L. Beaty and J. D. Hutchinson — Attachments 4 and 52. : These two detectives were stationed at the double doors leading into the City Hall from the basement parking area for more then 10 minutes before the shooting. They both knew Jack Ruby and neither saw hin in the basement prior to the shooting. They say Ruby Pagar9 | caetbes ee tee =: : ee Spe s eReeee Te ee ;itcre ie hod! DO See a) rh - Sry See . ee ew ; a wei- ae ee &> ‘+t : : — aid not ententha basement area from the double aedlen SE the Jail Office of the Police and Courts Building. XTIT. Statasent of Sergeant Puttian! Reserve Captain Arnett and Reserve Lieutenant HcCoy..- Attachments 86, rf and 72. . These officers y weabeteres are eeparaaae the Aeaxchh of the basement parking area and ramps and screening of — personnel in areas XIV. Nawspepertarttele in| DaYlas Times Herald, Sunday, Decenber 8, 1963, Statements of Darwin Payne, Dayid Hughes and Sergeant P, T. Dean, ~ Attachments 682A, 50A and 27. Thesarticle”alleged~~that-2- Dallas -Police officer: ay ~ JacksRuby-as:he: came down the- ‘Main. “Street Ramp. ?Sergeant Daan denied the- allegation and: thet Stat ctaith of«the:reporters and their-notes show.a presumption of? . the*fact: not; confirmed by-the “evidences xV. Statement of Officer W. Je Harrison ~ Attactinenttd 45 and &4-B. vack Ruoy came from this officer's left side when he plunged forward to shoot Oswald. ' pope Polygraph test by Detectays P. L. Benitley shows. that Officer Harrison did not see Ruby prior to the exit of Oswald from the Jail Office and did not recognize poe “until instant shot was fired. . XVI. Security check of newsmen who qjmtered the basement. . Al1 members of the press who were interviewed stated their credentials were checked upon entering the bese- ment, or that they knew the officers personally that admitted them to the b2sement. “XVIL: Use of Press Pass by Jack Ruby. ° fires me eyes & Case « “A, Statement by Eva Grant that she believed her brother had a Press Pass. See Exhibit 39~A. B. Statement by Mr, Thad Ricks (Attachment 90) or that no State Fair Pass was issued to Ruby. C. Negative report from all officers and news _ media regarding seeing Ruby with a Press Pass. D. An introductory card was found in Ruby's auto- -mobile glove compartment from former Judge Glen Byrd introducing the bearer as Jack Ruby and expressing appreciation for any help give -bearer. (In Property Room) a XV.amis Conclusion: A, This investigative team believes that Jack Ruby entered the Main Street ramp as the car driven by Lieutenant Rio Pierce was leaving the basement. . Petrolman R, E, Vaughn was the only officer guarding the Main Street ramp at this time, and he had stepped into Main Street to halt traffic in order that Lieutenant Pierce could make a left turn onto Main Street. B. We elso feel it should be noted that no officer interviewed knew the time that Oswald wes to be brovght to the basement. The car that was to be used for the transfer was still in process of ~ backing into position when Cswald was led fron the Jail Office (Attachments 37 and 77) C. The still pictures (Attachments 6-A and 53~A) show many of the detectives with their eyes on Oswald at the moment of the shooting, and not watching the viewers who were across the North Renp and on the East side of the ramp. 086 The mee Lights imamate} areaeos ane vw i cameras were centered on the area adjacent to —- ; the Jail Office, making it difficult for the - - . officers who were facing the lights and cameras to observe any movements originating from ae Northeast side of the ramp. “edits dD. rata officers had been x gh terete, to Perse Ea lines from. the Jail Office door to the vehicle to be used for the transfer and to close in behind the pris~ oner. (See Attachments 4, 16, 18, 41, 52, 66, 87 and 104) E. Exhibits 2h-A, 43-A, Re & HH are sound fins taken - from video tape of the shooting. ef - F, Exhibit 84 is a silent film of the Ca gti . The other Coeters of this Unit, Lieutenants C, C, Wallace, Jack Revill, F. I, Cornwall, P, G,. McCaghren and Detective. KE. M. eee concur with the statements in this SPER “fa a Wf) We. R. Westbrook x" Captain of Police Captain of Police JHS:nw 587 Mr. Sawyer. Proceed. Captain REvILL. This particular committee was comprised of In- spector Herbert Sawyer, Captain Westbrook, Capt. O. A. Jones, myself, a Lt. Paul McCaghren, Lt. Frank Cornwall, Lt. Cecil Wal- lace, and initially a detective, one of my subordinates in the intelli- gence unit, H. M. Hart, and as I said, it was our function to investigate the shooting of Mr. Oswald by Mr. Ruby. One phase of the particular investigation indicated that at 11:16 a.m. on the date of the shooting of Oswald, Ruby had sent a wire to Fort Worth—11:16 a.m. It is my understanding that the shooting of Mr. Oswald by Ruby was 11:20 a.m., some 4 minutes later. The Western Union Building is to the east of the police and courts building. The distance from the counter or table where he sent this wire to the young lady in Fort Worth was approximately 454 feet from that counter to the location where he shot Mr. Oswald. Using a tape measure and a stop watch, we determined that it involved approximately 1 minute and 35 seconds to cover the dis- tance from the Western Union to the location of the shooting. So it was pretty close timing there for Ruby to have gained entrance to the basement of city hall. If he sent the teletype or telegram or wire at 11:16 a.m. and the shooting occurred at 11:20 a.m. some 4 minutes elapsed, and we can account for approximately 1 minute and one half, 1 minute and 30 seconds from the time he left Western Union. Now, I will bring something up at this time. I personally con- ducted that investigation, Lieutenant McCaghren and I. We are basing the times on the statement of the Western Union employee, who says that Ruby sent this wire at 11:16, and this is verified by a date time stamp. In talking to this individual, McCaghren and I questioned him as to whether or not he actually date time stamped it automatically or immediately. He said, yes; he did because that was procedure. But that doubt was always in my mind. It is possible there was some time lapse in that maybe he didn’t do this at the time because this was a part of the procedure, yes, he said he did it. So who knows? But using the physical evidence that we found, using the date time stamp of 11:16, and Mr. Oswald being shot at 11:20, you have a period of 4 minutes. Mr. SAwyYeER. Can you show us where the automobile containing the three officers was located? Captain Revit. Yes, this automobile had already cleared the ramp. It went the wrong way. This is Main Street here, and the normal course of travel, it is one-way ramp into the basement of the city hall off of Main Street, and you exit one way on to Commerce Street. Officer Roy Vaughn was assigned at the ramp to prevent anyone entering the ramp. Now, something else that came to my attention in June, and it took me by surprise. Roy Vaughn, I have complete confidence in his integrity, and credibility. He was assigned to that ramp. As part of the investigation, I submitted Roy Vaughn to a polygraph examination. He passed the polygraph examination. He did not 588 knowingly permit Jack Ruby entrance into the basement of the city hall. This is verified by polygraph. In June of this year, one of the staff investigators was in Dallas and Roy Vaughn, who is Sergeant Vaughn, who I mentioned, is now my administrative sergeant, told me that he had talked to a Sgt. Don Flusche, who is still with the Dallas Police Department. Don Flusche was a sergeant assigned to the Northeast at the time of the assassination. Sergeant Vaughn reported to me that Don Flusche on that Sunday morning, had parked across the street from the police and courts building, stood outside his car with the door open monitoring the radio, just watching. He further told me that Flusche says that he knew Jack Ruby, knew him personally, that Jack Ruby did not come down Main Street and enter the ramp of the city hall. That took me by surprise. Mr. Moriarty, one of the staff investigators, was there, I called Sergeant Flusche to my office and he relayed that same informa- tion to both of us. So if that be true, then maybe Mr. Ruby did not enter the basement that way. It tends to dispute the findings of the investigative team I was assigned to. I don’t know. That is the truth. Mr. Sawyer. That would be consistent with the testimony of the three officers that drove up that ramp, too. Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; it would. Mr. Sawyer. They had not seen him, either? Mr. Revit.t. There are also two other alternatives, and it is a possibility. After determining that information from Sergeant Flusche, Mr. Moriarity and I personally, walked to the basement of city hall and I found some more steps. I have been there in that building off and on almost 28 years, and I didn’t know the steps were there; never paid any attention to them. There is another set of steps here that lead into the basement of city hall. Mr. Sawyer. From where? Mr. Revitu. From the first floor of the municipal building. The municipal building, at that time, was the city hall. The city hall, or municipal building and the police and courts building are two separate buildings, although they are connected. Mr. Sawyer. Is there a door, there, too? Mr. Revit. There is a door leading out of the basement into some steps. You can go to the first floor of the municipal building. Mr. Sawyer. And the first floor of the municipal building, I presume, was not secured at all? Mr. Revitt. On Sundays, or weekends, it is normally locked. Now, whether or not it was secured on that day, sir; I do not know. But the Western Union Building is here. Midway between Har- wood Street and Central Expressway South, the Western Union Building sits on the corner of Main and Central Expressway South. The police and courts building sits up at the corner of Harwood and Main. There is an alleyway that runs parallel to Harwood . Midway between Commerce and Main Street, there is an en- trance to the Municipal Building. Today, that door has a dead bolt lock. Now, what it had in 1963, I don’t know. It could have had a panic lock; who knows. I don’t know. 589 Another alternative is rather than coming down Main Street at all, Ruby could have come Central Expressway to an alleyway that runs midway between Commerce and Main Street and walked right into the area and it would not affect the timing at all. So, it still falls within the time frame of 4 minutes. Mr. Sawyer. Was that door and steps from the municipal build- ing secured or guarded in any way? Mr. REvILL. At one time, I am told by members of the staff, there had been a police reserve officer here, but prior to Mr. Oswald being brought out, this officer had been reassigned. I am just quoting one of your staff members. I was not present at the loca- tion that day. Mr. Sawyer. Was there any other way he could have had access to the basement other than the two you have shown us? Mr. REvILL. Yes, sir; he could have come through the police and courts building into the main hallway, but it is my understanding that ne was secured by uniformed officers and plain clothes per- sonnel. Mr. Sawyer. Did you ever ask Jack Ruby following this how he got into the basement? Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I did. On December 1, Lieutenant Cornwall and I went to the Dallas County jail and interviewed Jack Ruby. Jack refused to discuss with us his entrance or access into the basement. He told us this would be a part of his defense tactics. Again, on December 3, I interviewed Jack Ruby and he repeated the same thing. He refused to discuss how he gained entry into the basement. Mr. Sawyer. Do you have any hypothesis or any reason that you could conceive why he would’t discuss this with you? Mr. Revitu. None other than his statement to me that this was to be used as part of his defense. Mr. Sawyer. Might it be that he was protecting the identity of some people that might have let him in? Mr. REvILL. That entered my mind at the time, sir. Mr. Sawyer. And he never said, he never said at any point that he did go down the ramp—— Mr. REvILL. Not to me; no, sir. Mr. Sawyer. To your knowledge, did he tell anyone else that? Mr. REvILL. I think I read some accounts in the newspapers that he had reported and he went down the ramp. But he never made this statement to me, sir. Mr. Sawyer. Where some of these officers that went up the ramp in the car given polygraph tests? Mr. Revitu. No, sir—— Mr. Sawyer. Or otherwise checked out? Mr. Revi... No, sir. The three officers who went up the ramp were not given polygraphs. An additional officer was polygraphed. An Investigator Harrison who was standing in this area here, and the reason for the examination of Mr. Harrison was, in reviewing the films of the actual shooting of Oswald, it appeared as though Harrison looked over his left shoulder and Mr. Ruby was standing just to his left. So, with that in mind, we decided that he had to have seen him. We examined Harrison on the polygraph and he passed the polygraph. 590 This is possible, too, because major network stations had set up, I believe the correct terminology is klieg lights, bright TV lights here in this area. We re-enacted the scene and those particular lights completely blinded anyone who looked in their direction. Mr. Harrison did pass the polygraph examination that he did not see Jack Ruby to his immediate left just prior to the shooting of Mr. Oswald. Mr. Sawyer. Were any of the other officers given polygraphs? Mr. Revitt. Those were the only two that I personally was involved in polygraphing, sir. In answer to your question, I don’t know of any other officers. Mr. Sawyer. Did any of them, who were given polygraphs, fail the polygraphs? | Mr. Revitt. There was one other officer who took a polygraph examination. I had nothing to do with that. A former Dallas offi- cer, Napoleon Daniels, was standing at the top of the ramp. It is my understanding he made a statement that he saw Ruby enter the basement by the ramp and that Roy Vaughn, who was assigned to that post, looked at him, nodded to him and permitted him to enter. Mr. Daniels was subsequently administered a polygraph exami- nation and he flunked the examination. Mr. Sawyer. Was that ever followed up with any further ques- tioning of him? Mr. Revi. I did not question him, no, sir. Mr. Sawyer. To your knowledge, did anyone else? Mr. REvILL. No, sir, not to my knowledge. Mr. SAwyer. But it was a conclusion, then, of your special inves- tigative unit that Ruby had come down the ramp, but I infer now you have some reservations. Mr. Revit. The conclusion, at the time, was that Mr. Ruby had entered the ramp of the city hall here. Based on information that just came to my attention in June of this year from Sergeant Flusche—there might be a doubt. As I said, I have complete confi- dence in Mr. Flusche’s integrity and credibility. Mr. Sawyer. There have been some statements that some guards were removed from the interior door about 20 to 30 minutes before the shooting had occurred. Were you aware of that? Mr. Revit. I found that out yesterday, sir. Mr. Sawyer. Just yesterday? Mr. REvILL. Yes, sir. Mr. Sawyer. Do you know anything about that? Mr. Revitu. Nothing other than what one of your attorneys told me. I was not present at this location on the date of November 24. I was home. Mr. Sawyer. Had there been any public announcement or any papas information about the intention to transfer Oswald at the ime’ Mr. Revity. As I recall, the chief of police at that time, Jess Curry, publicly stated over the radio and TV that at 10 a.m. on Sunday the 24th, that Mr. Oswald would be moved. Mr. Sawyer. When you did find out that these guards were removed or had information to that effect, do you know who would have done that, or do you have any information? 591 Mr. ReEviLL. I now know who did it, but I didn’t at the time because I didn’t know they had been moved. Mr. Sawyer. Do you know who did it? Can you tell us? Mr. REvILL. Yes, sir, I am told Sgt. P. T. Dean, a retired sergeant, removed them. Mr. Sawyer. Do you know why he removed them? Mr. REvILL. No, sir, other than, again, going back to your coun- sel, he said they were moved or relocated to a position outside to work vehicular traffic. Again, that is based on your counsel. Mr. SAwYER. Was there ever any kind of finding as to negligence or otherwise on the protection of this area made by your unit? Mr. Reviu. I think it is a foregone conclusion that there was negligence; we let the man get killed. But as far as being able to identify any one individual as being responsible or negligent, no, sir. Mr. Sawyer. And your special unit conducting the investigation made no finding of negligence on behalf of anyone? Mr. REvILL. No, sir, in that the entire department was negligent. Mr. Sawyer. Did the Warren Commission, so far as you know, rely on your report to that effect? Mr. REvI Lt. I don’t know, sir. Mr. SAwYER. But they were aware—— Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir, they had copies of all of the reports. Mr. Sawyer. I have nothing further at this time, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. You may resume your seat at the witness table, Captain. Mr. ReEvitu. Thank you. Chairman Stokes. Captain Revill, did you attend the trial of Jack Ruby in Dallas? Mr. REvILL. Yes, sir. The district attorney of Dallas County, Mr. Henry Wade, had myself and five of my investigators assigned to his office during the trial of Jack Ruby to assist him in preparing for prosecution. Chairman SToKEs. In the course of the trial, was it not necessary to establish how Ruby had gotten into the basement of the police station? Mr. REVILL. I never testified to that effect, sir. Chairman SToKEs. No; but in terms of the prosecutor proving the crime, didn’t he have to offer evidence of that? Mr. Revit. I am sure he did. I was under the rule, and I was not inside the courtroom for the actual testimony. I do not recall who actually testified or addressed that particular facet. Chairman Strokes. In your capacity of helping the prosecution, you were kept out of the courtroom during the course of the trial? Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir. Chairman Strokes. And then I assume, then, that you are not familiar with what the evidence was in the case relating to how he got into the police station? Mr. REvILL. That is correct, sir, I am not familiar. Chairman Stokes. Are you familiar with whether or not a state- ment was taken from Jack Ruby by the police at the time of his arrest for the crime? Mr. ReEvILL. A written statement or a verbal statement, sir? Chairman SToKEs. Well, either one. 592 Mr. ReEvILL. It is my understanding that shortly after the shoot- ing of Mr. Oswald, Ruby made some type of statement to members of the police department in the fifth floor jail, but I was not there, sir, and I don’t know exactly what he did say. Chairman SToKEs. I see. Mr. Revitu. It was a spontaneous statement, or something to that effect. Chairman Stokes. Let me ask counsel of the committee if they have a statement from Mr. Flusche for the record? I understand that Mr. Flusche’s statement to our committee was on June 7, 1978 and has been identified as JFK exhibit F-569; is that correct? I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Flusche’s statement be entered into the record at this point. Without objection, so ordered. [The above-referred-to exhibit, exhibit JFK F-569, follows:] 593 JFK Exuisit F-569 ae ; : KENNEDY ie aap 2 77 . > ie 1h a “2 a, ——— | ; INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW SCHEDULE Zdentifying Information: . - . + 09968 ah Name Date_ 4-7-7 Cian Address Place Jura juai Pras epoca: cz . City/State Ce 327? 5777-H , elephone ¢¢to 670 5-t) — bate : OS. Meee EFS... S89 op . 8H: Mor Ss sala _ Social Security - Spouse - ; Children Physical Description: — i gen ia Height 5S“*/g" Color Eyes BuiE_ Hair JARED . Weight_] Fo i . , Special Characteristics" ** ° Ethnic Group (°*¢4)t) : . + site Personal History: 22, — | a. Present Employment: Tr TIONA Laviess address “yAcanevenrns Gone a Telephone 4,76 os ' ' b. Criminal Record 1. Arrests 2. Convictions ‘Cthate Ce Additional Personal Information: a. Relative(s) : Name : Address ee ee b. Area frequented: c. Remarks: Investigator Dk 220 pea ary eae oe 41-373 O- 79 = 38 — Se 594 _ KENNEDY SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS Date 6 778 Time 1400 Name Don F. Flusche Place on the jab ’ : Si Address 2321 Globe Avenue ~ Dallas, Texas _ 214 670 4405 (work) 21453 29857011 Interview: Interviewed Sgt. Flusche on the job today as he is_as- signed to the Inspectional Services Section of the Dallas Police Department, at which time he advised he was standing alone on th Main Street sidewalk diagonally across the street from the DPD basement ramp. It was some time before noon and he observed Officer Roy Vaughn, whom he knew, at the ramp's entrance on 11/24/6 The sergeant had his cruiser parked to the cuxb with = the right front door opened on to the sidewalk area. He was listening to the Police Department radio (he was on duty).- at thous) assigned to the "Northeast District" at the time, he was also | working as the Watch Commander and had driven to Main Street to see if he could see Lee ax cee Oswald as he was ‘moved to the Sher—- Lee's Office. | . | He stood there long enough to see (Lt.) Rio Sam Pierce drive up the "in" ramp and Vaughn step towards the street. . He was still there when the obvious commotion told him something was amiss in the basement. The street was void of pedestrians in the downtown . _ Interviewer Signature ss ae, Lick | Typed Signature Jack Moriarty : Date transcribed June 28, 197 By: ROSs —sa8RP 595 Flusche Interview | Page two in the downtown section on this Sunday morning and he knows beyond any doubt in his mind, that Jack Ruby, whom he had known many years, did not walk down Main Street anywhere near that ramp. eS Asked why he hasn't mentioned this eeote. he ad- vised he did as soon as he found out what had happened. He im- mediately notified his superior, Lt. Knox. He didn't hear any more about it until yesterday talking with Vaughn who asked him to mention it to ae | Captain Jack Revill was present during this interview. I accompanied the Captain and Vaughn to the basement of this building where the LHO/Ruby scene is located and we examined the scene carefully. | Close inspection reveals an alley separating the polite Headquarters building and the next building and the ad- joining iA A never tbh ends the block. This last or third building also houses (and did in 1963) the Western Union office used St Ruby that Sunday morning. It is quite plausible that Ruby - or anyone else - could walk from the corner building (Western Union) past the second building, turn left into the alley alongside the Police Headquarters and enter the Dallas Police Department by 7 way of a side door, which leads to a stairway directly to the base-— ment area where the shooting took place. While this possibility: doesn’t alter any facts, it's an alternate route which could have been utilized by Ruby and would have made a much less conspicuous entry possible. 596 Fleusche Interview _ Page three The timing and the distance would be within feet and seconds of the "ramp" version. The Sergeant pet Main Street Police Headquarters "old" building 597 - Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. reyer. Mr. Preyer. Did you ever see Jack Ruby in jail after the trial? Mr. REvILL. No, sir, not after the trial. Mr. PREYER. So, you didn’t see him again after the trial? Mr. REvILL. No, sir, I saw him during the course of the trial, but I never had occasion to see him after the trial. Mr. Preyer. The only other question I wanted to be clear in my mind on, I understood you to say that he only, or you only saw Jack Ruby in your bureau, your office, say, twice a year? Mr. REvILL. Yes, sir, this is correct. And I might explain that. The intelligence section was a part of the special service bureau which consisted of vice, narcotics and intelligence. We were located in room 217 of the police and courts building. In 1960, due to space limitations, the intelligence unit was phys- ically moved to a building located in the State fairgrounds. My daily activities would require that I make trips to and from the police and courts building, but my office was actually in the build- ing in the fairgrounds. Prior to that time, I was assigned to that bureau in 1954, August of 1954 I was assigned as detective to the narcotics unit and from 1954 to 1960, I seldom saw Jack Ruby in that office except when he was in the process of renewing a license. Mr. Preyer. The only point I was getting at, I had the impres- sion that Ruby often visited police headquarters and brought sand- wiches to officers. Are you telling us that he didn’t do that, or are you telling us that he only visited your particular department that you knew about a couple of times? Mr. Revit. I am telling you that I have no knowledge of Ruby’s frequent visits to the police and courts building of delivering sand- wiches, et cetera. Mr. PrREYER. You are just telling us you don’t have knowledge of that; you are not saying that didn’t happen? Mr. ReEvILu. Yes, sir, I might also add my normal duty hours were daytime hours, that Ruby was probably a night-time person, and he could have done this during the evening hours. I have no personal knowledge of it. Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Captain. Chairman Strokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. Mr. DeEvINE. I just want to inquire in one area, Captain. This sergeant, Don Flusche—— Mr. REvILL. Flusche. Mr. Devine. I understand he was standing outside his cruiser with the door open listening or monitoring—— Mr. REVILL. His radio. Mr. DEvINE [continuing]. His radio. Was he standing on the offside, the right side of the vehicle? Mr. REvILL. Yes, sir, he would have been standing on the right side of the automobile parked across the street from the police and courts building. Mr. Devine. So that his automobile was between the officer and the entrance to the ramp? Mr. REvILL. Yes, sir, he was standing on the curb. 598 Mr. DeEvINE. Yes; I believe you said he knows beyond any doubt in his mind that Jack Ruby, whom he had known many years, did not walk down Main Street anywhere near that ramp? Mr. REvILL. This is what he told me, sir. Mr. Devine. Was he questioned as to whether he consistently and continuously and without interruption observed the ramp area or was his back at any time turned to it? Mr. Revitu. He was questioned by Mr. Moriarity of this commit- tee extensively about what transpired and he contends that his vision was not blocked at any time, that Ruby did not walk from the alleyway in front of the municipal building into the ramp of the police and courts building. Mr. Devine. At least he didn’t see him. Mr. REvILL. He didn’t see him. Mr. DEvINE. Was he assigned there specifically for that purpose or was he there just on an off-chance he may have an opportunity to see Oswald depart? Mr. REvILu. I think the latter is the correct version. He, on that particular day, was the acting watch commander for the northeast division and due to a lack of activity in his particular sector, he had driven to the downtown area to see, in essence, what was going on, and he was parked there when the murder of Oswald took place. Mr. DEvINE. Do you know, Captain, why he didn’t make this information available to the Dallas police in November of 1963 or the Warren Commission in 1964? Mr. Revi... He told me he did, that he had related this informa- tion to a Lt. Earl Knox, who was his superior, and what Lieutenant Knox did with it, I don’t know. I think he is now decreased. Mr. Devine. Do you know whether or not this information came out during the trial of Jack Ruby in Dallas? Mr. Revit... Not to my knowledge. Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. Mr. Forp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have one question of the witness. Captain, did you say earlier that the investigating team, consist- ed of seven, eight different officers? Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir. _ Mr. Forp. In your final report of the investigation you did not include any information regarding the stairway in the municipal building, is that correct? _ Mr. Revitt. That’s correct, I am saying we didn’t submit any information about the stairway. Mr. Forp. It is just until recently that the stairway in the municipal building was discovered; is that correct? Mr. REvILL. That’s correct. | Mr. Forp. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. _Chairman Stoxgs. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. Firnian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Captain, did you ask Jack Ruby if he went down the ramp? Mr. REvILL. Yes, sir, I did. 599 Mr. Firuian. And he said he refused—— Mr. Revi... He refused to respond to that saying this would be a part of his defense tactics. What he meant by that, I do not know, sir. Mr. Firuian. I believe Congressman Sawyer referred to this, but I didn’t quite understand all the answer, and that’s the polygraph test that was administered to Mr. Daniels. Mr. REvILL. Yes. Mr. FITHIAN. The information I have and the documents we have is that on the crucial questions about whether he saw somebody go down the ramp and the description of the person, et cetera, he failed every one of those questions. Mr. REvILL. I am not personally familiar with Mr. Daniels’ poly- graph examination, other than the fact he was administered one ang he did fail the particular test. The pertinent questions, I do not now. Mr. FITHIAN. Can you tell the committee something more about Mr. Daniels than we now know? What kind of a person was he? How reliable as officer? Mr. REvVILL. I didn’t know the gentleman, sir. Mr. FITHIAN. Let me turn, then, to another area. At the time of the transfer, you said that you were not in the building? Mr. REviLL. That’s correct. . Mr. FITHIAN. But this must have been in the long course of your review and investigation of this, a very, very pertinent topic and, therefore, am I wrong to assume that you are really pretty familiar with what the mood of the action and the activities in the building were? Mr. Revit. I had no knowledge of the proposed move of Mr. Oswald. Those were decisions made by the chief of police and the captain commanding the homicide and robbery unit at that time. Since the incident involving the shooting of Oswald by Ruby, in talking to other people, I formed ideas. But having personal knowl- edge, no, sir, | have none. Mr. FiITHIAN. Let me ask you another way, then. Isn’t it true that there was a real effort to provide security for this transfer? Mr. REvVILL. Yes, sir, there was an effort to provide security. As I have testified earlier, the basement of the city hall, and I am advised of this—— Mr. FITHIAN. I wonder if you could move the microphone over in front of you a little more, Officer. Mr. REVILL. I am advised that the security survey was made, or a sweep of the basement of the city hall was made prior to the actual movement of Mr. Oswald, that this sweep involved looking into automobiles, under automobiles, behind any possible barricades, and that prior to the actual movement of Mr. Oswald, that the all- clear was given. As I say, I was not there; this is what I am told. Mr. FirHIANn. Then, in light of the fact that a fairly significant effort was made to provide security for Oswald and to transfer him to the county sherriff’s quarters, what was your finding with regard to Chief Curry’s making a public announcement of the time this would take place? Mr. Revi. We really did not address that particular aspev., ~' s 600 Mr. FITHIAN. It just seems to me, as a layman—I am not a police officer—to take a celebrated prisoner that had just assassinated the President of the United States and then to announce to the world that at 10 o'clock, you are going to move him from point A to point ae Mr. REvILL. I agree with you, sir, it is strange. Mr. FiTHIAN [continuing]. Is a remarkable development. Mr. REvILL. Very strange. Mr. FirHIAN. Second, was there ever any question as to whether or not the decision to allow the media and the klieg lights and all the commotion that would bring into the basement, was there ever any question, have you conducted that investigation as to why that decision was made? Mr. REvILL. Yes, sir, we attempted to address that question, and we were advised that, the understanding was made with the net- work stations that they would not illuminate the klieg lights which were used by the TV stations which tended to blind the partici- pants in the basement of the city hall. Mr. FIrHIAN. Captain, is it your professional opinion that had the commotion and the additional people, the media and the cameras not have been present, that Lee Harvey Oswald would not have been shot? Mr. Reviti. They contributed to the killing of Oswald, yes, sir. Mr. FiTHIAN. That is, in creating this commotion in the base- ment—— Mr. Revit. Mass confusion. Mr. Firnian. Well, then, in your final findings—you were in charge of investigating this whole thing? Mr. REvILL. No, sir, I was not in charge. I was one of the people assigned to the unit to conduct the investigation. Mr. FiruiAn. You were one of the people assigned—— Mr. REvILL. Yes, sir. Mr. Firu1an. Were your findings critical of these two decisions, one, to make the public announcement, and, two, to allow the media in so you—— Mr. REvILL. No, sir, I don’t think we addressed that particular subject in the investigation report. They did contribute to the confusion, but the decision had been made by the chief of police and possibly some of the city fathers to do this in an effort to cooperate with the news media to assure the world that we had not mistreated Lee Harvey Oswald while he was in our custody. Mr. Firnian. Mr. Chairman, I only have a closing observation. It seems unusual that the two elements, besides Jack Ruby, that seems to have been the source of the event, or the cause of it, would not be addressed in the investigation of it. I guess that is 20-20 hindsight. . I yield back the balance of my time. _Chairman Stokes. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar. Mr. Epcar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Captain, who was in command on the Sunday morning of the Oswald shooting? Mr. ReviLu. The chief of police would have been in comma the police department that morning; he was on the nd of premises. 601 Mr. Epacar. I had some extensive experience over a 3- or 4-year period in riding with something called the police clergy unit. I also rode in the command car, which, in the city of Philadelphia, was the lieutenant’s car. He tried as best he could to be on the scene of any major incident and be on top of the situation and be in control of the situation. Do you know who was in charge? Mr. REvILL. Yes, sir, the chief of police was in the building the morning of the transfer. As to his physically being present in the basement of the city hall, I have no information to that effect. It is my understanding the assistant chief at that time, Charles Batche- lor, and the deputy chief of CID, W. M. Stevenson, were or had been physically present in the basement. But ultimately, responsi- bility must lie with the chief of police. Mr. EpGcar. How would you grade his command, A, B, C, D, F, in terms of grading the quality of it on that day? Mr. REvILL. Sir, I was not present, and again, this is hindsight. I don’t feel it would be proper for me to comment—or attempt to evaluate his performance. Mr. Epcar. Let me comment for a second because I have been very interested in a couple of things that you have said and a couple of other important things that we have gotten over a period of time. We have analyzed and asked witnesses from the Secret Service and FBI, now the Dallas Police, whether any tape record- ing or any verbatim of Oswald’s testimony was taken, and the answer came back no. We now find out that in terms of security arrangements, centered around the movement of Oswald, from the police station, as to whether or not the security arrangements were really adequate and good, and the answer comes back no, there were mistakes. Even in the investigative report that you did, you have admitted this morning there was an officer who was not far from the ramp, who had testimony to give, and yet your investigative committee, looking into how Jack Ruby got into the basement, was not ana- lyzed. You admitted further that an access that would be a possible route of entry into the basement was not brought to your attention until recently. We could go through a number of other specific events centered around the control of Lee Harvey Oswald, the control of the press, the control of the area, and the security, et cetera. And find a number of mistakes had been made. Can you identify for the committee why no member of the Dallas Police Department was even reprimanded even slightly for their activities or actions surrounding the death of President Kennedy? Mr. Revit. No, sir, I cannot personally address myself to that. That decision would have been made by the chief of police. Mr. Epacar. Could it have been part of the kind of the environ- ment of police thinking that it is very difficult to publicly criticize any of its own members for mistakes, or part of the environment of the thinking of the Dallas Police Department that they would not want to admit a mistake? Mr. ReEviLu. Sir, at that time, I don’t think we would have hesitated one bit to admit mistakes because we became, you might 602 say, a laughing stock, keystone cops, due to the inadequate security that we provided for Mr. Oswald. Mr. Epcar. But the record indicates that you took no action to reprimand any of your officers for any of the activities that they were involved in. Mr. Revitut. Had the investigation proved that any particular officer was involved with Mr. Ruby, I would hope that he would have been disciplined. I can assure you that this would occur today. Mr. Epacar. Let me just have one final question. I was surprised at your very quick characterization of Jack Ruby as a baffoon and your indication if you were or if there was a personnel director of the underworld, that Jack Ruby would not be someone to hire. But couldn’t the speculation also go that the underworld needs a number of people to act in different capacities other than profes- sionally involved in roles of the underworld, and that Jack Ruby could have been used by organized crime in a particular way, and that the speculation that the underworld never uses baffoons might be too quick of an analysis of underworld activities? Mr. ReEvILL. This is a possibility. Again, Mr. Ruby may have been playing a role, but this is the image that he projected to me and this is my personal opinion, having observed Ruby on infrequent occasions. As I testified, I never went to his clubs, I would see him on the streets. He was the type person who would run up to you to be identified. He sought attention. This is my interpretation of Ruby, a loud mouth. Mr. Epcar. I yield back my time. Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. Mr. Dopp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want at the outset to thank my colleague from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer, for filling in for me on some of those questions. I had to be over in the House Rules Committee. I would like to ask the witness, did the special unit on that day, on November 24, ever consider the possibility after the fact that Jack Ruby had entered the basement through a route other than through the ramp? Did you examine other alternative routes that he could have come in? Mr. Revit. No, sir. After a determination of the physical evi- dence, by this, the timing, the distances involved, and the fact that Mr. Ruby had reported to other officers that he entered by the ramp, we zeroed in on that particular entry. Mr. Dopp. And didn’t examine any other possible alternative? Mr. REVILL. No, sir. Mr. Dopp. Yet based on the testimony you have given here today, what I have been able to read as a result of previous state- ments you have given to this committee: one, Ruby in fact did not tell you that this was the way he got in, down the ramp—I will enumerate four or five factors that I have listed in my notes— there was an alleyway route and an entrance on the side; informa- tion that the alleyway entrance door was unguarded; the additional fact that three officers in the car on the ramp said that they did not see Ruby; and that Officer Vaughn did not see Ruby; and that Sergeant Flusche, who was on the other side of the street, on Main 603 Street, he didn’t see Ruby walking down the street. Here we have all of this evidence that seems to contradict the statement or the fact that has been believed for so long, that Jack Ruby came down the ramp. We can conclude in light of all this evidence that he probably didn’t come down the ramp? Wouldn’t you agree with that? Mr. Revitu. No, I cannot conclude positively he did not come down the ramp. As I said earlier, the information from Sergeant Flusche came to my attention in June of this year. The three officers who exited the building up the ramp onto Main Street, it is possible that they would not have seen Ruby. It is also possible that Roy Vaughn in stepping out onto the sidewalk from the entrance to check for oncoming traffic, talking about eastbound traffic on Main Street, to enable the police car to make a left turn across traffic, Jack Ruby could have slipped into the basement at that time. But I am satisfied that Roy Vaughn did not see Jack Ruby nor did he knowingly permit him to enter the basement. Mr. Dopp. You would have to agree this day that there exists a strong possibility, in light of all the evidence that has come to light since that time, that Jack Ruby could just as easily have entered the basement, in fact more easily, entered the basement through that alleyway and that unguarded door? Mr. REvILL. This is possible, if that particular door leading to the alleyway was unlocked. Mr. Dopp. Prior to the shooting of Lee Harvey Oswald, in fact only minutes before, Jack Ruby sent a money order from the Western Union office. Did the special unit consider the possibility that Jack Ruby had utilized the sending of this money order to make his entrance to the basement and that the subsequent shoot- ing of Oswald seemed a fluke or coincidence of timing? Mr. REvILL. We discussed it, yes, sir. Mr. Dopp. What did you conclude? Mr. Revi... If that be the case, then Ruby had to have had assistance from someone in the police department. To know exactly what time Oswald was to be transferred. Mr. Dopp. Did the inspection unit assume that for Jack Ruby—I guess you have answered that by your response to your last ques- tion—you would have assumed he would have had to have assist- ance? Did you examine or how thoroughly did you examine wheth- er or not there was a possibility of such assistance? Mr. REvILL. We interviewed everyone that had been assigned to the basement. We interviewed members of the news media in an effort to determine if there was complicity between Ruby and any member of the police department or anyone else for that matter, and we were unsuccessful in that endeavor. Mr. Dopp. We will suspend for one moment. Counsel informs me of another possibility. I guess for the 15 years we have always assumed that word would have had to come out to Ruby from the police station, to inform him as to exactly when Lee Harvey Oswald was going to be transferred. Did the special unit ever consider the possibility that the arrival of Jack Ruby triggered the decision to then move Lee Harvey Oswald? 604 Mr. Revit. No sir, because it would have taken longer. If you can believe the fact that he did send a telegram or a wire to Fort Worth at 11:16, you have got a time lapse of 4 minutes from the time the operator date stamped the wire until his shooting of Oswald in the basement. That is a 4-minute period. That would have taken time—timing would have had to be perfect and know- ing the elevator situation in the jail I can ’t see that they would have played it that close. Mr. Dopp. I would like to pursue just one other line of question- ing, if I could. 3 You testified before the Warren Commission, is that correct? Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir. Mr. Dopp. And you stated there that you knew James Hosty? Mr. REvILL. I knew him well. Mr. Dopp. Could you tell this committee, without going through an elaborate questioning process, in your own words, tell us of your encounter with James Hosty on November 22, 1963, where it oc- curred, and what James Hosty told you when you ran into him, approximately the time you ran into him? Mr. Revitu. Of course, this will be based on memory. Basically, what occurred on that date, after searching the School Book De- pository, finding the weapon and other evidence, I departed the Depository and returned to the Police and Courts Building accom- panied by three detectives who worked in the intelligence unit. As I entered the ramp off of Main Street into the Police and Courts Building—— Mr. Dopp. This is the same ramp? Mr. ReEvILu. The same ramp. I was followed, or either I followed James Hosty, a member of the FBI. We both parked our cars—— Mr. Dopp. You weren’t following him specifically, he just hap- pened to be coming into the building? Mr. Revit. He just happened to be coming into the building. We both parked our cars. He approached me, and again from memory, he commented to the effect that Lee Harvey Oswald, a Communist, had killed President Kennedy. Mr. Dopp. What time of day was this? If I told you that in your testimony in 1964 you had said it was approximately 2:30 in the afternoon, would you argue? Mr. Revitx. I wouldn’t argue. It was at a time after Oswald had been taken into custody at the Texas Theater but before his arrival at the Police and Courts Building. Mr. Dopp. Were you aware of the fact that Lee Harvey Oswald had been arrested? Mr. Revit. No, sir, not at that time. Mr. Dopp. Were you aware that Mr. Hosty knew that Lee Harvey Oswald had been arrested at that time? Mr. Revit. No, I assumed he did based on his statements to me. Mr. Dopp. You said, and I will quote, you said in 1964, I will quote your response to Mr. Rankin, just so you can refresh your memory and you can correct it if you would like, this is your testimony: “And Mr. Hosty ran over to me and he says, Jack, as I recall these words, a Communist killed President Kennedy. I said, What? 605 “He said, Lee Oswald killed President Kennedy. “T said, Who is Lee Oswald? - te said, He is in our Communist file. We knew he was here in allas. “At that time Hosty and I started walking off, and Detective Bryan as well as I recall, sort of stayed back and so forth.” Then he also states to you that at that time, according to your testimony in 1964, that they knew, that he knew, Jim Hosty knew, that Lee Oswald was capable of killing the President. You became upset at that? Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir. Mr. Dopp. Is that a fair—— Mr. REvILL. That is a fair—— Mr. Dopp [continuing]. Assessment of the conversation and your reaction? Mr. REvILL. Yes, sir. Mr. Dopp. Why were you upset? Mr. REvILL. Because we had worked with the Bureau on identify- ing people who posed not so much physical threats to Mr. Kennedy but those people who would attempt to embarrass him, and also those who would harm him. We had shared information but on this particular person, for some reason, Mr. Hosty had not shared the information with us. Mr. Dopp. This was not normal operating procedure. In fact he had in the past—— Mr. REVILL. Well, in dealing with the FBI, local law enforcement, most of it is of a personal relationship with the agents and my relationship with Mr. Hosty was that we shared information but in this particular case he had not. Mr. Dopp. Did he tell you why he—how he drew the conclusion that Mr. Oswald was a Communist? Mr. REvILL. No, sir. What happened, after making this statement or these remarks to me, I asked him what he was going to do with the information, and he said he wanted to talk to Will Fritz, who was the Captain of Homicide. I asked him if he knew Captain Fritz and his response was no, so with that I accompanied Agent Hosty to the third floor homicide and Captain Fritz was not present at the time, some of his staff were. I left Mr. Hosty in that office and returned to the second floor, to the Special Service Bureau office. Mr. Dopp. You are sure of that? Mr. REvILL. Yes, sir, I am sure. ie Dopp. There was extensive questioning as to which route you took. Mr. REvILL. Yes, sir. I don’t walk up three flights of stairs when there is an elevator. Mr. Dopp. This was all about 2:30? Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir. Mr. Dopp. In the afternoon? Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir. Mr. Dopp. Prior to the time Lee Harvey Oswald had arrived at the police station? Mr. REvILu. Yes, sir. Mr. Dopp. Can we just suspend for 1 minute? 606 Could I ask you if in fact later at a subsequent time in your conversations with Jim Hosty, you ever explored with him how it was that he happened to have drawn the conclusions he had, how he happened to develop a file on Lee Harvey Oswald? Mr. ReviLL. No, sir. After, I believe, that night, Chief Curry went on TV and announced that the FBI had information to this effect. Later, it is my understanding that the statement was—he made a retraction, and from that day I don’t recall ever talking to Jim Hosty again. I may have but I don’t recall. And I do know that we never discussed it. Mr. Dopp. You said you wrote up a report? Mr. REvILL. Yes, sir. Mr. Dopp. Pertaining to the Hosty conversation? Mr. REvILL. Yes, sir. Mr. Dopp. You signed it that afternoon according to your testi- mony in 1964 and you state then, you said, “yes sir, at the time I was hoping it would never come up.” Mr. REvILL. This is true. Mr. Dopp. Would you tell this committee why you hoped it would never come up? | Mr. ReviLi. Because Jim Hosty was a friend of mine and I knew that Hoover would crucify him. Mr. Dopp. Crucify him for what? Mr. Revit. For making that statement. Whether or not it was true or not, Hosty made the statement to me and I relayed the information to my captain at the time, Pat Ganaway, shortly after our conversation, and he instructed me to reduce it to writing. At that time I told him if I do, Jim Hosty will be crucified or penalized by the Bureau, and to that he said, “I don’t care, you put it on paper.” I put it on paper. Mr. Dopp. Which, is he going to be, crucified for telling you or crucified for not following in the normal operating procedures of sharing that information with the Dallas Police Department? Mr. Revit. It is not normal operating procedure for the FBI to share that information with you. As I mentioned to you earlier, the information local law enforcement gets from the Federal Bureau of Investigation is primarily based on personal contact between an agent and the officer. Mr. Dopp. So he more than likely would have been crucified by the Director for admitting to the Dallas Police Department that they had information in the security file on someone who they perceived as capable of assassinating the President? Mr. Revit. I can only assume that, sir. Mr. Dopp. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Stokes. Any further questions? Mr. Cornwell? Mr. CorNwELL. Just one very brief matter, Captain Revill. Were you sitting in the room earlier when we, through a narrative, provided the results of a phone analysis? 3 Mr. Revitt. I was in and out, sir, I wasn’t paying much atten- ion. | Mr. CorNweELt. Let me ask you, then, there were a number of people who were identified through an analysis of Ruby’s phone 607 calls as receiving calls from him or making calls to him in the months immediately prior to the assassination. Those individuals include Irwin Weiner, Nofio Pecora, Harold Tannenbaum, Barney Baker, Dusty Miller, Lenney Patrick, Dave Yaras. Did you or the police department, to your knowledge, have any information about Ruby’s association with any of those individuals during 1963? Mr. REvILL. No, sir. Mr. CorNWELL. Was the police department, to your knowledge, even acquainted with the names of those persons or with their reputations among law enforcement agencies? | Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir, I knew some of them. Mr. CorNWELL. In 1963, I take it that the Dallas Police Depart- ment had no organized crime unit, per se, is that correct? Mr. REvILL. We had an intelligence unit which was charged with gathering data on organized crime. Mr. CoRNWELL. Well, simply, if you would give us your estimate of the possibility or probability that if one or more of those persons would have been in Dallas prior to November 22 and had met with Jack Ruby, would the nature and scope of your intelligence pro- gram have been such as to likely identify such meetings? Mr. REvILL. Yes, sir, had we had knowledge of a meeting involv- ing these people with Ruby. Now, one of ‘these persons you men- tioned, I believe Miller, Dusty Miller, he may still be in Dallas, I don’t know, he was head of one of the unions, Teamsters there, and for him to have contacted Ruby, it may or may not have caused us concern. These other people, possible. Mr. CoRNWELL. Would your intelligence unit officers have been knowledgeable of the appearance of these people, would they have recognized them if they had been in town? Mr. REvILL. Possibly. I am not sure that we would have recog- nized them upon sight. Hopefully some other intelligence unit throughout the country would have forewarned us that they were enroute to Dallas. Mr. CoRNWELL. No further questions. Thank you. Chairman Sroxgs. I think this might be an appropriate place for the Chair to make a special acknowledgement. Over the life of the existence of this committee it has been necessary for our investigators to spend an enormous amount of time in Dallas and to be in touch with the Dallas Police Depart- ment and other city officials and we want to acknowledge the extraordinary amount of cooperation that the committee investiga- tors received from all of the city officials in Dallas, along with the Dallas Police Department, particularly Chief Byrd, who when our investigators first went to Dallas, gave them a letter of carte blanche enabling them to go anywhere and talk to anyone and to have full reign in terms of gathering evidence for this committee, and the Department has on occasions located witnesses for us. As you know, if you have been in touch with these hearings, that we have produced evidence that has been turned over by the Police Department to our investigators, particularly in conjunction with the acoustics tests which were conducted in Dallas in Dealey Plaza. The police department provided extraordinary cooperation in order that we might conduct that testing, and provided us with their own 608 sharpshooters and blockaded the area, and did everything neces- sary. in fact, that morning they started testing somewhere in the area of 5 o’clock in the morning and went to noon trying to provide this committee with the kind of evidence we have been able to produce here at these hearings, and I certainly want to extend to both Chief Byrd and the Dallas Police Department our appreciation for that cooperation. Mr. Revill, at the conclusion of your testimony as a witness before our committee, you are entitled to 5 minutes, at which time you may make any comment you desire on your testimony before our committee. I extend to you at this time 5 minutes for that purpose, if you so desire. Mr. REvILL. I have no statement to make, sir. Chairman Stokes. Then we thank you for having been here and the testimony you have given our committee this morning. 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