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Robert Blakey, chief counsel .................:ccc:ccccesscessesscesseseeeseeeees BPTI OTN Oise AINES HA MAIC. oc asenc:-ussscovecoyssosensousabanacdbsontbeVinhssceoussesanonaeescsAc cones Narration by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel ...................ccccsscsseeseessesseseeeseeesees aT ATTICS EDS CEN Ge oso oo oss oka cveansadewsesucocusddssavercsuevansesotaccrucweceteteasteres September 21, 1978: Narration by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel ...............ccccccsssscsssesseseessenseseeecenee Testimony of former President Gerald R. Ford ..............:ccccscessscssseessesssceseceeeees Testimony of John Sherman Cooper and John J. McCloy ...........sccseseeesereeees AFTERNOON SESSION Testimony of J. Lee Rankin, former general counsel of the Warren SES by oh) GAR A OE gp ES RR SE SEY aR BAR So AEE 612 a 8, onan sBace Sesh cone sods bepsbcossnderwaraissircnsaceastecadeecedh cele antaam 642 i, a SS Re a a RE | | | f vetcnaeall voctrstistecemtnn ation Teits. eligi bode gus oniait PeAiea) ead eit eniadl oe oidaeu’l eT . eo eee ee . ee een we eee heehee at da a ae peeeree er |bag ngenes Soret evans eens asi ee noses pischthera A . 2 ae sh PIERS eee es AOC EE NieGoNn Cangas oie 0 3 4 Ta era ie aN le de al 4 sai cnariroes obergilA we gel NAL ed chine euiseeants on Asisis ep sisted rolRosiavib dash Secvr ie Terie ee ete i tere eee oft Tay RTH Y= lial SSE wer Teri CB RORIN PREVEN,. RELMARDCON WALTER Pe . E vik Owe Seed (cont # oman Aiba 4 es RS wired. aff ms , Thebedioy ‘vo on emp s Previrreetre thir? iit tee petasee sanaet mattis hm CSM? 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Tisrado: Because my friend Maria Carman, she was dead-- she had an accident, and during the funeral I told Azcue that if he wants me to hels him, tor some people come from Cuba, just to help him. »And of course he savs yes. Thev need some. seo0le thev Gan trust, and 1'd been workine in ne tins -ie ice. 50.5. Cornwell: ‘How was it that you knew Eusebio Azcue by this time? pap Moat Tao I don't remember, Secause he was uh, fhe was an Architect and he knew a lot of veoole, friends of ours, I mean my husband and I. Cornwell Had he lived in Mexico for a Longe period of time? Tiracos Yes, ves. Coryell: And, because of his po cmese yen would have known your husband. Is tnat correcc? Purace Yeah, more or less. : Your husband Yoracio was 2lso an architect Vacs RHGUStL LOS ROS LO Bene (eS, ate. lone = — - sanaitt “ =-- Cornwett : | Atteroxinately 2 a wheh ot wasdane, io ici. teat~ at vou : cfrst =3 obeatnes is : = 4 1 spy iat bs a Pyle 2 hen: 11 Papal inborysaw —-1 eC Cornwell: 3 Rh 'y jv Qn.Oo Kennedy did you work there? Only two days. During that period of time what were =he hours of Operation of the Consulata? Tiraco: BomWaseaOOuUt 9:30 or 10500 to 2:00 and in fhe ‘afternoon about 35:00 to 3:00 or something. f2 we have a lot of work, we stayed longer. Cornwell: The hours were 10:00 to 2:09 and then 5:90 *o Bavune Ls thet correct? Tirado: Les, that's true. Cornwell: Was the Consulate open for visitors during doth of Saage’ sets of nours? NO, 1t was just in the morning. Would you mind sketching for us what the physical (pause) You have drawn a rectangular shape. Wheat formed the outside of it? Nas it a solid wall around Ene Outside? Was the outside of the premises a wall? Tiraco: Yes. Cornweil: And -we'll 12 leftt-hnane corner, there a small box you drew. What is that? “he consulas. the consulate's Cornwell: we'll know that’s the consulate's office. Then, the door was .°. .where, on she corner?. .you remember the name of the streets, still tocav? This is Tacubayo. This is Francisco Marquez. You want me to write it down? If you remember, yes. the nouses. Cornwall: All right. You've labeled three sides o£ she * os Suilding with street names and on the fourca sice which on the ton of the drawing, you said they nouses. Correct? Piura: Yes. Cornwel uyet What is in the long triangular shape on the ing above the Consular oftice? twas the commercial office. Alt ricnt.. We'll Gust cut =i = ! in - : ‘ - where YOu wers, WNSrs WOULG =e entrance sto goaS second floor, No 17 Beaved S25265 Intervie Fase 2. it woule be at the same eantranca? > pee Eafe 28S. LOsEZ: Ang irom where vou sat, vou coulan'+ see outsice ape ll? ei aco: No. Losez: You coulcn't see any area in the vara? There was no glas. SSE Polo MO. i can remember glass, a window, vestysr I can remember wincows here, and serhazs hera, sut TL. don't ) remember. Or swell: Oxayvy. There may have been windows for vou £0 see Out in the street? mt ~ aco: Yean, but I couldn't see outsice secause perhaps trey were very. hich. Cornwell: while Mr. Lopez was asking ‘ you cuestions, he draw =: @ Giagonal line across vour office snace.- Does TL aco: Yean. (Laughs.)} Cornwell: Ow, did you know a Teresa Proenza? Was she employed at the Consulate or the Embassy? ea AGO: Tae Embassy. She was the Cultural Attache. ‘Cornwell: She would have worked in the area marked number four? 18 Cornwell: Constructed? Setaco: Later. It was the old buildings. Cornwell: Did she work there during the same veriod o£ time vou did? Tecseo: Yes. Cormmet At that seriod where €id she work? Nhat area? Sa Saas: Here. corawell-: That's the area we marked number three on the Glagram. Did you know a Louisa Calderon? Trrado: Louisa? Yes, she was in the commercial. .. Cornwell: And where would that be on the diagram? Ina the area we marked number <=wo? Tixrado; I think her office was exactly above mine. She was a secretary. And I tnink it was above. cornwell: Either above the areaa wa marked one, or the area markec two, but on tne second Level. Tiraco: Yes. Cornwell: Do you know the names of any other emplovees who worked there at the time? Tirade’ No, I don't remember. 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Ww hy i) a) nt fon ths tome ) J tO) ti} 77) orf ie} 1@) $4 . My el Oo rn) wo Cc 4 : + 3 -| Q ° ut wy .Q a « a 4 rt on) = ri) “A ws sy |) & Dy no + Yn Se rT) 0) a oO rt su} Q) cd) Oo rt 4 ‘4 v es et Th oY oo S ct BS, fi O ota qQ) re) rf) ni a ; i) UG hy Ve tJ ie A) O 20 Lt ae = r x Bnd 5 nere een was <<212 AZCALVO. sale SOx. ovez: archives. two smaller boxes next to your Cornweli: So you've drawn lika a filing cabinet, SF desk .rOte cf tnem was rh I \-- This one. The Files. APs ck NS Oye Yas. the cztherz one wes a sable. Cornwell: And nere was the sane 3Ox- Aisle icleter No, Tiraco i (D 10) ue + fu Au jan w N ) (o it) 0) \--4W) O rv my {) (ft (Dp t- (b 'O 3 Oo ay (D el Cornweil Cornwell iJ ra cr (D +3 WY) I--oO He . rdExcten nfl: : accor. Tir acces Here was the wheres st : were you « Living + ? es DM | eekstalese aA 1963, Ft Gornwe ie; eer) tust a faw weexs . . . summez = 9-SS 1952? rik © ard Did ASA vor. have ; So ped sometime us in : che -% art 21 Bol7ia Tiraco Interview Pace 15. a telaohone at your nome? Wri rado:: Not at the moment that Cswald came. Because we had just moved. I think we moved in | July because we were separated in Julv, also, | July “63 and it is when the contract finished. SOmOere rans i.) . Cornwell: mesce. YOUr rent conrract ran owt in July of '683? Cornwell: About the same time that you and Horatio were ois vorced? /Tirado: Yes - Cornwell: Did you, vou say that because of your move, it took some time to get a telepnone in your home? ‘Tirado: Yes*. (Cornwell: And do you remember approximataly wnen it wag chat vou, frinally cot that in2 Tirado: At the assassination we nad, a, Let me sae, wea Gidn't have telephone--cays later. ‘Cornwell: It was sometime after the assassination that you first got a teleonone in this residence. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And do you bv anv chance recall the teleonone nunm- per S2erthe Consulates? ma rado: Oh, so manvittimes I write it down. Perhaps it was 11-28-45, serhass? 22 Silvia Tizrado interview Pase 17. Cornwell: Coulé it have been 11 28 47? riracdo: Ppernaos. Cornwell: when were you first advised that we wanted toa speak £0 vou? TiTAcO: Last week. Cornwell: And since =hnat time, of course, last Wednesday, I believe it was, we ssoke to vou informally, and told vou basically what we were interested in. And learned most of what you could remember about the events we were interested in. Correct? Tirade: Yas: Cornwell: Apart from that, nave you had anv other ovnportuni- ies to reac anything, or sveak =o anyone, in order to refresh your memory abour the events? Te Teco: Yes. “In -October of °76 some Journalist from the Washington Post came to interview me Cornwell: - We are familiar with the story that appeared in the Washington Post at aporoximately thet time. apart from that have you for instance rsad the Warren Commission Resort? TIT s2co. Yes. Cornwell: when did you last have an occasion to read that? TIiSaco® uh, when Horacio told me vou were coming, EgWaS Woterang, anc trv to remember exactly and I'm Silvia Tiraco tnterview Pace 13. ana so on, and I wanted to check the gates. Cornwell: So, last week sometime, you had 2a chance to reac it over again? miradco: No, not everything just the one little otpial ae Cornwell: Just the part that dealt with Mexico City ane your testimony and that sort of thing. Correct? Tiraco: Yes. Cornwell: Let me ask you, when you read that, was there any part of it that seemed to you to be inaccurate? Tirado: Inaccurate? Cornwell: not correct. ‘Tiraco: NOt Correct? Yes, but with the Warren Commissicn, I get angry when I start reading it because they make some afirmacionnes (5h). Lovez: Allegations or conclusions. iPiradco: Pefteeceaon - like it, So I tried to erase it. Cornwell: Okay. What specifically about the report was it that makes you ancry? Tirado: That I was a -- let me see now to sav it--, I don't remember exactly. but uh, I did more to Oswald when he was here than was my job, that it was extra. Cornwell: You mean part of the report that suggests that you went beyond your duties at the Consulate, that you exceeded your authority, and vou thought thet you dic not co so. Is that correct? Correct. Ts there anythine else about che Warren Commis- I cannot answer “hat because I oniy read at that time wo sages. I didn't read the whole. tning- Okay. jn, adédi zion, to, looxcinc Ac that aeorceu ae refresh vour memory, have you had 2 chance co speak to any one els @ ae) MO wae . + Wi SeuSome “34 _ os Ot = CHOC ’ £2 es Cran ~- Witla ee = 4 eee Well, I was trying to remember averychning cnet hapoened in the interrogatorvy. It was not hard, I mean, what = felt, but wh, what the police had done to me, so it was my but I'm writins, I'm writing an, autooiographiea how do you say that, and chis is a- oe late Senotember of 1963, 25 we learned from you tre other dav, a man came =o the Consulate, a man who you later associacec, wi 23 Sic [axes t7 le soewes 25 Bilvia Pace 29. | = ct) QO oO ba ry ' ~~ | el DO yOu remember how manv times ne came to Hie Consulate? Taree times. DO you remember the date or dates “con whick those three visits occurred? io, I saw the apolication. vou showed me the other Gay, and in the Warren Commission was Sestember 27, but I aidntec rerenmber, of course, until I read ic. Cornwell All right. Do you have a racollection whethe.: it was all on one day or on separate devs. The same day. Q oO a) re = @ tt Cn the very first visit, would you describe to us what the man said and dié, and what vou saig ia response? tes, he, well, he anter and he ask me if I sper English and I say yes, ané then he start askin me about requirements to go to Cuba, to get a Visa to_so to Cuda, and I explain is. What did vou exolain? Well, that he needed to, he said thata transit visa so that he needs 2 visa to the country wat ce was-coing, “rouif Lt was 2 socialist country, the visa was siven, as soon 26 Cornwell: When me first asked about the requiraments for a visa, diag ne tell you that his objective was ide Aina dado TO Gile SOvVLece GoLoi. Cornwell: Did vou ever sugcest tO Aim that there was any alternative means to acscuire a visa other than what I used to say is i= vou want to go to Cube, you nesc 6r you have to have -aco: No. It was strange. I mean because if vou are e,communis= and you're coming: | Pr aco: Yean. (2)12) Ka!+3 = ct) ed Did vou say anything to nim about that? me iraco: Perhaos I told him, what are you doing with all Weeentee and he said-to orove, I’m a Srienc of yours Cornawe li: Dic you discuss-your suspicions with anvone els me. Saco: Wis one -Consil. Cornwell: NiL=h Azcue? 36 Silvia Taradco interview Pace 31. : a : LiLaco-. Yes. Cornwell: Do you remember when tha z discussion occurred? Tiraco: It was aiterwards. Cornweil: Was that asSter his seconc visit as,vou recall? TL3Taco: DE AS OU LdeiGr le See re ar Se Cornwell: BUS iG aS eas en Oe PRR ESflora Neh Ler seback Up agaist 2of) Jus > a momanc. What time of Gay as Dest ss you racall did come to Sie Consulate she first cime? ide Ehad Vole We Perhascs it was eleven o'clock or something li Cornwe li: And the second time? Tiraco: About twelve, or eleven, no, about one o'clock. Cosawe lL Okav. The first one was roughly late mornin and the second one was early afternoon. 22 3aco 4 Cornwell And then, why cid he leave the second time? Tirado To get nis Russian visa. Cornwell: Le tne requeqt was an in-transie, Sorean NOE have Visa =>om the’ thire coun=cy. OF trom anotner SOUNTIVC ? 4 3 Wis duds Riad Panto ty) Es 37 Cornwell: Tiraco: Cornwell: ereecagnt. Okay. So, then you sent him?sz effect, to the Russian Embassv7. And it was that point aiter he left that vou socxe to. No. Cornwell: No Cornwell: Cornwell: Would it have been consistent in the Consulate for vou to have take one or both of the apolications tyved outside the Consulate? I don't ramember very well if uh, there wer two codvies. I-mean, one original anc one c ooy, but uh, “it could have-nanvened, but i-don't remember Cornwell: Okay. To the best of your memory tnen, the per- son who made the apolication was not have a cooy. Ledon st tttiow z I Gon't remember. Okav. VOuUre mot SsurSs. Suc vourrsetLSative none evs. tiatowould sno slave -cecurrsc: 38 Silvia Tixrado interview Pace 33. Tizraco: No. Cornwell: Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Would you have ever allowed a person to take all of the applications outside and attach the photos Sign them themselves? Tirado: Yes, because vou may come, ask for the application and you may keep it. Corawell: You, on occasion, would allow someone just to nave &. hankupo0ei tl that: corracree Tirade: Yes. But he was citferent because he cic aot speak in Svanish so I have to fill it. Cornwell: I see. If ne would nave spoken Spanish or dro-- fessed to having someone with nim who did speak Svanish, you might have allowed him to take the applications and fill them out. blots lo)\t Perhaps. Cornweil: At least on other occasions you have Gone that, with other people. Si rac. That's something that I really don't remember. Cornwell: There, at least, there was no recuirement that you type it there -insthe office, as:iong as it got Sr itecreut: TiLEaAsa I think ‘I have cavtype oLts io D have to tyoerit because =f have *O maxe some observations, always. Cornwell: Down a& the S5ottom? TE Yes. 39 Nicer = 7 ul Snide =¥ tee : = SRNe « Hoey -=<«17 3} fa Bo eT : . a nao SO, .at most, you would allow someone =o i: fees. wOULG YOU still recuire she gerson. to sign it in your presence? Just so we can keep our cocuments straight, let's a photograpn ane we'll ask you some questions This is a photograph of what would appear to be a visa application. Dces it appear to be basically the tyve of visa application that we have been 40 Silvia, Tiradéo: interview Dace 35. Cornwell: Those appear to you to se in your handwriting. Tirado: Yeah, because wnen I file I write in the number, the following number? Cornwell: Okay. And on the very sottom of the application, where it says "para uso de la mision" that means it's filled in by someone associated with the Cuban Government. Is tnat correct. Or the Consulate? TEredor Yes. Cornwell: Who, according to the+usual procedure, filled out that portion. Ti raco: Me. Cornwell: The other day when we talxed to you informally, you read through the words in that section. Is thatwcor:sce2 Tavace: Yes. I remember. Cornwell: And you memory is that you in fact typed that section on this adolication. Tirado: Yes sri sused to d6ésthis with ‘all the applications. Cornwell: And under that, there is a signature. Tirados Yes. Cornwell: Are you able to tell whosa signature that is? ibayale ye No, I was thinking lt was Mirabal, but no-- I couldn't sign any dapers. Cornwell: Okay. So it’ was definetiy not Your signatura? Tisado's No. Cornwell: Do. you Know whether, according t5 normal proceéusre, 41 any particular person routinely placed nis name at tnat location? TLraco: No, only the Consulate. People in the Consulate. Cornwell: What would be the pdDursose of a Signature in ‘the lower right-hand corner? . Tirado: I. don't know, perhaps to cneck that it was right as it was written. Cornwell: Did you ever see the Consulate or any other employee routinely sign the apolications at | the location? Tirado: I don't remember, Dut what I used to do was put the original W te Es 16) iw 0) 'O 03) (9) w 100) cr fe ray qras fy { 2 ey) W with a letter to the Minister, da Relacicnes exterister (spanish), How do you say chat? (Lopez - Minister of Foreign Relations), and I used to give tc the Consul so ne sign the vapers and send it to Cuba. Cornwell: Okay. One copy stayed in the Consulate and one Relations. yi tat_Kololty Yes. Cornwell: Tesit possible. then that the signature in the ‘Lower right-hand corner is someone in Cuba? Tirado: Perhaps that one that gest it. Cornweil: That receives -i+.in Cuba... All, right. the stamp, 42 Tirado interview which apcears slichtly over the name, the hand- placed on the application if you know? Perhaps in the moment that he sign? - sie Was that part of the normal sroced f ry 0) ae) gO t-Au < ie) G have a stamp as you recall to do. that? And was that a means of authenticating the si¢- nature, that you would stam Oo O He} iv O GO oO i" }- cr I | a, cy shat? I think so. Because let me see. was October 10. This was the answer, serhaps. and you are assuming, I take it, that that was the date placed on the cocumen ra QO 5 fu aN) Perhaos but I don't know. I don't know the date of when we send the apslica- CTO. Zt was Dlacedc on there when vou mailed it? Yes. 43 Interview tneene ‘Consulate A LOsip aha bag he o ~~ i Pesecurni:” pack = mean? Perhaps. I don't know “Tat. Could it have been the Gate vou received i= Tiraco: No, because it was the same cate. Cornwell: Okay. ‘The only da te on here of receipt from Oswald was the one near the tov, the secorid line, which reads: 27 Se p. 1963. Yes. So I guess the bes t we can do is Colette OL Con: Nave a distinct re collection of how the October date would have Tirado: Yeah. Cornwell: How long normally would receipt of would have been ma iled to Cuba? Well, it depends o nm thessiight. remember in that t ime, if we were =>om Cuba to Mexic of§and®erom Mexico to?’ Cuba and ae M depencsI- on the workb} oo that t ~ we> havey . to ~ do, mt if= we have- a ict of=. work “ysre we wouldn't : he | ta have> sent - te itin immediately ~ - Te =7eValise- diplomatica, dow Sotvou say it? ase eS Would there have been some usual amount of time? How much could it vary? The Zlichts were Monday, Wednesdav and Friday, Mcehink.- And’ un, "well we Send" a punchiviey, think, I don't know, when what dav in the weex to the pest of your recollection, that is a photo- graph of the man whom you saw on or about the 27th of September? Vas - = . I don't understand. Amoment ago, did you say that Would vou please repeat the question? Was there a usual day, did the mailings to Cuba usually occur on one given dav of the week? on Friday, perhans, that we make, we send applica- 45 ~—se eSe sestember was a Friday, then, the usual -routina would have been either for you ta have mailed “his application on the very dav that you receivad it, Or to have to wait until at least che next Friday. fe cieac cor vec 2 Tiraco: Yes. Cornwell: Now. You have told us that after the sacond visit, he went apparently to attempt to obtain 2 visa srom tae Sovelt Empassy. Yas. Cornwell: When Go you recall him returning? feLeeado : Re came in the artternoon. Cornwell: About what time? LEA = Pee On 7 iC, Cornwell: Anc that woulc have been, according to what you told Us. earlier, not normal visiting hours? Renee GoOrrect? Yes. ROW were you able to speak to him on this occasion? Because when somebody came doorman and was speaking in another language that wasn't penish, he used to call me and say somebccv' See Goesn't speak Sovanish, someone sent he taxes the vecole to the Consulate Cornwell: ANd tne doorman came and got vou. Yes. Dic you ¢o Sutsice to the main cate? Nia — -372 O-7 - 4(Vol. 3 46 eet «pe nm og geet geNy Se 2acs os z1. a | = m~ . +1 Cornwell. Somebocy to the Consulate. Okay. You said the main gate. Was that the area that; on Exhibit One, vou markec as being the door =o vour offices, or some other area? Ye was closed. In the aiterncon he was closec. BUE Derhaps ne came. . . ae The door on Area One was lockec uo. Okay? Yes. And then he was open. Over near Mumber Seven, is that correct? Where they let the cars in? Yas. There was a door there 00? Yes. It was the garage and another door. And she Coorman*from treat area Srocont tim co your Or rs¢e? Yes. Niet, OCCULTod (on eat socscasion:e What? oe What hapoened on that cccasion? Well, he came in and he said that he already have his Russian visa and’ th, he want to get his Cuban visa.°- Ané I said that thatwas nct :0ssibls “be- cause he has*t6*tea- FirstosentsesrCcaba anc~ He wy insisting and insisting so Azcue tolc him to go away because if he dicn't go away at that moment he was told Oswaid to go away. Coraweil: Okay. So he went to the coor wnich was in the area we marked 'one,' which was the Consulate Office? euliaelele)p Yes...Remember, I was feeling sitv for hin because he looked desdarate. Corned: is Re lookeG desparate? 49 Siivia Tirado Interview Pace 44. Corswei!: my, you felts Kingips isorzmy Sorbian? Tiradco: Yes. Cornwell: At any time during these three contacts, Cid he indicate to you that he could sseak or unéerstand Spanish? Terao. No. Cornwell: During this period was vour normal work week, did 1t include Saturdays? Tirzaco Yes. Cornwell: Is it possible that, in addition to nis visits on Friday, he also came back the zOoliowing dav on Saturday morning? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Fow can you be sure of that? Tirado: Because, uh, I told you before, that it was easv to remember, because not ali the Americans that came there were marriec with a Russian woman, they have live(d) in Russian ané wa, we didn't used to fight with those people cecause i= you, they came for going to Cuba, so apparently they were frienés, no? So we were nice to them with this man we fight, i mean we had a hard discussion so we didn't want to have anything to do with him. Cornwell: Okay. I understand that but I don’t understand how that really answers the cuestion. In other 50 words, the question is, what is it apout the events chat makes vou sura that he did not come back on Saturday, and have another conversation with you? Cornwell: Did Azgcue work. on Saturdays? Mara cos Ves, we. used to. work ist therprsite, aus now for Cornweil: Was, there a guard, was there a guard out here at the corner near number seven on your diagram on Saturdays? | Tiraco: Excuse me? Cornwell: Was there a doorman out near the area that you marked as number seven, on the dlagram? Russo: Yes,,but.on Saturday he never let people: Gl. Cormwe ils Never let pecole in. dipaeg (ota) No. Cornwell: Not even if they came up to the doorman and didn't speak Svanish? And were very insistent? digropeat- cole 4 No, because they. could answer or something. Thev 51 the Goorman (Spanish). oo nave £O come anc. to bother me. So 2 used to sive a call next weex to see if your visa arrived. Cornwell: Well. Are vou saying that based on your memory the guard was allowed to bring peopvle in during the five till eight o'clock at night uh, sessions during the week but not on Saturcays? Cornwell: Cornwell: Do you have a distinct recollection with respect to telephone calls to the Russian Consulate, was it just one call or was it more than one call? Only one. Just one. The . . .I believe I asked you this, Dut just to be sure, althouch the apolication was tyaed with 52 ma be me = peFaa Be =ES aleehres ha{wo Sot : ee SG ASF s a carbon to make two copies with one typing; Gid he have to sign both indevencently? Or did vou allow them to use a carbon to sicn the saper? ms ee Ss CLS ~— NO, nOw) Be WasectonOr anaes Cornw 1 Two Original signatures aN THe Veae evra ire Yes. Was anvthing saic that you recall at this time which looking back on it indicated the sossibibicy, even on that cate, Oswald had on Ais mind some intension of killing the President of the United States? NO, lt) Gon tCetninkiso. Let me read something to you, and ask vou LE 1t at all refreshes your memory or if vour heve a memory of a conversation similar to this? I don't believe I read this to you before, when we talked the other day, or did I? oid I read an excerpt from Daniel Schorz's book to vou? No, vou told me. Okay. I'll read it to you then at this tie. [It's an excerpt from a book called Clearing the Aix, woitten by Daniel Schorr, published 2n) tne United States in 1977. And sage-17,- Saceuas rolliows: "it at ijterviewecn elke too ew eee British journalist, Comer Clark, Castro Silvia Tirado Pace (meaning Fidel Castro) said shat Oswald haG come to the Cuban Consulate cwice, each time for about fifteen minutes. The first time, I was told, he wanted to work for us. He was askecé to explain but he wouldn't, he wouldn't go into details. The second time he said he wanted to free Cuba from American imveriaiism. Then he said something like 'Someone ought to shoot chat Presicent Xennedy.' Then Oswald saic, and this is exactly how it was reported to Rew ey oe Foi try to do it.” Do you recall any conversation like that in either what was said to vou by Oswald or that was said by Oswald to Azcue or anyone else that you might have overheard? Wirado: No, I don't remember. Cornwell Did anv dart of that conversation occur? Tiraco: NO, because I don't remember chat he says he was to go to work in Cuba because he only that he wanted to go in-transit. That's what I remember. ) Cornwell: What do you think, well, first let me ask you, do you think that conversation could have occurred mage use forgot it? In other words, is. that tresxinad Of conversation which, ££ it occurred, you would definitely remember _ Yes. SB3ecause in the shouting and crvyl: miss somethin ‘ Dus say so, fT ras Sate} - = = -73 : 1 gg ROB ha tage —4co eoBe Sg Hea — pg) es aven Azcue. Etmnean-thaess rot the, iV"don t Eiink SO, stiles alaenaa en fu ct 0 O a 0) ey Uv) fu a ke:oO |re RS I-- (Tthy | — (8) =| Dd fu pa He was*aroquing fer. Sornwell: Do you remember anv part of the conversation Tiraco: He was angry at us. That’s why iL called Azcue Because he was not a strong man Dut anyway, Tf eidn”’s PT ae Tike , 7, to figh<= 4 = with ose int oic, ws sae jos was; = Very = Janeoe- and he was blaming me and Azcue. because ne thougnt = t Oe ogee FL = * . = 1 , 4 ‘ it was in ; our hands ws += to - give ~ tee the Ss Sey visa ert = .immedtacely, = Te ie 1A = = --+-=: = ~* > =% <-t b _ Shc COLLEEN & UNGess os now Se se ea cpio rae 5d Cai ySt—ogs aa 0g come from Cuba. You mentionec earlier that you had discussed with Azcue on this, as I understocd this, during ene third visit with Oswald, the suspicion that you had about the documents. Is that accurate Pmi There's) '- ao he said that he was a Communisé. . Because it would be reall; to the visa througn the Commu- Pasty. any point in the conversations that you have us apout, d id Oswald say anything indicating that he really wanted to stay in Cuba? No. He just wanted to go and visit and saw what was the Revolution. Cornwell: Okay. That's sort of what I meant. In other words, he did indicates that he ¢idn't just want to pass through, that he wanted to spend some time there. is that“correct: Yes. What do you recall about that part of the *conver- BeacoOta® him thas at wo o'clock, 59 Russia at five o'clock, ne has to stay in the Bre pore, in tne Ctban aissort. That ne coulen’t ae ult. Cornwell: Why didn't you tell him that? Tixraco: Because he was saying tnat ne wanted to go 9 cubaito visit and to see what the revolution nad mede. Cornwe li: Dic you ever see him again, after the argument with Azcue? Tiraco: No. Cornwell: Did you ever talk to him aceain? raraao: No. Cornwell: Not in person nor by telephone. No, he never call. He could have called when I usec to get the messace, eo = somebocy answer, = used to get a message. Did anyone else overhear any of conversations you have described? Other than which Azcue was involved? raAcaco: Yes Could be that pecslie trom she 2aerener estes aera TOMMerclat co mesma 7 7 o martAP 60 I can't remember. The onlv thing that I remem- ber is that it was onlv Mirabal. And did Mirabal come out in the reception area during the conversations as you racall? Yes, averybody who was vassing through, even in ms the streets, = they t were shouting, =* —4 really: ! The windows would have been up? The windows to In other words, you're saying seoole on the street might have overheard. it? Yes, ves. Ii vou were here and there was always a police here, they could nave heard the shouting, the crying. Ots Of noise in background, unintelligibl (9) 61 KENNEDY TAPE 2 Name Silvia Tirado (Duran) Date June 5, 1973 Time Address Placa Interview: Cornwell: You cold us previously when we discussed intormally with you that vou were sympathetic towards the Cuban Revolution curing the early 1960's-- Tiraco: Yes. Cornwell: Dic vou ever overhear any conversation aither in the— Consulate or among any of the peoole you may have as- sociated with concerning the vossibility of killing Tirado: No, because I think the people I used to know during that time, thev think like me, and I think the death of a man doesn't make anything good, I mean, you Pee a puitlicing, no? ~The President is like, I mean, for instance, a roof--not the top, but if you take the top, the building still stands. You have to de- stroy the whole building, not one man. I= vou kill the man, you make a hero. So, is no good. Cornwell: What were your own feelings towards Presidant Kennedy? Interviewer Signature Typed Signature Gary Cornwell ‘Date transcribed 6-26-73 Byr §Dr = a * Formos toa 41-372 O - 79 - 5(Vol. 3) 62 Mexico, as I remember now, they were very good in +t - 7 ree re : oa ene COMMerCla ln2%SS,, sone SULClbas avea. He came to they — liked 7 = him By very trary? muga. raat Cornwell: aereats is and,= |S what > vou're fe ee ' saving =atre is, ts you're ' describing s52 > what you understood to be che basic reaction of the Mexi can seools? Is ..4at, correct: Tr 200s Yas\ Cornwell: Cormwell: Was Was thathee ELS ie) feeling theN= edi same ie even aye aamong n ene sho sare sart or= Lovez: Would you repeat the question, please? Cornwell: Was the faeling that vou just described as being Cornwell: The same with respect to that part of the Mexican 63 America, undeveloped countries, you don't love them, oz course, Dut you may see that is dit . that he has been a gcod Pre in) 1 4 (i @ 5 a ct is fy ct Hs) (D Was, °L think he was ingenious wit Dd Dulles Piigesewias that. . Dotvour know that. shrase? Cornwell: One more time. Lovez: (Soeaxs to Tirado in’ Soanisn.)** Dulles. =Lraco: Ye said once the United States has no friends, the; have interests. (Speaks in Spanish.) And Kennedy tried to destroy that ohrase, saving we want to nave friends. And he was chancing the politics of Latin America, Xennedcy. Cornwe:i: So, vou're saying that because of President Xennedy Solicnas towarces Latin aAamerica,othat: even ene o£ the Mexican sveople who were svmpathetic \ Cuban Revolution, thev also very much liked Kennedy? {Liviachelale teak sow Now, I'm not sute,.. mean’ I-- Cornwell: At least-- > I asked you if at any time curing the early 1960's you had overheard any conversations among peoole who were in favor of the Cuban Revolution to th effect that they would consicer killing the Pras logics of the situation, that vow don't chance che svstem Dy changing <=he President. Nevertheless, let me ask vou again, more pointedly. Did vou, never- theless, ever overhear anv such conversations? ms —acdco No. Cormwell: Did you ever overhear them within the Cuban Consulate rn] * 7 - += aM BOF I'm sorry, go ahead. Mo, Dut I'm Mexican and I was im Mexico and I Was z ‘ * working there and you have to see chat un, even though I-was 2 =riend, they would not say things like that: in iront of me, of course, no? When the news came over the television and in the news- ‘ papers that President Xennedcy had been killed, Pt, i A . = . + * , . -_—-— AN 65 Tmeconnecclon wltn snose consaces. enact have read as forexnowledse, in other words, ae it totally surprise you chat that assassin, or was there anything about vour contact with him which him it understandable? No. No, even now L COm = cio, chek ne would have cone it. Poieeetal. cont think ¢nat-Ae.kilced han? Mo, because I think that ne was 2 weak man. I saw Pig@enme Colac set .angrvy,y.Sut.un, for ne, he was not @ man thatcould kill the Drasicent, Secause even ‘when I saw him on telavision and he said all the time, "I'm innocent" and if I kill someone very im- porcant,-2 would be proud. I mean, because aven 1£ Zimowith police I know that I'm going to be killad Oredie.or.something.like that, I'd say, “Yes, i killed the President” and I don't think so. So based on all of your contacts with him, you do not think that he killed the President? Becon’t think so. Let me ask vou just some miscellaneous questions Shout the nature of vour contact with Aim. Was there ever any conversations or indications asout money mroblems that he hac? Was that ever the sup- —ee eS os as ment would ratte h—Vekes—) winpiiqt< Ce) - aver done that No, no. We used were visitors and we had =rom the Cuban vi sitors Sromecuioar, what vou mean? No, no. For instan ce; Cuban Ra -_—~— volutionary Anniversary, shev do have every- hing vaic. Cornwell: in other words, it was versons that hac been invite to go to Cuba by the Cuban Government? Yes, yes. Well, even though, then you would not, or the Cuban Government would not have financec this trip, did he ask Zor such assistance? At the time that I was working there, it never hap= pens. SoeGtctcasl ? Oswalt. 67 paste Ts cO onthersvylaw ao 3 “ = - Be ° Pace wy — . ob thee fete te al(ate «east Pa 8 Peed remember... Iidon’evthink so. Sut =r don't rememper. Scrnweltl: Did ne ever sav anything or did vou ever soserve anything to indicate that he had travelling compan- ions in Mexico City? whey. Vntm e No, he didn i: Did he ever say anything or do anything that indéi- “cated that he knew other neoole in Mexico City? Ti-aco: Ddon"t know. Cornwell: To the best of your knowledge he knew no one, is Bnet correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Do you know when he left Mexico Citv? mra2co: No. [)- Sornweil: By what form.of transportation? Cornwell: Did anyone ever.call or come by the Consulate on his behal Fh 2 ‘Cornwell: Did they ever deliver anything to the Consulate for 68 egy al.= witn Oswald outside of the Consulate? No. Cn--let me snow.vou two books, one of which is labeled shoto ident Sook and has roughly three inch by Five inch pictures in it and the other one which is labeled JFK Document 7549 and nas smaller sic- tures ft; anc iL°L) Cur the recorcer of-\ torus second and give you a few minutes *o look through them ané ask us, and I will ask you i= vou recognize Okay. We've turned the tape recorder back on and vou've had five minutes, mavbe ten, I don't know, to look through the two books “rin the” first*pook; you only dicked This looks Lipa a Which one: look Like? aa exactly. 69 Cornwell: Okay. And you also I sSelieve pointed to Number 5 when you went through tre bock. Yes, ana who ¢O you think “that is? Oswaic. ; Cornwell: a bo SS 4 oe 8 Des Sdgerey Oswalise Now, (many of che picturas in Siete ooOn Aare not shat clear, ofcourse. when vou that that looked like him except that: as vou recalled him, he had either Blue or green eyes and blond Hawa COrrect? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Waeneyou say blond hair, what color is that? Ts it very light? bight. Let's see if we can find an example. Looking in the Second book--that's all vou found in the first book, correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: All Fright. Looking in the second book, uh, take as an example, Number 266 04 268, would treat se basically ec vow recat, to be the color of his hair, blond? wesw tere it, looks’ verv, very light, mot shat lich. Okay. That would be what vou describe as blond but Mitte meiory is that Lt was close 5buvt noc quite as 70 Silvia Tiraco Interview zage 19. Licht 25. so4 62 ii eag Koko Yes. Cornwell: Okay, out the tape recorder was back away from-us so just to make sure we got that answer, you sicked out in the first book photograp By Ne Ur ~) iS O & 0) cr iy) (hi(D en (r rs) fu ct it looked like the way vou recalled the man who came to the Consulate axcent th i) ct | @ re fo Nu vo - G @ (8) a af) (D (D | He MiG LONE eCuLee. caked aod Q ry cr ir O iSOo G La if | Oo ” inal gi 77) that right? Pireaco: Yes. (Long break.) Cornwell: I don't know now, working with black and white photos, we can do much better than that? sut-- little lighter than vour eyebrows. little lighter than my evebrows? There photo.” y fin “the “second book, mumber 24 Or 27. 200 also pointed to those photos when vou went through tne Sook. Would the color’ oft that hair approximate the way you remember it? 71 No, Decause he had verv light, almost white. .. Okav, again, it would be not as: lig om (t jv W) (t a fu c ed faaeeagit. Then soing =o che second book, you pointed to ohotocrapn #4, when vou looked at the BOOK =ne first time. What is vour memory about that? Hemseom os me, Oz. Mirabaly me reminds me Sul not exactiv. Cornwell: Pee te ohtse He looks a littla like Mirabal? Yes. Cornwell: I= I skip a photograph you remember looking at, me know, but I jotted down some notes as vou came ‘em when you looked at the Sook. You next pointed to number 26 and 27. Does that appear to you to the same man? Ti rado: Yes. Cornwell: And who was that? Ernesto Lefei. He used to work with my husband. Ernesto Lefel And what's the nature of ine associ tion between he and your husband? He was working with him. x 72 Tiraco: He started working with us. Cornweil: Is he a social acquaintance T2raco™ Is what? Cornwell: Do vou Know him on a social Sbasis in adcéeition toa his bein¢c a business associate of vour husdand? Tirade No business associats.\ Se was working for Aim, tor HoOracia. Cornwell: "Okay. “Thak"s what I meant. He was 4n asstetane. rircado: Assistant. Cornweil: All rignt. Tizado: No social. Sometimes he came to our house to dinne Cornweli: Next, you I believe sointed to Number 57. Is that correct? Fifty-seven? Ae iat-Volo}s! Yes. Cornwell: Who does that look like? jislearaie Kole He looks like Gavino Fernandez. Cornwell: What's the first name? Gavino. Gavino? And who is pa hag gala) Nell,-he's*uh, dignitary, and ne used £5 so €o the Cuban Insti have anv: memory what Ais name might be? No. Okaw.. Giliine Abbe But tell me, who is it? (Laughter.} Do vou recognize the man in shoto 266? Ss, feces the one I want. 266? No. He looks like Russian. Cornwell Do you recognize the man in 265? Tirado.: No. Do you recognize the man in 213? No. You're not going to tell me who's tera! t man2 1 Not right now. (Laughter. But maybe Late rhe Whe na the ub assassination occurred, do you remember 3 where vou were, when you cane. — he 7 ews = 2- DOES? 77 Silivia Tiraco Interview Pace i? eer aco: At the Consulate. Cornwell: And co you know what vou did at that cime? Tiraco:;: No, it was almost noon, I= mean the Lunch hnour, about two o'clock, or near two o'clock, and some- body came and cata Kennedy was killad, and all was confusion anc, uh, well, we were realiv sorrv. Everybody came in and went out and there was con- fusion. All over. And then I went nome . Seomty ~OlLd him, =f -think this*man came “o° tie’ En- Then, the next morning vou saw a newsoaver. (Cornwell: Were you sure at that time that that was the man? mi aco: “Cornwell: Do vou remember who was at the birthday sartv that night? DO yOu remember whether or not vou discussed these events with anv one else at the varty? Tirado: Yes, we were talking about it. ‘Cornwell: Whoever was at the dartv. ir ado: The whole night, yes. Cornwell: What was the tone of the pariv? sorrow. And speculation, what "Ss gOing on? Because with Kennedy we knew what was going on, but now, what will happen? Cornwell: The nex morning what did you do? @Pirado: I snow she paper to Horatio and told him this is the man that went to the Embassy and I went to the Consu- Yate anc I look in the Archivos and I saw the ~ ao- 80 Cornwell: What was the nature of your conversation with the Ambassador? Just to tell him that that was tne man? Traces 2es,. 4 Think so. Cornwell: What was his name? TLradg: Fernandez Armes (cr Hernandez). Cornwell: anc, Sic you°-do anytning else? Did you pull che File On Aim or maxe anv other actamcts to Dus. the facts together? I Pitas: £ Leave ~Ne 521s Wien mia. Pulled the file and left it with the Ambassacor? Yeah, the whole bunch. What would have been in the file besides the appli- Gation, tt. anything: Another applications. Cornwell: I see, you sulled the whole file which included his apolication? Yes. Did anvthing else hapoen that morning at work? No. Then, did you go home for lunch again? Yes. ANG Wita= Occurrec at tiat Sime7 Uh, mv brothers-in-law, servant, maic came and when uw Saw'me, she cried, she stzrvec srvincg, anc sne sana “Yours ative?” and I sav “why?",lecausS some man 81 came to the house and says that uh, vou had an accident and you were dead anc they take away Senor Ruben to identify vou." Then we went to Ruben's house and it was full of men and thev catch me. They caught you. Okav. And the men were reoresenta- tives of the Mexican police, is that correct? Yeah, but they never told me. What hapovened when vou walked into the house, to Ru- ben's house? I saw my brothers-in-law, wife, and the same thing. She cries, and says "Silvia, vou're okay?" "Yes, I'm okay." She was between two men and she couldn get near to me, but I was walking and I saw in the bedroom, it was Ruben, and full of photographs on the bed and he said the same thinc--"Silvia, you're Okay, you're all right?” and I say "Yes happened?" Then I saw the telenhone and I trv to get the telephone and 42 man hold av hane ane he Says you can't call because you are under arrest, and they say, I don't remember, but they say, ah, this is the accomplice of Kennedy. I thought that's what they told but I say I don't remember. They told me, "You're under arrest." I sat down on the bed and I said “You have to show me an order signec 82 Silvia t Page 22. me, my nands, and I try to defend myself, and they kicked somebody and thev took me-- You were trving to kick them and keep them from tak- ing you with them, right? Yes, ves. who were vou going to call on the teleonone? The colice. -) The scolice, the lawver, IF don't know. And when they took me out of the house and I was crying, “Call the police, call the police!" and they, he covered my mouth, and they took me to stationwagon that was parked at the corner. There was a man there Sut T- G@idn't know him and I was quiet, and they say, "Don't cry. Sacndalous woman." "Scandalous old woman, shut up. Because where we are going we will see what's going to happen to you." So, in that moment, 1 wad aga See, Cornwell: So you were taken to the solice station? Tiardo: No. It's not the police’station> The office where the ‘security, that. was where the intelligence agencies were in. Sut IT didn't know that because that building Not the one I ‘fen = -_-s - 23". . And who else was taken down there besides you? The wnole--my brother-in-law, his wife, my sister- in-law, a friend of hers, another woman that was there, anc me, but thev were taken in another car. And, at the police station, what inquiries were made Of you? What did they ask? Everycning. Evervthing. They asked me ay name, where was I born, mv jobs, when I marriad, mv status, evervthing. They have mv fincer-srints, shotograshs of mysel=, everything. And uh, well, thev ask me where I was working, if I had been in Cuba, some seo- ple that I saw in Cuba, and what I was doing at the Consulate, that there was a tunnel, that makes me laugh, it was a tunnel from the Cuban Embassy to the Russian Embassy, and uh, well, a lot of foolish ques- Specifically, = what did they allece you hac done? What did they accuse you of doing? Nothing. They never said-- During the questioning on all the subject matters that Did they record the conversation, or transcribe it? Reey “sec a little machine. Thev say it is a’ ‘steno- ? i) | He i) $6 fu uw tr Db be O ve) ai {v 'O h-rscord: Yeah, ané a man was writing. Cornwell: All the cues tions and all Tirado: Yes Cornwell: Did any of the procedures that we have asked you about cause you to say anything to the police that Was-noc’thne truth? NOY Icon" t@tnink’ ss? ©=- don't-Have’ aAGEnIAS to. aaa Ses. ere Evervytning that vou Soid them was the eruch: Yes. At any tine, auring cnelsuestioning adic thev ever allege that you had met with Oswald outside the Consulate? Yes. A lot of times. Did they ever ask you any questions about 2 Negro? I don't remember. You don't remember anything about that? No. Did you ever Know, during this same period = time, Tirado . Commercial Attache was a Negro: Cornwell Anyone else? pea SON The -Goorman. ae Anyone else? Thea wita ct zne Commercial bES), oko, ocWig Did thev ask a5OWES Rem? 85 rnterview —1 eS Mo. Q 18) "% 2 z= @ be te Nhat was his name? = don'= remember. I even don't remember if he was there when Kennedy was shot. were they from Cuba? Yes. Dic¢-vyou know any other Necroes from Cuba outside the Consulate? I don't think so. Well, this man, the boy at Consu- laco at Vera Cruz. Hewas aNegro, not completely, but-- The one Yes. Did vou know any Negroes who had red hair 2 None of the ones vou described did? No, we usec to call “Red® to a bovwho was wo rking there but he was like Spanish; I mean he was white and-- Cornwell: Not even very dark skinned? Tiraco: No. Remember his name? Tirado: Rogelio, Rogelio Rodriguez, I think, something lixe that. - Cornwall: After the questioning, eS 86 Yes. Well, they were waiting for me and... we went to have lunch, something to eat because we haven'c= had. And well, we talk about it. Cornwell: Remember where vou went? ixado: No. Horacio told me we went to Sanborn's. I don't remember. I aven don't remember when i got home and what hapsened. Next dav evervone know. nl — ornwel Dia tnhs -ofaicers#srom the Securidad - Department ever suggest.to vou during, the questioning that they nad information that vou and Oswald had been lovers? Yes, and also that we were Communists and that we were Dlanning the Revolution and uh, a lot of false Cornwell: What happened the next day? Well, we.staved home and at night a friend of ours came and we didn't say anything. why was that? $y Cornwell: Why did you not say anything? < irado: Because these people told me to keen quiet. Cornwell The police? Dice vou = You understand though, the kind of question I'm asking vou? (Tirado spoke £0 Lopez in Spanish, who asked Cornwell to re- peat che question.) Cornwell: Okay, let me just ask vou a hypothetical. Some- times, a person has done something completely inno- cent but then thev are confronted with a very-se~ vere accusation. They may think that theirs innocent act will be misunderstood by their accusers so thev might withnold the innocent act simply to be sure that -tnev “don o-get-rnto more trocole=« T2rado: No. Cornwell: Simply to be sure they con't get into more trouble than they apparently are alreadv in. Tiraco: No. Cornwell: There was no thing that vou nad done or seen or knew about that you withheld because of that? t Tir aAco : No. No, 4 (D A 'U I {v I- Ha} (D S (Db "y re \- a! Q cr a fv cr they wanted vi aw Nashnincton Post anc that was aporoximately 2 year or Commission Reporte recently. Do vou recall anything ‘about chat that was inaccurate other chan what vou Cornwell: Had vou either done anvthing oO or offeredto do any- thing for Oswald other than what you nave already dhnlga Velo lr No. Cornwell: And was that all within the scone of your rasponsi- Cornwell: Was it all within the scope of vour authoritv? Cornwell: . 5 rd Sia rg vou opm ever have b * anv of=~ the pecole at the &% Cuban +} CONSULSZTS ars? ~ 2ctend a = pes = tiss= =F in : gour +. ncme? 7 95 a social relationsnio with any of them? ( oO ry = ft) |aad Which ones? Tiraco: Azcue, Maria Carmen, I think Luisa, she went once. Cormwe!l: Who is that? Luisa? 25260 3 Luisa Caldaron, the one you ask me. a re n ‘s = 0 'li:\ Okay. Azcue, Luisa, and the secretary who was killed Peeeoat correct? Tiraco: Before, before this, before I usec to work at the Embassy, uh, and before we move to Constitutyentes we make some varties, for instance, when Armando Hart (Pho) was here, he was ehe Minister of Education, and ; with the Ambassador he was in that time and Organa, a who came irom Cuba. We used to invite. ieepnwelrlssOkay. dow about Theresa Proenza? Tiraco: Perhaps she came. Cornwell: Did vou ever receive any indication from tnem chat any of them had ever had a contact with Oswald? TPprado : No. Cornwell: Did Elena or Elinita Garro de Paz aver come to those parties? In your home? i?)16) nh ‘3 (b <, - \- oO | be it i (v ) Oo rs) (Db O mm w {3 lay wm |+5 Le) 96 Silvia Tixradco Interview Tirado: Once, Dut it was, I think it was before that I was in the Cuban Embassy. Cornwell: Would it have been aporoximataly around '63? Tirado: tT don't xnow because when thev came =irom France. . . Cornwell: Apcroximately 1963? Tis2cg; r-only, s9erhaps, Isson’t«xaow. Zarcway: Dic you say that it was when thev came from France? Tisacas Yes. Hardwav: It was after they returned from France that they came to one of the parties? Tixado: Yeah, to Ruben's house. Hardwav: At Ruben's house. 3 | ry ju re) ian < eah. That was the wnole family thera. I only saw Elena a few times. One was the day that I got married and another time was somewhere else, I think three times I only saw ner. Cornwall: Did you know General Clark Flores? e?r3ad00:: Yeah, but not very well. Cornwell: Was he ever at those varties? Tizado: I don't remember. Perhaps once, at Ruben’s house Sut not at mv house. Comnwell: Didwou know Emilio Carbillido ? (@)oO a as = (vb 4' t . WU tr ion pe) (Dd (b (Dp ty ju (Ttcr rt)|rs (or ct =) oO 1) c1)) J fu ry wr |a (ib 7) J S2Lvia Interview Se Pase 7. c Cornmwe erent 1 il: Devaci.* Elena‘’s sister. Did she attend those varties? No, she went, I think I saw her sometimes at the Embassy. Bow about Eunice Cdio? No. [I know her, I mean I met her sometime. But, n She was not a close friend. Over the years, have any of chose seools aver indi- cated to you that they Had any knowledge of Oswald’ trip to Mexico City? No. Have chey ever nave either seen him or heard any stories about any one who did see or meet with him? Ti ade: No. Cornwell: Has anyone else ever come to you since and pro fFessed =o have to Mexico Sity? Tirado: No. Would vou have any reason to believe that if we spoke sO any of those people they could have information of held to us? tac L[aco >. tT con't know. co enywolt. BOW in aise Have you ever had any association with any intalii- gence agency of anv country, includine 98 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 38. _ Once I met a Russian when was working at the Press Agency Dut he was from the Russian Press, and they say that he was irom the volice, the Rus- Sian Police but I don't know. But you just met him one time? x con' nave any additional cuestions. tT nave 2 few questions of .Ms. Duran. As normal procedure, when a person came tothe Cuban Consulate, do you explain to them that there are differant tyces of visas? No. So they would normally come to you and ask you for a special type of visa, and then vou would get that Syetree kbyos Okay. The application was the same. Same application. But they were different visas. There were only two visas. Transit visa and normal You dGicn't normally explain to seople whether there were two different tvoes of visas when ther 33° aaa Lice Vaew Oxav. =I just wanted to read to you a couple of sections of what was recorded in the Warran Commis- sion Resort. What happened was, oh re Wes “a “report given Dy the Mexican authorities to the Warren Commis- gion anc. 2t was, published in the ‘rerort ‘and let me read vou one sentence, okay? The declarant complied with her duties, took cown all the information and completac the aporo- priate application form, and the declarant admit- tedly, exceeding her resvonsibilities, informally telephoned <=he Russian Consulate with the inten- tion of doing what she could to facilicate issu- ance Or the Russian visa to Lee Zarvev Oswald. PSaciat, Statement, accurate? i=-S cnet»one and:I don’tilike»it.,.) The-Sther one? That dert about admittedly exceecing her ressonsibili- ties? Uh huh. That's she part vou had reference te earlier when you told us that you had reac sometnhing-- Yes. It says here that you telephoned the Russian Consulate Yes’. Did he ever telephone you back? No. Okay. And it says here with the intenticn of doing What she could to facilitate issuance c= the Russian visa. © Did ‘you ever “do anything else, 7 J mg} Ase Vv) anh 2 Yar LaIHXy G0re-A 122 . Mr. CoRNWELL. The early portion of the transcript simply estab- lished her present name, that her name in 1963 was Sylvia Tirado Duran, the fact that the tape recording of the interview began at 5:45 in the afternoon, and that her birthday is November 22, 1937. We might ask that those who have transcripts—there were copies provided both for the press and the public and to the com- mittee, if you would turn to page 5, we will begin the tape record- ing at the top of page 5 of the transcript. [Tape recording was played.| Mr. CorNWELL. At that point, Mrs. Tirado did make a sketch o the consulate which is now part of the record. We would ask, however, that we now move to page 19 of the transcript and continue her testimony at that point, near the bottom of page 19. (Tape recording was played.| Mr. CoRNWELL. At this point, Mr. Chairman, we would ask that we turn to page 25 of the transcript, beginning near the bottom. (Tape recording was played.| | Mr. CORNWELL. We next ask, Mr. Chairman, that we turn to page 45, or 40, excuse me, near the top of the page. (Tape recording was played.| Mr. CorNWELL. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we turn to page 47, near the top portion of the page. (Tape recording was played.| Mr. CoRNWELL. I next ask, Mr. Chairman, that we turn to page 54, toward the middle or slight upper portion of the page. (The playing of the recording was resumed. ] Mr. CoRNWELL. And the final portion of the tape recording, Mr. Chairman, begins on the following page, which is labeled nage 1 of tape 2. (The playing of the recording was resumed. | Mr. CoRNWELL. Mr. Chairman, we also, while we were in Mexico, spoke to Mr. Horacio Duran. That is the man who is displayed in the blue coat, in JFK exhibit F-482, and who was Sylvia Duran’s husband in 1953. We also spoke to Ruben Duran, who is Horacio’s brother, and who is displayed in the white shirt in JFK exhibit F-431. And to Betty Serratos, the lady on the left in the array of JFK exhibits, numbered F-430, and who was the wife of Ruben. Each of those individuals was, of course, around Sylvia, spoke to her during the traumatic events after the assassination of the President. And each of them provided information to us of substan- tially the same nature in all significant respects as that which you have just heard in the tape recording of Sylvia Duran. We would ask at this time that those three exhibits be placed into evidence. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point. [The information follows:] 123 JFK Exurisit F-4382 JFK Exuisit F-431 OAD NB a ONE LALLAIP NOBLES, Wet RR Era Ae PLEA Gi aie Pike gh BREN Meea ipa. Sie 0 JFK Exuisit F-430 125 3) O - 79 - 9(Vol. 41-372 126 Mr. Fauntroy. Would the gentleman yield, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Strokes. The gentleman from the District of Columbia. Mr. Fauntroy. I take it that their statements are also a part of the record, a part of our files. Mr. CorRNWELL. They are part of the files of the committee, that is correct. Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you. Chairman STOKES. Is counsel finished? Mr. CoRNWELL. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STokEs. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. Mr. Buakey. Mr. Chairman, the next witness to be called is Eusebio Azcue Lopez. Mr. Azcue was the Cuban consul in Mexico City in September 1963 who informed the individual who visited the consulate and gave his name as Lee Harvey Oswald that he would not be issued a visa to Cuba. Senor Azcue is presently living in retirement in Cuba. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Senor Azcue. Chairman SToKEs. Prior to calling the witness, the Chair will once again advise that this particular witness, due to security reasons, we are requesting that all persons remain in their seats any time the witness comes into the hearing room or at any time that the witness is leaving the hearing room. We ask that all . persons please cooperate with those arrangements with the committee. At this time the committee calls Mr. Azcue. The Chair requests first that the interpreter please stand and be sworn. Sir, do you solemnly swear that the testimony you interpret before the committee will be a truthful and accurate interpretation of the testimony of the witness to the best of your ability? Mr. ANTHONY J. HErRvas. I do. Chairman Stokes. Thank you. I would ask that the witness be Sworn. Mr. Azcue, please raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Senor AzcuE [through the interpreter]. Yes, sir. Chairman Strokes. Thank you. You may be seated. Does counsel desire to be heard prior to the witness testifying? Mr. STANDARD. Yes; with the Chairman’s permission. My name is Michael Standard of the law firm of Rabinowitz, Boudin & Stand- ard of New York. Mr. CORNWELL. Excuse me, Mr. Standard. Would you mind moving the microphone so we can make a record of your state- ment. Mr. STANDARD. For the past 17 years the office has represented the legal interests of the Government of Cuba in the United States. To my immediate left sits Sr. Eusebio Azcue, the witness. To his left sits Sr. Ricardo Escartin, first secretary and consul of the Cuban Interest Section in Washington; and to his left, Capt. Felipe Villa, of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Cuba. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appear here today in two capacities. One, to reflect the view of the Cuban Government that the assassination of President John F. Kennedy 127 was an act of the vilest kind, an act unacceptable by any standards of human and political behavior. Both at the time of the convening of the Warren Commission and today, the Cuban Government has cooperated to the fullest extent in providing what information it has at its disposal to the U.S. authorities investigating the event. Second, to accompany two former consuls of the Republic of Cuba who were present in Mexico City in the period September 1963 through August 1964, both of whom appear today of their own volition, and as a result of the Cuban Government’s decision to provide the Congress of the United States with the testimony of such witnesses as may aid in the process of gathering evidence regarding the assassination. On the day following the assassination, President Castro, in a speech televised to the people of Cuba, and devoted exclusively to the implications for his country, said, and I quote: It is in the interest of the American people and all the people of the world that it be known, that it be demanded what is really behind the Kennedy assassination, that all the facts be revealed. On April 3, 1978 members and staff of this committee had an extensive interview with President Fidel Castro in Havana. Presi- dent Castro made it abundantly clear, and I quote from the tran- script of the interview: We are very much interested in having Kennedy’s assassination clarified because in one way or the other attempts have been made to try to have Cuba involved in it. We have our conscience clear. There is nothing as important as having your con- science clean—absolutely clean. That’s why it is not a matter of conscience, but rather a matter of political, historical interest to have all these problems clarified. It is in that context, and with that hope, that Senors Azcue and Mirabal appear here today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SrToxeEs. Thank you, counsel. The Chair at this time recognizes Mr. Gary Cornwell. TESTIMONY OF SENOR EUSEBIO AZCUE LOPEZ, FORMER CUBAN CONSUL IN MEXICO CITY [The examination of Senor Azcue was conducted through the interpreter. | Mr. CoRNWELL. Would you state your name for the record. Senor Azcue. Eusebio Azcue Lopez. Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, you are presently a resident and a citizen of Cuba, is that correct? Senor AZcuE. Yes, sir. Mr. CORNWELL. What is your age? Senor AZCUE. 67. Mr. CoRNWELL. And where were you born? Senor Azcur. Havana, Cuba. Mr. CoRNWELL. You are presently retired? Senor AzcuE. Yes, sir, I am retired. Mr. CoRNWELL. In 1968, what was your occupation? Senor AzcurE. Consul of Cuba in Mexico, Mexico City. Mr. CoRNWELL. Senor Azcue, when did you first go to live in Mexico prior to 1963? Senor AzcuE. In 1944. 128 Mr. CORNWELL. What was the basic nature of your occupation between that date and 1963? Senor AzcuE. I was an architect in Mexico before the triumph of the revolution. At the time the revolution triumphed, I was re- quested to take charge of the Cuban consulate in Mexico City. Mr. CoRNWELL. For how long a period of time or until what date did you hold that position? Senor AzcuE. Until November 18, 1963, though since the month of September of 1963 I had started to turn over affairs to the new consul who was to replace me, Mr. Alfredo Mirabal. Mr. CoRNWELL. And on November 18, 1963, when you did ulti- mately turn over that position to Senor Mirabal, where did you go? Senor AzcuE. I went directly and definitively to Havana. Mr. CORNWELL. I would like to direct your attention to an exhibit which has been marked for identification as JFK exhibit F-408. That exhibit is provided in an enlargement form, and a photograph of it in a smaller form has been handed to the witness. Can you tell us what type of document that is? Senor AzcuE. This form is a request that was given to foreigners who approached the consulate requesting a visa to travel to Cuba. Mr. CORNWELL. May we have that exhibit admitted into evi- dence, Mr. Chairman? Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered in the record at this point. (The information follows:] 129 ; ~ m.:* oe - f ‘ “j , * ~iehe es SO MSULADO DE CUBA, MEAICO, DF, ra ae . Solicitud ds visa No.: Z #2 ‘. : ad: focho y jeger ds necim.anto: osutsye 3 & a New Sv iectiaes Cake ameeinaansal ——— ledintaiantectincintie 7 - Pasaoortu No. D-O785RS ores a > ~ “s O8b¢ ands Dees Tews eo” LSS UE- ll i Ot ee nnd mn loNo oes oe iS ; , bec tan SS r x 5! } Ld & ‘ ————— ee ee PD eR >> eR ER nee meen y ‘.: . Se =: Sem(npn em pea ai Tovcorets, et nie teae Comer tial EDD tance TORR oe eS | tt - *. meg mea ee Be a aaa RR RRR nena emememnmmnnente ie “ oer ‘es albasonodldas: rédidgaias on Cubc_ ‘ ate ie do Aisdo JFK Exuisit F-408 130 Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, can you tell us, do you recognize that document? Senor AzcuE. Yes; it is a document that we used at the consulate to be completed at the request of the applicant. Mr. CoRNWELL. The document bears the date 1963. Would you tell us what function that document served during that period of time. Senor AzcuE. This document? Mr. CORNWELL. That is correct. Senor AzcuE. We had large amounts of printed forms of this nature, of these applications, and they had to be completed in sextuplicate, that is to say six copies of this document, to which were attached their photographs. They had to affix their signa- tures, as well as provide all the detailed information that was required to accompany the request. Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, this particular document bears the name Lee Harvey Oswald, and the date September 27, 1963. Do you recall the occasion upon which this application was filed with your consulate? Senor AzcurE. Fine. This gentleman wants me to narrate the antecedents of the visits of this individual to the consulate. Is that the nature of the question? Mr. CORNWELL. That is correct. If you recall the occasion on which this specific application was filed, would you describe that occasion for us. Senor AzcuE. Certainly, with pleasure. Yes, this gentleman ap- peared on the date indicated at the consulate, requesting a visa to travel to Cuba. This gentleman was referred to, as was the usual practice in the consulate, to Mrs. Sylvia Duran, a Mexican citizen, who was responsible for handling these contacts with persons ap- plying for such visas. Mr. CoRNWELL. Senor Azcue, in a previous interview with the staff you stated that the very first occasion to your memory on which you saw this individual was 1 to 2 days before the date on this application. Is that still accurate to the best of your memory? Senor AzcuE. It is something that I cannot state categorically. I cannot state whether it was on the very same day, a day before, or several days before, and I am in a position to explain why. Mr. CORNWELL. Please do. Senor AzcurE. He approaches us. The secretary normally takes care of the case. There is no need for me personally to go out to see him unless he specifically requests that I do so, as a special case, that he requests either my presence or the presence of another Cuban consul responsible. He did so. He requested my presence because when he initially formulated the application with the sec- retary, the secretary explained to him all of the requirements that he would have to fulfill in order to obtain the visa. And as he was carrying along certain documents which he believed would be suffi- cient for the visa, and the secretary could not resolve the case, he then calls upon me to see whether I, upon examination of those documents, can proceed to issue the visa immediately. I answered negatively. The documents that he submits are not enough. He is exhibiting or producing documents such as, one, attesting to his membership 131 in the U.S. Communist Party. Also another indicating that he is a member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Also another docu- ment indicating his residence in the Soviet Union, as well as a marriage certificate to a Soviet citizen. Upon presentation of these documents, he thinks that I will be able to solve his problem and grant him a visa. I at that time tell him that this is not sufficient; that I must request authorization from the Cuban Government. And at that point he agrees to proceed to fill the application out in order to process the visa. At that point, he leaves the consulate, conceivably to look for some photographs. One could think whether he returned on that very same date with the photographs; it is possible that he might have returned on that very same date with the photographs, or _ that he might have returned the following day. As far as the date that appears herein, and bearing in mind that I received him on three occasions, maybe it would be possible to determine that on this very same date, it is possible, I cannot fully guarantee this, it is possible that on that same day he might have made the first two visits to the consulate; one during the morning very early, and the second one a little later, bringing the photo- graphs in order to complete the application. There is a sufficient time for such a thing. Mr. CoRNWELL. Was the first visit of this man that you have just described to us during the normal working hours at the consulate? Senor Azcuk. Yes, without a doubt. The consulate opened at 10 in the morning and closed at 2. Mr. CoRNWELL. Directing your attention, then, to the second occasion on which, as you have just described, the individual re- turned with photographs which could be attached to the visa appli- cation, what occurred on that second occasion? Senor AzcuE. I did not assist. I was not present at the very time when the secretary receives the photograph and fills the docu- ments. That is a function that pertains properly to her. He very probably insisted once again on the need to proceed urgently to Cuba or to transit Cuba. As the amount of time required to process this document by our own Government was one that I could not predetermine, it could be a matter of 15 days, 20 days, or the response could be negative, during this second visit that he makes to me I bring up or note that if he already had a visa to go to the Soviet Union, I would be in a position to grant him a visa to Cuba without the need to consult my Government, in terms of a transit to the Soviet Union. This should have been clearly stated or established during the course of the second visit that he made. Whether it might have been on the same day or 2 days thereafter, I tend to believe that it will have been on the date that appears on the application, that is to say on the 27th. Mr. CORNWELL. So the second occasion that you have just de- scribed would have been the date on the visa application, Septem- ber 27, is that correct? Senor AzcuE. That is very correct. Mr. CoRNWELL. At the termination of the conversation on this occasion, what if anything did the individual do? 132 Senor AzcuE. I believe, and this is something I think, that he left or withdrew from the consulate, and we can imagine or conclude that he attempted to obtain a visa from the Soviet Union, because he was a resident of the Soviet Union and he was married to a Soviet citizen, according to what he stated. Mr. CoRNWELL. After he left on this second occasion, did you have any conversations with the Soviet Embassy about this rou- tine, in other words, about the possibility of him obtaining a visa from the Soviet Embassy? Senor AzcuE. I don’t know whether it was that very same day or on the following day. A few years have gone by since, and it is very difficult to determine or recall exactly the manner in which the events occurred exactly. It is possible to reconstruct a sequence. It could have been that very same day or the following day. But obviously if the first two visits took place on the 27th, the third visit would have had to take place on the following day, because in and during the same day it is not possible to complete three visits that are separated by time, and at the same time to undertake the necessary actions to obtain the photographs we needed. In fact, after he left the consulate, I received a telephone call from the consulate of the Soviet Union. I cannot guarantee wheth- er it was on that very same day or on the following day. But whatever day it might have been, the consulate of the Soviet Union gets in touch with me over the phone. And the consul tells me that apparently the documents that he is exhibiting or producing attest- ing to his residence in the Soviet Union and his marriage certifi- cate with the Soviet citizen are apparently legal, are correct, and he believes that they are correct. But without a doubt he cannot issue the visa without consulting Moscow. Consequently, I cannot, in turn, grant him a visa to transit Cuba without consulting the Government. That was the content of my telephone conversation with the Soviet consulate. Mr. CoRNWELL. After that conversation, did you again see the individual, did he return to the consulate? Senor AzcuE. Yes, sir. That was the third and last time I saw him. He possibly thinking that his documents had been legalized orally, verbally, that I would consequently change my attitude and in view of the legality of the document would grant him the visa; these were his hopes. And in addition one noticed that he was very anxious that we grant him the visa, because we never had any individual that was so insistent or persistent, in spite of our refus- als which were logical and legal. Mr. CoRNWELL. Did all three of these visits occur during normal working hours at the consulate? Senor AzcuE. We never received anybody, any individual, outside these regular office hours. Mr. CorRNWELL. As I understood your testimony, the first visit may or may not have been on September 27. The second visit was most probably on September 27. And the third visit would have been most probably on a day afterward, is that correct? Senor AzcuE. That is correct. I believe that on the 27th, that was the day that the application was completed. I have no doubt about it: 133 The first visit, however, could have been that very same day, earlier in the day. And the third visit could have taken place the following day or could have been on the same 27th if the first visit had taken place on the 26th. But my private opinion, the first two visits took place on the 27th and the last one, after my conversation with the Soviet consul, was on the following day, that is to say September 238. I believe this would be the most reasonable thing if one were to analyze it. Mr. CORNWELL. September 27, 1963, was a Friday. Does that mean that the third visit could have occurred on the following Saturday? Senor AzcuE. On Saturday, exactly. Mr. CORNWELL. The consulate was open on Saturday. Senor Azcur. Saturday morning—not open to the public. Mr. CORNWELL. Would you tell us how the conversation on the third visit ended. Senor Azcur. He had great hopes that I would grant him the visa in transit. When I[ told him no, that if the Soviet Union does. not grant him the visa as destination of his trip, I cannot grant him an in-transit visa to Cuba without consulting my government. He always had a face which reflected unhappiness. He was never friendly. He was persistent. And he was not pleasant. So on the last visit, when he loses the opportunity to obtain the visa, he gets very worked up. And then in English, which is a language that I have not full command, and all our conversations took place in English, and with great effort on my part because it is a language that I do not have full command of, but I do hear him make statements that are directed against us, and he accuses us of being bureaucrats, and in a very discourteous manner. At that point I also become upset and I tell him to leave the consulate, maybe somewhat violently or emotionally. Then he leaves the consulate, and he seems to be mumbling to himself, and he slams the door, also in a very discourteous manner. That was the last time we saw him around. Mr. CoRNWELL. Was he with anyone on any of these occasions? Senor AzcuE. With my colleague, Mirabal, who probably was always with me, because I was together with him. I was the exiting consul and he was the new consul. I am handling this case because I had a better knowledge of the English language than he did. But we were both handling the case, he in order to become more familiar with the situation and I also in order to train him. So this was a colleague of mine who saw him, how many times I don’t know, whether on one or two or all three occasions; he was a colleague who was present there, and I know that he also saw him. And in addition to Consul Mirabal, he was also seen by the secretary, because she was the one who took care of his application. The three of us were the only ones who were able to see Oswald, nobody else. He could not have seen anybody else, because the business that brought him to us was one that was of the exclusive responsibility of the consulate. And therein the only ones present were the three of us. 134 Mr. CorRNWELL. Was the individual who came to your consulate on these three occasions accompanied by any other persons? Did anyone come with him? Senor AzcuE. I never saw. The private area of the consulate, from this private area it is difficult to observe who comes in from the street. My secretary from the chancery, maybe she was able to see. But whenever I emerged from that area, and to the chancery, I always saw him alone. Mr. CoRNWELL. Did he say anything in any of the conversations with you which would have indicated that he either had a compan- ion with him in Mexico City or that he knew any persons who lived in Mexico City? Senor AzcuE. No, never. We did not hold any conversations other than those directly related to the visa. Mr. CoRNWELL. If I could direct your attention again to the JFK exhibit F-408, I would like to ask you first, was the document signed in your presence? Senor AzcuE. No. It is not necessary. It is never necessary. This is a document that is provided to him by the secretary. It is filled in by the secretary. She affixes the photograph, turns it over to him, and right there he signs, until it is sent, forwarded to Cuba, through the pouch. Mr. CORNWELL. Would it have been necessary, under the usual custom and practice of your office at that time, for the document to have been signed on the premises of the consulate? Senor AzcurE. This document or this application does not leave the desk of the secretary. She types it out and places the photo- graph, places the seal, and hands it over for the individual’s signa- ture. Mr. CORNWELL. You told us earlier that the normal procedure for the preparation of such applications was that more than one copy of the document was made, is that correct? Senor AzcuE. Yes, six. Six photographs, six signatures, and six copies of the application is complete. Mr. CORNWELL. Do you feel certain about your memory today as to the number of copies that are made or were made in 1963? Senor Azcur. Yes, absolutely. There was never an exception made. They come already together in a bunch. Mr. CORNWELL. The copies as opposed to the original, the carbon copies, were they signed separately or was the carbon paper used to transfer a signature from one to the other? Senor AzcuE. No, one by one, because the paper is very thick. This is mimeograph-type paper. Chairman Strokes. Will counsel suspend for a moment? I think this would be an appropriate place for us to take a 5-minute recess at this time. The Chair requests that as the witness departs from the room, that all persons remain in their seats please until the witness has left the room after which we will have a 5-minute recess. [A brief recess was taken.] Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order. All persons in the hearing room are requested to remain in their seats while the witness is being brought in to the witness table. The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. Cornwell. 135 Mr. CoRNWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before we begin again, I believe that we neglected to have the interpreter identify himself for the record. Would you do so? Mr. Hervas. My name is Anthony J. H-e-r-v-a-s. Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you. Senor Azcue, I would like at this time to show you JFK exhibit F-407. For the record, that would appear to be a carbon copy of the previous JFK exhibit F-408. The previous JFK exhibit, F-408, is a photograph of a visa application which the staff of this committee took while they were in Cuba this year. It was taken of a document which was provided to us by the Cuban Government in an original form. We were allowed to inspect the original and to photograph it. The exhibit which we just placed on the easel, JFK F-407, is a photograph of a visa application which was provided to the Warren Commission in 1964 by the Cuban Government. As you can tell, the writing on JFK F-407 appears to be somewhat displaced on the lines; part of it sitting directly on top of lines instead of resting over them as you would expect, and otherwise its content appears to be virtually identical to 408. Would the two documents in that form have been expected, based upon the usual procedures in effect at the consulate in 1963? Mr. Hervas. May I ask a question? Did you say would the two documents have been expected or inspected? Mr. CoRNWELL. Expected to be in that form with those type of variations based upon the procedures in effect at the consulate in 1963? Senor AzcuE. Do you have some other copy of the actual size that I could be able to look at or analyze because from this distance it is for me very difficult to see the exhibit on the easel. Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, would you like to go to the easel to get a better picture of the blowups? Do the representatives from the National Archives have a small photograph of that document with them here today? OK, we do have a smaller photograph we will show the witness. It is also marked for identification as JFK F-407. Senor AzcuE. As I stated before, the paper on which the applica- tion is printed is a very thick or heavy paper. So it is not possible to prepare six copies at one time, not even three in an ordinary typewriter such as the one Sylvia Duran had in the consulate. Conceivably, she prepared them two at a time, an original and one copy, an original and one copy, an original and one copy. So conceivably it is possible that there be some differences be- tween some of them, between three, for instance. Mr. CoRNWELL. But at any rate your examination of the two documents would indicate that JFK F-407 is a carbon copy of the original JFK-408; is that correct? Senor AzcuE. I am not an expert on these matters, but any one of you could—and I cannot see very well either and the quality of the copy is not very clear. However, in looking at these two docu- ments I note that the words appear exactly one on top of the other in both documents in the same places. 136 So, consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude that the copy, that the second exhibit constitutes a copy of the first one. It would be very difficult to place them in separate. In spite of my limitations, I believe I can affirm that this one is the original and this other one is the copy. One does notice, if one analyzes the margin on the right side, that the text on both copies coincides perfectly one with the other. That is very difficult to do otherwise. Mr. CorNWELL. Senor Azcue, the pictures on the upper lefthand portion of each document would appear to be of the same individu- al; is that correct? Senor AZcUuE. Yes, sir. Mr. CorRNWELL. Do those pictures of that individual appear to you to be the same individual who visited the consulate in Mexico City on the occasions you have previously described to us? Senor AzcurE. Truly, this photograph is one that I saw for the first time when the honorable U.S. committee members came to Cuba in April of this year, and I was surprised that I believe that it was not the same person. Fifteen years had gone by so it is very difficult for me to be in a position to guarantee it in a categorical form. But my belief is that this gentleman was not, is not, the person or the individual who went to the consulate. Mr. CoRNWELL. Directing your attention to the period of time immediately after the assassination, the day of the assassination or the day after the assassination, did you during that period of time have an occasion to see pictures of the alleged assassin in the newspapers or to observe on television the man identified at that time as Lee Harvey Oswald? . Senor AZcuE. Yes, sir, not so close to the date, not in the first few days, not immediately thereafter. Some time I calculate ap- proximately—and I say this because I am not a great movie fan, but it was in mid-December approximately—I saw at that time the film in which Ruby appears assassinating the Oswald who was there, and I was not able to identify him and only 2 months had gone by since I had seen the Oswald who appeared at the consul- ate. And I had a clear mental picture because we had had an unpleasant discussion and he had not been very pleasant to me and I did not recognize when I first saw him. I did not recognize Oswald. The man who went to the consulate was a man over 30 years of age and very thin, very thin faced. And the individual I saw in the movie was a young man, considerably younger, and a fuller face. Mr. CORNWELL. What color hair did the individual have to the best of your memory who visited the consulate? Senor AzcuE. He was blond, dark blond. Mr. CoRNWELL. Did the individual you saw in the movie, the person who was killed by Jack Ruby, resemble more closely the individual in these photographs to your memory than the individu- al who visited the consulate? Senor AzcuE. I believe so. Mr. CoRNWELL. I would like to show you JFK exhibit F-434. Do the representatives from the National Archives have the original or a small photograph of that exhibit? 137 While they are looking, Mr. Chairman, I believe we neglected to ask that JFK exhibit F-407 be admitted into evidence. Chairman StToxkEs. Without objection it may be entered into evi- dence. 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(Sh: } (Mo: ) ton que ebjutol — me ae eR ree ee te re tc ete evel <: st mot.wo gabavicie propussic Ls lenetiadlliainettttaiiedineeitealineaneintion tienteninennan a neelienaneateendiancmsaaninsiieeinemman RT Aa ee eee oe te ne + age o- cthnwdbe-~ seme te anki Covietmer (=> i sbiiaeimecanenvinign ee ee en oe ee en oe EIR cent a ee Suche proa-ctia ds 9 qlee FWes conte nes SAR eis DirgcesSn * Ldbat Secale Ee tae gee Wes > Fs CBE echo $ = JFK Exnuisit F-407 Mr. CoRNWELL. That is a passport. May we have that exhibit admitted into evidence, Mr. Chairman, JFK F-434? Chairman STOKES. Without objection it may be entered into evi- dence. [The information follows:] 138 AIO Tae ee ~ , 22 > a 5 ‘aI 7 : > WARNING-—ALTERATION, ADDITION OR MUTILATION OF ENTRIES 13 PROHIBITED oa —————_ ANY UNorricial CHANGE WILL RENDER Tuts Passport INVALID. . NAME . : “ar as va *33 \ oc ne t+ ~ 1 tte fast i VEY ube Pats Vie be ee ee ass ee See eS mirth) OATE TMAURTHPLACE e - yt Au sep aDistiiis A Oi ee ease as ieadeiiea . UC TOOER. hse tt Eves yarns G yoo SSUE DATE eT 1) ae tr Sy 2, PASSPORT RENEWAL | -» IMPORTANT: Uniess Oruerwise Limitep Tuis Passport Expires Taexg Years From Issut Date. Ir Renewen, It Expires Fryvz Years From Issur Dare. ar RAP AS Soe ee, . Sahat ae WS: : e : 4 ee SS. Sane : SAY “aN aa ~ aay Redaad Sata ) ~ < ~ SSN P s YY | bead ek << e NAN wWthas we - e s Ss » yess NE. SATE CN SS A AEA LE LITE IN L MOS ETT LEN OS RE TREE VOTRE SET hE me 5 JFK Exuisit F-434 Mr. CoRNWELL. Did the individual who visited the consulate look like that individual? Senor AzcuE. No. Mr. CORNWELL. What differences were there? Senor AzcuE. Many differences. The individual who visited the consulate is one whose physiognomy or whose face I recall very clearly. He had a hard face. He had very straight eyebrows, cold, hard, and straight eyes. His cheeks were thin. His nose was very straight and pointed. This gentleman looks like he is somewhat heavier, more filled, his eyes are at an angle with the outside of his 139 eye, at an angle with his face. I would have never identified him or recognized him. I believe I can recall with fairly good accuracy the individual in such a way that I could recognize him now in a group of 100, that is better than a photograph of him because obviously during a period of 15 years he might change. I think I could recognize him, and this is not him. Mr. CORNWELL. We would like to show you what has been previ- ously admitted into evidence in this case as Exhibit 194. As you can see, Senor Azcue, the pictures on the right are simply blowups of the same visa application, but I would like to direct your atten- tion to the two pictures on the left which come from photographs taken by the Dallas Police Department. I ask you if that individual looks like the man who visited the consulate? Senor AzcuE. I would have never recognized him as I did not recognize him in the movie where he dies, and I can, however, identify him as or think of him as the person who was killed or assassinated by Ruby. It is a question of personal evaluation on my part. But it is very clearly imprinted. Mr. CORNWELL. The staff of the committee has had an opportuni- ty to speak to Mrs. Sylvia Duran, and during the interview with her she expressed no doubt about the fact that the person who was killed in Dallas by Jack Ruby was the individual who visited the consulate. Do you have any reason to question her memory or the reason that her memory might differ from yours? Senor AzcuE. Categorically, I could not affirm it without any doubt. However, it is possible that she might be more susceptible to _impression or more impressionable than I. I remember what I saw on the film and also what I saw on TV later or maybe before. I remember that moment when he was killed and I remember I did not recognize him. I did not have any prejudices or preconceptions. I wanted to recognize, however, only 2 months had gone by. It was between September and November. At that time I was much younger. That was 15 years ago, and I think that because of my own profession I probably had better eyes. And because of the impression that was made by this person who visited the consulate, for these reasons, maybe my version is correct or more correct. Mr. CoRNWELL. Thank you. I have no further questions. Chairman Stokes. At this point the procedure will be as follows: The Chair will recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, chairman of the Kennedy subcommittee, Mr. Preyer, for such time as he may consume, after which the committee will operate under the 5-minute rule. The Chair recognizes Mr. Preyer. Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Azcue, it is good to see you again. As I understand it, at the time Lee Harvey Oswald visited the consul in Mexico there were three people who could have seen him: yourself, Sylvia Duran and Mr. Mirabal. Is that correct? Senor AzcuE. That is correct. Mr. Preyer. And you were the consul at that time and Mr. Mirabal was in training to replace you as consul? 140 Senor AzcuE. I would say it was the opposite. The consul who was already functioning as such was Mirabal. From the very time he arrived as a designated consul. When the consul arrives—of course, there could be two or three consuls—but when the consul arrives, he takes over the functions, the responsibilities, and I was turning over the official business of the consulate to him. Mr. Preyer. What I was getting at was, you had been the consul before Mr. Mirabal arrived? Senor AzcuE. Yes. Mr. Preyer. Mr. Mirabal came to replace you as consul? Senor AZcuE. Yes. | Mr. Preyer. At the time of the assassination on November 22, you were no longer in Mexico and Mr. Mirabal remained as the consul at that time; is that correct? Senor AzcuE. I had already returned to Cuba and Mirabal had assumed the position of consul there alone. Mr. Preyer. You returned to Cuba, as I understand it, on No- vember 18, which was, of course, after your encounters with Oswald and before the assassination; is that correct? Senor AzcuE. That was the case. I returned on November 18. Mr. Preyer. Did your return to Cuba have anything to do with your encounters with Oswald or did it have anything to do with the assassination of President Kennedy? Senor AzcueE. It was not related to any of those things. I re- turned to Cuba because all of my family was already there. As of June of that year I had been awaiting a consul to replace me because I already had a son studying in Havana and a son working there and already in June they had given me permission to return permanently to Cuba. I was not able to return before because they were not sending me a consul to replace me, and the reason I did not leave immediately upon Mr. Mirabal’s arrival was, first, because I had to train him. He did not have any experience in the handling of consular affairs there, and, second, because there was a meeting or congress of consuls being held at that time and I was asked to stay. This was because of my connections developed over the 5 years that I had spent there. Mr. Preyer. So that it is fair to sum up your answer by saying you were not recalled by the Cuban Government, but, you, at your request, returned to Cuba? Mr. Hervas. Excuse me, sir, did you say at your wish? Mr. PREYER. Yes, at his wish. Senor AzcuE. I cannot say it was at my wish exclusively. I need the permission of the Government of Cuba, but I had requested my return in June because, as I noted previously, my sons were back in Havana. One was already working. One was studying there. I was then alone in Mexico with my smaller daughter, and I also wanted her to study in Cuba. I wanted to return there. Mr. Preyer. I would like to turn to the visa application, the JFK exhibit F-408, for a moment. In the middle of that document, over on the right-hand side, there is a printed date that says October 10, 1963. I don’t believe there has been any discussion about that as yet. Could you tell us what that date is? 141 Senor AzcuE. I will relate the manner in which I believe that appeared. We sent, of the six copies of the application with photo- graphs, five to Havana. Those are distributed by the Ministry of | Foreign Affairs to different organizations in government, different | entities, and these receive different copies of the document. Immi- gration possibly receives two copies. The Interior Ministry receives a copy. Each organization receiving a copy might possibly stamp |the date of receipt of the document on such a document. One organization in this case must have stamped that date on the document. On the other document, the organization probably did not have its routine practice to date such document because it was |not a rigid requirement. |p no PREYER. So that this was a date stamped on the document in _ Cuba. 1 Senor AzcuE. I believe that that is so, because if we received the |reapplication on 27th, we never hold on to or retain, in order to || protect the interest of the applicant, the document for such a long || period of time before forwarding it to Cuba. We will be mailing it in the next mail departure, 2 or 3 days at most, and this date, | October 10, corresponds more closely to what I had just indicated, | that is, to the distribution of the correspondence to the different |, entities, where they are supposed to receive copies of this docu- ment, that is, 13 days thereafter. Mr. PREYER. So it does not indicate that Lee Harvey Oswald was | in Mexico on October 10. Senor Azcur. No; in no manner. He never returned to the con- sulate. We never saw him again. This date is completely independ- _ ent of Mr. Oswald. This is an internal matter. Mr. Preyer. Looking again at this document, the visa application | form, doesn’t it indicate on this form how long Oswald wanted to stay in Cuba? | Senor AzcuE. Here it should be stated. Sometimes we included it, 2 weeks, and, if possible, a longer period of time. _ Mr. Preyer. Does it also indicate when Oswald wanted to leave _ for Cuba? Pia) F AzcuE. Proposed date : of arrival in Cuba, September 30, _ Mr. Preyer. That was just 3 days after he applied for the visa, and I believe you have testified earlier today that you had never seen anyone so persistent in seeking a visa. Did Oswald tell you why he was in such a hurry to get to Cuba? Senor AzcuE. None whatsoever. He arrived there convinced that with the documents that he exhibited at the time, I would issue the visa immediately, and one can analyze the fact that if he had a great need to go to the Soviet Union, he would have chosen the shortest route, and that was not through Cuba. Mr. PreyER. But he gave you no explanation of why he was in such a hurry, why he was so anxious to go to Cuba? Senor AzcukE. I do not recall it, and it is hard to find a reason- able explanation, because if he is in a hurry, he can go through any other country. Mr. Preyer. Down in the right-hand corner of the visa applica- tion there is a signature. | Is that your signature? 41-372 O - 79 - 10(Vol. 3) 142 Senor AzcuE. No. Mr. Preyer. Is it Sylvia Duran’s signature? Senor AzcuE. It is a signature, and we have been able to check it thereafter, of Alfredo Mirabal, who, as I have already mentioned earlier, he already was empowered as a consul. He had already been named or appointed consul. Mr. PREYER. So it is Mr. Mirabal’s signature. Just above that signature there is a section, a printed section, that has the title “Observations.” Now you have testified, in general, as to what those observations were, but I wonder if you could read out loud for us, for the sake of the record, what that section says. Senor AzcurE. The applicant states that he is a member of the U.S. Communist Party and also the secretary of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans, and that he lived in the Soviet Union from October 1959, that he is married to a Soviet citizen. He showed documents certifying that he was a member of the organi- zations mentioned, as well as a marriage certificate. He went to the Soviet Embassy in this city requesting that his visa be forwarded to their embassy in Cuba. We called the Soviet consulate, and they responded that they had to obtain, they have to await authorization from Moscow to issue the visa, and that it would take approximately 4 months. This is the very same thing I told the members of your commit- tee in Havana in April without having seen this document before. Mr. Preyer. This section of the application was not filled in by you? Senor AzcuE. No, no, I had never seen it. This was made or prepared by Sylvia Duran, and it was signed by Mirabal, as it appears here. I repeat once again that the first time I saw this document was when the committee showed it to me in April. Mr. Preyer. Is there anything in those observations that would make you think that the person who wrote them believed that Oswald would be given a visa? Senor Azcur. Probably no, this is something that is written or addressed to Cuba, all of the information that we can provide Cuba, but we do not prejudge what Cuba is going to determine, even if we may have an interest in seeing something resolved. Mr. Preyer. Incidentally, to clear up one point on that, I believe you testified this morning that you initiated the call to the Soviet Embassy. No, I’m afraid I have that just reversed. I believe this morning you testified that it was the Soviet Embassy that called you, but in tbe observations it states you initiated the call to the Soviet Em- assy. Would you like to clarify that point? Senor AzcueE. It is relatively easy, I believe, if one analyzes it. Conceivably, I was under the impression that the Soviet Embassy had called me because I was told to pick up the telephone. I did not call. It is possible, however, that at Oswald’s request, Sylvia might have called the Embassy and then would have transferred the call to me, and thereafter I was under the impression that it was the Soviet Embassy that had called me, and I was always under that 143 impression. But it is possible that she might have initiated the call and thereafter transferred the call to me. Mr. PREYER. One final question. Going back to the observations written on the bottom of the application, written by Sylvia Duran, in your opinion, did Sylvia Duran ever pressure you to grant the visa or encourage you to grant the visa to Oswald? Senor AzcuE. She, the poor woman, was in no position to pres- sure me. She might have been in a position to make a personal recommendation, and the recommendation was not a personal matter. Yet she might have believed that because of the fact that he was ‘a resident in the Soviet Union and he was a member of the North American Communist Party, she might have believed that we ‘might have been in a position to make an exception, but this is |simply as a comment, a possible comment. She did not exert pres- sure or any such thing. Mr. Preyer. Did she make any personal recommendation or did she evidence any unusual interest in Oswald’s case? | Senor Azcue. No; she might have thought that we might be in a position to grant him a visa because of his personal conditions or /circumstances, not for any reason of friendship. It wasn’t any such thing. She never spoke again about him, nor did we ever speak about him. As in the case of many of the hundreds of applicants ‘who come through a consulate, we see them at that time, and thereafter we never remember them again or discuss them again. _And if it hadn’t been for the unfortunate incident, I would have by now completely forgotten about this gentleman. -Mr. Preyer. After Oswald visited you the first time, that visit ‘ended when you sent him out to have a photograph taken, as | understand it. Was there a place nearby where he could have had the photo- graph taken? _ Senor AzcusE. Yes, yes, about four or five blocks away in a street enown as Calzada de Tacubaya. There are photographic studios. Possibly Sylvia might have pointed out to him where he could obtain the photographs, or maybe he already had the photos. _ Mr. Preyer. Well, in the photographs on the application, and |also in the passport, Oswald appears to have on a tie and a sweat- er. How was he dressed when he came to the Embassy, to the consulate? _ Senor AzcugE. I always imagine him or visualize him as wearing a suit, coat and pants, trousers, with a pattern of crossed lines, not very clear design. Blue, some reddish. I never conceived of him or visualized him wearing a light sweater. _ When I saw this photograph in April of this year, I also noticed that the clothing he was wearing was not the same. Mr. PrrEYER. So that the clothing he was wearing in the photo- graphs was not similar to that which he was wearing when he actually visited you in the Embassy. Senor AzcuE. I am almost in a position to assure that. Mr. Preyer. When he returned with the photographs and with his application, visa application form, and his passport pictures, 144 would you have looked at the pictures on the visa application and on the passport? Senor AzcuE. No, I did not see the photograph, nor did I witness the preparation of the form. I did not see the photograph at that time. I only saw this photograph last April, when they came to Cuba. Mr. PREYER. So that at the time of processing his visa and the passport, you never looked at the photographs, you never compared them with the man standing before you. Senor AzcuE. No, I was never present during the preparation of this form nor of the affixing of the photograph. And it is also signed by Mirabal. And in the normal course of business this is a matter that goes to Cuba. It is generally kept until it is prepared for shipment in the next plane, outgoing plane, and there was no reason for me to go back searching for this form. Mr. PReYER. You have indicated to us that you don’t believe the man whose photograph appears on the visa application and the passport was the same man who appeared before you in the consul- ate. Have you ever seen a photograph of the man you believed to have appeared before you in the consulate? Senor AzcuE. Never. I shall explain. The committee brought to me an album with many photographs. I shall try to explain. It is very possible that amongst all of those photographs which were made available to us by those persons who took pictures of every person that went near the consulate or the Embassy and that were contained in those that I was shown, it is very difficult when I consider all of the photos that I saw, that anyone could escape being photographed if he approached the consulate during working hours, that is, escape without having his photograph taken. It would be easy for them, having at hand the photographs and the dates, to facilitate or make available the photograph of the person who went to the consulate, be it the decedent or the dead man or the other person that I think I saw went to the consulate. It is indeed curious that they did not provide that photograph, because if it were the same man, you would have recognized him in that photograph. And if I remembered the face, I would have Spee ae it amongst those photos. And there was no photo of either. This is very curious, that something like that should happen, especially among individuals or men who are so efficient and who spied on our consulate and our Embassy. Mr. Preyer. I would like to ask if we could have exhibit 437 displayed. Mr. Azcue, I will ask if that is a picture of you in Cuba looking through the album of photographs which the committee made available to you. Senor AzcuE. Right. That is a photograph of myself with the photo album that you provided me. Mr. Preyer. And I believe you recognized none of the photo- graphs in that album as being the man whom you feel you saw in the Embassy. Have you ever seen that man again, the man who you believe you saw in the consulate? Senor AzcuE. No, never. This is what I stated before. Mr. PReEYER. I believe you said that the man who signed the visa application did not sign it in your presence, as far as you recall. 145 Senor AzcuE. No; the secretary is the one who takes care of all of this. And we are normally in our private office while she is having the applicant provide the information and fill the forms and attaching the photograph. During all of that time we are in our offices working. Mr. Preyer. If analysis of that handwriting, of that signature on the visa application showed it to be Lee Harvey Oswald’s signature, would you still believe that the man who visited you in the consul- ate was not Oswald? Senor Azcur. Under such circumstances I would have to accept that I was being influenced or that I was seeing visions. Mr. Preyer. Mr. Chairman, I am at a point now at which there are two other areas that I wanted to ask Mr. Azcue some questions. It will probably take about 15 minutes. Would you prefer to go forward or to recess until after lunch at this time? First, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that JFK exhibit F-437 be admitted into evidence at this point. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this point. [The information follows:] 146 dey eth Tac gee negate oe Coe%nB~e: ‘i es Ble ee Pee 3 re io RD Ee AFAG AAD la ENS 5s Sate teas ea >* JFK Exuisit F-437 Chairman Stokes. The Chair thinks this is a good time for us to take a recess. Accordingly, the committee will recess until 2 p.m. this afternoon. I request at this time that all persons remain in their seats until the witness has been escorted from the hearing room, after which we will declare a recess. (Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., a recess was taken until 2 p.m.] 147 AFTERNOON: SESSION Chairman STokKEs. The committee will come to order. _. All persons in the hearing room are requested to take their seats and to remain seated while the witness is being brought into the room and to the witness table. Thereafter you may move about if you please, but then once again, whenever the witness departs the room, you are also further requested to remain in your seats for security purposes. You may bring the witness in. The Chair at this time recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer, for such time as he may further consume. TESTIMONY OF EUSEBIO AZCUE—(Resumed) Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask that JFK exhibit F-428 be placed on the easel, please. Do we have JFK exhibit F-428? In the earlier testimony that was read to the committee today from Sylvia Duran, mention was made of a newspaper article by a reporter named Comer Clark which appeared in an American paper. This is a copy of that article. I would like to read you about the first five or six paragraphs of that article, Mr. Azcue, and get your comments upon it. I would suggest to the translator that I might read by sections of it and give you a copy of the article and you can translate it directly, in the interest of time. The article reads in the first paragraph, it begins in quotation marks: _ “Yes, I heard of Lee Harvey Oswald’s plan to kill President Kennedy. It’s possible that I could have saved him. “T might have been able to—but I didn’t. I never believed the plan would be put into effect.” These were the dramatic words spoken to me by Cuba’s Prime Minister Fidel Castro in Havana on July 15. “Lee Oswald came to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City twice,’ Castro went on. The first time—I was told—he wanted to work for us. “He was asked to explain, but he wouldn't. “He wouldn’t go into details. “The second time he said he wanted to ‘free Cuba from American imperialism.’ “Then he said something like: ‘Someone ought to shoot that President Kennedy.’ “Then Oswald said—and this was exactly how it was reported to me—‘Maybe I'll try to do it.’ “This was less than 2 months before the U.S. President was assassinated.” Mr. Azcue, would you comment on that statement? Senor AzcuE. I have already commented to you, in the course of previous conversations, that Mr. Oswald did not see nor could he have seen, either at the consulate or the Embassy, any persons or individuals other than we. He did not have any contact other than contact with us, consul Mirabal, I as consul, and Sylvia Duran as a secretary. He did not mention any such thing to any of us, and much less would we have passed this information on to Fidel. So I see no way in which our Commander in Chief could have been aware of a conversation that Oswald says he held with one of our agents. The only agents present were those three I have men- tioned—the two consuls and the secretary. 148 First of all, I would have never tolerated a conversation of that nature because, without any doubt, that would have constituted a provocation, and we do not allow ourselves to be provoked, and our revolution never dealt with anything related to terrorism, much less so the death of President Kennedy. What would become of us should we have intervened? This is ridiculous that we should attempt to walk into the mouth of the lion, and this has been repeatedly asserted by our Commander in Chief. We have never used terrorism. We have never supported terrorism, and we have never even supported terrorism even in those cases in which we sympathize with the views of those who did practice it. Mr. PREYER. So that the man who appeared before you in the consulate did not say these words as set out in the article, nor anything that sounded like those words. Senor AZcuE. I repeat once again that I would not have tolerated it because I would have taken this as a provocation, and our’) behavior in this context is extraordinarily clear and clean. Mr. Preyer. Moving to another area, Mr. Azcue, Sylvia Duran | and her husband often entertained, I believe, in Mexico City. Did you socialize with the Durans from time to time? Did you attend their parties? Senor AzcuE. Yes; in Mexico naturally it is a custom to have social gatherings in the home of one or another friend. They did © host them, not as frequently as the question you have formulated would imply, but they did, and I in turn have attended some of those gatherings, and I believe that whenever they did have a party, they always invited me because I was very friendly to both. Mr. PreYER. Do you know if they had any parties in September of 19638; that is, the time when Lee Harvey Oswald was in Mexico? Senor AzcuE. It is possible, but it is difficult that they would have held such a party without inviting me, a person that was so | close to them. And I recall that the last gathering that I attended at the Duran home was one that was carried out in order to bid me farewell in preparation for my return to Cuba, and it was during | the month of November, a few days before my departure from Mexico. Mr. PreEYER. Do you know Elena Garro de Paz? Senor AzcurE. Yes. I have seen her on some occasions in the | home of one of her sisters, whose husband is a Mexican painter, | Horacio, whose name is Guerrero Galvan, and who was a friend of | mine. be PREYER. I believe her husband is Octavio Paz, the Mexican © poet: : Senor AzcuE. Yes, Octavio Paz, who was also Mexican Ambassa- dor to Paris and a distinguished poet, was her husband at the time I met her. Mr. Preyer. Elena Garro de Paz was a friend of the Durans and also a friend of yours, I believe; is that correct? - Senor AzcuE. That is correct; yes. She was related to Horacio uran. Mr. Preyer. And did I understand you to say that the painter, Guerrero Galvan—is that the way you pronounce that?—was a 149 pichy of yours and was married to the sister of Elena Garro de az! Senor AzcuE. Exactly. Mr. Preyer. Perhaps I should get the blackboard out and draw | some lines to spell out the family tree there. But let me just sum up by asking: You knew Elena Garro de Paz fairly well? Senor Azcur. Not very well. I have met her on two, maybe three opportunities because she was living at that time in her sister’s home, the home of Mrs. Guerrero Galvan, the home that I used to visit with a certain frequency, but we were not intimate friends. It was simply a social acquaintance. | Mr. Preyer. Would you describe her as an emotionally stable || person? Senor Azcur. She appeared to me to be a delicate person, a | refined person, a cultured writer. || Mr. Preyer. Did she have what we might call a vivid imagina- || tion about things other than her writing? Senor AzcuE. I believe it is very difficult in the course of two or | three visits to be able to fully understand the character of a lady |without being a close or intimate friend, and her writings I have | only read from the standpoint of literary criticism or review. I | would not attempt to make a critical evaluation of her personality | or character because I am not a psychologist. | Mr. Preyer. Let me put it this way. If she told you a story about | something that had happened, would you be apt to believe her? | Senor AzcuE. It would depend on the kind of story she would be | telling me. Mr. Preyer. If she told you something of a serious nature, would | Foti be apt, likely to believe that she would be telling the truth about it? | Senor Azcur. I repeat once again that it will depend on the | subject matter. It depends on the issue itself, not who is telling the story. If it has some viability or credibility, I would accept it. If not, I would not. Mr. Preyer. Did you ever hear that Lee Harvey Oswald had | attended one of the Durans’ parties when he was in Mexico? | } : Senor AzcuE. No, never, and that is one of the things I would not | believe, no matter who would tell me, because I knew the Durans | well, and I knew that this gentleman, I know that this gentleman | who turned up at the consulate to request a visa had no other | activities or purpose while there. He came to the consulate and _ thereafter we never talked about him or saw him any other time. | And I repeat once again that I wouldn’t believe that either Sylvia | or Horacio would host a gathering during those days without invit- _ ing me. | Mr. Preyer. Did you know a man named Emilio Carbellido, a _ Mexican writer, I believe? _ Senor Azcur. Yes, of course, very well known in Mexico. He is a well-known writer, and well known in Cuba also, because he has |visited there repeatedly. Mr. Preyer. Did you ever discuss President Kennedy with Mr. Carbellido? 150 Senor AzcukE. It is my prior practice not to discuss with anyone outside of my own group, members of my own Embassy, or of our own group, any of these issues of foreign policy or policy of other nations. We are very careful regarding our own views, especially in the presence of a gentleman who was not such a great friend of mine. Mr. Preyer. Would Mr. Carbellido have been at the parties or some of the parties that the Durans gave from time to time? Senor AzcuE. It is possible. I do not recall his presence at any specific one, but it is possible that he might have attended. Mr. Preyer. I have asked you some questions earlier, Mr. Azcue, about Miss Elena Garro de Paz, and as to whether you would be likely to believe a story if she told it to you. Miss Garro has told us that on one occasion she was at a party at one of the Durans’ houses, and that you and Oswald were both at the party. She has told us that at another party at one of the Durans’ homes she overheard a conversation in which you and Emilio Carbellido were discussing President Kennedy. She says that at the conclusion of that conversation, you stated that there was no alternative than to kill President Kennedy. Would you care to comment on her allegations? Senor AzcuE. Yes; first, because it is not possible or conceivable in my own mind to kill anyone, much less so the President of the United States, and much more so because of the possible implica- tions or effects upon our own revolution, which I would defend with every effort that I could muster. It would be necessary to ask this lady why she makes such statements; it is incredible. Because, I repeat, I have seen her only two or three times in my whole life, and much earlier than the time when this gentleman showed up at our consulate. With some analysis, I could probably even determine the date of these meetings with her. And I know that the last time I saw her was much before Mirabal arrived at the consulate, and Mirabal arrived on September 2. I can almost fix the date. The previous secretary, the one who preceded Sylvia Duran, was a relative of mine who died on July 19. And I clearly recall that the son of Guerrero Galvan, the painter, who was a student of medicine, was discussing with me the unfortunate death of my secretary, who was, in turn, my relative, as a result of a car accident in a Volkswagen, and he was explaining to me how dan- gerous it was to be in an accident in a Volkswagen because of the shortness of the car and the proximity of the riders to the wind- shield, and it was a date so close to July 19 that he was telling me that, during that same period, those same days, there had been three fatal accidents similar to the one in which my secretary had pepe and that was the last opportunity on which I saw Elena arro. What did they offer Elena Garro to make such absurd state- ments or declarations? Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions at this time. Chairman StToxgEs. The time of the gentleman has expired. nate Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. odd. Mr. Dopp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 151 How are you again? Senor AzcuE. Glad to meet you, sir. Mr. Dopp. I am not going to speak in Spanish. My Spanish isn’t that good. | Could you please tell me, Mr. Azcue, how long you had been the consul in Mexico prior to your departure in November of 1963? | Senor AzcurE. When the revolution achieved its victory, I was appointed consulate the beginning of January 1959. Thereafter |they called upon me, thereafter the Government of Cuba recalled |me to put me in charge of the reconstruction of housing for peas- ) _ants in our country, and who were members of the rebel army, and housing that had been destroyed during the course of the war. So at that point I returned to Cuba in June of 1959 and was working | in the Sierras, in the mountains, in charge of construction, work, |probably until 1960. I do not recall the exact date. Then I returned | to Mexico as an attaché, a diplomatic attaché, to the Embassy, and | shortly thereafter I had to take over or take charge of the consul- ‘ate, and on this occasion until November of 1963. | Mr. Dopp. Am I to understand, then, that you assumed the duties of consul in 1960, some time early in 1960, the end of 1960? ‘What period of time did you assume those responsibilities? | Senor Azcur. Yes, it was in April of 1961, after the Bay of Pigs. Mr. Dopp. Now, did I understand your testimony correctly, that you were not aware of how the photograph on the exhibit, the visa application, you are not aware of how that photo got on that ‘application? In fact, you had not seen the photograph on the appli- cation? Senor Azcur. That is the case. Sylvia Duran was handling that area. She typed in the form, affixed the photo, had the applicant sign the forms. In the meantime there was no reason for us consuls to be present there observing the procedure. We were simply in our private offices. We had a lot of work. _ Mr. Dopp. The reason I asked you that question, is that when several of us had the opportunity to interview you in Cuba a few _short months ago, on page 14 of our interview, which I hope you _have a copy of, I was questioning you and | asked you: _ Going back to the physical appearance of Lee Harvey Oswald, apart from having | a receding hairline, was there any gray in Lee Harvey Oswald’s hair? You responded: - You know he had blond hair. It is all very interesting. You see this picture, I really did not study carefully. The picture was taken by the secretary and she _ applied it to the application. It would seem from your response to my question then that, one, you did see the picture on the application or that you did not see the picture on the application then, but were merely looking at it when it was in front of you, and that you had very specific knowl- edge as to how the picture got on the application, that in fact Sylvia Duran stapled it to the application. _ Chairman STokEs. The time of the gentleman has expired. _ The Chair will permit the witness to respond to the question. Senor Azcue. Yes; it is a matter of routine. She is the one who handles all of these detailed operations. I could assure that she was _the one who did it without having seen her do it. There was no one, 152 no other person there, that would do that work for her, and neither Mirabal nor I did that work. Mr. Dopp. All right, then. | May I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, just to proceed and finish this line of questioning, which should take just a couple of minutes? I will try to make my questions brief for the transla- tions. | Chairman StTokEs. Without objection, the gentleman may pro- ceed. Mr. Dopp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Based on the testimony you have given, if we are to believe your testimony with regard to the description of the individual that you said you saw that day, it would vary quite significantly, or signifi- cantly from the actual photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald, the one on the visa application and the photograph that you see to your left over here. They would be different than the person that you saw in the Cuban Consulate, isn’t that correct? Senor AzcuE. For me, yes. When I saw in April the photograph placed on the application, I was surprised by his looks or similarity © with the Lee Harvey Oswald who had been killed. This was my reaction in front of you. You were the ones who showed me that © picture. That was the first time that I saw that application com- | pleted with the photos and all of the other information. Mr. Dopp. But what you saw was someone that was very differ- © ent looking from the person that you met in the Cuban Consulate in September of 1963? Senor AZcuE. Yes, as different as I found him when I saw him in film. The image I had of the individual who showed up. at the consulate was the man in his thirties, maybe 35 years old, and with the very thin face. You will recall that he had very natural lines, very thin straight nose, except for all of the items I mentioned, and this gentleman appeared to me to be much younger and with a much fuller face. That is the evaluation I have with absolute certainty. It is my truth. Mr. Dopp. My question is this, after having gone through that, I am left with two choices that I perceive that caused this to occur, since according to your testimony and the testimony of others, there were three people who were working in the consul’s section. There was Mr. Mirabal, there was yourself and there was Sylvia Duran. It was either a terrible mistake on the part of Sylvia Duran, who also saw this individual come into the office and who stapled this on here, or there was complicity in placing the photo- graph on the application at the time. If the two people were that different, then the only people who could have been involved would have been people at the consulate. Would you please help me out with that possible contradiction? Senor Azcur. Well, I am sure that it was not a case of complic- ity. It is possibly a matter of what I see as the truth and what she sees as the truth, my image of the individual present there, her image of the individual there, and whether she carefully studied the photo. These types of photographs are not necessarily that precise. They are not as regular passport pictures which have to be very clear. And there is, of course, one other possibility, and I cannot guarantee that this is the case, but it is conceivable that 153 while writing down all the information on the application, that she might not have checked exactly the picture against the individual | who was applying, that, occupied as she was, she most probably proceeded to place the photograph on the application without this check. Mr. Dopp. In effect suggesting that there was an enormous error. Senor AzcuE. It is a mistake that results very often in the case of | the course of one’s work, in the normal or ordinary case. Mr. Dopp. And that also, if I understood you, the third option being is that you could be mistaken as to separating the identity of the two people. Senor Azcue. It is possible. We are all exposed to error or mis- take. It is not, however, my view. My view is that I am right. Now I have to say I am not infallible. Mr. Dopp. I wasn’t suggesting that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the additional amount of time. Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. Sawyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am just curious. You had been in Mexico from 1943; am I | correct in that? Senor AzcuE. 1944. Mr. SAwyYER. You were a Cuban by birth and had lived in Cuba | before that time, I understand. Senor AzcurE. Yes, many years. Mr. Sawyer. Why had you spent so long a time in Mexico as opposed to being in Cuba? Senor AzcuE. I first left Cuba during the time of the government of Machado in 1981. I lived for about 10 years almost in Europe. At that time I wanted to return to Mexico, to conclude my studies. Because I did not agree or follow the politics in Cuba during the | time, I never felt at home with Batista, I never felt well. I pre- ferred to live in a country that offered me opportunities to study i} and to work, and I built my life there. It was my second homeland, | as is the case with so many other Cubans who at that time had to :| be bouncing around from one place to another. Mr. SAwyeEr. So then since about 1931, up until about 1959, you H were what you might say a political refugee, or political exile, in | effect, from Cuba. Senor Azcug. A voluntary exile. Nobody forced me not to live in my country. I did not find it pleasant because of the political climate in my country to live there. Mr. Sawyer. Thank you. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Mr. THone. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask just one question in line with the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd, on which I am a little confused. Chairman STOKEs. Certainly. The gentleman is recognized. Mr. THONE. Consul Azcue, did I understand, and I may not have gotten it right this morning, that when you went back to Cuba you saw a film which depicted the shooting by a Mr. Ruby of Lee Harvey Oswald, and at the time you were concerned that this wasn’t the same person at all that was at the consul applying for a visa? 154 Senor AzcuE. Exactly. Only 2 months back I had seen the indi- vidual who appeared at the consulate. So I had his image clearly engraved in my mind, and I did not recognize him in the movie. Mr. THONE. Exactly. Now my question. Did you report this to the Cuban Government, and if so to whom and what happened on your report in this regard? Senor AzcuE. I reported this to some of my friends in the Minis- try of Foreign Affairs. But in fact, in truth I was aware of the fact that it was testimony of my own, it was of my own imagination. And that the conditions under which I had seen him in the film at the time he was killed, with distorted features as a result of pain, it is conceivable that I might be mistaken. I reaffirmed my view when Attorney Garrison of New Orleans stated that the Oswald who visited or was at the consulate was not the one who allegedly killed Kennedy, because of the date he departed New Orleans and the date he had visited the consulate in Cuba. So that confirmed my own view, and at that point I believed that as being the truth. And then I communicated this. And that was probably filed, recorded. I did not write a report. I made an oral report. But it would be necessary to investigate whether such a report in writing exists or does not. But that was the time when I saw my own views confirmed in my opinion that there were two Oswalds. Garrison shares the same opinion. Mr. THONE. Senor Azcue, I don’t want to be too repetitious. But just a quick followup question. Again, to whom in the Foreign Division, or Service, down in Havana, did you report this after you had seen the Ruby film, and at what time? Senor Azcur. These were colleagues of mine in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But at that time all three of us were working in ing National Council for Culture. And it was Mr. Lechuga and Mr. tero. Mr. THONE. And when did you make that report? Senor AzcuE. Immediately after reading Garrison’s statements in the newspaper. Possibly at the end of 1964. That would be some- thing very easy to check out. Or maybe beginning of 1965. Mr. THONE. Last this, and it is probably a question you cannot answer. Do you know what action at all was taken within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on your report in this regard? Senor AzcuE. Honestly, I do not know that. Mr. THONE. Because this is quite a startling development here. You would have thought that your government would have done something with the report from the consul who supposedly had three confrontations with the man reported to be Lee Harvey Oswald. And when you came up with this information that this was not the same person that was down there, you would have thought something would have happened. Just a comment. I don’t know that it needs a response, Mr. Consul, unless you would have a thought on it. Senor Azcuz. Yes. It is very possible, it is a possibility that they did not believe me at all, that they might have thought that this was simply my own impression or evaluation. And moreover, that 155 it might be with reference to a matter that was not one of immedi- ate concern in terms of current events at that time for us. Chairman SToKEs. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. Mr. Forp. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time to the Chair. Chairman SToKEs. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Azcue, you testified that Oswald produced a document show- ing his membership in the U.S. Communist Party. To your knowl- edge was that document valid? Senor AzcukE. I did not concentrate much of my attention on the documents themselves. And I could not see whether they were authentic or not. The person who saw them, or the person who made the notations might have been Sylvia. But she had no way of telling whether they were authentic or not, any of the documents. That is the reason that he addresses himself to the Soviet Embassy, so that they in turn could tell us whether the Soviet documents are or are not valid. Mr. FirH1ANn. Thank you. At your consulate, whose responsibility was it to compare the applicant in person with the picture on the application, or the picture offered to be put on the application, to assure that the photo was indeed the photo of the person applying for a visa? Senor AzcuE. The first one that should have checked that out was Sylvia. And I feel that we also should have checked. But fatally I did not make the comparison or that check. I had not seen that photograph until April of the present year. Mr. FirHiAn. May I direct a question to counsel, Mr. Cornwell. Would the passport, the application that we have on the display board, would we have gotten that from Havana, or the consulate in Mexico City? Mr. CORNWELL. The passport and the passport application came from New Orleans. Are you talking about the visa application? Mr. FITHIAN. I am talking about the visa application that was submitted to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City, the large display on the board. Mr. CoRNWELL. Two visa applications; No. 408 is the one on the right, that is a photograph of an original visa application which was provided to us for inspection during our trip to Cuba by the Cuban Government. The one on the left, No. 407, is a photograph of a visa application provided by the Cuban Government to the Warren Commission, and would appear to be a carbon copy. Mr. FirHian. My question, Mr. Cornwell, goes to the stamping of October 10 on it. Obviously if it were from the Cuban consulate at Mexico City, and it had a date of October 10 on it, that is one thing. It is quite another, obviously, if it is a photo of a copy that has been sent on down to Havana to one of the other bureaus. Mr. CorNWELL. I don’t believe there is testimony solving that issue yet. The only testimony I believe we have had is with respect to the exhibit 408, and as I recall, Senor Azcue provided informa- tion about his understanding of the date October 10 on that docu- ment. He was not asked why there was no similar date on docu- ment 407, to my memory. 156 Mr. FirHi1aAn. Thank you. Mr. Azcue, Lee Harvey Oswald was a radar operator in the Marines and was familiar with the U.S. spy plane, the U-2. Did Oswald ever mention to you his service in the Marines or in the military in the United States during your con- versation with him as he was trying to get a passport to Cuba? Senor Azcur. He did not provide any information on his own background other than the presentation of the documentation that he had brought forth in connection with his application. It was clear, and I was able to check out from the first time, that his only intent was to obtain a visa immediately. Therefore his background, especially his nonrevolutionary background, was of a nature that he had no interest at all in communicating to us. He was interested in telling me that he was a member of the Communist Party, that he was a resident of the Soviet Union. In other words, that which he believed would be sufficient to obtain © the visa. And our conversations were always extremely brief, be- ~ cause I used to put an end to these conversations, referring to the | instructions I had from my government of a need to obtain their prior authorization before issuing any visa, either the final destina- | tion visa to the Soviet Union, so that I may be in a position to provide him, without prior consultation to Cuba, with a transit visa, but with the visa of the Soviet Union already affixed to his passport. Everything went around that very issue. He did not speak a single word outside of that issue. Chairman SToKEs. The time of the gentleman has expired. Does counsel have anything further? Excuse me. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. Mr. Dopp. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to pursue one other line of questioning, if I may, and I will try and be brief on it. Could you tell me, Mr. Azcue, what the Cuban surveillance of the Cuban consulate in Mexico might have shown during those days in September 1963? Did you conduct or have photographic surveil- lance of people who came into your Embassy, or did you keep any sort of surveillance mechanism by which you could keep a record of those people who came to your Embassy or stopped in for whatever business? Senor AZCUE. We were very young, maybe trusting. We did not have great experience. And we had great trust in our neighbors. At first we did not mistrust anyone. Intuitively we might have had certain reasons to be concerned or to fear certain individuals, but we did not take any photographs, nor did we have any mechanisms or systems. We simply took measures to protect ourselves from some possible aggression or aggressive act. But it was a result of our own action. And with some small security protection or guard that the Mexican Government provided outside the premises, and our own colleagues within the Embassy, who might be able to react to outside aggression, but with nothing much other than their own physical ability to do so, with their bodies. Mr. Dopp. As I understood your testimony, you were in Cuba on November 22, 1963. You had returned from Mexico. Senor AzcukE. I left on the 18th. Mr. Dopp. I presume once it became—once the knowledge was acquired in Cuba that the alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had applied for a visa in your consulate in Mexico, that there was 157 then an investigation in Cuba, that it was then a concern, I pre- sume, of Premier Castro and his government to inquire as to those people who had knowledge of that particular circumstance as to actually what in fact happened in Mexico in September of that year. Is that a fact? Chairman STokEs. The time of the gentleman has again expired. The Chair will permit the witness to answer the question. Senor AzcuE. Immediately, as soon as I saw the name, I commu- nicated it, or got in touch myself with the Foreign Ministry, and after a quick interview with the Minister and with the Chief of the Bureau, I was immediately sent to the person responsible for such matters in the Interior Ministry, and that was Commandante Pin- eiro. Naturally this event constituted a great commotion for us because we feared that we might be involved in that dirty business. At that time the Commander in Chief, in his speech of November 27, he is already informed in advance of all those points on which I had personally reported, reported to Commander Pineiro of the Ministry of the Interior. Therefore it is in that speech that Fidel comments or reflects and states what I have always stated. Mr. Dopp. Did you make any effort or are you aware of any effort that was made to also talk to either Sylvia Duran, Mr. Mirabal, anyone else that could possibly shed any light as to what actually happened in the consulate in Mexico, other than talking to yourself? Senor Azcur. Our colleague, Sylvia Duran, was arrested by the Mexican Government in order to obtain from her clarification or other types of statements from her. Regarding other possible investigations on the part of the Cuban Government, I am not aware of them, because I am not an intelli- - gence agent of the Cuban Government. I provide the information I hold so that it might be processed or acted on. Mr. Dopp. So am I to understand that you gave oral testimony, there was no written statement, there was no tape recording or any stenographer that took your statement at the time? Senor AzcurE. No. Commander Pineiro and I were alone in his office. But a few days thereafter I heard the speech of Fidel and I realized that the Commander in Chief was fully informed of all points. So the precise report summarized in brief form is incorpo- rated in the speech of Prime Minister Castro. All of the informa- tion is contained therein, and consequently printed in the press and televised and transmitted through radio. Mr. Dopp. Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask whether or not we as a committee have asked the Cuban Government for any and all documentation which they may have prepared or have at their disposal as a result of their investigation of this particular aspect of the case at the time that they became aware of Lee Harvey Oswald’s visa application in Mexico. Have we made that request, and, if so, have we had a response? Mr. Buaxkey. Mr. Dodd, we have indeed asked the Cuban Govern- ment to provide us with any written reports filed at that time by either Mr. Azcue or any of the people with whom he dealt. And they have informed us that this was handled orally; that no writ- ten reports were made at that time. 41-372 O- 79 = 11(Vol. 3) 158 Mr. Dopp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further ques- tions. Chairman SToKEs. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Azcue, at the conclusion of a witness’ testimony before this committee, the witness is entitled, under the rules of this commit- tee, and of the House, to have extended to him 5 minutes in which he may comment upon the testimony he has given before our committee, and I would extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose at this time, if you so desire. Senor Azcur. Thank you very much. I will use the 5 minutes or possibly less. First, I want to thank you for the good reception that we have had in this visit here during our trip, for all attentions extended. It has been more than we could have expected. And at the same time I want to state or express that it is in our greatest interest that this entire issue be clarified to the utmost, and that we have always cooperated, and that you must have been able to note it as a result of statements made by our own Prime Minister reflecting our sincere cooperation, without holding back any information, an attitude which we have consistently maintained. We have the greatest interest in seeing that the issue is clarified, possibly an interest equaling your own interest in having it clari- fied. . At any and all times we are available to you and at your disposi- tion within the context of our possibilities. We have always played with clean decks, with clean cards, as has always been our custom. Once again, thank you very much. Chairman Stokes. Mr. Azcue, I want to also say to you it is nice to see you again. We enjoyed the visit we had with you in Cuba, the testimony we took from you at that time. And on behalf of the committee, we want to also thank you for the cooperation you have given this committee and for you voluntarily appearing here today as a witness. So on behalf of the committee and the House of Representatives, we thank you for the cooperation you have given this committee. You are now excused. Dun} AZCUE [in English]. You are welcome, Mr. Stokes. Can I oF. Chairman Strokes. Yes, you may go. All persons are requested to remain in their seats until the witness has departed from the hearing room. Mr. STANDARD. Mr. Chairman, if I may, for a moment. Chairman STOKEs. Yes, counsel. Mr. STANDARD. The witness has made reference today to two speeches of Prime Minister Fidel Castro of November 23 and No- biel 27, 1963, and I ask they be incorporated as part of this record. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, your request is granted. JFK exhibit F-684 may be entered into the record at this point. (The exhibit follows:] 159 JFK Exuipit F-684 ine televisién y radio orientando qj del atentads ein respecto ETtrascendental suceso Estadca . en que perdiera la vida el presidente de loa Unidos, inf. rios, gue histeria desatada por elementos reacciona rreristas, en relacién con exe sucesO. A continuacién ofrecemos la versién taquigri- 1 mé- fica de los esclarecedores pronuncismientos NOV, 2? 19o- ximo lider de nuestra Revolucién. (DPTO, DE VERSIONEA TAQt IGRAFICAS DEL GOBIERNO REVOLUCONARIO) LUIS GOMEZ WANGUFMERT. Muy buenas nocnes flores televidenies. os ipa 3 po Zl comandante Fidel Castro, primer ministro del Gotner. Revolucionarin y primer serietaris general de Partidy Unido de la Revolucién Soniaiictn de Cubs. va a hablar & puctlo a través de todac las emer: Ae radio ¥ telesices de} pare trater temas de ac’ dad lene la palabra el comandante ide} Castro DR. FIDEL CASTRO RUZ —Sirmipre que ha om urritn algin hecho de trar-endenca. tanio nacional! coma interna. clonal. hemos estimado ja convemenca de hablarie al purr 4 para expresarje nuestras opiniones, y en enda una de esas cireumeancias expreear también Ja oricntacioOn dey timers, Ja orientactén de nuestro Partido ) saber cada uno & nis otros cud) es la ectitud que debenios adoptar frente » cota fecha de Teodoro une de esas situaciones Es verdad que estamos un poco acostuimbrados arn; + singjdad mas vigorosa que el a agin tipo de hechos Inesperadna, de herchos importantes de incolore gv . cubrir la ausencia de gravedad, porque desde el triunfo d- |e Revolucion nurs! @ jada. por e) Mandct:4h desaparecido, La sustitu- pals ha tenido que enfrentar una serie de problenian ura serie 4~ situectones Que han ido teinplando ya los nervis O58 pag:amentana comportaba siempre un apre- de) puedio pare Vevar adelante #1 Revolucién victoria 146 de dediiidad. os A; vk ratic-material de imputaciones, ANALISIS i muacianes fue destruido por Fidel a isi§ cudaaose de los factores que con- OBJETIVO currian en el crimes,_La muerte de Kennedy no Y SERENO eta la obra desssptada de un fanatico imbindo 1 por una causa. a la manera de lor Wiatonces de Sarajevo y Marsella. Lo gt Ries: seee:.s jas caracteristicas de una Per es, con moto de Ine hevhos ocurridos ayer en ns Zstatc« Unidos. y que Meron luger a] awsinato del Premert - TOBE, Hesyecccsamente pianificada con un te de ese pais. por la repercisidn que esos hecho puede acqu gs prozes:sqaiismo crimina!. Fueron tres tener y por e) papel e! rol que ja nacién norteamericans @sparos realuzadosa distancia reguiar sobre un juega en los problemas de la politica internacional es po: vehiculo epmo-imiento, flanqueado de motoci- le que nosotros creemos que Gebemoy Racer un andlias o- pecalmente objetivo y sereno de jos hechos y de sus nomibles Gustas, que alenzzron a Kennedy y a) goberna- consecuencias dor Connally :.c rozar siquiera a las otras cua- E) Gobie-no de los Estados Unidos tanto la Adinin-- bent ack 5wn viajaban en el apretado espa- tracisy anterior de Eisenhower, eomo ja Adminutracion de Kennedy. no practico® una politica preci enie amistons be- 2 Pr ble presidencial. ca nveotrea La politica de amhes Administractones ew ca- een ~~ ra-tenz per su espiritu agresivo, hostil ¢ implacable hecia Ls i ivarnente. «] asesinato de Kennedy nuetro pais sé. ucia en rmitad de una funosa campanha Nuestro pais fue victima de agresiones de Upo economi- ‘contra la politica‘ extenor de la Casa Blanca, co tendientes a provocar la ruina de nuestra economia y sb Rambre de nuestro pueblo. fue victima de ataques de todos campaha-quero se limitaba exclusivamente a) tipos, ataques que costaron sangre. cientos de nuestros com... Ulamado cas® de Cuba, sino que apuntaba tam- patriotas perdido la vida, defendiéndose de les staques bicn a r @ interrumpir el did'ogo con la de} imperialiamo yangui. T no sélo eso, su Seatilidea ¥ mI agresiom hacia nuestro pale nos [levé a} borde misme de la Unon Dew. para retornar al ‘borde de la guerra. que afortunadamente pudo evitarse: lievé a] mundo 7. En ese sentido, resultaba intrigante el a) borde de la guerra termonuciear. Y stn cuande so contemplabe esa alternativa tomo la de la crisis de ortuare, cuando ja invasion de Girén, todos estamos perfectamente Bae m.t6 & & ° < EL ASESINATO Fel-culns recogié esa opinién? ;En posesién NOTICIA GRAVE un indicia & css Levar por su senil charla- ser.a Maniacs" mas ae la cuenta? En una u :y hems wi recho grave, gravisimo mas alla c tea cadficacion. se produjo exactamente & tres Gas Cumplida ia primera parte del Oy empezaba & ventiarse la segunda. Ya . re marcha la histérica propagands antiso- vietica y -anbcubsna encaminada a liquidar las postpilidades; de paz . 5 miles y barta —quizds— clientes de miles de vidas a nuesire queda, Dd ret '-. singe|: Aes ree Herats wide victimas de una hostilidad constance por os Ge les Estados Unidos Y entre los gobernantet : jos joanbres Girigentes de jos Estados Unidos, je cabia a Keunedy wns ortante responsabilidad en- esos hechos Y embargo. Ja noticia del asesinato de| Prendente de Yee Estados Unidos os una noticia grave y mala. Esin drbe- mos analizario bien para comprenderio; sobre todo, anslizer- lo serenamente, desapasionadamente, que es come ict revo- Tuctonarios Geberos analizar estas cosas. -. Male noticia, dejando s un lado el problema humane. en Que siempre la penribilided de] hombre, de cualquier hombre, we siente afectada dnte un acto de ena naturaleca, ante un erimen, ante un eserinato: digo que, dejand>@ un lado exas euestiones, yo clempre reacciono —y estoy seguro que fsa es la reaccién de la inmense mayoria de jos acres humance , reaccionamos siempre con repudio <.ente al aveunato y frente, @) crimen. « Mo podemas considerarlo como un erma correcta de tue eha, no debemes consderario. Y sobre todo. en las cone: io- mes en gue se produce. porque — 29 Niberaci4n —como es e} caso de Nam ¢@el Sur—, su acti- 1 Y, ea fin, Asay una sorte éo vectores que ao tud hare los pueblos de América Latina, gu actitud hecia | globar en una sola 3 . manera defendible desde el punto de vista moral eoa witrarreaccién, em todes y |Ahora bien: sin eubargo, Gentre de la sociedad ame- j|internos 9 externas ée loo Ticann Beeame y dentro de la politica de Ing Extados Unidos hay elements partidarios Ge Una politin todavia muche méa | peligross para je pas, y mée aventerera, rearcionaria, de une politica todavia muche még agresiva, : = Ge una politica mucho més guerrerista. Fa decir, de una ctuacién determinade ap dan gradoa, y den politica mala se dam grades: de lo male @ le peor y @ be WGt 9 ae rk Sa Fe : ‘ péaimo. Y atin dentro de una politica mala pusde haber aepectos te Sa ce en cae mentee &.snctean, 9-3: sUr acpectos ‘os ire wna politica qua, conjunto, me mala Menos grave press : ' har, troéeraeituactin, “Vin presidente’ pa eet ea Weg ae Npsrr, Puen thsadidaFeacs A & " lk we oh a a sbokipd eee wert a es | “ Ob ? DY vd On Cs fan te a a ni slakre ii TR i—hoe 3g| il | si e a. . , i ae ae 162 : ie hat 4 tl Aeal fe G et :} | h if tiH dy it Bas ed fd ] :I ain 163 soi ets ~ Se os ee! a 2 [fees SeeeRe SasSores aloes une ace ata ~ ride,© ote munstre posite cor28, tohehechoeer pa pusbic 48 Pestle 60 : ° TS drt) Getaici, 7 hemesafventade, beprosbe age 7 aon won partidarios de la guerra nuclear preventiva; eg decir, Que son partidarios ée desatar Ja guerra sorprestvamente, la guerra nuclear, porque obstinadamente piensan que ésa es la politica que deben realizar los Estados Unidos, elementos reaccionarica, neofascisias, sin consideracién ninguna @ los ms elementales derechosde las nacionesy « los intereses ée la humanided. tipo de imperialismo fue e] nazismo. y ja mentalidad criminal, fue la mentalidad del imperialismo en su forma 6e nazismno. Luego hay toda una serie de grados en estas cues- hones, } Es decir, que analizando objetivamente la cosa, desce el }momente en que falte una autoridad mds fuerte, una autor dad personal acatada, en las situaciones, en Jas formas y en jas condiciones en que sc elabora la politica de Estados Uni- | dos, todas estas fuerzas reaccionarias pueden encontrar una magnifica oportunidad —y de hecho estén encontrando ya [sna magnifica eportunidad—, para destacar su politica des enfrenada y ultrarreaccionaria, Eston pueden ser lon sectores, lan corrientes, Jos tnicos {que pusden salir benieficindes, de un hecho como ei que ‘ jecurrlé ayer en loa Estados Unidos “Dallas, Noviembre 22, UPIL— La policia detuve hey Ahora bien: esto ex analizando el resultado automatico Oswald tificado como el Preal . fie ese hecho, Independientemente de otro aspecto de Ja aren ate mcrae: euestiOn: qué hay detrds del asewinato de Kennedy? ;Cua- on'el nate del te John: Kean i Jes fueron los verdaderos méviles del asesinato de Kennedy? 1 5 af regs6 fi la wree U So 2 Qué fuerzas, factorer. circunstancias, se movieron detras widtica: Aci pg han dedi eg er t niéa pa- de este hecho inesperado, insdlito, ecurrido en e| dia de eee fa antisoviética y anticet erox eam, Una noticia que sorprendié absolutamente a todo e| mundo; ay hecho que, poeiblemente, no Je habia pacado por la imagi- Cable: “La Embajeda ée los Estados —-. confirms nacién @ nadie. hoy que Lee H Oswald estuvo en Rusia. Un Todavia exactamente en esine instantes, la cosa no tie de exta representacién dijo que Oswald — Embajeda ne nada absolutamente de clara: en exton instantes hay mu- ©" Noviembre de 1959 y que de acuerdo == informacién che cosa oncura y mucha cosa confusa. alrededor de joa he- disponible abandoné la Unién Soviética en Agregé que choa que dieron lugar al asecinato del Presidente ée Jos © lgnorabe cudndo el sospechoso de rey emp al Pre- . Poseees Y haypinto, algunas otras cosas que son siniomas evidentes de propuaicvas hd be vale y Ser tiempo Phy su visita ng be i Ie lo que extaha diciendo anteriormente: de que lax fuer- 8 Hubo informaciones sim confirmar que Oxwald solicité yas mas reaceiona@rian se exthn dexborando dentro de los 14 cludadania soviética pereno pudo obteneria”. Entados Unidos, Eas decir, que ya desde los primeros cables ae traig de Insinuar una responsabilidad para la Unién Sqviética y une HISTERIA CONTRA LA URSS Y aa ()) Por ejemplo, ke | peor sintoma es del aprovechamienta a nadie? iAlguien que tenga dos éedos de frente, un que estan haciendo dej hecho. para desatar dentro de koa mental sentido coma, que conceca cudndo los hombres ¢s- Fstadoe Unidos un etado de histera anti-soviética y de his- tan trabajande per una causa y que saben cuales son ke tena anti-cubana; eso en primer lugar. Quiere decirse que, caminoa por les cuales se conduce una causa al triunfo? ja nueva Adminisiracién que toma posesién, se puede llegar a enconirac frenie @ na situacion de histeria desatada den- fra de Ine bstadoe ionidos, precsamente por joa sectores o de su viaje y cudnto tiempo durd su visi! mas reaccionarios del pais, por ia prensa més reaccionaria y este fee be @ro em la opiniém publica de los Katadoa Unidos, ¥ ei peor carécter que tiene, es que estin agitande una campafia éel peor eapirita “Me-carthista”, dei peor espirisu mista. ‘ ‘ : S aeatee tie aie Ree Ros creen, menos; quizds piensen que somos exaltados, quizds plensen que elics nos han agresiones. Pero ja Unién Sovittica, ; Boviética pueda heber tenido alguna ' 7 4 . ane le puede creer a nadie? Ee ‘ teneria, ;ne le puede creer oc ve tenga dos dedos de frenie, un ele. tro de les )3=mental ser que conceca cudndo joa hombres **- wna causa y que saben cuales son los caminos por lee cusies se conduce una caune al triunfo...° F 3 primero que trataban de inainusr. cho é@el pals, por la prensa més reaccionaria fue ja primera inaimuacidn, y eto fue lo Que einiperh pats com lee podereme recursos, que poderoeas corrien- 9 hacer anspechoso todo esto; porque dio la casualidad de politica tiengn dentro de los Extados Unidos, que jo més inesperado —1tan ineasprrado como al axesinato Ex decir, que ya se extdn combinando para crear UR CUA- mismo— fuera que inmediatamenie empezara a aparerer un en la opinién pablica de los Extados Unidos, y el peor cylpabte que —jqué cesualidad!— habia ido a Rusia; y cardcter que tiene, es que estin agitando una campafa del _-qug casualidad!— estaba relacionado con un Comité de eapirita “Me-carthista”, éei peor espirisu anti-comm- Tyeio Justo Cuba. Eso en lo que empezaban a decir. hd Ad que leccadietnmitete aparecié wn culpable: un cul- ° Cuando ccurrié of asesinaio- del Presidente Kennedy, pable que habla estado en la Uniéa Sovittica, un culpable 3 i | que la mente de la inmensa mayoria de Jes pereo- que era simpatizanie de Cube. qte parmra—, que ei ee [ee ee ee erenne nen ces | ties internactomal; es decir con su politica éej Pacto Fpcceets Oot on pen ee SOpecis 8 Cube Eee ROS ome ee mgt woe ae pats wired fel)ewsaaneene a m« 1 |tnternes de los Unides. Porque no muchos dine @1 prople representamte de Estados Unidos, Stevenson, on la {| propia ciuded ée Dalles, fue agredido por elementos ultra- i | | ieee nsoernp re ahaere he | Desde Ivego que a fabricar un paquete de esta naturaieza, es ie que eles |a no estén persiguiendo este , ellon estan ahora otro objetivo, porque es imposiniea todas |foces inventar ningin género deresponsabilided Ellos a- f | i g§ z é e % i sicamente a Stevenson, por considerar que ena es una polt- 3 t i } anticomunista, una histeria antiprogresis- |ite, una histeria antiliberal, una histeria antlsoviélica, una tlea débil, y que es una politica mala, que no es wna politi- | 'histeria anticubane. Es decir, una histeria aventurera. una ca su temente reaccionaria. }nisteria reaccionaria, una histeria guerrerista dentro de les 1 Por kh mente todo el mundo pasé eno. ;Pasd acase |; Estados Unidos; porque ai tuvieran un dtomp de respoe- la mente ée jen que fuese un hombre de imquierde’ |i sabilidad y de seriedad o de buena fe, no desataban une ‘0, es@ mo pasd por la mente de nadie. ; Por qué? PorqueJa |compatia Ge esta naturaleza, como la que han desaindo y mica hoy, dentro de Estados Unidos, la polémica furiosa fe estaba Bbrende entre los eleméntos més ultrarreacctons- '! = vamos 9 leer este: “Noviembre 22, UPL— Ei asesino irios, los elementoa ultraderechistas, y jos elementog mix MO- ge] Presidente Kennedy ox un marxista confeso que pasé |@eragos de la politica ée ius Estados Unidos. tres afios en Rusia tratando de renunciar a su ciudadanis Ne se carecterizaba le poiémica interna Ia pugnafe estadounidense, luege cambié de idea y obtuvo un pase- jos comunistas de Estados Unidos con el de los je ée regresoa Norteamérica pegado por el Gobierno de les Estados Unidos, no se caracterizabe por ja pugna de los el Estados Unidos”. meentos Ge tnquierda o de los elementos Hberales. No queria Ee decir, ya wna insinuacién de imputacién a la Uniée decir cto que los elementos ée izquierda apoyaran la poll- govidtica thea de Kennedy; pero la lucha, la batalla sin cuartel, s¢ ee “Fue identificado camo Lee H. Orwald, de 24 afcs, exim taba Ubrando dentro de Estadon Unidos entre la extrema fante de Marina y Presidente de um “Comité de Juego Lim- Gerecha, la extrema reaccién, y lon elementos més moders- plo con Cuba”. Goa; en el Pariamento, em la prensa, en las calles, em to- Es decir, inmegistamente i / if4| ili ; :i | i it i 8 pF [ : iii : fi Ht ; m Sin Fo se Heittunit 165 oo : Ht + > aeiB ye ‘aa a0 leuf ali | alta fe a Hi fit i du ; oF ama eh ; wait i lyf $,, s 844i “ue| alee || is ee ee ee He c 7 | que e entidad filocastrista en esta ciudad, proplotse alguien em rio dei revélver con que fue muerte. "Leva « oco de sen- H.PH ée la Uniéa ren creer @& ce aqui, plensen que un Comité = Cuba. Ellon afirmaban que este sefior.3 eno?.... Afirman de que se es una Seccional de} Comité Pro Tra to J Nueva Orleans o en Dallas. 1 “ @ este sehor. Y que allie. a ja Revoluci6n Cubana Esté rare todo eso. Noe¥ ie HEE i aH aga gs da exgyane Serurevacerne pguegeas ny rill iatt ate ‘ifulf i fH Whe Be re : HeiitUiee clue iat ie ee aa it f » pda seed Cri i leiidous “23 3 AAe Tere SHRI : ie tiiebibe iHi tHe A ulHH ies : BP dally ieee jasteiite TH alin il if isi i (ies ii i eel ccapetal ai Hi informes:crudndee donde hablaComité Pro 166 ne aea ete GT yea an ao By a that tik faint cit i il call i Ht all eae dattaeuie ett Ramer eee PORT eT ERC Lt Pet He GR fl] tt irae see elgttsauilag i agg pain] Ea serra (ay) ia aReece rice AHN i Be 4 i: fiju % iy i;3 ij aq it a a3,i" j aH FR ai tule’ tat Lit eat iets (ke a PST editTift scistad eRTNTE UEELSU TTeepet nent rrBy REVOLUCION (4)r Lents 23 DC Beviteeer Ot 18 ee wectente asta @ pechle nertmmectoarg FUoRDEEto Cp. ee” ab ate tomar af poder Tine Shsesicuene aleioearng Cue i Gidente an ta vouniéa és Bevtotisd Frees olpunes patJanoche, oloOiesel " yiasd Cusire, medy tnand al pucblo @ éerrocar a Fitad y que une ver realizado exte af pucdie porteemertrans fosaments ayedaria al nueve régimes que tomara ol . “Bigue exponiende el Giario que ofproblema es que la 4600 politica seguida por el Gobierno de Kennedy con reo. @ Castre, come secueia de la que Bevé @ embo su pre. soa meet domes rd greener erage una unos cables que Ge quea couvirtioran entre tante a ee amenaraba entomces secretarie de Marina Ge acudir a @e @ puebdle précticamente mo tiene esperanza aigu cualquier medio para vengarse ée oun injusticia ¥ of mia, poder rebelarse con éxito sin gran ayuda de] exterior, “Bigue Gictende el periédico: Kennedy ahora se pioga mo ere el que fe acompafandsa @ pormitir a les exilados cubarms lanzar ataques a Cube @ende territorio de Estado Unidos —dice of periddico—, y Ad = ée heche utilima el poderio aéreo y naval de le nacién pe- ear otra posible versiéa. Y equi hay una informacién que dice: “El Fiscal dal Distrito, Henry Wade declaré hoy que eonfia en que he. SieWansids ean ed” ue plasson cictnas Gein semetio ertspiee- grerd obtener la pena de muerte para Lee Harvey aan Gigunts Cisenerechisten y pionsen olpucde. haber ai. el ex infante ¢- maring que ha sido formalmente ecumée sume Giferencia entre pensar asi y sacsinar a su presiden- te, y asesinar a un presidente; la diferencia que pueda ha. dei asesinato Gel Presidente John J. Kennedy, segta in- ber emtre pensar ad y aprovechar ei asecinato ée su pre formaron las agencias moticiosas ée este pals. “Agrega la informacién que Wade ha intervenide eo mo Fiscal en 24 casos de asezinato, y obtuve 33 veces la pena de muerte para los acusadcs —parece que este Fis. eee an Werdugo—, 7 on otease restante condena de ca- “Gena ue. “Wi Gijo que posse pruebas materiales contra Oa. wald, pero se negé a previsar cudles son esas pruedes, Afie- 6 que todavia no ha sido establecido que el “mmuser” ea- contrado fuera el arma éel crimen. : erable diferencia —dice el periddic.- . ha negado curants los interrogatorics tener esta actitud y las palabras osadas que emitié Ken. Psrticipacién alguna en e) atentado...”, etoétera. nedy sobre Cube en la campafia presid de 1960. Du- “El capltdn Will Fries, Jefe del ito de baF damos que muchos electores hayan sido desorientados por micidios de la Policia de Dallas, afirmé que segin su observaciones del presidente, relativas a Cuba anteayer”. a : ] 5&| oa electores no habrin sido @esorientados’ iF 2 Bg ue Bo es lo mismo que decia antes. 4 Fay que después tratar Ge ver aigunos datos sobre be puede ser este sefior a quien ellos acusan. Pero nos. Fn 3 ee estaba observando ung corriente de otroa queremos hablar de ung campafa ecencias de cables —realmente UPI—... que lea UPI las Da la casualided 2 “33 za 4°8s como ~ que precisamente estos hechos ocurren en un momento en Pero bien, cables y més cables, més cables, porque nun. rd que Kennedy estaba siendo duramente atacado por los que ,c nsideraban que su politica con Cube era débil; no podrie- eecribieron tantos cables. Es curioso cémo las agencias mS ser nosotros, sino preciaamente los enemigog de la Re~ hicieron una divulgacién bdrbara de todas jas volucion. y los enemigos en general de toda una politica joee moderada, una politica menos guerrerista, es decir, los re FUg8 229 que le hicieron g Kennedy decir, que la UPI, SEAL por su politica sobre Cu- de intormacién como {enem:gos de una politica de ese tipo, los dnicos que podrian estar intervsados en la muerte del Presidente Ken: y [ie Unicos que quizds puedan haber recibido con sa joven ja noticia de ja muerte de Kennedy. Porque en dias atrés a mi me llamé le atencién un he- cho y es que mientras se realizabe la Conferencia de la SIP, que fue una cosa escandalosa, porque una serie de go b.ernus fueron duramente atacados, erudamente atacados, Julio Mesquita, Ciro, éste es un des\ ergonzado, reac. come el gobierno de Brasil, por un al Mesquita que dijo cionario, que fue el que fue alli a hablar contra el previ- horrores del Presidente de Brasil, que incluso hablé y pro- p4gno e| golpe de Estado en Brasil, donde se hicieron tam- btn deciaraciones contra otros Presidente, otros gobiernes “ineamericanos, alli en Estados Unidos; me llamé la aten. oon que los cables... y se hicieron tiraron largas tiras phi.cando toda una serie de opiniones contra el discurso de K 5| t Ht: ;| tuchos ee reunteron en las Oficinas de las organise- | i S B 35 HI * Tevolucionarias y en casas, para eecuchar por radio ao . por atse de Kennedy, la traduccién al espafiol transmi. ias estaciones de radio de los exiladoa Oyeren : e ef es0; undnimes y agresives toda una serie de cuestiones de la politics intsonadional Ge a seereta de infiluraci6n que no puede ser divulgada”. -" "Miles de exilados concurrieron a una concentra- | mre libre, en vista de la llegada de Kennedy, y en. ecucraron criticas, por lo que calificaron de politica Ose de: Estados Unidos hacia Cuba. “ox@ Ignacio Rivero, Director en e] exilio del “Diario @- \ Marna” —ee quedard toda la per allé—, ai po- tem >. mis antiguo de La Habana y Ntfies Por- Tuon.>, ex Presidente del Censajo de Seguridad de lag Na. eivare Unidas, pidierom una seciéa még posttiva por les tadin Un.dos Sealer” “Puvero. miembre ée Prensa, a le cua) vine @ 9 4 v .~ bs herilaferio, dijo iF : 2 bsey hewn her eve _la mixma « heraisterio”, {Por qué? Porque éste representa la ol)- los entos diag visperas de] asesinato de Kenne- 4%. we haya notado une colncidencia, como nunca de op! ‘Ones entre los eectores reacclonarios dentro y fuera de Extados Unidos; la campafia que se hizo en la SIP contra es0; la coincidencia de opiniones undnimes Y ag-esivas por toda wma serie de curstiones de la politica internariona ce Kennedy, —-¥ éste habla aqui de ja forma fume a ie Ker nedy Ge conrebir *’ problema agrario. La decir, que cra #1 consorclo de gorilas oligarcas y ultraderechistas de den- tro y de fuera SOSPECHOSO ANUNCIO DE SERGIO CARE Y aqui este sefior sigue prociamando su Poiltice ant’. brasileAa. Y entonocs, por ultimo. algo muy interesante. ya de Srritacién area con rexpecto al Gobierno < lee | habido en anteriores discumos del presidente Kennedy, Estados Unidos, con respecto a declaracién de este sefor Que ocupa un cargo importante on loa eirculoe intelectuales de la reaccién dentro de Extados |Unidos y fuera, como Director del Consejo Ejecutivo de la | Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa, vean cémo termina, y que fue lo que a mi me llamé la atencién. Terminé ex- preeando ej & modificar su politica de coexistencia pacifica”. iQué quie- Te decir esto? ZQué quiso decir este sefior con seto? Trea ccionaria dentro y fuera de los Estados Unidos, segin los | dias antes ée] asecinato SpeRennedss ae decir un sehor que ecupa un cargo importante en cireulos inte- cables. do.ja,UFl.¥ dela APdicen que ware cena Betnales delaultraderecha dentro y fuera de Estados Uni- aron asumido posicién } ficlentemente - Yuerte contraroe convoming de Fidel Castro”, _ cable que no es de Prensa Latina. en este caso os ée+ la « @ criticar la politica de Unidos, atin estando all en @ modificar mu politica de coexistencia pacifica’ Estadde Unidos, que se supone que lomence que pueden i I i gti nt: Karp hacer es callarse la boca; pues no: ellos se slenten ecm de. | Kennedy’ yo Pronunciaron en términos ° ecaso, sad en determinadéos |, 8 Que Una serie de sidente del Colegio Médico de Cuba@ Degar. Aqui: “EI Pre- cirwulcs més reacelonaricscirculos civiles y militare. en of wortas, expres’ cue a discuree noeciara wa compict eontra Javidado Extados Unidos nopodia del Presidente Kennedy? Tales 1Qes ninguna de extrafio, realmente, que ee produsca ei asesinate del Pro. tales a heed , | Sdente Kennedy on instantes un steque undnime, una om que hay un concierte und. eomtra | mime 60 epiaicnts contra varics especies éo oa a uma critica furfeunde a ou politica! j¥ qué extratic Bien: pero no eran séie lstincamericance, eran tam tote ese} bién muchos ediitores norteamericanes. Aqui! tenemes: “Mee. va ¥ noviembre 30, UPI— Kl Daily News dice om os orn,ate aver que ahora aparece come Sqrdén eo,hennecitoctae’ ca,samen nas Jgcitn satotat precepts cutee Cree cone mer mimmety pore | bean’derarcey, 0s ua oe estar preccupedo emtre etraf exons per le Ge | enterme. Poficra sor fo una, enferme? Esdecir, esan rap iilf i pes €8norteamertcanesJ,Sedevia, etka bs Gesante ° siarme \fiteade UnsexeT scpciae es co'ens Denieet | ay baexiotencia docotacabeas Goplays Gel Can Bowwree sd ppp nee iveniin fests coents Jascondiciones smbientiee : : pas J Pao Mendes Uniden?, eet eres See i] gm seme Se beSecetas Ecramatnne, Ge Dros vcs Gbiminie meeey ane, y ot ine — 169 Times” pneinen Same a om Cube”. Ye mo ore ox i participarea les aciomario de Fidel lot ecastrista, Ya, se- gon informa a “New York Times”, ee eae ra ingreser om une erganimciée contrarrevoluctonaria Ue derrecar InRevei.-ite Cubana, KE) periédico cite fuentes 4@e refugindos cubance en New Orieans y on Miami como base de eva informacién. Segin la informactin, “Oswald re- greed a Estados Unidos hace 18 meses, dexzpués de dos afos y medio ja Uniée Soviética, donde traté infructuosa- Que obtuvo sobre ja base de que es fotégrafo y queria via- jar al extranjero durante los meses de octubre, noviembre brero después de estudio Ge ra caso, ret ea de que no habla adquirido pasaporte para retornar a la Unién Soviética; mientras tan- to, se vio envuelto en una disputa com un cubano anticas- trista Uamado Carlos Bringuier, quien expresé }o aiguiente: “Se ofrecié como ex infante de Marina para adiestrar a cu- banos para una invasién; desde ei principio sospeché de ¢!, francamente, pensé que podia ser un agente del F.B.L o de ae Oxwald con lus contrarrevolucionarios cubanos, dice la C.LA. que tratabe de infiltrarse pare averiguar lo que que Jusé Antonio Lanuza, vocero dei Jiamado Directorio Es- haciamos”. tudianti] de Cuba, declaré en Miami que Oswald se acercd al delegado de exe grupo anticastrista en New Orleans el Y asi, cosas mis o menos de las que ya se han jeldo aqui pasado juliv™. Es decir, que ya hay nuevos ingredientes. En fin, es toda “Lanu7a —sigue diciendo e! “Times"— dijo que “Oswald una eserte, toda una cadena de propaganda, distribuida en afinwe que queria ayudar @ jor cubanos en su lictha contra dosis: que primero es un hombre dei Comité Pro Trato Jusio ei comuniamo. y ofrecié 10 délares de contribucién y su Para ba" —lo cual es falso—; después, un hombre que ayuda en el adiestramiento militar para una invasién”. El extuvo en la Unién Soviética; después, toda una eerie de delegad) de} menctonado organismo contrarrevolucionario, insinuaciones en una serie de cables; después, ya hoy, no Caikn Bringuler, dijo al “Times” que “al principio soxpeché es edlo evo, sino es comunista, ya es de buen grado comu- de Oxwald, pero francamente, pensé¢ que pudiera ser un cea confiesa. En fin, que todo esto esté realmente muy extrefio. agenie del F.B.1. o de la CIA. que tratahe de averiguar qué estabamos haciendo nosotros”. ka decir, aqui aparecen Tiraron no al tipo de un fandtico, um individue con una contrarre, olucionarios cubanos diciendu que cuando traté ae serie de caracteristicas que je viene como anillc a] dedo a lo ingresar en su organizacién, mo jo aceptaron porque cre- que quiere la reaccién en Estados Unidos, que le viene como yeron que era de la CIA. o del F.B.1. y que estaba tra- anillo a la peor politica de los Extados Unidos, que tal pa- tand» de averiguar qué sstaban haciendo. rece haber sido expresamente fabricado para eso; parece el Qué curtoso! Y no es eo lo que publican, sino i los individuo expresamente tabricado para determinados fines, castristax. castristas, si lox comunistas admiradores de Fidel para creer je histeria, para desatar una campafia antisovié- Castro. simpatizantes de Fide] Castro; y equi aparece que ica, anticubana, anticomunista, antiprogresista, antiliberal, traté de ingresar en une organivacién y que ellos no lo ad- en jos Estados Gpspemal eeeig.oeigen a@ un Presidente cuya mitieron porque crejan que era de) F.B.1. o de la CLA. politica chocaba en te con la politica que promo- —tlhs deben conocer bien, porque tratan mucho con ellos, vien los sectores més reaccionarics después del] acuerdo sobre qué tipo tlenen los agentes de] F.BJ. y de la CIA. tl cese de —_ Rucleares, después de determinados dis- Pero por lo pronto, sin que nosotros afirmemos nada, cursos que fueron undnimemente combatidos, porg coa- porque no podemos afirmario, porque lo mismo puede ser sideraban débil con Cuba. nde un culpable que un Inocente. no podemoa afirmario; que iCudles pueden haber sido los méviles del asesina puede ser un agente de la CIA. o dei F.BI. como sospe- Presidente Kennedy? iQué puede haber detrés regen charon esta gente, que puede ser un instrumento de los esto? hace gdno lo peers afirmar, porque nosotros no eeciores mAs reaccionarios, que hayan estado fraguando un podemos con con otros elementos ulcto; - plan siniestro. que hayan fraguado e) asesinato de Kennedy sonalidad del individuo es Sg gh tL por inconformidad con su politica internaci:nal, como puede que se hace es sospechosa, es sospech ser un enfermo que esté# ahora siendo utilizado por los sector-s reaccionarion de Estados Unidos. Pero hay una serie de cosas raras en este presunto cul- pable, que se presenté en organizaciones contrarrevolucio- narias pare ingresar, y sin embargo, después dicen que apa- recié repartiendo propaganda ——— —ficen ellos—, que después aparece en una television —jqué extrafio ver- que sabe preparar esos planes; que puede ser enfermo. dad? . sin tener una personalidad, porque es que las esta- en cuyo caso Jo inico henesto ers mario alll @@leposicion cienes de Televiaiin o de Radio norteemericanas no lamag + Ge in soso yy ] Paice, weaken eraborands 1 @ ye gents eet “rreco Justo Pera Som quae lagan eampafias a favor de Cuca. no!: les eierran puer- tas de low periéc.cos, lex cierran las puertas de la radio vy i la television. ;Qué extraho que ahora aparezce que este ‘ald —-que primero eatabe tratando de ingresar en una eanizacoen contrarrevolucionana—, ahora recurra a jas voertas de la televisién para ¢@efendernos a nosotros; qué extrafiee’ Que extrabo que este ex miembro de la Infanteria oe Manne vave a la URSS, as quieras ingresar, hacerse ciu« natane avietioo, y hos soviéticos no lo acepten, que declare * la ti rbaiada Amencana qsce piensa revelaries todos los ete de be que conocié, muentras estuvo en servicio, a la “nS. Alles. y que, a peaar 60 ena Geciaracién, le pague bash un republicano @e Texas que est& conaiderado * + @9-1 mismu dice: “Teams est4 considerado por ellos vie ee eke POS St hogan anhis aide ellos miuamos afirmas que os @1 bestién é@ reac jon, que Texas os af éa resectonarierg ‘ tia Que @qui este ester gue é | H ene salt 2.8 yStbat2e ‘ef abs ll peautbeeae SESE = —= el ani itaf — Sieye “pil! ane ni LY ET 4134 FA 33 R ith ae fellE i 4 it 1 ya i aptdsj ° of ts? | tye3 & jar 3 eal a ei adits He ae ots ay Scala 5 fgo85 aeees ga tHe 1 i oningtil d Hit, ar eea THe ee Ee i abt, eat Hit ft HtEEE eanue ABT Cet=i | 170 nih Hane ia Ht ii tt a h i ie dey wh ip : fie 3 au fie iri THe Fi i Hi i ty ifit,t it i i pialre gpesiies Hehat ¥ gidat << “3 byt $ “ytae F fae }e3 ob ya's Hilt i| tated Hf i uf 1323 sibetagt Tali & ty a Hatina i itl een ra Hie linia i METH all Hallifi! 3 ipa 48 tee|ducesdig aig es ay se A OT 1gt HOY—La Habena, Jorres 28 de Noviembre ce 1263 . Discurso del Primer Ministro, comandante Fidel Castro; en la Universidad Ni ahora ninunca n uiestro heroico pueblo debe a roe ser tolerante con los vicios ni con el delito DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR EL COMANDANTE FIDEL DIFICIL QUE PUEDA MANTENERSE EL SECRETO Y CASTRO PRIMER MINISTRO Y PRIMER SECRETARIO DEL EL MISTERIO’HASTA EL FINAL’ . FARTIDO UNIDO DE LA REVOLUCION SOCIALISTA (PURS), EN FL ACTO-CLAUSURA EN CONMEMORACION Y Jo que dice Connally una entrevista que concedio DE LA FECHA LUCTUOSA DEL 27 DE NOVIEMBRE. . & los periodistas. desde su lecho. en el Hospital, entre otras cosas dice: “Lo que se manifestd en Dallas fue el odio que (OPTO. DE VERSIONES TAQUIGRAFICAS DEL ° existe en nuestra sociedad, e] mismo odio que 2¢ manifests . GOBIERNO REVOLUCIONARIO) =. > cuando se colocé une bomba en la iglesia de Birmnghem, gue causé le muerte de cinco nifos™. Esto lo dice otro herido, que iba junto con Kennedy. irks.mientras realizebe wne visita casi acostum- Y asi, va a ser muy dificil Seguir vistiendo este mufeco, bada—cvando iroportunidader nonlopermiten— «i va a ser muy dificil seguir sosteniendo lo que habian estado. sosteniendo, ¢€ incluso. nosotros pensamos que es dificil que no hays suficieate reaccién dentro de los Estados Unidos como para que quede sin investigar. Es muy dificil concebir nun universitaria una serie de Cutstiones que que no haya muchos" norteamericanos, cualesquiera que sea nos imteresen mucho, interess 8 nuestro pals, interesa a nues- Su posicién politica, su ideologia, que por un elemental sen- tra economia, les imierexe & usiedes 3 tide de decoro, de vergienza y de prestigio, no exiian que Posteriormente ocurrieron une parte Se a pig Tee Jodox estos hechos we aclaren. _ todas estas extrafas cir- ho— un acontecimiento de carécter inierns cunstancias encuentyen una explicacién. Y seré muy dificil, tional pa Sucndecs. 7 sobre inde muy revelndor ¥ solo a un costo exwaordinario de prestigio ira Estados del estado de descomporicion le sociedad imperialists. lo Unidos, que puedan encubrir a Jos culpables del asesinato, ual hizo que la atencion de nuestro pueblo, de nuesiro pais, que pucdan mantener en el secreto y en el misterio los preocupara en el andlisis y le pres’ Ja atencion debida mdviles verdaderos, los propdsitos verdaderos y Jos autores 2 ene acontecimiento F intelectuales ¥ organizadores de ese crimen. Posteriormente —ayer precisamente—, por otras causes, Pero ellos fhismos. ellos mismos. los que fraguaron estos ruvimos una reunion con estudiantes de la Ensehanza Se Planes contra Je paz contra Cuba, contra la Union Soviética, cundaria, Y en esa ocasiom, pues algunos de los temas que contra le humanidad. contra Ins s¢ctores progresistas € inchu- nosotros hablamos . tretar aqui en ej die de hoy, #0 liberales de Estados Unidos, Jos que fueron los culpables, fueron plantesdos & aquellos estudiantes. Les quiero deci #s muy Uificil que puedan mantenerse en el secreto y en el con esto que ha venido a presentarse el 27 de Noviembre misterio hasta el) final nn con las ap amen en que Lees et Serco ee ir. sim otros problemas que no fueran nuestr Y por eso: esperamos tranquilos. pero no confisdos. Y pacggeeA He Manion. extudiantiles, académicos; y, ade- ne confiados. porque jvean qué peligros amenazan a Ja hums- més. sin un tems en parte trated. nided. qué peligros amenazan @ los pueblos’, jcudnta falts de escropulos. cudnta majdad y cuanto cinismo se encierra UY; Systane’ manere,tay conforive: porque yepense: manera muy con! “rr pars tratar tods una serie de cuestiones irs Ak Oe S 3 en la sociedad imperialista, entre los elementos mds reac- cionarios de esa sociedad! jCudntos peligros. cudntos planes 0 parcial de la jencla del acto en conmemoracion del 27 de Noviemre, efectuado anoche en Ia Escalinata de siniestros! Por esa decia que esperamos tranquilos. pero no ver con le técnica, con ja economia, con le intversidad de Le ns. Junto a Fidel, aparecen jos mv! Jembros de Je Direcién Nacional del PURSC, Blas Roca y ca- confiados. porque es una enscAanza mas, es una leccion mis. ‘in Osman Cienfuegos, Ministre de la Construccion: el cap! tan Antonlo Nofe:Jiménez, presidente de la Comision Nacio- Y mientras tanto, veamos como Jos que organizaron todas eee Acisorintod Ciencias, y los padres del inolvidalbble Camilo, sehore mon Clenfuegos y Emilia Gorriaratn. esa maniobra se cocinan en su propia salsa; porque ya hasts . = los campeones olimpicos de tiro estin dando sus opiniones an quinto piso, Por Jo general, e] fanstico confiess y ¢xpliea evande Je dicen ue no puede ser? . Por que tra Ja puerta, en cua}quier parte de) mundo. qué acta inmediatamente, es una reaccion sicologica por qué se marca? Ningun amigo de Cubs ingun comu- De todas formas, para nuestra Patria, que s¢ vio nurve- fanstico. ve, nista. hace exo nando visita nuestros Consula » Padie se mente amenazada, que vio nurvamente como contre ella se se han ido produciendo van paulatinamente Aqui se da el extraho caso de que e! acusadn. © #l su- comporia de peamanera grosera ws apuntaban las armas de le agresion, que vie como trateban desenmaacerando toda la maniobra, tode In trastienda sucia. puesto asesino, dispara de] lugar donde trahaya. Ningiin in- Y. desde lueo, nosotros no tenemos otros antecedentes de echar sobre ella y su Revolucion un chaparron de infa ly habia detrés de ese episodio, #1 complot dividuo que intenta escapar —es decir, ya no xiendo wn fa- de ete acusadono tenemos ningun otro antecedente, que mias. ha visto como gees una ver mas en evidencia, com and siniestra conjura que cada ver se Waites nitico, alguien pagado. alguien que miente excapar— ae dis- joe pnteredenitesque «* enuncian por Ja prensa. Norotror queda uns vez més demostrada la conducta de cada cual qnas on la imaginacion, en Iaidea de los responsables de ea realizar ese ateniado desde el propio sitio donde tra nunca afirmarent® ealegoricamente que alguien sea culpa e) procedimiento de cada cusl. De esta prueba, como de . ¥ cade dis Is opinién pablica mundial recibe mix |. donde a los cinco minutos va a ser identificade. donde ble de algo, sincienemos pruebas irrebatibles de el o, Pero todas las pruebas a que sea sometidas nuestra Revolucion by ep onde iuleie queponen al desnudo, que des- a jos cinco "minutos va a ser perseguido ferozmenie por hasandones en tpdlesia, #) este fue el verdadem autor ma sale con mas razén y sale con mas moral. porque ante jos gamascaran completamente Ia maniobra que se urdio conire todas partes. Habria “buscado una azotea de otro edificw. terial de Jox hechs. su viaje a México, ru xupuesin entrevis ojos del mundo esté claro, y In extara cade vez mas, como ‘| mundo, y como pa pane —muy eapecialmente—, habria alquilado un apartamento a Jo larga de Ja travector, por la prensa. preentandose como defensor de Cuba —breve Ins reaccionarios de Estados Unidos quisieron hacer s nues- ra nuestro Fs se habria situsdo con su rife telescopico a una distancia que emp antes dels hechos—, su supuesta reyeria con ele tro pais y al mundo victimas de sus criminsles designios. ene me toda oe tate de cosas ext s, que cade Je permitiera escapar. meine conirarrvolucionarios; ahj en todo eso se veia per- aim al precio de asesinar al propio Presideote de ese pals die oe hacen max extrafhas ¥ que hacen cada dis més débil Pero es muy extraho que un individuo, dondr mismo tra- Ieciamente elatwade la coarlada la cosrtada . Y todo este episodio se semeja mAs # una novela del le version, los infundios, las insinuaciones, que st Quisieron “baja. donde va a ser identificado = los cinco minutos, realece ¥ entonces todo resulla perfeciamente implicable, en FBI. « un Re odio de gangsters. que # un acontecimiento hacer a raz de le muerte de Kennedy; sparte ——decia— de un hecho de esa Indole desde alli y, a] mismo tempo, trate de alguien a quien ae le ofrecié escapar, dispard. dejaba huelias, politico. Todas las circunstancias, Ja forma escandalosa en toda una serie de hechos sobre los cuales ¢) mundo se he excapar. Exo no tiene lgica, no tiene sentido, Una sene de se identificaba, desaparecia, dirian que vino para Cuba, que que se produjeron Jos dos asesinatos, nos recuerdan las pe- pursto # pensar, y todo el mundo s¢ puso & pensar; y mien- Cireunstancias extrafias como esa. « ~ 7 ’ Cubs lo alhergd; quizas esos mirmox complies Jo desapare- Viculax de gangsters -que nosotros vimox tantas veces aqui. trax mas piensan sobre ello menos explicaciOn Je encuentra. Luepo, emplear ese tipo de fusil desde alli, tratar dr ee ‘clan despues, pero hacjan creer que habia venido a Cuba, que filmadas precisamente en Hollywood. porque para que no Incluso hey, por eiemplo, un campeon de tiro —que capar sabiendo que habria estado identificado inmediatsmente. habia estado en Cubs antes del asesinato. Porque se ve que faltara hasta el maximo le semejanza. e) encargado de ligui- ” decirse un especial si huhiese sido #) culpable, traté de escapar, después lo dar o de linchar » yn acusado fue nada menos que un tahur srresian y se sonrie ante Ips cAmaras de Television, no con- procedente de Chicago. * 3 . Todas son esas cosas contradictorias, ilégicas, inexplicables, cree que lama Hubert Harmmerer— declaro en Viena que lo mismo demuestran, 0 bien que se inventé un culpable, ™ invernsimil que we tirador equipade com une care. + que se fabricé un culpable. o bjen que el autor de lox hechos. fies, mega, no admite que je gan e) deiector de menti- max potente ex la mira, pues tanto lado y también al esposo de dicha empleada. Unidos, sino de un perro asesinado en la calle: y declaran Porque la Revolucién era al principio, mas que nada. una més sensible es & cusiquier movimiento, y se pierde el ob- {Para qué la s#rrestaron? Y cpor qué ta arrestaron? La cerrado el caso a Int 48 horas. Cerrado el caso, cuando el fuerza destructora de una vieja sociedad: era un tremendo vo. errestaron para interrogaria y para interrogaria de manere asm Be hacia menos cerrable, cuando el caso ee hacia mas entusiasmo, pero no un entusiasmp organizado, preparado v Hay ademas la circunstancia —y todo eso parece indi. brutal, maltratandola, insimuandole supursias relaciones con misterioso. cuando el caro se hacia mas sospechoso, cuando consciente como jo es hoy. Antes soplaban Jos vientos de) eer que puede haber aparecido exe fusil ahi como parte de el acusado del asesinato de Kennedy, tratando de obtener alll el casn se hacia més investizable desde el punto de viste despilfarro, de Ix desprencupacion Jos gastos. de la des- ~ Ja trama, del ardid— que hayan puesto ese fusil, que no ex mediante coaccion, alguna informacion. judicial y penal, Preocupacién no sdlo por ja cantiand: sino, incluso, por la precisamente un arma pare disparar a ochenta metros, ni Nosotros no sablamos exo. Yo ignoraha eso cuando habit Porque estoy secure que ningun fuez que actue come tal, Calidad de Jo que produciamos Pye para disparar tres tiros; la mira telescépica es un arma para —slengo eniendido que e! sdbado por la noche—. Pero esto ohjetivamente, cierra ningun caso en crrcunstancias como Claro esta, que en los primeros tiempos de la Revolucion disparar a 300, 400, 500 Dnt metros, y adn mis, Y demuestra como se estaba perfilando todo. ‘ fsa. en que el principal acusado ex axerinado. . se Vibraba una tremenda batalis ideologica: fue una batalla Jos compaheros que v en el “Granma”, muchos de Alegaron los agentes policiacoy que In interrogahan con ie Juego, que nosotros Jeimos cuidarosames entre las ideas, entre las teorias, porque era necesario com: hecian blan: vist Ja visita que habia hecho este sehor Oswald al Conku- cables donde se consiznaha Ja noticia del segundo ase batir las tesis, los atgumentos de los enemigos de !a Kevo- Indo de Cubs. ¢COmo lo sabian? (Quién xe In din? (Desde y sobre todo lox de la UPI. Inmediatamente el mismo énta Jucion, que trataban de engahar. de confundir, de desorit dénde se Io dijeron? Pprque nosotros no lo sabiames. Porque que hahin pursio Ja UPI en presentar » Oswald como Es claro que en aquella etapa estaba en primer plano xquella jien fuese « realizar un atentado desde ochenta metros, des- ee una cora de rutina: nadie en la Cancilleria, ningn funcin un filo-romunista, como un Castro-comunista. como ain admi batalla, la batalla por la defensa Sel ¥ que durante un wiriera un fusil de mira telescdpica. cuan- nario siquiera habia identificado # aquel individuo que apare- rador de Castro, Jo puse en preseniar a este sehor, Jatk periodo de tiempo. muy poco se act de Ins problemas cia como supuesio culpable come uno de lox individues Ruby, como un admirador de Kennedy, un gran admiradot importantisimos de la economia y de Ja produccion. Era légico que en Ja lucha de las teorias nos hubiesemos —cientos de individuos— que se habia aparecido a asolicitar de Kennedy. Yuelto demasiado teoricos, 0 no demasiado tedricos, sino de- una view Ex decir, que lo primero que hace —lo que se dedice a masiado teoricisias; nos hubi¢semos vuelto demasiado argu- hacer de faniediets de inmediato— le UPI es dar la versién Onre dete que me Hamé la atencién esque se compré Luego. Ip policis americana le mentistas. Hablamos aprendido a manejar los argumentos e de Dallas lo informé. ; Por qué lo * 12.78, © algo de eso; es decir, 3 Por qué ie im gite Ie interesaba: tratar de presentar un caso de asesinato. y las teorias, x ® aplastar Jas teorias y los argumentos de 12 ddlares. Y una buena mirilie como esa, sola. vale joe 12 formé? . Por qué ne habia aparecido eso en Jee periodices per emocién, por sentimentsliamo, per patriotismo. Flace nuestros enemigos ideolégicos. Y e! pueblo adquiné mucho, doleres y més. del mundo se venden furiles todavia, ) si aparecié en un periddico de Meéxien dos o tret faver puede hacerie la UPI_@ quien fuera presidente de su pais. preseniando » ecie gangster, @ este tahur, « este inmo- lo que se ie_calificar de instruccién revolucionaria. bo do oe A Dap ao ne ig Por dink después? ral. viciose. y Viciose sujelo, como un gran agmiradar de cual era, ademas imprescindible e importantisiine. Pero con- 6 em $12.78? Nosotros compramos unos cuantos fusiles de Por aqui se purde ver claramente el hilo. . Qué fur 8 Kennedy: como un admirador tan extraordinarie como que forme é¢ramos eficaces en combatir teéricamente, ¢ramos in- Fu H hacer exie xehor al Consulade de Cubs en Mexico? 2 capeces de combatit précticamente con le misma eficacia a y sabemos lo que vaien. Y tuvirmos necesidad de com- esiuviers dispursio a afrontar Ja sila eléctrica por venga: Ruestros enemigos. > sabemos lo que cuestan les miriilas, pretexto utilizé? ;Solicitar una visa de transite, cuande yu muerie: un individun que teda su vida no hizo mAs que ala Union Sovietica podia haber ido por Inglate explotar al vicie, ¢) jurzo y Ja inmoralidad. Y a le par = jos imperialistas ¥ Jos capitalistas arre ere otro dato extraho, =» para \iajar ‘ciaban su campafa de propaganda sobre la base de nuestras DE COSAS REALMENTE RARAS were not correct and were a lie or something to that effect. At that time, I understood you could not speak English and did not understand English; is that correct? Senor MIRABAL. Yes, it is true. I did not speak English at that time. However, my colleague, Senor Azcue, and the secretary would, without any doubt, have informed me if he had stated anything of such a nature. I have complete trust in my colleague, Azcue, and in the secretary, and obviously because of the unusual and extremely alarming nature of any observations or statements of that kind, I feel sure that they would have advised me had they heard them. Mr. Sawyer. I just wanted the record to be clear that you are repeating what the other two told you rather than stating an observation as to what he said yourself. You are nodding your head yes. Senor MirRABAL. Yes; I don’t understand English. Even if I heard it in English, I wouldn’t have understood it—yes, it was my col- league, Azcue, and the secretary who took care of the application submitted by Lee Harvey Oswald. It was also them who provided me with all of the information that enabled me to add the observa- tion contained in that footnote to the effect that he was requesting at the same time a visa to go to the Soviet Union. In fact, I noticed that he presented a card or credentials as belonging to the Communist Party of the United States. I under- stand, or it is also my understanding, that the Communist Party of the United States stated that he never belonged to the party. I was surprised by the fact that the card seemed to be a new card. I must say that I also have been a Communist for a number of years and that generally we do not use credentials or a card to identify ourselves as members of the party. Rather, we are identi- fied to ourselves as Communists by our own behavior and by our own ideas. I was surprised by his unusual interest in using identifi- cation as a Communist. I would think it would be interesting to know how he obtained the card. It did have his name, and it did coincide with the same — name that appeared in the other document. And, as I indicated, it — was my colleague, Azcue, who brought all these documents and all this information to my desk for my report. It is then that I talked | with the Soviet consul, and when I mentioned this to him, he told me that Oswald had in fact requested a visa for the Soviet Union but that he had been told that it would take about 4 months to obtain a response, and that is the reason that I included that information in the footnote that was to be sent to Havana. Mr. Sawyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STokEs. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Mirabal, was it standard operating procedure for an appli- cant to affix his signature to the application in the presence of a consulate official? Senor MIRABAL. That was normal. And it was always applied in that manner. 177 Chairman STokgs. Were there ever any occasions when an appli- cation form would be signed in blank? Senor MiraBat. During the 11 months that I was there, that was never done. Chairman Stokes. And under the procedure as you knew it, were | applicants ever permitted to take the application forms out of the consular office? Senor MiraBau. To my knowledge, no. The ministry did not allow that to be done. I could not authorize it, and as far as I know, it was never done. Chairman STokEs. Thank you, Mr. Mirabal. Is there anything further? The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. Mr. Forp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Could I get Mr. Mirabal to describe Mr. Oswald’s demeanor, please? Senor MiraBAL. What I recall, and this, of course, is not only an image that time has eroded, but also I looked at him without concentrating great attention on him. At that time his appearance was not a cause of concern, but rather the events that were taking place at that time, the loud conversation, et cetera. As I recall him, he was a rather small man, medium height or somewhat less, narrow shoulders. I believe he was wearing a coat, short hair. I do not recall him having a moustache. He did have a _ serious expression on his face. He appeared hard or tough, someone | who is upset or unhappy. That is the image that I retain of him. Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. Is there anyone else seeking recognition? Mr. Mirabal, at the conclusion of a witness’ testimony before our committee, he is entitled under the rules of this committee and of ] the House to address the committee for a period of 5 minutes in : : | } the event he desires to in any way clarify his testimony or expand upon it or explain it. I would at this time extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose if you so desire. Senor MiraABAL. Thank you. I would like to state to the members of the committee that in connection with this entire process of the two visits that he made to the consulate, my impression from the very first moment was that it was in fact a provocation. He insisted on the urgency of his need for a visa. He indicated that he was being persecuted. He indicated that he could not stay long in Mexico, that he had an urgent need to travel to Cuba and there- from to go to the Soviet Union. On the first day he was not given the visa because he did not fulfill the necessary requirements, requirements that are asked of all individuals who are visa applicants. On the second time he came to file the application, and yet he insisted that he needed to have it processed rapidly with great urgency. It was because of these demands of his that the argument with Mr. Azcue and with the secretary followed, and in fact during the argument he accused us all of not being true revolutionaries, of not being sensitive to the fact that he was being persecuted. I must say that from the very beginning I considered this a provocation, and IJ assured that in the manner in which we handled the case we followed the directives of the Foreign Ministry in the 178 sense that all individuals have to follow certain procedures in order to obtain a visa. I would also like to say personally that as far as I am concerned, it is a source of great satisfaction to be present here before the committee because in the first place I consider this a very impor- tant investigation in itself and also because we are very interested in its successful outcome. I am individually—and my government wants to insure—that things will be perfectly cleared up as a result. We feel that there have been efforts at making propaganda, at conducting campaigns, and Cuba has been, attempts have been made to link Cuba to this horrendous assassination. From the reports that have been read here, apparently even I had been linked to this event, and I can assure that neither Cuba nor I in any manner whatsoever participated in something that we very strongly repudiate, as was clearly stated by Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Chairman Stokes. Thank you very much, Mr. Mirabal. We also want to thank you for having volunteered to be here today and to testify before this committee, and we are deeply appreciative for your appearance. Does counsel have any statement to make? Mr. STANDARD. Just this, Mr. Chairman. In anticipation of your incorporating in this record the 4 hour approximate transcript of the interview with President Castro, I ask that you incorporate into the record and make it a part of it a series of articles which are referred to but not with specificity by date or name. First, a series of three articles by the French journalist, Jean Daniel, one which appeared in L’Express in French and two arti- cles which appeared in the magazine, The New Republic. Second, in the course of the interview several references are made to Ambassador William Atwood. Those statements describe his role in contacting the Cuban Government at the behest of President Kennedy. And I ask that those be included as well. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, counsel’s request is hereby granted. JFK exhibit F-685 may be entered into therecord at this point. [The information follows:] 1z9 JFK Exuipit F-685 Nov 28,1963 LLEXPRE>> LES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES Se Krouchtchew par exemple, Kennedy mettre ca sur Je dos, Mais, dites- est un hop vee qui l'on peut moi, cela fait le quatriéme président parler. C'est J’impression que j’al re- des Etats-Unis qui est assassiné sur tireée de toutes Ofes conversations -eomtren-? 36? C'est fnquiétant.. A Cuba, il n'y en a pas un seul. Vous Avec Castro avec Krouchtchev.,DYautres im’assu- rent que, pour cela, il faut attendre savez, lorsque nous élions dans la sa réélection; Moi, Je le crois respon- Sierra, il y avait des gens (pas dans sable de tout mals, je vais vous dire, mon groupe, dags un autre) qui voulaiept tucr Batista. Is croyaient a Vheure du crime. __ je crois qu'lJ a campris pas mal de choses depuis quelgues mois et puis qu’on pouvait en finir avee un -ré- aussi, ea fin de copipte, je sttis per- gime en le décapitant. Moi, j'ai tou- suadé gug n'importe qui d’autre jours été furietisement hostile & cds serait pire. > methodes. Par calcul politique Puis Fidel a gute avec un grand d‘abord, arce que, en cé ui rire d'adolescent:. «Si vous le re- concerne Cuba, si on avait tué Ba- voyez, vous pouvez lui dire que fe tista, i] aurait eté remplacé par pn suis prét a declarer que, Goldwater militaire qui ayrait prétehdu faire est mon ami, si cela doit assurer payer aux révolutionnaires - le “mar- sa réélection... >» tyre du dictateur. Maid par lempéra- Cette conversation datail du 19 no- ment aussi car, au fond, ce getife vembre, d’assassinal me répugne.2 =~ ‘ Maintenant il étalt 2 heures envi- Ms ron, et nous nous sommes leyés de_ OPS: Soran ‘table pour poils installer devant une oe, Gullo meniatité 1 ee ee radio. Le commandant Vallero, gon médecin; aide de camp et ami in- Les émissions ont repris. Un re- par ~time, a facilement pris |’émission en orter croit devoir parles des dif- anglais du relais de la N.B.C. a cultés que Mme Kennedy trouve & Miami. Au fur et & mesure de V’ar- mee ea de any sain, mes rivée dcs nouvelles, Vallero les tra- idel explose :.¢ mentalidad», sev st duisait & Fidel. Blessure & la téte. . il répéte plusieurs fois + Quelle - ance © = Poursuite de }’assassin, Meurtre. d’un mentalité», apres tout de gterillero a annoncé que le ré- uand il a prononce | nn Aprés uo goat Yheure de silence jal pensé ao crucifix gui ttakt-res sident de In République Dortlcos: : [annonce fatale | obscrvé par toutes les stations de ra- youlait parler d’urgence au Premier dans la chambre que ]’on m‘ayait dio américaines, nous nous sommes réservée. J'ai pensé aux égiises ca- ministre. Fidel a pris l'appareil et réinstallés devant le poste : le silence je lui ai entendu dire ; « o 7? Un Soudain, ensuite, M1 s’était dé- tholiques, aux temples -protestants tendu : «Cet homme, m‘avait-il dit, n’avait été iaeh Nae que pour la ue j'avais vus, emplis de fidéles le _atentado» («Comment? un atten- retransmission de I’'hymne national tat ?>). Il s'est adressé & nous pour ce pourrait étre encore Kennedy. Il imanche matin précédent & San- a gardé encore toutes les ossibilités aniéricain., Cela procurait une tiago. Je me suis souvenu .que tous nous dire que Kennedy venait d'étre étrange impression que d’entendre abattu a Dallas. I] a repris la conver- de devenir, aux yeux de I'Histoire, le ces révolutionnaires célébrdient relic plus grand président des Etats-Unis. retentir cet hy:nne dans Ja maison gieusement Ja naissance, Ae mariage, sation et ‘a déclaré tout haut :_« He- de Fidel Castro au milfeu des vi- rido ? Muy gravemente 2?» (Blessé Celui. qui comprendrait enfin qu'il peut y avoir une cuvexistence entre sages préoceupeés. row gauche, fdcl Castro. De gri¢vement 2), « Maintenant, devait dire Fidel, il dos, marqu “une croix, Jean le est revenu s'assepir devant la cupitalistes ct socialistes, meme faut vite, trés vite, qu'ils retrouvent Daniel... ‘ace, I'écrivain cubain fable & manger et il a répétée trois dans la zone américaine. Juan Arcocha, Au fond, le comman- ¢ Ce serait alors un président: su- assassin, sinon, vous allez voir, je fois: ¢ Es una mala noticia» (¢ Voila Jes ‘connais, ils vont essayer de nous dant Vallejo. une mativaise nouvelle»). Puil il est péricnr & Lincoln. Je sais que, pour resté silencicux pendant un moment, + OOO TT eta. aaa z j3 I) attendait un autre coup de téle- plone et plus de details, Ha dit en- suite qu'il y avait dans la socicté americaine une proportion inquié- Se zi tante de désequilibrés et que ce pou- vait @tre Peeuvre aussi bien Wun fou > que dun terroriste, Un Vietnamien ! a re 7? Ou un membre du Ku tux Klin, Le second coup de tele- Miene est arrive 2 on croyait pou- yoir lui annoncer que fe president des Btats-Unis était encore en vie et qu'on esperait le sauver, La réac- tion immediate de Fidel Castro a ete de dire: «Alors, il est réelu.> Tl A prononce cette plirase avec satis- faction. Un réquisitoire Cette phrase faisait suite A une conyersalion que nous avions eue Yayant-veille, pendant Ja nuit du- rant. Exactement de 10 heures du suir A 4 heures du matin, Une bonne partic des entreticns avait tourné autour des impressions dont je lui avait fait part sur une audience que m'ayait accordée Je président Ken- nedy le 24 octobre dernier et sur les réactions de Fidel Castro & ces impressions. Il s’était livré alors a un implacable réquisighire de la po- litique des Etats-Unis, ajoutant qu'en plus le gouvernement américain avait cu toutes les chances dans un passé récent de normaliser les rap- ports avee Cuba et qu'au licu de cela il avait toleré que la C.LA. entraine a CasTRO DANS UMB CHAMBRE DE 1L'HOTEB Haspana-Rivisra (*). une équipe et organisé Ja contre- « Maintenant, ¢a y est | Ca va étre mon tour, > 180 LES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES i Lc ‘y« hoon .= “, albert pacer -geen Fin 0 gat BAe vitanen . tan eeee (ilare Ripoud-Ragn vim.) x Finer Castro et Jean DanieL. ’ «C'Ht le quatri¢me Président des Etats-Unis assassiné. C'est inguiétant, » et la mort. J’ai pensé & cette phrase d’un jeune bomme, membre du ¢ Fair Si je peux en juger par le temps qu'il Avait éte-amené & mettre en danger d'un ministre cubain : ¢ N’oubliez Play Committee for Cuba >». C’est un m’a consacré pendant ces trois jours, la paix du monde avec les fusees ? jamais que cette révolution socialiste adimirateur de Fidel'Castro, Fidel dé- il] n’avait pu dormir auparavant que }ae était la dépendance 4 l'egard | parle l’espagnol. Vous ne pourrez la clare ; « S'ils avaient des preuves, ils quelques heures a peine. e l'Union Soviétique ? S’il n’était connaitre vraiment que si vous étes auraient dit un agent, un complice, pas possible d’envisager des rapports un familier du « Romancero>», du un tueur a gages. S'ils disent simple- avec les Etats-Unis, comme la Fia- L’ironie de histoire landé en a avec J}es Reeces 7 Com- «Cid » et de « Don Quichotte >». ment un admirateur, c’est simplement Moi, j'ajouterais u’il faut aussi étre pour tenter de lier dans l’esprit des ment le passage s'est fait de Phuma- un familier de l'Afrique depuis que gens le nom de Castro et l'emotion Aprés Matanzas d’ot il devait or- nisme de la Sierra ie, © au” j'ai entendu chanter t « Internatio- suscitée par l’assassinat. C’est la mé- donner l'état d’alerte, nous sommes maryisme-léninisme de 1961 ? Fidel revenus a Varadero pour diner. Hl a Cas{ro, @ nouveau en pleine forme, nale >» par des petites filles devant thode de la publicité, c'est la mé- dit, citant le propos qu'une femme la maison ou l'on célébrait un thode de la propagande, C'est ter- s'est expliqué sur tout, Puis™il m’a rible. Mais vous savez, je suis str lui avait tenu peu avant, que c’était questionné a nouveaw sur Kennedy « chengo » qui est une sorte de vau- une ironie de_ I'histoire pour les dou cubain. que tout cela va se dégonfler trés et chaque fois que je faisais un éloge vite. Il y a, aux Etats-Unis, trop de Cubains, dans la situation qui leur des qualités intellectuelles du pre- Vers 5 heures, Fidel Castro a polices concurrentes pour que les avait été faite depuis le blocus, sident assassiné, j’éveillais chez lui déclaré que, puisque nous n'y poii- d@avoir a déplorer la mort d’un pré- le plus vif intéret. j intentions de l'une d’elles puissent vions rien, il fallait tout de méme sident des Etats-Unis. « Aprés tout, Les Cubains ont vécd avec les étre imposées a toutes, trés dong- a-t-il ajouté, il y a peut-¢tre des gens essayer de respecter l'emploi du temps. > © - Etats-Unis dans cette intimité cruelle, temps. Il tenait & me faire visiter Nous arrivons & la «granja de dans le monde que cela réjouit, Jes et que je connais bien, des colonises lui-méme une ¢ granja de pueblo» gucrilleros du Sud-Vietnam, par avee les colonisateurs. Gest tout de ucblo» ot les paysans accueillent exemple, et aussi, au fait, j'y pense, (ferme d’Etat) dans laquelle il s’était ide], Au méme moment, un speaker meme une intimitée. L’évéenement qui livré & des expériences personnelles. de la radio annonce avec une voix Mme Nhu. » Je pense, en effet, au frappe les honmes frappe en meme Son obsession actuelle, c’est l'agri- étranglée par l’émotion que I’on sait peuple de Cuba habitué a voir des temps les autres. Dans celté si sédui- culture. Il ne lit que des études agro- désormais que l'assassin est un «€ pro- affiches comme celle qui représente sante ville de la Havahe of nous nomiques, I Sale avec lvrisme du lArmeée rouge en surimpression der- sommes retournés dans Ja nuit, tan- castro-marnxiste >, sol, de sa fertilisation et des possi- Les commentaires se succédent, ils riére des maquisards et sur lesquels dis que brillaient les enseignes lami- bilités que donnera 4 Cuba Ja canne deviennent de plus en plus émus et on peut lire : « Alto Mr. Kennedy, neuses des slogans marxistes qui ont a sucre, en 1970, d’acquérir une com- Cuba no esta sola... » A tous ceux que remplace la publicite dp Coca-Cola de plus en plus agressifs, Fidel s’ex- pléte indépendance économique, l'on a conduits a lier leurs privations et du dentifrice, au milieu des expo- use alors: ¢«1] faut abandonner la visite de Ja ferme.» Nous alfons vers a la politique du président des Etats- sitions soviétiques et des camions , Unis. Mais ce peuple cubain est tchéques, une certaine émotion ame- Un « admirateur » Matanzas d’ot il pourra téléphoner au président Dorticos. En chemin il égaré. He se demande ce qui va lui ricaine vibrait dans I'air, faite de pose des questions : « Qui est Lyndon arriver encore, Ce peuple cubain est ressentiment, de trouble, d’anxiéte, Johnson ? Quelle réputation a-t-il? aussi un peuple leger, je dis cela mais tout de méme aussi de je ne Nous avons pris Ja voiture et ou- dans la meilleure acception. du vert la radio. On était sur Ja piste Que! rapport avait-i] avec Kennedy ? sais quel imperceptible rapproche- terme. Lei Espagnols ici n'ont pas ment.. «Apres. tout, ge président de V’aysassin de Dallas, «C'est un avec Krouchtchev ? Quelle etait sa été imprégnés de la gravité indienne espion russe », dit le reporter. Cor- position au moment de Ja tentative améri¢ain s'est mis d‘accord, pen- d'invasion a Cuba ? Quelle autorité, comme au Mexique : ils sont impreé- dant sa vie, avec nos ajynis russes», rection cing minutes aprés : ¢ C’est nés de la jovialité africaine, C'est un espion marié a une Russe. » Fidel enfin et surtout, a-t-il sur Ja C.1.A.?> m’‘a dit, au moment de; mon départ, le peuple du rythme et la haine ne un jeune intellectuel cubain, comme dit: « Maintenant, ca y est, cela va Et puis, soudain, i] regarde sa mon- résiste pas au rythme. pour s’excuser de ne pas se réjouir étre mon tour.> Pas encore. L’as- tre, vérifle qu'il nous faut une demi- éassin est un déserteur marxiste. En- heure pour arriver a Matanzas et Au diner, j'ai po reprendre toutes de l’assassinat, suite on entend en effet qu'il s’agit comme sur commande, i] s’endort. mes questions. ;Comment Castro JEAN DANIEL, 181 LES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES = ss A cele { LE ‘TESFAMENT- DE KENNEDY == | ‘ i | Le ‘ / ! § iedkb Vink PS =: Fug ‘ — ot dernier 4] dialogue Les conclusions de Kennedy sur de Gaulle et Castro confiées a Jean Daniel. Et la vérité sur l’affaire des fusées. pl été recu & la Maison-Blanche par le Président Kennedy, le jeudi 24 octobre, & 17 h 45, Le rendez- vous m'avajleété §xé a 17 b 30. J’ai altendu pendant un quart d’heure dans Ja salle des Conférences de Cabinet, salle contigué au célébre bureau du Président des Etats-Unis. u bout d’un quart d’heure, c’est le résident lui-méme qui-est ven e hercher pour m'introduire dans § ureau. I] s’esf excusé de m’avoir fait attendre, non pas pour étre courtois ou pour m’accorder quelque importance, mais pour donner une explication au léger trouble apporté dans un empfoi du temps dont [‘or- Ganisalion paraissait trés stricte. En pussant dans la petite piéce ot se tient la secrétaire, nous avons vu sortir par une porte-fenétre Mime Jac- queline Kennedy, qui se dirigeait vers les jardins privés de la Maison- Blanche. Le President l’a rappelée pour que je puisse lui étre presenté. C’était encore, & Washington, I'In- dian Summer: i) faisait trés chaud et le président, comme Mme Ken- nedy, etuient trés légérement vétus, ce qui ajoutait a l'extreme impression de jeunesse, de charme et de simpli- cité que l'on était surpris de ressentir en accédant & cette solennelle en- ceinte. Le Président (allure sportive et élégante, gestes rapides et courts, le regurd mobile mais qui, & certains moments, se figeait dans une immo- bilite inquiétante, je dirai presque globuleuse) m’a fait asseoir sur le canapé semi-circulaire qui se tient -au milieu de son bureau. Lui s’est assis, en face de ce canapé, sur un fuuteuil & bascule. L'entretien devait durer de vingt & vingt-cing minutes. ‘Il ne fut interrompu que par un bref coup de téléphone. D’accord sur rien ’ Le Président Kennedy m’a aussitét™ ‘Jous Fivzermaip oie pent decinieor,"nay age nS «Fai léléphgne disectement-& da.Gaulile.., » m'a parlé do Ii Pa fait defacon déteadue comme depuziis le visite récente de M.-Gouve <- un homme a enfin trouvé te de Marville, le Président. Kennedy -ttail. motes: préoceupe- partes rela- a Gots 206nncestexaspéré ee fastingé. tions -:frenco-américaines, Il avait Joho Kennedy diltia eamne i décidé de ne 3 s’en | préoccuper. aimait comprendre vite et: résou C’était, selon i, une jautile perte tension urrait redoaner aux En- plus bape See canner? Nord oT de temps. ropéens l’envie de penser par eux- fate ce n’était’ - Cétait «Nous avons: v M. Couve memes et de ne plus com agg) avec | Krouchicher. Pus et moi, m’4: dit le Pré- seusement ni sur. bea - ; jour, Re pes compren- sident, que nous n’étians d’accord Yimpulsion itique des Etats-Unis. ‘mais qu'il les dre, et Act a : > Hl avait Mais nous n’alions plus donner & la les amis ‘les tut procuraicat sur rien, et nous convenus taient. eux-mpties.+ engages . \ sa honé directement au général de que ce désaccord total ge devait pas France des occusions de créer cette a tension.» Yaction, ; 5 ‘ En vain. Mais, fait singulier, naire & igmitié entre deux grands J’ai ‘alors demandé au Président ~ Kennedy ce que J’on pouvait attendre La notion d’indépendance du voyage aux Etats-Unis projeté par le général de Gaulle en février pro- Le Président Kennedy a poursuivi chain. Il a répondu: « Absolument en résumant, avec concision et vi- rien. > i ueur, les désaccords entre les Etats- Jnis et la France. Mais il a aussitét précisé avec un large sourire, et comme savour Sur l’Allemagne, la politique nu- cléaire, l'Europe, la notion d’ « indé- Yavance le plaisir de la future ri pendance », il m’a dit ce qui, depuis, contre : « Ce sera tout de méme : a été publié partout. Il a cependant excitant, le général de Gaulle est que ss ajouté que la France avait une sin- SSSEnS PAGE 3 ‘ L'EXPRESS. — 6 DECEMBRE 1963 ar ee eer ae a 182 LES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES ————— LES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES ————————— ’ Adjoubes, sat de potent, bgnerent ——____—_> «hes Russes, eux, sen sont bien qwavee lui eon pousart parler >. apergus, du moins aprés notre réac- eats fois, Mma fait repeter certai- foul, ne pouvait Urer les miciues figure historique, c'est decidement le hon, mais ou ie) Castro je n'ar- nes phrases, en particuler celles ou conclusions que nous. Et lorsque us étrange grand homme de nous avons cos unhiqae & Krouch- rive pas Aa ir sil s'en rend Kennedy exprimait sa reprobation fi.poque. > tehev fous fea os rents 2ae compte, ni mdne s'il s'en soucie. > du regime de Batista, celles ou Ken- ‘ui alors pris Vinitiative de repar- Un sourire, puis: «Vous me le nedy Simpationtait des propos pre- fericurs, ils se sonk fuis €UX aussie # ler du Vietnam et de Cuba pour dire niderpreter dans metre sens le Cute divez, & votre retour de Cuba. Ge tes au general de Gaulle, celles enfin que les gaullistes n'etaient pas seuls qui aecuyaient: Fidel Wavoir Cail versation Keanedsy-Adjouber et als nest pas comme cela, en tout cas, en France a regretter Jes erreurs po- sont alles aux renseignements, Au je veux dire par la inéthode de la étre a Vorigine dune guerre fatale litiques des Etats-Unis. Ici, mes notes subversion communiste, que les pour Ihumanité entiere, bout d'un mois, kes gouvernements sont trés précises et je laisse parler russe et Cubuly por. neiege & fe cere peuples d’Amérique Jatine arrive- le Président des Etats-Unis : titude quan debarquemeht’a (abe ront a la justice el aw progres. Ce pouvait se faire dun moment # Pate «Novus n'avons pas le temps de n'est pas en passant d'une oppre Thistoire LAA EEA sedes Suid fusées ee parler du Vietnam ct je vais vous sion economique & une dictature tre. Voila la verite. parler de Cuba. «Que fullaital faire? Comment muarxiste que stro dénongait lui- Lorsque je me suis tu, et du fait prevenic Vinvasion 2? Noas avons «ll mvarrive de lire des articles meme il y a peu d'années. Les de la presse evropéenne ov il est des signes de passion qu’avait donnes trouve chez Krouchtchey Jes mémes Etats-Unis ont la possibilité de faire Fidel, je m'attendais a une explosion, preoccupations que les nétres. Ii démontré que nous autres, Améri- autant de bien qu'ils ont commis cains, nous étions aveugles devant Jai eu droit, au contraire, a un Jong nous a demande ce que 20u3 you~ Werreurs en Amerique latine, je silence, et, au bout de ce silence, @ lions. Nous avons repondu: faire Vévolution de Ja situation cubaine, dirai méme que nous seuls avons Je viens d'apprghdre que pour le un exposé calme, serein, souvent en sorte que les Etats-Unis sorent ce pouvoir, A la condition essen- humoristique, toujours réfechi. Je surs pele Cuba c'est atta- général de Gaull? lui-msme, le com- ticlle que le communisme ne s'y munisme n'étaif, a Cuba, que la ne sais pas si Fidel a changé ou non, quer 'Lnion Suviétique. installe pas. > et si les caricatures vociferantes que « Comment realiser cet objectif 7A forme accidenfelle ct provisoire Mune volonté” dindépendance a Le Président Kennedy s'est levé Yon presente de lui dans le monde partir de cette question, ls reflexion Véyard des Etats-Unis. Naturelle- pour signifier que Ventretien était occidental ont quelque correspon- et les discussions ont commence. On ment on comprend tres bien, autour terminé, Je me suis alors excuse dance avec une réalité antérieure. pouvait envisager une proc nation, du Presi lent de Gaulle, cette « vo- de Je retenir pour deux questions pout ce que je sais, c'est que, a au- une alliance, l'assistance militaire lonté Pindépendance », rapides. La premiere: Est-ce que nh moment pendant les deux jours classique. les Russes nous ont expli- les Etats-Unis pouvaient tolérer le complets que j'ai passes pres de lui, qué qu’ils avaient un double souci ~ collectivisme économique ? Il mi'a et ou il s'est passé pas mal de choses, sauver la revoluiioa cubaine, c’est-a de Bati repondu: «Et Sekou Touré? Et Castro ne s‘est départi de son calme dire leur bonheur socialiste dans } Tito? J'ai recu il y a trois jours et de son équilibre. Comme pour le monde, et en méme temps éviler u John Kennedy s'est alors ramassé le maréchal Tito et nos conversa- President Kennedy, je lui laisserai la conflit,mondial. Pour eux, si I'c en Sree sorte pour se faire per- tions ‘ont été trés Osilives, >» parole, me réservant la possibilité s'était Contente des armes classique suasif. I] a ponctue toutes ses phra- Deuxieéme question ; Qu'attend le ullerieure de corriger par ma pou- les Etats-Unis pouvaicnt ne pas h ses du geste court ef necsnique qui gouvernement américain du blocus ? velle experience cubsine certains siter devant Vinvasion, en ce ¢F était devenn celebre : l“isolement économique de Cuba est- jugements des deux hommes d@'Etat. Ja Russie ripostait et cétait Im guerre aJe vous dis ce : NOUS SAVORS Woune punition ou un caleul poli- « Je crois que Kennedy est sincere, mondiale inevitable. > tique ? a commence Castro, Je crois aussi | parfaitement ce qui est arrivé a Cuba pour Je malheur de tous, J'ai person- Réponse de Kennedy ; « Vous ne que expression, aujourd'hui, de nellement suivi depuis le début Vévo- eroyez pas © Vefficucité du blocus ? celte sineerite peut avoir une signt- e question sige = lution de tous les evenements avec kh bien! j'aimerais que vous en fication politique. Je vais vous inquietude. 1) y a peu d'affaires sur etudiez les effets pour me donner expliquer. 3 A ce momen terromps Castro Jesqueiles Je me sois penché avee votre sentiment a votre retour. De «lily aun point sur lequel je veux pour Jui demander commen} on pou- aulant de son. La conclusion que tout de suite vous donner des infor- vait étre absolument sar d¢ linter- toute facon, nous ne pouvons pas Jen ai tirée va beaucoup plus loin Jaisser la subversion comnyuniste ga- mations nouvelles. Je ne lai jamais vention sovietique. Aprés tout, dis-je, que les analyses evropeennes. Voici fait juss aujonr@ hui il Staline a biengliche larkos, le chef xner les autres pays de l'Amérique faut que le monde connaisse la véri- de la Resistance communiste ce que je pense : Jatine. 1 faut des digues pour conte- lable histoire des fusees. «Je pense qu'il n'y a pas un pays nir expansion soviéetique ; le blocus grecque, pour des raisons de partuge au monde, y compris toutes les ré- «Six mois avant Vinstallation & de zones... : Mun cote, un immense effort de pro- Cuba de ces fusées, nous avions eu gions d'Afrique, vycompris n‘importe gres de l'autre. C’est le probléme «Je sais, Mais il n'y @ aucan rap- quel pays sous domination coloniale, une accumulation de renseignements port. La Russie s’était beaucoup trop essentiel, Les deux batailles sont nous informant d'une nouvelle pre- ot Ja colonisation économique, l'hu- aussi difficiles l'une que l'autre. (Si- engagée en notre favcur. D'ailleurs, miliation e@ I'exploitation ont été paration pour Vinyasion de Vile, a depuis, nous; avons eu toutes les lence) Puis (derniére phrase) le paration entreprise par Ja C.LA., pires que celles qui ont sévi a Cuba, maintien du blocus dépend du main- preuves de lmmense solidarité du du fait de la politique de mon pays, dont les directeurs étaient mortifies peuple soviétique et de ses diri- tien des activités subversives. > ae Yéchee de Ja baie des Gochons pendant Je régime de Batista; je Apres cela, je me suis rendu & La geants, Vous pouvez voir ici vous- nae que nous avons sécreté, cons- ils sétaient vus ridiculisés dans le meme comment se manifeste cette Havane. monde et malmenés par le gouverne- ruit, fabriqué de toutes piéces, sans solidarité. lly @ ee ee préci- nous en rendre compte, le mouve- ment ameéricain). nt @ pro je Staline, Lorsque La Perle des Caraibes « Nous si ns aussi que le Pen- jetais en URS Se et tandis ment castriste ; je pense que !'accu- tagone couyrail de son autorité les d'autres, ailleurs, reprochaient @ mulgjjon de telles erreurs a mis en danger toute !'Amérique latine. L’Al- preparatifs de la C.1.A,, mais nous Krouchtchey d'étre plus conciliant Dans la « Perle des Caraibes, par- avions des doutes sur l'état d'esprit hance pour le Progrés n'a pas d'autre fumee au rhum et baignant dans une ue Staline avee les capitalistes, but que de renverser cette politique du Président des Etats-Unis, Certains krouchtchey ma. confié, et je ne triomphante sensualité », pour parler ont meme era quil suffisait dalerter nefaste. C'est un des problemes les comme les prospectus du tourisme vous les répéterai pas, plusieurs ps importants, sinon le plus impor- Je Président et de Vinquieter pour exemples illustrant la pru , et aniericain gui trainent encore dans fuire avorter Jes projets. Et puis, un nt, de ja politique americaine. méme labdication de Staline. Il di- «Je peux vous dire que j'ai Jes hotels e Ta Hayanm j'ai passé_ Pra jour, Je gendre Krouchtchev, saity et je je crys, que jaitars Sta- frois semaines pleines et intenses. Adjoubed, est venu tous rendre visite compris les Cubains. J'ai approuvé Je me suis entretenu avec des line n‘surait installe des fusres & Jes proclamations de Fidel Castro avant de copondre a Vinvitation des Cuba. paysans et des ouvriers, des écri- collaborateurs de Kennedy, Des son dans la Sierra Maestra. lorsque Fidel vains et des peintres, des militants «Hi est vrai que lon a dit alors, Castro desirait, a juste titre, la justice ariivee @ Washington, Adjoubei etait et d'un autre cole, que si ces fusées et des contre-révolutionnaires, des recu par Je chef du gouvernement et surtout la pureteé. Je vais vous dire ministres et des ambassadeurs ont été instefice., crest porce que encore; dans une certaine mesure, americain et ils ont parle surtout de certains problemes intel cu mais Fidel restait inaccessible. Cuba, Coe semame apres cet entre- c'est comme si Batista avait incarné On m‘avait prévenu : il était acca- rairnt poussé les Husses a se un certain nombre de pechés des tiva, vous recevions a La Havane une de nous pour peoyoquer les Etats pare . Jes consequences du cyclone copie du rapport) dAdjoubei & Etats-Unis. Muintenant, il nous faut conduisaient le gouvernement cubain Unis. Tout ce que je peux vous dire, Payer ces péchés. Sur l'ancien ré- Krouchtchev, Cest cette copie qui c'est que les Russes ne yous 4 reviser entierement la planification gine, je suis d'accord avec les pre- et puis surtout il n'avait plus envie a tout declenche, et ne veulent pas la guerre. Ii fact miers révolutionnaires cubains. Cela pile recevoir des journalistes, occiden- aller sur place, les vair travailler, tement clair. > partager leurs preocevpations eco- faux qui plus est. J'avais pratique- Le préeédent hongrois Passa tA La oho numiques, admirer leur acharnement ment renoncé lorsque Fidel en per- sonne est venu @ mon hotel, Nous a Clever le niveau de vie des travail Le blocus sommes montés dans ma chambre & « Qu’avait dit Kennedy & Adjou- leurs et on comprend tout de suite 10 heures du soir pour n'en sortir bei? Ecoutez bien cela, c'est trés qu’sls sont loin, trés Icin de Apres un silence qui lui a permis qu’a 4 heures du matin. Je ne rela- important : il avait dit que la situa- idée de provocation ou de domina- de constater ma surprise et mon ferai aujourd'hui de cet extraordi- tion nouvelle de Cuba était infolé- tion. Or, la Russie soviétique était Inte le Président a poursuivi : naire entretien que ce qui constitue rable pour les Etats-Unis, que le gou- devant un choix: une guerre 2hso- « Mais il est aussi clair que le pro- une reponse aux propos de John vernement ameéricain était décidé & lument inévitable (du fait de leurs biéme a cessé d'étre makin pour Kennedy. ne pas la tolérer plus. longtemps; engagements comme de leur posi- devenir international, je vais dire Fidel m‘a écoute, je veux dire a il avait dit que la coexistence paci- tion dans le monde socialiste) si la soviétique. Je suis Président des écouleé Kennedy par ma voix, avec fique était gravement compromise revolution cubaine était attaquée, ov Eta nis, je ne suis pas un socio- un intérét devorant, passionné : var le fait que V'influence soviétique bier les risques d'une guerre si les lugue ; je suis président d'un pays frisant sa barbe, enfongant son béret Cuba altérait le rapport des forces, Etats-Unis, ne reculant pas devant libre qui a des responsabilités dans de parachutiste, ajustant sa vareuse detruisait Péquilibre convenu et (1a, les fusées, refusaient de renoncer & le Monde libre. Je sais que Castro de maquisard, jetant mille lumiéres Castro s'expri en détachbant les détruire Cuba. Ls ont choisi la fra- a trahi les promesses de la Sierra pétillantes de malice depuis le creux svllabes) KEN Y AVAIT RAP- teraité socialiste et les risques. Maestra et qu'il accepte d’étre un prorena de ses yeux noirs et vifs. ELE AUX RUSSES QUE LES «Dans ces conditions, comment egent des Soviets dans lAmérique n moment, j’ai senti que je jouais ETATS-UNIS N'ETAIENT PAS IN- aurions-nous pu, pens, Cubsins, re- Jutine. Je ssis que par sa faute — le réle de ce partenaire avec qui il FERVENUS EN HONGRIE, ce qui fuser de partager des risques pris volonté d'indépendance, folie ou avait une envie aussi forte de dis- évidemment était une facon d’exiger pour nous sauver? C'est tout de communisme — te monde a été au cuter que de lutter, que j’étais un une non-intervention russe Jors de méme une question nneur f bord d'une guerre thermo-nucléaire , Eee cet ennemi intime, ce Kennedy sion projetée. Bien sir, Je terme en octobre 1962. ont Krouchtchev avait dit & Fidel H on n’ttait pas prononc: t L’EXPRESS. — 6 DECEMBRE 1963 1-EXPRESB.:— 6 DECEMBRE 1963 183 LES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES ou bien sont balayés comme Bosch & Saint-Domingue, ou bien se transfor- Non? Vous croyez que cela no ment, Betancourt o’elait: pas un compte pas, lhonneur en politique ? Nous sommes des romantiques ? Batista: il lest devenu. > |ee Je demande & Castro od est Peut-étre, Pourquoi pas ? En tout cas, l'issue ? Comment Ja situation peut- nous s@wames des militants. Bref, elle évolucr ? nous noas sommes mis d’accerd sur — Méme si les Etats-Unis utl- Viastallation des fusées. lisxent) contre vous ce que vous « Alors, au mois de juin 1962, appelez Valibl du commuanisme, 1 Raoul, mon frére, et Che Guevara reste que vous avez cloisi le com- sont allés & Moscou pour discuter munisme, que votre économie et | des modalités de la mise en lace votre défense ou votre sécurité dé- des fusées. Le convoi est arrive par 3 ‘) pendent de I'Union Soviétique, et mer en semaines. Les Etats- que, méme si vous n'y étes pour rien, Unis sont parvenus a savoir qu'il les Etats-Unis considérent gue vous | s’agissait d’armes, bien sir, mais ils ‘4 ms faites partio d'une stratégie inter- 4° Sosy ont mis deux mois pour découvrir nationale, ie vous conslituez une / qu'il s’agissait de’ fustes. Deux base saviétique dans un monde mois, c’est-d-dire davantage que ce quo nous avions calculé, Car il est & ig ay la paix dépend du respect d'ut” partage tacile des zones. bien évident pour tout le monde — Si les Etats-Canis posent ls pro- u'il s’agissait d'intimider et non bléme comme vous l'avez posé, alors, ‘agresser. tranche Castro, c’est yrai, il c’y a Ni becennitcttnetintinh hesnttiaataistcietis tibet a as d'issue. Mais qui est eden « Maintenant, nous allons parler | de l’Alliance pour le Progres. Je la fin du compte ? On a tout es- @-AU COURS DB L’ENTHOTIEN, Fi Fipgu Castano... sayé contre nous, tout, absolument vais vous dire: dans un certain «C'est le rapport d’Abjoubel... ~.qal @ tout déclenché.» i sens, c’était une bonne idée, cela tout, et nous vivons encore, de mieux a marqué un progrés. Méme si on en mieux, nous sommes debout, et | peut dire ue c’est tardif, timide, bile. Ils vont choisir des hommes nous allons féter avec un éclat plus que cela a été fait & chaud, sous la de paille, pour gouverner indirecte- re que d’habitude, Ie 1° janvier contrainte, malgré tout cela J’ac- ment. Mais Jes difficultés vont com- 964, le cinquiéme anniversaire de copte de dire, je conviens que Vidéo mencer. la Révolution cubaine. La politique en elle-méme constituait’ un ‘ort « Crest pourauot les bonnes idées d'isolement des Etats-Unis est cha- d'adaptation au cours extraorditai- de Kennedy ne pourront ri¢n don- que jour moins efficace... rement rapide des événements en ner. C’est [rés facile & comprendre Amérique laline. : et lui, en ce moment, il dpit s’en apercevoir, parce que je vous I'ai Ni dollars ni banquiers dit, c’est un homme réaliste: de- « Je viens de vous parler en ré- Les pétreles argentins puis des années et des anhées, la volutionnaire cubain, Mais si Je dols politique américaine, c’eft-a-dire yous parler comme un homme sou- non pas le gouvernement, is Jes « Quand nous apprenons par exem- trusts et le Pentagone, sappule en cieux de la paix et qui considére ple (vous aves flu les journaux ce Amérique latine sur des oligarchies. que les Etats-Unis sont un pays trop matin ?) que Teg Argentins nationa- Le prestige, leg, dollars, la puissance important pour ne pas influencer la lisent le pétrole! Le gouvernement passaient par les mains d’une classe paix dans le monde, alors, évidem- argentin |!Non, mais vous vous ren-: dont Kennedy lui-méme vous a dit ment, je ne ux pas m’empécher dez compte? A la Bourse de New ce qu'elle était en parlant de. Ba- d’espérer qu'il se trouvera un homme Yurk, cela a dQ faire plus de bruit tista. } eo Amérique du Nord, un homme que le castrisme ! Les conservateurs «Tout d’un coup, un président pour braver l’impopularité, lutter catholiques et militaires de l’Argen- arrive qui prétend s’appuyer sur une contre les trusts, dire la vérité et tine, les hommes les plus liés aux autre classe i n’avait entre les surtout lIaisser les peuples aegir intéréts américains ! Ici on parle de mains ancun'des leviers de com- comme ils l’entendent. : Nationalisation, la de réforme miande) pour que les peuples aient « Je ne demande qu'une chose} agraire, bon, siYAViance pour le l'impression que les Etats-Unis n’ap- ni des dollars, ni une aide, ni des Progrés provoque cela, ce n’est pas polent plus les dictateurs et ane diplomates, ni des banquiers, ni des mauvais, cela va dans le sens des ‘on n’a plus besoin de faire des militaires, rien sauf la paix, qu’on aspirations populaires. révolutions A la Castro. nous accepte tels que nous sommes, « Lorsque je pense qu’entre les « Qu’est-ce gui se passe alors ? Les Nous, nous sommes socialistes, les Etats-Unis et nous, du temps d’Ei- trusts voient deuts intéréts compro- Etats-Unis sont capitalistes, les pays senhower, ou plutot de Nixon, tout mis (A peine, mais tout de méme }), d@’Amérique latine choisiront ce @ commencé lorsque nous avons dé- le Pentagone pense que les bases quis voudront, Tout de méme 4 crété une réforme agraire qui oe stratégiques sont en danger, les oli- époque od les Etats-Unis vendent_.. visait, écoutez bien cela, que les pro- pipes artpuissantes de tous les: pays du blé aux Russes, ot le Canada or priétaires de plus de 200.000 hecta- "Amérique latine alertent leurs amis provisionne la Chine, oi de Gaulle res! Mais oui! 200.000! Mais alors américains, elles sabotent la nouvelle respecte Ben Bella, pourquoi serait-!l la réaction des trusts avait été ter- politique, bref Kennedy a tout le impossible de faire comprendre aux rile. Aujourd’hui, pour les autres, monde contre lui. Sur place, les quel- Ainéricains que le socialisme conduit et parce qu’on agite |’épouvantail ues présidents libéraux, ou preéten- our eux non pas A V’hostilité, mats us tels, que l’on a choisis comme la coexistence. Pourquoi ne serais- communiste, la réaction des trusts je pas Tito ou Sekou Touré ? antéricains est en apparence plus ha- instruments de la nouvelle politique, « Vraiment, je crois qu'un homme < iome Oe aah emai om — comme Kennedy peut découvrir +1 > Ag 7 oe* que J'intérét des Etats-Unis n'est pas de poursuivre une _ politi- que gui ne méne qu’& des échecs. Avec nous, sur la -base du respect réciproque des scuverainetés, tout peut se norimaliser. » Fidel Castro s’est levé et m’a dif 2ie encore, pour conclure : Puisque vous allez revolr Ken- nedy, soyezs un messager do paix. Jo préciss bicz, Je ne veux rien, jo n’attenda ricr ct, conime révolution- naire, la situation actuclis ne me déplalt pas. Mals comme homme, comme homme d’Etat, Fed le devoir d’indiquer o& peuvent etre les bases d'une bonne entente. > eet qm RTE SSeaeggeneuntierter Ny Deux jours aprés, Kennedy tri assassiné. J'ai revu Fidel Castro, était bouleverse. SEAN DANIEL. (Mare Riboud-Magnum.) (Copyright «L'Express» et Jean « Pourquoi ne serais-je pas Tito ou Sekou Touré? » Daniel, Toute reproduction, méme partielle, interdite, sauf accord.) L'EXPRESS. — 6 DECEMBRE 1963 PACE '28 184 Pee. 7 1963 New Republic When Castro Heard the News Havana It was around 1:30 in the afternoon, Cuban time. We both the American continents. To achieve this goal, a were having lunch in the living room of the modest leader would have to arise in the United States capable summer residence which Fidel Castro owns on magni- of understanding the explosive realities of Latin Amer- ficent Varadero Beach, 120 kilometers from Havana. ica and of meeting them halfway. Then, suddenly, he For at least the tenth time, I was questioning the Cuban had taken a less hostile tack: “Kennedy could still be leader on details of the negotiations with Russia before this man. He still has the possibility of becoming, the missile installations last year. The telephone rang, in the eyes of history, the greatest President of the a secretary in guerrilla garb announced that Mr. Dor- United States, the leader who may at last understand ticés, President of the Cuban Republic, had an urgent that there can be coexistence between capitalists and communication for the Prime Minister. Fidel picked up socialists, even in the Americas. He would then be the phone and I heard him say: “Como? Un atentado?” an even greater President than Lincoln. I know, for (“What's that? An attempted assassination?”) He then example, that for Khrushchev, Kennedy is a man you turned to us to say that Kennedy had just been struck can talk with. I have gotten this impression from all down in Dallas. Then he went back to the telephone my conversations with Khrushchev. Other leaders have and exclaimed in a loud voice “Herido? Muy grave- assured me that to attain this goal, we must first await mente?” (“Wounded? Very seriously?”) his re-election. Personally, I consider him responsible He came back, sat down, and repeated three times for everything, but I will say this: he has come to the words: “Es una mala noticia.” (“This is bad news.”) understand many things over the past few, months; He remained silent for a moment, awaiting another call and then too, in the last analysis, I’m convinced that with further news. He remarked while we waited that anyone else would be worse.” Then Fidel had added there was an alarmingly sizable lunatic fringe in Amer- with a broad and boyish grin: “If you see him again, ican society and that this deed could equally well have you can tell him that I’m willing to declare Goldwater been the work of a madman or of a terrorist. Perhaps a my friend if that will guarantee Kennedy's re-election!” Vietnamese? Or a member of the Ku Klux Klan? The This conversation was held on November 19. second call came through: it was hoped they would be Now it was nearly 2 o'clock and we got up from able to announce that the United States President was the table and settled ourselves in front of a radio. still alive, that there was hope of saving him. Fidel Commandant Vallero, his physician, aide-de-camp, and Castro’s immediate reaction was: “If they can, he is intimate friend, was easily able to get the broadcasts already re-elected.” He pronounced these words with from the NBC network in Miami. As the news came satisfaction. in, Vallero would translate it for Fidei: Kennedy This sentence was a sequel to a conversation we had wounded in the head; pursuit of the assassin; murder held on a previous evening and which had turned into of a policeman; finally the fatal announcement: Presi- an all-night session. To be precise, it lasted from 10 in dent Kennedy is dead. Then Fidel stood up and said to the evening until 4 in the morning. A good part of me: “Everything is changed. Everything is going to the talk revolved about the impressions I recounted change. The United States occupies such a position in to him of an interview which President Kennedy world affairs that the death of a President of that granted me this last October 24, and about Fidel country affects millions of people in every corner of Castro’s reactions to these impressions. During this the globe. The cold war, relations with Russia, Latin nocturnal discussion, Castro had delivered himself of America, Cuba, the Negro question . . . all will have to a relentless indictment of US policy, adding that in the be rethought. I'll tell you one thing: at least Kennedy recent past Washington had had ample opportunity was an enemy to whom we had become accustomed. to normalize its relations with Cuba, but that instead This is a serious matter, an extremely serious matter.” it had tolerated a CIA program of training, equipping After the quarter-hour of silence observed. by all and organizing a counter-revolution. He had told me the American radio stations, we once more tuned in that he wasn’t in the least fearful of his life, since on Miami; the silence had only been broken by a re- danger was his natural milieu, and if he were to become broadcasting of the American national anthem. Strange a victim of the United States this would simply en- indeed was the impression made, on hearing this hymn hance his radius of influence in Latin America as well ring out in the house of Fidel Castro, in the midst of a as throughout the socialist world. He was speaking, he circle of worried faces. “Now,” Fidel said, “they will . Said, from the viewpoint of the interests of peace in have to find the assassin quickly, but very quickly, 185 Tue New Repus tic otherwise, you watch and see, I know them, they will he was an-agent, an accomplice, a hired killer. In try to put the blame on us for this thing. But tell me, saying simply that he is an admirer, this is just to try how many Presidents have been assassinated? Four? and make an association in people’s minds between the This is most disturbing! In Cuba, only one has been name of Castro and the emotion awakened by the assassinated. You know, when we were hiding out in assassination. This is a publicity method, a propaganda the Sierra there were some (not in my group, in an- device. It’s terrible. But you know, I’m sure this will other) who wanted to kill Batista. They thought they all soon blow over. There are too many competing could do away with a regime by decapitating it. I have policies in the United States for any single one to be always been violently opposed to such methods. First able to impose itself universally for very long.” of all from the viewpoint of political self-interest, be- We arrived at the granja de pueblo, where the farm- cause so far as Cuba is concerned, if Batista had been ers welcomed Fidel. At that very moment, a speaker killed he would have been replaced by some military announced over the radio that it was now known that figure who would have tried to make the revolutionists the assassin is a “pro-Castro Marxist.” One commen- pay for the martyrdom of the dictator. But I was also tator followed another; the remarks became increas- opposed to it on personal grounds; assassination is ingly emotional, increasingly aggressive. Fidel then repellent to me.” excused himself: “We shall have to give up the visit ee The broadcasts were now resumed. One reporter to the farm.” We went on toward Matanzas from where felt he should mention the difficulty Mrs. Kennedy he could telephone President Dorticés. On the way he was having in getting rid of her bloodstained stockings. had questions: “Who is Lyndon Johnson? What is his Fidel exploded: “What sort of a mind is this!” He re- reputation? What were his relations with Kennedy? peated the remark several times: “What sort of a With Khrushchev? What was his position at the time of mind is this? There is a difference in our civilizations the attempted invasion of Cuba?” Finally and most after all. Are you like this in Europe? For us Latin important of all: “What authority does he exercise Americans, death is a sacred matter; not only does it over the CIA?” Then abruptly he looked at his watch, mark the close of hostilities, but it also imposes de- saw that it would be half an hour before we reached cency, dignity, respect. There are even street urchins Matanzas and, practically on the spot, he dropped off to who behave like kings in the face of death. Incidentally, sleep. this reminds me of something else: if you write all em Matanzas, where he must have decreed a state those things I told you yesterday against Kennedy’s of alert, we returned to Varadero for dinner. Quoting policy, don’t use his name now; speak instead of the the words spoken to him by a woman shortly before, policy of the United States government.” he said to me that it was an irony of history for the Toward 5 o'clock, Fidel Castro declared that since Cubans, in the situation to which they had been re- there was nothing we could do to alter the tragedy, we duced by the blockade, to have to mourn the death of must try to put our time to good use in spite of it. He a President of the United States. “After all,” he added, wanted to accompany me in person on a visit to a “there are perhaps some people in the world to whom granja de pueblo (state farm), where he had been en- this news is cause for rejoicing. The South Vietnamese gaging in some experiments. His present obsession is guerrillas, for example, and also, I would imagine, agriculture. He reads nothing but agronomical studies Madame Nhu!” and reports. He dwells lyrically on the soil, fertilizers, I thought of the people of Cuba, accustomed to the - and the possibilities which will give Cuba enough sight of posters like the one depicting the Red Army sugar cane by 1970 to achieve economic independence. with maquis superimposed in front, and the screaming captions “HALT, MR. KENNEDY! CUBA IS NOT ALONE... .” “Didn't I Tell You’ I thought of all those who had been led to associate their deprivations with the policies of President John We went by car, with the radio on. The Dallas F. Kennedy. police were now hot on the trail of the assassin. He At dinner I was able to take up all my questions. is a Russian spy, says the news commentator. Five What had motivated Castro to endanger the peace of minutes later, correction: he is a spy married to a the world with the missiles in Cuba? How dependent Russian. Fidel said: “There, didn’t I tell you; it'll be was Cuba on the Soviet Union? Is it not possible to my turn next.” But not yet. The next word was: the envisage relations between Cuba and the United States assassin is a Marxist deserter. Then the word came along the same lines as those between Finland and the through, in effect, that the assassin was a young man Russians? How was the transition made from the who was a member of the “Fair Play for Cuba Com- humanism of Sierra Maestra to the Marxism-Leninism mittee,” that he was an admirer of Fidel Castro. Fidel of 1961? Fidel Castro, once more in top form, had an declared: “If they had had proof, they would have said explanation for everything. Then he questioned me 186 DECEMBER 7, 1963 once more on Kennedy, and each time I eulogized the and Czechoslovakian trucks, a certain American emo- intellectual qualities of the assassinated President, | tion vibrated in the atmosphere, compounded of re- awakened the keenest interest in him. sentment, of concern, of anxiety, yet also, in spite of The Cubans have lived with the United States in everything, of a mysterious almost imperceptible rap- that cruel intimacy so familiar to me of the colonized prochement. After all, this American President was able with their colonizers. Nevertheless, it was an intimacy. to reach accord with our Russian friends during his In that very seductive city of Havana to which we re- lifetime, said a young Cuban intellectual to me as I was turned in the evening, where the luminous signboards taking my leave. It was almost as though he were apolo- with Marxist slogans have replaced the Coca Cola and gizing for not rejoicing at the assassination. toothpaste billboards, in the midst of Soviet exhibits JEAN DANIEL ‘187 Dec. bf 19763 Mew Repub Iie Unofficial Envoy An Historic Report from Two Capitals by Jean Daniel A recent trip. to the United States, followed by a journey to Cuba, made it possible for me to establish a “dialogue” between the late President Kennedy and Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Since my arrival in Mexico, where this article is being written, I have been asked whether the impressions I derived from these interviews could shed any light on the assassination of the President and on future relations between Lyndon B. Johnson and Castro. Last week in these pages I answered the first question by describing the re- actions of Fidel Castro, with whom I was visiting at the time, to John Ken- nedy’s death. Here I shall explore the second question by reconstituting the Kennedy-Castro dialogue from the viewpoint of one who was a witness to it. THe AUTHOR President Kennedy received me at the White House like someone who has at last found solace in indiffer- on Thursday, October 24. My appointment had been ence after having long been exasperated and fascinated. scheduled for 5:30. I waited in the Cabinet Conference John Kennedy was a man who liked to get to the heart Room, and at 5:45 the President, following his usual of a matter quickly, and make decisions even more custom, came to look for me himself so that he could rapidly. But this was not possible in dealing with de escort me into his office. He apologized for the delay, Gaulle, who is more difficult to handle than Khru- not so much as a courtesy or to flatter me, but to ex- shchev. One day, impatient at not understanding the plain the scheduling of his time, which seemed to be General’s reasoning and intent upon convincing him, very strictly organized. As we passed through the small Kennedy telephoned de Gaulle direct. All in vain. Odd- room where his secretary was working, we caught a ly enough, however, since the recent visit of de Gaulle’s glimpse of Mrs. Kennedy leaving by a French window foreign minister, Couve de Murville, to Washington on her way to the private garden of the White House. Mr. Kennedy had ceased to be so deeply concerned The President called her back to introduce me. about Franco-American relations. The truth is, he had It was still Indian summer in Washington. The made up his mind not to worry about them any more. weather was very warm, and both the President and According to him, it was a waste of time. Mrs. Kennedy were very lightly dressed, thus enhanc- “Mr. Couve de Murville and I both verified that we ing the impression of youth, charm, and simplicity didn’t agree on anything,” the President told me. “And which was in rather surprising contrast to the solemnity we agreed that such total disagreement was hardly cal- of entering these august chambers. The President culated to create a flourishing friendship between two (athletic looking in his well-tailored suit, speaking with great Western nations. I came to the conclusion that quick, abrupt gestures and a mobile expression but, at: General de Gaulle’s strategy, which is rather incom- times, freezing up and becoming disconcertingly, al- prehensible to me, requires a certain amount of tension most, I would say, completely expressionless) invited with the United States. It would seem that only through me to be seated on the semi-circular sofa which was in this tension is it possible to restore to Europe the desire the middle of his office. He sat in a rocking chair op- to think for itself and renounce its torpid dependence posite the sofa. The interview was to last from 20 to 25 on American dollar aid and political guidance!” minutes, and it was interrupted only by a brief tele- President Kennedy went on to sum up, with con- phone call. ciseness and vigor, the points of disagreement between The President immediately asked me how the French the United States and France. On the subject of Ger- situation was developing. After my reply, he spoke many, nuclear policy, Europe, the idea of “indepen- about General de Gaulle. He talked in a relaxed fashion, dence,” he told me what has since become public 188 Tue New Repustic knowledge. He added, however, that France had a “T believe that there is no country in the world, in- strange way of manifesting its independence, partic- cluding all the African regions, including any and all ularly, for example, on the subject of Vietnam and the countries under colonial domination, where eco- Cuba. It seemed ironic and irritating to him that the nomic colonization, humiliation and exploitation were French Chief Executive was apparently bent on telling worse than in Cuba, in part owing to my country’s him how the United States should proceed, without policies during the Batista regime. I believe that we assuming any risks himself. He told me that no one was created, built and manufactured the Castro movement more appreciative than he of advice, information, and out of whole cloth and without realizing it. I believe even criticism; but that these were all the more valued that the accumulation of these mistakes has jeopardized if the friends proffering them were themselves com- all of Latin America. The great aim of the Alliance for mitted to a program of action. Progress is to reverse this unfortunate policy. This is I then asked Mr. Kennedy what could be expected one of the most, if not the most, important problems in from General de Gaulle’s proposed visit to the United American foreign policy. I can assure you that I have States next February. He replied: “Absolutely nothing.” understood the Cubans. I approved the proclamation But he followed this up immediately and with a broad which Fidel Castro made in the Sierra Maestra, when grin, as though savoring in advance the pleasure of he justifiably called for justice and especially yearned to the impending meeting: “It will be exciting, just the rid Cuba of corruption. I will go even further: to some same. General de Gaulle is an historic figure; he is de- extent it is as though Batista was the incarnation of a cidely the strangest great man of our time.” number of sins on the part of the United States. Now we shall have to pay for those sins. In the matter of the Relations with Cuba Batista regime, I am in agreement with the first Cuban revolutionaries. That is perfectly clear.” Taking the initiative at this point, I brought up the After a silence during which he was able to note my subject of Vietnam and Cuba, saying that the Gaullists surprise and my interest, the President continued: “But were not the only ones in France who deplored certain it is also clear that the problem has ceased to be a mistaken US policies. I pointed out that the first time Cuban one, and has become international — that is, it I had the opportunity of meeting John Kennedy, he has become a Soviet problem. I am the President of the was a Senator and had just made a resounding speech United States and not a sociologist; I am the President on the subject of Algeria. Had the ideas set forth in of a free nation which has certain responsibilities in the that speech been faithfully applied in Saigon and Free World. I know that Castro betrayed the promises Havana? Here my notes are very specific, and I shall made in the Sierra Maestra, and that he has agreed to let the late President speak through them: be a Soviet agent in Latin America. I know that through “We haven't enough time to talk about Vietnam, his fault —either his ‘will to independence’, his mad- but Id like to talk to you about Cuba. Incidentally, our ness or Communism— the world was on the verge of conversation will be much more interesting when you nuclear war in October, 1962. The Russians understood return, because Ben Bradlee [of Newsweek] tells me this very well, at least after our reaction; but so far as you are on your way to Cuba now. Fidel Castro is concerned, I must say I don’t know “Every now and then I read articles in the European whether he realizes this, or even if he cares about it.” press pointing out that we Americans were blind to A smile, then: ‘You can tell me whether he does when what was happening in the Cuban situation. I have just you come back. In any case, the nations of Latin Amer- learned that General de Gaulle himself regarded Com- ica are not going to attain justice and progress that munism in Cuba as nothing but the accidental and way, I mean through Communist subversion. They temporary form of a will to independence from the won’t get there by going from economic oppression to United States. Of course it is very easy to understand a Marxist dictatorship which Castro himself denounced this ‘will to independence’ around President de Gaulle.” a few years ago. The United States now has the pos- John Kennedy then mustered all his persuasive force. sibility of doing as much good in Latin America as it He punctuated each sentence with that brief, mechan- has done wrong in the past; I would even say that we ical gesture which had become famous: alone have this power — on the essential condition that “T tell you this: we know perfectly what happened Communism does not take over there.” in Cuba, to the misfortune of all. From the beginning Mr. Kennedy then rose to indicate that the interview I personally followed the development of these events was over. I apologized for keeping him to ask two with mounting concern. There are few subjects to which quick questions. The first: Could the United States I have devoted more painstaking attention. My conclu- tolerate economic collectivism? He answered: “What sions go much further than the European analyses. Here about Sekou Touré? And Tito? I received Marshal Tito is what I believe. three days ago, and our discussions were most posi- 189 DECEMBER 14, 1963 tive.” Second question: What does the American gov- ers, writers and painters, militants and counter-revo- ernment expect to gain from the blockade? Is the lutionaries, ministers and ambassadors — but Fidel re- economic isolation of Cuba a punishment or a political mained inaccessible. I had been warned: he was snowed maneuver? under with work; as a result of the hurricane, the Kennedy’s reply: “Are you suggesting that the polit- Cuban government had been obliged to revise its whole ical effectiveness of the blockade is uncertain [smile]? planning program; and then, above all, he no longer You will see when you go to Cuba whether it is or not. had any desire to receive any journalists, least of all In any case, we can’t let Communist subversion win in Western newsmen. I had practically given up hope the other Latin American countries. Two dikes are when, on the evening of what I thought was to be my needed to contain Soviet expansion: the blockade on departure date (the capricious plane which links the one hand, a tremendous effort toward progress on Havana with Mexico happily did not leave the next day the other. This is the problem in a nutshell. Both battles after all), Fidel came to my hotel. He had heard of my are equally difficult.” (Silence.) Then, a last comment: interview with the President. We went up to my “The continuation of the blockade depends on the con- room at 10 in the evening and did not leave until 4 in tinuation of subversive activities.” the following morning. Here, I shall only recount that The interview was over. I did not really wish to sug- part of that interview which constitutes a reply to John © gest anything, since I had never been to Cuba and, F. Kennedy's remarks. on the other hand, I had heard from all sides tales of Fidel listened with devouring and passionate inter- the privations the Cuban people were suffering owing est: he pulled at his beard, yanked his parachutist’s to their isolated economic situation. But I could see beret down over his eyes, adjusted his maqui tunic, all plainly that John Kennedy had doubts, and was seeking the while making me the target of a thousand malicious a way out. sparks cast by his deep-sunk, lively eyes. At one point That same evening I recounted this conversation in I felt as though I were playing the role of that partner detail to an American colleague — an intimate friend of with whom he had as strong a desire to confer as to do President Kennedy, through whom I had obtained this battle; as though I myself were in a small way that interview —and to the editor of The New Republic. intimate enemy in the White House whom Khrushchev Both my confidants, who knew the President a thou- described to Fidel as someone with whom “it is pos- sand times better than I, agreed that John F. Kennedy sible to talk.” Three times he had me repeat certain re- had never before expressed himself so specifically and marks, particularly those in which Kennedy expressed with such feeling on his understanding of the first his criticism of the Batista regime, those in which Ken- phase of the Castro revolution. They hesitated to draw nedy showed his impatience with the comments attrib- any political conclusions from his remarks. However, uted to General de Gaulle, and lastly those in which they were not surprised at Kennedy’s invitation to Kennedy accused Fidel of having almost caused a war come and see him again when I returned from Cuba. fatal to all humanity. In effect, John Kennedy displayed two basic charac- When I stopped talking, I expected an explosion. teristics in his exercise of power: first, an overwhelming Instead, I was treated to a lengthy silence and, at the degree of empiricism and realism. A man without a end of that silence, to a calm, composed, often humor- particular doctrine, he reacted decisively to events, and ous, always thoughtful exposition. I don’t know wheth- only to events. Nothing but the shock of collision with er Fidel has changed, or whether these cartoons cari- a problem was sufficient to make him come to a deci- caturing him as a ranting madman which appear in the sion, and because of this, his decisions were unpredic- Western press perhaps correspond to a former reality. table. At that point he had a consuming need for I only know that at no time during the two complete information, and this need had increased a great deal days I spent with him (and during which a great deal since experience had taught him not to rely solely on happened), did Castro abandon his composure and official channels. poise. Here too, I shall let Castro speak for himself, After this, I went to Havana. reserving only the possibility of correcting certain judg- ments on these two political leaders based on my own Night Session experiences in Cuba. “I believe Kennedy is sincere,” Fidel declared. “I In the “Pearl of the Antilles, rum-perfumed and also believe that today the expression of this sincerity steeped in triumphant sensuality,” as Cuba is described could have political significance. I'll explain what I in those American tourist folders still lying about in mean. I haven’t forgotten that Kennedy centered his the hotels of Havana, I spent three closely packed and electoral campaign against Nixon on the theme of intensive weeks, but thinking all along that I would firmness toward Cuba. I have not forgotten the Ma- never get to meet with Fidel Castro. I talked with farm- chiavellian tactics and the equivocation, the attempts at 41-372 O - 79 - 13(Vol. 3) 190 Tue New Repvustic invasion, the pressures, the blackmail, the organization upon and [at this point Castro emphasized his state- of a counter-revolution, the blockade and, above every- ment by pronouncing each syllable separately] Ken- thing, all the retaliatory measures which were imposed nedy reminded the Russians that the United States before, long before there was the pretext and alibi of had not intervened in Hungary, which was obviously Communism. But I feel that he inherited a difficult a way of demanding Russian non-intervention in the situation; I don’t think a President of the United States event of a possible invasion. To be sure, the actual word is ever really free, and I believe Kennedy is at present ‘invasion’ was not mentioned and Adzhubei, at the feeling the impact of this lack of freedom. I also believe time, lacking any background information, could not he now understands the extent to which he has been draw the same conclusions as we did. But when we misled, especially, for example, on Cuban reaction at communicated to Khrushchev all our previous informa- the time of the attempted Bay of Pigs invasion. I also tion, the Russians too began to interpret the Kennedy- think he is a realist: he is now registering that it is im- Adzhubei conversation as we saw it and they went to possible to simply wave a wand and cause us, and the the source of our information. By the end of a month, explosive situation throughout Latin America, to dis- the Russian and Cuban governments had reached the appear. definite conviction that an invasion might take place from one moment to the next. This is the truth. Why the Missiles Were Installed “What was to be done? How could we prevent the invasion? We found that Khrushchev was concerned “There is one point on which I want to give you new about the same things that were worrying us. He asked information right away. I have refrained from doing us what we wanted. We replied: do whatever is needed this until now; but today an attempt is being made to to convince the United States that any attack on Cuba frighten all mankind by propagating the idea that is the same as an attack on the Soviet Union. And how Cuba, and in particular I, might provoke a nuclear war, to realize this objective? All our thinking and discus- so I feel the world should know the true story of the sions revolved around this point. We thought of a missile emplacement. proclamation, an alliance, conventional military aid. “Six months before these missiles were installed in The Russians explained to us that their concern was Cuba, we had received an accumulation of information twofold: first, they wanted to save the Cuban revolu- warning us that a new invasion of the island was being tion (in other words, their socialist honor in the eyes prepared under sponsorship of the Central Intelligence of the world), and at the same time they wished to Agency, whose administrators were humiliated by the avoid a world conflict. They reasoned that if conven- Bay of Pigs disaster and by the spectacle of being tional military aid was the extent of their assistance, ridiculed in the eyes of the world and berated in US the United States might not hesitate to instigate an government circles. We also knew that the Pentagon invasion, in which case Russia would retaliate and this was vesting the CIA preparations with the mantle of would inevitably touch off a world war.” its authority, but we had doubts as to the attitude of At this point I interrupted to ask how Cuba could the President. There were those among our informants have been absolutely certain of Soviet intervention. who even thought it would suffice to alert the President After all, I said, Stalin certainly “let down” Markos, and give him cause for concern in order to arrest these the Chief of the Greek Communist Resistance, because preparations. Then one day Khrushchev’s son-in-law, such help would have conflicted with prevailing zones Adzhubei, came to pay us a visit before going on to of influence. : Washington at the invitation of Kennedy’s associates. “I know,” Castro replied, “but the two situations Immediately upon arriving in Washington, Adzhubei cannot be compared.” Then he continued: had been received by the American Chief Executive, “Russia was much too deeply committed to us. More- and their talk centered particularly on Cuba. A week over, since then we have had every proof of the im- after this interview, we received in Havana a copy of mense solidarity of the Soviet people and its leaders. Adzhubei’s report to Khrushchev. It was this report You can sce for yourself how clearly this solidarity is which triggered the whole situation. manifest here. Then there is something else, specifi- “What did Kennedy say to Adzhubei? Now listen to cally apropos of Stalin. When I was in the USSR and this carefully, for it is very important: he had said that others, outside Russia, were reproaching Khrushchev the new situation in Cuba was intolerable for the Unit- for taking a more conciliatory stand than Stalin toward ed States, that the American government had decided the capitalists, Khrushchev confided to me several ex- it would not tolerate it any longer; he had said that amples, which I will not repeat to you, illustrating the peaceful coexistence was seriously compromised by the prudence, even the abdication of Stalin. He told me- fact that ‘Soviet influences’ in Cuba altered the balance and I believe him — that Stalin would never have em- of strength, was destroying the equilibrium agreed placed missiles in Cuba. 191 DECEMBER 14, 1963 “Tt is true that it was said then by other factions will cause more commotion on the New York stock that the real reason for installing the missiles was exchange than Castroism! The Catholic and military because certain internal problems were driving the Rus- conservativesof Argentina, the factions most closely sians to use us to provoke the United States. I am here linked with American interests! There is talk of na- to tell you that the Russians didn’t want and do not tionalization of industries there, of agrarian reform today want war. One only need visit them on their there... well and good! If the Alliance for Progress home territory, watch them at work, share their eco- provokes these developments, then it’s not doing so nomic concerns, admire their intense efforts to raise the badly; all these things are consonant with the aspira- workers’ standard of living, to understand right away tions of the people. I can look back to the days of that they are far, very far, from any idea of provocation Eisenhower, or rather of Nixon, and recall the furore or domination. However, Soviet Russia was confronted which broke out when the United States and Cuba to- by two alternatives: an absolutely inevitable war (be- gether decreed an agrarian reform which was to apply, cause of their commitments and their position in the mark this well, only to landowners of over 200,000 socialist world), if the Cuban revolution was attacked; hectares! Yes, 200,000! Yet the reaction of the trusts or the risk of a war if the United States, refusing to was terrible at that time. Nowadays, in the other Latin retreat before the missiles, would not give up the at- American countries, because the Communist banner is tempt to destroy Cuba. They chose socialist solidarity used as a bogeyman, the reaction of the American and the risk of war. trusts is shrewder. They are going to choose strawmen, “Under these circumstances, how could we Cubans so as to rule indirectly. But there will be difficulties. have refused to share the risks taken to save us? It “This is why Kennedy’s good ideas aren’t going to was, in the final analysis, a question of honor, don’t yield any results. It is very easy to understand and at you agree? Don’t you believe that honor plays a role this point he surely is aware of this because, as I told in politics? You think we are romantics, don’t you? you, he is a realist. For years and years American policy Perhaps we are. And why not? In any event, we are — not the government, but the trusts and the Pentagon militants. In a word, then, we agreed to the emplace- — has supported the Latin American oligarchies. All the ment of the missiles. And I might add here that for us prestige, the dollars, and the power was held by a class Cubans it didn’t really make so much difference which Kennedy himself has described in speaking of whether we died by conventional bombing or a hydro- Batista. Suddenly a President arrives on the scene who gen bomb. Nevertheless, we were not gambling with tries to support the interests of another class (which the peace of the world. The United States was the one has no access to any of the levers of power) to give the to jeopardize the peace of mankind by using the threat various Latin American countries the impression that of war to stifle revolutions. the United Sates no longer stands behind the dictators, “And so in June, 1962, my brother Raoul and Che and so there is no more need to start Castro-type revo- Guevara went to Moscow to discuss ways and means lutions. What happens then? The trusts see that their of installing the missiles. The convoy arrived by sea in interests are being a little compromised (just barely, three weeks. The United States was able to find out but still compromised); the Pentagon thinks the strate- that weapons were being shipped in, of course; but it gic bases are in danger; the powerful oligarchies in all took them two months to discover that these weapons the Latin American countries alert their American were guided missiles. Two months . . . in other words, friends; they sabotage the new policy; and in short, longer than we had calculated. Because, of course, we Kennedy has everyone against him. The few liberal or were seeking intimidation, not aggression.” allegedly liberal presidents who were chosen as instru- ments of the new policy are swept out of office, like Alliance for Progress Bosch in Santo Domingo, or else they are transformed. Betancourt, for example, was not a Batista; now he The conversation now turned to the Alliance for Prog- has become one. ress. “In a way,” Castro said, “it was a good idea, it “In view of all these things, how can the American marked progress of a sort. Even if it can be said that it government seriously believe that Cuban subversion is was overdue, timid, conceived on the spur of the at the root of explosions taking place all over the moment, under constraint . . . despite all that I am will- South American continent? In Venezuela, for example, ing to agree that the idea in itself constituted an effort are you familiar with the situation there? Do you think to adapt to the extraordinarily rapid course of events in the Venezuelans need us to understand what’s going Latin America. Such as, for example, what we read in on in their country? Do you think we don’t have the papers this morning — did you see the news? That enough problems of our own? Right now I ask only Argentina is nationalizing the oil industry? The Argen- one thing: Leave us in peace to better our country’s tine government! Do yot realize what that means? This economic situation, to put our planning into effect, to 192 Tue New Repustic educate our young compajieros. This doesn’t mean we which diplomatic relations with the United States do not feel solidarity toward nations that are struggling would pose! The Swiss Ambassador is representing the and suffering, like the Venezuelan people. But it is up US at present. I prefer to do business with him than to those nations to decide what they want, and if they with 200 members of an Embassy among whom surely choose other regimes than ours,.this isn’t our business.” _ some spies would be spotted. “T have just talked to you as a Cuban revolutionary. “We Have Always Lived with Danger” But I should also speak to you as a peace lover, and from this viewpoint I believe the United States is too I asked Fidel where is this all going to end? How will important a country not to have an influence on world the situation develop? Even if the United States uses peace. I cannot help hoping, therefore, that a leader against you what you call the alibi of Communism, it will come to the foreinNorth America (why not Ken- still remains true that you have chosen Communism, nedy, there are things in his favor!), who will be willing that your economy and your security depend on the to brave unpopularity, fight the trusts, tell the truth Soviet Union, and that even if you have no ulterior mo- and, most important, let the various nations act as tives in this association, still the United States considers they see fit. I ask nothing: neither dollars, nor assist- that you are part of an international strategy, that you ance, nor diplomats, nor bankers, nor military men — constitute a Soviet base in a world where peace depends nothing but peace, and to be accepted as we are! We on mutual respect for a tacit division of zones of in- are socialists, the United States is a capitalist nation, fluence. : the Latin American countries will choose what they “T don’t want to discuss our ties with the Soviet want. All the same, at a time when the United States Union,” Fidel Castro cut me short. “I find this indecent. is selling wheat to the Russians, Canada is trading with We have none but feelings of fraternity and profound, China, de Gaulle respects Ben Bella, why should it be total gratitude toward the USSR. The Russians are impossible to make the Americans understand that making extraordinary efforts on our behalf, efforts socialism leads, not to hostility toward them, but to co- which sometimes cost them dear. But we have our own existence? Why am I not Tito or Sekou Touré? Because policies which are perhaps not always the same (we the Russians have never done us any injury such as have proved this!) as those of the USSR. I refuse to the Yugoslavians and the Guineans have complained dwell on this point, because asking me to say that I am of in the past, and because the Americans have never not a pawn on the Soviet chessboard is something like given us any of the benefits for which these two nations asking a woman to shout aloud in the public square congratulate themselves today. that she is not a prostitute. “As to this matter of fearing Soviet intentions in “If the United States sees the problem as you have Latin America through Cuba’s subversive activities, posed it, then you are right, there is no way out. But this is just attributing to others one’s own desire to who is the loser in the last analysis? They have tried dominate. You said yourself just a little while ago that everything against us, everything, absolutely every- the-Russians have had enough of their Cuban involve- thing, and we are still alive and getting better day by ment. Economically this is obvious. This is why, speak- day; we are still standing upright, and we plan to cele- ing from a military viewpoint, it is better not to force brate with greater festivities than usual, on January 1, nations to turn to the Russians for help. Really, it 1964, the fifth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution! seems to me that a man like Kennedy is capable of The United States’ policy of isolating us economically seeing that it is not in the United States’ interest to is less effective with each passing day; we are increas- pursue a policy which can lead only to a stalemate. So ing our trade with the rest of the world. Even with far as we are concerned, everything can be restored to Spain! We have just sold a shipment of 300,000 tons normalcy on the basis of mutual respect of sover- of sugar to the Spaniards. Far from discouraging us, eignty.” the blockade is maintaining the revolutionary atmos- In conclusion, Fidel Castro said to me: “Since you phere we need to stiffen the country’s backbone. Are we are going to see Kennedy again, be an emissary of in danger? We have always lived with danger. To say peace, despite everything. I want to make myself clear: nothing of the fact that you have no idea how many I don’t want anything, I don’t expect anything, and friends one discovers in the world when one is perse- as a revolutionary the present situation does not dis- cuted by the United States. No, truly,. for all these please me. But as a man and as a statesman, it is my reasons, we are not suppliants, we ask nothing. I'll duty to indicate what the bases for understanding tell you something else: since the rupture and the could be.” blockade, we have forgotten the United States. We feel All this was said two days before President Ken- neither hatred nor resentment any more, we simply nedy’s death. : don’t think about the US. When I think of the problems @QUSA: The New Republic and Jean Daniel 193 Mr. STANDARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STokEs. Because of the lateness of the hour, it will be _ the plan of the committee to make the presentation tomorrow morning of the interview with President Fidel Castro in Cuba. For that reason I would like to make some other remarks at this time. This committee made two trips to Cuba, one on March 30, which extended from the 30th of March to the 4th of April. The second trip was from August 24 to August 29. Prior to going to Cuba on both occasions, it required a great deal of preparation and a great deal of contact between this committee and the Cuban Interest Section in the Cuban Government. I want to acknowledge the presence here today at the witness table of one of the gentlemen who was extremely helpful and cooperative to this committee in terms of both of those trips, Senor Ricardo Escartin, who is the Consul and the First Secretary of the Cuban Interest Section. It was necessary for Mr. Escartin and other members of the Cuban Interest Section to meet with me on many occasions and also with Professor Blakey and members of this staff. We spent a great deal of time and received a great deal of cooperation from him on every occasion. Also, in Cuba, Senor Senen Buergo, the American Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was extremely helpful and cooperative with this committee. I also want to acknowledge the presence here at the witness table today of another gentleman who was extremely cooperative with us, and that was Senor Felipe Villa, Captain of the Ministry of the Interior, and during the course of. both of our trips he extended a great deal of cooperation and help and assistance to this committee. I would like also to mention two very talented and able Cuban translators who were extremely helpful to us, Ms. Juanita Vera Nellie and Ruiz de Sarade. Others who gave cooperation and hospitality to this committee were Dr. Mondo Torres Santrail, the Minister of Justice; Oscar Fernandez Mel, the mayor of Havana; Jose Raimond Fernandez, Minister of Education, all of whom were extremely helpful and hospitable to us on our stay in Cuba. In addition, we want to express our deep appreciation to Presi- dent Fidel Castro. On the first trip we made to Cuba, President Castro spent in excess of 4 hours being interviewed by the chair- man of this committee and other members of the committee and staff. The entire transcript will be put into the record at some point tomorrow. During that period of time, the President made it very clear that it was the purpose of the Cuban Government to make it very clear that their government had nothing to do whatsoever with this very tragic occurrence in this country. It was the intent of their govern- ment to do everything possible to cooperate and see that the Cuban Government did everything in its power to clear up whatever it could around a tragedy of this type. So we are indeed grateful for the kind of cooperation that this congressional committee has received, and we want to thank each of you gentlemen for the assistance you have given us in this very important matter. 194 If there is nothing further at this time, I might also say that we are once again indebted to the U.S. Marshall Service for the secu- rity arrangements here around the distinguished witnesses who have appeared here today. We also would like to thank the interpreter from the State FERED Mr. Hervas, for a very efficient job he has done here today. At this time the Chair will request that everyone remain seated until our witnesses have departed from the hearing room. Thereaf- ter, we will adjourn these hearings until 9 a.m. tomorrow morning. Thank you, gentlemen. You are excused. (Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 9 a.m., Tuesday, September 19, 1978.] INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1978 House OF REPRESENTATIVES, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, Washington, D.C. i} } The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:15 a.m., |/ in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes 1 i](chairman of the select committee) presiding. ij Present: Representatives Stokes, Devine, Preyer, McKinney, Sawyer, Dodd, Ford, Fithian, and Edgar. Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; | Leodis Matthews, staff counsel; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief | clerk. Chairman SToKeEs. A quorum being present, the committee will | come to order. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. NARRATION BY G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL Mr. BuLAKEy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In late March and early April of this year, three members of the select committee—yourself, Congressman Preyer, and Congressman Dodd—as well as three staff members, traveled to Cuba. It was the first of two trips in which the committee sought firsthand informa- _ tion about Lee Harvey Oswald’s alleged visit to the Cuban consul- ate in Mexico City, as well as other evidence about the Kennedy assassination. During the trip to Havana the committee representa- tives were given an opportunity to interview President Castro him- self. In a 4-hour session, which was tape recorded, President Castro denied that he or any official of his government had anything to do with the death of President Kennedy or with Lee Harvey Oswald other than the visit to the Cuban consulate in September of 1963. The committee asked President Castro a series of questions. First, the committee asked him to recount whatever details he had learned and could recall regarding Oswald’s two visits to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City in September 1963. Mr. Chairman, I ask that JFK F-429A, a photo taken during the interview of President Castro, be displayed and entered into the record at this point. Chairman STokEs. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this place and displayed. (The information follows:] (195) JFK Exurisit F-429A Mr. Biakey. In addition, may a tape of that interview, JFK F-429B, and a transcript, JFK F-429C, also be included in the record at this point? Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this point. [Tape referred to above is retained in committee files. | [The information follows:] 197 JFK Exuisit F-429C INTERVIEW OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ PRESIDENT OF CUBA STAFF REPORT of the SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION September 18, 1978 198 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS Ninety-Fifth Congress LOUIS STOKES, Ohio, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio WALTER E. FAUNTROY, District of Columbia STEWART B. MCKINNEY, YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, California Connecticut CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut CHARLES THONE, Nebraska HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee HAROLD S. SAWYER, Michigan FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana ROBERT W. EDGAR, Pennsylvania STAFF G. ROBERT BLAKEY, Chief Counsel and Director GARY CORNWELL, Deputy Chief Counsel Kennedy Task Force EDWIN JUAN LOPEZ SOTO, Researcher 199 Table of Contents Page Tniivroacdoc1on 4S SA RSRe eee Fae eer SCOT IT% Excerpts: A. Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban. ‘Consulate: ini Mexico? Cityiige Gis cs 62 Be *Comerniclarki’s ‘Allegati.onievey .Oseeid..x2c 8 C. Use of Assassinations as a Political Weapont® Sys 2e.eie7- .esORseig yes eo LT D. Statements made by Fidel Castro at the Brazilian Embassy on September 77 1963 eee Pee ee el EIAs Transcript of an interview of Fidel Castro Ruz on April 3, 1978 by Congressmen Louis Stokes, Richardson Preyer, and ; Christopher Dodd, Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey, Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell, and Researcher Edwin Juan Lopez SOCOM me e sprit eierelt es icttts a elMis ee Fen 16!) ene) 200 INTRODUCTION This Staff Report contains an interview held with Fidel Castro on April 3, 1978. It is President Castrots story as told by President Castro, about major areas of the Committee's concern. President Castro's words have been transcribed from the contemporaneous translations of Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade. Their translations have been used so as to provide as accurate a transcription as possible. It is based solely on statements made by President Castro; it does not rely abort or cite other source material, or evidence the Committee has uncovered. It is based on an | interview conducted by the Committee and staff with President Castro in Havana, Cuba. This interview, released today in its entirety, will also be published as an appendix to the Pinal Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, This Staff Report should not be read as "implying" that the Committee believes or disbelieves the statements made. The Committee is currently analyzing and investigating all aspects of the subjects rasied in this interview that are related to this investigation. The Final Report will contain a complete analysis of the subjects discussed during the interview related to the investigation. The Final Report will also incorporate all the material that the Select Com- mittee has acquired as a result of its investigation. 201 Page EXCERPT A Lee Harvey Oswald's Visits to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City Mr. President, did it come to your attention shortly after the assassination that Lee Harvey Oswald, who was the accused assassin, had had contact with your Embassy poameexico City? Castros Yes. In fact, it was after Kennedy's death that he caught my attention. Because here nobody receives news about anyone filing applications for a visa. These things are always solved through the Office of The Minister of Foreign Affairs. So it never is taken to the government. You know, it is not necessary. This is normal routine work. None of us has anything to do with visas. Some officials knew about it when somebody in particular filed an appli- cation there. But tens 2 or maybe hundreds of thousands of people file applications. But when Xennedy was assassinated and Oswald's actions were published in the newspapers, the officials who had handled visa applications realized that this Oswald could be the same Oswald who had gone to the Consulate in order to apply for a visa. That is why we had news about it, you know? After Kennedy's death we learned that a man by the name of Oswald nad gone to the Consulate and filled out an application for a visa = . “ . = St YSN=) ‘ ote WY ave fmfe WAT 2 Sw much ion My m is z A rtay 4) a” Mt Sls iera a Sy q) 1@) “@)v tedc;> OQ Ss ie) he a = a ort mn Oo U 4) H a a te of 19h) a ti} = 1) Sa a) =f W n ) qa) us Ho a m ny "4 sy a) E t) m i) 1@) Ci} 3 ne) a 0) ) O 2 =) at | “3 a) J Xa) Li} . | Ud a) v >t -t at b' WwWjoukS “ne ~= gigan “r-~ Fond “ VE OVOCACzZOI hae , Se an except ion , 203 Page Four Cuba because there was a tremendous suspicion and because in general dermits to (travel to Cuba) were denied. Wow, if it was a transit visa going toward another country - let's say -- had the Soviet Union granted the visa, you may be sure that our Consul would have granted the transit visa because the person would not be coming to Cuba only, but would be going to another country. The person would have to come (here) and if the Soviets would have granted the visa, then that would have accredited the person..like, you know, the serson would have been given a transit visa because I feel that if the Soviets had granted the visa, tnen he would have come here. (In that .era),.it was not so,.crazy (that he tried) to come to Cuba because if he had obtained the visa from another country, it would have been for certain that our, Consul would have granted him tne visa to stop here. Now, can you imagine if that verson had been to Cuba in October and then in November the President of the United States would have been kilied? That is why it has always been something -- a very obscure thing -- something suspicious -- because I interpreted it as a deliberate attempt to link Cuba with Kennedy's death. That is one of the things that seemed to me very strange. ... 204 Page Five Stokes: Let me ask you this question, Mr. President. One of the persons that we have talked with since we have been here in Havana has been your former Consul, Mr. Azcue, who was produced at our request by vour officials here. 1 - told us that with reference to the man who apoeared at your Embassy and who filled out an application for an intransit visa, that the photograph which appears on the visa application is the photograph of the man who died in the United States as Lee Harvey Oswald, but, that this man was not the individual who had\ appeared at your Embassy in Mexico City. And, my question would be in two parts: One, Nave vou nad an opportunity to talk with Mr. Azcue? And secondly, from all the information available to you, would this be your opinion also -- that the man who appeared at the Embassy was an imposter? Castro: Actually, I don't have an ovinion about that. I wouldn't be able to say whether I've met Azcue once. I don't te- member now. I have no recollection at present of having met Azcue. Because I had been given the information about all that, I myself did not know whether he was in Mexico Or here. It is very likely that I have seen him some time; however, I don't recall having met Azcue those days. Secondly, about the idea of an imposter, I have no special theory on that. As far as I have understood, Azcue has an Ht o- ts fr ion q) f ct) ms @) E “ef nO) q) Q 1) le UG 4) ) te ay @) a " = TS 1) 1) UN 0] compromised. 12) oO wv ce rd My ti et au oO i) "1 oO oO ' 1) v' us (@) rl "4 ie) ' O a () SS Sa wt ! ny q) q) a) 1 " S Mr i) +43 . MY aA a oO oF a) W) a) tn ms Gy "I Mt ay Gi fs cc) ) ci mM ri] ra a) i) TS OQ ta) wv as ies F,& el Ati ian 1) Gs as ) pa us 7] 1) 9) . a “el as a) tS ie HoH ie tm) 2e 1) ay > 4 rf q) S Si have cc) a) (@) a es ri} at > i al ~~“ Ey a) C 2 ™ E id my 3 E: Gy be in el (i) macy = O ”) () 0) rd a) a Siew aA ) So Os MM I ra SG ad would “ef mn q) z e) oO 0] "4 in a ed = ae om] wa m NI Ay (@) mt cy Oo d a) — m Sc ~ TS (3H a a> ~~ Cs ws on 2 et tia} vil 1.1 O . nn ) He rl a ti) 205 i) a) f ) J ws G Ns a cs te Gt Sy We ) mM ier as a] ce cw) us. a) Ci oO . a #, ~ JC. oe q) nm ) . ) . 13 Vv Mi ns 1) m i) a) rf = co) By r-t U wf rl compromised = rt ) or i) Or W 0) > = set 00) O 14 v 4% Qa O 0] Ee i) at Ks "A oA x a) Mm, as 1) Oo wn a” ) 4) O ’ in 1) af v a on re) 4) O Ci wu St Oo = i as , a s\ O ”) Gr dd a St at Q) My "ch re) Q) a) ‘3 a) a al on c "I as wv wt re 3) mn Sa - “I m "4 and i ) oO vel vel mt al re rf ae O - 79 - 14(Vol. 4) i oes U6] Oo 19] rr ” a) rp) E ) O q ci) > Oo Sy a oO Cuba ue) i] uti 4 as <4 q) Ps ' vel a aut 1) a3 1) on t1 on Six 41-372 Page 206 Page Seven There is something that I can guarantee. The Cuban government believes that Azcue is a serious and honest man; and that he has never said something differently from what he said the first time. Ye has more or less kept his story -- as far as I know. I mean, he is a person you can. trust.» de~is ar trustiul~mans?: That as all I can say about Azcue. But, I may say that if many people have elaborated theories, I am not among them. 207 Page Eight EXCERPT B Comer Clark's Allegation Cornwell: One passage reads as follows: An interview in July 1967 with a British journalist, Comer Clark...do you have the trans- lation of it there? Villa: Yes. Castro: Let me see it. I have it here. Pause: (Approximately one minute while President Castro reads it.) Castro: Pueeeis absurd. -i *didnet say that. Cornwell: Did the interview ever occur? Castro: It has been invented from the beginning until the end. I didn't say that. How could I say that? It's a lie from head to toe. If this man would have done something like that, it would have been Our moral duty to inform the United States. You understand? Because if a man comes here, mentions that he wants to kill Kennedy, we are (being pro- voked), do you realize that? It would have been similar to a mad person. If somebody comes to us and said that, it would have been our moral responsibility to inform the United States. How could we accept a man from Mexico to Cuba who tells us that he is going to kill President Ken- nedy? If somebody is trying to create provoca- tion or a trap, and uh--we would have denounced 208 Page Nine him. Sure, a person coming here or even in one of our embassies saying that--and that never happened--in no part, as far as I know. Escartin: That refers to the interview you spoke about in the beginning. Castro: But how could they interview me in a pizzeria? I never go to public restaurants and that man invented that. That was invented from the upper to the bottom. I do not remember that. And, it is a surprise for me to see because I couldn't have said that. You have to see who wrote it. And, what is the job of that journalist? What is he engaged in? And, what prestige has this journalist? Not the one that wrote that book, but the origin of that version. You should have to find who he is and why he wrote it, and with whom he is related--and which sense they have to attribute those words which are absolutely in- vented. I think it is possible that you would _ be able to find out who that journalist was. Do you have some news about that journalist in that newspaper? Villa: He was in Cuba and tried to carry out an interview with you, Casceg: Let me tell you. Of every one hundred interviews that are requested of me I only grant one because 209 Page Ten if I were to give all the interviews that I am requested to, you can be sure that I would not be able to have anything but twenty-four hours of my life to have interviews. I would not have enough time to do anything else. Bar- bara Walters waited three years for an inter- view--just almost three years. And even that of Moyers. I didn't want to have that Moyers interview. He started talking and the truth is that he was very insistent from the time he “came down from the airplane and in spite of the fact that there was no commitment from me regard- ing the interview. I granted one. There are a lot of interview requests and it is very diffi- cult, but I would never have given a journalist an interview in a pizzeria. Dodd: I don't even give interviews in a pizzeria. Villa: Another element commander. That interview was published in a sensationalist or yellow press from the United States. It is a non-serious news- paper. Castro: Especially at that time, a lot of barbaric things were published--a lot of lies. 210 Page Eleven EXCERPT C Use of Assassinations As a Political Weapon Castro: s 6 © © «© « « %Itwas really something inconceiv- able - could have the idea of killing the President? First, because that would have been a tremendous insanity. The Cuban Revolutionaries and the people wno have made this Revolution have proven to be intrepid and to make decisions in the right moment. But, we have not proven to be insane people. The leaders of the Revolution do not do crazy things and have always been extremely con- cerned to prevent any factor that could become a kind of an argument or a pretext for carrying out aggression against our country. We are a very small country. We have the United States 99 miles from our shore which is a very large, powerful country economically, technically, militarily. So, for many years we lived concerned that an invasion could take place..I mean, indirect and at the end a direct aggression. We were very close to that. Yet look at the conclusions we draw. If the elections of 1960 had not been won by Kennedy, but Nixon instead, during the Bay of Pigs, the United @) States would have in- vaded Cuba. We mean that in the midst of the fight that Kennedy followed the line that had been already traced. 211 Page Twelve There is no doubt that we appreciate very highly the fact that Kennedy resisted every kind of pressure not to have the Marines land in our country. Because, there were manv peoole who wanted the Marines to land here. Nixon himself was in favor of that. Had Nixon been President during the Bay of Pigs invasion, a landing by the military army of the United States would have taken olace. We are absolutely convinced of cnaet. However, Xennedy resisted all the pressures and he did not do that. What would that have meant for us? The destruction of the country? maybe millions of deaths? Because, undoubtedly the people would fight. The veople I am absolutely sure about. An invasion of Cuba by the United States would have cost hundreds of thousands of lives, maybe millions of lives. We were aware of that. We have an American military base in our territory, by force. And, it is not assumed that anyone is going to have a military base on someone else's territory, if it is not on the basis of an agreement. However, the United States has militarv bases in many places of the world, but here, SB is by force. rom that base, many provocations have been carried out against Cuba. There were people wounded. .there were peovle killed. What did we do? We brought our- guards away from the lines, from the fence. 212 Page Thirteen We never shot at them. ‘Iny? Because we made every oossible effort so that an incident of that kind would not become a pretext to be attacked. So, we have followed the policy. We had an American boat just three miles away from us for years, a warship full of electronic communications equipment and never : hostile action was carried against that warshio. So, there are many events that have proven how careful Cuba has always been to prevent the scerpetration of an invasion. We could have died heroically - no doubt about it. ‘Yow, that would have been a victory for our peoole. They're willing, to be sacrificed . and to die... Yet, it,would have been just another page in history..nothing else. So, we have always been very much aware to not give The. United States, the pretext... the possibility (4 for (an invasion.) What was the cause of the missile crisis? The need we had to seek orotection in case of an (invasion) from the United States. We agreed on the installation of the (stategic) missiles, because un- doubtedly that diminished the danger of direct aggression. That became a danger of another kind, a kind of a global danger we became, but we were trying to protect our country at all times. Who here could have operated and planned something so delicate as the death of the United States President. That was insane. From the 213 Page Fourteen ) feevassasal SOLNc S2= Yisw Lt Was Unsane el oldeseare yee eae SOlLiTical Soin: 32 view, i+ was a =remencows insani-=: Poa go-tg =) =Sil You Sere thas nosody, nobody ever Pita tS Soen OS such TAings AS. WOU LA eeeoy) AS Peet criee =o Getend our folks Sere, within dur cearri- SOLy ALYONeYWRO; SUDSCribed to. taat idea would have peemsguesea insane..a5solutaly sick Never, in sweaty Wesgue7Gs -S7OlUution,; I never Reard anyone suggest Sor evSnes .ecula=2 asoul a measure Of Enat Sort, Séecause PaeeeOULa ~ilnnk Of [ie itea of orsanizing the Seath of the President of the United States. That would nave been the most perfect pretext for the United States co invade our country which is what I have tried to prevent for all these years, in every possible sense. Since the United States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain from a war with the United States? The United States would lose nothing. The Gestouteion would nave been here. The United States had J-2 air surveillancing for almost fifteen years. The slanes lew over our territory everv day. The women said that they could not go over their terrace naked for the U-2 would have taxen a picture of them. That thing we could not allow to Hapoen, vou know, vecause it was oe So, there were, vou know)° those flights’ iust very close to the soil. Those kind of ftights was really demoralizing for our people. It was impossible +o let 214 Page Fifteen them continue to do thaty so we had to shoot sx them. On the. following day after the missile crisis, we had the need to shoot at those planes, because to have allowed char would have created a demoralization among our people. And, I say that if we allowed that, you wouldn’t have been able even to play baseball here. Because those planes came just twenty meters from here, so it was really de- moralizing. bsde! the U-2 came very high, you know, and I tell you, Cuba has been characterized by following a firm policy, a policy of principles. Our position was known after the missile crisis. We were not in a position to make any concessions. That is a known position, but Cuba, the leaders of the Cuban Revolution, mavenaee made that kind of insanity, and that I may assure vou. And the biggest kind of insanity that could have gone through anyone's mind here would have been that of thinking of killing the Presidenc of the United States. Nobody would have thought of that. In spite of all the things, in spite of all the attempts, in spite of all the irritation that brought about an attitude of firmness, a willingness to fight, that was translated by our ceople into a spirit of heroism, dut it never became a source of insanity. I'll give you practical reasons. Apart from our ideology, I want to tell you that the death of the 215 Page Sixteen leader does not change the system. It has never done that. And, the best example we have is Batista. Batista murdered thousands of our comrades. If there was anyone in which that kind of revenge was justified, it was Batista. However, our movement did very difficult things, but it never had the idea of physically eliminating Batista. Other revolutionary groups did, but never our movement. We had a war for twenty-five months against Batista's army and spent seven years under Batista's dictatorship with thousands dying. But, it never came to our minds.. we could have done it, very well, but we never thought about that, because it was different from our feelings. That is our position. That is why we are interested. That is why I was asking you whether you are really to give serious conclusions on this. On our “hopeful if there is something we could give you, we part, would, without any kind of precondition. The informa- have offered you is not conditioned to anything. tion we of the fact that the problem is thorny, that In spite this Committee here from giving the im- doesn't stoop we are being judged here, that we are pression that being tried. 216 Page Seventeen EXCERPT D a Statements Made By Fidel Castro At the Brazilian Embassy on September 7, 1963 Castroy ), Sofie S Then a journalist asked me). «a ane purpose I had ... I don't remember literally what I said, but I remember my intention in saying what I said and it was tO warn the government that we know about the (at- tempted) plots against our lives. I mean, in one way or the other to let the United States government know that we knew about the existence of those picts. SO," £esaue something like those plots start to set a very bad precedent, | a very serious one ain Chat. that could Decome a boomerang against the authors of those actions ... but I did not | mean to threaten by that. I did not mean even that .. not.in the least .. but rather, like a warning that we Knew; that we had news about it; and that to set those precedents of plotting the assassination of leaders of other countries would be a very bad precedent .. something very negative. And, if at present, the same would happen under the same circumstances, I would have no doubt in saying the same as I said (then) because I didn't mean a, threat by that.) J. didnit say dt as & threat... fedid ‘not mean by that that we were going to take measures-- Similar measures - like a retaliation for that. We never 217 Page Eighteen meant that because we knew that there were Slots. For three years we had known that there were plots against us. So, the conversation came about very casually, you know; but I would say that all these plots or attempts were part of the everyday - life. I do remember about being in the Brazilian Embassy at that time ... that I did make a statement in that sense ... in the sense that I was informed of the plots and that that was a very bad precedent to form the various orin- f.o1Les0 oo relation to, .... 218 KENNEDY SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS Name Fidel Castro Ruz Date April 3, 1978 Time 6:30 DM Address Havana, Cuba Place Presidential offices ‘ Interview: Present were President Fidel Castro and his interpreter, Senorita Juanita Vera, Captain Felipe Villa, Senor Ricardo Escartin, zenen Buergo, and Alfredo Ramirez (representing the Government of Cuba). Also present representing the Government of the United States were eat aeesenen Louis Stokes, Richardson Preyer, Christopher Dodd and staff personnel of HSCA: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, Gary Cornwell, Deputy Chief Counsel and Edwin Lopez, Researcher/ translator. The meeting opened and President Castro stated: Castro: Do you have the supposed statements that I have made? I have tried to remember. There is an individual who says that he interviewed me in a restaurant. That is very strange. I tried to recall him, you know. I tried ‘td recall (the proposed) interview and on one occasion (he) said that it was in a (pizzeria). I just reached a conclusion not only because of the circumstances in which he says the interview was made, but also be- cause of the content of the interview... . .or the alleged interview. I am absolutely certain that that Interviewer Signature Typed Signature started July 10 Date transcribed 1979 219 Fidel Castro Interview Page two interview never took place. Now, I will have to check that about the (alleged interview at the Brazilian Em- bassy) because that is true. I mean it's true that I went to the Brazilian Embassy. I've been trying to re- member, and I recall the following: It is not that I found out that an attempt was being plotted. Villa, when did the tnterview occur? Villa: On September the seventh, 1963. You spoke about the topic with Bill Moyers. maestro: Then faGenmnoOwil Lor a long. tine. Le was not recent because the attempt against our lives started to be planned here a long time before that I could say that trom 1959 that was known to us We were constantly ar- equipment by the CIA that would come to the country with explosives, with telescopic target rifles, even dazookas -- every kind of weapon. Here they organized, since very early, plots at Guantanamo Base. So, that was very well known to us. Then a journalist asked me.... purpose I had ... I don't remember literally what I but I remember my intention in saying what I said was to warn the government that we know about the (at- tempted) plots against our lives. I mean, in one the other to let the United States government know that we knew about the existence of those plots. something lixe those plots start to set a very bad Fidel Castro Interview Page three a very serious one -- that that could become a boomerang against the authors of. those actions!... but I did noe mean to threaten by that. I did not mean even that .. nOt-ii the Least-.we-but. rather, likes warning that we knew; that we had news about it; and that to set those precedents of plotting the assassination of leaders of other countries would be a verv bad precedent .. sometime very negative. And, if at present, the same would happen under the same circumstances, I would have no doubt in saying the same as I said (then) because I didn't mean a threat by that. I. didn’t, say it as & threat see not mean by that that we were going to take measures - Similar measures - like a retaliation for that. We never meant that because we knew that there were plots. For three years we had known that there were plots against us. So, the conversation came about very casually, you know; but I would say that all these plots or attempts were part of the everyday life. I do remember about being in the Brazilian Embassy at that time ... that I did make a statement in that sense ... in the sense that I was informed of the plots and that that was a very bad precedent to form the various prin- ciples in relation to ... I remember (another nefarious prececent) was that of the nijacking of olanes. The first olanes hijacked in this area were Cuban planes, and the hijacking of the planes was encouraged by the United States government. Even an amount of money was offered as a 221 Fidel Castro Interview Page four reward to the veople that hijacked a Cuban plane. And later what happened? Well, it was all the way around -- terrorist elements and insane elements and every kind of peoole. (Once) the precedent was established, these people started to hijack planes. And that is what I may tell you is part of that experience. And I ‘repeat again that if a similar situation would come about, I could say just the same words -- I could say just-the » same. Now, I cannot guarantee because I don't have the exact recollection. I don't have the exact copy of what I said literally. And, of course, one always has to be careful with the versions even on a given statement. But now, what were the intentions of that man when he wrote that he had interviewed me in the restaurant, and writing the things he wrote? There was a deliberate purpose -- of creating confusion, of planting confusion and trying to have Cuba involved in these events. Stokes: Mr. President, as a result of the statements or the con- versation you had with this gentleman at. that time, did you ever hear from President Kennedy? Castro: Ivam-trying to. recall the’ date. I can tell you that in the period in which Kennedy's assassination took place Kennedy was changing his policy toward Cuba. I mean by that he was not adopting measures, not in fact. The whole style and aggressive measures against Cuba existed for many years. “First of all, the Bay of ‘Pigs? then the 41-372 O - 79 - 15(Vol. 3) 222 Fidel Castro Interview Page five missile crisis; then the piratic attacks -- those attacks which were organized in Central America and Miami, at a time at which they sent the mother boats to attack the refineries, the warehouses, boats, merchant ships, port installations and even the (innocent) population was also attacked in»those days by these people: It has been known later - more or less - for how long these actions lasted. Now at that time, Kennedy was starting to question all these things. One of the facts, one of the events, was that an American official from the United Nations called my house. I don't speak English, so he spoke to one of my comrades who was with me there. After that, I've been able to go with more accuracy through those things. And, I think it was Atwood. I think it was Atwood because later he was appointed Ambassador to Guinea, and that was very significant because it was the first time such a thing happened -- the first time such a gesture came about. And, you could see undisputably that a new trend was coming (into) existence in the sense of established contacts. So, it was a sort of a change (in) policy. I don't recollect exactly what month it was. Have you been able to reconstruct the time at which Atwood (phoned me) at my house? Escartin: We have been able to reconstruct that date around (inaudible). Castro: Well, that was after the missile crisis, I think. That was after the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis. I was of the opinion that the only man who could change that policy was Kennedy himself, becauseit seemed to me that at 223 Castro Interview Page six that time it was not a time of the Bay of Pigs. At that time he had more experience. And, he had much more authority. Maybe after the missile crisis, he had much more influence. I was convinced that Kennedy was the man with enough talent and enough courage to question and change that policy. And, people started to (feel) about it. And I felt that a positive act was that famous speech he made at the American University. It was a speech about the need for peace, the need for prevention of war, the destructions that Hitler's invasion on the Soviet Union had caused.(He expressed this) in terms that he had not used for a long time -- that had not been used in the American theory for a long time. I have read all over that speech again. I cannot say that that's a perfect (speech),I feel that it had some gaps, but if you bear in mind what he said, at the moment he said it, in the midst of the cold war, there is no doubt that those statements were of a tremendous value. Now, in addition to that, the unfortunate circumstance happened that in the days previous to Kennedy's death a French journalist visited our country -- Jean Daniels. Then he told me .. he said that he was interested in having a discussion about a special topic with me. I remember that I took him with me to Veradero. Then, in the morning -- it was the morning on the way to Veradero and also at the beach ne was ex- plaining to me his purpose. We were talking aboutoe@ ht thes. 224 Fidel Castro Interview Page seven And, I would say that he was bringing a kind of message from Kennedy. In substance, as far as I remember now, he himself has spoken about this on several occasions. But, the most important thing was he told me that Kennedy had explained to him the great danger that existed during the missile crisis, and that Kennedy asked himself whether I (also) was aware of the whole danger that was announced at the time of the missile crisis. But, he was (somewhat) traumatized with all the remembrances of those days. When Kennedy found out that this journalist was coming to Cuba - he had a long talk with this journalist. (He asked the journalist to talk with me, and then return to Washington with a response). We were just talking in those terms. He had to finish explaining to me everything he had talked about with Kennedy and I had to give him an answer about- all this. But then at lunchtime or after lunch -- I don't remember quite well -- the first news started to arrive by radio that an attempt against Kennedy had taken place and that he had been seriously wounded precisely at the moment that we were having that talk and that came to be another smyptom, that Kennedy was questioning the policy that had been followed so far. Maybe he was elaborating some formula in order to have that policy changed. (From our) point of view, Mr. Kennedy was the only man that at that point had the authority and enough courage in order to bring about the change in that policy. 225 Fidel Castro Interview Page eight That was my opinion at that time. Stokes: Do you remember the name of the journalist? Castro: Jean Daniel -- a French journalist -- very well known -- enjoys prestige. He (had) met with Kennedy for some time, and he was well impressed with Kennedy and he was pre- cisely letting us know (about) the whole interview with Kennedy, and the things that he had talked about with Kennedy regarding Cuba. It was assumed that I had to tell him something so that he would go back and convey it to Kennedy. But, before we had just finished with our conversation, the news arrived of the attempt against Kennedy's life. Actually, we were very much concerned and immediately we suspected that an effort could be made Bmaorder to try to link us... to link that death attempt with the Cuban problems. Because immediately, you know, it seemed to (us that) also within that atmosphere of a cold war, some people could try to have us linked with Kennedy's déath -- to the point that we were very concerned and we thought about the measures that we could take in the face of a danger of that sort. Stokes: Mr. President, I thinkperhaps in that respect that it might be good for you to tell us what your reaction and that of the Cuban people was to the assassination of President Kennedy. Castro: I have no objection in telling you my reaction. It was a natural and logical reaction. Actually, I felt sad ApoOWt 2. I received that news with bitterness. Reasons? 226 Fidel Castro Interview Page nine Pirst, I think an event of that nature always produces that reaction even when it is a political adversary. It's kind of a repulsion, a rejection. In the second place, I think I have said before that Kennedy was an ad- versary that we had sort of become used to. I mean that political, a strong political struggle existed. But, he was a known adversary. He was somebody we knew. We had (undergone) the Bay of Pigs, we had had the missile crisis -~ so many things had happened. And, at least he was an adversary we knew about. And all.of a sudden, you have the impression that something is missing..." that something is missing. (Thirdly,) on the basis of very deep political feelings, I think the first thing I learned from Marxism was the idea that Situations, societies and social processes do not depend on men, but rather that there is a system; and the system cannot be changed by changing the men even on the basis of an old controversy. For the very past century among revolution- aries, between those who thought that the Czar should be eliminated or that the emperor had to be eliminated because they were the chiefs. That was the theory of dictatorships. Marxists always have been opposed to the idea of killing or having a person killed. That was a very much debated topic among the Marxist (elements). That is one of the first things the Marxists learned; and that it doesn't make sense to kill the political leaders ..., to such an extent 227 Fidel Castro Interview Page ten that in our own experience here (in Cuba) it never came to our minds the idea that Batista's regime could be eliminated by eliminating the person. We attacked a regiment with 120 men ... over 120. men.... one of the strongest regiments of .the country ... in order to take hold of the weapons and to start a struggle against Barreca sAnd, ist mever came, to, ourm minds ther ideas ot killing Batista. If we had wanted to eliminate Batista, we would have been able to. Later 82 men came back to the country from Mexico in a boat that was barely 60 feet long. We traveled 1590 kilometers. We started a war in Sierra Maestra and it never came to our minds the idea of eliminating Batista physically. (Some) people thought that killing Batista would change the system. And finally, maybe one of the things that I regretted the most was that I was convinced that Kennedy was starting to change, himself. And, I was going by the Gmpression) that I was here talking to that man who was bringing a message from him. Actually, I was sad. I was very badly depressed. The imoression I got was very bad. I was very sad about it. He was an adversary; a man with his personal characteristics .. being intelligent.. you may always have the adversaries, but you have an assessment of them as a person, as an intellectual, as political leaders. To a certain extent we were honored 228 Fidel Castro Interview Page eleven in having such a rival. He was not mediocre. He was an outstanding man. And, that was my reaction. Stokes: Mr. President, did it come to your attention shortly after the assassination that Lee Harvey Oswald, who was the accused assassin, had had contact with your Embassy in Mexico City? Castro: Yes. In fact, it was after Kennedy's death that he caught my attention. Because here nobody receives news about anyone filing applications for a visa. These things are always solved through the Office of The Minister of Foreign Affairs. So it never is taken to the government. You know, it is not necessarv. This is normal routine work. None of us has anything to do with visas. Some officials knew about it when somebody in particular filed an appli- cation there. But tens - or maybe hundreds of thousands of people file applications. But when Kennedy was assassinated and Oswald's actions were published in the newspapers, the officials who had handled visa applications realized that this Oswald could be the same Oswald who had gone to the Consulate in order to apply for a visa. That is why we had news about it, you know? After Kennedy's death we learned that a man by the name of Oswald had gone to the Consulate and filled out an application for a visa - that he had been told that we did not normally give an intransit visa until the country of destination granted one. And, Fidel Cas tro Interview Page twelve then we were told that a person had gotten very upset and nad orotested in an irate manner because he aia net re- ceive a visa. This was the news I had, more or less. The rest you know. Stokes: We were wondering your... Castro: There is something I would like to add in that connection. You see, it was always very much suspicious to me --that a person who later appeared to be involved in Kennedy's death would have requested a visa from Cuba. Because, I said to myself - what would have happened had by any chance that man come to Cuba - visited Cuba - gone back to the States and then appeared involved in Kennedy's death? That would have really been a provocation - a gigantic provocation. Well, that man did not come to Cuba simply because that was the norm -- we rejected visa ap- plications .. like that. In those days the mechanism was very rigid because, of course, we had suspicions of anyone who tried to come to Cuba. People in charge of granting visas asked themselves: Why does (this applicant) want to come to Cuba? What kind of counter-revolutionary activity could he carry out in Cuba? Maybe the people thought that the person was a CIA or FBI agent, you kn10W, so it was very difficult for a North American, just from his own wishes, to come to Cuba -- because systematically we denied the visas. So, I think that there could always be an exception, but in those times it was very, very difficult to have anyone from the United States come into 230 h Fidel Castro Interview Page thirteen Cuba because there was a tremendous suspicion and because in general permits to (travel to Cuba) were denied. How, 1f it was a transit visa going toward another country - let's say -- had the Soviet Union granted the visa, you may be sure that our Consul would have granted the transit visa because the person would not be coming to Cuba only, but would be going to another country. The person would have to come (here) and if the Soviets would | have granted the visa, then that would have accredited the person..like, you know, the person would have been given a transit visa because I feel that if the Soviets had granted the visa, then he would have come here. (In that era) it was not so crazy (that he tried) to come, to Cuba because if he had obtained the visa from another country, it would have been for certain that our Consul would have granted him the visa to stop here. Now, can you imagine if that verson had been to Cuba in October and then in November the President-of the United States would have been killed? That is why it has always been something -- a very obscure thing -- something suspicious -- because I interpreted it as a deliberate attempt to link Cuba with Kennedy's death. That is one of the things that seemed to me very strange. (The facts of the events) seemed very strange also. As it was published, Oswald would have shot several times at a car that was moving with a telescopic (rirle). (I remember) when we trained in Mexico in order to come to Cuba to make revolution we had 231 Fidel Castro Interview Page fourteen several guns like that and it could be that we learned almost everything that could be learned about telescopic pistols, even the differences between different pistols; a normal pistol with a trigger, an automatic pistol and Seeetescopic (rifle). It is smuchimore practical. af you use, aenormal sight «. . .....when you try to focus. a, moving target and you (do it) more accurately .. with that kind than with a telescopic sight. A telescopic sight view gun should be used against a fixed target -- not a moving one -- It is very difficult. And, I tell you it seemed very strange that he used that weapon and that those shots could have been made with that kind of weapon. Because, when you shoot the first charge you have to take the weapon away from your face to (focus) i twagain, ro, try tort ind the object again..the target..and you lose time -- it is quite difficult. I don't know whether later things were technical proof - technical tests were made to see whether - just a normal shooter at that distance and at that speed of the car could have (accurately made such shots). That was something else that was very suspicious to me. But, as far as we are concerned, what was most strange was Oswald's attempt to visit Cuba. Stokes: Realizing, Mr. President, the enormity of the appearance of Oswald at your Embassy and realizing the significance that it had relative to the assassination itself, was it 232 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifteen important enough that you summon individuals who would have knowledge about his appearance to talk with you or to submit written reports relative to this matter? Castro: I think what happened was the following: Nobody knew that. The comrades who had news of that, after the events took place, they reported it, I think, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. So, the only thing we did was when the Warren Commission was created and it requested information about this, it was agreed to send all the information we had at that time .. . I recall that we were consulted with something about the visa application and we were willing to offer all the information they wanted. Now it was assumed that they were conducting the investigation. If they had wanted some additional action on our part (material from us), they should have (requested) it. But, they did not request any other (information) since .. .as far as I have understood . . .here we spoke with the people (our people) who had been in Mexico and our people went into the details of what really happened. And, that was very well clarified. Beyond this, there was not much more that we could do. You can imagine there was not much that we could contribute. As far as I have understood, the Mexican lady who used to work at the Consulate was later the object of many pressures -- even some kind of persecution. Villa: She was arrested by the Mexican police with the purpose of finding out what he had said at the Consulate. Castro: All that they said -- it was assumed that they wanted her 233 Fidel Castro Interview Page sixteen to say that also while at the Embassy he had made reference to killing Kennedy. So the Mexican police had the purpose of having the Mexican declare that. Villa: Exactly. Castro: And, who were the people interested in that? Who could be the people interested in that? To us that is very clear. But, that is something worth to be taken into account. Why would that lady become the object of that oppression? What BG you know about this lady now? Ve ova She lives in Mexico at present. She used to work in the Consulate and she was sympathetic of the Cuban revolution. Castro: She, of course, has a very high merit and that after that, knowing how these things are, a person that did not enjoy the diplomatic. immunity could have been coerced. She could have been blackmailed and she could have been “submitted by fear, you Know, in order to have her make a statement that would be against Cuba -- harmful to Cuba. So; itis a tremendous merit that this Mexican lady did behave the way she did because you know how people are in some countries of the world. They take a helpless woman without any kind of protection and then she can be forced to say anything. One question I would like to raise with you because we are speaking about that topic about which we are very pleased to give you all the opinions and all the cooperation that you might request that is in our hands. Now, do you think you are going to be aple to bring out something really clear on the whole work you're 234 Fidel Castro Interview Page seventeen — doing? Do you think you are going to be able to reach a clear conclusion? | i Stokes: Mr. President, that is the precise reason why we are here in your country. One of the things we said to your top officials Friday morning at our first session was that we came to your country without any preconceived ideas or notions or conclusions of any type. We have tried to pursue the entire investigation in : fair and objective manner, searching only for the truth. The assassination of President Kennedy was a traumatic experience for the American people. And in addition to the trauma which was incurred by them, we found that a Gallup Poll in’ January of 1977 revealed that 81% of the American people believe that someone other than Lee Harvey Oswald vartici- pated in the assassination of President Kennedy. Only 19% believe that he was a lone assassin. Consequently, the mandate given this Committee by the House of Repre- sentatives was for us to investigate all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy. Precisely, it is our job to ascertain who killed the President. Did such a person have help either before or after the assassination? And then to ascertain in that respect whether there was or was not a conspiracy to kill the President. Additionally, we are charged with the responsibility to ascertain the per form- ance of our own agencies in the United States; that 2s, the FBI, CIA, Secret Service, all of the American agencies 235 Fidel Castro Interview Page eighteen that participated in some way in the investigation con- ducted by the Warren Commission. And then lastly, our mandate is to make recommendations to the United States Congress based upon our findings as a result of the total investigation. So we have approached the investigation in that way -- hoping that we will be able to ascertain the truth of these facts and then be able to put to bed the theories, the rumors, the speculation that presently exists around the assassination of President Kennedy. Castro: Have you had a broad access to all the possible sources of information? Stokes: Yes, we have. If you have reference to our own agencies and our. own files, the answer is yes, we have. Castro: Are you optimistic about the fact that you'll be able to reach a sound conclusion on this problem? Are you opti- Mrsticeabout 1t? Stokes: We are optimistic that even though the job is an awesome responsibility for the eleven men and one woman who are members of this Committee, along with the staff of 115 people, all of whom we feel are dedicated to eakcp Aeslsily our final report will be one that will be a highly pro- fessional and competent job. Castro: Any other question that you would like to raise I would be pleased to answer. Stokes: Could we for a moment, Mr. President, go back to the moment you learned about Lee Harvey Oswald having been at your Embassy in Mexico City? Do you recall a speech that you made on the 23rd of November? 236 Fidel Castro Interview Page nineteen Caseroe This is on the twenty ... the speech on the 23rd. Did we have the data at that time that Oswald had been at the Embassy? | Vilva: NO a INO’ Castro: So very likely we did not have it. I think I learned about that some days later and not immediately. | Villa: You mentioned that in the speech on November the 27th. Stokes: 27th - all right. Then my question would be firstly in two parts. One, if he remembered the speech he made on November 27th, and then secondly Castro: But, you should not confuse the man with the system. Stokes: Yes, right, right. That's what you told us earlier, right. Castro: That would be a negative fact for the interest of humanity. These ideas I've always had about this. Stokes: And with reference to the second part of my question regarding the matters which occurred at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City which you referred to in the November 27th speech. Do you recall from whom you learned what had transpired at your Embassy? Castro: I cannot recall. It should have been through Foreign Relations or maybe the Minister of the Interior. Some- body reported to me. We were just reported to about the facts -- that a gentleman had appeared at the Embassy requesting a visa by the same name as the man accused of having assassinated Kennedy. I don't remember how it was told to the American authorities. I remember the 237 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty Warren Commission requested through the Swiss Interest Section all the information we had about it. And, im- mediately, we put at their disposal all the materials we had. Because of course, we were interested more than anyone else in those events being clarified. We were more interested than anyone. At the first moment we were somewhat, you know, uncertain about what was behind this -- whether there were some people that wanted to use that in order to promote an aggression against Cuba. We had Many reasons to suspect that because tremendous things had happened in that sense. We thought that maybe some very reactionary element could have wanted to eliminate Kennedy and just on the wav try to eliminate Cuba, you know. That's why we were observing the whole development of events. But, some days later it started to be clearly seen that it was not a campaign orchestrated against Cuba. But, I'm not - I have no doubt in the least that if they had had the least evidence to link Cuba, that would have been done. A tremendous campaign would have been made and a very dangerous situation would have been created for us. But, now you have to bear in mind, at least to the extent that we know, that the Warren Commission did not make any charge against Cuba, nor did it conduct any effort in that sense. We were under the imoression though, that they were working objectively or that if they were able to discover something, they would handle it. They would expose it. But, we thought that the danger 41-372 O - 79 = 16(Vol. 3) 238 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-one that we were concerned about in the very first moments were then no longer so bad. The fact that somebody went to the Embassy was what brought about the suspicion that somebody had tried to link Cuba. The other theory is that this individual decided himself just because of his initiative -- to visit Cuba - with what purpose? That nobody knows. You would have to have good doses of naivete to think that he was the one who planned rae trie to Cuba -- that he planned the trip to the Soviet Union himself. Actually, all of that is very strange, you know, very rare -- that he tried to go .,to, the Soviet Unions that he tried to go through Cuba -- no other place, but through Cuba; because to go to the Soviet Union you don't basasbee to go to Cuba necessarily. And to this we could add the further event that this individual who could have been able to clarify all because who could have shed more light on this than he himself - Oswald - 24 or 48 hours later. How many hours after the event? Villa: 28 hours. Castro: He was killed 28 hours after the event. And the only explanation given by the assassin was a sentimental reason. As far as,I recall from what I read at that time he said that he had seen Kennedy's widow crying and seen the wnole drama. He decided to take revenge with his own hand. And later on it was known that he was not a kind of a sentimental man; I mean to say he's a psy- chotic character and in the very face of the policemen - 239 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-two killed the supposed author of Kennedy's death. Because, who could have verified that better? Why was this man killed? I do know that you have more information than I do -- much more information than I may have on Jack Ruby's personality. . and, if Jack Ruby fora kind of strictly sentimental reason would have gone there to the very police station and in the face of the policemen killed the supovosed author of Kennedy's death. All this seemed to us very strange. And that is why we gave such importance Pee ~oenerlOrt.he mace in the Cuban Embassy. It was a kind of an attempt by somebody to have Cuba involved in the whole affair, -in the whole issue. Another reasonable fact which I think deserves attention, a fact that de- serves attention - and that is something that was known afterwards when the Senate Committee conducted their investigations was that practically the same day that Kennedy was killed, a CIA agent was going to have an interview. I do not know whether he.had planned that interview with an important agent (Cubela) in order to assassinate me. I felt that a poison was going to be given to that person who was supposed to kill me. So, that is another element which is very suspicious. The same day Kennedy is killed, well about those same days, I get an attempt, a very urgent attempt by an individual with a plan to assassinate me. The Senate (Intelligence Committee) did not give his name, but we know who he was. And, there is no doubt that if one 240 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-three person had the possibility to carry out that attempt, it was that person. Because, he was a man who came from the revolutionary ranks and he had very much good relations with us. So, I would say that among the very many at- tempts, plans, plots, collaborations of the CIA, this was one that had many possibilities of success because that individual had access to us. And that visit practi- cally coincided -- that's a very suspicious coincidence with the Kennedy assassination - very .. We did not learn this until the Senate Committee investigation was con- ducted. Now, in connection with this Embassy, what were you interested in -- in connection with the Embassy and the visit? Stokes: Let me ask you this question, Mr. President. One of the persons that we have talked with since we have been here in Havana has been your former Consul, Mr. Azcue, who was produced at our request by your officials here. He told us that with reference to the man who appeared at, your Embassy and who filled out an application for an intransit visa, that the photograph which appears. on the visa application is the photograph of the man who died in the United States as Lee Harvey Oswald, but, that this man was not the individual who had appeared at your Embassy in Mexico City. And, my question would be in two parts: One, have you had an opportunity to talk with Mr. Azcue? And secondly, from all the information 241 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-four available to you, would this be your opinion also -- that the man who appeared at the Embassy was an imposter? Castro: Actually, I don't have an opinion about that. I wouldn't be able to say whether I've met Azcue once. I don't re- member now. I have no recollection at present of having met Azcue. Because I had been given the information about all that, I myself did not know whether he was in Mexico or here. It is very likely that I have seen him some time; however, I don't recall having met Azcue those days. Secondly, about the idea of an imposter, I have no special theory on. that. As far as I have understood, Azcue has an idea on that. I've heard those comments before -- comments about the possibility of a difference, that he noticed the difference between the person who appeared requesting the visa and the person known as Oswald. But, I don't have a theory on that. It is likely that there could be two different people. But, now I am thinking -- if the person had obtained the visa, would he have visited Cuba? That is a hypothesis. What did he want the visa for? From my point of view, the individual could have come to Cuba and compromised us. He would have us compromised. It seems to me that to apoly for the visa had the purpose of having the individual come to Cuba. Now, we would have to enter into many conjectures to reach a conclusion on that. Because where did he get the vassports? Where did he find the passports that he was taking there? 242 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-five Where was Oswald's passport? What became of Oswald's passports? Those papers should be somewhere. I don't know what could have been the sense of sending another man, but I wouldn't dare deny that possibility. Actually, we would have to know what would have been the purpose. Why would another person have been sent? I don't know whether you would have a theory about that. Personally, I don't have a theory. Wnt aWille he About the possibility of an imposter, in public sources we have read that the possibility exists that there could be a double that carried out some actions that the real Oswald did not on some occasions in 1963. Castro: There is something that I can guarantee. The Cuban government believes that Azcue is a serious and honest man; and that he has never said something differently from what he said the first time. He has more or less kept his story -- as far as I know. I mean, he is a person you can trust. He is a trustful man. That is all I can say about Azcue. But, I may say that if many people have elaborated theories, I am not among them. I have not operated on a theory like that. I just see many strange things that are not logical. It started with the very attempt of the person to come to Cuba; the calibre of weapon used, the absolutely abnormal way in which those people behaved. I mean there have always 243 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-six , been many strange things that made me (suspicious) about Other people. I tell you, I read the book. JI read that book "The Death of The President” written by Manchester. Manchester had the theory that this man acted alone and he argues a lot. He makes a kind of psychoanalytical (study) of Oswald and he defends the (lone assassin theory). Many people have a different theory. So, I have not been able to elaborate -- I wouldn't dare ’ elaborate a theory -- for with me, everything would be | speculation. On Our account and because of our interest, | some time ago we started gathering elements in order to have a better founded idea, you know. And, that is why | our people started to gather materials and information. A group of comrades has been working in this direction. But, I am very much aware that we don't have access to (sources) of information which are fundamental. We have no access to the CIA archives or the FBI archives. We don't have access to the Warren Commission's files. How could we do something really well founded? When the Cuban government saw the Senate Committee Report, it was something real and it was that that individual who was the Man to be given the weapon to kill me in Paris. This man never spoke about that. He was tried and was sentenced on account of the attempts, the plots against our lives. Those plans (had been continuous) and he sent weapons to Cuba until he was discovered. He con- fessed and told us the truth, but he never spoke about 244 Fidel Castro Interview Page twentv-seven that interview in which he was going to be given the weapon to kill me and that was published by the Senate Committee. He never made reference to that. That person is alive because I had to request some leniency. I mean, because his crime was very serious. It was a tremendous betrayal. It was treason, and at that time to participate in such an action was very severely sanctioned. And, following a tradition with individuals that had partici- pated in the revolution, whenever it has been possible to prevent drastic measures, we have done so. This gentleman had been a revolutionary leader. | He had been a good revolutionary fighter, and the public opinion was very irritated about it. His crime was really very serious. I wrote a letter to the Cuban Tribunal morally condemning him (but asking for leniency). I Aid ci2 CEGE the public opinion....That is. Cubela's case. We learned that later when the Senate Committee Report appeared. But, all these elements made us think about the advisability of organizing some investigation on our account. We had hoped that being in contact with your Committee could give us some elements of judgment for our own informa- tion. But, as far as I know, you don't contribute elements of judgment because -- as I have been told -- many you cannot make use of most of the information you possess. 245 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-eight I have been told that one of our hopes was to receive some information. We are giving as much information as we have and we are receiving nothing. Stokes: One thing I would like to say and I think you ought to how is that many Americans are ashamed of the CIA and the degrading attempts that they've made on your life. And, that's something that disturbs many, many decent Americans and I think you ought to know that. Mr. President, with your permission I'd like to defer to my other colleagues, if they have any questions, if that is agreeable to you. Gastro: Yes, please. Stokes: Mr. Preyer? Preyer: Mr. President, you mentioned that you believe that you could transfer power of chains of government without killing the head of the government. That is the tradition of our country also. I speak personally and not for our government, but I join Chairman Stokes in saying that when I read about AMLASH, Cubela and the Church Committee reports I was shocked and outraged. I am confident that is the overwhelming reaction of the American people. I am convinced that the President did not know about that; the head of the CIA, John McCone, did not know of that; or our other high officials; and that this was an aberration of a small group and that it would have 246 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-nine shocked our high officials just as it shocks me if they fad known of it. The fact that the Church Report on AMLASH came from the Agency -- from the government itself rather than being leaked through a newspaper story or something of that sort. Interpreter: Excuse me, I didn't get that last part--- I am sorry: Preyer: Well, the fact that the information on AMLASH and Cubela was revealed by our government agencies themselves and was not brought out against their will through a leak or newspaper story, I think, indicates the strong feeling in our government thatthis kind of thing must never happen again. And, we have set up now a House Intelligence Committee and a Senate Intelligence Committee, both new, to insure that it does not. On the question of our not giving information, but re- ceiving it, let me say we have a common interest in arriving at a final answer, a clear answer, to the question of the assassination of President Kennedy. We are seeking your help in that and your officials have indicated to us they are willing to continue working to. help on that. Our Committee goes out of exsistence at the end of this year. When we file our final report, there will be a great deal of information in it. Castror Is it going to be public? Preyer: It will be public -- which will be of interest to you. Until that time, because of our different jurisdictional problems, there is some evidence which does not belong 247 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty to us which we cannot release. But in the final analysis, the full report will make available much information of interest to you and may answer many of the rumors. In the meantime, one reason we press so hard for information is that this is the last Opportunity that will probably be made in our country to reach a final answer. The last chance where an official body of Congress -- an official governmental body -- will make a judgment on this question. That is why we hope that any information that bears on this-subject that may come up in the next few months and any effort that could be made, even strenuous effoft, would be justified because this op- portunity may not come again. And I hope very much that we will be able to give clear answers to the questions. Your help will assist very much. Castro: I think you are right in what you are saving. When I spoke about the hope of obtaining some information, 1 it was not but a hope. It is absolutely our curiosity, you know. But, it is absolutely evident that we have the duty of handing over all the information we may gather. We are very much interested in having Kennedy's assassination clarified because in one way | or the other attempts have been made to try to have Cuba involved in it. We have our conscience clear. 248 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-one : There is nothing so important as having your con- science clean -- absolutely clean. That's why it is not a matter of conscience, but rather’a matter of polvtical, nistorical eer eneee to have all these problems clarified. It is also true that the fact that the United States has conducted an investigation on the (attempts on our people) and the fact that (it) has been made public is a very correct thing to do -- very right. Of course, I (hear) that in that publica- tion many names were not disclosed -- on reasons of safety. When we conduct an investigation, in general, we publish everything because ..anyway..but I would have liked for the Senate report to have been more complete. It should have not protected so many people in the interest of the national security because that, you know, diminishes its moral value. It diminishes the moral value of the publication. However, I coincide with you that the fact that the investigation had been conducted and that all those materials were released is something highly positive. Now, you see, I was recalling Bill Moyers' report. Bill Moyers made a very important report of all these attempts -- all these logs on terrorist groups. Now, then, there is one point in which an intimation is made that Kennedy's death could have beena result of all these attempts against our lives. It is to say to a certain extent -- Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-two : -- Moyers' report -- which has many vositive things -- can leave the doubt that Cuba could have had some partici- pation in that because there is a Representative of Congress speaking -- I think I spoke later, and at the end a Senator spoke that said that he had no doubts about that topic. So, we are very much -.we are highly in- terested in that party being satisfied. Because, even when the Senate Intelligence Report was released, in some people the idea could have become stronger that Kennedy's death could have been our revenge for all that had been planned against us. If Cuba had something to do with Kennedy's death, it would have been indirectly because many people were trained in handling weapons and many Pad bas that were not normal were done, and under ‘the shade of these irregularities, terrorism (arises and) develops, so (that) all these acts become the (norm). ime was precisely in that sense that I said that it was a nefarious precedent. Can you imagine that in the (entire) world I was one of the naive people who thought that these things could not happen. Not in the Middle Ages, but now in this era in which the whole apparatus of the government can remain very quiet and promote the killing of leaders of other countries? What is to hapdoen to the world in the nuclear era if that becomes a practice? Now we are lucky that all those plans were a failure. 250 Fidel Castro Interview . Page thirty-three We have not had to (regret the) death af panaeaeae leader of the revolution. Our attitude is not even that of hatred or resentment. On very rare occasions do we talk to visitors about these problems. That belongs in the past. It happened a long time ago and still the prints exist -- still the poor things exist. You have to see the terrorist attack against a Cuban plane in flight -- a plane that exploded. Before that plane fell down, all the people got burned alive. Seventy-four people died. Who perpetrated that crime but people who were trained by the CIA? We suspect that some CIA agent had to do with that terrorist act. It's very strange, because that happened after Angola. The United States had adopted a very violent attitude towards us and Nixon made very forceful statements against us. One of the individuals who was recently arrested in Miami because he was involved in the preparation of terrorist activities was just declared non-guilty in a trial and he defended himself by saying Simply that he had been in the White House. He said who he had spoken with and who gave him the weapons, and precisely those facts, those events, took place a week before the attempt -- before the sabotage on the Cuban plane in flight. And, he is just defending himself by saying that in the trial. He is one of the persons that was in the group who perpetrated the 251 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-four sabotage. Now, I am going to tell you something. I think that now Carter is - I don't know what Party you belong to - and it is not interesting to the part of what I'm going to say, if I hurt someone's sensitivity I apologize for that, but I would have not trusted Johnson. I may say sincerely, I sincerely believe that Johnson would have followed that line, of the attempts against people's lives, terrorism, subversion. I have no doubt that Nixon was a man without scruples. I was always under a bad impression. I was convinced of that. But now, I see that this President of the United States would not be capable of resorting to that kind | of action. There are two things in this connection: | One, I think there is an attitude in the public opinion as to that Watergate affair, and the Senate investiga- tions have contributed to create a sort of consciousness. I also think that the politicians have taken that into account, and I think also that personally Carter is a man of a different mentality. If I am asked whether I think Carter would be capable of planning these kinds of actions, I would say no. I would say I don't think him capable of doing such a thing. I am quite convinced. In that sense, we feel more relaxed. We had to defend ourselves from these actions for many years. You should not? think that I like to be surrounded by people. I think you have to be alone. I would like to have a 252 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-five normal life. We have taken many measures in all these years preventing attempts with different kinds of ex- plosives and weapons, attempts with poison, and actually we are not saying all...I will tell: you something. I would even say that I underestimated the CIA somewhat because I thought them capable of many things, but when I read the Senate Committee Report, I confess that I had not thought so much. Because, all that from bacterias, viruses, poisons, a shell with explosives, I don't know how many tremendous things. But it was not only that. I want you to know that if we would have been careless, they would have brought a microphone and put it over there in one of the ashtrayvs and one mike over there in that seat and everything. There were not only sub- versive activities, but also espionage. There were many activities related to espionage. I remember that around the day in which the sabotage against our plane took place, the CIA asked in a question, to one of their agents here, whether I was going to travel to Africa, whether he could find out what place I was going to visit, what means of transportation I was going to use, I mean, a whole set of investigation which was not political, but rather that could be used for anything else. Now, going back to this topic, one of the things I've gone into recently with some people, is why Cuba - it was really something inconceiv- able - could have the idea of killing the President? 253 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-six First, because that would have been a tremendous insanity. The Cuban Revolutionaries and the people who have made this Revolution have proven to be intrepid and to make decisions in the right moment. But, we have not proven to be insane people. The leaders of the Revolution do not do crazy things and have always been extremely con- cerned to prevent any factor that could become a kind of an argument or a pretext for carrying out aggression against our country. We are a very small country. We have the United States 990 miles from our shore which is a very large, powerful country economically, technically, militarily. So, for many years we lived concerned that an invasion could take place..I mean, indirect and at the end a direct aggression. We were very close to that. Yet look at the conclusions we draw. If the elections of 1960 had not been won by Kennedy, but Nixon instead, during the Bay of Pigs, the United States would have in- vaded Cuba. We mean that in the midst of the fight that Kennedy followed the line that had been already traced. There is no doubt that we appreciate very highly the fact that Kennedy resisted every kind of pressure not to have the Marines land in our country. Because, there were many people who wanted the Marines to land here. Nixon himself was in favor of that. Had Nixon been President during the Bay of Pigs invasion, a landing by the military army of the United States would have taken place. We are absolutely convinced of that. 416272 O<- 79 - 17(Vol. 3) 254 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-seven However, Kennedy resisted all the pressures and he did not do that. What would that have meant for us? The destruction of the country? HUundreds of thousands, maybe millions of deaths? Because, undoubtedly the people would fight. The people I am absolutely sure about. An invasion of Cuba by the United States would have cost hundreds of thousands of lives, maybe millions of lives. We.were aware of that. We have an American Military basé.in oursiterritony,. by force. And, Lo aaeeen assumed that anyone is going to have a military base On someone else's territory, if it is not on the basis of an agreement. However, the United States has military bases in many places of the world, but here, it is by force. From that base, many provocations hav? been carried out against Cuba. There were people wounded..there were people killed. What did we do? We brought our guards away from the lines, from the fence. We never shot at them. “hy? Because we made every vossible effort so that an incident of that kind would not become a pretext to be attacked. So, we have followed the policy. We had an American boat just three miles away from us for years, a warship full of electronic communications equipment and never a hostile action was carried against that warship. So, there are many events that have proven how careful Cuba has always been to prevent the pervetration of an invasion. We could 299 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-eight have died heroically - no doubt about it. Now, that would have been a victory for our people. They.!re willing to be sacrificed and to die. Yet, it would have been just another page in history..nothing else. So, we have always been very much aware to not give Tne United States the pretext..the possibility .. for (an invasion.) What was the cause of the missile crisis? The need we had to seek vrotection in case of an (invasion) from the United States. We agreed on the installation of the (stategic) missiles, because un- doubtedly that diminished the danger of direct aggression. That became a danger of another kind, a kind of a global danger we became, but we were trying to protect our country at all times. Who here could have overated | and planned something so delicate as the death of the | United States President. That was insane. From the ideological point of view it was insane. And from | the political point of view, it was a tremendous insanity. | I am going to tell you here that nobody, nobody ever / Rad the sidea..of.«such.things..~.What,would it,.do?: We | just tried to defend our folks here, within our terri- | tory. Anyone who subscribed to that idea would have been judged insane..absolutely sick. Never, in twenty years of revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor even speculate about a measure of that sort, because who could think of the idea of organizing the death of 256 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-nine the United States. That would have been the most verfect pretext for the United States to invade our- country which is what I have tried to prevent for all these years, in every vossible sense. Since the United States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain from a war with the United States? The United States would lose nothing. The destruction would have been here. The United States had U-2 air surveillancing for almost fifteen years. The planes flew over our territory every day. The women said that they could not go over their terrace naked for the U-2 would have taken a picture of them. That thing we could not allow to happen, you know, because it was demoralizing. So, there were, vou know, those flights just very close to the soil. “Those kind of flights was really demoralizing for our people. It was impossible to let them continue to do that, so we had to shoot at them. On. the following day after the missile crisis, we had the need to shoot at those planes, because to have allowed that would have created a demoralization among our people. And, I say that if we allowed that, you wouldn’t have been able even to play baseball here. Because those olanes came just twenty meters from here, so it was really de- moralizing. See, the U-2 came very high, you know, and I tell you, Cuba has been characterized by following a firm policy, a policy of vrinciples. Our position was known after the missile crisis. We were not in a position to make any concessions. That is a known position, but Cuba, 257 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty the leaders of the Cuban Revolution, have never made that kind of insanity, and that I may assure you. And the biggest kind of insanity that could have gone through anyone's mind here would have been that of thinking of killing the Presidenc of the United States. Nobody would have thought of that. In spite of all the things, Lisprce of “all the attempts, in spite of all the irritation that brought about an attitude of firmness, a willingness to fight, that was translated by our people into a spirit of heroism, but it never became a source of insanity. ion wiGave yOUsDraGtical reasons. Apart from our ideology, I want to tell you that the death of the leader does not change the system. It has never done that. And, the best example we have is Batista. Batista | murdered thousands of our comrades. if there was anyone in which that kind of revenge was justified, it was Batista. However, our movement did very difficult things, but it never had the idea of physically eliminating Batista. Other revolutionary groups did, but never our movement. We had a war for twenty-five months against Batista's army and spent seven years under Batista's dictatorship 1 with thousands dying. But, it never came to our minds.. ! we could have done it, very well, but we never thought about that, because it was different from our feelings. That is our position. That is why we are interested. That is why I was asking you whether you are really 258 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-one hopeful to give serious conclusions on this. On our part, if there is something we could give you, we would, without any kind of precondition. The informa- tion we have offered you is not conditioned to anything. In spite of the fact that the problem is thorny, that doesn't stoo this Committee here from giving the im- pression that we are being judged here, that we are being tried. Stokes: We certainly don't want in any way to convey that, aiSoWcra-Renera FONgt 2 ere Castro: No, no, no. I mean not you. I am not thinking of you. I mean that some people could see it that way; that Cuba has been investigated by the Committee. Stokes: Well, Mr. President, one thing we have done in that respect, we even said to your Cuban Interest Section in Washington when we first began that we wanted to come down here and do this part of the investigation very quietly without anv fanfare, without any publicity, and this is the overall way we have tried to conduct our whole investigation..everything is being done quietly in executive session until such time that we compile all the data so that we don't in any way declaim or degrade anyone. Then, hopefully, at the end we can come out with a report that everyone will respect. Castro: There is something which is not secret. 259 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-two If I may ask you, is there anvthing true, or how much could» be° true about those publications which state that many people who could have had a part in Kennedy have died in accidents and things like that? Stokes: This is one of the difficulties of attempting to~conduct an investigation thirteen years after the event has occurred. Obviouslv, there are people who in the normal course of the investigation we would have wanted to talk with, we cannot talk with because they are now deceased. This is°onevoft the difficulties dHsedws face. I yield to Congressman Dodd. Dodd: MreePresident, I ™wontt taketmuecnh times think most of the questions have been asked. I wish we had ... Castro: I have time. Please don't mind’ about my time. I made no other commitment today, so I would have time. Nobody is waiting for me. Dodd: I wish we had’an evening just to talk aout tite Peace Corps, but we will save that Zor another time. A tape is played? There are a couple of things here. The question you asked of Chairman Stokes - - - - the one regarding the optimism we have over reaching’a final conclusion in regard to this effort is one that I think we all ask ourselves almost every day. It is the question that is very important in the minds of many, many people, not only in*government, but also of course, the American 260 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-three people are concerned about our efforts. I said today in one of our meetings that I strongly suspected that your grandchildren and my grandchildren will be reading books about the assassination, just as we read them today about the assassination of Lincoln, another historical figure that had been assassinated, and where the suspicion of conspiracy has existed. I think we would be fooling ourselves if we tried to suggest that at the conclusion of our hearings we were going to end once and for all, all of the sveculation for all time. I don't think that is possible. But, what we are going to try and do, and I think that what we have done successfully over the past year and a half, is to approach this case with an open mind and not prejudge the case. And, the temptations are great to do that. For every day we almost see a new theory. But, we are determined to proceed through this process listening to all sides and then using the evidence that we are able to collect, to reach as definitely as we can, regarding those points that have been nagging at the consciences and minds of the people all across the ath Two other points: One is that we intend not only to publish our hearings and the conclusion that we reach. We also intend to use every available means of communication in the United States, hopefully tele- vision, radio, to conduct open public hearings, not only showing our conclusions, but how we arrived at 261 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-four those conclusions. We suspect that many, many people do not want to read a boring report, but would rather be better informed by radio and television and news- papers. We intend to hide nothing, to release all in- formation without any fear whatsoever as to where that information leads or what our conclusions would be. I think, I know I can speak for myself, and I'm sure I can speak for everyone else on this Committee. I wouldn't serve on this Committee if I didn't think in the end that I could say to my constituents that I had done an honest and thorough job and that I wasn't hiding anything from them. And, my last point is, Mr. President, that had some of your government officials not mentioned it today, we would have, but it was very encouraging to hear it come from them, that they would like to continue to keep the lines of communication open between themselves, your government and our Committee. And, as that old Chinese proverb goes - a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. And I think this is a good beginning and I want to just say here and now that I have been deeply impressed by your statements. I find your logic compelling and I guarantee you that we will do the very best job we can, including the final report. Castro: How many legislators do you have on this Committee? Stokes: There are twelve in all, one lady and eleven men. 262 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-five Castro: Don't you all have to be invovled in elections at the end of this year now? Stokes: URenUhe aves 4sweldo. Castro: And how would you be able, how would you manage to carry out all this work, and take care of the election campaigns at the same time? How would you? Dodd: He doesn't have any trouble at all. (About another Congressman.) (Laughter) Castro: And you work personally in the campaigns, don't you? I mean, with all this? The twelve, I mean the twelve people on the Committee work together, participate in all hearings and all the interviews and all that? Stokes: The Committee ... I have been in Congress ten years, Mr. President, and I serve on several other sommittees in the House. And, I know in general they are hard working committees. But, I have never seen twelve people who have worked together the way this Committee has. We work extremely long hours, we have worked into the night when the occasion necessitated tt. We have worked Saturdays and Sundays when it was necessary and remained in Washington to work on Committee matters. We just have twelve people who are dedicated to the fact that this is an opportunity to do something of historic nature and they are dedicated to devoting the time that it requires. In addition to the twelve Members of Congress, we have a staff of 115 people. The staff is 263 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-six headed up by Professor Blakey. You might be interested in knowing that we spent three months searching for a director of the staff. And, we were extremely concerned that we get a person of the highest professional ability, along with integrity that cannot be compro- mised in any respect, and one who would direct the staff in a way that we would let the chips fall where they may in the final analysis. And to that degree, I am sure.... Castro. Now he has to continue working while you run the re- election campaign. (Laughter) Stokes: But, when we go hone he has to keep on working right here. Castros You would have to go to meet your constituents and then that would be the most important moment of all these efforts, you know? The moments to draw the conclusions... Would it be possible for you to finish up the report when due? Don't you need more time? Stokes: We promised the House of Representatives (laughter) that there would be no further requests for time. I am not worried about time; it is the money part. The House is appropriating about five million dollars over the two-year period for us to complete this in- vestigation...and Castre-= And only 115 people? 264 Fidel Castro Interview ; Page forty-seven Stokes: Well, Mr. Barber of Maryland who watches the purse : strings of the House says it involves a lot of money. We have had to face that kind of opposition on the floor of the House of Representatives. Blakey: Mr. President, I have no questions to ask of you, but iace we as guests only asked questions and did not respond to any of yours, let me answer at least in part the last question you asked. You expressed some interest in what we call the mysterious death projects. The literature about the Kennedy assassination is filled with instances of people who have in some way been connected to the assassination and have themselves died under mysterious circumstances. We are looking into those deaths and seeing whether there are sinister explanations for them. Let me comment on one of them: Now, this is not from our investigation, but from my own information, and he may be a man of some interest to you. Let me put it in context for you. I cannot comment on many of the facts in the investigation. As you put it, much of the information is limited by matters of national security. For example, in our country, it has never been officially acknowledged that AMLASH was Rolando Cubela and nothing that we say here today should be read as an indication on our part that that is true or not true. But to continue..Sam Giancana, who was a Mafia leader 265 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-eight in Chicago, who according to the Senate Intelligence Report, directly plotted on your life, was a person who was under investigation by myself in the Department of Justice and ironically on November 22nd, 1963, I was with the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, in a meeting of the Organized Crime session and among the subjects taken up at that time was the Attorney General's personal interest in my work in seeking to prosecute Sam Giancana. I bring this to your attention for two reasons: First, to express to you the feeling of one who has spent a great deal of his life working to see to it that members of the Mafia in the United States consistent with due process receive justice. I know from personal knowledge that Robert Kennedy shared those concerns. He would rever have been knowingly in- volved in using those people to plot an assassination of you. And, while I cannot speak of personal knowledge of the President of the United States, there was no difference between them. I say that to express my sense of shame and outrage that members, according to the Senate Intelligence Report, of the CIA were in- volved in that. Those people who were in charge of our government at that level in my judgment had no knowledge. But to respond more particularly to your question, it is unlikely that Sam Giancana died be- 266 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-nine cause he testified before the Senate Intelligence Com- mittee. As I indicated to some of the members of your staff, Mr. Giancana was responsible for the death of hundreds of people in Chicago, and the remarkable thing is not that he died then, but that he had not been killed much earlier. Stokes: The last gentleman here, Mr. President, is Gary Cornwell. Gary is the Deputy Chief Counsel for the Kennedy Subcommittee and he would have direct respon- sibility in terms of the final work product related to the Kennedy investigation. I separate out the Kennedy assassination because as you know we are in- vestigating also the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. Two murder investigations are going at the same time. Castro: The five million dollars is for both? Blakey: You ought to also know, Mr. President, that this is the budget attributable to the Committee itself. In fact, the United States Senate, particularly the people who were responsible for the Church Committee investi- gation, have been helping this Committee. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has a relatively large staff devoted to getting their files made available to us. We have actually received cooperation from the Central Intelligence Agency. Some members of the staff would say not as fast and as full as we might like, but the final report is not in. The police departments in Dallas 267 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty and in Memphis have been helping us and if you consider the work that was done in 1963 and 1964, the actual available resources in the United States devoted to these investigations are considerably more than five million dollars. Castro: May I suggest something? Why don't you investigate also Oswald's personality in one sense, whether Oswald was also a member of any intelligence agency in the United States? Blakey: That is among the issues that we are looking into. Castro: I think that is a very important thing. Because, for me, Oswald's personality - it's a mystery..that first he was in the Army, the Navy, and later he appears in the Soviet Union. He married a Soviet citizen. He came back to the States. I still get the impression that this individual's personality is that of a spy. It is the typical way you recruit a spy and send him to another country. This seems to me very important. I think it is very important to go very deeply into his past, to see if at any time it was possible to really know about his personality. That would be very important. Blakey: Of all the questions I think we will answer, that I feel with a degree of certainty, we will. I should also add, Mr. President, that if you consider the resources that your staff has also devoted to this 268 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-one Organization and the time and effort they have put into it, the five million dollars grows even more. (Laughter) Castro: Sure, they have been working. But as you know, our contribution is very modest because I think that the fundamental things for the investigation could be con- ducted only in the United States. And, what we can do as very. Tittle, very littles Sante from thes rarer moment we made the decision to make available anyone you wanted to talk with. I think that your task is a hard one. Hard, because your prestige is at stake with the investigation. You face a task of tremendous responsibility and in that sense I think a very hard job has been assigned to you. Stokes: We share your feelings on that, Mr. President. Blakey: Their job is harder. They are politicians. They must run for reelection. I can always go back and teach. Castro: Will the report be many volumes? (Laughter) How big is the Warren Committee Report? When will the Warren Committee Report be published? Blakey: The Warren Commission has already been published. Castro: Warren Commission? Blakey: Commission. Yes. Castro: Warren Commission, what was it? 269 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-two Villa: It was twenty-six volumes. We had two copies of the summary, but we have not seen the twenty-six volumes. Castro: Have you read all that? Villa: Yes, we have. Castro: We have to say that the Warren Commission was object ive. They did not try to commit Cuba. You were a Federal Judge. Then, are you the man wit h the most experience in this kind of business. Preyer: Well, in the federal courts we didn't have to deal with anything as complex as this with so many rumors and so many facets to it. Usually, we had a narrow question, so this is really a new experience for me. Castro: They would give their lives to discover something decisive, you know? (Laughter) Is there anyone else you would like to meet? Villa: Piniero. Piniero worked at the Ministry of Interior at that time. They are interested in speaking to Piniero because he met with Santo Trafficante in the early sixties and gave him 24 hours to leave the country, and also because he met with Ascue. Castro: We did not even have a Ministry of Interior at that time. He worked as some kind of investigator, but at that time Weidaid mot,have a Miné¢ster of Interior. I think at was for the Army. Some things we have now that we did not have then. They were created, you know, in the course 41-372 O - 79 = 18(Vol. 3) 270 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-three of the years. The first year everybody did whatever they wanted. There was chaos, you know. The state was not organized, so the people came in and out, absolutely free. There were not the controls that existed later, that were created later, especially in the first year of the revolution. I recall a social problem. All the casinos were closed and thousands of people were unemployed without a solution to the problem. So, we had to take back that measure to gain time to find an economic solution for the people who would remain unemployed when the casinos were closed. So, the state had to cover the salaries of all the people who worked there. And, I want to tell you something else: As you know, recently there was a television conference where efforts were being made in order to have the Cuban government involved in drug traffic, smuggling drugs. That is very curious, you know. I don't know why that theory is expounded now. It is a very recent in- ‘vention. It happens that we are the one country in this hemisphere that has cooperated the most with the United States without any purpose, I mean, we have no intention of doing the United States a disfavor. But, anyway, on the basis of Cuba's belief with regard to drugs, very severe measures were implemented to prevent them. We have become the number one cooperators of the United States in this area. You don't know how 271 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-four many boats we have captured here that come along Cuban coasts carrying drugs. You don't know how many planes we have taken here carrying drugs and, of course, over the past twenty years the individuals who have been in- volved in drug traffic have always been sentenced, always. These were not people that could affect us. They were just going and coming from South America and Central America to the United States. And, they just happened to come here by chance. Dozens of people have been searched on account of drug traffic, on account of the international drug traffic laws. We have elminiated drug use in Cuba and I myself wonder why it is we have to cooperate with the United States if when the embargo was imposed on our country we could have planted ten thousand acres of marijuana and become the largest Supplier of marijuana to the United States in combina- tion with all those people. We did not do that since we were blockaded and knowing that in the United States there is a market for marijuana even though the govern- ment in this country has fought the most against drugs. Besides in Cuba we don't have drug problems, but we had to even uproot the last plants of marijuana planted in the mountains. And actually, look at how we're being paid back now; they pay us back by trying to link us into the drug traffic. It's incredible, you know. We can say it like that; this is the government that has fought the most against drug traffic in. this hemisphere. No ‘ Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-five discussion about it. And, we are lucky that we don't have that problem ourselves because unless the State imported cocaine and marijuana, that problem has | almost disappeared. Laughter. Translator left; said she would be around. Second translator arrives. Castro: Well, we have almost finished. Escartin: Who was the one who made that impeachment about the drug problem where Representative Wolff participated? He was the nead of the Committee. Castro: Why did he do that? Do you know the address, because I am going to write them a note. Laughter. Castro: ‘And, Iam going to ask a budget for stamps and paper. I'm going to sabotage the next election. Escartin: bon] Even though he made some political statements with a certain corestige, >] he is deceitful. It seems that there are some statements made by him on the basis of an investigation and that this man used them as he wished trying to attain certain political objectives of propaganda because you have explained our stand regarding that. And, there is something strange there: A Cuban Counter-Revolutionary was mentioned who made an operation with Colombia which seems to have serious drug problems...and they tried to 273 Fidel. Castro Interview Page fiftv-six link him with us. Afterwards, Hernandez-Cartava who was a Counter-Revolutionaryv, participated in the Bay of Pigs. He made some declaration saying that he was anti-Castro and that he had nothing to do with this. Castro: Just two old friends down there defended me. The President of Columbia defended me also, so I have to thank some two persons who defended me. Escartin: It is interesting that Hernandez-Cartaya was re- tained there by the FBI. It seems that somebody is Seving tO Solidify this story..that's the situation. Stokes: Mr. President, before we continue, Gary Cornwell, I Think, has a couple of questions to ask you. | Cornwell: Mr. President, there was a book published by Daniel Schorr called "Clearing the Air". If you haven't read the book, I would like to read one vassage. Castro: I haven't read that. You know about that book? Villa: I haven't. Cornwell: One passage reads as follows: An interview in July 1967 with a British journalist, Comer Clark..do you have the translation of it there? Villa: Yes. Castro: Let me see it. Yes, I have it here. This is absurd. Pause: (Approximately one minute while President Castro reads it.) Peeerore fis 1S absurd. I didn't say that. Cornwell: Did the interview ever occur? Castro: It has been invented from the beginning until the end. I didn't say that. How could I say that? 274 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-seven Lt..5\.a, lbe,from (head to.toe),. , Df this, man would have done something like that, it would have been our moral duty to inform the United States. You under- stand? Because if a man comes here, mentions that he wants to kill Kennedy, we are (being provoked), do you realize that? It would have been similar to a mad person. If somebody comes to us and said that, it would have been our moral responsibility to inform the United States. How could we accept a man from Mexico to Cuba who tells us that he is going to kill President Kennedy? If somebody is trying to create provocation or a trap, and uh...we would have de- nounced him..Sure, a person coming here or even in one of our embassies saying that..and that never happened..inno part, as far as I know. That refers to the interview you spoke about in the beginning. But how could they interview me in a pizzeria? I nevergo to public restaurants and that man invented that. That was invented from the upper to the bottom because you asked me about the Brazilian Embassy and I have no BBS gain to that and never said it was true. That in the Brazilian Embassy I talked about this problem of the attempt. That was true. I could deny it, but I don't because it was strictly the truth. I didn't remember who the journalist was nor....but I 275 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-eight have the idea that something like that was discussed and that there was a declaration at the Brazilian Embassy. I can't assure it because I don't remember it, but it probably occurred...Later on they tried to present it as a threat and I didn't do it with that intention. Of course, I didn't do it with that intention. But, not that other interview. I do not remember that. And, uh, it is a surprise for me to see because I couldn't have said that. You have to see who wrote it. And, what is the job of that journa- list? What is he engaged in? And, what prestige has this journalist? Not the one that wrote that book, but the origin of that version. You should have to find who he is and why he wrote it, and with whom he is Tak= =ha=lo WAR and which sense they have to attribute those words which are absolutely invented. I think it is possible that you would be able to find out who that journalist was. Do you have some news about that journalist in that newspaper? Villa: He was in Cuba and tried to carry out an interview with you. Castro: Let me tell you. Of every one hundred interviews that are requested of me I only grant one because if I were to give all the interviews that I am requested to, you can be sure that I would not be able to have any- thing but twenty-four hours of my life to have interviews. 276 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-nine I would not have enough time to do anything else. Barbara Walters waited three years for an interview.. just almost three years. Ane even that of Moyers.. I didn't want to have that Moyer interview. He started talking and the truth is that he was very insistent from the time he came down from the airplane and in spite of the fact that there was no commitment from me regarding the interview. There are a lot of interview requests and it is very difficult, but I would never have given a journalist an interview ina pizzeria. Dodd: I don't even give interviews in a pizzeria. Val iaka’: Another element commander...That interview was published in a sensationalist or yellow press from the United States. It is a sensationalist newspaper. Castro: Especially at that time, a lot of barbaric things were published. They are still being written. Yesterday I was reading an English paper, I don't remember its name, speaking about Angola, and saying that we in military operations against the blacks killed thousands of women and children and so forth. And, I also mentioned before the declaration of that Representative about the drug traffic. Previous to that incident they tried to implicate us in that. If there is somebody in this world that has accustomed himself to listen to the worst things without losing sleep, it is us. 277 Fidel Castro Interview Page sixty The campaigns that were carried out, directed campaigns that were carried out throughout the world - in western continents and also in the United States - against Cuba and all of us had no precedents. There are a lot of people that are badly informed about Cuba, and we have nothing to hide, nothing. They have spoken about tortures in Cuba, and that was a tradition from the war.. during the Revolutionary War. We never put a finger on another person because we created an awareness in our people. We condemned torture and I can assure you that this is a principal that knows not a single excep- tion in our country, because it would have the repulsion of all the world..Why are our policemen so efficient --especially the security policemen who protected all of us? Do you know why? Because, it was precisely a police which did not carry out torture. There are a lot of countries where Sire apply torture and they never discover anything. They never become policemen in themselves. Now our people couldn't be able to receive any information by means of torture, and they develop intelligence, and the technique of investigation and of prevention. There is a time in which we had more than one hundred counter-revolutionary organiza- tions and all of them were penetrated. We knew more than the counter-revolution armies when a person was arrested because there were some things that he didn't 278 Fidel Castro Interview Page sixty-one remember: who he met, which places and so forth. I'm going to tell you, there was a time in which penetration of our people increased so much that in turn they became the heads of some of those counter- revolutionary organizations. The police wouldn't be able to develop a technique of investigation and they wouldn't have investigated anything if they just took One verson and tried to destroy him. That tradition will never serve. A true police is one which is developed and that will seek intelligent ways of obtaining information. Batista's policemen tortured and didn't discover anything. And, for us there is no problem. Security has a lot of advantages because all of the people are militants within the Revolution - country people, children, neighbors, students, peasants and the women. Everybody is organized and, that is why. Through the agents we know everything that is going on. Let me tell you something. One day a parrot was lost. In Havana, we told this to the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution - about trying to find out where this parrot was, and they found the parrot. Some other time, a woman was at the hospital. She had a daughter. Her daughter was robbed from the hospital, so we had to find the girl. Everybody assumed that it was a mental case of somebody. Of course, that was not published in the newspapers. 279 Fidel Castro Interview Page sixty-two Why not? We did not want any panic. We called up all the CDRs and forty-eight hours later, the girl appeared. One person in one place had a child and they hadn't seen that she was pregnant. That woman was obsessed about having a child and she went to the hospital dressed up like a nurse and she took the girl. And, after forty-eight hours, they found her. There was something else: Here we never have a political kidnapping. Here we never have a terrorist activity. We find out earlier. There were some counter-revolutionaries. But, there is something. The greatest part of them went to the United States, especially the wealthy people. The social base of the counter-revolution was transferred to the United States. The United States wanted to take from us the doctors and the professionals - they got half of the doctors. Out of six thousand doctors, they got three thousand. But then that forced us to concentrate on a school of medicine. Now we have twelve thousand doCEoOnse= almost one thousand are abroad in different countries working. We have thirty-five hundred students at the Cuban Medicine School. By 1985 with the new facilities now in progress we will enroll some seven thousand . students every year. We are going to train thirty-three thousand students at the University. Our doctors are distributed throughout the country, and before they 280 Fidel Castro Interview Page sixty-three were all located in the Capitol. So, if the United. States wanted to take our professional personnel, they forced us to develop a new system. Fortunately, they didn't take only technical people, but also wealthy people, delinquents, pimps (Laughter). and exploiters of vices such as drugs, gangsters and all that type of people. They went to the United States. They opened the doors because before the Revolution they had a limit. The United States couldn't receive more then ten thousand and there were a lot of people who wanted to go there trying to find some jobs of social programs. Then, when the Revolution triumphed, the United States opened its doors. Can they repeat that procedure with some other countries? No, they can't. What would happen if the United States opened the way for all those Mexicans who want to go to the United States trying to find jobs? What about all the Brazilians, Colombians, Peruvians..? They opened the doors and they took the social ground work of the Counter Revolution. So, they left the houses. Those houses were turned into schools and dwelling houses for humble people. You understand? And all those who left here, they left these houses for humble people.. and, in the country, the most humble people stayed. You understand? What resources they need to carry on 281 Fidel Castro Interview Page sixty-four the Revolution and what social ground work they need for making Counter Revolution, they don't have. That is why the country is defending itself. And that is why we were able to denend on intelligence, and not torture. Thousands of times, they have said that in Cuba we torture. It is like that, but people of all nations know how things were and are in Cuba. We never had any persons disappear. It wasn't a new in- vention. We would never have that. We never found a dead man in the street. We were forced to legislate tough laws, but nobody was ever sanctioned except through the courts and through previous law. Since we were in the Sierra Maestra, we started making the first law. We said to the people..Well, the assassins a a and the torturers are going to be punished. Nobody will take revenge in their own hands. That was a promise we made to the people. The torturers were punished and also the criminals, who generally are not punished. You can see now that things are going on in Chile and in some other countries. They are doing unbelievable things. Sometimes I have heard some stories about things going on there, and they are unbelievable. That is why we are not in agree- ment with their thinking. We have been accused of denying a man his human rights; that is to say that things are worse here then in Chile, Brazil and so forth. Who are they going to tell that story in this case? But, in spite of it all, we have survived.. And the campaigns did not manage to destroy us. REST OF INTERVIEW CONSISTS OF PERSONAL REMARKS 282 Mr. Buiakey. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like now to play the recording of President Castro’s answer to that first question. Chairman STOKES. You may proceed. (Tape recording played.] Mr. Biakey. Mr. Chairman, the committee’s next question was more specific. It dealt with an account published in 1967 in the National Enquirer claiming that Oswald while at the consulate had voiced an intention to assassinate President Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, I note that JFK F-428 has already been displayed and ask that it be entered into the record. It is a reproduction of that National Enquirer article. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, so ordered. [JFK exhibit F-428 follows:] 1° FIDKNE W ‘"aSmmmHE TRO SAY EL CASOF cm Ht OSWALD THR EAT Inei _ TOKILL JFK i an The £6 sk to feceteface om astro. S| And here, ter readers ENQUIRER, ix the wxctunive atary of the fs a with Cartra. oe JFK Exuisir F-428 Mr. Buakey. It is probably also appropriate to note that that article has had wide circulation. For example, Daniel Schorr re-— peats it in his book, “Clearing the Air.” President Castro, according to the story in the National En- quirer, had admitted to being told of the threat, though he had taken no action in response to it. The tape of this portion of President Castro’s remarks is not suitable for playing in a public room. Consequently, I will read his response. President Castro said: This is absurd. I didn’t say that * * * It has been invented from the beginning until the end. I didn’t say that. How could I say that? It’s a lie from (head to toe). If this man would have done something like that, it would have been our moral duty 283 to inform the United States. You understand? Because if a man comes here, men- tions that he wants to kill Kennedy, we are (being provoked), do you realize that? It would have been similar to a mad person. If somebody comes to us and said that, it would have been our moral responsibility to inform the United States. How could we accept a man from Mexico to Cuba who tells us that he is going to kill President Kennedy? If somebody is trying to create provocation or a trap, and uh * * * we would have denounced him * * * Sure, a person coming here or even in one of our Embassies saying that * * * And that never happened. No part, as far as I know * * * But how could they interview me in a pizzeria. I never go to public restau- rants and that man invented that. That was invented. I do not remember that. And, uh, it is a surprise for me to see because I couldn't have said that. You have to see who wrote it. And, what is the job of that journal- ist? What is he engaged in? And, what prestige has this journalist? * * * You should have to find who he is and why he wrote it, and with whom he is related * * * and which sense they have to attribute those words which are absolutely invented. I think it is possible that you would be able to find out who that journalist was. Do you have some news about that journalist in that newspaper? Let me tell you. Of every 100 interviews that are requested of me I only grant one because if I were to give all the interviews that I am requested to, you can be sure that I would not be able to have anything but 24 hours of my life to have inter- views. I would not have enough time to do anything else. Barbara Walters waited 3 _years for an interview * * * just almost 3 years. And even that of Moyers * * * I didn’t want to have that Moyer interview. He started talking and the truth is that he was very insistent from the time he came down from the airplane and in spite of the fact that there was no commitment from me regarding the interview. There are a lot of interview requests and it is very difficult, but I would never have given a journalist an interview in a pizzeria. Mr. Chairman, the author—— Chairman Stokes. Would you suspend for just one moment? Mr. BLAKEY. Certainly. Chairman Stokes. I think I misunderstood you. There was some reason you explained for reading that. Mr. BuaAkey. Yes; the tape unfortunately, as has been my experi- ence, Mr. Chairman, and I am sure yourself in trials, that any effort, when you have a mechanical device inevitably they fail at least once out of three, and while we made an effort to enhance the quality of that portion of the tape, in which President Castro responded to this particular question, we played it and it just simply was not suitable for playing in a public auditorium. It was not audible. Consequently, it was thought best to read it rather than to play the tape. Chairman SToKEs. Thank you. Mr. BuakEy. We really did the best we could. _ Mr. Chairman, the author of the National Enquirer story was a British freelance journalist named Comer Clark. He died in 1972. Nevertheless, the committee, while conducting other investiga- tions in England, made an effort to explore Mr. Clark’s background and reputation for veracity. Frankly, it was not good. Apparently, he wrote extensively for the sensationalist press in England. His articles include such items as “British Girls as Nazi Sex Slaves,” “I Was Hitler’s Secret Love,’ and “German Plans To Kidnap the Royal Family.” On the other hand, even though there may be considerable doubt as to the fact of Clark’s interview with President Castro, the com- mittee has been informed that the substance of the Clark article is supported by highly confidential but reliable sources available to the U.S. Government. Apart from the reliability of the source, whether or not this source may have provided reliable information in this instance is of 284 course an issue that the committee will have to consider in Decem- ber. In this connection the Cuban Government has suggested to the committee that the circulation of this story represents a disinfor- mation effort by the Central Intelligence Agency designed to dis- credit Cuba and to implicate her in the assassination. Mr. Chairman, President Castro also discussed the general sub- ject of assassination as a means for achieving political change. His thoughts on it are pertinent to the investigation. It would be appro- — priate, then, to play his response to that question, which fortunate- ly is clear enough to play in a public proceeding. | Chairman Stokes. OK. (Tape recording played.] Mr. BLAKEY. Finally, Mr. Chairman, President Castro comment- ed on the specific so-called threat reported in the New Orleans Times Picayune of September 9. It would be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, to play the last excerpt. | Chairman STOKEs. You may proceed. [Tape recording played. | Mr. Buakey. Mr. Chairman, I would note for the record that President Castro was of course speaking in Spanish, and the simul- taneous English translation was provided by Juanita Vera. Mr. Chairman, in August, during the committee’s second trip to Cuba, the Cuban Government made available to the committee one Rolanda Cubela, who identified himself to the committee as AMLASH, on the basis of his reading of the 1976 Senate report. It would be appropriate at this point, Mr. Chairman, to enter into the record and to display JFK F-424, a photograph of Mr. Cubela. [The information follows:] 285 nissan ot a er JFK Exuisit F-424 Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record and displayed accordingly. Mr. Buakey. Mr. Cubela indicated that he had been prosecuted and convicted by the Cuban Government for plotting against Pre- mier Castro. He said that during that prosecution he did not inform the Cuban Government and the Cuban Government did not ‘learn that his plot had the support of CIA personnel. The Cuban Government affirmed Mr. Cubela’s assertion. He also indicated that he had no evidence on which he could say that any official of the U.S. Government or of the CIA higher than his case officer was aware of the assassination aspects of his plot. The Cuban Govern- ment suggested that the AMLASH plot in operation on November 22, 1963, as outlined in the Senate report, could not, therefore, have served as a provocation by the U.S. motivating Cuban retalli- ation against President Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, another aspect of the committee’s investigation of Oswald’s trip to Mexico had to do with any associations Oswald may have had while he was there other than those at the Cuban consulate and the Soviet Embassy. The Warren Commission con- cluded he had none, that he kept to himself throughout his stay. It turns out, however, that 11 days after the Commission concluded its investigation and issued its report in September 1964, a Mexi- can woman came forward with quite a different version of Oswald’s activities in Mexico City. Her name is Elena Garro de Paz. Though now divorced, she was at the time the wife of Octavio de Paz, the noted poet and Mexican diplomat. Elena Garro herself is an accomplished author. A1.279 QO - 79 - 19(Vol. 3) 286 Ultimately, Elena Garro’s story came to the attention of Ameri-. can intelligence services. As far as it is known, no service initiated a full-scale followup investigation. One reason might be that Elena Garro’s credibility is controversial. This committee has been told, on the one hand, that she is absolutely trustworthy, while others have claimed that the same vivid imagination that has made her a literary success has also tended to color her perception of actual events. That being said, Elena Garro’s story is interesting, as is the way it has unfolded in this investigation. Elena Garro says that along with her daughter, Elenita, and her sister, Deba Galvan, she was invited to a party at the home of her cousin, Ruben Duran Navarro, then the brother-in-law of Sylvia Tirado Duran. She first said that the party was in early October 1968, though, after inspection of her personal calendar for that period, she adjusted the time to late September. There were three young American men at the party, she says, the guests of Sylvia Duran, and one of the Americans was Lee — Harvey Oswald. She describes one of his companions as tall and slender with long blond hair, a gaunt face, and a protruding chin. The other was tall also, with short, light brown hair. In 1964, Elena Garro became a friend of an American foreign service officer named Charles Thomas, and, over time, she related her story to him in detail. She explained that when she had gone to the American Embassy in October 1964 and told her story, the man she talked to seemed to believe little of it. She told Thomas that Oswald was wearing a black sweater at the party, and that he stared at the floor a lot. She said the three Americans stuck together rather than mix with the other guests. She said that Eusebio Azcue, the Cuban consul, was also at the party. Elena Garro told Thomas that on the day of the assassination, she and her daughter went to the Cuban Embassy and shouted, assassins. This she claimed was before she saw a newspaper photo identify- ing Oswald as the suspected assassin. After she and her daughter returned home on November 22, 1968, a man she thought was an agent of the Mexican Ministry of Government came to her house and told her and Elenita that they were in danger of being harmed by the Communists. He took them to a “sanctuary”, a small hotel called the Vermont, where they remained for 8 days. It was after getting to the hotel that Elena Garro first saw a picture of Oswald and realized she had seen him at the Duran party. This man, who must be referred to here as Mr. X, advised Elena Garro to beware of the American Embassy, that it was staffed by Communists. Elena Garro also claimed that several months after the assassi- nation she was visited by two Communists who warned her not to tell her story. Shortly after the assassination, Elena Garro told Thomas, an American woman came and spent several days at her home. This woman, who must be referred to here as Ms. Y, was told the story one evening by Elena Garro’s sister, Deba Galvan, who had been 287 drinking. Ms. Y urged the two women to tell their story to Ameri- can authorities in Texas, not in Mexico. Failing that, Ms. Y offered to arrange a meeting with a high-ranking American official in Mexico. It never transpired, because Elena Garro and Ms. Y had a falling out. Ms. Y did, however, send the first report on Elena Garro and her story to American authorities in 1964. Charles Thomas, the American service officer, was concerned about the Elena Garro story and reported her account in memoran- da that were circulated in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. Never- theless, when the reports reached Washington, neither the CIA nor the FBI showed any interest. No investigation was ordered, even though, on October 10, 1966, it was learned an Elena Garro had indeed been registered at the Hotel Vermont over the period she claimed she was there in 1963. Charles Thomas returned to Washington in 1967 when his tour of duty in Mexico ended and he was “selected out” of the foreign service in 1969 for failure to be promoted. In 1971, having had some 2,000 job applications rejected, he committed suicide. In 1974 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, having determined that his dismissal was a mistake, had through an act of Congress Mr. Thomas posthumously reinstated. | Mr. Chairman, the committee on Friday of last week received permission from the State Department to make public a group of previously classified documents dealing with Mr. Thomas and Elena Garro de Paz’ story. While they have been declassified, there are certain privacy aspects of them that would make it inappropri- ate to include it in this record now. Nevertheless, I would ask that they be marked as JFK F-403 and inserted in this record at this point after they have been duly edited. Chairman Stokes. Without objection it may be done. [The information follows:] 288 JFK Exuisit F-403 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, 0.C. 20520 September 20, 1978 Dear Mr. Stokes: This refers to my letterof September 15, 1978 concerning your September 13 request for the declassi- fication and release of six documents about Charles William Thomas and Elena Garro de Paz. The Department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs concurred in the declassification and release of the Major portions of the documents, enclosed at Tab A. These six documents contain certain information which still warrants classification pursuant to E.0O. 11652. . The deleted information, if released, could damage | _U.S.-Latin American relations or reveal confidential sources and methods which remain a part of U.S. : Embassy operations. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs also agreed to the declassification and partial release of four other documents, which appear in the CIA files on Elena Garro de Paz. These documents appear at Tab B. However, the Department requests that the Select Committee not make these documents a matter of public record. These documents may assist the Select Committee- in understanding the background story of Elena Garro ‘ de Paz. However, because the nature and substance of * these documents relate more specifically to U.S.-Latin American relations and not directly to Ms. Garro de Paz, the Department would prefer that the Committee not cite these documents in the public record. : The Honorable i Louis Stokes, Chairman Fags Select Committee on Assassinations House of Representatives 289 oe As always, I appreciate the Select Committee's cooperation in all matters of record releases. I hope the release of the enclosed documents will prove useful to the Select Committee in conducting the hear- ings into the circumstances surrounding the death of President John F. Kennedy. Sincerely, 10: hae Douglas/J. Bennet, Jr. Assistant Secrétary for Congressional Relations Enclosures: As Stated 5601 Potomac Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20016 - ee : ned. ed PRBOTISS SOG 25 gEgy” SAM OTs P, ; p : - - Honorable William P. Rogers :w ME i OMS Hp gue Secretary of State ee Aah z “hes + ew Washington, D.C. - . - ee Ne Seay c . Ae Dear Mr. BarReLexy eat = In winding op my affairs at rie eet of State, "tard - a Pend - ‘ing matter which I believe merits Lheting? attention. _ ’ i Lee Harvey Oswald, the presumed esaunetn of President Kewnede? was ° - " allecge .* present at a party given by a Mexican communist sympathizer ‘and actenied by the Cuban Consul, a veteran intelligence officer, when™ e was in Mexice shortly before the assassination. There are allega=—- tions exican Government may have been aware of Oswald's ie presence at that party —that the Cuban aetna on may L pie tried to - A intimidate others who saw him there. ae ; - A careful investigation of ‘these allegations could perhaps exstaie them away. Until then, however, their public disclosure could reopen the debate about the true nature of the Kennedy assassination and _ damage the credibility of the Warken Report. Since I was the Embassy es i. in Mexico who acquired this intelli— gence information, I feel a responsibility for seeing it throvgh to | its final evaluation. Accordingly, I have prepared a memorandum ~ (enclosed) explaining this information and its initial assessment, keyed to three memoranda of conversations with my Mexican informant. I belo you would 1 want to consider carefully whether to let well. enough alone in this case, or whether the risks attending possible public disclosure of these allegations make further investigation warranted. : Bleeds beerd Charles Willian Thomas », é Enclosure: een 97 - HAUSE Memorandum and four attachments. ‘ i per. Frenets J. LaeNes/ ARR - 9/15/78 291 July 25; 1969 MEMORANDUM ok Sig nsf SUBJECT: Investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico | 1. While serving as Political Officer in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico - ~~ { City from 1964 to 1967, I became quite friendly with the Mexican play- : . , right, Elena Garro de Paz. An intellegent, witty, and outspoken woman, «.- - I found her a very useful if sometimes biased source of political gossip -- _and personal history on significant.Mexican personalities. She introduced ‘ my wife and me to many important people in Mexico. She was also parti- ~. * cularly knowledgeable about agrarian affairs. A biographic FOpOREW feats I prepared on her on May 3, 1966 is attached (Tab A). . acdng 2. On one occasion, Miss Garro Peta mentioned to me that she- he; “* had be22 at a party with Lee Harvey Oswald and two American companions "- “~~ -- whes Osuald was in Mexico just before the Kennedy assassination. The ein party nad been at the home of her cousin, Ruben Duran. The memorandum °.- conversation, dated December 10, 1965, is attached (Tab B). I e . : F had not rea nm Report, but I assumed that if Oswald had been --: - : to such a party in Mexico, would~have been well known to the Embassy. LS = I also knew Miss Garro to be something of a professional anti-communist _. 7 4 who tended to see a communist plot behind any untoward political event. a ie However, the episode about her being escorted into hiding at an obscure hotel intrigued me. Accordingly, I decided to report the matter in writing. I gave the memorandum of conversation limited distribution _ within the Embassy, and did not send gay copies to Washington. - ee. oe 3. A few days later I was called to the office of Mr. Winston. Scott, i who headed the Embassy's Political Research Section _ Also present C B2)C mie - was Mr. Nathan Ferris, the Embassy's Legal Attache ‘They had noted with interest my December 10 memorandum of conversation. They pointed out that there had been a great many rumors about Oswald at the time of © ne the assassination and that some could not be verified and others had _-. - ae proved false. They asked me, however, to try and get a more detailed ~ : replay of Miss Garro’s story. Mr. Scott made clear that the FBI had Ares cS responsibility for any further investigations of the Oswald case. ee ee : i 4, In a memorandum of conversation dated December 25, 1965 (Tab C), I provided a much more detailed and accurate restatement of Miss Garro's ‘ alleged encounter with Oswald and subsequent developments. Certain errors in my original presentation were corrected. Miss Garro guessed that the . date of the party at her cousin's house was in early September, 1963. She admitted that she had gone to the Embassy to BEROSE byichly about this matter * ? on an earlier occasion. . . a ese. 5 per, Francis. 7 Me NMei/ hse PRE OB]TR as 1) 5. I got no reaction to the second memorandum from Messrs. Scott and .~ l Ferris. However, the Deputy Chief of Mission, Clarence Boonstra, who had been Charge d’ Affaires at the time of the Kennedy assassination and subsequent Oswald investigation, told me that Oswald had not. been . in Mexico .on the date given for the party. He stated, furthermore; > am that the informant had changed her story. When I explained that she. 3 —_—> hadn't changed her story but that rather I now had given a more accurate . ° account of it, he reiterated that the date was wrong and seemed to dismiss _ the whole affair. . . : eae ee sath fs * 6. Some time later, Elena Garro told me she had found her old calendar : and had reconstructed the date of the party at which she had seen Oswald. She ed it had been in late September rather than early September. > Oswald was in Mexico rrom September Ge) c “L accord— a. a . ingly went to Mr. Ferris" office and informed him of this. He replied ~~ . that she had given the late September date accurately when she had come ~ ~- -. . to the Embassy and made her original report to the FBI. He added, how— : ever, that someone who was at the party had stated that there were no SO Americans there. He did not reveal who had provided this information. | ~-~:. * _ I askei Mr. Ferris to tell me frankly if he thought I should continue °" _:- - pursuing this matter. He advised me that it was not necessary since he ~. 2 ~~ considered the Oswald case olosed, stating again the he had heard all ~~. these rumors before. ty eg ae ak a ‘ ; ent: 7. Although the date e alleged party had been placed in the i proper time frame, I was puzzl at the-xeport ed that there had been no ~ .* Americans at the party. I had assumed that Miss Garro could have Clearly = been mistaken about the identity of the Americans shé saw there, but never doubted that she had seen some Americans. Although, I had met ~ . ; Elena Garro's sister, Deva Guerrera, I had’never discussed the Oswald a case with her. Mrs. Guerrerao's grown son, however, told me that he was ; quite convinced that his mother had seen Oswald. 8 Although I pursued the matter no further, I felt obligated neverthe- : less: ta teport in writing the developments described in the memorandum - ls of .con..:sation dated July 13, 1966 (Tab D). I thought it was particularly Stran + that the Cuban Government would carry as Miss Garro’s address the = small hotel. where she was allegedly hidden away after the Kennedy assassina— ~ tion by a man identified with the Mexican Ministry of Interior. I should = perhaps add that it was I, rather than Miss Garro, who first noticed the deg: = address. At the least, the letters lend some cross confirmation to her i story about the small hotel. At the most, they provide a source of n be endless speculation about conspiracy and international intrigue. Y 9. In early 1967, in the context of the Garrison investigation of the ae Oswald case, which had opened in New Orleans, Allen White ea 4B) made an interesting comment to me about the investi-- gation of Oswald's activities in Mexico. He stated that the DSF (the security police attached to the Ministry of Interior) .had interrogated the | ert 2 it , ne te nC OR % ARA | ee Fronts TF. MeNei{ 9[ 15/78. Sele 2 eae a Lean a ee 293 -° ti. | tke - 6 .. Durans after the assassination about a party which Oswald had reportedly attended, but that the transcript of the interrogation was entirely unsatisfactory by normal investigatory standards. Furthermore, the party | inquired about was not the one at Ruben Duran's house, reported by iaz2 Elena Garro, but at an entirely different place. This transcript may WT} dse , well be the source of Mr. Ferris’ belief that Elena Garro's story had been ~- checked: out and found to be untrue. . - |10. It would appear that whereas the FBI has discounted the Elena Garre ei + allegations, the CIA is still considerably disturbed by them. The CIA - . . may not have pressed for further investigation, however, for a number of" ; reasons: 1) considering the sensitive overlap and subtle competition . - between two intelligence collecting agencies, it had to yield to the ee, FBI's clear jurisdiction; 2) there are obvious complications in conducting°= such an investigation in a foreign country; mae = ees : ee ea, @ (2) the circumstances it is unlikely that any further investigation of this ~-,:y<>! _° matter will ever take place unless it is ordered by a high. offictal.in seiner ett ai dante ae ene ’ Washington. Se ee a ait < Lid = T£ all the allegations in the attached memoranda were true, they” Snes; testes Would-mot in themselves,.prove that there was a conspiracy to assassinate §:. : President tag ket tien they were ever made public, those who - m Wags have tried to discredit the Warren-Report could have a field day in ~ see speculating about their implications. The credibility of the Warren Report would be damaged all the more if it were learned that these allegations were known and never adequately investigated by the competent American authorities. ; ; “12. Reference is made again to the biographic report (Tab A) on Elena — Garro. She is hardly an ordinary:or average person. Her strengths and _ weaknesses become exaggerated precisely because she is not. It would ie be easy and convenient to sweep this matter under the rug by claiming Miss Garro is an unreliable informant since she is emotional, ._. = _ > that opinionated, and "artistic." I have been affected at times by that Soa ae temptation, myself. No American official, however, knows her better than ; I do. On the basis of the facts that I have presented, I believe that, on balance, the matter warrants further investigation. . Th, 13. Finally, the record should show that a representztive of a major _. American publication has at least some knowledge of f story. | ° . Charles William Thomas _~ ~ _ July-25, 1969 ee RG ks GI per Francis J.MeNeif .. hea ai te ees da -owel.. pg RO.. 1/15/78. woo 294 oe : Bo TaNmieNaN ote * wee f oof t ors ua v ‘ WWCLASSIHED ’ ES je , a oaa"Uetteed oe te . INSTRUCTIONS © Charles Wa. Tnomes mae iybalwe a | aeRO mn reen = Saas - een Teen teed Dew Ate. Ane VG For full instructions on suomis- | Copies TO v . % 2% ;i - not automatically declassified. per Gwin Alivia Te Franers ws Minintelse | ~etiBha) ak ce aie ced ARA J. McNeal ae 9/1578" ee . ——- 295 cn) USED —_—_—__——. -2- a oe serious counteratteck. Her plays cre deing currently produced in Mexico City end Zerich, and she hes just had a lengthy exclusive interview with ome or the large morning deilies here. Politically, she avpears to pe Catholic and traditionalist, and in her admiration for German culture she occasionally exhibits fleshes or Navionel Socialisa- Al- though on domestic politicel issues, her views seex progressive, she often Gescribes herself as a reactionary, because this is the term ner communist friends apply to her. Her political connections run the gamut of the political spectrum. During her moments of bitter denuncia- _ tion of corruption in the ruling PRI, she often threatens to join the Co=msmunist Party. , . 5. Miss Garro has for many years been en active worker in the Con- federacion Necionel Cemvesina (CNC), the egrerign erm of the PRI, end is perticulerly close to the recent CNC Secretary General, Jevier Rojo. . - Gomez, She has been a tireless propagandist and agitator on behal? of .the poorer Mexican peasants, and she is on close personal terms with - and apparently enjoys the respect of peasant leaders from ell over the . country. Fer house is a constent meeting place of peasant leaders, - ~ en2 she was recently paying the hotel bills of over 100 of tnem who ~~ e we: 7 | as Wae Thomas, Polit jee Crricer . ; 2: ve : ° : 2. : FS 3 ae | a ; - * = t : . : . , - , 3 ° 3 - S va : ah : . Saks <= ams " e sy r ae : ou e . - sa ete ' - = - 5 he? “s : or = > - aMB, DG, P, P/R, CED, Lb err “it Bee te In the ccurse of a Aisevssicn cscut other motters, Sra. de Pas moitionsa that she hoa neb Lee seis Osweae the a esuncd assessin of Pres sident Jonna Fs Kennedy. BE a +i: if) fe 68f a: Be ck “movter, but finally imparted tae follo.wirs. cr oO VFy % cnrorH 8 at to Say, the soure 8fu Hee@less 2G 2 ce of this informevion Srottha! be carefully cr ~ o“ rotect od a é ms - — . bah Soh ba Septexber, 1953, snorely cee hes aeeien fron sbrooi, sh2 wont to 2 perty st the kene of Rubén Surin, who is maveied to her ccasin. Eor Concntcr, Elenita, eccomsamica her. There she n2b Osveld end tio Ovner young fAsiericens who wore with hing The three young Anericans retntriet apart fron the ctherguests. She express2d om interest in talking to thea, but was discouraged fron doing so ) by some of the sthor g astse , ; : : Yost of th2 guests et the party were Comzmists o> pnilocos=mnists. Sho remembers sesingthe Cuoen Consul, Asoucs (pronstic); Generel Clers Flores of the Mexicen Oly=pic Comittee; Silvie Duran, vio sus later leernad wes Cswelé’s mistrass siiea, tne writer, vno she thints is now in tne _ While he vas here; _Zeilio Carbal = - ee ' United St ates; end a Letin Anericean Tiesro man vita re@heir. became mown, 3. In Noovemer, 1953, vaca the identity of Keeaciy'’s ossassin he ond her dosgier went to the Cuden Bhbassy and, cence sin*tied throves tne ond other Renta at the steti there. : . Bont gate, Toatexg! “eid . . Tata ard) hk. Shortly oftericrora, sh seer her Gaughter were visited by a eytees » Home! oo onde E ; Ceryilio, vho was thon =n offteae 222) tes Scersteriet: or Coneranci et = told he het orders to escors tren to a small 2nd obscure Hoss in the center of j towne cae were kaot there for eigat Gcys undor orotext thes they were in danger. OL eee 3 - Dormgratol at 12-yoe> interveis, © ~~ } ne rot extomosiestiy declossiricé. ie ee as a VE eee YE TE esSee - te ie; oo me gene OD TT 8 ene SP a Sees {2s 5 anes. ae per Page T MeNFeif - ~ARA - 9/15/7 . al nk ee sas _T- *.7 mes st 2- xs ty oe £ Wey ese ‘ Hao sho tela Cesyills sue vented. ts gsite the fncrtean Locessy ang elon | ee Se 5) ¥ “ot she ineiw of2 Csvela’s fiers gt agente comiscticns neue an Oe atce ar Hors with Se G8 mas Roxican pe ae Cosawiists - on . * thefas sh2 ves told thet the Ansrican EeSossy was Tull of Comumist s xles. = She seid > ~ Cervillo trices to give the impression that he is om extreme rishtist. He now ace job ct- Brallas Artes. : ‘ en ee s . a . . . 5. Some of the other ynoonle who wore st the norty with Cswal@ vere tekken to the stet2 ef Varser:a, Waer? ther wore "pvotees-1” by Governor Eon2s fetes Rubin Durin “is revertedly "“protectad” by Ceacre) Clerk Floris and is now. driv, 2 big ca> emi looking very pzcsdborcus. < -t 6. Nony Commmists end philocomamist: here bolieve Xennsty's assessina- tion Wes the result of 2 Comamist plot wrliusared by Fidel Cestro. Rubin Der fas subscqucatly told her tiat he is not really a Commmist ond that it rad db oe = a grest mistake to icill Xenncty. . . 2 aa bi : . - . B me 7 F i ‘<: a 5 e te - “ ts - ¢ Sr te A F a se - . e - \e e - — a. a . : - Len . 7 - 4 - °° ri - - 7 .-: - - a - . ‘a e = = a = i . y = " - “ %. : F 4 . . e - - : - ™ 2 = - . - é e xi* on . 3 P . » aad ; - y Fe i “ - e . . . 2 . ° Sane : - - ar fe < . e * te ~ . a, & « - -~ is . * ‘, = - 2 . . e A > e e . = H : 2 =F = 2 . : ; . . . a eo. % . 2 a A -* ° : . = » é . ase e - ? . . .- ° one = b - ~ 4 . . ri . . Sais oe z= A, ve . . 4 - - = Ss = > ° & . S > = . - ) ° - ® e : - : e : -.°* = . ° a . . ~ te ° . - ° e e e - - . < wnat 7Ge - = P/CvTasres "4! ae shez uw é € . gm . MEE s aE : : - hs - —_ « e me . : - Sal ? - e A , + - . a ~*~ ain “a © WISI - Lee Hervey Oswald and Kennedy Assassination ‘ Deal Seca Spe RIFFRENCE: ©Mesorarndua of Converssation, Decezber 10, 1965 Oepd e ope ae Flens Garro aePez, Moxtean writer i ae Cherles Ym. para Political Gfficsr - — oats F 4 HB, Be al, P (2),2hB,30,3/2acess RE et gee . Cr Decexbar 25, Sra. Gc Paz cgcia Giscussed ob considsrobl2 Loerci hor 45 alles:d encoustsr with Oswald, lso- present, 25 they vere at the orizinal coa-~. versation on this subject, ware ny wite and Sr. de.Paz* doucshter, Elovita. Soae -further inforaction on this stoject ves ‘glven ‘gubsequently cn Jonue>y g¢, 1 ~ 2. Daring this letter conyers sion, fre. G2 Paz ofnttte’ teat ce sho aad gone to chisss » Exnassy on en cavlicc ceeasicn with hor Geuthtor en mothar-in-iay and hal tortos to .two Exvsssy officers (oresuasbly from the Lezol Attech4's Pfic2) cbout trae matter. Gie said since the Dvb2asy cfficers dic not give mca credence to anything tnoy soid, thc omce!TBe bosher to giv2 a very Co: aplete stozy.e The Following in- » So=i2.1L00n. S pploned and in son instences corrects that givon in the nemrandiat 5 ; a hes ; eee eee or Deces sor 10. 1. Tydia,EBforecio, end Fubéa Darén ore 211 cousins of Sze. é2 Paz. Silvia - Durén is macvied ta Horacio, who is a rather weak mm.’ Eorecto was convert=ito - Cocmymun*~i Ricerto Guerre. Sra. G2 Por has never had aything to co with Silvia, 5By5Fe fart 25t3 end: considers. a tnore. Rubén wes born in the United Stetes and - SOL es ao 2S Arcy Curing the ver. Ho still goss to the US Pron tine to tin2. ~ but has no relatives: or porticulor connections tacrc. Lydte also travzls ecca- sionclly to the US. Tue perty in question wos held at the hone of Rebin Durdn. - 2 : 2. Sane believes that the abe.of the porty vas cbout Septcazer 2 Gr 3, 1963." She be- a “It wos a few ake before the visit of the Ssvict estrozait, oes wlieves it vas 2ace cr TuesSee, beesuse it wes: en odd night to have 2pertye -. Intervals, on uw) ta e = o-- G20U? — Downgraded ope 1asyesr So eter aor ae 2 s not artonatically Beate» ? ESSE ae a: a / per Francis ae Hees Nest Kk Wie G/IS[78.. es 300 pes Fee ( | BC aoe | . *. . ‘ 74 | ‘¢ a ¢ = . uw 4 7 | Miey P | ToL SSHED naire a ci ; | f . E a “ (S252 sioer 2"and 5 rucsday.) s&h2 Gems con- Vientiy reconstruct =792 3¢ 35 32 oa: Ges’: tien Jaa row storsd s¥vey wit! [che seg di Lekhaeime oe ee : tt 5. At the perty, the an she essuges wes Osweld wore 2 bleeck syeates. Te Senacl to bs sileat and stars’ a los ck the Slesr. OF his te young Lzcriesn compsaions, one ves very tell at slewier ond hai Jong dDlond naiz> veich beng eceross his forchead. ie hol a gaunt face mad a’ rather ieng protruding chin. The ~ {| othe: wis olse rather tell end het short 2 Lignt Brew hale, but bo kat no ros distinguishing ° charecteristies. . fll three vere obvicusly Anscticen anz did meot-- - —_— Eanes or iix vith the other. psonls. - Sha taree were evidently ws rricuis, 7 3 because = *~ she saw thea by chence the moxt Cay walking d wa the streat together. ed = h. Althoum Sra. de Paz nod posurasl fren om extentei stoy In ewose only in Jeune or July, she het elreadz net Teachio Accue ond knows positivay that he ves 2& the party. On snother ocension (it wos not cloar vhethor before or after the party in questicn), she attonded a party where she sew, cnons others 3 Sascdio _ ‘Azene; Enllio Caxdallido, the pro-Ssstzo writer; ond a Intin Acoriesniie-ro men” wita rsa _boir. (Teese last tvo vere not a3 the Decin vorty os wos mistakenly statedin the Decesber 10 memorcn2ua.) Cordollids oné Arcus, clong with cond ; others, 3...> In a heotes Ciseussioa on thas occasion about Prosidcat Kennedy, end they cis i: che conclusion thes th2 only ecluticn yes toa WD bis. Ses. 22 Paz - sol tact Cerdalids is now es a Castro uzast in ioxtes. He hes bem to Red a China, tre Soviet Union, end nay thucs to CWwia. Following the assacsinstica of Homecty, he spent esout a year in Césa. thon he returasi, hs got a joo tezching et Rutgers University through Dr. José Vousnan Saprol, tho was forsorly vith the °° Seczerolicy Feundation in Now Yort:.en2 tho is nov 2 BSnrofesse ES . 1iéo is presumsbly still thare. The Csy alter the assassination, Eheiite Paz *| excountorsd E>2. de Accue in Satosras. O2 sucing her, Sra. Je Aseuz tuemmed and ° nurriod cut of tn2 stores. ZCu2 was Luncdiately celled back to Haronn oftor the essossinatioa, end his wife folloucd him shortly therseftor. Ze qs _. 5. Cthers prasent ot the Durga perty in aliition to her end hoc doushter were Serecio ani Silvia turin; Lydia Durén; Sra. de Paz*® rhliscomamist sister, . Dove Gr2rrerg; Jos* desis Flores ‘sui hig mictrsss, ‘a Cescoenlen ee oaths 2 mctical cactor frou Dolinie Eos 'g chlo2 wee 2 young anericon cougl2, bota feat = end blend, who were spending their honajasen ped Uae in Moxkleos 2 4C-y2ear old Moxican women in 2 Soa eress; ond a rather stronmze mm wad clsin:2 to be Haxicen bxt Cia not loox or telc like one. His first none vos Mejo@ro 202 he subseqiortly vote ‘Elenite several love letters.. ~ She clains che turacd thes> to the Anzstiem Ene -. bessye Ricerdo Guerra, a communist, oni his wife, Sasorfo Costollazss, 2 wetter, vere dota supsosed to cone to the party but declined ta cone, ‘eccordims to Sra. - “Ge Paz, when they learned that she would be there... | thy ge ~* 6. On Scturdsy, Novenver 25, 1955, the day efter the? ennody cssassiusatica, : Sr. Go Paz’ brother drove her ond Her Gouckter cb svoub 3:09 p.m. to the Cube: Esbessy. Hor-brother was etbarrassca by their ochcevier on2 drove e blse: up tno Btrese to voit for thea after letting taca ot. . The two vores then wont irslée - Re y gate ~~ - ond- shouted % - ~ “eseassin’ ict F Q- 222 ~a other ~% <, Zastts j x id - - - oom ; e ; . 4 . . ba ~ ad . - - - a < ee —t eee nny pithraty poe 3 e oy 2 - an ‘ : : - oo - : - e P) 5 . : 4 . e e = es +2 e *. oe ~* *e Le . “3° ei ipek kare aa Tees * ine esi) wien « oes comme tg 6 te em ee gee ee ete ee ee ss ee = ee eS re 76 Pid 4 bad re La oe ts . -é ‘e: ty it | 7- Loter that aoy, taoy vere visited by a fried, Mauch Calvillo, vio said thet thoy wore in soricas Conger frou the cosninists ok taal ke would tcke thea to e small hotel waere they iol) be sefe for 2 fox days. (Is was not clear whether he selé he was ecting unter crders er nod.) Colville ves lmsim erourd tee tozn to bz on undercover atent for the Sooretorias of Cobors-aion ont te be a personal fricnd ofPolomerss Ho2 mi Custero Dies Crdaz; eecoréincly they belierad end trusted hin. Acorns othor things h> saié was thet Sylvie Dorfn bol bem ore Pasect. tlie Jas ROL wilic Thromstion ct 22-35 tins. 8. Since she could not raoansbor the nae of tha betel, Sra. de Paxfi re ve ne to the part oF tom where snc ronemeree it to be, and we found -it. It isob the Vernent Notsl, located at Calle Yorusnt 29. Yt is‘ cone ond a holf tlecks ve e of Avyeitide d2 los Insursentes in3%e South ; . of> 2°%,°. 5 ne Vie Vieseto. She; stated ee ae 7. tint thea tel is ownci dy somzone from San Isis Potosi a1 is used by. businasenen from J that orca. She end her dsuchter did. not. p=rsonaily register at tae hotel. She. tninks Caivillo registezre? thea as relatives + = or Prionds-o? his fron San Iuis Postesi. Althocza modest, 1t is 9 so%ern end coTortchble-leoking hotel. -Fhoy staycd there until the following Fridsy und berdly Aes their room . - e . w oe 2 cs aun? end the phovogranas ci2 Oswald A\~-- a a is thst she on2es her a pa er Ceurhtar =vo both exis ay fae to the inka. ‘ pendens conciuston that he was one of. the young Snueleats et the Purdn nrvty. Kam Coludlo visitsd then x3 the hotok, 's the Avuriwwas Tobessy What she knsar cocut Gsweli's coune muinists ond with Azeuce. Calvillo said she sho : Dre bessy wes Tull of commnist spies. Mis. she rcturnedto her’ house the fclloving weds, guards ware posted outsizc it.. : be ae =D se: 20. Shea saa sev nor sistor, Love Guserorea, after roturaics homt, the latter vos terrified besause ef Covela's prasenee ct the Dein porty. fhe hel cone to th2 conciusien indencniently thet it was Cayveld vnem she Gel seen there. Sre. de Cxrerrore vas also very angry with the Durin’s deemis2 she thought they bot decors | iavolv=d in te2 essacsinatiom nist for sonsy. Despite being a paiicesmamist, | | monarchist. sho wes on o@sirer of President Xcnnsidy's 7 v 938 sn is also a patrizicn omZ a | in vy tio coimamists, Absit tvo months efter the esses whoa she refuses to 1 ~ ~ - ' | mover to revecl to exyone tant she 60 terrified that she would not ecc ’ || tell tbat she knew of Osivald. _ wits" a a nee a ] 3 LL. A shors tine ofter the cssassinetion, Exilio Cardcllida, tie sro-fastra - | writer, tools the Durans to Jelena, Verccraz sna kess thea cut of the wey Zo => aon — 7 + | ehnile until the initial shock: of the Xemedy assassination wore off. Coxmbelli bas connections with txe University of Verceruz Press. - , : . “ 212. Also shortly ofter the assassination, rs - - 2 a1 Aaswricen vorm-nomed . - Jime Csba- 7% . i ‘ a Oa. 9s = a Wetec Come end soont = s2varsl cays in Sra. @2 225° :2 house... leaker Sn27.7, wes sens_ by tucir = 3". = =mitusl J - . ri} as ‘ fricois, Timie2? Caio, o Costa Sicen vho is mowon dims Ss Cobos8 rocnsaate ~ < eri“ts cho was. = Renee ” ees elas S i Se Grecs Ra OLpee s.. Yasoecs sliorg) 2 was, 3 hI wos wlth Fit. Ss Tht Panton, SntaetFSS ale eso ececteasior,ae . =a - . e a - l= . . e ne - * . = ". big : = e ~ - 2 ~ a : % wettest ete te terre oe ee - . a - ay = ae ee Pe er 22: oe 9 tg eS 41-372 O - 79 = 20(Vol. 3) 302 Metern Porulen CrzZeu. : end Urtesto 62 2a Poi ‘overt 42024 (ho succecned at — Gone press on ar zat = tor toi sth she Ime about: 7 2n exttins Deva Caz rexro Gm Osvalad ani the party at the hone of mia luvin. Miss -Cobd thin reutsi thea to -% Sell vhes they knew to tae Anoricaa quvlioritics. ae > she to Texes to- -—f > efvised egcinst going to the Ancrican Loassy md wayj2d then to go toll theis story. Failing ja this, she szid she voul@‘arraige 2 necting ina - guiet cars Tne nesting. cid not astericlize, however, becmuse saa Was osked to lsave the Pox nouse. Hiss Cosb hai Kicked Sree - o titak Pint Ge Pas ? Cate ae r ‘ it Nae 6 at. Ps- ——— = ~ - - s- 13. Ab ebous the end of Jom-ry, 398, ‘Rubén Devéa visited es. ae Poze os soik he wes going to visit the Uaited Etats end vated her te protcct hin es oF 4 -gueh 23 possible vnile he wes evey. Ho Porrod 16 night be panes e thos Oavola < 22 been to iis house. Since sic 2sz2 Doom born ia tus United States, he Imew it - vould be cesy for the Mescieen Covemamt to Civest him of nia citisensiis cad aopors hin. hey both sfreoi to say nothing ascut it. Ee said it was Silvia Surain vho . - got hin involved vith Oswald. He cddei thet he was not ase 2 comeusist oni vas; ageinst the exsassinotion. wie ozs . ns Sco alae . = =| x a ox = a = _ - 1+. Tost six months efter the ozscisingti m, ‘bnon she wes talkias ta Noe ~ get of the Sterctorias of Cobsraacisn ascut anctacr natter, she told the ~ - SOxy-OL HOD Cucortiver %rita ae oil as ~ her not to:f9 to the Anoricm Rabeassy, a susgested that if she insicst22 om Going omythingat see sne meraly vrite the - «= = EXioassy od aee misews keg Lett=ze- = t ° . ‘ ; ; ¢ hi = = ' 15. Sra. @2 Pos stated that it ves comssa Lnowlalge thet Silvie Durén vas ree | the mistress of Osmpld.. The only porson she could weasber whic told her this, aged however, wos Victor Rico Galz acdpro-Castzo journalist. a es te Shotrs she f) sze to Mexico sere — te 4% = Cae ee undorstsod thet Osveld het f s 10. She also statx es ly, been este tlio - . ie tess Pee o frard, ote “a e?% ail wae .* . >. a Ate . - a eh es 37. LZ ~~ - Lee Pees. ° aye ‘ o Pry Teen z wetl- ‘ > < a = Seti te eres ted,Ate? eect - f sf, Be of ms - hs fe 4 “3 { nae nea Cae EE ee a ee “#6 rey ase ye - 3 a fel # et at" a Lsiud . A “SY Faes8a os tc-y he iewl e pr Sey eS tate & CLV i ‘ r (3 eat fi Lees. Pd A tog! eet be i dele ‘4 s/eitinnos hag Ale Zz .4 .°@ $ 20% Ee ru pe Sore eh ots pao Se =o) ter * ges r} “* i s ’ bad * Z —— £ shoves ee ao o-2 pratense SE pieceee . . = ° . »”etNash “3 beats gis a. oo oe c= — ot ae ree re oer mentees ee apa! se pg pe wee OO v suhne - 4. eee Pe “7% s arias - (ae FranusJ.MeN. gif ARA 15[78 : 303 °PMOVALS207R 8-7 fleas : TITLES Esyeye Rae ner . ( Hicbe pOCQE af itp AQ he G. ‘ F | = i, : phat ais iy F , rs SS . A : 3 . a ve ts aE : fAomsrcnduia OF Veoveraion . . ¥ Dig OS + pate: Sully 15, 1956 SUBJECT: Further on Oswald ond Keaaedy Assassination ‘ Se i oar REPERESCE: Memorandua this Sudject of Dececber 25,1965 2 - 0° 2 ‘PARTICIPANTS: FElean Garro Ge Paz, Mexican writer . .-.- Fe ca el gaan, -Charles Via. Thoms, Political Officer ‘ payne : : as . . ¢ - == -° : Z a f : en fs - oul ee : °. - Saw - -; ° - : e-e) Ns ta 2 SS ee - . , a (| Corie To: -- #13, BoM, P, P/2, L, cmp, cB/? (2): - > - -° a ae A es -- * - F: y 8 e °, an ; 3 F ? | ~ ™ i =<. - ae = ‘ Le ‘Saas “a= @eseribed sone developacnts which may kuve soe bearing on her claia | thet she s..: Uee Harvey Osvale at ae parey at the hoxrsa of her cousin, Rubén Durie, | : < , | when Oswela wes in Mexico prior to the Keancdy assassinatioa~= — . ©. She stated that her writer frim2, Cortos Solorzano, is quite well acquainted ~~ ss < 55 saronthy | with Cubon A=bassador’ Joawin Hemonioz fra2s.° Saz s2id Solerzao wos | not porticulorly leftist tut that his orotaer, Alfonso, was a ccmamist. Asbas= -- he would very mich - like -,*to moat Sna- Pare .. | sn4or Herfoniez read tol@ Solorz=no thet - 2 os - e - | Solorzass accordingly arrange’ 2 porty eb his om hom? on vume J; 3665, ondine : F e Tito Also present were Montomsa ond his wife; Elvira Vargas >- l ‘vite? both of then. | the leftist journstiss with Noveicdes veo is a close personal Fziead of Presiemy . | | Diaz Ordaz: Cronnel Cexvallo, tne pro-Castro writer; Joomt Diaz Comesq, heck - -: | oF the podlishinay Pires eolicl Lditorial Mortis; ond dum Soriaus, the pointers __: | Se seid 27 eas probobly invited to mske her fecal at ease, since heise. | friend vs hers eno vas the only enti-commmist there besides herselie |: Sel s Sn, 3 | 3. Turing the eveing, Acbassedor Hernenioz, whta sie described 2s intalligent 4 =, | =a calture3, concentrated nis, attoation on her. and did his best to flatter har -: inverest + by Lending hor literary productions. ‘In addition, he expressed greet ~ | in her friend, Cerlos ticérazo. Be issucd 2 personel invitction to ker to atecad i | the exmol literary festival of the Casz de 123 Anerices in Havane._ She expinined Hevana unless’ 2s to hin that che wos not a Fidelista one thay sic souléa't go ts ~. | Jusn Soriong went wita her. Hernentez thea invited Soriae to attend es well,.. of the- “* Sut the latter roundly denounced the Cestro regime over tae oojections — .- : /. others present, who urged thea both to attoaé the festivel. 5 “2 r = = eno, she q Later, ker friesi, Victor Rico Gsla-, the pro-Castro jourmslist, ° =: = 2 9. as < =&S ty toc C252 :nlcna. : fobeassster NecnePits, varnicd her ast co | pe~soncily G@isitties Bays, p=. Li rvoLs > - TRC 5 ~ Tsu Cee iy. ee 2 ers ade clesaes jee . =— i! ~-— «OE wVvvs9%26Le smart T 4 sf - i] os eee - per Francis J. MoNeil ARA aoe : : pe 9/12/78 304 NOLASSIHED c —: TAs owes : = ° een Tae SS) 7 asi: wonree. Lv Virre. SEyeleps cs3 ve ee! ho GC Law 4~~ -- 1) (y oes One Pale =73 (5 () crchet written last SS - ct 5 x Vercons 2 So < - a i iD) iF)oO pa) -criting o ster, writton eo ~ ove Bee aitres VOTING Be enyclone for the first lcttor, return to the sender, which was teined the violre nm PS TEAES - Podenat y: ee > oe ho voter ced Sil con). cS. 29- She coucluded vie Cuban Go oe she 26 strses .= te J with @ minor error, 2s . egal . Vad somes ‘TF. Since Hemel Colvillo ve a2 ket 22 bow vsts tie Lotel ostensihly to pro — ‘tect her fren the commnists, the question of nay the Crvans optzinsd that ald : she WES SuEx[, th2 ez Fi ‘only psopl2 who kn Vermont vere Hannel Calyilioa, Gr: L ZL ioscovitae tMichsicegee ami tro closc “a 0 Sys ovrer friends of these a by 1 Big DES v ; Stas £ it ore Mmuice Céio end Juas Codd. Sh aid = oO¢ eT) ELULS VS aj 7 - suspicious of ali =. . tmrveve of teese people peralad 1’ RS ju ose Out-o os+ way to cultivate her then she returns > - a LS end hal mel such a.noins o? beins cutsrolea prot re 32 - AY IZLSGIGe Ct wae © LeSss): yeors 270 fsorzorits Mieke. id . eta Cs: won th.11SSe Calvilio ei perhe bark) Es) " : azein tush ¢ - “a? QO ‘j=Q¢ ci cities ty! bg Ge 4.06 anton tae ‘Gustavo Diaz Ord e PISA Cosocvaacion, = : hed ~ f = = > TyEssa: ak aoPa bye ave placed outs = acursa4 zrea tue VYessst ‘fact, since Crlvillo' Br aceyar4his a) = sosition -~nmaas 26 ¥ 25 th ait. uae tariat of T2ucetion ( =, or Gs Cu" ~7n BesEeonoaiea), oz tyO Hersonel t ee alasrais >. 07a ee azr0A SHAz Gas e5suriz, n2 + ~eneteber joo voul TF Ks. a) = Se, kiz.- ae = OF) tte Sf TOULIA Lor PRPs he ha aided that she noi told Catvillo wills = ae Suture. atscoc 2: .: US Expaisy at one point to tell whet she kney about her cllesed- etcoucter sith Osw2id. To cdi to her suspicions, sha semesbarel thst Waist ann2arel to be a gunmen who often acccmpsnied Calvillo ond Polouares” + wos a Sponish refugee naned (finn) Yoloncia. S22 seid Veloscia’s fizst—-.. ~ wi?2 wes 2 Russion consist h2 bhai merrie’d Curics the Spanish Civil Yor. Sue ho2 sussequently taksn their chilézm en2 returacd to tze Soviet Union. _ 8. She thovght it possible that tne Cuben Eobossy hod now deliterstely given her the letters from the Casa de las Anoricess wita tac Voromont Street otdress in orter <9 ieee a mend — 2 be —» © >32 ae Shvoouy.,conmes-Bel ee Td -- 20a, < a kite,= o aca appesread to b2 three gexnusnots me 22 2. tna. 2 sa been a sired tarctiga her upstairs. > 305 . . at *. 4 a ~ : . “4 seks wees E506 - : - oa hat eee em Sl aan say seh fase, Ee tea a aehe Beee Bocce ae ~ Ulises Wntle oto ois 24s OF Tro HAUSE TIES - ; me % , : Bor 0:". voang eit Se sais_ thot vith all the Lctcssis in tera ecewsing he Van ee le > ¢ -—- - ~~ wry ¢ =: I~ = “ ee . irsitotsd > Itapiwt ° 25 ~ aer 22ClseS with= Ae oo %.. oxccice Os fh esse mont of the Fut end the govorncant A 7 el <7 «' x scf2 *oalsn: Livin alone aef> Living ° x a a ~ & = ~ => sunsoxs for joe Cavics iiscraso, rH sic @ia = not~~Pasl entirely Sse seid her prother wes now sleepin: at the house - “Aso ro - 9. Finslly, Sna- Paz staved wnat ne had recently encomitered hor cousin, 2 oy5- io yee Lydia Durt:, od thet the ¥ latter + had bem vory frienDy ed vented to %, - Sac z said 33 bLycis en vos vory 3° ol a sn2it joo ritnh- 2 ress > nor esein. a o cy) ae Ditusion Cultvrsi ———-a_a_—_—_— Se at the Anthrorolozi Ccuss rus lle P aiam : - 4 ties - Lm ee be’ ° - ° 7 ¢ se‘ — . “. . = 4 es . ‘ - : Pike e ; 2 ae ? - 2 7" . . a - = . < - . - = - ; - ir e . -. - es - . ~= 3 - ~~ - + aa as . . _ . a) . S - = . - - : , Sa . - . : = * . ‘fetts.2 = - ; ~~ ” - . * 4 - eta: . iol . - = z - 3 . - - . 2 - ° - ee - Th - : - : - Re tod ath as o- 7 . :s . . " > o. - . 4 -" e - s = - oe . . > ae - . ad ol - - - + z * - J tal . ° . . = oe - - on = - \ 4 - s i. . - ‘ ae . eedina i. ? e ee . - - Se: 7 é es s _s - —. -* . ° . i = . oe - . he —_— “‘s =m - 306 eC RUMI: 6227, ' Amador — A- Director of Fducation for the State of Chihuahua ___ ong te 02> ZRNANDEZ, : Sala PRI, FOE othecots Bh atu 5 Sn 7. Me Ve. B- A friend of Elena Garro de Paz ‘who was cultivated foc her. ARA : : protection because of his membership in the Pree : 9 15/ 8 o.! party of power, : ‘ : anaes : C- None 1S eda ge tig sie vip e is the Cuban Cone tetas attache to Mexico. ea ‘ZCUE, Ensebio ——— fi- Subject B- Attended the party given by Ruben Duran which Oswald aa Y a “allegedly attended. ce C~ Reflects that Subject had contact with Oswald at the Cuban. fe : Embassy and that an argument between Oswald and Subject a eee occurred because Subject could not issue Oswald a visa to --- - : go .to Cuba, at the direction of the iba Government... - eo — eS --- Subject ‘is the Cuban Ambassador to hexico. bine eee _ ERNANDEZ Armas, Joaquin - A~ : B- Subject is a close associate of a communist friend a tee a le -« 4. 7 er ag ’ of Elena Garro de Paze -. : ' C= None eta. ’ Vi ; wes - +2 ae >» _ Soe oe aa ee os ; ‘ -, % iy ee ze “ : iss - Be: a es formation Obtained from Sources) : © > - AS On |: _Department of State Records ss. * pe O° (late wey So Sea ty rae i ee ps ei: - : - Mr. C.W. Thomas! Correspondence aS t « Cuszeeliom Report’. 22" acl ae, ae 28 : + oe The Warr cs ° . : : 7 < ae - a, os c 7 : =e = * 3s ~~ : = ss a i ‘ er; € a “4 ae ( ¥ Pace i tA ‘ ae es Wee . + Oty jw Beveos emcees Se -20m-7r ¥ Zmerican Consulate, Ciudad Juarez RIO PES s ‘ ma : few - uaIe ~9 : TITS pErantoenr OF STATE, WASIINGTON. - May 12, 1960 0/0 y fO jsnw nua3 BURCAU CF we Dan inyay). aeeiiemeaiend elaine Communist Agitation Among Student Groups " up Dorianst Munley | Pur Sanus] Wounbe-f Yerscrs. ‘ Sint Reus , Lo =; Lehrere Vig “Lay A 724 4 pe 41 LE eae Ce a ede Ceee PCB) | The Cefsulate le from a MOE be ohe ie ‘that Pras ne ag As 127 : a f crore 5 a a eeiug spent three. ff oO egitetors, ‘ - .- snd a third not yet identified, —|] | to Ciuded Juarez: to incite student groups to demonstrate against and stone et \*| emai the Amexican Consulate at Ciudad Juarez on May 23, 1960, Students! Day. The.- Chessman case, United States-Cuban Policy, and attacks on Mexican monopolists (Eloy Ysllina, in perticular) are to be used as the slogens for their student - demons; stan. Their efforts have resulted ‘in very little success to date,- ~~ -N0. with oniy la€Scusla Normal Nocturna giving them any backing. Apparently they - a ae ere quite dissapzinted with the results, but ‘intend to establish a cell among <: UI!- the students in Juarez to solidify their position. Arthuro Genis, the leader | of the three-man group, hes returned to Chihuahua City, leaving the other tio to carry on the work. At the moment the attack on the Consulate seens Mkely nO to feil; however, the Consulate will watch their future activities very closaly © * end will request polices protection if and when appropriate. ; _ Oo This may veryiwell be a local problem, in Micti"caee other posts in : : Mexico may not be affected. However, if the purpose behind the demonstration i is to cfeate the impression that widespread anti~United States feeling exists in Mexico, all posts may be attacked. = : d bet gh Sot waatad D. wrigh Rie ST Geco,shgs & fit.uk + + fimeriican Consul. General eon = > : ie: SENT TOsmat COPIES Original, . and eh, womnds. z+. & ee Oe 1 copy Political Section, AnEmbassy, Mexico ~ PR pac Ps eee 1 copy SufonGen, AmErbassy, Mexico . 1 copy ARA:(MA, Departyent. -- 7 1 copy Legal Attache, AmEmbassy, Mexico © . gS ae as ? 1 copy Security Advisor, An=zbassy, Mexico . * eee: = le See] DEPARTMENT PASS TO: j aia Gea es Joes = ous Ah a BL eat . 1 copy each Consulate iin Mexico Aeiy Br lf es, *- omeS i ita 4 re=: peer ls VL LéPeszzulloshj Pi Ikan fe oe : . Eo ROARED : vi ee om ; . o : yy] Ce r 5 : a | --:*+¢ % ACTION COPY — DEPARTMENT OF STATE , -.7: ~¥ 2 ars: The action ofice roust ene this permanent record copy to DC/R Niles with an endorsementofactiontaken. =~ ea *. Y One Se »-? per. Francis J. McNeil ARA 9/15/78 - : : . ore” . my mr + a te eres le 308 7 oe Rag PRTSIOBLe * “Os : , Ammbassys tk WOUSS cca - 138 has os : TNE DEPARTMENT ‘or STATE, WASHINGTON, joverher 21_, 1°46 a C=RP, Section D, Item III-A. SUBJECT: EXCON: Possible Use of Free Port of Tijuana for U.S. Ab » Destined for Cuba. _MeAz 0S ))-yeAl(R- L im -From a source within the Cuban AST elieved reliable ceme information indicating that the Bank Pe Foreign Commerce of Cuba (BANCZC) was planning to use the free port of Tijuana, Mexico, as point of entry for U. S. merchandise ultimately destined for Cuba. — me se Architect Eusebio AZCUE, Cuban Cormercial Attaché to Kexico, sapaotieaton OF. oe pn ee ae eer Uepencewith.‘BANCEC, a ele Habana. _nebarding. st advantages SS Ge tee _ ese eae. fee eesate wee oy Tee meee: pee eel eee me fate See: ieee § cera anaes “port.” a — a re, Siero “ tie has. a. Baer atedeal. of movement and: -hence. +there—— re eet vs ae owe ‘oye Ae lords’ to.‘the. chee BANODD: caresaa “pvadlabi’ some $3,000, 000: 1 eseDa in credits for purchasing raw materials and spare: parts needed for Public eae . Works equipment which is out of commission. Possibly the credit would be - increased later to obtain vital perts for sugar mill machinery and other _important factories. The Public Works department was to furnish a Est “of ae raw materials needed ‘but the rest was siato be dgtermineden . _ a merchandise. An unnamed American a inerry Ss moseeten as partiaies : pating; a (presumably) Mexican firm called "Don Lazaro's son" was meationed as being trustworthy for the transaction. : at Through another source the Enbassy learned that Cuban Cascerciat Attaché Azcue had mentioned a iiexican alggdonero (cotton dealer, broker or grower) as possibly being of assistance, SA @ third country transaction, oe suggesting the possibility thet "Don Lazaroharry might be connected in some ~- way. with the cotton business. . = wa e 0 “hay é 4 me ead Se z2 a >. gee ay Olas Pe liek Sel pe pies ot * P |= ry] . _ een seSRiCAat fees r¢ fi4 to BOON: LeColby:mlb. - RGSS, yy,G2 139 " REPORTER ‘° a : mp - * ottktts.2. —— = sw COLMIENT = It is jikely that se pent upon his Se to hexico, will play a prominent role in this transaction » assuming that the financially hard-up ie Castro Administration can make available the tapes 4 credits, or is not able to’ obtain the merchandise in other i : . The Embassy realizes that the EAformahton Deiesured above is sketchy and eetaos is not in a position to obtain details, nor to follow the progress because the ~ contacts were “one-time contacts" and brought the information to the Embassy ~—:- at some personal risk, However, it may fit in with other information already ... 72 _imown to the Department and serve as background for such additional information ~~ -: on this mubsock, as. ee Cae may chance to Pick up at a later date. a 39 iveges ® te e<. “i ae of oe. For, theChargé ‘dtiffaires ad.interim: ” “ea? of ae fe iagnde Mieciee “yiid ie E. A. Gilmore, Jr. ft SS 3 WRAL... ae | “lias. +... +.; Counselor of Embassy for > + | ” me be broae iat a , Eeonomic Affairs © 2-0 7° 0 7 ACTION Ro” -SSTEDs - Department please pass ‘copies to Mexico’ City, Honterrey, fe: - » * Z mh a ' u : >. Le qo = ‘ bd . wa t. o-f : ace “4 é : a =f : ESS - - : - e _ - .: ‘~ : wt suse eft ay “ie es - ae =, oe~ - : > Pee* = ° os i -- = as - = - ¥ - e +4. a Te - * a. 2. A = - = oe - - a ° = ay oo : ers ; : a St ik”ark aeie ie SES:2 ee = & Toe ore a3 a78 ng wile . ~* a - $ ee . . oe e : Fe > as fio. © od > = - . - - < - “f° :ie Ge ee :eo . . . a a eae . Oe, ier'. w= ote a osSe" od- me : to.ea2 tes . sae ate x s oo ae» z ste 7? “ bY Pee ee» 2 oe € . - u Fuses - ~- >= a -. - ° . . 2 = ° c - < > a . fa ° epee ? e ~ <* - - ok : se = Sighs 3. - ° e-.-: :.S - a ail) a - i - a. “ - . = - oe fs . bs ° + at * 5 a oe = = Mies = Sas —*. - _ > - . . . 3 . - - bd . - i- + 2 a = ait - . r 2 . oe en 2°, Pee..e “a - ° - oye" © -- 7. ec i . oe . - - . - - ’ < - - ee ce + oe © cee cee < . « o a a ee ¥ -* 4 % poe - . ot © Oh. - sete . : on ey eile - we awe? tiie,e eS in . . - co. a = ry =e i ° om * oe = 2 ee = t Ps 72" Ee a, 2 aie awh wx —: - z - oP se : = : - = = - a oS $s) ~ ° E *, e ~ *. < ° mR = Ease, > pid =, eta _- Wes ie We-~ ote se oe @ t -: bs a ;3 — -- = = Py- 3 Sheng sae. tree Se,Sa . - _-_—_— - wel* -- as STU - kes: = . - at a Fi 2 a0 wie 0s 2 i ee gout Hs ‘a --* Bie eooo aewo° - - ai = oa : Ae tee : a > ‘ Ls > ol . ees - * a ns oe. e ig EES reer, 2, P] ee : i PSi Ze - a eae “= ~ - e-’ ad = Foltep shay. fi ers . : é* x4 “ A > meee ae er ae ee, sued -s 2 = 23°ee . ° - oy = “6 = PS . - > > e - =e - 3 et Ere ee ° ks 3 oe PC ee ae = Soares 4" Bern's ar ee - . apuria * atsal es 3 pe sia a, ay a Se a aT OL es A -! OE ~ ON Nea! 9 aot Se rte Se . . -°- -. . eee AE 7. ae ° 5 2% 2 sie< : aaa - . gate ° . .Ps wan Pie, 21st s Se Gi “ous jf - e495 a“ fe -ra _ re - maha Ee - . ey - = uw © -- : o = : > Ss = err - a ee ‘c= NOES : ~ : - -- . a"? =a @ z See gO : _ .- ? Sed be - Cae . - a . 2 : --> % ~ . aad 4 = ° ea. . . ‘° 4 -~ . . « aF-4 ° be eo . ~ - oe . 9.6 —* e + ae . - od . - : oo : - - 310 Ce SUE EOE ase tie ea ar 208d ee ‘@: ia : ¥ ME seth teR (arte vamos ERA (sige, Legpie pt phos ante s one 1? ~ mea: CANTEEN pay is a it FOR RM USE ONLY Fi oeNes \aie Yo age * Department g HANDLING INDICATO a hyeas : of State iaern# pe 25 aEa u I ae3g Soll Oe rma Ws : apr: paaee -* GROUPS . ro) oa ; ve : te 5 “ t ! sae DO Tey ae s z ti eae ‘not’ graded autém . : 2-year intervals, ary! BI *. Se ‘ al Nina Mobo cbaae ang ee AoMatted iy declassitiea. FROM ? sConsul, TAMPICO st oe SUBJECT : Visit of Cuban. Ambassador to : cal igo eee pa aes ER gk ET Pee oe: Sn te REE seagRy cite cri Sy hy yh aewenss ed oe aR HES ‘de. ee oo ‘ 4 ; L€ om a 42 ie TNs i Sar 2; fly Sa NAVY : . eee: age ie { 3 ee < een 2 zi Cuban Ambassador to Mexico Joaquin HERNANDEZ. Armas arrived at Tampico ~ ey {ake on the evening flight% of CMA on September 5, 1964. Hernandez was meb ab. : the airport by Cuban Consul José L. POSADA Torres and his wife, Camilo .e .-"* a] 7/SC] Domenech; Commercial Counselor of the Embassy, and Attaché Alejandro.- =~ “of Rodriguez, who had preceded Hernandez by car, . and a group of less than * —-twenty local people, No state-or municipal officials were present. 9, °3= On Sunday, Septanbedt 6, a barbecue was offéred in the visitor 4 s®.~ : ae Ténor by Eng. Alfonso MURIEDA of Petroleos Mexicanos at his home in - Colonia Petrolera, Murieda 5 is a known commmist, ne ert Wye. 1> j On Monday, the Cubans traveled to Ca. Victoria where they were * Agen ws ‘received by Governor Praxedis BALBOA and other government. The Governor had a private luncheonofficials.of the state fea" " for the Ambassador and ~-_-: his party. The Governor also accompanied them on visits to. * government buildings and the museum, schools, -" * +s: ae iP per es Se COPYFLO-poR a z 7. 2D See The Cubans were in Cd, Mante on Tuesday, A ee accompani ed by Lic. Cristobal’~~=| - GUEV'".. slimes, Executive Officer of the state government, and Amado’ TRE ~.3, Director of the Office of Press, Informa ., ..: oe tion and : stz:e, According to sources in Mante, noenthusiasm could Tourism of the~ ‘= }. be generated “7: ‘<3 ; for a mass greeting; therefore, some school children and municipal employees were ordered out to greet the Cubans, oe oo ee F eas P< = Fa .| |]. \the Guban Anbassador visited the “Ingenio (suga: mill) of Hants and" ; * 72 S33 had a long talk with its manager, “Inge Manuel ZORILLA Rivera. Zorilla pe is a well known leftist. (Pate ap Information avail able indicates that he has_ pate. long been under Commmist Party discipline, . bat ct Seto ‘ Shida” Oe ug a- - - . . WUC ; 2 yr te ie 8. eee Tanp ico rs ta - The visitors were ‘entertained at supper at a tee cafe on the edge of Cae Mante. It is not known by whom they were entertained or who attended. It is understood that only a few personswere present. The party also visited a school ~ and the new Social Security Hospital, : Newspapers stated the next day that the Cubans had amnounced that they will buy 40,000,000 pesos worth of Tamaulipas cotton. If true, it is probable that. | about titty per cent of the cotton will be purchased from the Ingenio del Mante. Members of the cooperative planted 4,000 hectares in cotton this Ninian eye ot On Mondey afternoon, the Mayor of Tampico was Epscricted by telephone from, Cd. Victoria to give a luncheon for the Cuban Ambassador at the Casino af eng _ Tampicquefio on Wednesday, September 9. The maximum number of persons authorized — _ was twenty. The luncheon was duly held, but it appears that there was some é difficulty in filling twenty places. Only fifteen persons, including the four ~ Cubans, attended. A list of those present is attached. Mayor INGUANZO told me- in confidence that he was ordered by Mexico City and Cd. Victoria to give only . | this luncheon and to invite only city officials. Also, he wes ordered to dis— | : once ee citizens from making any displays of friendship. _ k es A - —-, buffet supper for one hundred twenty persons was given by the Cuban Consul. - at the Gruta Azul of the Hotel Tampico on'the evening of September 9. The affair was atten¢ed by ths general, and admiral commanding the military and naval’ zones and the finance oificer of the military ZONCe aa eae told me that he did Beh ree : 7 2 = =< ea ae “The Cubans have emphasized the commercial ty their public and rete talks. They continually reiterate their desire to buy cotton, henequen, beans and . onions. They grow lyrical over the advantages to Tamaulipas that such trade would bring. Commnism or politics are never mentioned. aes oak ae In Cd. Victoria, the Ambassador talked at length with Oscer GUERRA Elizondo, = representative in Tamaulipas of the Department of Agriculture and Cattle Raisinge . The arrangements for this and other commercial discussionswere made by the. ’ Banco de Comercio Exterior at Mexico City. -According to a reliable source, no contracts or pacesmanks Were signed, : eer ee3 Sa < 4 The Ambassador is esta to have offered greats ius ve youths from Tamaulipas | to visit Cuba. One, a third year law student, José TiS Cuella, who probably- a _. Will make the journey, said that he had been nominated by the Governor, The . ae Consulate will attempt to learn andreport details soon of the exact method of. > hie as heeas the names a8 Lapa of rag Bigs oka fe a esa he . saat PASAT Ace : = aan Ios . . . pie, : > "e » a sete,” _- ~ PY ans oe AES < --= * ~ . i aa . 8% so) as . - - - 2 eA ‘ GnOre Ss Dalene, -Downgradea at 12-year intervals ,..: ae M. e’ 3 eee + not oer avianadGeclassitiads zs 312 oe 6 MRIS co : : In the Consulate’?s view the visit should be considered a failure. The minimal courtesies accorded by the state and local authorities; the very poor |; press coverage; the reported failure to reach any firm commercial agreements; 4 and the apathy of the public (including ey mst have been Pa ate indeed to the aoa pene 'youne sons? Lciaciaaiae Consul : MMs Co ad, 20te ¢. % i lay ° - nee : . rahe ap yt nies tie eat ae . Sota basa , ino tote ae x ae : ¥d : - - oa - axe ‘og Sg ti as - - tg pre: Ty is aay -- 7 “° fy, ses os ay eit ae a ‘se = ~ es ~ O.° « n> 4 ae Sx . >» By aa 3. . at x 2h . * . : _~ De ° ae ee Sieg : bigs at . = wer: : > hate ae “ Sn gh rahe : ae aM aie Saree retin ee ee ; GROUP 3 ae edes :. Downgraded at 12-year intervals, | ‘ Deer nnrtic og aay oes a “not ihe Sedioniaes declassified. + -. © =O “ee ¢ ae > “ oe Es, ~ : = = . ac ee) a Loe - = ek soz erhe -- Par | * Be ne «< a iS , a = . », . : ahie oe Sis % - 22 oe 2 2 ‘ . in 4 -_ e - 5 . . 5 eis 2 ~ - - : ° tele + A {= : ee” ae +r 4 cn e -. ys a ate e mr It = a 5 Z : Ps “COREE4 2 7 ape‘ 5 ERA: 313 | “+ PIO TE +2984 i ua ew ifEN ed CE1d BNMeenaepe >: s “er : mop Fe - ‘FOR RM USE ONLY MANDLING INDICATOR To = DEPARTMENT OF STATE - ey yy 3 VRE e pe hep. . ci : Sate ‘ agy ; Lysi° s a! RsTTON mS - a4) oF Bor. iim ae : 965 ” ™ ia wes ; Rab Amembassy, MEXICO bews pd iui iane gSakser.ia}RNelSoto 4 RLV eaves January 13, 1965 sa SUBJECT: - Mexican ain of Sixth pontversary ‘ofCestro Regine ~~". *- REF : fest ee oy ee AE wa gosrn °: ‘io ay Be | oi ‘The activities of the Cuban Embassy here in connection with the 2 sixth snniversary of the Castfo regime were almost ignored by Mexican -..:i3, The leftist E}’Dia (January 5) did carry a brief item on WANDEZ Arnas'. reception, held en Jenuary “ry and reported the Anbassedor's” participation in the traditionel wreath-leying ceremony at the Independence Monument earlier in the day. But El Dia omitted any editorial eulogies, contrasting sharply S with the moderate Excelsior's attack on the "abominable extrenes" in- --. curred in Cuba, made in the course of a commentary (January 5) on Secretary Rusk's Secent ooservation that the menace of Cestroisn had : - declined. a ; . x atest : . 2 : "GROUPce ene aa at 12-year intervals, = > 777 ieee ee notan areas Tat declassified. es Mwai nen 2 42 pe eG are \ a [rw a - : Poe | eS 4 ie ‘ ¢* ae he Oe Sone om See fete 2 Belen 7 fale : {HE ta LH NOL AO soressm FORM ; . | Ke Boos ; _" 1/12/65 |: ° ftauos : Approved by: WwStuert ° a P/CGStefan:hag ars of the National Directorate of LOMBARDO foledeno's Popular Socielist = ( °PS) did participate in the ceremonies at the Cuben capitel- A ~verfety of *ecsoms vere probably responsible for the absenceof any top-level PCH officials. These officiels were presum2oly very busy making final arrengexents for the Netionel Congress of the PCii-dominated faction of ‘the Central Camoesina In- cepandiente (CCI-Independent Peasents' Central), which opened on January 6 (see f Weekes 51 and 1). Among other reasons, it is possible that the PCM leadership also concluded thet this was not a particularly opportune time to converge on Havana, verticularly in view of the recent change of administration here Asee in this con= - : nection the opas ere53 A-5T9 of Deseanes 79 AOS) «1re dare tote Saito eaiye re, ees ale geet 24? aloes EOE, the Aubassador: Pe, ik ys ‘ - ae nis : (Hees | AL fe: Oy iets J : st . z batas par oe “ae fete Fae tf ‘ft * ee ~ a * 922% * Re rc oof. cr Wallace Wi Stuert > Ps : ° ="? Be ie Sere ag aw oe Counselor of Enbassy .~. |-- ~ tae Re hy for Political Aff airs se Se Op ne Bel ke ae acl ef ae 8 pat oss). Soom Us. Ete See -* "Ee : i tt vs Se rE ares : . aps te 3 - > : “33 of “The tex’ of the brief Diaz Ordaz message to President Dartiooe was released. to Be the press by the Cuban news agency Prensa er on January 8 and was picked up ig. without coment in El Dia of hesial at! ¥ 9, 9; 19 Do ep ye hs i 2/ ineoneaine to the Ultimas Noticies of Gandary 2, 1965, the “Panenkniatt Commmnist . lesder and agitator Mois Moisés CARRASQUILLA Vazques'" passed through. Mexico aie on: January i en route ee sevens: dole the. po epee ah can Dy Soe Z “nclosure: (conprpaerrat/vo FOREIGN DISSEA)eesjrantivce kieran 23 ne ae :ices So is) ey ane _ List, as aestribea shove: | 4 ) {A Huis :i;~ = pay on P ee acoe i ae asi ao — neath. 2 - ee =_——— ee Monte 3 a Erne’. Noe ‘pet _ 4-609 trom Syenibs QDsxs7 fF 66 a 2 Certain Mexicans Known to Have Farticipated in Ceremp fes in Favenrte} Meri— 7, ing Sixth Anniversary of acces Resime 4 Ernesto int ss Esperén wait Ve Margarita Ay cal Salazar 6 é , .Méxino CORREA Camargo | “. | Elvira Hanzeno ae Gonzatez , | Jorge or ALEZ Ronfrez iat hy Te 63 on Carlos LAGinZs “aT elarte, 3 Nicol4s PEREZ Ranirez ; z aS -“- ni { . Gloria Yordce Ortega 1 : oT Rosa PUIG Fernandez : _ Lezaro Kote Felix. aM, - ; J y ofan ‘Alfredo | 7 Delgado . kz eee Was > | “fi; ieenit A. Yexusco »- Ons a tn ’ ORD, rey sr3 t " = " ; j i: BIDS a eal . b serey aye noe ' if hs "per: Francis J. MeNeil aS ae 7 2LA arg - Bat RA Bureau and the kind of reports that we get from the Bureau that I think we should have. We got after the Warren Commission’s recommendation up until 1974. We have had a great many of them and they are falling off predictably every month. Chairman Stokes. Thank you very much, Mr. Kelley. We appre- ciate your appearance here. At this time you are excused. Inspector KELLEY. Thank you. Chairman Stokes. The committee will recess for the noon hour and we will therefore have recess until 2 p.m. this afternoon. [Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m. the committee recessed, to reconvene — at 2 p.m.] AFTERNOON SESSION Chairman SToKEs. The committee will come to order. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. Mr. BuaKeEy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The next witness to be called this afternoon will be former Secret — Service Chief James J. Rowley. Chief Rowley was Director of the Secret Service from 1961 until his retirement in 1972. | As Director of the Secret Service in 1963 he exercised general © supervision over President Kennedy’s trip to Dallas. | Chief Rowley entered the Secret Service in 1938 as a special agent. He received a master’s degree in law from St. John’s Uni- versity in Brooklyn, and in 1939 he was transferred to the Presi- dential Protective Division. He was named special agent in charge of the division in 1947, a post he held until he was appointed Director of the Secret Service in 1961. Chief Rowley has served six Presidents during his career with the Secret Service—Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Chief Rowley. Chairman Stokes. Would the witness please stand and raise your right hand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Chief Rowtey. I do. TESTIMONY OF JAMES J. ROWLEY Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated. The Chair recognizes Counsel Leodis Matthews. Mr. MatrHews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rowley, in 1963 where were you at the time of the John F. Kennedy assassination? Chief Row.ey. I was at the Treasury law enforcement training school’s graduation luncheon, a restaurant in Washington, D.C. I was summoned to the telephone and was informed by Mr. Behn, who was at that time agent in charge of the White House detail, 357 ‘that the President was shot. I immediately notified Mr. Bob Wal- lace, who was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, in attendance at the luncheon, of the nature of the telephone call, and both of us immediately proceeded to the East Wing of the White House, where Mr. Behn’s office was located. $$ aS $ Mr. Mattuews. What did you do in regards to assigning respon- sibility for the assassination to anyone in the Secret Service? Chief Row.ey. I spoke to Paul Paterni, the deputy chief, and asked him who was the nearest inspector to Dallas, Tex., having in mind that time was of the essence. He reported back that Inspector Kelley was just leaving Louisville, Ky. We were able to reach Inspector Kelley at the airport and told him to proceed immediate- ly to Dallas. Mr. Martruews. At the time you made that assignment to Inspec- tor Kelley, did you give him any specific instructions of what he should do when he reached Dallas? a Chief Row.ey. I did not speak to him, but I am quite sure that Deputy Chief Paterni did. Paterni told him to take charge of the investigation, which was also my thought at the time we decided to send him there. Mr. MATTHEWS. Soon after Inspector Kelly arrived in Dallas and began his investigation, you received a communique through the mail, an office report, indicating that there had been a Chicago — - investigation of some Cubans? —- O_o —_—_—_---- —_—_—_—_——_—-- = ee 2 cm —>-——— aet en me - Chief Row.ey. I did not get that. Mr. Matruews. Mr. Rowley, let me just call your attention to JFK F-419, a document I believe that I have supplied you earlier. Chief Row.ey. Yes. Mr. MatrHews. Have you had occasion to read through that report? Chief Row.ey. Yes, sir. Mr. MattHeEws. That report indicates that you received it shortly after the assassination. It was entitled, ““Possible Involvement by Quentin Pino Machado in a Conspiracy to Assassinate JFK.” Did you review that report? Chief Row.ey. I do not think I reviewed that report. I did not see my initials on it, so therefore I have to assume I did not review it. Mr. MattHews. I also call your attention to JFK F-422, a docu- ment which you also have in your possession, entitled, “Chicago Investigation of Cuban Groups Alleged To Be Involved in the As- sassination of President John F. Kennedy.” Do you have any recollection of having received and reviewed that report? Chief Row ey. I think my initials are on that report which would indicate that I did read it, but I have no immediate recollec- tion. Mr. Matruews. Did you receive any report about the agents’ performance in Dallas? Chief Rowiey. We did receive reports from time to time on Dallas, but which specific report are you referring to? Mr. MatrHews. Well, did you receive a report indicating how the agents had performed at the time that the shooting episode oc- curred in Dealey Plaza? 358 Chief Row.rey. The report indicated that they performed ade- quately under the circumstances. The action of Agent Clint Hill, that he was attempting to take some action, is indicative of the agent’s response. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you play any role in supervising the investi- — gation itself? | Chief Row.ey. No, sir. Mr. MATTHEWS. I want to call your attention to what has been marked as JFK F-423, “Secret Service Organizational Chart,” off to your right. In your opinion, would the Service have been orga- nized in substantially the same manner in November of 1963? © Chief Row.ey. Yes. Mr. Matruews. Would Mr. Kelley’s position on the chart have indicated that he had authority in the field office to direct that the agents conduct whatever investigation he felt was necessary? Chief Row.ey. Yes, sir, he had that authority. Mr. MatrHews. Did you ever establish any other panel or re- viewing board or authority for the Dallas investigation? Chief Row.tey. Offhand, I do not recall any review panel, unless you have in mind what I heard this morning, that Mr. Kelly conducted a meeting in which they discussed the intelligence aspect of the Service. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did that meeting occur in Washington? Chief Row ey. I believe it did. It would have, been at the PRS office. Mr. MatrHews. What was the purpose of that meeting? Chief Rowtey. Mr. Kelley described it in this morning’s hearing. I was not aware of it at the time. Today is the first time I became aware of the meeting. Mr. Matruews. At the time of the assassination, had the Secret Service established any procedures for the handling of physical evidence? Chief Row.ey. I think basically they handled the phyusical evi- dence as they would any other evidence, particularly evidence in the criminal field. Mr. MatrtHews. Mr. Kelley mentioned that there was some con- fusion as to what the scope of the Secret Service investigation was. What authority did the Secret Service have to participate in the investigation? Chief Row.ey. We were involved in the investigation in that we had the responsibility of protecting the President. The reason for my dispatching Mr. Kelley to Dallas was to supervise the investiga- tion, to ascertain the facts as quickly as possible. Mr. Martruews. The Chief of the intelligence branch of the Secret Service testified before this committee that he was removed from his position for what he interpreted as the failure of his mission. Were you responsible for his removal? Chief Row.ey. In the course of reorganizing the protective re- search division itself, and because of the infusions of additional agents into that division to handle and evaluate the many reports from the CIA and FBI that we were receiving at that time which required considerable supervision, we assigned an inspector to su- pervise the whole operation until the workload became less de- manding. 309 = | Mr. Matruews. Did you make any effort to close off the Texas- Mexico border? Chief Row ey. My first reaction was to ask the Immigration and Naturalization to close off the border between Texas and Mexico. Mr. Mattuews. And at the time you made that request, what thoughts did you have as to what should be done? Chief Row.ey. At that time, because of the proximity of the border to Dallas, I thought that there might be the possibility of someone escaping via that route. Mr. Marruews. In your own mind, in discussions with the per- sons convened on your staff to discuss the Secret Service role in the assassination, were there any thoughts that perhaps a person of Eaternational character may have been involved in the assassina- tion’ Chief Row.ey. There were those thoughts, and that was one of |the reasons why I asked Immigration and Naturalization to close the border. Mr. Marruews. When the Warren Commission was established, |you selected Mr. Kelley to be the liaison person? Chief Row.ey. Yes, sir. _ Mr. Matruews. Why did you make that selection? _ Chief Rowiey. Why? Because it was a natural selection, inas- _ much as he was in Dallas to conduct the investigation, and would be familiar with what might be required by the Warren Commis- gion, and therefore would be of great assistance to them. _ Mr. Marruews. As Chief of the Secret Service, did you ever make any attempts to meet with the person in charge of the FBI and formulate a strategy for investigation? Chief Row.ey. I did meet with Mr. Hoover and, we reaffirmed the longstanding cooperative relationship between our two agen- cies. ~ Mr. Martuews. Did you have any input on a strategy of investi- gation for the Warren Commission? Chief Row ey. I think we did prepare something for the Warren Commission. Specifically I do not recall, but I have in the back of - my mind such a report. Mr. Matruews. Mr. Kelley has already testified to some exhibits I would like to identify for the record which you have a copy of: of JFK F-414, of JFK F-415, of JFK F-416, F-417, and F-418, a series of reports which his testimony has indicated involved the Secret meen investigation of the Cuban plot to assassinate the Presi- ent. Were you aware of those reports during the course of the Warren Commission investigation? Chief Row.ey. No, I have no recollection of them. Mr. Marruews. Do you have any recollection of having reviewed those documents? Chief Row.tey. No, sir. You mean at that time, or recently? Mr. Martruews. At the time that the documents were generated. Chief Row.ey. No. Mr. Martruews. Did you work out any agreement as to which files would be supplied to the Warren Commission? Chief Row.ey. That was left up to Inspector Kelley, since he was the one most familiar with what documents. In fact, he was direct- 360 ed to comply with all the requests that were made by the Commis- sion to the Secret Service for reports. Mr. Mattuews. Were there any restraints on his authority to produce reports? Chief Rowley. There was no restraint on his authority. Mr. MatrHews. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would move for the admission of JFK exhibits F-419 through F-422, and request the chairman’s approval to make a subsequent submission. | Chairman STOKES. Without objection they may be entered into the record at this point. [The information follows:| 361 JFK Exuisit F-419 SECRET SERVICE REPORT REGARDING QUINTIN Pino Macuapo’s PossIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN CONSPIRACY To ASSASSINATE JFK Porm No. 1388 (Trevised) a As Pes Sj paet papper 6m Nocatee Ma wonasoun LY UNITED STATES S7l°-ET SERVICE not. Gu Anh-c & TREASURY CEPARTMENT. FLZNO. so —~2-54,,054 TITLE OR CAPTION Wome jayoue Assassination of fresident Xennecy valles, Taxas PERIOD COVERED 11-27/29-53 = Tnformation has seen receivei leon j-Li-iS indisatin> shat : Lf the ragemotion of Trésicant .:uneis involve: an intes- mevioral nist or conspiracy Bes, Seawilitit was escebl tse viet Sts@i Gastro lat anyeoin’: 2d co with the slob.er fore spiracy , Sicumehe JSNUy7 “SsSooncuysc son Carlee: Oloo, arr acvion On tie dart of Fidel Castro undcoubtediy wes Tuinté > PIO M a ChcnOL na uUulveverrorrsn use. Wy Coss po) sO ces J : ; ary vasero action. . (A) Eetncoccriov: Gn November 27, i963, —li-45 was interviewed on 2not! tS =SuseEr Sand Gurim="cits inmcerview he furmisnhed information which he Selieyss sertinant piel connection Wath tae assassination of Sresident fennel;. s (3) GiEERL CRQURIGs: During interview of 3-Li+,s on Novesber 27, 1963, ne stated saet it am | Severecsicre. Ccolssizacy Or alot, or iz Castro*’s intervention iv’ tne ass2assimation fey Preside mt Senmedy ts in fact established, Rise US uss TO DOmeCo BOUL ear gen the intellectual direptor of the con sizacy Or OLOcw™ SOUrse ‘TeLavewtnaee TEATS >i tiscnads bveldnged to the Somminist Party Sut wes Setter smowm es PJelondemcacOnCascra™ ‘ = Sree , 3-11-45 added that Quintin Pino Machado was a force> Tuban dalerste to’ tae and subsequently tre Cuban acbassador to Nicaragua. Se stated that vesheds =s Wel. cclow 2S 2 tersoriss who also trained otner yous i cha menutactursns Or Dlacine of Somos enc explosives and was sue viiel coorcinauor of secs vase Zor Cestro against Batiste. | \ DISTRIBUTION caries | REPORT MADE 3Y erred SPECIAL AGENT IN CHAAGE ~ - * -—oeo Bi Ome eae “o> Sree ACONTINUE CN PLAIN PAPER) BG COVEAAmEST PELmTing OFFICE os i : ComLe 2=324. 032. he La 7 ~ ‘ Source in lg Suriner Cae papho c e ofTA PTSi behh enna 3+ wheat hone oct ee: : pees is EESTo pagel keWeen iLatbiteSak o MA © hay an ta aed Pie geothe hyfete et! opner = for ce Castro See shrousnout South “ies Arerica and Seat isgyro she2 nerson= ressonsisls 2°57 > Zor Nga a AT tet be ee te Smeg yt . 2 = =. a“ oi. Seae ss SCueOre Ley 1 set Sa Ua des Meee Ca yy ESO Sues Slash weed. wel ated oe ee SS lea ee a = ’. : 9% --% , 3-11-43 aiso stated b2Ci2C0 Wasi Cusseta es vo Nicaragua, ° 2@ 2iegediy on rc 44 sponsored =ad a Ine Sasvsatt tear. 5 cnown as seftes: : “Cuva* 3 wees anc o,vould et case the mexbers of the vasebail team to an suvlying arse allacveiirr to sractis + oS . aS A > + - : Be Se = ate wae S ane, Sut instead tauzht tex how to sanuvacture Sonos end acsslosivas. 3-11-46 furtier advised that either in June o> Jule 1963 x bachalo was kKtown to nave particinatec in a sonf erence “aon Cne : ~y Trinidad, Soutn anerica end~subsequontiy “uiscon” Pino .acka os continued cverating ous of Necico City eno... nave ceen there o>iler toce> up until the assassination of =re ident Ra@mecy. The sourss salt taapeciee were employing aii of treir resources,..21.Srvyiny.20 “4? -- “4 = =" 237 Lum TO VULRtInN Vin fIChaLO (pe winaaias iso mre sobsunts GG)» igscct ccna . : a Poi! a me a ote wa fot 2 = imvoLvins 4a Cusen stou fo assassit 22 weed , 2 Sct OTLENLEAC laa e lee=e a ee _ ae ~ is 3 de te -+Vv. : < * a nae : ye : mee | ees a oe res. = grass <3-55 ui‘cSa“ re)I be j- q ceadeteien ww [+ « 4 ( f c Pe ct wees NU a eer Sere oN = : 2. : =. Jecenbe> aca ate | t= -2° pwr: i oncelatsa =F > “5 - oe Soe vendesttan Sy Mapiy SI G yes -_ — HAR YAsme : : : a's + a Oo “sh @ relerenced sana renort, =a == s2e 3-7 iyured oy = wt . “-< = > ¥ wiereis is i7c= sare oI CS. CSc Lusees WULRUA. 2250 .542eGen0 srovlé Se consicaz AR ae 4 = = wees vou +t lemme arm oA _ — wee w oi \+ eek US ‘ay be ch ie) u \° linPHONE bi QQ 4" 0 ars UCr?Resi “pi)3. Tas a4u 6| ol ss3fe ) r wfiy dp Oo ilps Motoo{un wi GgTs23 MNDctci (ov uwee @ ain W© [> ra)a ¢ fa. qv Crs pt eyfs iit we ij | CTie f.. + oe _-~ tse cl ¥Puy { | at @ stas)A ) © ivevis : 2 notec, e Rowever, } Dane thatuur.-aunsique ee See * wet ae ter: Soa was ancnsow cri mn = esident John F. a +. “under tae |v css oa ee eT . . F 363 — JFK Exuisit F-420 Pomme =Hwonsn meee TT ka STATES ok tN SECRET STE SERVICE La e 37 ae aa P PO oe ». * @ 2 er ee, | i = = se | Pesoa UNITED ' TREASURY DEPARTMENT Vf Ch Conridensat a pode rt me 5 ayIeeh| K\ Z oricin = FAcla OFFICE Miani, Florida FLENO. 3-11—5563-S ry ai caaa STATUS TITLE OR CAPTION | Protective Research Closed — iani Alleged Possible Threat Against Tne President | INVESTIGATION BADE AT : PERIOD COVERED Hiemi, Florida 11-12-63 ; A 3 | INVESTIGATION MADE BY | SA Robert J. Jamison —JFK yy OS a Stay) Pa | DETAILS . STOPSIS [ | Trenscript of conversation involving alleged threat : | against the President furnished by 3-lL1-17 copies ' ; of which are being furnished the appropriate offices |} for discreet backzround checks and photographs of the individuals involved to be obtained through the respsctive FBI offices. This matter has been classi- fied es "Confidential" by SAIC Bouck. ; DSTAILS CF INVESTIGATION ' > On 11-12-53 informant 3-l1-17 furnished this service with a typowritten |B transcript of recorded conversation betzeen a trusteid conficential informant of 3-11-17 anc one J.A. Hilteer, 212 S. Troup2 5t., Valdosta, Ga., telephone . Charry 4-1357, with a Post Office Box located at Quitman, Ga. where this | incivicual hai run for 2 volitical office. This conversation tocx place on | the mormins of 11-¢-43. The contents of this s transcrivecd conversation was telephonicaliy furmished —aA = Se el oe eee ee . aw : Z aq to SAIC Bouck, Chisf's Office, Viashington, D.C. by SA Jamison on D-12-63. Sovies of same attached to the oriszinal of this rerort as well as to the copies of this report being sent to the aporopriate offices listed under "Distribution". SA Jarison conferred personally with SA Leonard Peterson, Far, Miami, Fle. ana Sgt. C.H.Sapp, Commanding Officer, Intelligence, Miami Police Dept., liiezi, Fla. re any Imowledse of tne individuals mentioned in the transcript of the ~ conversation involved ani the following information was obtained: 3.4. Milteer, whits, male, 43 to 52; 5'7"; 155; glasses; brown graying hair; was last seen Criving a white Volxswagon sedan, state and tag nudSer uncon; > 'STRISUTION REPORT MADE BY ~ > rf ie] re) © dou 2 50R 2cc APPROVED SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE » * (Cobfinud ON PLAIN PAPz2) ; Confidertis? ; ; Aeoias | . 3-11.-5563-S << 2. reported to have departed the Hiami, Fle. area l1-$-63 lle for Jacksonvi for the purpose of havin an attorney by the name of Lee (YU) s enarser for the proposed draw up Constitutional Party of America in the State o= Fiorica and then return to his home in Yeltosta » Ga. iilteer is allezed to carry a loaded .45 calibre automatics his in Vii. Tne FBI office, Atlanta, is alleced to have background information on this individual and possibly photographs. If seme are not eveilable through tae Avulanta FBI office, photosraphs will prooadly be available through the local newspapers in either Valdosta or uitnan, Ga. as he was a candidate — for a political office in that area. "Browm". This is one Jack Brosm, who is reported to be the Imperial Vizard of the Dixie Klan, Chattanoosa, Tenn. He is described as white; male; avout 50 to 55; 5'7"; very slim build; reddish complexion; sandy hair; doses nos wear glasses; is reported to operate an older model car tanich is kept in very good condition and is thouzht to be either a Tord or a Chevrolet. Ee is considered as one of the prime Suspects in the bombings in that area ani the FBI office, Knoxrilie, Tenn. is alleged to have background information and photozraphs. Jackie Broim is reported to be the son o2 Jack Browm end resides with hin in Chattanooza, Tenn. The Jack Cau: (phonetic) is also thousht to be- this same Jackie, son : 2 ss Kenneth A O2eahis 1S 2a wnlu2 prymM:ale; from Anniston, Ala., very active in an activities and possibly involved . 43 in bus ducnin 3S several years previously. 222 FOI office at Birminghan, Ala. should have informstion an= nhotosrapns oz this intivicual. : There is another “Zenneth" possibly associated with this Group, one Hoaneth Goff, wac is a radical and lives in the Denver are2. Information si photosrapns of this individual are &ilased to be arziladl= enrouza tas PBI office in Denver. Lse licCloud or Meleod is from Atlanss a2 nae ates Pee gens 6a ne 3 OrmaueLon any Dnovosr2 Kiss POL US) Ai eae o Conner EcGintzs is reported to be the pudlisher of a pamphlet in Union, H.d. callec "Common Sense". Ho other informahion is known concernins is 60's; quite toalthr: S quite a 03% of raal aul, Fla. ale ‘ crta a5 i?) ’ ’ feeo sy oO |j~ re) 4 ) br | . a gontin] : Ces ee Sh 54 Paterson azi St. Savon stated that it would not be atriseble , 6 te contact sis intivicual as he would Gamage the source? of the infornation. tinirews" is Hovart Andrews, op2arator of Andrews Optical Shon, 7501 N.S. S2conz av2., itawi, Fla., who is syapathetic with risht wing neonle but is not actively ongaged yith them or willing to be identified with then. In connection with the proposed visit of the President to Iiaai Beach, Fla. on Yovombar 18, 1953, the information contained in this report and that of the transcribed conversation has been furnish2d the aivance agents maxing the ~ surrey on this proposed visit. SAIC Bouck requ2sted that the aporopriate offices in whose districts previously mentioned iniividuals reside make discreet inquiries concerning thes2 indivicuals on the FBI level and only of trusted enforcement agencies known to have no sympathetic feelinzs or aligments with orzanizations such as Ku “lux Kian or other radical right wing organizations. SAIC Bouck also requested that photozraphs be obtained of thes? individuals enc. furnished his office immediately as well as the Kiami office for us2 of the men on the advance wi protective vey veins conducted in connection with the visit of tne President to thi Ss a 2° P4 ie ’ * JISHISITICN - eg es BS SSeS we nn ee _ s : This report is beinz susmitted for informational purpos?s and as tne 5 bs Ae rN ie 7 = ores A : Mete eG Involyfen are currently inother iistricts, te casa jis) being stically clos3¢ 2% Mianwi. Iny additions: information ostainss trroug e - -s eK hy Ea yg ° © & Be on x =* ~*~ : 4 Bde Sore, is Fee, oe r gonmbacas 1221 ho mate the subject oF 2 sunnlemantal renort. SEAS AS MINS ee ee ne ee Seek’ divers aceh Simielobey ea ents S BP Sadao cin keeae SSM EOL ed adte sc. vo 41-372 O - 79 - 24(Vol. 3) 366 JFK Exuisit F-421 oe oo US Ss er Gans Sc rvice) Ciieft Eo: a dak ee SA* Patcersen, -UaL les Z i Lo ) ai nl CS3555 A pH we Irformation chtaincd at the Dallas office ot ipl : san: 4Gee Pak ag the intervier of thei subject's witetshe 7% advised that the FsI had centacted her sbcut the location as of ner ae aoout 10 Gays prior to tze assassination and sse had teld thes that her husband worked in the building fron which the Fresidant was kilied. She also stated that she had beea interviewed in Gctober and gave the same tasic infermation Colts het. while I was at the police station, I enczesed an Fol agent in a conversation and found out that he was on the subversive desk. He statec that Oswald brad contacted two known sudversive agents about 15 days sefore the shocting but the entire=infcrnetion was top secret end he coulda tot fel. any more but-he felt sure ti2t the file would be tiyned over to our ‘Cniess The wife etso advised that she bad seen the ritheetnee was used in the sheoting at her home atcut thrse weeks before the Shooting. She advised tnat she was a Castro supporter and from tne interview it wes feit that she is still a nara ¢ore communist. She stated tat he had never mentioned Killing the rresidént me but would not mention anything absut shooting Connally. Sne stated that she did not know the man that killed her husosand. htawes felt by the interviewer that she was not telling the truth and Still selieved in cormmunisr. William li. Patte Special Aveat | ie ) .- rina, Mehra tap ee sore ei ae aR aa aia Wer a ~ a ae tite: Report of the U.S: Secret Service | on the Assassination of — President Kennedy U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT 7 Washington, D.C... ; AAMEINE A TIAL 3 TSE iFos Sei tnk ‘r os = ae a I ee ae ae ae re a gutigur asec pFSW NY EA EWS WY IE WP CGI RE OW %IYOG Oo EY I oe 368 eg ss Charge of the Districc in which the visit is scheduled. He coordinates all local activities and works out a minute by minute schedule for the President's visit. He coordinates, through the Special Agent in charge of the proposed trip, ail e — arrangements with the White House states with field offices of ' — — the Secret Service,-with political party officials and others directly concerned with the President's visit. He also gues to the destination a: the proposed visit and personally takes charge of coordination with local law entogeanerte agencies and other local officials. On November 4, 1963, the Secret Service White House Detail was informed that the President planned to make a trip to Dallas on November 22, 1963. Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAIC) Roy H. Kellerman was designated to be in charge of the Texas trip and Special Agent (SA) Winston G. Lawson was assigned as advance ‘agent in charge of preparations for the proposed Dallas visit. Final confirmation BE the visit plans was received on November 8, 1963. (See Exhibit l - Tentative Itinerary for President's Visit on November aie AG. Identification of Individuals Believed Dangerous to the President The Secret Service has established procedures which are designed to identify in advance individuals in. the area who might CONFIDENTIAL 369 CONFIDENTIAL ay fy PS constitute a sat to the person of the President. These procedures are initiated as scorn as possible after definite nutification of a trip is received. ‘They may be divided into two categories: me) the activities of the Protective Research Section of the Service, and (2) eee ease the scene on the visit ise the direction of the adyaere agence in charge of preparations and the Special agent in Charge of the District. (1). Protective Research Tnyvessisation On November wu, the Prutective Research Section of the aecre’ Service, was ficccped by SA Lawson of the forthcoming visit of the President to Texas on November 21-25 and requested to make a suitable check to see if there were any identified individuals in the Dallas area known to the Service to have cither threatened the person of the President or been brought ty the Pee rrion of the Service as ane danserous ty tha President. A search easgchen made of the files to see ir any such individuals were known to ve located in the areas where the President was to visit (Exhibit 2). The files of this Section eentain information on persens who over the years have come to the attention of the Section as potentially dangerous to the President, The basic criterion for including-an individual in CONFIDENTIAL 370 CONSIDENTIAL : 3 the PRS file pars“ nformation which indicates the iadividual may * cousctitute a seesto the persen of of President. The filas - include amonz Benatst individuals afflicted Ltr! mint et itiaeee manifesting Leself inbehavior hostile to the ees ea those ! wae have mad2 overt threats, and those who belong to organized groups which have specitidatty advocated assassination of U. 3. public officials. — | The number of names in the PRS files presently approximates 1,000,090, an unknown number of which are dead or inactive. A principal geared ad names is these enewtave written letters, sent Ss shicats or made telephone calls to the White Mouse which are thought to be WeneeReentRe er who have appeared in the vicinity eles rigte White Housé makings threats on conducting themselves ina Way to arouse suspicion of hostile intentions. “Other tanes are Suomictten to the Secret Service through established Tisteoa procedures il the F.B. I., the C.1.a., and States ana local police departments. “From the ndsie pes ites, certain names of seriously dangerous individuals are gatecced and also maintained in a trip file. This fila contains approximately Bae high risk individuals.’ Le is constantly changing as new names or new information is received. CONFIDENTIAL 371 JFK Exuipit F-422 JFK EghibirF- ¥RR— THOMAS MOSLEY - HOMER ECHEVARRIA INVESTIGATION Secret Service materials aig etiat by Ge ewe UNITED STATES GOW NMENT - ¢ ~2-3b, 10k & a4 Memorandum U.S. Secret Serrica Vy TO 0: Chief - Attn. Desuty Chief Paterni Date: December 9, 19635 ee Fs ees — FROM : ASAIC Martinear, Chicago vi NetA ae =i a SuBsect: Homer S. Sclevarsi ce. Tais will coctize ny lorg distance shona call ta Decsuty Crier Paul J. Paterni in which the assects of this case were discussed and in which it sas agreed that. the nature of this invastization should be discussed witha other federal agercies to insure that they do not have a prior case involving these sudjects wnich would te jeonardizad by comtinued investigation by this Service. 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Mi a ' vem 4 ‘ jn. — om 4 y NN on? f v : ac e i 4 d 47 1 " cf ‘eae ft ° A “2 . a~ Wg1 te .a N. ee aha PSUS Daeern se oge : j wk u' C ", “3 “°O Vv a atin h Ralena nm ¢ “ R Le be f 4) tH Wy 7 nhnubo ” vO” he rv Vv yay te pug} ff AI ' ab tad” ty om ,8$ bith Hep OW oe oO 1 Hoeft od ae 8 , ONNA | At Ct ft n ‘) QO 43 ow h4 9) J tye ‘ f ee) on “ ot ur 4 ¢ bes Te) EoParyetenino der) ” ny am : a es = og the Gaiszgs uy 7] oo ~~ ae ze a = _ ; . ' a t oo oe 4| H i M wp wat ( w be 4 , f F le — 4) OF ties {‘ “uy On ytd AoA ith Y C che =25S . - = I- + (i— vu 44 1) ede f! “A ots -———— “f » 43 AEE 14 y 1 own) 1‘ ¥ of¥ has A = eo —_ mM 3 ' fe yx ° hy ai ea] Re 2 OS U8 (Towieedy -t\a00™ itcroer 771-6) ‘SNITED ‘STATES SECRET’ SERVICE RE ae SB cielans seeae an ENT wre J s SN" Chisesg 12. tan TITLE OR CAPTION.: oe . : on on s . * x ad - = Sl Tea: tarrey ‘Gawals £ ~~ vervias PERIOD COVERED Asoassination of Presitont lecal offices. Ther statod their Central Ofittce, Vhpesegutesiats D.C. could advise the iccation of thts Mie. The Francisco Blanco in gub— Jeet. case 23 saneona other. than the Francisco Blanco mentioned in CO-2-30,155. The Francisco Blanco of antersstin this sprestl gallon: kas deen Saaeeatively identitied aes Juan Prancises Blanco-femarmias, a mszher of the Student Revolut:onary Directcrate at Miact, Fla. Vas INTROCUCTICN b4 f : « = anon ny - set ‘ Serexto ese r 3, 2953 C4 7 Stas b> SA Zaward zo investSEi-atia _ ~~s er + n of: this*3- cr25 is ha! Hews, to t longer rent s cat sronbadet a scthavarsta ari Ss -WAAAst ae em Deets oS 1 Re8s cre .2) CUMEYAL DRQUIRIES: ; : On Lé~10—93 inquiry wes rate of 3-LI-14 relative to Vallivis-Sstaverria anal ho ~3 mot o£ secard. Ca tho sacs Gato, recorts of the I2ms, sige! e 2ilo ef Valiivie-2shavarris was in ae diatedici. Sa Cuarics Crallestos, INS. 2ivisod thas Valtivie-Zchevarria nay have bcen ea transient shrouck diasl and ni nis “i332 would have been forariel to the office where itiwaa to st ablish residences, ar. fhallewhas stated that if this peeeieten Silo was not in Chdcazo that thair ‘antral ee a Jmashirgton 5.C, would be able ta prees tha exact losation of r fils.” =e: s } ‘ APPROVED er ene: dh eweens paar eran wae PS (CONTINUE PLAIN ON PAPER) re GB b. COVERamdal reietine aseuce te—0 Lan ¢@ Sa | sg ee ee ee Ste oS ea eeemen ae oFee ; * * ee : -- x te . -] é a2 > c =— id - . . : : i. et i - : eta ; 2 Shay Se > "0c 12-11-63 the reporting a:acent discrcatl; interrt ewed Franct ' Blanco nentioned in CC-2-30 ees A He is currently reaiding at mi ES $ We s Oye25th %., Hiatt, Fla. Francisco Blanco is described 23-y, A; Puerto Rican; - - 53 5'6"; 140;-brown eyea;.:silver srey hair; dark complecton; arthritic — i 8 resided ia Blac since 1927... As will be observed , the Francisco - Blanco deseribed above tg scceong other than the Francisco Blancs of. F interest AES investisation. SE a ines ae . ; . att eins i ep Somes os 2 / On 12-13-53 meces cf niece : active sezsice in tha U.se Atay ero net iw, Tor ig the axact 403 OL his us ischarss. Since has disciar= d irom ha U.S. 7 e Ager, 2 be ae hac ?been ,) casieti cod sii) MW? om exsenae oz us Wan een ce AileCy ru, fetta 1G m3 recent wie -P. CO Cniileaco UILSESO apo ana Ra f- ne if SerrornulLy red ep hse tu east orir £1, t29 i titers = secticn Of ea thaeDsiee oe yrrt — rootesraph of Fernandes wes ectracted fron bie. 1 ee 25°55 ed file =< iq 2 pet aml oxmizcito!eh 2 sha etre fislontiat si sources and he identified lim as tha suble arteahphe dea 3.3 phowosrash nds Deen resreduced and copies are a ny $80 Chicaso ofitec, By PCONCLUSIOS: Cosics of this serzcrt aro being See tire te the Lashingten F.0. in omer we inqiery aay te made at tho Central Office of TNS in an afLort to determing sones the IS fils of Yorare aaa Valdivia Echoy avia jokes DUS ~G5slc) is located there, For the inforzation cf tho Vushinstan F.9. ; vTersia is also know as Hoaer> S. Schevarvia ee isee scribe: as u/s; Cuban; sar a% vatisonics, Caracuay, Cuda; at eh oe “ . Fait 533 1H) we wohmosson. LSS number A12236i59. 41-372 O - 79 - 25(Vol. 3) a" ute ‘i RC "nee ‘ oe C2=34,050 : Je. ar pease ae : SS pp] x ctepla : we “Bets BS ASS eben ay . ae Ss i oe - Photographs of Juan Francisco Renco-F arnacioz oa sttachei for° Giicasa ard unless: oe ea: dire ge Re ge vioz.Zii eee - eo an ee ohana etee «i : + saeseY Naat ve ign 4 =i “Artsonia *!cee ae ‘ca s Chicago:. Photograph ‘of Hlanco-Femanses SER RECE, et . i nk B< GRE 7 “zeae tet, ‘ or , t=T: - - aS: 5 Inaamelr 2g Hlanco-Forandag 4g the direstor of a5 nilitary branch of the D.R.&. in Niani, his seg to Culcaso cay hare poo for the purpose of securing milita: Vy equimmoast from Thomas a3 Hoselsy.* If the. Caicago office desires“adirect intsview with pace tee please advises... +. RS ee ok ae Se 383 ti) Ms WL TERA BEI A idee Mp Cae ee M-2-3h,20c) . Prericesly M-H2=72!: Ieetectize ; Zesearcs 3 } Closed . | Eonar S. Echevrarziz Bites Lees teCN MADE At PSSt0D Cove=s3 : ¢ 3 (Previcush titled, ie mo aacege,cags; Litizcis Dias w/29_— 12/10/63 Lee Zarrey Bs Oneida i | } SWESSIGATION MADE SZ Py te fod sabe tper iia Neectal. Agects Eduard I. Tucker, Josepa =. President Texcedyz} rd MW MeTaes. 2-4 Tamee A TM +h ; ~ x Informamt 2-1-246 acvised of neetings Setween Thomas Yesler $f Echevarviz; and alse tetveen Moslay asa oss Xi Menmte’ (last name takscwn), whe allegedly is a leader Of all Guban sxcuns in Cetcagc. "“Marmie? nas exoresseae SL ex interest im cOtaimics. sutematic weatons, detenatcrs; 4 ; amd explosives... Ze further statad that purchase of cuese 33 | | items would be om a case Desis and that no credit ves desired. 2-1-246 farther stated thet Moslay ned been tole j that. there was going to te an action teken by the Ccban a group. im 90 dazz,. fer waich action the Cobams had meed oF explosives. _4s investigaticn has estzblished that tere is F mo apearert viclation over which “he United States Secret Service has joréisdtiction, other Federal agencies which nay be cencermes. are being nrovided with copies of this > and investizatios cy the T. 5~ Secret Service is Seing terminated... STTSCEUCTICH Deference is made to the-report of Ssecial Agents idvarc Z. Tucker and _ > - Se oe 2 ‘ Jesech 2. Noonan, Ix., dated Decemter 37-1983 \ GeNeRAL er a TICuTAss wets On Maverber 30, 1953, confidential informant 2-1-265 advised that Teomas Mosley amd Homer S~ Echevarria were plang 2 naett— oe ee)hela om Daceshe> 2, 1543 at the Chicago Trensit Authority station, 422) Hest wes =to saxe place tetvesn 7 Tivsizey — iveace, Chicago, a Le IMlinois. a8 + - This tt neeting tee tease i { Siod—aece- hear bairuretan | os See aySeed ToCM .i 25-027 Eat eee ee (¢| ae See8 Sika sf | eee ae e ae — {21> Pe 2 Acer = 3 m2 I fete so Recker = Pies Eo es UE s | 384 2:00 and 5:00 pax., ard allegedi> Ea to Se held because Echevarct2 had Szdicated that thers a goi=az to "...ce a hit in 90 days...” amt Echevarzia's g=ccp sas interested in cotaining explosives. The simian Coad cance of the above iveae is not meowas cf this writicg. ine ane ame date, mother chack of the veoesen esPolice Derartmen’® <3 8, 2ilex of suspect Thenas Mosley revealed a record for Mosley mmdzer the alias, a4 gio pte, and reflected that in Asril 1959 Mosley, alizs Rickeften, mac Seenarrested ic> illegal pessessicn of fictiticus license platas zd tSat shen bis ao b= was searciad seme mectine ps sere Jae and Hesley had deen tuomed cram ta =e Alestol and Tebaces Tax Dirisicnaf the Intermal Revenues Serrice. a ae Cm this same date, Stectal Agent ‘ialter Zogers of the Federal Sereau of Investigatice was niecesck Sue possidle nesting setween Mosley and Echevarria om December1, 1963. Special agent Pagers was also advised of she possizle negotiation for the sale of explasives, and te jantiesied. Stas to the-cest of Hs Eerer one Martin emma, 2 menber of the 2 Jazectort Qistectente Revoica = bad come Nort® tran Mian. escent ei zat or mine mOmeRs ago and aan Jeen i iss2g34 Merza nad exoressed an interest in covaining detcnators a Bac Seer ©. 0.5 in Mich? gar...” trying tare Cetomaterss Special Agent Zegers was told thet thts Service wculd keen his agency informed cf exy deevelsmments. Pagers Stated thet it we learmed - the names of any percticcle> orgenizethicnus men Sioned by Mosley or Echevarria, She SSL would. Like pres. to loow shout there Cx Dacembe> 1, +963, a= L:t5 vam. Thales Mosley was cbwSserred sitting i 2 mis 1960 Thucersird in the parking lot behind the Caicage Trensit Awwority station at 227 West Diversezy ivente, Chicege, Dliinsis. ast 5:03 pam. Homer S. chevrarcta arrived in tis 1957 red and white Chevrolet. Se stsoped text ta Mosley ard got ints the car with Mosley. 14 5:10 Leute pote) evarzi2 got out of Mesley's aw tomcaile, got into his om car, parked iL35 anc Men walead ints tue Sus station, dressed in his wiitorn, escarsentiz “3 go to work. Echeverzia was late end was wortted about being tardy fcr his tus mm.’ Mosley indicated to Hchevarti2 that Mosley's associates were interested i= “teking over the finmeial bacld=z of Echevarria's group, and Mosley indi- cated to Echevarria that he telieved the Cubam groun fad criminal bacidiag; ‘Shot if these hocdimms were "...ct tco Digs. Mosley's greuz coula take ware of them. Mosley also told Echevarria that if the Cuban groin kad siged any tyse of praonissozte mote with any Sackers or bankers, Mosley's - crgenizas: Sen could gay off the note. Mosley alse told Echevarcia that he, Mosley, was only a contact na, rummer, and anforcer for ¥osl net organiza— —=icn, but if Ectevarsia could swing te 2imancial Saciing af the Cubans ta Hosley's peeple, Meslay would assure Echevarria of a share of the profits. Stesley then chided Echevarria about not wanting te go back to Cuba to fizgtt, “ao which Sckevazzia replied that the ether pecple could do the etd ne and saen the fighting was over Zchevarzia woule then retizn to Cub 385 q titans He eculc switg st 2 c hevarsia- could=co Sack to Cena with slent> cf Credit Serean on December 3, 1963, revealed that c at the Chicago A check st Sigegst > a Francisca Zis= residins at 1833 South May Street, Caicage, Tilinois; wire; Macaluces formerly lived oz (acuse number not show) Callartom Avenue; expleyec s7yCroname, inc., Nites, Dliinois; had deem the shines of 2 cecit£ dnqwity Sy the Lapin Purmivre Company =x December Vlg fae - : . - ~ Cn this same date, z search of the files of the migratics xd Naturalization Service revealed that one Frencises Slanco, originality tom Mexico, was of record. It was noted mat tae descmineicn |= thts srerciscs Blancs was not the same as the subject of the same mame refersed to in tre prior resorts. Hcwever, a photsg>anh vas cotaizec for future reference anc possible id\exttticatime Om Lecenber 2, 1943, informant 2-1-2646 eGrised thet Echevarziz and Mosley were discussing a resting © fosiey and a mam imcwn cuiy as Wianrie,? sto was ts nset Uo on: the evening of December 5, 19635, ac 8:30 oom., at the Legen Square Terminal Tap Rear, acl allegecly7, this "Mamie au, “entize courcil.” thePRs a ye ie ) ermme™ w + 0. .C@IS2w_—clog 3 ~ ec esoa> a sce eat over is 5 we hang eee Re TS | a4 =e € dvinicize a bottle of Budweiser teers he was tg have 2 package of Canes cigarettes om the Left i side of the Dottle anc 2 ‘cigarette iter + oe evhe dS rignt.. Mosley was to appreact this nan am ask Winig. sate eo emeaene TS the answer was affimaative,. Mosley was to state, "L ax Black Fcot.? On December 5, 1963, 2-1-266 rT AZZ advised 2. : that Mesiey wes gaing so xeet ar = ar Ste ; : : mee Tooaccs pessoa. 2h Speci, Sess eomes 2° Uremman, Aiccaoil end (endo p 4 4 F | : jy x rl (?) ~soesmineS™eCshea raw [ de Digsa\or Bac. awe ‘saea oo aited ss_— as. ciSS ays oe ee So Ge : arsavinvestigation ~ Ieee An wv : - end were caonrideriali7 <= — =x a Dorased ee of —s ae tat weasens > = 2 es date, Cooies of the renert of the writers, cated Decencer 3,. were meds ~ evailzhle =o noth of these men end they were requested ts keer tits iInvirg discussion witn Ssecial igers Macscr, : Snformetion confidential. Zuresu of Custans, ne ; mede availenle files fram thay Busear reflecuizg— 3 has been some Coches ams activity in the pest. The following intarzation -! a extracted 5 fran 2 these . files: == . Ia Augest 1961, ome Jenn Suvimen, resic ing at 535 Zzaseline 2ead, end wno i employed: 4s 2 sales representative for the Yorthvible, Michigan, Sichnende ites Company, Blissfield, Michiger, ves azcroached by cma Widece and a tleutenent General (FNU)tsdorme. willie Newten, allegediy \Stovton 2 a Ie oo. at Miant, Cetzhaaz, was F suspecvec capt cs oF ceing a leader af a Coban Sesiding 2 person «ho stayed in the backgrsund, The Custens fice movement bub wes int 3 & General Osbermee Mewton and Ban mot. seflaecs 386 Cn August 23, all ang at 1226 Morthwest at that time, of tie bis ta: .Cardoso met ‘2 Xansas City, Missccri to discuss 2 meeting tiat was to be neld cn Septenber 9, 1951 at Chicago. Also present was a can named Qvastizes, allegedly fram Xansas Cty. Recortediz, Cardeso was acting at the tine as tha acns srecarensst. ee fer this xoveremt. Accardiss to Custans 7fies, Cardeso is a eS tized dmerican citisen art was resizing as 2317°South Trotull Avene, “Caicagoe, Tllincis. Cz Septemzer $, 1961, Suriman met at the LaSalle Hotelin Chicase with Cardoso, Duqce, and one Dr. Criaméd Bosch. representative of the Cohax anti—Goommiss i=ay. This meeting was called. Zor “he purrese af discussizg the sale of such iteme 2s M-1 titles, M-lL rivzles, hard crenedes, flame throwers, Sazsokas, and aurlvicon fer the same. On Sentasser 12, 1561, amcther meeting was telt Sy the same Eoo3 ts disewss the srice end t7ze cl ams. Some time later im 1561, exect date unlccwn, ome Martin Merce (sresabl> the same persem menticaied m7 FST Agent Regers), who accerdine to the Custons - files is the Naticnal Coordinator of the Directeria Esvudiante Zevolzctonaric, qotzired 3,0C0 fuse-tyze Dlesting cans fzom EBuricien and two telegresa sending aca receiving sets saich allegedly were given to ivelio Ducue, Tho supeeseanpy 2D took them ta Mia. According ta the Customs file, Morea ned origizally summitted his request. for blasting cans to Jose Cardoso (mentioned ancre) emu ~ > -_- wita > +> ky r — ——F 4 y On Octcoser Dae 1562; anaes: ge Marti (prebebly Jorge Marti Setzzan) vesiding at 1jlStmelenocd ocslixsed, Tllinais, Ursaen retugee ariszeciy worms fer ‘he un2, telechoned Suckman and imgcui=ec ints the scssisiisy of ootaiming four o> five tems of ex explosive :icown As abou ; thts me aint a) i 2s C—1,) same time, Surman allegedi7 sunplied Marti G Seteza> and Xerua. wi blasticg cans, and Mort2 ant Maret @ Salazar rerorved : Siiegecty, these mem nad driven to Buriccan's residan rave an to Mac efter receiving these materials. The files of the Burez2 of Customs. also reflect three dizi crusts, eit: eViaced?z Ccuans, wno were iden (st) Sierre, and \(2it) “Sarnendez,' het come to the Wille ‘eirport, where they were met OF Surman and then Taken to reens i been reserved for them at the Mayilewer Hotel in Piymoutn, Michigen. ) Allegedly, these Cubans advised Surkman that they wanted to purchase wot5 caliber pistels, sub-nackine gms, Brewing autcenatic wearers, compoesi- ~) +cn C-3 explosives, recoilless rifles, and ammmition for these weazens, They indicated that they had the necessary ime 2¢ «were incettient +o : constzmate the purchase. -Sucicnex wes told that the aroun nescsd these . K : : Sth pate Pt ey Te 9 S+ens far far a guerilla bapreli scticn a wrist : eas 30+0 Sreceds wees Ff 2 real attengs Ade 2526 >srolz- FF nat tien 2 in Ceba. is Tt is 2 . oe ha) not“ laoiowm wnetner ce-“very > 9 24 tana Aali= >= o F ge Sy Surician. 7 Eovever, *. sneMt 5 + indicates =. _ tas’ Sianse = Peas enc nesmencas desarted viillow 2m oy plane for Chicage and that Cardeso cesasted willow D1 “alone OF automcolis. — ee 387 Regarding the sme, Sierva, znenticned above, it is noted that the Custos tite reflects” that’ the’ Sisr-e ac witlow non, “icaizan tas constansis- referred to as "Coctor" oy the other Cubans. 1 confidential scurce at Chicasa tas acrised that there is ne Paylind Siem2, m attorney, whe has been very active in the Cuban movements in Chicago, «ne clzins to nave financial dacking, and sno alleged'’7 wants to mite all amti-Castro grouss. It now azcears nossible that this Pauline Sleze, the Doctor" Sierra uA who stpeared at V2 o—=, and tue Warmite” tno met Mosiev at co ea Ta 1 em Leumge om Decetse> 5, 1963, Bay Se cre amc tne sexe Serscz. Tigi waas | “ Begarding the Dyelic Duene sexticned above, it is noted that the lccal television newspaper scize Zor the week of December 7 through Jecember 13, 1963, reflected that the lccal SEC station at Giicags souls corzy a "Eite Paper* program ot the evering of Decexber S,. LOso, ae Fsew Date, Cony Soom would comcers itsel? with the Zaz of Pigs imvasiom cf Octcter 1961. It was determined that. this preazam vas cencelied enc another was schstituted for it; however, the brief sketch im the T7 guide listad Cubm serscmatives 45 te interriawed exd ane of the rmes Listed vas me Srelio Gucze, viz wag desecited as cre of the perticinants in the Zacabray / Guba) Mométain : a EE a er é ; revolt. gsoci2ticn with any of the smmes engearing in tims = Cn December 5, 1963, informant 2-1-2646 advised chat Mogley hed gome - | 9 the meeting with the mex mow 23 "Mancie” on thatidete at tue Inger : Square Terminal Tape A deseriztion of "Memmie’ sili ampear cela, TYennd al allegedly ecrised Mesley that he wamtec to neat Mosley's suseriory,. eid he indicated ioMosley th2t the Dackers of Ais grec vere very respon— Iz. 8 ul (3) =| fi tl qf o h. iy} -4 oe t g| Q > ty I } » Je ram Hi Q fe if iy i) ( B . =~ Relative ta the rolictes to de Zellaved i) "Manet indicated that it made little difiarence = one way or rte! Marnie? ellegedizy stated that to the volictes President Jcansen Followed. Pe *: I ; the late President Xennedy helned "sometimes"; now fence to seve face.” "Mamie" also indicated that all af he sides of the of one. Cuban greuss in Caicags were now united with the exception: According to "Mannie," bis movenens 13 Seasquase rE. +i Y A — $ nd extended to it end will meke all 2 7 = ale tis group wents no credit of any a , ‘ - --— had Seen coing 2 — - ‘<: murcnases om a cash basis, "Mennie” indicated sues te bo le - mae gus New Tork, exd atuer cities. : : let of trevelling lately—ts Jan Frencscs; : alegec-7 ich edt avoided ata any =r “men the subject of New Orleans cme wD, “Marnie” — a ro 1 ; —_ = ~ bha> <4 ; : Sivscussicn ofP that city, for uniciowm reasons Dee: pie . 388 TMamria™ indicated < ta Mosley that oy the $h or 10th of Dececter 1963 ms nis Cuben grows's requisements n weuld Se. “Mernte” gaia 4 he wes gcizg tw gat in 7touch wit: Miami md that he dafinitely wanted ts seet the perscm who Mosley has alleged makes his cow's cet siced, ia order that “Mann2! can place am initial order far denaliticn exsinsires. Cn Decexher 9, 1963, informant. 2-1-2656 advised that there is = Rossa=J _ bLLty that Echevarria nas contacts in Cuba, es he alleged?7 igs zoiz Ootain camenorative Cuban stamns depicting the flights of the B:ssis ~O (COsmmanis—. Echevarzi2 indicated te could get these stexss in 2b weexs. “i “rs : 2-1-2686 also acrised that the Cuban ercuss ave indicating that ther eesiz>e *o stan = t be sabotage pregram; however, it is mot “mow if thea» ‘grsues sean the sab Otes2 Dregram in Cuba or elsewnere, 2-21-256 sas also cs Gevermined that. thers is 2 desize om the part of the Cuban a-ows “<2 cere SPs any and/or all of the exnlosives *hey PUSccase . im Cais2go distzisuted ~ee —_ to Tarous Sests or aot s > 1963, it was ee ook thas the forme> selachome member of Zener ichevarzia, HUxb0ldt°9-2907, loceted at nis former eddress ot 2575 Norsn iSitvackee ivanue, Chicags, Uilinois, received 2 collect tala phone call from Miami, Florida on December 9, 1962. The call wes nade fF-—— Z7LA5672 at Mimi and was from ome Goncales“Cseltz (shcretic) +o Janes { iremeia or James(Trebela (saonetic). Weithe> of these names caoule be ~ > ecres Service naster index at Chiceso vemmined cr Decemser 10, 1963, that Zomer 3. Zchever-a 235 North Washtenas Avenue, Chicago, Titi sid — ed : “= Sses nentiqned in the memerancomm resort of Decenter 3, an 2753, tall iia of Scectal az SaVS = moe = es. diate fcomem exc Tucxar, U.S. Secret Service, Caicage. y 1963, 2-1-266 advised that he is sositive > ne caz . Iesroduce an wedercsrer agent into this’ sroun st any tise. TOE> S. TCHSV232 movARS — previcusi7 descrited,.. SEOMAS MOSL2T - previously described. ? Fae te ed be | SEIGWN CusaN met a; 7 Mesley and Ichevazzta on Novenver 28, 1553 - oreviersi> = ar 4 AANNIE" ~ waite male (Cvban); could :be Jewish ; or Creeks Saige eel, years; 8 to 52 seas 5797; dazk, short wavy hair (receding); tery shazo dresser; suit and *ia; sme2ks Tluant snglisn; resp meas end clean. 389 - Te 5 ‘, DISECS PHT AS — = j investizavia concucted 37 the U.S. Secret Service inciszates shat a group of enwi-Castreo Cubans is endeavoring to accumulate eutaqeaci | weapoos, emmivicn, end explesizes-for the aMagad sursese of ovemhoe eae | ing tke Castro reine. : |e ° ‘ aos Soract a nS acuicitr +* Sait ced Ob : 2s: : dees. not care within the ferisdiction ° m r fa of |NESwae Urived States Secret Service, exd es there is no enperens Ficlaticg FSita OD oriar..ti ia ASCes PEL c= BS | oe Ie hee ka oc =is agency's PeSview, the wnvestizgaticn of this case | By the Secret Service is being discentinved, | } Costes > 7 oo- Sas = Tenors~ ~— are ) teins % ee directed ‘s = to the Caicago a = sifices =. of the U.S. Custans Service, the Aleshel and Tebeces Tax Divisicn of she iosermat events Service, anc the Federal Jucean of Investisation fcr | wmiatever coniisued attenticn is ceemed aneresriate Oy Shsse agencies... | DIS TSTSUTICN = H |] ACete? Oi ee en ioe | Means + ot Cm & | Dalles bec ; . ea nega Bo - a wofey feab@is }apis lick | Bisnizghen Sos merieis se Lcc S52, Chiczso : aT eesoul == Ch rl Buseau of Custans, Lice Caicaso Pauecuol Division, & Tccec | ri 390 Mr. MATTHEWS. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Sroxes. At this point the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford, for such time as he may consume, after which the committee will operate under the 5- minute rule. Mr. Ford. Mr. Forp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rowley, when you became aware of the assassination, you requested that the Immigration and Naturalization Service at the Texas border be alerted. Could you tell us why? / Chief Row.ey. I just tried to explain that it was a natural instinct or reaction, if you will, to do that, thinking that there might be some avenue of escape in that direction. | Mr. Forp. Were there any thoughts on your mind at the time that there might be an assassin from a foreign government who would then attempt to escape to Mexico? Chief Row.ey. No, not at that time; no, sir. . Mr. Forp. You mentioned a minute ago to the counsel that you met with the Director, Mr. Hoover, and in talking with him, did you ever discuss the line of investigation and the exchange of intelligence? | Chief RowLey. That was worked out right after the assassina- tion, Mr. Congressman, but we already had their cooperation to the extent that they were able to provide us with intelligence informa- tion prior to that time. Mr. Forp. You mentioned earlier that you assigned Inspector Thomas Kelley—— Chief Row.ey. Yes, sir. Mr. Ford [continuing]. To Dallas for the investigation. Again for the record, why did you assign Mr. Kelley, dispatch him to the Dallas-Fort Worth area? | Chief Row.ey. I assigned Mr. Kelley because he was the nearest inspector to Dallas at that time. As I explained previously since time was of the essence, I wanted to send an inspector as quickly as possible, and Mr. Kelly was the closest one. One of the responsi- bilities of an inspector is to do precisely what Mr. Kelly did in Dallas, direct the investigation and the activities. Mr. Forp. Was he there to investigate who may have been in- volved in the assassination or to review the performance of the Secret Service in connection with the assassination? Chief Row ey. He was there to become involved in the investiga- tion to determine the facts surrounding the assassination. Mr. Forp. Mr. Rowley, you testified before the Warren Commis- sion June 18 of 1964. At that time in your testimony you were asked by Senator Cooper the following questions, and I quote: Do you have any information based upon any facts that you know based upon any information given to you by persons who claim to have personal knowledge that there were persons engaged in a conspiracy to kill President Kennedy. And your response was, “I have no such facts, sir.” He then asked you the following additional question, and I quote: I address the Same question as to whether you have any information that the killing of President Kennedy had any connection with any foreign power. Your response was, and I quote: 391 I have no such information. We have heard testimony from Mr. Kelley indicating that there were assassination plots investigated by the Secret Service in early 1963. Were you aware of those investigations at the time of your testimony before the Warren Commission? Chief Row.ey. I would have to look at the reports themselves, Mr. Congressman, to see whether my initials were on them. In the reports that you speak of, it was established that there was not any activity directed against—or of interest to us as it affected the President of the United States. i Mr. Forp. Going back to the first question, you said, “I have no such facts, sir.” : The second question you also said, “I have no such information.” I am asking now, were you aware of those investigations at the time you appeared before the Warren Commission? Chief Row ey. Well, if I made that statement, then I was not aware of those facts. Mr. Forp. I would like counsel to give the witness JFK F-416, F- 417, F-418, and ask the witness whether his initials appear upon the face of these reports. Chief Rowley. Yes, sir. Mr. Forp. Chief Rowley, why did you not call it to the Warren Commission’s attention back in 1964 when you appeared before the Commission? Chief Rowley. This information at the time was handled either by the PRS or through Mr. Kelley, and | can only assume, Mr. Congressman, that these reports were furnished to the Warren Commission. Mr. Forp. The reports in your hand were reported? Chief Row ey. That is right. It was an ongoing investigation, as I see it, in which case there would be a relationship with the FBI and the CIA, and in the ultimate I would think that the report itself would establish whether or not it affected the safety of the President of the United States. Mr. Forp. But you had initialed these reports or documents prior to the June 18, 1964 appearance before the Warren Commission; 1s that correct? Chief Row ey. That is correct, sir. This was a year before the assassination. We are talking about 1962. Mr. Forp. Thank you very much, Chief Rowley. At this time I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman, and yield back the time. Chairman SToxEs. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar. Mr. Epcar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rowley, were you here this morning when Mr. Kelley was speaking? Chief Rowley. Yes, sir. Mr. Epaar. | had asked him about the process of taking over an investigation such as the assassination of a President of the United States and asked about the investigative plan, whether or not Secret Service would have sat down to put together such a plan. To your knowledge, was such an investigative plan put together to coordinate the FBI and the Secret Service and other investiga- tive agencies’ analysis of the assassination? 392 Chief Row.ey. No, sir. Mr. Epacar. In your meetings with J. Edgar Hoover, wouldn’t it have been logical for you as Chief of the Secret Service and he as head of the FBI to determine what strategy or plan you would have to investigate this death? Chief Row.ey. Yes, sir. Your earlier question was that before there was an opportunity for anybody to sit down, the President of the United States directed that the FBI to conduct the investiga- tion and that the Secret Service would cooperate with them in any manner and phase that we could. Now I did indicate to the Director at such meetings that we would cooperate with them. They had their own strategy as to how they would investigate it. Mr. Epcar. But wouldn’t it have been appropriate for you as Chief of the Secret Service to say, Mr. Hoover, I understand that the President has designated you as the lead agency in this impor- tant investigation, but we have a role to play as well because it was our agents who were attached and assigned to the President for his protection and we have an agent in Dallas by the name of Mr. Kelley and there are others involved who have information. How can we sit down to make sure that the information that we have in our Secret Service files as well as the ongoing and continuing reports that are coming in from our field offices can be analyzed in an appropriate place in your investigative plan? Wouldn’t that have made some sense? Chief Row.ey. It would have made some sense, but I think it was all developed subsequently by submitting such reports by both agencies to the Warren Commission and eventually evaluated by their legal staff. | Mr. EpaGar. But in hindsight—and I know it is difficult in hind- sight—looking at a situation where there was information availa- ble to you, at least out of your Chicago office and your Miami office, relative to threats on the President’s life in the files of the Secret Service and that information was available to you prior to the death of President Kennedy, shouldn’t you have that informa- tion with the FBI as well as the Warren Commission? Chief Rowtey. I think Mr. Kelley indicated, and if he hadn’t, I will say it now, that the FBI was in on that operation as well as ine Agency. So we were exchanging information in the entire ing. I think you will find in the ultimate that we have found that there was no particular jurisdiction on our part, and that there was nothing of interest to us. Mr. Epcar. Let me talk about Mr. Kelley’s arrival on the scene in Dallas. If you would have put yourself in Mr. Kelley’s place, arrived in Dallas and went to the Dallas Police Department, sat in on several interviews with Lee Harvey Oswald yourself, would you have tape recorded that conversation? Chief Row ey. I don’t know whether we had tape recorders, but I think you must recognize under the situation at that time that Mr. Kelley was rushed down there and even if he had the funds to rent a tape recorder, I don’t think he would have had the time to do so. 393 Furthermore, I don’t think that he would have anticipated the type of confusion that he encountered as he described it to you, nobody would have. Mr. Epcar. Would you have insisted that word for word, verba- tim be taken down by a court reporter? Chief Row ey. If you could obtain one, I suppose you could. But in the confusion, no one had an opportunity to ask questions be- cause in addition to the people that he described there, there were also the press right beyond the perimeter trying to ask questions. Mr. Epcar. One of the reasons, Mr. Rowley, that I am pursuing both the investigative plan and the activities of the immediate investigation, it just seems to me that the Secret Service and the FBI and the Dallas Police Department, someone should have had their wits about them enough to say, let’s sit down and before we interview and before we go running in 1,000 different directions, let’s analyze what we have on our hands, tragic as it is, and make sure that the press is secured, the corridors are secured, the alleged assailant is secured, that the information that we receive from that assailant is taken down for possible use in the investigation. I don’t get that sense from looking at the materials that are available to us. The sense that I get, and maybe you can correct me if I am wrong, is that there were three agencies who felt that they either had some jurisdiction or no jurisdiction, that they had some information or no information, and that they had their agents on the scene but not necessarily talking and coordinating with each other and that no one strongly was in charge from the Federal point of view. Is that a misreading of what actually took place? Chief Rowtey. Captain Fritz was in charge, but whether or not he had the command of the situation, I can’t say. But that is all very nice if you can lay it out in advance knowing that there would be an assassination, knowing that you would arrest a certain indi- vidual and then be able to take him into custody and then set up the guidelines as you just enumerated. But here was a situation where they arrested Oswald, took him into the police station, photographers, television cameramen, re- porters and all were descending on the police headquarters trying to get to the man, trying to obtain his picture, the reporters trying to listen into the conversation and so forth. This is what Mr. Kelley described to me at the time. In addition, you had the situation with the Dallas Police Depart- ment. The State had the responsibility initially. So that as Tom Kelley indicated this morning, you know, they were the host, so therefore you had to respect their jurisdiction. To carry this a bit further, the FBI kept after me to try to get our man in charge in Dallas, Vernon Sorrels who was the agent in charge, and had a rapport with the Chief of the Dallas Police Department, to get them to release the rifle so that it could be flown to Washington and for ballistic tests. This is the process that I had to go through at the time in order to get them to release it. So I give you that for what it is worth that there was confusion and difficulty. Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Epcar. I thank the gentleman. 394 Chairman SToKEs. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKin- ney. Mr. McKINNEY. No questions. Chairman StToxkEs. The gentleman from Ohio. Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry floor business prevented my being here during the key part of Mr. Rowley’s testimony. I do want to welcome you here. I know we have pulled you back from retirement at the beach to testify this morning. I am sure it is not a very pleasant experience to have to go through all these things. You did testify before the Warren Commission, didn’t you? Chief Row.Ley. Yes, sir. Mr. Devine. Did you testify before any congressional committees in connection with this matter? Chief Row.ey. Yes. In 1976, in February, I testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee chaired by Senator Schweiker. Mr. DeEvINE. Do you as the former head of the Secret Service have any thoughts that you would like to impart to this committee inasmuch as the mandate of the House is that we make recommen- dations to the Congress in the area of possible legislation as it relates to assassinations? Do you feel that you would have been in better shape to have your agency handle it better if you had had more laws at your disposal or more funds or did you have the authority you felt was necesary to do what was necessary to protect the President? Chief Row ey. I think within the framework of that period, we didn’t have the manpower or the equipment that we would have liked to have had. But I must say that since then we have the manpower and the equipment. Mr. DevINE. Have you given it any thought, Mr. Rowley, about whether any further Federal legislation is necessary to make your organization more effective or to make the security of the Presi- dent more effective? Chief Rowtey. Well, in all honesty, Mr. Congressman, since I am retired I haven’t given that much thought. I would have to say that my as Director Knight, undoubtedly would have some views on that. I am quite sure that there have been considerable improvements in all phases of the Secret Service in the past 5 years under his leadership. Mr. Devine. That is all. Thank you. Chairman SToKkEs. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. Mr. Forp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have one final question. Mr. Rowley, would it be your opinion that the evidence of possi- ble Cuban involvement was never fully investigated by the Secret Service? Chief Row ey. I don’t think I could say that, Mr. Congressman. For one thing, we investigated to the extent we could with the cooperation of the information we got from the CIA and the FBI on the individuals that were earlier mentioned. _Then, further, I would not be privy to what the Warren Commis- sion legal staff did in the course of their investigation to establish something like that. 395 Mr. Forp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SToxss. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. SAwyeEr. There is just one or two questions. I am interested really in what current procedures are. Do I understand correctly that they now do actual practice runs on this kind of an emergency if it comes up so that everybody knows in advance just what kind of a game plan they have if something extraordinary happens? Chief Row.ey. That is now part of the training, Mr. Congress- man. We have out at Beltsville an outdoor range and training facility in which we are able to train the agents under all types of conditions and possibilities. Now whether they have improved that within the past 5 years, I don’t know. But I know when I left we had that kind of training. Mr. Sawyer. Do they start out with a kind of a premise that such a thing is going to happen on each motorcade so that they are mentally attuned to not being caught unexpected but actually ex- pecting this on each time? Chief Row.ey. It has greatly improved by 100 percent. We have alternate routes which are patrolled by our agents and the police. There are communications on different channels so that they don’t conflict with the main motorcade. We have men posted on roofs and places that were selected as vulnerable places by the advance agents. We have a certain number of advance agents who are supervised, who are assigned certain particular things such as buildings along the route and the type of traffic that runs through the city, et cetera. The other factor is that there is constantly a helicopter flying above, checking ahead with communications with all the posts on the roofs to advise them of what they see here so that they can take immediate action. Mr. Sawyer. As I said to a previous witness, I have been very impressed in watching the Zapruder film, the slowness of the reac- tion of the agents compared to the reaction of Governor Connally. I think for anyone watching that, it is perfectly obvious that they were not really alertly attuned to the possibility of some cata- strophic event like that happening. I just wonder if there has been some effort to in effect instill an approach that instead of it being the unexpected, it is the expected, and they are just waiting for it to happen which might have increased their reaction time and might have saved the President? Chief Row ey. Well, I think there is an exhibit from the Warren Commission that shows that one of the cars had the door swung open apparently after the first shot in which two agents are at- tempting to get out at about that time which may not have been in the Zapruder film. But to bring you up to date, the men are trained in precisely the manner that you have indicated, the response, the reaction, et cetera, and where their position is on the car when an incident of that kind happens. Chairman SToKEs. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. SAWYER. Yes, certainly. 396 Chairman SToKEs. On the point Mr. Rowley just made with reference to the fact that there.is an exhibit, during the recess I had discussed with Professor Blakey my concerns and your con- cerns about this reaction time. At the appropriate time he says he © is prepared to show us this particular exhibit which does denote © some reaction time which I will ask him to do at the appropriate time afterward. Mr. Sawyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, they were pretty much out of range of being any help to the President in this kind of a circumstance anyway. But the two agents in the car, by just jamming the accelerator on that first shot, might arguably have done some good. Yet it wasn’t until the third shot, which I guess spans a time frame of 7 or 8 seconds, which while it might not sound like a long time, is time enough for somebody to run 75 yards if they are a sprinter, they could have wheeled that car, it seems to me, a lot quicker than they reacted. I recognize that if you are not expecting a thing, it takes you a little while to gather your wits about what is happening. But if your mental attitude is, as I said before, a sprinter on the starting blocks waiting for the gun, if you are attuned to that, your reaction time is much quicker. Chief Row ery. You have to consider the scene, Mr. Congressman. The driver is concerned, and incidentally it was an armored car which carries considerable weight. Mr. Sawyer. But with no top. Chief Rowtey. No top, no, but it is still heavy in the body. When you are involved in one of those motorcades and there are people shouting and acclaiming the individuals and the motorcycles, you know, at times they slow down and then they have to kick the mgtgy in and it explodes and so forth, these agents have been used to that. So that when this first or second shot was fired, they assumed, because their concentration in the meantime is on the public and the people there, and they are oblivious to what the noise is that is going on, in other words, it was difficult to distinguish between a backfire and a rifle shot. So that these things have to be considered when one attempts to evaluate whether there was a reaction in sufficient time or not. Having been through those exercises many times myself, I recog- nize the problem that they had at that time. Mr. Sawyer. Well, I am only comparing it to Governor Connally who probably has heard a lot of backfires, too, and he immediately reacted to what he recognized, according to his testimony and quite obviously in the film, as a rifle shot where there was no compara- ble reaction by the agents for two additional shots. Anyway, thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have. Chairman Sroxes. The time of the gentleman has expired. I wonder because of the concern that both Mr. Sawyer and I have had in this area, Professor Blakey, if while Mr. Rowley is still here, you would display that exhibit and comment upon it. Mr. BuakEy. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the clerk display F-126. This exhibit, Mr. Chairman, has already been entered in the record. It is a photograph taken, according to the best evidence in the record, at approximately the time, according to the acoustics, of 397 ( |the second shot which would be approximately 1.6 seconds after the | first shot. I wonder if the clerk would use the pointer. You can see the Secret Service agents in the followup car have turned their heads. _You can see four Secret Service agents. Two of them have turned their heads and are beginning to look back at the depository. If you look back at the third car, the white car behind the _President’s limousine, the doors are opening. The evidence in the record would indicate that it is from that car that Secret Service agents came in an effort to protect Lyndon Johnson, the Vice President, who was following the President’s car. So that if the acoustic evidence is correct, the first shot was fired _and apparently missed, and 1.6 seconds later, the approximate time of this photograph, you do have the beginning of reactions by Secret Service agents. In the followup car they are turning around and in the white car _the doors are beginning to open and they are making an effort to come out. The acoustics evidence indicates there is approximately 5.8 or 5.9 seconds between the second and the third shot, and then if the acoustics evidence is to be believed, there would have been a fourth shot five-tenths of a second later, which would make it approxi- mately 7 seconds from the beginning of the process. My time on that may be a little off. The record would have to speak for itself. So it is approximately 7 seconds between the first shot and the shot that hit the President and surely killed him. Chairman Stokes. What about in the Presidential car? Is there any reaction being shown to anyone there? Mr. Buakey. The reaction in the Presidential car in this photo- graph, if you point at the windshield you can just begin to see the President's hand moving up. At least my inspection of this exhibit does not indicate that there has been any reaction by the Secret Service agents in that car. This is 1.6 seconds after the first shot had been fired. Chairman Stokes. Thank you. Would there be any further comment on your part, Mr. Rowley, on the explanation given by Professor Blakey? Chief Row.ey. When you talk about the two men on the right side, they are covering their span. The front man is just finishing his span so he will come back and the other fellow behind him is covering his span back that way. The others on the other side are finishing theirs. This is when Mr. Hill started off that running board to catch up to jump on the back pedal of the Presidential vehicle. That was a difficult thing to do, to run around in front of the followup or Secret Service car and then jump on that pedal. You may have read where Mr. Hill missed the step but was able to cling to the hand guard and to pull himself up. They were about to take off as Mr. Sawyer indicated to get out of the area. And he pulled himself up in time to do that, and having done so he was able to push the First Lady back into her seat. Chairman Stokes. That would have been standard procedure with reference to those two men. While one scanned the crowd in one way, the other would be doing it in the opposite way? Chief Row.ey. That is right. 41-372 O - 79 - 26(Vol. 3) 398 Chairman STokEs. Thank you. My time has expired. Mr. Epncar. Mr. Chairman? Chairman Strokes. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar? Mr. Epcar. I just have one question. Looking back at the information that you provided to the Warren Commission, was there any evidence or information that for any reason that was related to the situation that the Secret Service did not provide to the Warren Commission? Chief Row.trey. Did not provide to the Warren Commission? Mr. Epaar. Yes. Chief Row.Ley. We provided them with everything that we had. We had no reason to withhold anything. Mr. Epcar. So to your knowledge every bit of information relat- ing to the assassination that the Secret Service had was provided to the Warren Commission? 7 Chief ROWLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. Encar. Thank you. Chairman STOKES. Is there anyone else seeking recognition? Does counsel have anything further? Mr. MattHews. Yes, Mr. Chairman. During the course of these proceedings we have made reference to what has been identified as JFK F-414 through JFK F-418. Mr. Chairman, these exhibits are now classified secret and are in the process of being declassified. We would ask that they may be made part of the record in the condition that they are now in subject to being declassified. In addition, three additional exhibits, JFK F-450, F-451, and F-452, bear upon the testimony today, and we ask that they be admitted into evidence. Chairman Stokes. Without objection they may be so ordered. [The information follows:] 399 JFK Exuisit F-414 . E—Y/ of | 1-16-602.111 3033 >- April 1b, 1361 ' Te WHITES yOuss . nee SUPPLEMENTAL REPORE.. =. - =: ens es te oe = "= ‘s ye eo e Pree dent wm a beaay seS eee oo. . Wisit tothe Fan American (RS © - Fer ae eee ei re ee ish ty ee Om Satlding Gd Apesl » gear 1961, where ha will address the Special Meeting of the Council of the Organisation of American States. | D re bad i ° 7) e n oO ra 8 d Da n ® d ~ 3 Seshicgton, . D.C. Sir: This report is submitted in reference to the above captioned subject end supplements Protective Survey Report dated April 12, 1961. : The President and Mrs. Kennedy, accompanied by Mr. Arthur Scalesinger, + _2¢arved the White House at 10:51 am this date and motored to the san American Onion Suilding, srriving at 10:53 am. The program proceeded as outlined in the Protective Survey Report. Presicent and Mrs. Kennedy, accompanied by Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, departed Sts Pan American Union Building at 11:27 am and motored to the 4hite House, arriving a% 21:29 ame Taformaticn received from Mr. Henry C. Reed, State Lepartasnt, on the afternoon of April 13, 1961, disclosed that the Cuban Delegation to this Mesting would attend. Prsyious information from the Pan American Union officials said tney declined the invitation and would not attend the Meating. : : Mr. Peed stated that the Cuban Ambassador to the Organization of American | States was Carlos M. Lechnza; the alternate representative was Cuintin Pino Machado; \ and the adviser was Jose Moleon Carrera. Mr. Reed further stated thet both Machado ' and Neleon were characters oO repute, both reported to be carrying firearms, and were to be considered dangerous. Phosograpas of Machado and Meleon were obtained froa the FSI, and were reproduced by PFS and distributed to all rersoniel particivating in tae security arrangements. These photograrhs will be tumea over to 25S for future reverence. 400 ae Bavgoaman ay. 1-16-602.11%, . ‘ J &t 8:30 am this cate, Mr. Reed called and stated that the Brazilian Ambassador o this Meeting informed him that after paying a visit to the Cuban Ansassador's coethance last evening disclosed that it was the plan of Ambassador Lechuga to go — to Kew York City this date, allowing his alternate representative, Machada, to occupy his place with the 21 Ambassadors seated oa the stage with the President. ASAIC Campion, SAs Griffith andFParker of this Service and 3. detactives of ine’ Metropolitan Police Department were posted at the entrsace to toe Pan American -. __.S| -s Union Building with representatives of the Pan-American Unicon who could. taeotify , penne: subjects in the event they woukd sttend- tite Meeting. = : Ee . Neither the Cuban Ambassador nor the two muptctte F Machado or wolaon=appeared, at this Meeting. Resulting from the above tit demat ton; SAs Hill, Chaney and Burks, as well as the 3 Metropolitan Detectives were also added to the security. SA Hill was posted. on the balcony near the elevator on the seccnd floor. SA Chaney replaced SA Parker on Post #9. SA Burke replsced SA SA Griffith on Post #l.. ATSAIC, 1-16 eT eae dad 2 Ww oer betcha , ree = = + ee ee eee i sar Janes J. Rowley * SAIC, 1-16 ce: SAIC Washington (2) SSS :wb 401 JFK Exnuisit F-415 = es Forin No. 1588 (Revised) - Ly De Paceoe MrMmorasoux Reroar (T-1-40) UNITED SFATES SECRET SERVICE ob CoRR ESS TREASURY DEPARTMENT , ( 3-1-15-270 * ORIGIN Field OFFICE TYPE OF CASE STATUS | Protective Research Pending Cuban Plot to Assassinate INVESTIGATION MADE AT PERIOO COVERED the President - | t Washington, D.C. ilov. 21-30, 1962 Antonio Rodriguez y Jones i 7 ais _TeALC He We, Geiglein;.Special Agents J. Grimes, R. Kyanko, N. Hall, 2 i O DETAILS SYNOPSIS A letter in Spanish, postmarked Havana, Cuba, November 14, 1962, and improperly addressed, involving a plot to assassinate i the President, was intercepted by this i Service. Subsequent investigation dis- closed Antonio Rodriguez y Jones’ as the i most logical intended recipient of the i letter and the person designated to carry { out this plot. Investigation continuing a \ to establish the identity of the co- = ph cal conspirators of this plot. Collateral Stan, ete investigation requested of various offices apa | as indicated. ia For purposes of clarity, this report will be divided int BA, following sections: (a) Introduction; (b) General Inquiries;*: (c) Surveillance; and (d) Conclusion. BECP LOGGE . (a) INTRODUCTION: fen TY! 4) ~o, There follows a chronology of the development of this casey «: Cote 2 ie a4 A “a Wednesday, November 21 Hie SO GR SIGNED S RIOR Informant 1-15-45 telephoned the Washington Field Offic THIS Qeu Cuntiaci To-¢TURNED TO THE ¢ DCcu advising ASAIC Dahlquist of the existence of a paper which indicat®d a plot to assassinate the President by certain Cuban revolutionary factions. This information was immediately relayed to the reporting special agent for appropriate investigation. DISTRIGUTION | COPIES DATE Chief ;Orig. Miami {2 cc 11/30/62 ; ; Baltimore 12ece | Newark il ec New York i22ce | WH Detail el ce ‘ Washington 2 cc n Lf im prasriie Ber prises paceny Se ae 402 Secret CO-2-32,682 Page 2 SesU Pit. At the home of 1-15-45, it was learned that at approximately 10:15 A.M. that day a telephone call was received from Informant 1-15-47 who related that a chauffeur employed for the Venezuelan Delegation of the Inter-American Defense Board had seen a letter which involved a plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Fearing that the Chief of the Delegation, Colonel PUES Tesco, was. involved in the plot, the incident was reported to 1-15-47 requesting advice in the matter and what action should be taken to advise the proper United States officials. After 1-15-47 made appropriate inquiries with U. S. officials, he checked back with the chauffeur to insure that the letter would be given to the U. S. Secret Service for investigation. This chauffeur, Antonio Rodriguez Gil, stated that the letter was received in the morning mail at approximately 8:00 A.M. that day, and that since contacting 1-15-47 he had made inquiries among members of the Venezuelan Delegation and had decided to turn the letter over to an official of the Delegation for possible referral to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 7 Ape bests Through the tiashington City Directory it was ascertained | that Antonio Rodriguez y Gil resided at 2335 Ashmead Place, N.W., Washington, D.C., Telephone No. Hobart 2-9179. Rodriguez was called and arrangements were made for an interview later that evening. [Deleted.] 92-00 °F. It. At the office cf the Venezuelan Delegation to the Inter- American Defense Board, 2335 Ashmead Place, M.W., Washington, D.C., Colonel Hugo Trego, Chief of the Delegation, advised he had this letterin his possession. Col. Trego also advised he had notified the FbI and the Metropolitan Police Department to make certain. the proper investigative organizations in the United States were apprised of the existence of this letter. tie stated that the CO-2-32,682 Page 3 letter was received at the Venezuelan Delegation at 12:00 Noon that day and was opened by Col. Trego at 7:00 P.M. (this differs from the information received from Antonio Rodriguez Gil in that he reported the letter was received at 8:00 A.M. and was opened shortly after being received in the morning mail). During the course of the evening and interrogation of Col. Trego, Antonio Rodriguez, et al, the following were present: Lt. Jacob Breckman and Sgt. Robert Gray (Detective) of No. 13 Precinct; Special Agents L. B. McDonald and Joseph Sculley of the FBI; and Jose Valado, translator, Venezuelan Delegation. During the evening, the letter was translated by Col, Trego, in cooperation with Jose Valado and Special Agent McDonald of the FBI. Subsequently, on November 26, 1962, the letter was shown to SA Victor J. Gonzalez of this Service and following is the translation which SA Gonzalez furnished: "Comrad Rodreguez, "In accord with the planning and obstinant eteada of Kennedy to invade Cuba carry out the attempt on his life in the terms conceived. I am not giving you more data because it is not necessary since all that you have to know you know, and for its own security and effective- ness of the planning I comply thus with superior orders. "I have had no other way of communicating this to you by any other safer means, for that reason I had to do it by letter. In the U. States they are not ‘in habit of opening the letters for that reason I trust everything will go well. A good communist has to run these risks. Ve have to count on our own energeys because USSR has not adopted a solid position with Cuba. These are high level questions that a good communist (card carrying) should not question. , "If he does it in that way it will be for the good of all communist that are in the world. Cuba is not all. Enough already has been done by Cuba. "I will send you the next news if I am able by a far safer method. Give me a prompt answer. I am embracing you. . - Pepe" The envelope, written in English, was postmarked Havana, Cuba, 9:00 A.if., Hovember 14, 1962, and bore the address 9246 7 N.W. and 11432 St., Washington, USA. The letter, written in Spanish, is dated Havana, Cuba, ilovember 13, 1962. 404 Secret CO-2-32,682 Page 4 During the course of the interrogation of Antonio Gil ard members of the Venezuelan Delegation Rodriguez. by the reporting special agent and representatives of the FBI and Metropolitan Police Department, efforts were made to determi ne if any address existed in Washington, D.C., which would in any way tie in with the address on the envelope of this letter. It appeared strange, indeed, that a conspirator involved in a plot to take the life of the President would not know how to contact a co-conspirator. Although the writer of this letter indicates some knowledge of the United States customs, he apparently is confused as to the proper procedure employed by the Post.0ffice in directing mail in view of the fact that two addresses which are non-existent appear on the envelope. No information could be developed during this investigation which would in any way clarify this grossly © inaccurate address. Information was developed from: Antonio Rodriguez Col. Hugo Trego that Gil was born Gil and on OLY. de Lass oh Galesia, Spain. He is described as wnite; male; Spanish; 5-6; 1543; brown nair (shaved to the scalp with bald patches) . Gil left Spain and traveled to Venezuela in 1952, was married there in Sie tu Te Delores Valado, and worked in Caracas with the Columbian Embassy. In 1956 he became a Venezuelan citizen, Passport Same year came to the United States. #019965, and that His citizenship status was temporary and when he traveled to the United States he lost this Status and is no longer a citizen of Venezue la. In 1958, in the United States, he obtained a position with the Venezuelan Delega- tion to the Inter-American Defense Board. Gil claimed he has never traveled to or resided in Cuba. During the interrogation, it was learned that three months ago Gil received a letter from aporoximately the Central Office of Safeway Stores, Inc., and, as directed, went to the office and was shown a check payable to Safeway from an Antonio Rodriguez, ° drawn on Riggs Bank. A micro-film strip of this check was. pro- jected and on examining the Signature Gil immedia tely observed that it was not his but prdbably that of some other Antonio: Rodriguez. Gil was of the opinion that the check was drawn the 18th and Columbia Branch of Riggs Bank, at It was also learned during interrogation, from Jose Valado, that approximately two months ago, while attendin g the Americani- zation School, 19th and California Streets, N.W., he recalled a Student there by the name of Antonio Rodriguez; that this man was in his early 30's; 5-1 in height; slender build; very light skin; black hair; and married. 405 _—sa Secret we CO-2-32,682 Page 5 At the conclusion of the interrogation, Col. Trego offered his full cooperation to this Service and the FBI, and advised he wold immediately report any information that might come to his attention concerning the intended recipient of this letter. Thursday, November 22 Full details concerning the development of this case were reported to SAIC Geiglein at 2:00 A.M. As per instructions, SAIC Bouck, PRS, was advised of this letter at 10:00 A.M. He indicated that the White House Detail and White House Police would be alerted. During the course of this investigation, close laison has been maintained with the Chief's Office through SAIC Bouck by immediately transmitting any Significant developments as they occur. (Db) GENERAL INQUIRIES: [Deleted.] 1-15-5 further advised tht oneAntonio Rodriguez Jones had been contacted by pro-Castro Cubansknown to have been involved in acts of violence in the United States, and that further details of these incidents would be furnished at a later date. : On November 23, 1962, Nr. Carl Malone, Superintendent, Inquiry and Claims, Dead Letter Section, Nain Post Office, Washington, D.C., was contacted through Postal Inspector Joseph Verant. It was pointed out to Nr. Malone that the address, 9246 7 N.W. and 11432 St., USA, on the envelope in question was crossed out in red ink and on the bottom was written No. 953 and the address of Antonio Rodriguez Gil, 2335 Ashmead Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. Ur. Malone explained that the Post Office furnishes a registry service for any mail originating from a foreign country that is improperly addressed. The mail is forwarded to his section for searching and, in this ‘Secret 406 Secret CO=-2-37,682 Page 6 particular case, Mrs. Elizabeth Acree looked in the Washington Directory and found the only Antonio Rodriguez listed, and wrote the address, 2335 Ashmead Place, N.W., on the envelope with a note that the postman should try that address. A search was initiated through the foreign and local Dead Letter Sections of the Post Office for any mail addressed to Antonio Rodriguez, with negative results. As per request, Mr. Malone placed a flag in his files and if any letter is received in his section addressed to Antonio Rodriguez, this Service will be immediately advised. On November 23, 1962, Mrs. Cora Beasly, D. C. Board of Educa- tion, John Quincy Adams School (Americanization School), 19th and California Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C., was interviewed and a search was initiated in an effort to determine whether she had any students by the name of Antonio Rodriguez. Mrs. Beasly advised that no current students by. that name are on the rolls of that school; however, in 1959 there was an Antonio Rodriguez listed, age 50, address unknown. In view of the fact that Antonio Rodriguez is a very common Latin American name, efforts were immediately commenced to deter- mine the number of individuals in the Washington, D.C., area with that name, and whether or not agencies engaged in conducting investigations on individuals involved in subversive activities would show a record for any of these persons. ° On November 23 and during the week of November 26, 1962, 1-15-S furnished information concerning Antonio Rodriguez Jones and his possible association with Jose Moleon Carrera”and Quinton Pino MachadoY Carrera ostensibly is a Military Adviser to the Cuban Delegation to the Organization of American States and works with the Cuban Delegation through the Inter-American Defense / Board. Both he and Machado, who is known as the "hatchet man" for the Cuban Embassy in Washington, have been involved in acts of violence, including beatings and abductions of defectors from Communist Cuba. According to 1-15-5, in August of 1961, one Felipe Martinez y Kiverg was abducted by a group of Cuban Communists in the United states after it was learned that Martinez was severing all ties with Communist Cuba. Martinez was taken to Baltimore, Maryland, and held by this group. Antonio Rodriguez Jones was observed as being a member of the group and standing watch outside of the coor during interrogation of Martinez. Secret CO-2-32,682 Page 7 1-15-5 learned that the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations, October 4, 1961, had requested that subject be contacted on through the Organization of American States, requesting that he | furnish the Cuban Government with information concerning schooling. sthe It was further learned by 1-15-5 that on June 20, 146s. of his subject was observed making pro-Castro remarks to members the Institute of Modern Languages , L322 class while attending subject was ‘Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.; further, that the to the quite frequently with Martinez prior to Martinez’ defection United States. When the subject learned that the Cuban Embassy ts of Martinez, in Washington, D.C., was interested in -the whereabou Pino Machado he reported whatever information he had to Quinton to the Organiza- who was then acting as an alternate representative It was further tion of American States with Jose Moleon Carrera. t publica- learned that in December 1960 the subject had a Communis In addition, tion delivered to his residence in Washington, D.C. subject in Jose Moleon Carrera’had been in contact with the . November 1960 concerning the whereabouts of Martinez Carrera _ 1-15-5 received information that Captain Jose Moleon and selecting was active in New York City in December 1961 in in the United training 15 pro-Castro Cubans for undercover work accompanied States. Following his activity in New York, Moleon, United States for by an individual of unknown identity, left the United States ina Cuba and they were expected to return to the ‘ very short period of time. as The Granite 1-15-5 furnished the current address of subject State Apartments, 1731 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., Apt. No. 203. Information was also transmitted that photo- had been taken and graphs of subject and members of his family this Service. efforts would be made to obtain copies for an effort was made to determine the On November 24, 1962, with an account at Riggs Bank which had been maker of the check Safeway charged to Antonio Rodriguez Gil's account through the Road, N.W. It was learned that it is Store at 18th and Columbia information concerning the policy of the Riggs Bank not to furnish depositors without a subpoena. Mr. D. E. Wisecarver, Vice Presi- and Columbia Road, U.W., dent and Manager of the Riggs Bank at 18th and established that the inguired of the Central Depositor Listing ez’ listed; however, Dupont Circle Branch had two Antonio Rodrigu concerning these it would be necessary to obtain. information Jonn C. McCormick, in decositors from the Cashier of Riggs Bank, the absence of a subpoena. 408 Secret CO-2-32,682 Page 8 Mr. McCormick was telephoned and he advised that representa- tives of 1+-15-S had previously made inquiry concerning this matter and information was furnished them that the Dupont Circle Branch has two Antonio Rodriguez' - one, Antonio Rodriguez Gil (the recipient of this letter) and another Antonio Rodriguez who does not’ have a Washington, D.C., address but lists an address in a foreign country. Mr. McCormick suggested that since the original contact with the Riggs Bank was made by a representative of 1-15-5, the Riggs Bank be again contacted by 1-15-5 as additional infor- mation was in existence concerning the present location of the other depositor named Antonio Rodriguez. 1-15-S was advised of Mr. McCormick's request. On November 26, 1962, contact was made with 1-15-9 in an effort to determine the background on Antonio Rodriguez Jones and members of his family. It was learned that the subject's father, Antonio Rodriguez y Echazabal’, wished to defect to the United States at the time of the Punta del Esta Conference. He previously had fought with Fidel Castro during the revolution for a period of approximately three years, and after Castro had obtained control orf Cuba had been appointed to diplomatic posts in Haiti, Pakistan, and Guatemala. During these periods he had been known to associate with pro-Communist groups frequently. In April 1962, he and his son, Antonio Rodriguez Jones, were observed in Guadalupe, Mexico. Although the subject! s father had expressed anti-Castro sentiments recently, 1-15-9 is of the opinion that he cannot be trusted because of his past close association with Communist groups. Antonio Rodriguez Echazabal resides at 1638 R Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., Telephone 332-6277, which phone was installed on October 2, 1962, in the name of Enrique Pedro Rodriguez y Jones son. Informant 1-15-46 disclosed long-distance calls made from that phone since date of installation, es follows: 10-5-62 - New York Citv, MO 2-2908. 10-5-62 - Hoboken, lew Jersey » OL 9-899), 10-15-62 - fe Florida aS 1-935 9394, -62 - Miami, Flor 5508Wag 10- 7etg Pee idole, ae Jersey, OL 9-89 [ executed by Jose Menendez y Ramos, Examiner Todd furnished the opinion that in all probability these were not specimens of Ramos’ handwriting but rather that someone had prepared these forms on which the handprinting appears for Ramos. In studying the hand- . writing of Ramos, Mr. Todd disclosed that Ramos is capable of writing and printing in an above-average style. oer A further examination will be made by the EQD in Washington, D.C., when all specimens of Ramos handwriting have been received. Informant 1-15-42 was contacted and disclosed nothing of inter- est which would contribute to this investigation. All contacts observed by 1-15-45 between the subject, Antonio Rodriguez Jones, anc others have been in connection with the pursuance of better employment and with personal friends on which there is no deroge- tory. information. eat On December 12, 1962, Informant 1-15-49 was interviewed con- cerning the subject and whatever background information could be obtained relative to members of the subject's family. 1-15-49 indicated that subject's fatner, Antonio Rodriguez E Echezabdal,. was well known by officials in the Cuban government, botn bezore and after the Castro revolution. He recalled that the subject's father was engaged as a butcher (owned a meat store) in Haiti and that when Castro came into power the elder Rodriguez walked into the Cuban Embassy in Haiti and advised that he was the new Ambassador. In 1959 there were reports that the elder Rodri- guez had shot and killed an individual associated with an anti- . Castro group. Since that time he has been held in very low esteem by groups involved in anti-Castro activities. [Deleted.] 429 & SECRET oa eT ey (- _ CO-2-32,682 © Page §S (Deleted.] 1-15-49 knew of the infamous reputation of Jose Moleon ceetaes and Quinton Pino Machadoy that both of these individuals were members of tne inter American Defense Board and the Organization of American States; and that Moleon lived and operated out of the Cuban Embassy from January 1961 to January 1962 in a clandestined menner. 1-15-49 knows of no association between the subject and ? these two indivicuals. : i Wnen 1-15-49 was questioned concerning his knowledge of acts of violence by pro-Castro groups in the United States, jhe recalied that approximately four weeks ago Dr. Jose “iro Cardona, head GE) nt the Cuban Revolutionary Council, was almost Killed py a pro-Castro revoluntionary group. He had driven his car to his home and , apsroximately one hour aiter he entered nis nome his car was blown up by a bomb which was set_on the fender. 1-15-49 advised that another governausnt agency involved in investigations of a security nature compareé fragments of this bomb with the bomb used by the seboteurs in Mew York and could not associate the bombs as being of common manufacture. 1-15-49 said thet the pro-Castro groups, poth inside and outside of the United States, are capable of any acts of violence and have been Known to durposely have directed to anti-Castro grouss for reasons of harassment and 4/ communications difficulty for these individuels. : to ceuse the : 1-15-49 knew of a Jose Menendez who was employec with a Institute of National Agrarian Rerorm and is presently occupying very important position with the Castro government. He could fur- nish no further information concerning this individual. stated 1-15-48 offered full cooperation with this Service and ’ thet when ne is able to obtain a visa for the elder Rodriguez Avenue, motner he will deliver it in person to 1731 hew Hempsire con- wife, and attempt to obtain as much information as possible In addition, he indicated that he would cerning the subject. 4 PN a SA ees pee = : = purse oe : + . aie, « father was in the diplomatic corps for Fidel OW hed cife purposely lied to officials in the Cuban Jty Ulota. 1 ch (e) protect his father. The subject admitted no (ube4ent effort to optein further information and knowledge concerning the sender of these t . A request . has been.made through the State Department and Central Intell ee ence Agency to obtain a copy or tne original or this third let ~. which was sent to Guatemala City. Copies of the deposition obtained from Antonio Rodriguez Jones ere being forwarded to tne Miami, New York, and ifewark offices, with this report, for whatever value it may afford in current investigations. The Chief's Office, through the CIA Liaison, will explore the possibility of further investigation in Havana, Cuba, to determine the identity of the sender of these letters. The Immigration & Naturalization Service in Washington, D.C., | disclosed that the file on Jose Menende Ramoy, iio. A 6190210, is in Miami, Florida. It is requested at tne Miami ofrice obtain Secimens of Yemos'hendwriting and/or nandprinting and for ward them to tlasnington, D.C., for exami ination by the zQD. Close liaison is being continued with 1-15-5, 1-15-9, 1-15-46, otnver informants in an effort +9 obtain additional informacion enc percinent to this investigation. Sie Gere = CO-2-32,682 ~— Page 32 Copies of orficial reports received from other agencies, and other pertinent data are included as attachments for the Chief's Office only, as follows: e A. FBI Report on Antonio Rodriguez, Jr., 10/5/61. B. FBI Report on Antonio Rodriguez, Jr., 10/25/61. C. FBI Report on Antonio Rodriguez Jones, 7/16/62. D. Employment Contract Card - Antonic Rodriguez (Jones), . Georgetown Inn. E. Deposition of Antonio Rodriguez Jones, 11/26/62. F. beposition of Antonio Redriguez Jones, 12/12/62. ° « ©3L Report of Felipe Martinez Rivero, 11/18/62. rede he. CiA Summary Report on Antonio Podriguez Echazabal, 2/5/62. Je,,rtons Report.or. 7/30/02.,0n.dulio. Garceren: de. Valliv Souzd” (Phone, franklin 1-$221,siiiam1,/FLlé.,.¢ ae a Antonio Rodriguez (Sr.) 10/17/62, 10/22/62 &€ 10/25/62). TSAIC Stout, 4/14/61, relative to incident’ nvoiving Moleon and Macnaédo. 3I Report titled Dagoberto Molerio RemuioY 1/26/62, mentioning 2 recruiting activity or toleon (Page 7). 433 JFK Exuisit F-417 ay Rarosy BS gacRet ene & , Ley | .* Memossnoum (-1-0) ora STATES SECRET SERVICE Sat Cp aed VIA AIRMAIL REo'stens <7 TRE oo te vfs ? 2 nr dashington Field Cffice orpce liami, Florida meno. CO-2-32,682 INVESTIGATION MADE AT : { Person Identified: Hiami, Florida ove. ber 27-309, 1962 a SY 2 Name : Antonio Rodriguez y Jouec Address: 1633 R Street, N. wW., | Special Agent arnest I. Aragon Washington, D. C. SYiGPSIS Discreet inquiries of reliable sources of information in liami has failed to reveal any information relating to the subject. (A) LctRUDUCTICK: | Reference is maiz to lens distance telephone call of Hovember 27, 1962 from | Special agent in Char;e Harry ‘i. Geiglein, \ashington Field Cffice, to Special Agent cate. in Charge John A. iarshell, tdami, Fla., requesting discreet investigetion in this (6) Galicia IL UIRIs: Through the period lovenber 27 - 3), 1962, discreet inquiries were made of all reliable sources of i:.formction in the liami areca relative to the subdject matter. During contacts with these known relicble sources of inforuetion, the subject matter was not discuss:d nor the sudject of this irvestigation. io information of interest wes dcveloped curin; these iixviries, although the nature of the inguiries was extresely removei fro. the subject matter. [Deleted.] ms wa HAS Bee: FOUGED * mM era [erence rien 19 Dest bev os SAG beer ahest Tie rene ] ; ; 1 ti eo A eek SPECIAL AGENT INCHARGE =John A. i arshal oh ay OS SLT a (CONTINUE ON PLAIN PAPER) @ 8 Geer ewerer sees OPER Fe 434 CO-2-32, 682 a3 [Deleted.] [Deleted.] “urther rererznce is =.1e to long distemce telerhone call on Loveuiber 23, 19¢2 from S:c ciel Azsont in Charge Geiclein, Vashington cicld Civice, to Gu:cial sz enb aragon, :dami, rla., reauestim, the results o: irquiries in this area and also advisin,; of lon; distance telerho:.e calls meie from ‘.asninston, D. C. telerhone numver 232-6277 te.. to enrique hodriguez, orother of Antcnio Rodriguez y Jenec, LG ee OUPGChy 261155 gases OLLOWS s Gn Cctover 15, 1962 to Franklin 1-9394, idami, Fla. tn Getobver 17, 1962 to Franklin eee Itiiami, la. Gn Cetover 23, 190 to “renklir 1-922!, idami, Fla. Cn Uctover 25, 1962 ito Fraiklin 1-9221, idami, Fla. Cn tiis same date inquiry wes made of a confidential source in liani aml it wac learms' that teleshonc number Frenklin 1-9394 is a pay stetion listei to the Rice sotel, 390. crth jam ave.,.ciemi. Sls land tee telsunons nude, ramdin 1-$221 is also a vay station listed under the name of Julio Garceran, 222 i...5. 17tn Terrace, Miami, Fla. L he ediress of Julio sarceran, 222 1.. .. 17th in the vicinity of the adcress of informant 3-1l- 23/4 wa: contactei relecive to dulio Tarceran ard i eran is well—-knotm. 4is ll name is SJ years of ase. iInforment 3-11-23 435 CO-2-32, 682 5: states that Garceran is a former magistrate nd professor in Cuba; that Garceran now clains to d@ the head of the Constitutional Coverrment of Cuba ii: Sxile and has laid his own plans to take over the presidency of Guba after tie overtiirow of Castro. Inforsant states that Garceran is not recognized 03; legitimate and responsible Cuban organizations in Miami and that he does not have a large following. Informant states that CGarceran's ideals are considered "fantasy." The information relating to the lists of the telerhone numbers was ||relayed to Gp.cial Agent frmk G. Stoner, Washington Field Of ice, ‘asn-. pare v. C., lovemcer 3), 1962 via long distance telephene call, together mith the informaticn pertaining to Julio Garceran. DISFOSTTIGH: ssl tS ssl sll Ll FS Continued investigation in this case is neld in abeyance perdins further |snoescontinuefrem the controlling office: 436 JFK Exuisit F-418 othe 1588 amar ike (Revised) xPORT ae aa /-HE, 60) UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE ly TREASURY DEPARTMENT Uy, origin Field orice Miami, Florida FILEv0.COn2=32,682 a TYPE OF CASE STATUS TITLE OR CAPTION J V Protective Research Continued Cuban Plot to Assassinate | INVESTIGATION MADE AT PERIOD COVERED the President. Dade County, Florida 12-7/12-62 Bernardo Morales’ 5 INVESTIGATION MADE BY SA's Robert J. Jamison SAIC John A. Marshall: & Ernest I. Aragon OETAILS SYNOPSIS A,letter written in Spanish, postmarked at Havana,Cuba November 29, 1962, sent by Jose Mendenez, 5th Avenue No. 2611, Reparto Miramar, Marianao, Havana, Cuba, addressed to Bernardo Morales, Apartado 1624, Miami, Florida, was intercepted at Miami by 3-11-14 on December 7, 1962. The letter reveals a plot to assassinate the President of the United States. Traces are being rim on Bernardo Morales and persons of similar names as well as other names contained in subject letter. Bernardo Adalberto Morales-Rivero, a remote possibility, is being checked out further. (A) INTRODUCTION: On December 7, 1962, 3-11-14 telephoned Special Agent in Charge John A. Marshall at his residencs and informed him of the receipt of a letter, written in Spanish, which they had intercepted and which revealed a plot to assassinate the President of the United States. 3—11-1L, stated the letter was postmarked at Havana, Cuba, November 29, 1962 and indicated it was sent by Jose Menendez, 5th Avenue 2611, Reparto Miramar, Marianoa, Havana, Cuba, addressed to Bernardo Morales; Apartado (Box) 1624, Miami 1, Florida. 3-11-14, advised the letter was delivered to them by a source ‘on December 7, 1962. They further advised that Box 162) at Miami, Florida, is listed to Radio Libertad = Voz Anti~Commnista de America and the local _representatives for k a : Liga Dud de Heredia and Aida Mayo Caetera, both currently eae at 152 S.E. Third St., Apt. 37, Miami, Florida. 3~-l1~14 further advises Radio Libertad is a clandestine organization which broadcasts from Caracas, Venezuela. *OISTRIBUTION Chief WFO WHD ay N.Y. ELLOS Baltimore Ja Miami LA 2H Wa } SEU AGENT MCMRCE John A, Marahall |12-14-62 (rere mer mt AM, peor ey a 7+

." -~-+ te Warcn (tat ’ chs $ > a Ce eT ; RS Soe ya Cope PE Eee oe - Gpisae ANY la Tus we ed te Bt GS LP ea 2 | 5 ICLOSURS xg * BIL. 4 Dons nee *. ne ig Se rie eS : Ses 568 ; The cnly other step world be the acpointrer of « Fresidentiel Cosmissiocn of uninpeachable oessonnel | to review and exarine the evidence and announce ita 7774 - ecnclusions. Thie has both advantares ane Gisczdvanteg, -It think it can await publication of the Tul report =- and public reaction to it here -and abroad. ‘¢ =e ‘I think, however, that a statement that > = all the facts will be made public preperty in en ‘orderly and responsible way should be made nex. Se ”* need something te head off public speculation or “ Congressional hearings of the wrong sort. J 2a “a J ° - ge | ° “ eis 7. ‘ } tm att t . pean * —. fae ae “+ ° 2" 4.5 .. = je “4 “ o - rs a ome “ae ~ «ae o Sac ge g ” SS PRE A : ~ > ae 3 “Hicnolas de5. Xatzenbach «ia. Se ie § Deputy Attorney General: - Mr. CORNWELL. In particular, Mr. President, I would like for ye to respond to these portions of those memorandum. With respect Exhibit 457, the Walter Jenkins memorandum, according to th memorandum, Mr. Hoover stated on page 2, bottom paragraph, “The thing I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin,” and thanks to the cooperation of the Just Department, although it is not in your copy right there, Mr. Presi- dent, today we have received authority to declassify one additional sentence in that paragraph. That additional sentence reads: I felt this [not creating a presidential commission] was better because there several aspects which would complicate our foreign relations. In the second exhibit, F-448, Mr. Evans writes: Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach handed to me this morning the attached memorandum which he has sent to Bill Moyers, who will be the principal assistant to President Johnson in the White House. Katzenbach said this memorandum prepared by him after his discussions with the Director yesterday. And the attached memorandum at paragraph one and then para- graph numbered two states: It is important that all of the facts surrounding President Kennedy’s Assassi tion be made public in a way which will satisfy people in the United States a abroad that all the facts have been told and that a statement to this effect be iL now. In paragraph two, it reads: Speculation about Oswald’s motivation ought to be cut off, and we should some basis for rebutting thought that this was a Communist conspiracy or ‘as the Iron Curtain press is saying’ a right-wing conspiracy to blame it on the Communis And finally, in the materials which we previously provided - you, Mr. President, again the Senate report, at page 41, there is quotation from a memorandum by Richard Helms, a cable to CIA’s Mexico station chief. Helms states: For your private information, their distinct feeling here in all three age CIA, FBI, State, that Ambassador is pushing this case too hard and that we well create flap with Cubans which could have seriously repercussions. 569 What I would like to ask you is, were you aware of any such ressures at the time, and if so, to what extent, if any, do you think they might have distorted the investigative process? President Forp. To the best of my recollection, and I remind the ommittee that the commission did its job 14 years ago, there was 10 pressure as a consequence of a memo or a statement by Walter Jenkins. There was no pressure from any actions taken by Mr. Katzen- ‘bach. I fully would understand, however, the concern of the White Jouse staff at that time for some early resolution of whatever the ‘Warren Commission would decide. I can understand why the De- partment of Justice, and other Federal agencies, may have wanted jsome statement from the Commission at the earliest possible date. But to my best recollection, there was nothing that came from President Johnson or any of his associates in the White House, ‘there was nothing that came to the Commission from the Depart- ment of Justice or other Federal agencies to hurry, in an incom- ‘plete way, a decision by the Warren Commission. | Now, again, to be very precise, I would like to read from a ‘prepared response I have in reference to the Mexican question that “has been raised. ’ IT was not informed at the time of the Helms cable to the CIA ‘Mexican station chief, but to my best recollection, the members of the Commission were familiar with the strong personal feelings of the then-U.S. Ambassador to Mexico. The Ambassador did believe that Castro was somehow involved in a plot to assassinate Presi- ‘dent Kennedy, and he was forceful in setting forth those views. _ This view of the Ambassador obligated the Commission to make a thorough investigation of the Ambassador’s charges and the atti- jtude of the CIA, FBI, and State. Although the Helms cable, to my +best recollection, was not seen by me, I was familiar with the | oo views of the three departments as reflected in the Helms cable. | I believe the Commission was carried out to investigate any |divergent views between the Ambassador, on the one hand, and the _ three departments on the other. | Mr. CorNwELL. Mr. President, the committee has received evi- \dence about such things as the destruction of a note within the FBI ‘that caused internal dissension at the time, a note which may have been from Oswald and was delivered to Special Agent Hosty. We ‘have received evidence of such things as the existence of CIA ‘assassination plots, an association between CIA officers and some members of the underworld. -_ Was the Warren Commission familiar with those type of things ‘and, if not, using the benefit of hindsight, could their existence have distorted the investigation? ) President Forp. It is my best recollection that we were not ‘familiar with the alleged destruction of the Oswald note to Hosty. From what I have read of the content, or the alleged content of ) that note, I don’t think the course of the investigation would have | 4 changed by either the note itself or the destruction of that note. The other question that was raised, the allegation that the CIA | considered the possibility of using Oswald as a source of informa- f 570 tion, I am not able to recollect whether we were familiar with that possibility, but, in my opinion, if we had known about it, I do not believe it would have significantly changed the course of or the conclusions of the Warren Commission. ; There was a question raised about Mr. Hoover’s theory of 1959 that Oswald may have been an imposter. | I personally was not familiar with that attitude of Mr. Hoover, in all honesty, I don’t think that attitude on his part would have significantly changed the course of our investigation or the conclu- sions of the Commission. You also raised the question as to the connection or involvement of the underworld in any assassination plot. I would like to state this for the record: I do not believe that if there was any association between some CIA officers and members of the underworld that that would have changed the conclusion of the Warren Commission. However, had the Warren Commission known of any assassina- tion plots directed against Castro, this might have affected the extent of the Commission inquiry. In other words, if we had known of these assassination plans or attempts by an agency of the Feder- al Government, it certainly would have required that thé Commis. sion extend its inquiry into those kinds of operations by an ageney of the Federal Government. But from what I have known of those plots, what I have read or heard, I don’t think they, in and of themselves, would have changed the conclusions of the Commission. Mr. CoRNWELL. Finally, I would like to show you two exhibits marked for identification as JFK F-464 and JFK F -467, each of which respectively relate to the fact the CIA may have considered, at one point, the possibility of using Oswald as a source of informa- tion, and the second one relating to a theory or speculation that Mr. Hoover had at one point, that there may have been an Oswald imposter. May we have those admitted into the record, Mr. Chair- man‘ Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record. , How above referred to exhibits, JFK F-464 and JFK F-467, ollow: 571 JFK Exuisit F-464 PE SAAS 7 eS 4 - ET | ‘ = re TR . ~ Lee liaryey OSHALQ- the record wa formvard b ives Ris recolisc - _—- - * . - 5 3 BY : . “, ee a th * ‘ oe. aC aa = = Hy See < ¥ : | r Sa « - < : - : ; e eee Pa ae Oo: iene wha : - . . -. * > e me - “ = - - ks . > - | z . - = Enci rec. Lo alee Pie : PAS -_— ft:-7 ° z r ae —_— - < Ae* win feeks ae = | : - 3 e ° co es = * + = - by - . 7? > j = - en 2 @.. ec=tOustim !.e*. ; : ? : raat s 3 Se < = > , . ae 12 Dec 1965 woe (YET) Hel Beas. apere PS TsSe| 572 | | | 25 Novenzer 1963. fave . - ~* * ~ SUBJECT: Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald ney a OOS | eae “8 ; ig pen ne a F i - 7 i ire It hakes little difference now, buf : had at one time an | interest in Oswald. As soon as I had heard OswalB’s nave, I recalled~ that ‘as . se nat nao discussed -- sonetine in Summer 1960 .. with | we cares _. the a on of ‘Lnterview(s) through!" i+ y other Suitable’ channels. At the moment I don't recall if this was discussed while Oswald and his= were en route to our GOUNEND of if it was. axter their vee ; r Fh Wi nonetner that Oswald's unusual behavior in the USSR had me me fromthe moment-I had read the first SiAtse 'dispatch on hia, and Be _ told. my subordinates something amounting to "Don't push toa hard to get= the information we need, because this individual looks o#d.” | We were 1 particularly interested. in thein?y Oswald might provide on the Minsk. ae. factory in which he had been employed, on certain sections of the city © itself, and of course‘we sought the usual Lnant. mignt help develop Foraign :‘personality dossiers. BiOSRAPHIC ie ‘ 3. I was phasing into ny nox ‘cover Foon mease . ae — - So aa aan the tine, Thus, I would have left our country shortly after Oswald's ati. I on not know what action developed thereafter, % . t Ke i 2 zn eh. : [ Se eee pe | 4. AS an afPeastiuant I ‘recall also that at the time I was becoming increasingly interested in watching se sant? a patter that we had discovered in she course of our bio and research wor 3s the muber of Soviet women marrying foreigners, being pesieced to leave the USSR, then eventuall divorcing their spouses and settling down abroad without returning "home", The! says was among the first of these, and we oo turned* up something like wo dozen similar cases,” . om 5 f 90} became inter ested in the ‘developing " trend we had come across. ‘It was partly out of curiosity to learn if | Oswald’s wife would actually accompany |hin to our country, partly out of interest in Oswald's own experienced in the U SSR, that we she wed intelligence interest in the-Harvey story. ; . ? a | 573 JFK Exnuisit F-467 ' OT SPK Extibrr F-46067. : | ra ze. . eo per — ~ -- — . i; bs es & ee a tine e oS Se 2% 5 : Ane : ; ° , ne f] 0 va ee es UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE i FEDEKAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (3. Ba? : - : Ia,Reply, Picese Refer to iS aoge ry WASIMINGTON 25, D.C ~ gat File No.- 105-€2555 phe ve é ier ~ « - = . a os . . Ad fa- Dite: June 3, 1660 ; : Ss iS | 7” pes wos Ofyice of Security see Department:of State rare . tae te fas >. ee ee ; i J6 Fr OM: Join agar Hoover, Director ) ip WN ( Suoject: C Bo HikVvesY OS. iLD | oe - &s ae! LWESRIAL SsCuRITY - — Bet o x : 3 : Anus etercnae is made to Foreign S2rvice Despitcn 7 0er 234 Gated November 2, 145%, concerning Sudject's rerunciuiion of nis suierican citizenship at the Untied Staves srbsssy, — iZoscow, itussia, on October 31, 155%. - ties ‘ Loe : f It is noted thet “ORG otner items, sunjzsct surrenzered his United Stutes ~P2SSpore + "ur. ber 1933242 to on sAxerican ..inbassy official. , fits lass kjnowi residence as indicateti in your Fzspaien wis Tie iietrozole. Hotel, i-oscow, where he wis resicing ir a noniourist stutus. Your attention ts Girectea to tne Tresor: of Special 3 : -. <3 S else at ya a > - agent Jorn if. Fuin, Dalles, Texas y dated iy 12, (21460, entitled. "Sunis Grunsmitted to Residents of Russias Inesrnal security -~ ™. 2," a copy of which was furnished to tie Depsrtizent-os State ES on fay 24, 1350. in tnat report you will note that subject's notizer, ai urs. karguerite C. Ost 1d, ort Wortn, Texas, advised tirat sie . recently receiveG a Jatterc addressed to her son fron the i -lldert Scrwett2zer College in Switzerlanc inAICLEIN tnat Lee . Oswilé was expected at the college on #pril 20, 109. she 5 stated sunject had taken nis birth certificute with hin wir2r : lie left home. She wis apprehensive about his suyety because a three letters she had written him since Jenusry 22, 1660, fruve j keen returned to ker undeliverec. : | Since there is @ pos sibility ‘tit un The ont uREng Oswila's birth certiy icate, any current infor. artinent 0, Viute may ittve eee te subjccet tT Saitiette had: sh GP. 412279 ©) = 79 « 37(Vol. 3) 574 Office Memorandum ° UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT J 12 ~, Su nei r “ mee mane if ae DATE: duns 10, 1960 : exe : ‘Emery J. Adams, For the wei 4 Gra nee s Ae s4 " ? ‘a ; Director, Office a pecereOan ide - $03 tin othe nn . Pan $; ot TE had hoeard hve rae mae Lathes. fea ithe G. aD, Lee Bdevey, y aS a> en Aas jeer. vi arid : nee i f ; 2 ie . . = ; oe | ‘Rice an Ref 3 S¥ nemorandtm June 6 RRB est gorge p 4 a F 2 - J : - y to ‘ ne ‘ wee . ac ° . = 5 i - ‘ ; . a There are transmitted for your consideration the attached Fe -. documents and/or reports relating to the subject. Should _ additional data be required, the basic document, when not . - . attached, or the SY. Hes can be made available upon request. ‘ | - if bo q ; ‘The information transmitted herewith is for your confidential - - use only and not for dissemination outside the Department. ; ees handle the attached material as indicated: . Ay RETURN nO Wiha ang: ei | > She B. _RETAIN OR DESTROY, . = ~ Since. ibe final peracsach of the attacked ‘ST Reworanarn indica tes * -the possioisivy or an i: poster usin: the suddect's Olrtin certificate, - please furnish this office with any current, information avaizcole on his ' for transmittal to tne tt. - - by ~~ yt ; " : = NR Ort e ) ; on SOS eerie) ag ee , _ SCA - kr. Dorsz F P dent = . ;:a attachnent: " \ #BE-remo dated 6/3/60 at “csiington. 575 ease Or Teor aL FCM NO. te © “EDN RL © UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memo anduim rn? 7 TO-4 PI/F - vr 4onn T. White _ ATE? Harch 31, 1961 ‘’ Avanly ene Fe FROM : PT/U - Edward J. Hickey}; cs . “ile ' ; : SUBJECT: Lee Harvey Oswald, oe Nemorendum deted Harch 31. In view of the fact that this file conteins information first, which indicates that mail from the mother of + ' is not being Gelivered to him and second, thet it hes veen - Stated that there is an imposter using Csweld's identification data and that no doubt the Soviets vould love to get hold of his valid passport, it is my opinion that the passport snculd be delivered to him only on a personal basis erd after the Embassy is assured, to its conplete satisfaction, thet he is returning to the United States. Mr. CoRNWELL. Was the Warren Commission told about either such matter, to your knowledge, Mr. President? President Forp. Not to my best recollection. Mr. CorNWELL. Finally, the committee has received some evi- dence there may have been an employee in the Cuban consulate in a Mexico City which may have had foreknowledge of the assassina- tion, and the employee may have been a member of Cuban intelli- gence. Did you ever receive any such information, to your memory, during the course of the Warren Commission’s deliberations? ee -<- —— President Forp. It is my best recollection we were not so in- formed. Mr. CoRNWELL. Thank you. I have no further questions. Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Counsel. At this point, the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine, for such time as he may consume, after which the committee will operate under the 5-minute rule. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. . Mr. President, we welcome you here this morning and we appre- ciate it must be a bit difficult after 14-plus years to recall every- thing that occurred on this Commission, particularly due to the vast responsibilities that were put upon you, as both Vice President _and President of the United States, during the intervening time. With all due deference to the other members of the Warren Commission that are present, you did attain, probably, the reputa- tion of being the most conscientious member of the Commission, 576 having attended more meetings and interviewed more witnesses than anyone else on the Commission at that time. In that conclusion, Mr. Chairman, would Ms. Berning make > available to the President JFK exhibits F-441 and F-442. Mr. President, I think you have had an opportunity to, on a previous occasion, review these two memorandums, one of which is dated December 12, 1963; the other December 17, 1963, both memo- randums being authored by the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. Cartha DeLoach. And I would like to ask you if these memorandums, you had a chance to review them, are accurate with respect to the conversa- tions with you and what, if any, relationship you had with the FBI during the operation of the Warren Commission. President Forp. Congressman Devine, I appreciate the opportuni- ty to respond to the two memorandums from Mr. DeLoach, one of December 12, 1963, and one of December 17, 1963. And if the committee will permit, I will read a prepared statement because I wish to be very accurate in this regard During my service in the Congress from January 3, 1949, until © appointed to the Warren Commission, I had had an excellent rela- — tionship with the FBI. It was not on a frequent basis. I barely knew — J. Edgar Hoover, but like most Americans, had great respect for him and the Bureau. Over that period, I became reasonably well acquainted with Lou — Nichols, who was Mr. DeLoach’s predecessor. Mr. Nichols had a longstanding relationship with eight or nine editors of Booth news- papers in Michigan, including the Grand Rapids Press, which was the Booth paper in my hometown. I met with Mr. DeLoach through Mr. Nichols, and when Mr. Nichols retired and whenever I had a congressional matter involv- ing the FBI, I would contact Mr. DeLoach. These were contacts © well before my appointment to the Warren Commission. After my appointment to the Commission, and following several © of the Commission’s organizational meetings, I was disturbed that — the Chairman, in selecting a general counsel for the staff, appeared to be moving in the direction of a one-man Commission. My views — were shared by several other members of the Commission. The problem was resolved by an agreement that all top staff appointments would be approved by the Commission as a whole. In my December 12, 1963 discussion with Mr. DeLoach in my — office, I told him of this temporary internal conflict with the Com- mission—within the Commission, I should say. In that same meet- ing with Mr. DeLoach, we discussed several other matters, includ-— ing involving possible decisions of the Commission, and I related the visit to my office by Mr. John McCone, who was then director — of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. DeLoach gave me additional information on the matter dis- cussed by Mr. McCone. On December 17, 1963, I again met with Mr. DeLoach in my office and the subjects discussed are set forth in the copy of the memo from Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Moore. In reference to these meetings with Mr. DeLoach, and my ques- tions relating to my relationship as a Commission member with the FBI, I will state the following: 577 One, I do not have any memoranda which shows that after | December 19, 1963, I had any contact with Mr. DeLoach, and I know of no other memoranda from any source. Two, the two contacts with Mr. DeLoach, which were prior to | December 20, were made during the organizational period of the Commission and before any investigations or hearings were under- taken by the Commission. Three, to my best recollection, the DeLoach memos appear to be accurate, but the relationship mentioned by Mr. DeLoach did not continue during the investigation period of the Commission. Mr. DEvINE. On Sunday, June 7, 1964, Mr. President, you and I, I think, Chief Justice Warren went to Dallas and had an interview | with Jack Ruby. Do you recall that situation? President Forp. I recall it vividly, Mr. Devine. | Mr. Devine. You may further recall that during this conversa- | tion, Mr. Ruby said as follows, and this appears on page 194 of the | transcript: Gentlemen, if you want to hear any further testimony, you will have to get me to Washington soon, because it has something to do with you, Chief Warren. Do I | sound sober enough to tell you this? Chief Justice WARREN. Yes; go right ahead. Mr. Rusy. I want to tell the truth, and I can’t tell it here. I can’t tell it here. Does _ that make sense to you? I would ask you, Mr. President, why was Ruby not taken to Washington for further questioning as he requested? President Forp. First, the Chief Justice, the Chairman of our Commission, and myself, along with several staff members, thor- oughly interrogated Jack Ruby in Dallas on that Sunday afternoon; the interrogation went 8 or 4 hours. - We believe that we had fully probed from him all of the informa- tion that he had available, and the Chief Justice, the Chairman and I reported back to the other members of the Commission the interrogation that we had of Jack Ruby. The other members of the Commission had full access, of course, to the transcript. It is my best recollection that the other members of the Commis- sion agreed with the Chief Justice and myself that it was not necessary to bring Jack Ruby from Dallas to Washington and to go through another interrogation of him in the Nation’s capital. Second, as the transcript indicates, Jack Ruby did request a polygraph examination. At his request, that was given, and the Commission and the staff of the Commission had the benefit of that polygraph and that interrogation. So, when you brought it all together, the interrogation by the chairman and myself and the staff, plus the polygraph, it did not seem necessary to bring Jack Ruby down to Washington for further investigation or interroga- tion. Mr. Devine. In other words, it was the feeling of the Commis- sion, or at least a majority of them, that no meaningful purpose would be served by transporting him from Dallas to Washington, is that right? President Forp. That is correct, sir. Mr. DeEvINE. In another vein, Mr. President, if you know, why did Earl Warren agree to accept the position as head of the Warren Commission? 578 President Forp. I assume that the responsibilities of the Chief Justice—— Mr. DeEvINE. Would you hold a minute, I think we have lost our sound. Thank you Mr. President. Let me repeat the question, if you know, why did Chief Justice Warren accept the assignment as head of the Warren Commission? President Forp. I believe that Chief Justice Warren accepted the assignment from President Johnson for precisely the same reason that the other six of us did. We were asked by the President to undertake this responsibility, as a public duty and service, and despite the reluctance of all of us to add to our then burden or operations, we accepted. I am sure that was the personal reaction and feeling of the Chief Justice. Mr. Devine. I know that you were personally reluctant to accept it because you did not seek the assignment and I doubt if any of the other members did. What was Allen Dulles’ role on the Com- mission? President Forp. Allen Dulles had an identical relationship and role on the Commission with the rest of us. He was unique, howev- er, in that he had served for a considerable period of time as the Director of the CIA, so that as a member of the Commission he could draw on that experience and expertise in any matters that involved the foreign intelligence problems. It is my best judgment, Mr. Congressman, that we were fortu- nate to have had a person like Allen Dulles on the Commission because of his background. Mr. DEvINE. Would you know, Mr. President, what his informal relations were with the CIA, since he was the retired Director? Did | he have an opportunity to obtain more information for the Com- mission because of that unique position? President Forp. To my best knowledge, he had no unusual rela- tionship with the Central Intelligence Agency other than the fact that he had been a former Director. As I said a moment ago, I believe that background and experience was beneficial to the Com- mission and not harmful or detrimental to our investigation and our recommendations and conclusions. Mr. Devine. To put it another way, Mr. President, you then don’t feel that his former relationship with the CIA in any way hindered the operations of the Warren Commission? President Forp. Not at all, sir. Mr. Devine. If you know, why has the public acceptance of the findings of the Warren Commission diminished to reasonably low proportions over the years? This is speculation, but we would like to have the benefit of your thinking. President Forp. Because I would like to be very precise I have a written statement which I would like to read in this regard. Public acceptance of the Warren Commission findings has dimin- ished for several reasons. No. one, the critics who have obtained the widest publicity have either deliberately or negligently mislead the American people by misstating facts and by omitting crucial facts in their discussions. Second, there is general public cynicism about any report of an assassination of a President. The record shows questions after 579 many years are still being raised as to the assassination of other Presidents. Third, the overwhelming majority of the American people have not read the entire Warren Commission report. Now, under point one, let me make this specific matter a matter of the record. The coverup of the underlying facts, in my opinion, of the Tippit murder has been a hallmark of critics of the Warren Commission. For instance, in the introduction to one of the best selling books professing Oswald’s innocence, one reads, and I quote: The plain fact is there is no evidence at all to explain how or why the Dallas police instantly pounced on Oswald and until some adequate explanation is given no one can be blamed for entertaining the most likely hypothesis, viz, that the Dallas police had undisclosed reasons for arresting Oswald even before they had valuable evidence pointing towards him. Once that hypothesis is admitted almost all of the evidence accepted by the Commission can be reinterpreted in a different way. In my opinion, no investigation of the tragic assassination of the President can be complete without including an investigation of the murder of Dallas police officer J. D. Tippit. Almost all who have claimed that Lee Harvey Oswald was innocent of the murder of President Kennedy have also claimed that Oswald was innocent of the murder of Tippit. This is despite the fact that at least six eye witnesses, who either saw the murder or saw the Tippit gunman leaving the murder scene with a gun in hand, identified that gunman as Lee Harvey Oswald. Moreover, Oswald was arrested with the Tippit murder weapon in his possession. The arrest of Oswald was an outgrowth of the acts of an alert citizen in Dallas, J. Calvin Brewer, who managed a ‘shoe store in the neighborhood of the Tippit shooting. Shortly after Brewer learned from radio newscasts about the shooting of Tippit in his neighborhood, he became suspicious of the way a man first ducked into the entryway of his shoestore, where police sirens were heard coming down the street, and then left the front of the store soon after the police sirens subsided. Brewer followed the man down the street into the Texas Theater and then had the cashier call the police. When the police arrived at the theater, Brewer pointed out the man who was Lee Harvey Oswald. As the policeman approached Oswald pulled out a revolv- er. Carrying a concealed gun is a crime. The fact that Oswald had such a weapon in his possession, and drew it, is highly suspicious. Subsequent evidence provided that this very revolver had been purchased through the mail by Oswald under the same alias he used to acquire the rifle used in the assassination of President Kennedy. Both Oswald’s revolver and Oswald’s rifle were mailed to the same post office box in Dallas. Witnesses at the Tippit murder scene saw the gunman throw cartridge cases into the bushes as he reloaded his revolver; an irrefutable ballistic evidence proved that those cartridge cases came from Oswald’s revolver, to the exclusion of all other weapons in the world. This exactly corresponds with the ballistic evidence that proved that the bullet found off Gover- nor Connally’s stretcher in Parkland Hospital in Dallas, and the two large bullet fragments in the President’s limousine which came 580 from the bullet which struck President Kennedy’s head, came from | Oswald’s rifle, to the exclusion of all other weapons in the world. Now, the point I wish to make is that in too many cases some of the critics of the Warren Commission have either misstated or omitted facts that were developed by the Commission and in the process of either an omission or misstatement have led the public to have less than full support for the commission’s recommenda- tions and conclusions. Mr. Devine. Thank you. I have one question in a completely different vein. As you know, one of the mandates that the Congress has placed | on this select committee is to ultimately make recommendations. You as President were the subject of a number of attacks, and fortunately escaped with your hide. President Forp. I am pretty healthy now. Mr. DEvINE. You certainly look so. President Forp. I am glad she missed. Mr. DEviNnE. Not wanting to be distasteful, and God forbid that another situation would occur like occurred during the Kennedy years, I hope we never have another assassination or assassination attempt, but it is my understanding that if such a thing would occur they would go through the same autopsy procedures as they did back in 1963; whoever is President would be taken to Bethesda Hospital, and he would be looked at probably by clinical patholo- | gists rather than forensic pathologists. It is my understanding also, Mr. President, that the Metropolitan Police Department here has anticipated that type of need for any so-called VIP and that they have put together what they call an executive autopsy procedure where they have everything available, they have videotapes availa- ble, they have forensic pathologists available. That leads up to this question, Mr. President, do you in your capacity as former Presi- dent, as a former Member of the Congress that has been deeply involved in the Warren Commission and the assassination prob- lems, do you have any recommendations that you would like to make to this committee either legislatively or procedurally as it may relate to an assassination like this occurring in the future? President Forp. Well, No. 1, I am glad that some plans have been laid to maybe make the procedure in the case of another tragedy in better, more professional hands. I am talking about the autopsy. From what I read, this committee has determined that the autopsy procedure in Bethesda was not conducted by the experts or professionals in that area. That was of course unfortunate, and I trust that what is now laid out would eliminate whatever the difficulties were at the time of President Kennedy’s assassination. If such an assassination were to take place again, I am certain that there would be a public demand for some organization to undertake and investigate the full facts. I don’t think the public would be satisfied with anyone or all of the Federal agencies them- selves investigating and coming to conclusions. So you come down at the bottom line, I would recommend that in such a tragedy that what President Johnson did would be repeated. I see no better alternative. I just hope it doesn’t happen again, but if it did I think that is the best option. 581 Mr. DEvINE. Do you feel there is any need for further legislation in this area? As you know at the time of the occurrence of the Kennedy assassinaion, it was not within the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate nor have jurisdiction in matters of this nature. That has been changed during the inter- im period. President Forp. As I recall, that was a recommendation of the Commission and Congress responded to it, so at least legislatively we probably have a better circumstance today than we did in 1968. And other things have improved after as you have indicated. I would like to make a comment so the record is clear. Even though there may have been some inadequacies, at the time the autopsy was undertaken in Bethesda, as I understand it, the individuals who investigated and actually reviewed the materi- al on the autopsy, a very prestigious group from what I read, they have come to the conclusion which is the same as those who did it before, Kennedy was shot from behind. Mr. DEVINE. Fine. Thank you, Mr. President. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentlemen has expired. Com- mittee will now operate under the 5-minute rule. Mr. President, in the commission arriving at the conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin, to what degree did the Commission struggle with the question of motive and what was the final conclusion relative to his motive? President Forp. My best recollection, and I repeat it is 14 years later, is that we were not able to precisely pin down a motive for the assassination by Lee Harvey Oswald of President Kennedy. There was no way of really being definitive as to that motive and so we could only speculate. Chairman Stokes. Did it come to the attention of the Commis- sion that the CIA had in their possession a Soviet defector by the name of Yuri Nosenko, who claimed to have information about Lee Harvey Oswald while he was living in Soviet Russia. President Forp. It is my best recollection the commission was cognizant of the existence of Mr. Nosenko. It is also my best recollection that there was no certainty within the intelligence community of the Federal Government as to whether he was a plant, on the one hand, or a bona fide, on the other. There was that difference of opinion. And so the commission had to make its own decision as to the validity of whatever information he had. Chairman STokEs. I would take it from that then that in terms of the Agency, that is the CIA, they were unable to give you some definitive information relative to his bona fides, so you might then come to a conclusion relative to any information regarding Oswald in the Soviet Union. President Forp. I think that is generally correct, Mr. Chairman. Yes, sir. Chairman Stokes. Now, yesterday we had a former agent from the FBI who testified before our committee, and the way he ex- plained the investigative procedure was that the Commission con- ducted its own investigation, that the FBI conducted their own investigation, and I think the term he used “they did their own thing, we did our own thing; if they requested anything from us we gave them whatever they asked for.” 582 Would it be your recollection that that was the way that the Commission operated investigatively and FBI operated? President Forp. Let me put it my way. Chairman STOKEs. Sure. President Forp. The FBI, and I use that as an example, under- took a very extensve investigation. I don’t recall how many agents, but they had a massive operation to investigate everything. The Commission with this group of 14 lawyers and some additional staff people then drew upon all of this information which was available, and we, if my memory serves me accurately, insisted that the FBI give us everything they had. Now that is a comprehensive order | from the Commission to the Director of the FBI. I assume, and I | think the Commission assumed, that that order was so broad that | if they had anything it was their obligation to submit it. Now if | they didn’t, that is a failure on the part of the agencies, not on the - part of the Commission. Chairman Stokes. Mr. President, was the Commission made aware of the fact that as a result of an investigation or inspection which was directed by J. Edgar Hoover, that 17 agents were found to be deficient in the preassassination investigation relative to Oswald? President Forp. To my best recollection, at least I was not famil- iar with any reprimand or corrective action taken by the Director. Chairman SToKEs. Thank you, Mr. President. My time has ex- | pired. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer. Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to have you here, Mr. President, and Senator Cooper and Mr. McCloy, as the three members of the Warren Commission that can testify today. I think one of the problems the Warren Commission has had is that you went out of existence immediately upon the filing of the report, and you haven’t had the opportunity to answer your critics. There has been no official Warren Commis- sion. And so I think it is very appropriate that you have this chance to answer for the historical record today. Following up on the question Mr. Devine asked, one of the man- dates of this committee is how should we deal with the eventuality of a high-level assassination in the future. The Warren Commission was the first citizens’ commission, as I understand it, which investi- gated an assassination. In the past we have left it up to the normal course of the judicial system. You have had experience with citizens’ commissions. You ap- pointed the Rockefeller Commission I believe. And you served on this commission. In view of your experience, do you feel that a high-level political assassination should be dealt with by a citizens’ committee, or should we leave it up to the normal workings of the judicial system? President Forp. I would strongly advocate a high-level citizens’ commission as was done by President Johnson. To leave it up to the agencies of the Federal Government, in my opinion, would multiply cynicism and skepticism as to the conclusions. We certain- ly have had our problems with all the critiques that have been floating around in recent years but I think if the in-house agencies of the Federal Government had done the job and come to the same { i | 583 , {|}conclusion we did, the critiques would have been far, far greater. : ee I recommend what President Johnson did as a possibility for the uture. ; Mr. PREYER. One further question on that score. The Warren | Commission did not employ its own investigative staff and used ‘|agencies in place to develop the basic information—FBI, CIA, Secret Service. You have indicated that Warren Commission deci- |) sionmaking was independent of any conclusions of those agencies ‘| and that you crosschecked their information. _. But in the future, if a citizens’ commission is set up, would it be | your judgment that they should employ its own investigative staff as well as forming its independent conclusions with a limited staff, jor do you feel that using agencies in place and forming your eS, on that as the Warren Commission did is the best way to go: President Forp. It is my best judgment that the procedure and the policy the Warren Commission followed was the correct one, and I would advocate any subsequent commission to follow the | same. | For the Warren Commission to have gathered together an experi- | enced staff, to get them qualified to handle classified information, | to establish the organization that would be necessary for a sizable | number of investigators, would have been time consuming and in | my opinion would not have answered what we were mandated to | do in a timely and responsive manner. It is my, it is my strong feelings that what we did was the right way. We were not captives of but we utilized the information from _ the in-house agencies of the Federal Government. After getting the benefit of their experience and reports, we undertook by a wide variety of procedures to verify or to undercut what they had given us. Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. President. Chairman SToKEs. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney. Mr. McKinney. Mr. President, it is a pleasure to have you here. Basically, to follow up on Judge Preyer’s line of questioning, the — then —— —— Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Katzenbach, in a deposition | to this committee, and I quote from page 19, stated: Perhaps naively but I thought that the appointment of Allen Dulles to the ' Commission would ensure that the Commission had access to anything that the CIA had. I am astounded to this day that Mr. Dulles did not at least make that information available to the other Commissioners. He might have been skeptical about how far it was to go to the staff or how it might be further investigated SRS ate because there was somewhat more of an aura of secrecy surrounding the CIA in 1964 than there is in 1978. We have found out that there were CIA files and information, of — course, that were not given to the Warren Commission. | So following through on the judge’s questions, did you at the time feel information was being withheld, and how would you handle this if another commission were to be formed to make sure _ the Commission knew it was getting all information? President Forp. I had the feeling then, as a member of the Commission, that we were getting all of the information from any one or all of the Federal agencies, including the Central Intelli- 584 gence Agency. Obviously, there was some information as to assassi- > nation plots that, to my best recollection, was not given to us. I | can’t give you a 100-percent guarantee how you can get that infor- mation. It depends on individuals, it depends on the system. Why we weren’t given it, quite frankly, I don’t understand. | Mr. McKInney. Continuing on in that same deposition, on page | 20, Mr. Katzenbach says: | It never would have occurred to me that the FBI would cover up anything. If you | ask me the question if the FBI failed to do something it should have done, would § they have covered that up? My answer to you is, even then, would have been yes, | they probably would not cover up information that somebody else was guilty of | something of the kind, but if the Bureau had made any mistake or anything for © which the public might criticize the Bureau, the Bureau would do its best to conceal — that information from anybody, including the Commission. | Of course, we find out now that this was true in the case of the | action brought against the agents for a supposed failure before the | assassination in handling the case of Lee Harvey Oswald. . Again, it seems to be a fact that the Bureau was withholding — information from the commission, despite a Presidential mandate. — Is there any way that you could suggest that we, as a committee, | could—again, I keep hoping this will never have to happen—give a — legislative or governmental standing to this type of commission, © should it ever have to be formed again, which would override this type of bureaucratic decision within agencies such as the CIA or the FBI? : President Forp. I don’t believe it is necessary to have a legisla- tive charter for a commission of this kind. If my recollection is | correct, we did get, as a commission, legislative authority ‘to put — witnesses under oath and to interrogate them under those circum- — stances. | As I recall, we had to get special legislation for that purpose, — which we did. I think that’s enough, or I think that’s sufficient to insure that we have the power to pursue any and all angles. — Mr. McKinney. I want to thank you very much for taking time © out of your schedule, and it is a pleasure to have you here. Thank ~ you, Mr. Chairman. | Chairman Sroxes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The — gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. Mr. Dopp. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. President, to reiterate the remarks of my colleagues, it is a pleasure to have you here with us on Capitol Hill, particularly in © the Cannon Building. You were telling us earlier it was your place © of residence as a Member of Congress for some years. _ President Forp. I had an office down on the third floor down the © hall for 16 years. | Mr. Dopp. Welcome back. I would like to, if I could, Mr. Presi- dent, direct your attention to the two memos I think you have in front of you, exhibits 441 and 442. Those are the DeLoach memos. And I would like to, if I could, ask you to respond to some ques- tions with regard to the December 12, 1968, memo first, particular- ly two paragraphs, the very first paragraph of the memorandum and the next to the last paragraph of the memorandum. The first paragraph, for purposes of the record, reads, and I am quoting from it: 585 I had a long talk this morning with Congressman Gerald R. ‘Jerry Ford’ R.- Michigan in his office. He asked that I come up to see him. Upon arriving, he told me he wanted to talk in the strictest of confidence. This was agreed to. Referring to the next to the last paragraph of the same memo, again I am quoting Mr. DeLoach here: Ford indicated he would keep me thoroughly advised as to the activities of the Commission. He stated this would have to be on a confidential basis, however, he thought it should be done. He also asked if he could call me from time to time and straighten out questions in his mind concerning our investigation. I told him by all /| means he should do this. He reiterated that our relationship would, of course, remain confidential. Mr. President, I would like to ask you some questions about this, if I could. First of all, the December 5 and December 16 meetings of the commission, is it my understanding those meetings were closed | to the public and press; these were executive sessions? President Forp. I don’t recall those precise meetings, Mr. Con- |) gressman, but it is my best recollection that all meetings of the | Commission were in executive session; not only those, but all that | followed. Mr. Dopp. And as I understand it, Mr. DeLoach would not neces- || sarily have had access directly to the meetings. There was liaison | with the FBI, but he was not the liaison. President Forp. He was not the liaison person, but there was an | FBI liaison officer there, as I recall, at all hearings. Mr. Dopp. If I understood your testimony accurately this morn- ing, you stated that you felt that the information that was con- tained in these two memorandums, two documents, was basically accurate, and yet you said that you had terminated your relation- ship with Mr. DeLoach in terms of these kinds of meetings after this December 17 meeting you had with him. Can I, therefore, conclude that Mr. DeLoach’s statements with regard to the next to the last paragraph on the second page of the December 12 memorandum is wrong? } President Forp. As I said in a prepared statement which I read in reference to both memorandums, it is my best recollection that we no longer had contacts, as indicated in these two memos, and to my best information, there are no other memorandums that would indicate a continuing relationship. There are these two, all of which meetings took place in the organizational phase of the commission’s operations. To my best knowledge, and I asked the staff of the committee to check most carefully, there are no other memorandums indicating contacts with Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Dopp. Mr. President, in that second sentence of that next to the last paragraph, quoting it again, he stated, referring to you, I —— believe, “This would have to be on a confidential basis. However, _ he thought it should be done.’’ Do you recall what your motivation _ was, if that is a correct statement, that the time you thought it should have been done and then having changed the relationship, at that particular time, why you felt that it might be important to have this kind of a confidential relationship with Mr. DeLoach? President Forp. First, as I said in the prepared response earlier, I, like most Americans, at that time had great respect for the Director, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, and for the achievements and the 586 accomplishments of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I had developed a personal relationship, on a very off-and-on basis, with Mr. DeLoach. If I had a question as a Member of Congress that involved the FBI, such as you would have today, there is somebody over at the FBI you can call, and he will come and see you. That’s the kind of relationship I had with Mr. DeLoach. If I had a problem that involved the FBI, my contact at that time was Mr. DeLoach. I don’t know who your contact would be at the present time, but there is a person at the FBI who will respond to your inquiries, and that was my relationship with Mr. DeLoach. At the outset, during the organizational phase of the commission, we had some problems. We were concerned about what appeared to be the attitude of the chairman. Second, several others on the commission thought he wanted a one-man commission. Most of the members of the commission didn’t agree with that. There were other organizational matters that I thought I could get a better feel for if I talked to Mr. DeLoach and had the benefit of his or the FBI investigations. That’s why I had those two meetings, and, to my best recollection, that relationship terminated at the conclusion of the December 17 meeting. Mr. Dopp. Mr. President, you anticipated my next question. I wanted to know, if I could, from you, why you felt it was important that you share this information specifically with the FBI, particu- larly when it seems to have been, at least, on a couple of internal matters—who should be chief counsel, for instance, whether or not there should be a press release issued on the FBI report. Granted, it was on the FBI report, but that again, sounds more like an internal matter to the commission—what they should be doing, when the Chief Justice wanted to finalize the report. I am curious about why the FBI, why not someone else? President Forp. Well, in the course of a conversation, maybe 15 minutes, you cover a lot of subjects. Some of it may be related to or pertinent to the organizational—organization of the commission, some of it may have been just general information. I can’t help but indicate here that in one of these memos, it does state that John McCone, then head of the CIA, came to see me, and it is also — indicated in here that Mr. McCone went to see other members of the commission. Was that improper? Mr. McCone was the head of | an organization which was in the process of being investigated by the Commission. I don’t think you turn a person away, a person of that responsibility, and I didn’t, and I think it was perfectly proper. I don’t know what other members of the commission did, but you have to remember, we were a unique group that was trying to get all the information we could. It was our obligation. It was mandat- ed by President Johnson. In the organizational phase, we had a lot of questions, and, frankly, I think it was very proper to do what I did. Chairman Strokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Dopp. Could I ask unanimous consent to proceed for a couple | of additional minutes, Mr. Chairman? Say STOKES. Without objection, the gentleman is recog- nized. Mr. Dopp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You mentioned in the memo, as well, that you thought these meetings ought to be confi- 587 dential. Was it your understanding, given the personal relationship of Mr. DeLoach, that there would only be information you should share with him as an individual, or did you fully expect him to report to supervisors or superiors of his within the Bureau as to any common suggestions and statements that you might have made to him in those meetings? President Forp. I didn’t pursue what the process would be after he left my office. Frankly, it didn’t occur to me I should check it out. I only know what our two relationships were on those two occasions, December 12 and December 17, 1963. Mr. Dopp. Did you, Mr. President, by any chance, you mentioned that Mr. McCone sought out various other commission members. In fact, he sought out you to talk to you about something. Did you seek out anyone else in any other agency to talk to at that time, other than Mr. DeLoach? President Forp. Not to my best recollection. Mr. Dopp. I gather from what you had mentioned just a minute ago that there were other personnel from various investigatory agencies that did contact other members of the commission from time to time. Is that an accurate statement of your testimony? President Forp. I can’t verify it one way or another. I have no way of knowing who might have contacted other members of the commission, and certainly my memory at this point would not be sufficiently accurate to make such a charge. Mr. Dopp. Am I to understand that because of the confidentiality or the nature of these two meetings with Mr. DeLoach, that the other members of the Warren Commission, at the time, were not aware of the fact you had met with Mr. DeLoach? President Forp. To my best recollection, I didn’t indicate to him that I had those meetings; no. Mr. Dopp. Did Mr. DeLoach—granted this is going back a long time—but do you recall whether or not he shared any information with you as to their feelings that you brought back to the commis- sion? Was it comments, statements, suggestions, or anything that he might have said to you that you then brought to the commission as a member of that commission? President Forp. I don’t recall that any advice or suggestions he made were conveyed by me back to the commission; no. At least that’s my best recollection. Mr. Dopp. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I have no further ques- tions. Again, Mr. President, I appreciate your being here today. President Forp. Thank you. Chairman STOKEs. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. Mr. Forp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. President, I would like ~ to first join with my colleague in thanking you for appearing here this morning. I only have one question for you, Mr. President. Do you feel that the Warren Commission received full and honest information from the FBI and the CIA in regards to Oswald’s alleged connection with foreign governments? President Forp. To the best of my recollection, I think we got from any and all of the Federal agencies all of the information they had as to Oswald’s connection with any foreign government. 588 Mr. Forp. One additional question. What about the Secret Servy- ice, did the Warren Commission ever have dialog or communica- tion with the Secret Service? President Forp. Oh, yes, we had testimony, as I recollect, from the Director, who was Mr. Rowley at the time. We interrogated, as a commission staff, made a thorough investigation of the advanced procedures of the Secret Service, the actual operations of the Secret Service while President Kennedy was in Dallas. The com- mission and the staff, in my opinion, made a very thorough investi- gation of all the responsibilities and activities of the Secret Service; es, sir. Mr. Forp. Thank you very much, Mr. President, and, again, I thank you for coming. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. Sawyer. Mr. President, I join with the others in saying what a pleasure it is to have you here. You have been really my only claim to distinction as a freshman Congressman here. You would be amazed how many times when I am introduced to somebody, they say, this is the fellow who occupies Gerald Ford’s seat and the seat you held with such distinction for 25 years. President Forp. Thank you. Mr. Sawyer. Going back to this Tippit situation, one thing that has bothered me consistently, and I have to confess up until now I haven’t had any substantial enlightenment on it, I just wonder if you have formed an opinion, not with respect to whether Oswald shot Tippit, I am totally satisfied on that and I think the evidence is overwhelming on that, but why Tippit stopped Oswald is a perplexing question in that at that point in time, as you may recall. Oswald had gone to an entirely different area of the city, far removed, he was only walking up the street. The description that had been issued was a general description that would be just kind of an average guy in size and general appearance. Did you form any opinion on that? President Forp. Unfortunately, because of his murder, we never got any testimony from Officer Tippit, but I assume that he was a good officer and he had been alerted that there had been an assassination. I suspect that any well-qualified, alert officer was anxious to pursue anything that was suspicious. I think we ought to compliment and congratulate Tippit for undertaking this effort that he did. Unfortunately, it resulted in his death. But why he did, other than carrying out his responsibil- ities, I wouldn’t know. Mr. Sawyer. Do you think that there would be any advantage in a criminal law applying to such a commission, let’s Say, as the Warren Commission, making it a Federal crime for any Agency personnel to withhold or not provide all pertinent information that they are requested to provide? President Forp. I haven’t studied this but are there not present laws on the statute books that would permit such a charge? Mr. Sawyer. I can’t answer you. President Forp. If not, I think that ought to be investigated. Mr. Sawyer. Fine. Thank you very much, Mr. President. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 589 Chairman SToKEs. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. FirHian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to join with the others in expressing my appreciation for your coming this morning. I have just two areas I would like to explore briefly with you. I would like to return for just a minute to your earlier statement concerning bullet fragments found in the Presidential limousine. In reviewing the Warren Commission, I find that the FBI tests of the fragments, both through spectography and neutron activation anal- ysis, could not in fact determine the origin of the fragments. I just want to read briefly from the Commission report: _ Each of the two bullet fragments had sufficient unmutilated area to provide the basis for an identification. However, it was not possible to determine whether the two bullet fragments were from the same bullet or from two different bullets. With regard to the other bullet fragments discovered in the limousine and in the course of treating President Kennedy and Governor Connally, however, expert examination _ could demonstrate only that the fragments were “similar in metallic composition” to each other, to the two larger fragments and to the nearly whole bullet. Is it your recollection that other evidence or other tests were run on the bullet fragment other than what I have had access to? President Forp. I am not able to recollect that detail as to what other tests, if any, were conducted at that time. Mr. FirHtAn. Thank you. I would like to ask you about something that has been troubling me throughout our investigation and some reports that there was unusual pressure to either arrive at an early conclusion that it was Oswald alone, or to arrive at unanimity that Oswald was the lone assassin, et cetera. There was a report in 1975 pertaining to a June 4 meeting of the commission, and the report in the Washington Star indicated that Ford provoked “a near uproar in the panel when on June 4, 1964 he charged that outside forces were trying to pressure the commis- sion to decide in advance that Oswald was a solitary assassin.” I wonder if you would help the committee out by commenting on that report? President Forp. I have no recollection of that particular June 4 _Meeting or any pressure that the commission received for any definitive conclusion. As other members of the commission, I think, will testify, we had a unanimous vote as to the fact that Lee _ Harvey Oswald committed the assassination and all other decisions of the commission were also unanimous. There was no pressure. We operated as a unit of seven members who fortunately all agreed. Mr. Firuian. I want to return briefly to the unanimous question in just a moment. But is it then your testimony that in your judgment the FBI had not decided prematurely, that there was no evidence that you had that the FBI withheld information from the commission or gave information to the commission that would _make the Bureau look better instead of “everything that you asked for’’? President Forp. I suspect that the FBI, after its investigation, came to the conclusion that Oswald was the assassin. I suspect there is evidence, reports, around the Bureau, or maybe over in our : 590 files, that that was their conclusion, but I emphasize their conclu-§ sion did not determine the conclusion of the commission. What) they came to as a conclusion was helpful to the commission, but it didn’ t decide for the commission what our conclusion was. | Chairman SToKEs. Time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Firaian. I ask unanimous consent to ask one additional question. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, the gentleman is recog- nized. Mr. Firutan. Mr. President, it has been reported many places} that there was some difficulty in arriving at unanimity of the} conclusiveness of the evidence for the final report and that in order} to get the unanimity, which is the historical record now, certain} very carefully drafted language, such as no evidence to the con- trary, or according to the evidence presented to us, and then the conclusion. Would you care to comment on the effort at drafting the report in such a way, did you have any problem arriving at the unanimity short of drafting some very careful, artful language? President Forp. There was a recommendation, as I recall, from the staff that could be summarized this way. No. 1, Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin. Two, there was no conspiracy, foreign or domestic. The commission, after looking at this suggested language from the staff, decided unanimously that the wording should be much like this, and I am not quoting precisely from the Commission staff, but I am quoting the substance. No. 1, that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin. No. 2, the Commission has found no evidence of a conspiracy, foreign or domestic. The second point is quite different from the language which was recommended by the staff. I think the Commission was right to} make that revision and I stand by it today. Mr. FITHIAN. Well, thank you, Mr. President. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Thone. | Mr. THONE. Welcome back, Mr. President. The hour is late. Just} one question. There was no question but that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has a lot of background material on Lee Harvey Oswald that should have alerted them, I am sure did alert them, to the fact that he could very well have been a security problem. They also knew, as I understand it, as least one agent knew, that he was working in the Texas Book Depository. It is my understanding that that information was not then trans- mitted to the Secret Service. Do you have any thoughts or suggestions regarding this obvious breakdown in communication? President Forp. At one time I knew that whole story, but I must say I can’t recall all of the details. I think the conclusion of the Commission was that there had to} be a better liaison between the FBI and the Secret Service and/or } any other agencies involved in intelligence, et cetera, and I trust? and hope that that interrelationship has been improved. It wasn’t} the best at that time, as my memory serves me. 591 Mr. Toone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. ' Chairman Srokss. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar. Mr. Epcar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to welcome you to the committee today and thank ) you for your answers to our questions. Mr. President, was there a sitdown meeting of the Warren Com- mission with the FBI, the CIA, and the Secret Service at the very beginning of the Warren Commission’s investigation to outline an investigative plan for the commission? President Forp. I do not recall any meeting of the full commis- ‘| sion with the Director of the FBI, the Director of CIA, and the | Director of the Secret Service. I am not sure such a meeting was necessary or essential. | Our first responsibility was to appoint a staff, which we did, and | to layout a procedure by which we would investigate, et cetera. Mr. _| Rankin and the Chief Justice, if my memory is accurate, had the | basic man to man relationship with the head of the FBI, the Secret |Service and the CIA, and it is my feeling that that interrelation- _| ship was sufficient from the point of view of myself as a member of the commission. | Mr. Encar. Did the commission itself have an investigative plan? __ President Forp. Well, we have a plan that was under the direc- | tion of the commission and implemented by the staff, and that was _a very specific investigation method, procedure, and I think it worked. _ Mr. Epaar. The reason for my question is that we have uncov- |ered some information that the Secret Service and the FBI and the CIA didn’t talk together very well and did not share information with each other prior to the assassination, and that there is some /evidence that even after the assassination each of them worked separately and apart from each other. Wouldn’t it have been a proper role of the Warren Commission to act as a coordinating function between these agencies to get them to share information about Lee Harvey Oswald or about the investigation? President Forp. If you will return or look at, Congressman Edgar, the report of the commission, page 24, under subparagraph small (c), the report says, and I will read it for you: The Commission has concluded that there was insufficient liaison and coordina- |tion of information between the Secret Service and other Federal agencies necessar- ? | ily concerned with Presidential protection. _ It goes on, but that is a summary of the rest of the paragraph. _ Yes, I think we found there was insufficient liaison, coordination, before the assassination. I don’t think it was necessarily required | |that they have liaison afterwards in the course of the investigation. To do their respective responsibilities effectively, cooperation was | essential before the assassination. | Mr. Epaear. Thank you. | Moving to another area. In reference to the disciplinary action of | the 17 agents of the FBI, to the best of your recollection, when did | you first come to know about the disciplinary action? 592 President Forp. To be honest with you, I did not know of that disciplinary action at any time while I was a member of the com- mission. | Mr. Epaar. Do you think that knowledge of that information would have been helpful to the commission in light of the fact that J. Edgar Hoover indicated that part of the reason for the disciplin- ary action was that the agents should have been aware of Lee Harvey Oswald’s background and placed him on the security index? | President Forp. It might have been helpful to the commission but I don’t think it would have altered in any way the final recommendations or conclusions. I think we might have been helped by that information, but I don’t think it would have varied other commission conclusions. Chairman STokEs. Time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Epacar. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous con- sent for 2 additional minutes. Chairman SToKEs. Without objection, the gentleman is recog- nized. Mr. Epcar. Mr. President, you mentioned the importance of Officer Tippit. I wonder if you could speculate for us where Lee Harvey Oswald was going at the time of the shooting of Officer Tippit? President Forp. I have no immediate recollection of where he was going at that time. I would have to refresh my memory before I could give you any firm answer. | Mr. Epaar. Did you have an opportunity as part of the commis- sion to retrace Lee Harvey Oswald’s steps from his rooming house to the shooting of Mr. Tippit and then to the—— President Forp. Yes; I went to Dallas with the Chief Justice and we spent a full day not only interrogating Jack Ruby but going over precisely Oswald’s movements as we understood them, during that whole period. We went, again I can’t recall the number, by the house where the woman was on the porch, et cetera. Mr. Epcar. In that journey, did you also travel to Jack Ruby’s apartment? President Forp. I don’t recall that. Mr. Epcar. Let me just ask one final question, then. Mr. President, what would you do to improve the protection of the President of the United States? President Forp. Well, having experienced 30 months of their protection and their continuing protection at the present time, I think they do a very professional job. They are an outstanding group of people. They are well organized and have fine leadership. I only know firsthand that in two instances they did a very, very superb job in responding to an assassination attempt. In the case of Fromm in Sacramento, an agent, Larry Boondorf, really moved in effectively and quickly. In San Francisco, again, what was done I thought was very professional. I am very grateful as to how they handled themselves, what they have done, and the way they are organized. I know of no way you can improve it from my personal experience. Mr. Epcar. Thank you, Mr. President. No further questions. 593 Chairman STokeEs. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd, is seeking additional recognition. Mr. Dopp. Just one question, if I may, and this will be the last one. I know you are running behind. Today you stated that there were a number of alleged incidents or facts that were relevant to one degree or another to the assassi- nation which you and the other members of the commission, or: many of them, were not aware of at the time you served on the |commission. You refer specifically to the existence of the Hosty letter and its contents, or its alleged contents; the allegations that Lee Harvey Oswald might have been an FBI informer; J. Edgar Hoover’s so- called second Oswald theory in 1959 when he was overseas; assassi- nation plots against Fidel Castro; and just recently here, in ques- \tioning from Congressman Edgar, the disciplinary action that was |taken against the agents in the FBI; things that you were not privy to at the time you were serving on the commission. I raise those |points to ask you this question. | Without—and I understand your answer with regard to the con- \clusions in light of these additional revelations—but putting that laspect of it aside, the conclusions, in terms of an investigation, |would you agree that the investigation of the Warren Commission, I mean that, for example, the witnesses interrogated, in light of these four or five facts or allegations that I have just mentioned, in light of that, do you feel that the investigation of the Warren Commission would have called upon additional witnesses, that the investigatory process would have changed as a result of those addi- tional facts and information? President Forp. To a degree, but I do not believe that there would have been any significant change in the process or the methods. Obviously we wanted to have all information, including the information that you have related. Unfortunately, for various reasons, it was not made available to the commission. But I refer again to what I said earlier. I do not think our lack of information in those instances had any adverse impact on our conclusions or would have changed the conclusions. Mr. Dopp. Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SToKEs. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine, is seeking additional recognition. Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. President, again for your total cooperation and appearance here. I ask unanimous consent that JFK exhibits F-441 and F-442 be admitted in evidence at this point in the record. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be admitted to the record at this point. [The above referred to JFK exhibits F-441 and F-442 were ad- _mitted into evidence and follow:] 594 JFK Exuipit F-441 > Meemorandum. . en he fedhe | °(= twee aef ss: ; Mr: Mohr. St That a ¥ pares "December 12, ri Fy hy . ; r , 1963;ih Re ; a : q i E : hie : ©) “oo 4, a oD. D ed Poke! YY Tog) Hang. Trvvene ae ee ROM AY . ae Ae pebeach be aeeeesre ~' = ) Be ~~ é me +7ss as) mie. sabe ws! Pal LCA aber she Te Lae ee i} Bee 7 "ASSASSINATI ON OF THE PRESIDENT + KR ws K ir we - ‘it : Ihada long talk this morning with Coigrestinad _— R. ~ Michigan) in his office. He asked that I come Gerald Rai (Gerry) up to see him. Uponar riving a told meé he wanted to a in the strictest of cormiden ce. This was oe ie . OG &G ae Ford told me He was somewhat disturb ed about the manner an which ' Chief Justice Warren. was Carrying on his Chairmanship of the Presidential Commission. |He explained that the first mistake that Warren made was hisa) a tempt to establish a [* —. One , man commission” by appointing a Chief Couns iprotege. Ford stated eae the menti el, Warreh.Olney, that was his own is on of Olney*:s name by the Chief Justice, sheir first meeting, Alle at lies, former Director of CIA, protested quite ‘Because of Dulles’ protest, the other member violently, WN s told Warren that neewould like to know. more about Olney etl bay togiving their consent, APs —_ iaate “apt: st Daa a:-, asree) would not work = > y] V.C- 3 Hefen pie Ss de B rf riety Cee. #3 Cee { te su 4 0 Oi ES I f Ford told me that he was ‘currently having problems pig aof we members of the fom mission desired inasmuch-as | éte ; to go along with the recommendatjon mmission dated 12--9- 63. make an immediate” iz ort clearly showed there was no internation wa >onspiracy or collusion and that Oswald.was a loner. Ford stated he was a minority okt one that did not want to give out any press rele ase until the Commission had hada 8. Shorough Opportunity to review and discuss, ys meHane aana noted that e ee a8 32 his,desk at the time ofOur ‘meeting. Ms os 1 - Mr. Belmont ; ec Guiry +> Mr. Resen’?. tabs Sr abrtaaed = . = Mr. Evans |ana ee copies “sis. oiDp i- Mr, Sullivan J Pare epiai CRS 6 Coe ne a Mr, Tones a for rewtes ote % sreaby] +: & ” CONTINUED NEXT PAGE. gh fe on: awed Neda ’ 9: is os oF te > “, vy OVANt 3. et EC ¢sae ¥2 4 F : 22 2 D£0.271965 Ge Sind le ae ue wees tw Lae ASS pl Stet ean a Ss = ae : ‘at St Hy % Serres as of Ph itry ah Be connotes asd EK Esch. bitrs a Cat +/ JexpsSeaTREAT : =~ 5 Sees = Debeacth to Mohr 12-12-03 Re: Assassination of the President. . $ Uae “| Hg . I told Ford in strict confidence that the Director concurred with his — viewpoint. I mentioned that our investigation thus far had conclusively shown that Oswald perated by himself and that Ruby additionally was aloner. However, FBI investigation was still pending on a large number of rumors, speculation and gossip re pitt it, therefore, would be quite unfair for the Commission to take a stand prior to’ ~ ll the evidence being turned in, Ford stated this was his point entirely and that * nomi he was a Barons of one he intended to stick to Is point. * aawad om a "Sly ] Ford told me that John McCone, Director of CIA, had, appr oximately one week ago, gone up to his office and told him that CIA had uncovered some : "startling information" in the Oswald case, McCone proceeded to tell Ford that a- source of CIA’s in Mexico had seen money exchange hands between Oswald and an *- - ‘unknown Cuban Negro. Ford stated this excited him greatly inasmuch as it defi piers tended to show ae was eae a Pete nal ongee.eE involved in the assassination of : the President. hae Danas aa AF *e : nw Corre UD are I told Ford that appareh y McCohe had failed to follow up on this cette I mentioned that CIA's source had recanted his story and had indicated thaLitwas a, ‘figmentofhissintigination. However, t0 prove the unstable dle tendencies of this source, the source had later claimed that he was actuallytelling the truth. I pointed out that we_- ae still till checking someangtes of ‘this; t however,the CIA source was obviously either wis Beg OF Somewhat atofp of pve spathic. eX a heal stated he c yld ser Sage see this. se Dain: sD as t win aies Ford ate he would keep me thoroughly advised as tb the activities of the Commission. He stated this would have to be ona ontidential basis, however, he thought it should be doné. He also asked if he could call me from time to time and straighten out questions in his mind concerning our investigation. I told hinr by all means he should do this. He reiterated that our relationship would, of course, remain confidential. We have had excellent relations with Congressman Ford for many years.- He has been given an autographed copy of the Director's book "A Study of Somptans wh Z and has peen in touch with my office on numerous occasions in the past. ‘ACTION:be he 596 : JFK Exnuisit F-442 UNITED STATES GOs(( SMENT | 2 a ee M. emorandum oe. alk Mr. Mohr oP. aa lh hen ero, Date: December 17, 1963 vif é nee> ; Se ae . ero" 4 iN = “BRI ¢6 > ROM : y C. D. otonenfyt SUA a Pye “set Sesh Crehie - ‘ ‘ Gaps : . “7 i £ ‘iy iter, F ha a ae im UBJECT: © LEE HARVEY OSWALD EEE ROE be + \ ‘ os a oe p i INTERNAL SECURITY -R t Bronte®sot lf THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION Hae. ° uyay 22 tod me iewas glad he to further facts concerning the matter, particularly ," . view of thé story that meee. JohnMcCone ofCIA | had told him Pate yer PUP soee Nie _— i) ——T‘ - J = NW mil 2a respect to the Se of the Presidential Goriniscisieee Hessel € , Congressman Ford told me that the members of the Commission, including ee nie i ustice, agreed unanimously that no preliminary release should be made to the> 72S seget cite,the facts as outlined in the FBI report, ta! : Chiet Justice Warren told the Commission that they should strive a haye .2'~ hearings completed and the findings made public prior to July, 1964, when the i > vidential campaigns will begin to get hot. He stated it would be unfair to present’ ae : .2 findingshoa July, 1964, ref ; , 7 yd he 2m ¥ < j ad Cryst we “several members of the Commission indicated that Oswald's handw> ttens” ‘ements in the exhibits section of the report should be typed out for clearest yee: eal; a‘ a xin was instructed to contact our liaison man, Inspector Malley, in this regard, ~abnnay Lo! MAAR evens BG Pitt Cozies. Lore tse —-D>3,- : twas tt . ae was no Criticism of the FBI at yesterday's meeting. There were >. » allegations ‘made by any one, including the Chief Justice, that the FBI had leaked . scvions of this report. I again went over very carefully with Congressman Ford the ct the FBI had not had any “leaks" whatsoever. I told him we were well aware that the cteaent 2 had done considerable talking; furthermore, it now appeared somewhat »vious that members of the Commission were beginning to leak the report, I referred this week's issue of "Newsweek" magazine which contains a rather clear analysis . the report, I told Congressman Ford that "Newsweek" was owned by the "Washington ost" and that apparently some one was trying to curry favor. I told him we, of course, ‘not get along very well with either the "Washington Post" or “Newsweek.” He | : plied that he was in ie same boat, that he liked apes one of these publications . . } : } ‘ « Be Belriont en be Se yas Siena Laisa /9) ee st Agree ppt XENOX ast ae ~DECQT IGF ae wilhWe 06h EL PSE Fae ai oyi wed ‘ , ’ =] } TE iv hibir, Ee df orP20 Oe, ts ow Be ) 597 | a... = : | mo Darsach to Mohr . = $e | 1277/6 3 . ee he Presidential Commission : Bs ister a n.” pe aE Mae . _ 4 Congressman Ford in strict:‘confidence thatedeearen tteChief Justice Warr en was ite close to Drew Pearson and obviously used Pearson from time to time to get - oughts a¢ross to the general publie. I mentioned Pearson's ar ticlesof December 14- 16, $3. I told Congressman Ford as he well. knew 98% of the facts in these oe ee 2re absolutely false, mas De AAhe Se so SA eh es - aie U Por etees ish Ford told me that several members had been somewhat _ _rprised, however, pleased that the FBI's report had been in narrative form rather an written in a straightforward factual manner. I told him this, of course, was --.- r the convenience of the Commission. He then mentioned Chief Justice Warren d expressed-the desirability of seeing the actual reports which back up those in Prative form. I told him the Director had issued very specific instructions that 2se reports be made ready for the Commission. I told him they were quite lengthy By a would be ee material to wade through, . is ere Pe 4 :. _ . Two members of the Commissian brought up the fact that fey still =-e not convinced that the President had been shot from the sixth floor window the Texas Book Depository. These members failed to understand the trajectory the slugs that killed the President. He stated he felt this point would be discussed = rther but, of course, would represent no problem. - tae ie. £) % li vi F ; 2 ‘ Three Members of the Commission ‘expressed disappointment that - . ED\Baughman, formex_Chief of Secret Service, had seen fit to make a number of ill- “ised emarks concerning the> operations of the "secret Service in the press. The meresion does not agree with Baughman and criticized him quite thoroughly. They ertheless pint to call him pease the Commission and take testimony. Bape At the Commission akira? testeraay, Lee Rankin, the Chiet Counsel, 1s authorized to hire two so-called "technicians" who will assist him in research and -yelopment of the Commission's findings. The Commission was told by Rankin that ~ >se men were skilled attorneys. One of these individuals is named _- Adams, ‘ormer Police Commissioner in New York. Another individual is a person by the .me of Jenner, an attorney from Chicago. The Commission was advised 4+ both of these men are available for immediate employment. Congressman Ford ‘ated he raised the question as to checking the backgrounds of these individuals. He 2s told by Rankin that, both of them had very satisfactory backgrounds and belonged no organizations inimical to the best interest of the U. S. Government. "thew . .’3° » Upon leaving Congressman Ford advised me that he will be in Michigan a skiing vacation with his wife and children between December 22, 1963 and a =f i,1964. He stated I should call him at any time ney Te w as needed. . nd . . a a Bel i 3 . Y ete tn eo S a. ; ” a es pesky ie : 598 emo DeLoach to Mohr ~*~ - i 4ae.> . ee A RATSE3 2: Lee Harvey Oswald ; = \ re iS -varealee . IS-K: ; *. ne ee es The Presidential Commission .-. =» | ee es = »tated‘he had one problem. He wanted to take the FBI report with him yet ™: : 2 had nosway of :transporting itin complete safety. I told him I felt the Director ould want him to borrow from us one of our Agent briefcases that contains a lock. gi @ stated this would be ideal and he would appreciate loan of a briefcase very much.” - CTIONS.= This matter will be followed very closely. If there are no objections, Avil deliver an Agent briefcase containing a lock to Congressman Ford tomorrow, ., ecember 18, 1963, - es Lis , 5°33 Ad ae Chairman Stoxgs. Mr. President, at the conclusion of a witness’ testimony before this committee, he is entitled under our rules to 5 minutes. He may take that 5 minutes for the purpose of comment- ing upon his testimony or explaining it or expanding upon it in any way, and I would extend to you at this time 5 minutes for that purpose. 7 | President Forp. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will not take that time. I do wish to express my appreciation to you, the committee members, and the staff for their consideration. It has been a pleasure to be here. I will give my time to my former associates on the commission, John Sherman Cooper and John McCloy, who I am sure will be very helpful in expanding or im- proving on my observations here this morning. I thank you very, very much. Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Mr. President, for not only the time you have expended with our staff and Mr. Cornwell prior to your appearance here today, but taking time out of what we know is a very busy schedule to appear here and to offer the testimon y we have received this morning. As one of your former colleagues here in the House, it has been an honor to have had you here. President Forp. Give my best to everybody. Chairman Stokes. Thank you, we certainly will. All persons are requested to remain in their seats for securit y reasons until President Ford has left the room. Professor Blakey. Mr. Buiakey. Our next two witnesses this morning, Senator Cooper and Mr. McCloy, will be called as a panel. Mr. Cooper received an A.B. degree from Yale University in 1923, and and LL.B. from Harvard Law School in 1925. He served the State of Kentucky as U.S. Senator from 1947 through 1958 through 1955, and 1957 through 1973. Currently 1949, he is in private practice in Washington, D.C. as counsel of Covington & Burling. 7 599 Mr. McCloy received an A.B. degree from Amherst College in 1916 and an LL.B. degree from Harvard Law School in 1921. He is admitted to practice in New York and the District of Columbia. Currently he is in private practice in New York with the firm of Bilbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. Mr. Chairman, at this time it would be appropriate to call both Senator Cooper and Mr. McCloy. Chairman STokEs. The committee calls both witnesses. TESTIMONY OF JOHN SHERMAN COOPER AND JOHN J. McCLOY Chairman SToKEs. Gentlemen, would you raise your right hands. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. McCtovy. I do. Mr. Cooper. I do. Chairman SToKEs. Thank you, you may be seated. ae Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. Gary Corn- well. Mr. CoRNWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Would you have identified for the record, counsel, the gentleman who has so ably assisted President Ford and who will be assisting these gentlemen? Mr. CoRNWELL. It is Mr. Dave Belin. He was a member of the ||Warren Commission staff and he has been here as counsel for the |President. |} Mr. McC toy. He is not acting as counsel for me. I know him and |have great respect for him but he is not here as my counsel. | Mr. CoRNWELL. Senator Cooper, I am sure that the committee ‘will wish to explore with you whatever areas you may wish to jelaborate on or that you may have any disagreement with in jrespect to the President’s testimony. I just have one question I | would like to ask you. | You are quoted as stating in a televised broadcast recently that \there were disagreements among the commission members, that, and I quote: | I think the most serious one of the ones that come to me most vividly, of course, it )the question of whether or not the first shot went through President Kennedy and \ then through Governor Connally. Would you mind explaining to us the nature of that disagree- ment and how it was resolved? | Senator Cooper. If you don’t mind, may I make just a short preliminary statement? First, I do want to thank the chairman and members of the committee for inviting the remaining members of the Warren Com- mission to be here. I think it has importance that we can give you our view of our work, our responsibilities, at a time 14 years before Ce a this date. Also, I appreciate the fact that recent studies and events in the intelligence community have raised new questions which have caused you to conduct this investigation. I would like to say that I agree wholeheartedly with the state- ment made by President Ford. We conducted our investigation, in the way he explained. I don’t know whether you will go into that 600 question with me, but we were not pressured in any way by any person or by any organization. We made our own decisions, as the President had asked us to do, and as we determined to do on the basis of what we thought was right and objective. We knew each other. I had known every member of the commis- sion before in some way. I cannot say we were intimate friends but we did know each other. We did have disagreements at times in the commission and, as I have noted, I think the chief debate grew out of the question as to whether there were two shots or three shots and whether the same shot that entered President Kennedy’s neck penetrated the body of Governor Connally. The original judgment of the FBI, the Secret Service, and the CIA was that there were three shots. I don’t think that convinced us except as a statement by people, many of them who were familiar with ballistics. This question troubled me greatly. If not the first witness, one of the first witnesses, was Governor Connally of Texas. I remember very clearly this testimony. He said, “I heard a shot, I turned immediately to the right, and looked over my shoulder in the direction of the Texas School Book Depository.’ Later, he said, “I am familiar with firearms and I knew the shot came from that direction. I then turned back, I wanted to look at the President, over my left shoulder. In turning back, I knew I was struck by a bullet.’’ He then fell or was pulled into the lap of his wife who was sitting to his left in the jumpseat, and he said, while lying there, he heard a shot and there fell over on him, into, I believe his hands, brain tissue, which, of course, he believed came from the President. We heard later the testimony of ballistics experts. Some contend- ed that because of the time element and relying to some degree upon the Zapruder films and other films, that is was not possible to turn off three shots in such a limited specified time. Others testi- fied that certainly there was the time, that the rifle was a perfect rifle for that kind of firing, that the alinement was correct, there was a slight deviation at the end, but it was perfectly possible with- in the area and time space, which was I think between 5 seconds and 8 seconds. I must say, to be very honest about it, that I held in my mind during the life of the Commission, as I have since, that there had been three shots and that a separate shot struck Governor Connal- ly. It was determined, as shown in the report of the Commission, which I can read to you, but I know you are familiar with the report. It states there was disagreement on this issue, particularly me the subject was debated, that there were different opinions about it. The majority believed that the same shot struck both President Kennedy and Governor Connally, but the report ended by saying, in effect, whatever was the fact, whether there was one, whether two or three shots, that it did not alter the conclusion of the Commission that Oswald was the sole assassin and there was no conspiracy. Mr. CorNWELL. Mr. McCloy, again I am sure the committee may wish to explore with you whatever comments you may have in light of the President’s testimony and which you may agree or 601 disagree with, but I would like to ask you about one subject matter. In an interview with our staff previously, and I hope I am quoting you substantially accurately, you expressed the view that the Com- mission did have enough time to reach its conclusions, but that you were greatly disturbed by the rushed composition and writing of the report. I wonder if you would explain that to us and comment upon it, if you would. Mr. McCoy. I will be very glad to. I would like to read a very brief statement from some notes about my general attitude toward this examination and the conclusions which we arrived at 14 years ago. With respect to this particular question that you put to me, there was a book called I think, “Rush to Judgment,” or some such title, and I had that in mind when I received this inquiry. There was no “rush to judgment.’ We came to a judgment in due course. There were some questions of style in regard to the preparation of the report where I would like to have had sort of a lawyer-like chance to make it a little more clear, from my point of view, as to what our conclusions were, but I had no question whatever about the substance of the report. As I say, it had only been a matter of style and I had a feeling at the end we were rushing a little bit the last few days to get to print rather than to arrive at any conclusions. We had already arrived e our conclusions. It was just a matter of putting them into good orm. I may anticipate some of your questions in this very brief state- ment I will read from my notes here, but I would like to put one or two points before you, if I may. | You, of course, know I was appointed by President Johnson to this Commission. He called me up personally and asked me to serve, and he referred to some of my prior experience in govern- ment. I had known President Johnson before and he was aware of some earlier work I had done in the investigative field. I gathered that this was one of the reasons why he desired to have me serve. He personally enlisted, I think, all our services, and we all had a deep sense of responsibility to present to the President and to the people the facts, all the facts, relating to the assassination. I believe that the Commission did aquit itself of that responsibili- ty. I had a strong impression after our first meeting with the Commission, which we had early on, that each of the men—let’s put it this way, not one of the members of the Commission had any prior conceptions as to facts surrounding the assassination. As Chief Justice Warren very bluntly put it, “truth is our only goal.” There are one or two things that I would like to say in addition to the reaffirmation of my belief that the report of the Commission does contain all the essential facts surrounding the assassination. I think it has stood well the test of time, and in short, I think it is a straightforward, objective, and reliable report of the essential cir- cumstances of that great crime. I don’t want to reexamine all of the evidence or defend the conclusions here. Probably, if I tried to defend them, it would take up too much time in the first place, and in the second place, it 602 probably wouldn’t be looked upon as an objective analysis when I got through with it. % But I do wish to point out one or two things that I think have not been sufficiently stressed, as far as I can tell, in the course of this investigation. We are, in New York, handicapped by the fact we don’t have any newspapers and we can’t follow from day to day what has transpired down here. But I would like to attempt to put in perhaps better perspective before this committee the contribu- tions which were made to the essential integrity and accuracy of the report by the trained and conscientious investigators who took part in making it. And I would refer, first, to the much-maligned Dallas police force. I also refer, of course, to the FBI investigators and those of the CIA who were called on to assist, and the Secret Service and a number of other agencies. And, lastly, I would like to do justice to the Commission itself and its staff in arriving at these conclusions. These factors have not been sufficiently stressed either here, so far as I know, and indeed, in any of the commentaries I have seen over the years. By and large, I would say that we had the benefit of very skilled and valuable investigative services in the course of reaching our conclusions. In the course of our work, I had ample opportunity to come in contact with the people that were doing this work and I have, generally, a very favorable impression of the quality of that work. And coming back for a moment to the Dallas police force, I think it. was rather remarkable the way that police force, bedeviled as they were by newspaper reporters and the press at that point and by the other pressures they were under, performed and that they should be given credit for the prompt and, in many cases, excellent police work which resulted in the very early apprehension of the assassin. | The Dallas police were responsible for the early collection of | evidence which came to be of vital significance and they were also beset by all of these other agencies that were pounding around them at the time, including those of the Commission. I was rather impressed with the way they handled themselves in spite of the fact that there was a great dereliction of duty in connection with the provisions they made for the security of Oswald, resulting in his death. But my point is, in spite of that, you can’t and shouldn’t deny the Dallas police credit for an assiduous and, I think, prompt and efficient bit of police work. it The FBI made some mistakes and some misinterpretations, and } we criticized them for the lack of full surveillance of Oswald that they probably should have undertaken before the assassination, | But their work generally, I think, was of rather high order, and I don’t see that, as President Ford said, the mistakes, such as I can recall them now, had any relevancy or any reflection upon the conclusions which the Commission reached. | I would refer to the staff of the Commission itself, which has already been referred to by President Ford. It is not true we didn’t have our own investigative facilities. There was a very distin- guished group of litigating lawyers that constituted the staff. I remember I was called upon to make suggestions as to who we 603 might get from my knowledge of the bar. We had a very impressive list and they did excellent work. - It is not true, as has been alleged, that we relied entirely on the agencies of the Government. Mr. Ford has brought that all out. I subscribe to what he said. But I would also like to refer to the Commission itself. The Commission itself had considerable ability, in terms of experience in investigative procedures. Here is Judge Cooper; he was also a judge as well as a Senator. He was a county judge in Kentucky, and I am sure in connection with that position he had a great deal of experience in investigative work and in balancing judgments on r evidence. Hale Boggs, who is deceased, had a lot of investigative work in _the House, certainly. I don’t know that he ever held an office as a prosecuting attorney, but Senator Russell, who is also now dead, had been, as I recall, a county attorney or prosecuting attorney. Justice Warren, himself, had been not only the former Governor of the State of California, but he had been attorney general and I think he had been. a State prosecuting officer before that. You know the experience of Allen Dulles. As for myself, I don’t | want to overemphasize it, but I spent 10 years of my life on a case ' which people have now forgotten about, but it was a rather famous case at one time. It was called the Black Tom case. It involved _litigation—you probably heard of it—it had international and na- tional prominence, at one time. It is hard to conceive of any experi- ence that required any more exacting or more sustained investiga- | tive work than that litigation did. The outcome of it finally didn’t take place until just before the beginning of World War II. It _ related to crimes that had been committed by the German Govern- ment in this country while we were neutral in World War I— murder, arson, explosions, and sabotage were involved. I won’t go into all the details of it, but it took years of my time and experi- ence, and I had rather extensive investigative training as a result of it. I am simply saying that this Commission was far from a naive group. When the President asked me to take this position, he referred to my Black Tom experience. He said, you have a reputa- tion for having some investigative experience. But he said, what I _have in mind is something in the nature of the royal Commission which the British made such good use of and still do. It was something after that pattern that he was thinking in terms of the Presidential Commission that he set up. I don’t know if that throws a great deal of light on what his motivations were, _ but certainly he put a great deal of pressure on us in terms of the responsibility that he was putting on our shoulders. He was clearly very sensitive of how important an investigation this was. So, I think the combination of the investigative experience, of not only the staff but of the Commission itself, was rather impres- sive. They weren’t, as I say, naive. They had the know-how and the experience of weighing facts and evidence. It may be some of them didn’t attend all the formal meetings, but the record doesn’t show : what work they did do outside of meetings. For example, I person- ally traced every step that I think that Oswald took after he committed the crime. 604 I sat there in the little cubbyhole he had from which he shot at the school depository; I worked and reworked the bolt of the rifle. I have had a good bit of experience with firearms and I knew a good: bit about ballistics. I spent a lot of time in match shooting, using bolt-action rifles. And I tested for myself what I thought a man could do in terms of firing that particular rifle. And the contacts that we had with the various witnesses and the staff, none of which are a part of the record, are perhaps not understood. I think if you had a realization of all this work, you would find that the Commis- sion as a whole was really most assiduous in terms of its applica- tion to its task. It didn’t simply sit back and accept something that was handed to it. Perhaps I would suggest that the sum total of the experience, of the investigative experience of the Commission far exceeded that of all the commentators that came along after the event and broke into print purporting to be experts in the matter. We, of course, had some questions and differences of view; we talked to each other—Senator Cooper, I recall, had considerable doubt about this question of the path of the bullet which hit Connally. If I may just draw for a minute on my personal experi- ence—perhaps I shouldn’t do this—but it influenced my judgment. It was an important element in arriving at my own judgment in regard to that bullet, the so-called single bullet theory. Twice in my life, and I am sure a number of people in this room may have had a somewhat similar experience, I stood right along- side of a man as he was shot. The first man—it was in World War I in France—was killed. The second man recovered from his wound. The circumstances of the second experience were really quite amazing. I am convinced, after my experience, that on occasion, when you are shot, you don’t know the minute you are hit. There is a sort of a perceptible period following the impact before you get the full realization that you have been hit. In the first case, it was a fellow officer in World War I. We were not far apart and he quietly said, “Jack, I think I am hit.” He shortly collapsed subsequently and died of his wound. The other experience, which is almost unbelievable, was in Berlin when we were rehearsing for the reception of President Truman, who was going to visit us at the American headquarters in Berlin after the war. I had been, as you know, an official of the Government, Military Governor, and later High Commissioner for Germany, and Gen. Lucius Clay, my predecessor as Military Gover- nor was with me, and we began to rehearse the ceremony because President Truman was coming along that afternoon to visit the headquarters. We were rehearsing, for example, who would step up and first shake hands with the President, when the bugles should sound off, et cetera—“You are going to do this and you that.” There was a friend of mine who was on Clay’s staff and who later became a very distinguished jurist in Massachusetts. He became Chief Judge of the Supreme Judicial Court. His name was Cutter, and we designated him to pose as the President. We said, “‘you are going to be President Truman, you are going to be the President and are to stand here.” We started through the rehearsal. This was in front of the headquarters in Berlin and, by 605 George, Cutter turned to me at a certain point, sort of hesitated and said, “Jack, I think I’m shot,” and in a little while, he col- lapsed. You can imagine what a tizzy that created. There were Secret Service people all around. Here was the man we were setting out to impersonate the President of the United States who was shot. And here again there was a very definite perpen’ period following the shooting before he fully realized he was hit. I know Governor Connally very well; I have shot quail with him and I know he’s a good shot and I know he is familiar with firearms. Frankly, I don’t think he knew exactly when he was hit. I saw his recent testimony—at least somebody reported to me, perhaps indirectly, that he wasn’t as certain now as when he first appeared before us—before our Commission when he said he was sure it wasn’t the same shot which hit President Kennedy which hit him. I don’t know where that bullet could have gone if it didn’t go through Governor Connally. Moreover, Governor Connally didn’t know until the next day, I think it was, that he had been shot in the hand, as well as in the body. I am suggesting that the certainty which he felt earlier isn’t entirely reliable. The Germans have a word for it. They call it the “nachschlag.” I believe those who had been close to places where people have been shot are frequently aware of a perceptible delay on the part of the victim in registering an awareness of the shot. Insofar as the conspiracy issue is concerned, there has been so much talk about it that I don’t think I need to dwell on it any further. I no longer feel we simply had no credible evidence or reliable evidence in proof of a conspiracy, but I rather think the weight of evidence is affirmatively against the existence of a con- spiracy, though it falls short of proof. I know how difficult, and you all know how difficult it is, to prove a negative. Somebody may pop up at some point and come forth with some affirmative testimony that would be credible when you have not been able to find it. But we weren’t able to find it in spite of all our rather extensive efforts. And I think we inquired of every agency that purported to have any information about it and all of the reports which came back to us were negative. I wouldn’t know what kind of an agency could have told Oswald to stand ready in Dallas to shoot the President of the United States or at some other point when the opportunity arose. It was hard for me to concoct a conspiracy, whether with the assistance of Oswald or not, when there were so many fortuitous circumstances. Oswald clearly, in my judgment and everybody else’s judgment, I think, who purports to be objective about it, was the undisputed assassin of the President of the United States, and that in a very brutal manner he indisputably killed Tippit closely following the assassi- nation. He also had tried to kill General Walker. If Walker hadn’t pulled his head back the minute of the shot, he would have been a goner, too. Oswald, the evidence shows, was a killer and he was a loner. Having said that, my chief objective is now to try to give this committee the conviction that the Warren Commission was a rather well-equipped organization, because of its experience and because of the standing of the members, to perform its duties. This 41-372 O - 79 = 39(Vol. 3) 606 is relative to the question as to what should be done if this situa- tion arose again. | This is something that has been puzzling me as to what one should do, because I know the disrepute in which the findings of the Commission, our Commission, have been held. The Gallup | Polls, I have been told, have shown that some 80 percent didn’t believe our report to have been thorough and reliable. | I didn’t talk this over with President Ford, but I was interested — when he was asked the question. He said he thought he would do pretty much the same thing as President Johnson did. I had rather come to that conclusion myself because I have the feeling—this may be too subjective—that the Commission was a very thorough bipartisan unit, got together and hammered out an objective, reli- able report. It did act in somewhat the same manner as the royal Commissions of Great Britain have done in the past. They have — proven to be a rather effective form of investigating body. I would hesitate to put legislation on the books now that would | tend to set a rigid form for future investigations. I think you have to deal with the situations as they develop. I do believe that things have improved and some defects disclosed. I believe better commu- nication between investigating agencies is apt to take place in the future, partially due to the criticism we made in our report of the prior work of the FBI in terms of surveillance, as well as in the findings of this committee. I don’t know, however, that you can today sit down and work out a piece of legislation that ought to cover all future assassination. Let’s hope that we never have a — recurrence. Suppose I just stop here and let you carry on with any other questions you may have, and I will try to answer them to the best of my ability. Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you. That answered my question and I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Stokes. Thank you, counsel. Do any other members of the committee have questions? Mr. Sawyer, the gentleman from Michigan. Mr. Sawyer. Just more of an observation than a question. I think that the most puzzling and unsatisfactory part of the conclu- sions of the Warren Commission, to me, had always been the single-bullet theory. I had trouble with that. I think that the evi- dence that has been produced before this committee, and what I think was a superior scientific analysis by some NASA people who worked with that question, I think, at least in this committee member’s opinion, has made me a total convert to the single-bullet theory, and I think we have, to any reasonable mind, now proved that beyond a reasonable doubt. _I don’t think there was any deficiency in the Warren Commis- sion members. I just think that there was a superior scientific analysis of it, particularly one that made use of a still picture from the opposite side of the street of Magruder which, by placement of things in a car, was able to position Mr. Connally in the car at a position laterally, considerably to the left of the President, which I had never really appreciated before. So that it was their conclusion that the bullet that went through the President’s neck could not have missed Governor Connally. 607 | Mr. McCtovy. I don’t think it could have missed Connally. I think \we were a little lax in the Commission in connection with the use of those X-rays. I was rather critical of Justice Warren at that time. I thought he was a little too sensitive of the sensibilities of | the family. He didn’t want to have put into the record some of the | photographs and some of the X-rays taken at the time. | We took the testimony of course, of the doctors and probably | with the X-rays—we wouldn’t have been able to read the X-rays if we hadn’t had the doctors’ testimony. I believe later on a more thorough examination of those pictures and the X-rays and photo- | graphs with the respective positions of the President and Connally | did produce a more convincing proof of where that bullet went. | As I say, I don’t know where else it could have gone. I have | talked with Governor Connally about it on a number of occasions, i and I was very much interested to see he was a little shaken the | last time he testified here. He had a conviction earlier that it was a |second bullet that hit him. | Mr. Sawyer. I think we have had some evidence that would tend | to bear out Governor Connally’s recollection. I think there has | been considerable evidence now that the first bullet missed every- | thing, and it was the second bullet that hit the President and | Governor Connally which then coincides with his testimony be- cause he probably would not have heard the shot that hit him. But in any event, I also wanted to commend you on your conclusionary statement in the Warren Commission that there was no evidence of a conspiracy because you, as a lawyer, I am sure, appreciate about as far as you can go in proving a negative is to say that there was no evidence of the affirmative. Mr. McC oy. That’s right. Mr. Sawyer. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ee Chairman Sroxes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. Mr. Dopp. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. McCloy and Senator Cooper, it is wonderful to see you again, particularly you, Senator Cooper. I remember meeting you on a number of occasions when you served in the Senate. It is a pleasure to see you here this morning. Senator Cooper. Thank you. Pardon me, could you speak just a little bit louder? Mr. Dopp. I will try and speak a little more clearly. It is nice to see you here this morning. I would like to just ask you, if I could, | “teed a lyates You heard this morning the testimony of President ord. Senator Cooper. Yes. Mr. Dopp. And I specifically asked him some questions with regard to a memo that was drafted by Mr. DeLoach from the FBI pursuant to a conversation. Senator Cooper. Yes. Mr. Dopp. That then Congressman Ford had with Mr. DeLoach. Senator Cooper. Yes. Mr. Dopp. At the outset of the Warren Commission hearings. President Ford, in his response to my question this morning, indi- cated that it was not an uncommon thing for a Member of Con- gress to have a relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investiga- 608 tion, have someone there you might know, talk over things with and so forth. That was the gist, as I understood it, in part anyway, of his answer to my question. My question to you, Senator Cooper, is this: As a member of the Warren Commission and also as a Member of Congress, at the time that the Warren Commission began its work, did you have any such meetings or interviews with anyone from the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Central Intelligence Agency which you initi- ated on your own to report in a confidential way the happenings of executive sessions of the Warren Commission? | Senator Cooper. First, I never initiated nor did the FBI ever initiate any conversation or correspondence with me. I met Mr. Hoover socially. I never talked to him about anything connected with his work. We just met him. I knew Mr. McCone chiefly because my wife was from California and had known him. It hap- | pened his wife was from my State, Kentucky. We saw each other socially, but never during this time or after did we ever discuss the work of the Warren Commission or the work of the CIA as it | applied to the Warren Commission. | Mr. Dopp. Thank you, Senator. Senator Cooper. I never discussed with the Secret Service during this time any of their duties or their responsibilities outside the hearings. After it was over, 2 or 3 years later, I was accompanying President Johnson to Kentucky on a trip. Mr. Youngblood of the Secret Service was in the car with us. President Johnson got out and spoke to everybody on a country road for 50 miles. Mr. | Youngblood turned around and said—I was in the same car—he | said, “you remember what I told you?” As he had told the Commis- sion, it is almost impossible to protect the President who wants to see the people. Mr. Dopp. Thank you, Senator. Senator Cooper. I was asked this one question, and I am not going to take up your time, but in order that my first answer may not be misconstrued, would it be permissible for me to make two or three comments? Mr. Dopp. Certainly. Senator Cooper. First, I would like you to consider the difference in the time from 1963 to date. The FBI, at that time, was headed by Mr. Hoover who had been appointed Director continuously. He had, I would say, a good reputation. I don’t think anybody ever thought about the CIA meddling in internal affairs. The shock of the President’s death called for an immediate inves- tigation. It actually lay in the jurisdiction of Texas. There was no law that would permit the Congress to investigate. We were given that right by statute, also the right to subpena witnesses and also to give immunity. We never gave immunity to anyone. We provided complete pro- tection to witnesses—right of attorney, right of record, right to cross-examine, and open hearing if they desired. Only Mr. Lane asked for an open hearing. We also had advisers sitting in with us from Texas: Mr. Jaworski, well-known today, the president of the American Bar Association; also Mr. Louis Powell, now Justice Powell of the Supreme Court, sat in at times. They took turns. And Mr. Eberstadt of New Orleans, former president of the American 609 Bar Association. Now, I just want to say this. As far as the killing of the late President Kennedy, we will always remember it with sadness. There is no evidence of any kind except that is directed toward Oswald: his rifle was purchased under an assumed name, but directed to his post office box; the cartridge shells which were down on the floor; the tests which showed that this was the only rifle which had the markings which were shown on the bullets; the fact that a man was seen by several witnesses, not identified, but seen in the window with the general description of what he looked like; his flight immediately; the fact that within a few minutes it was radioed that the killer perhaps came from the Texas Book Depository and radio cars were circling the city. That is the reason Tippit was circling the city; the fact Tippit was killed and his killing witnessed by several witnesses brought Oswald to the Texas police offices. The police had already found the cartridges and the rifles and the bag in the Texas School Depository and within a half an hour, those facts were known. Now, people have said that somebody told them that they saw somebody on the railroad bank or saw somebody going over the bank, but no one has ever been able to show any cartridges, any rifle, any pistol, no one has ever found anything other than the evidence about Oswald. I would like that to be known; these facts are in the summary which I think is a very good one. The intelligence investigation under the leadership of Senator Church, which I know has helped cause this investigation by you, points out that the agencies did not disclose certain facts to us and that certain plots were going on. At the time we were in session, they should have been disclosed to us. They were not disclosed to us. We knew nothing about them. There was no testimony of conspiracy—Oswald’s efforts to get in touch with the Soviets and with the Cuban Fair Play groups in New York were rebuffed, rebuffed at every step—I think he felt he was a failure and for the United States and for President Kennedy and all of us. He knew he was a failure at everything he tried, frustrated, with a very sad life, but he was a Marxist. Very curious, at the age of about 13 years, he began to study Marxism and he kept on in his writing, affirming that he was a Marxist. Probably he did want to show himself as a great, supreme Marx- ist. Rather, like the anarchists of the last century, he didn’t care if he was killed or not. They just wanted to be known. We found no trace of any conspiracy. Our staff not only received | the reports from these agencies, they examined them. They ques- tioned them. They went to the files of the FBI and CIA to see if there were any informants, if Oswald was an informant. They did a thorough job and I join with President Ford and Mr. McCloy in praising them. But they did not disclose to us all the facts. I wanted to make this statement to make it clear that I concur wholly in what President Ford and Mr. McCloy have said, that we did our best. We found what we could at that time—the truth. If somebody else can find something else which we didn’t find, that, of course, is a duty on their part, as is the truth. It will be the truth. I do make this final statement. I don’t think many people have ever read the report. Who has read 26 volumes of this case? How 610 many read the summary? If you read the summary, it takes a long time. Everything is in there and one of the reasons I know few people have read the summary i., there are some very interesting little side stories in it, that newspapermen and others would have published. For example—and I will quit—the press dodger that was put out on the streets in Dallas. In this summary, it shows that that author just before he was discharged from the Army in Munich, he and a comrade demanded to go back to Dallas; they were trying to figure out ways they could make the quickest, and they said, we will go back to Dallas and we will infiltrate the John Birch and YAF and that’s what they did. I just have talked too long, but I congratulate you on the efforts you are making. I am very proud to come back, to speak on the disinterested effort we have made and I believe that, with all due respect, that the decisions we made, when we turned our final report over to President Johnson, will stand in history. Mr. Dopp. Thank you very much, Senator, for your statement. Mr. McCloy, if I can I would like to just address the very same question I did to Senator Cooper, the first initial question I had for him, the same one I had in the light of the questioning, that I followed this morning with President Ford, and that is whether or not you, as a member of the Commission, at any time, whether during the organizational meetings of the Warren Commission or any time after that, initiated any contact on your own in a confi- dential manner to report or confide in those agencies with regard to the happenings of the Warren Commission? Mr. McCtoy. No, I had no such contact. I saw their agents and talked to them but I initiated no contact with them whatever. Mr. Dopp. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Stokes. Time has expired. Any more members seeking recognition? Mr. McCoy. May I make one addition to the record. I don’t like to let that Berlin situation stand without pointing out the reason that Mr. Cutter was shot was because a major was cleaning his pistol three or four blocks from where this took place and the bullet came in and hit this man that was posing as President of the United States, and everything quieted down after that. But it was an extraordinary circumstance. Chairman Stokes. Gentlemen, Mr. McCloy and Senator Cooper, on behalf of the committee, I want to thank both of you for having appeared here today and taken the time to give us the benefit of your observations with reference to the service you rendered while members of this very distinguished panel of Americans, and you certainly have been very helpful to this committee, and we also appreciate the time you have expended with our staff, and at this time, does counsel have something further? Mr. CorNWELL. Before we adjourn, it might be a good idea to make a matter of record JFK exhibits F-476 and F-477, a chart of the Warren Commission and a photographic blowup of the Warren Commission members that have been displayed during the testimo- ny of the last three witnesses, and perhaps we could enter them into the record at this time? 611 Chairman Strokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this time. [The above referred to JFK exhibits F-476 and F-477 follow:| THE WARREN COMMISSION Richard B. | John Sherman Hale Earl Gerald Allen W. John J. _ RUSSELL COOPER BOGGS WARREN FORD DULLES McCLOY J. Lee RANKIN Norman REDLICH Howard P. WILLENS Alfred GOLDBERG Melvin A. EISENBERG Charles N. SHAFFER, Jr. |. Basic Facts of Il. Identity of lil. LHO’s IV. Possible V. Oswald’s VI. Presidential Assassination Assassin Background Conspiratorial § Death Protection Relationships ~--}----~--} --~-~~- [SENIOR COUNSELS]~------ ------- --- Francis W.H. Joseph Albert William Leon ADAMS BALL JENNER COLEMAN HUBERT —--t-------} ---- JUNIOR COUNSELS] ———————-——-------— fete Arlen David Wesley W. David Burt Samuel A. SPECTER BELIN LIEBELER SLAWSON GRIFFIN STERN LIAISONS Jim Davis - assigned from State Dept. to consult Thomas Kelley - Secret Service with WC about approaching USSR Abram Chayes - State Department Ted Sorensen - White House H. Miller - Justice Department Adam Yarmolinsky - Defense Department R. Helms - CIA James J. Malley - FBI JFK Exnuisit F-476 JFK Exnuisit F-477 So again we thank you very much for having appeared, and you are now excused. Mr. McCoy. Thank you very much. 612 Senator Cooper. Thank you. Chairman Stokes. At this time the committee will stand in recess until 1 p.m., in the afternoon. [Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee was recessed, to recon- vene at 1 p.m. of the same day.] AFTERNOON SESSION Chairman SToKEs. The committee will come to order. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The next witness to be called this afternoon is J. Lee Rankin. — Mr. Rankin served as General Counsel to the Warren Commission. He received an A.B. degree in 1928, and LL.B. degree in 1930, from the University of Nebraska. He is admitted to practice in New | York, Nebraska, and the District of Columbia. Mr. Rankin served from 1953 to 1956 as an Assistant Attorney General of the United States Department of Justice, in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, and from 1956 to 1961 as the Solicitor ; General of the United States. | After serving as General Counsel to the Warren Commission, he — became the corporation counsel for the city of New York from 1966 to 1972. Currently he is in private practice in New York with the firm of Rankin and Rankin. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Rankin. | Chairman STokEs. The committee calls Mr. Rankin. Please raise your right hand to be sworn. Do you solemnly swear | the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the _ whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Thank you, you may be seated. The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. Klein. Mr. Kien. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sir, could you please state your full name for the record? TESTIMONY OF J. LEE RANKIN, FORMER GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE WARREN COMMISSION Mr. RANKIN. My full name is James Lee Rankin. Mr. Kern. Mr. Rankin, what was your position with the Warren Commission? Mr. Rankin. I was General Counsel. Mr. Kuern. And could you give us an idea of what your duties were as General Counsel? Mr. RANKIN. I had the executive responsibilities for the staff working under the Commission. Mr. Kirin. Were you in charge of the day-to-day operations of the Warren Commission staff? Mr. RANKIN. Yes, I was. Mr. Kein. How did it come about that you became General Counsel for the Commission? Mr. RANKIN. I was called by Chief Justice Warren and asked whether I would be willing to serve as General Counsel for the Commission and I told him I would have to call him back, and I finally said I would but probably the rest of the Commissioners 613 would not want me and he had better find out whether they wish me to be General Counsel. He said he had already found out before he asked me and they were unanimous about my being the General Counsel. I then came down and was sworn in as Counsel. Mr. Kuen. Was there any discussion at that time about the goals of the Commission? Mr. RANKIN. The only discussion was that we were to try to find out who the assassin was and whether there was anyone else involved in it beyond the person whom we found to be the one who committed the act. Mr. Kier. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would ask that the chart already up, marked JFK F-476 be received as a committee exhibit. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be received. VE above referred to JFK exhibit F-476 was entered previous- y. Mr. Kern. Looking at that chart, which is on the extreme left, Mr. Rankin, it is entitled ““The Warren Commission”, is that an accurate representation of the personnel who worked for the Warren Commission? Mr. RANKIN. Yes, it is. It does not include all of the personnel, of course, but does set forth the upper layers of it, and the Commis- sioners. Mr. KuieEIn. Could you tell us how the investigation itself was organized? Mr. RANKIN. I proposed an investigation that would consist of five parts and went to the Chairman, the Chief Justice, and the Commissioners, with that proposal, and it was accepted and that is the way we proceeded. They are all described on the chart there. Mr. Kuen. How did you determine what the five parts it would be organized into would be? Mr. RANKIN. Well, it seemed to be a logical division of the responsibilities of trying to discharge our requirements under the executive order of the President. Mr. Kuen. Do you recall at this time what the five areas were? Mr. RANKIN. Well, I wouldn’t wish to miss any of them. If you have them, if you will just recite them, I can tell you whether they are correct or not. Mr. Kuen. The facts of the assassination, the identity of the assassin, the background of Lee Harvey Oswald, conspiracy, inves- tigation and death of Lee Harvey Oswald. Are those the five areas? Mr. RANKIN. That is correct. tho. Kien. How many lawyers were assigned to each of these areas! Mr. RANKIN. There were two on each of the areas. Mr. KiE1n. Would it be fair to say the the the Federal Bureau of AE i did most of the investigation for the Warren Commis- sion? Mr. RANKIN. Well, that would be accurate as to the proportions, if you mean by most, percentage-wise, but we used all of the intelligence agencies of the Government before we got through and sometimes we used one intelligence agency on matters that we were not satisfied concerning and which were worked upon by 614 another intelligence agency. Oftentimes we wanted a doublecheck or felt that there were some inaccuracies or we were not complete- — ly satisfied, and asked some other agency that had no apparent relationship to check on the matter for us. Mr. Kuier1n. Whose decision was it to use Federal agencies as opposed to hiring investigators? Mr. RANKIN. That was a decision of the Commission, although I recommended that kind of a procedure because I described various possibilities of getting outside investigators and that it might take a long period of time to accumulate them, find out what their — expertise was, and whether they could qualify to handle sensitive | information in the Government, and it might be a very long time before we could even get a staff going that could work on the matter, let alone have any progress on it. Mr. Kern. In 1964, at the conclusion of the investigation, what was your opinion of the performance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation? Mr. RANKIN. Well, as to their cooperation with us, I thought it — was good. We were critical about some of the things that happened about alerting the Secret Service, about information that they knew about and we learned they had not informed the Secret Service about. That was all in the report. But as far as not being frank and open with us and revealing what information they had, we assumed that they did that. I did, at least, and I think the Commission did. | Mr. KieIn. You have partially anticipated my next question, — which is, today, 1978, with what you learned over the course of the years, what is your opinion with respect to the performance of the — Federal Bureau of Investigation? ! Mr. RANKIN. Well, I have been very much disappointed with some of the things that have been revealed and I have, of course, no personal knowledge about those matters. I have just read them in the press from the reports of investigations by the Senate com- mittee and others, but I had a close relationship with J. Edgar Hoover while I was in the Department of Justice and it was always friendly, but also professional, and I thought good. I never believed that he would withhold information or have it withheld from any- body like the Commission or that the FBI would do that. It seemed to me from my experiences that they were more pro- fessional than to do anything of that character. When I learned that they were supposed to have known about plans for an assassi- nation that were underway in the CIA, according to the investiga- tion of the Senate committee , and did not report it to us,and that we didn’t receive any such information from the CIA, it was quite disheartening to me to know that that kind of conduct was a part of the action of our intelligence agencies at that high level. Mr. Ken. I only asked the question as applying to the FBI, but your answer applies to the CIA and the FBI; is that correct? Mr. Rankin. I think it was our experience as it is revealed by investigation on the Senate committee. With the CIA it is worse than with the FBI because the FBI apparently did not originate the assassination plans and apparently the CIA did. So the FBI only happened on to them or were informed about such plans and then did not convey them to us. 615 But the CIA, they were apparently involved in them and did not alert us to the situation at all, give us any opportunity to take the action that we should have had the chance to, of investigating that type of information. Mr. Kien. As General Counsel of the Warren Commission, you had no knowledge whatsoever of the assassination plots against Fidel Castro? Mr. RANKIN. That is true, I did not. Mr. KLEIN. What were some of the pressures, the political pres- sures, time pressures, that were exerted upon the Warren Commis- sion staff? Mr. RANKIN. We had pressures from the beginning on the time element because the country was anxious to know what had hap- || pened and whether there was any conspiracy involved. I was as- sured by the Chief Justice that it would only take me 2 or 3 ‘| months at the outside in this job and that is all the time I would be away from my law practice, and, of course, I wished to get the job ‘| done correctly and properly, but also to get back to my other work. || On the other hand, the first meeting we had with the staff, I told || them that our only client was the truth and that was what we must search for and try to reveal. I think we adhered to that, that |) we never departed from that standard, any of the Commission or ‘| myself or the staff. We tried as conscientiously as possible to ‘| convey the information explicitly that we discovered. Mr. Kuen. The report, the final report was completed in Septem- | ber of 1964. Was there any pressure to get that report out before | the election in November? Mr. RANKIN. I didn’t think there was any pressure. There was an | expression by some members of the Commission that it would be _ better if the problem of the assassination and whether any conspir- acy was involved and what had happened, who the assassin was, as _the Commission found, if all of those questions were not injected into the various political conventions, but there was no indication at any time that we should try to get the report out for any such purpose and not adequately make a report or investigate whatever sources we were able to find. Mr. KueIn. Were there any pressures exerted not to find a for- eign conspiracy because of the dire consequences that such a con- spiracy might have for war or peace? Mr. RANKIN. None at all. There was a conscientious effort throughout to try to discover anything that would reveal that there Me a conspiratorial action about the assassination of the Presi- ent. Mr. Kien. On that question of a possible conspiracy, the Com- mission has been criticized over the years for not devoting enough time, effort, and resources to investigating the question of whether there was a conspiracy to assassinate the President. Would you tell us first, do you believe that the Commission did devote adequate time and resources to that question, and second, would you give us an idea of how the Commission went about investigating whether there was a conspiracy? Mr. RANKIN. Well, I think that they did an adequate job in that regard. The problem of what could be discovered concerning what- ever happened in the Soviet Union and whether there was any 616 involvement there was necessarily a very difficult matter because of the closed nature of their society. Our opportunity, even with I the best penetration that we were able to learn of by our own | intelligence people, to reach within that society and discover mate- | rial that could be relied on, was quite sparse to say the least. | We, within the domestic community, made great efforts, and we § followed out as far as we thought there was any reason to believe | that there was a possibility of any Cuban involvement. If we had had the information from the CIA, we certainly would have run out those leads and tried to find out whatever we could in that 7 area, but we were not given the advantage of that. Mr. Kuen. The Commission has received a good deal of criticism to the effect that in some areas in the final report the evidence was © not strong enough to support the conclusions reached in that — report; and that some staff members immediately prior to the © issuance of the report stated that in certain areas they felt the evidence was not strong enough to support the conclusions. What would be your position in reply to this criticism? | Mr. RANKIN. I do not think it is a valid criticism. I examined, I } think, every word of the report before it was printed and I con- stantly tried to understate rather than overstate the findings, the position of the Commission on all of the various matters that it acted upon and reported upon. These positions were carefully reviewed by the Commissioners, in fact by each one of them, and they argued them, and the staff — presented such materials they had and the Commissioners exam- | ined it. They participated in hearings and it was their disposition, | so expressed, that the report not overstate what the Commission found and the evidence that would support it. | Mr. KLEIN. In connection with this issue of whether the report overstated the evidence, I would like to read you a portion from a deposition of Mr. David Slawson, one of your staff counsel he made the statement in 1978, when he was deposed by this committee. I stand corrected, it was at an executive hearing before this committee, that he made this statement. He said, “I think because Earl Warren was adamant almost that the Commission would make up its mind on what it thought was the truth, and then they would state it as much without qualification as they could, he wanted to lay at rest doubts. ‘He made no secret of this on the staff. It was consistent with his philosophy as a judge.” Do you agree with this statement by Mr. Slawson? Mr. RANKIN. No, I don’t. That was not in character with the Chief Justice in my experience with him. He was explicit that he thought we should not spare any effort in trying to find out the answer to the question whether or not there was any other involve- ment than Oswald in the assassination. But with regard to what we should say about it, or report about it, he was always very vehement and expressive that we should tell it exactly as it was. Mr. KLEIN. As you sit here today, do still believe the conclusions of the Warren Commission to be correct? Mr. RANKIN. I do. Mr. Kern. In retrospect, what, if anything, would have been done differently in the Warren Commission’s investigation? 617 Mr. RANEIN. As I have said, if we had the information from the CIA and FBI, that they failed to give us, certainly those leads should have been followed out to discover whether or not there was anything of a conspiratorial nature involved. I assume that this committee has been doing that and that if you had anything of that kind we would know it by now, one way or the other. But otherwise it has been suggested we could have taken a longer time. Of course, you could go'on and on for years on any- | thing of that kind. But I think there are reasonable limits and the Congress, I am sure, recognize that. I think the American people || do. They realize that you can’t spend forever on matters of that || kind and there is a limit to the amount of money that the people | would want to spend, all within reasonable limits, I think. We never had any difficulty on problems about money. We were assured that by the President. Our expenses were paid out of the Presidential funds. We received’ any money we needed, and we were never at any time told that we were to limit ourselves in that regard. Nevertheless, we would certainly not have wanted a staff | just staying on and on nitpicking at a lot of little things that didn’t || have apparently any prospect of success. Mr. Kein. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You say you have no further questions? Mr. KLEIN. No. Chairman StTokEs. Thank you, counsel. The procedure at this point will be the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer, for such time as he may consume, after which we will go to the 5-mimute rule. Mr. Sawyer. Counsel, Mr. Rankin, has the fact that the Warren Commission report, according to all polls, received so much poor acceptance by the American people, given you any pause to reflect on whether you went about it correctly or not? Mr. Rankin. Not really. You know, as a part of my job as General Counsel, I researched all of the assassinations and a number in regard to other countries, and went into the materials that were available about the assassination of President Lincoln. I discovered that there was a large body of opinion that didn’t be- lieve any of the findings about Lincoln’s assassination, and about other people that had been assassinated. Apparently that is the lot of anybody that works in this kind of a field. Mr. Sawyer. Did you make any effort either as a staff or, to your knowledge, as a Commission, to determine just where Oswald was going at the time he was intercepted by Officer Tippit? Mr. RANKIN. We speculated on it but speculations aren’t worth much. Mr. Sawyer. Did you come to any reasonable hypothesis as to where he was going? Mr. RANKIN. We all agreed that he was on his way to try to escape but where we didn’t know, and everything from that point on was just one person’s guess against another’s. Mr. Sawyer. Of course, I presume you were aware that the direction in which he was heading at the time that he was con- 618 fronted by Tippit kind of led to nowhere with respect to either escape routes or anything, just out in the neighborhood? . Mr. RANKIN. We didn’t think that was really the complete answer because at that point he was very hardpressed and we thought he was more in the posture of just running. Mr. Sawyer. Well, did you find out that Jack Ruby’s apartment was about two or three blocks up the street, also on the direct route he was going? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Mr. Sawyer. Did you also find out that in the Dallas newspaper — announcement of the President’s visit, that on the same page was the identity of an informant who had substantially destroyed the Communist Party in Texas by informing to the FBI and he was — identified as living just about two blocks up the street, also on the direct route he was going? Mr. RANKIN. I don’t recall that I was aware of that. Mr. Sawyer. But other than just the fact that on this some 14% or 15 minute walk he had taken through a neighborhood after leaving his roominghouse, other than just running or escaping, you had formed no hypothesis on where he may have been going or what his intent may have been? Mr. RANKIN. That is true, we did not. Mr. Sawyer. With respect to—As you are undoubtedly aware, much of the criticism of the Warren Commission report and much of the basis of the various critics who have written extensively on the subject has been centered about one thing, principally the single bullet theory and the fact that available time did not permit one assassin. You made a decision or you and the Commission not to allow access to the autopsy information. Are you still satisfied with that decision as being a sound one? Mr. Rankin. Yes, I am. I think it has been revealed, that the basis of the decision was that the Kennedy family did not wish to have the pictures of the President, as shown by the X-rays and the other pictures after the assassination attempt, be the way that the American people and the world would remember the dead Presi- dent. We thought we had good evidence from the doctors who were involved at the hospital in Dallas and also at the autopsy, and we did not want the President’s memory to be presented in that manner, and we had already promised the American people that the investigation that everything that we obtained, except for such matters as involved national security, would be made available to them, so we would have had to publish it, if we used it ourselves. In light of that, I think the choice that was made was correct and I don’t think it has done any harm. I still would hate to have published throughout the world those pictures as a rememberance of our President. Mr. Sawyer. On the other hand, Mr. Rankin, this committee staff and the committee made all of that original material availa- ble to a panel of pathologists, but we did not feel any necessity to make the pictures themselves public. To the extent they were relevant we had drawings made from the original and produced them and were able, I feel, to have totally laid at rest the one bullet theory, because of the ability to determine the points of entry of wounds and exits to be able to project back from those ( 7 |wounds to locations from which firings occurred, and I don’t think we were in any way compelled to or did do anything either dis- |tasteful or shocking at all as far as our public exhibitions of the | situation were concerned. _ Mr. Rann. As far as I know, you haven’t promised the Ameri- | can people that you would give them everything that you have received. Maybe you have, I am not aware of it, but we had, the Commission had. The Commission would not have been willing to cover up anything or withhold anything after such a promise. | Mr. Sawyer. Well, do you feel then that you may have made an error in promising to make all original material available, or do you feel you may have made an error in not making the material available to pathologists? Mr. RANKIN. No, I don’t think either one was an error. I think if we hadn’t promised the people and done what we did about giving them everything that we, the Commission examined, that was not involved in national security, the Commission’s work would have had little credence with the people. I also think that once having done that the Commission couldn’t say, well, we did everything but this and this and this and that we aren’t going to give you—— Mr. Sawyer. In other words, then, if I understand you, because you made this commitment and didn’t feel like this was material you wanted to make public for taste reasons or feeling reasons, you just didn’t even look at it then, you let this promise govern your _ investigation? Mr. RANKIN. There was another factor that it was merely addi- | tional evidence, that is cumulative. The evidence of the doctors was equally good as far as the law goes and was of first quality, so that it wasn’t as though we were without evidence. Mr. Sawyer. Based on the testimony of those doctors and the evidence developed, they were, for example, like 4 inches off on the point of entry of the head wound, which, of course, projected, would be a horrendous error. Mr. Ranxin. I don’t know that. I have heard that your staff discovered that and that Dr. Humes has admitted that he was that much off. At the time it was, and since, until I heard that, it was difficult to imagine that a man conducting an autopsy could make that kind of a mistake when he was observing the body that he was examining, and so forth. : Mr. Sawyer. Well, now that you have heard that, are you still satisfied with the decision not to even allow access to the X-rays and autopsy original data? Mr. RANKIN. I think I would not allow access if you combined with that the obligation to publish the X-rays as they are, because I think that, with the importance of President Kennedy to the people of this country, and to the world, and as an American public leader, I think that is very valuable even today. Mr. Sawyer. Would you have taken that position vis-a-vis any relevant information that if you decided that either because of embarrassment or damage it might do to the FBI or the CIA or international relations, or whatever, that because of this self-im- posed obligation to publish in general, you just then followed the proposition of not even looking at it? Mr. RANKIN. No, and I think our work shows that we did not. 620 Mr. Sawyer. Are you still happy with your decision to use the FBI as your sole investigative source? Mr. RANKIN. Well, that does not meet my, does not conform to my testimony, in my opinion. I thought I—I tried to make it plain that we used all of the intelligence agencies of the Government and we used Secret Service and others, including Military Intelligence, to check back on the FBI from time to time. We also had a couple of investigators who were not important in the whole scheme of things. They could not do enough. But we had many files of investigations that the FBI made and if we had had a force to equal the number of man hours that we used the FBI, Secret Service, Military Intelligence, the cryptology people and all the others that we used in the Government, there would have been many thousands, and I think it would have been impossible and we would not have gotten out a report for years. Mr. Sawyer. But as you probably know now, information was withheld by the FBI with respect to the so-called Hosty note from Oswald threatening to burn down a police station, or allegedly so. Mr. RANKIN. Yes, but Congressman, if you look back at that period we, all of us, did not believe the FBI was capable of that kind of conduct, at least I did not, and none of the commissioners did. And I think all of our ideas about what people in government are capable of and do has changed, but back then we did not think they would do such things. Mr. Sawyer. Did you ever receive any advice from the FBI about the 17 agents that were subjected to administrative discipline be- cause of their mishandling of the pre-assassination information about Ruby—not Ruby, Oswald? Mr. Rankin. I think that is very shocking too. I think we were entitled to that information and a frank disclosure by Mr. Hoover that he felt they should be disciplined and why, and that we should have been able to go into that and try to discover whether it had any effect on our work. Mr. Sawyer. I assume you feel the same way about the CIA’s nondisclosure of alleged assassination plots that they may have participated in, vis-a-vis Castro. | Mr. RANKIN. I do. Mr. Sawyer. I am interested in the fact that you had received advice that Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who had defected, was available and willing to testify, had you not, before the Warren Commission. Mr. RANKIN. Yes, I had. Mr. Sawyer. And that he professed to have first-hand knowledge a Oswald’s activity in Russia during the period that Oswald was in ussia. Mr. RANKIN. Congressman, you did not include in your state- ment, as I understood it, that the CIA had told us that he was a fake and not a real KGB officer and that he was probably just planted on us. That was the information we got from the CIA about him, and it was in light of that that we did not call him because we thought, the Commission thought, they would just be the dupes of such a plan, if that was true. Now, we certainly did not have the expertise, even with Allen Dulles on the Commission, to be able to judge whether a man was 621 truly a KGB agent or a plant. They, as the people in government skilled in that work ought to know such things. They spent a lifetime at that work, told us so that we felt, the Commission felt _that there was no purpose to examine him after such advice and they did not want to be used to assist in the distribution of any information that the KGB; or anybody else; would be interested in having distributed to the American people through the Commission by somebody that was making a dupe of them. Mr. SAwyYER. Well, did you opt to have the man at least inter- viewed by one of the staff to form a judgment yourselves? Mr. RANKIN. No. I had nobody on the staff and I had no Commis- sioner with such expertise. Ido not think Allen Dulles could have done it; or could have had the skill, the expertise to make that kind of a judgment? Our information was that the CIA put a group to work on Nosenko to try to examine all of his background and _ find out whether he had enough knowledge of various events and _ matters within the Soviet picture to be a true KGB agent. We were led to believe, at least I was—it was my belief that these people _had sufficient knowledge and the skill that was required so as to _ determine anything of that kind. Mr. SAwYER. So that, then, because of the doubt cast on his | veracity by the CIA, you opted not to even have the staff talk to | him or even check what he had to say, is that right? Mr. RANKIN. No; they were not telling us his veracity—whether he was truthful or not, except insofar as he was representing that he was a KGB agent. They were telling us that he was not a real agent and that seemed to me very important with regard to what | he might have to say about the matter. Mr. SAwyeR. You are aware that the CIA has now reversed themselves totally on that position, I assume. Mr. RANKIN. Yes; but I am shocked by the way they arrive at that conclusion and the procedures they apparently went through | as I observed from some of your TV programs. Mr. Sawyer. Are you satisfied with the decision of the Commis- sion to hold all executive session hearings rather than public hear- ings? Do you think that may have contributed to the lack of acceptance of the report? Mr. RANKIN. We had one open hearing. Mr. SAwyY_Er. That was because Mark Lane demanded— Mr. RANKIN. That was Mark Lane, and I think you had similar experiences— he SawyYER. Who would naturally demand a public hearing, right? Mr. RANKIN. I do not think it helped with your hearing, although I think you handled it well in regards to some of the problems developed. Mr. Sawyer. As some people who watched it said that Mr. Lane had done for the legal profession what the Boston Strangler did for the door-to-door salesman. Mr. RANKIN. We had no indication by the public that they were unhappy with our failure to have more open hearings. I cannot answer the question about whether it would have helped. But I have been impressed with this committee’s open hearings. They seem to have gone well and the reaction I have heard from various 622 people to some of the evidence has been impressive; they have been convinced by some of it. : Of course, they were not convinced by all of it; but you cannot expect that. Mr. Sawyer. Another thing that I was interested in was that in the conference or interview or interrogation, whichever, that Presi- dent Ford and the Chief Justice and some staff members had with Mr. Ruby while he was incarcerated in Dallas, he said, according to the transcript, substantially that he would like to tell the whole truth but he cannot tell them the whole truth while he is in Dallas, and if they would transport him to Washington, he would tell the whole truth. Was any follow-up ever done on that at all by the staff or otherwise? Mr. RANKIN. No, there was not. We were all convinced that Ruby was interested in a trip to Washington rather than how much he could enlighten the Commission. It seemed quite apparent when you observed him and his approach to the whole suggestion. Mr. SAwyY_Er. Were you there at the time? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Mr. Sawyer. Is that the impression you got individually? Mr. RANKIN. Yes, I thought that he was quite enamored with the idea of coming to Washington and he even wanted to see the President. It was easy to imagine what that would all develop into if you got started on it. Mr. Sawyer. There were no followup attempts, though, to try to elucidate that situation? Mr. RANKIN. No, there were not. Mr. Sawyer. Was any check ever made or any check requested by the Commission to have the possible organized crime participa- tion of this situation investigated? Mr. RANKIN. Well, we did the checking that is revealed by our report and appendices in that regard. We did not find enough possible connections to go beyond what we did. When I heard about some of the information that the Senate committee had developed about plans for the use of personalities from organized crime in connection with the proposed Castro assassination, or efforts or plans, or whatever you want to call that activity, it did disturb me some as to that aspect. I said to some of your staff, “I assume they were following up on that, and are running that out,” to be sure they investigated out to the end of it. Mr. Sawyer. The FBI liaison officer who appeared before this committee and who was acting as the sort of sole or principal liaison between the FBI and the Commission said that they had never involved or were never asked to or ever did involve their organized crime section of the FBI in the matter. Is that consistent with your recollection of it? Mr. RANKIN. That is, yes. Mr. Sawyer. So, you did not have access what electronic surveil- lance may have been available in that section that may have > related to their interest in doing away with President Kennedy; am I correct on that? Mr. RANKIN. That is correct. 623 Mr. Sawyer. Thank you very much. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Stokes. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Rankin, it appears to me that there are two things that the Commission was looking for and could find neither. One was a motive for Lee Harvey Oswald to commit the crime and the second was the question of whether there was or was not a conspiracy. Would that be true, the Commission was trying to ascertain the facts of those two things? Mr. RANKIN. It is true, they were. I felt they did find an answer to the first one you described. They felt there was no motive beyond Oswald’s own ambition for notoriety and position and so forth that was gone into at some length in the report. Chairman Stokes. Let me ask you this: Whatever his activities were in Soviet Russia, do you think that it is possible that that could have provided some insight into motivation by way of back- ground? Mr. RANKIN. I do not think so beyond what we presented. Now, I am quite aware, as I think the report shows, that we only said that we were unable to discover any such information about conspiracy or conspiratorial activity. What else he might have done that we never could get any information about in our efforts through the _ State Department or CIA or anyone else, is just a matter of specu- - lation. Chairman STOKES. It would seem that in that area, that is where Yuri Nosenko would have been very important to the Commission in terms of what he was able to tell the CIA about Oswald while he was in Soviet Russia, would it not? Mr. RANKIN. Well, if they got anything from him. When they - reported to us, they did not report that they got any word about his associations with Oswald or knowledge about Oswald or anything like that. Chairman Strokes. Do I understand from what you are saying that—I think we are talking about the CIA, are we not? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Chairman STOKES. Tell us what they did tell you that Nosenko told them about Oswald in Russia. Mr. RANKIN. They were satisfied he was not a KGB officer. They felt that he was a plant, that he was sent in for some purpose, but they did not know what it was, to try to participate. They said they felt he was not believable about anything that he would claim about Oswald or knowledge about him. Chairman Strokes. And that he was not himself a bona fide defector then, I suppose. Mr. RANKIN. That is what they said. Chairman Sroxkes. Did they tell you though what he had told them that he knew about Oswald? Mr. RANKIN. They did not go into any detail about what he said. They said that he just wasn’t believable. Chairman SToKEs. When you say they, can you tell us specifical- ly whom you are talking about at CIA? Mr. RANKIN. Well, I cannot remember the names now. It seemed to me, though, looking back on it, that it was their specialist in 624 Soviet matters and I think they had, my recollection is, they had a number of them and it wasn’t just one man; it was teamwork of some kind. Chairman STOKES. Did you ever have any conversation with Richard Helms about Nosenko? Mr. RANKIN. My recollection is he supported that position, that there was no purpose in trying to have Nosenko before the Com- mission or to inquire what he knew because he was not believable. Chairman Stokes. Did anyone ever tell you Nosenko had said that while he was in Soviet Russia that two suitcases full of docu- ments on Oswald were flown up from Minsk to the Russian capital immediately after the assassination? Did they ever tell you that? Mr. RANKIN. I do not remember anything like that. Chairman Stokes. Probabilities are that if you were told some- thing about that you would recall. Mr. RANKIN. Yes; because it is quite impressive. You would want to see what was in those suitcases if you had heard, I am sure. Chairman Stokes. That is correct. That is part of the informa- tion Nosenko has given this committee. I have no further ques- tions. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer. Mr. Preyer. I have just a couple of questions, Mr. Chairman, relating to the problems that might have been created by using the FBI as your major investigative arm. Early on in the work of the Commission, I believe it did come to your attention, allegations came to our attention that Lee Harvey Oswald might have been an FBI agent; is that right? Mr. RANKIN. That is correct. Mr. Preyer. How were you able to investigate the truth or falsity of that charge? What did you do to investigate it? | Mr. RANKIN. When that information came to my attention and then to the Commission’s, we were very much shocked about it and the Commission had deliberations in which they tried to determine what was the best approach to try to find out the fact. They decided that we should make direct inquiries to J. Edgar Hoover. The problem was not, as I recall it, whether Oswald was ever listed as an agent in their records because, as I recall, we checked that out and he was not. My recollection is that the question involved whether he might have been a numbered personality that the FBI had where the name of the individual is not revealed and thus has a cover, and it could be concealed. We examined the possibility that we could try to go into their records and examine every person, identify every person who had a number and we were assured that involved a large number of personalities. | The FBI was greatly disturbed about the idea of taking the cover off of all those agents that they had established over a long term of years and revealing their names to all of the staff as well as the Commissioners. I couldn’t assure that their identity would not become known in that kind of a process. So, the Commission finally determined that they would accept J. Edgar Hoover’s personal assurance by affidavit that Oswald had never been an informer or agent of the FBI, and that was given. Mr. Preyer. But you were somewhat in the position of asking the FBI to investigate itself or going to the innkeeper to ask whether the wine was good or not. 625 Mr. RANKIN. Well, back at that time, Congressman, that did not seem so impossible as it might today. Mr. Preyer. Yes; I think your answer to an earlier question has demonstrated a certain fall from innocence that we have all had since that time. Things are now believable which we would not have thought believable at that time. Mr. RANKIN. That is correct. Mr. Preyer. The threshold of this belief has gone up quite a bit. Let me ask you one other thing. The FBI reached a conclusion in their report that was made 17 days after the assassination that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin. Don’t you think that would have had some chilling effect, would have dampened the incentive of FBI agents in following out the question of a conspiracy where his organization had already declared itself to the effect that there was no conspiracy? Mr. RANKIN. I think that is true but we always assumed that. We started out knowing the FBI had already decided who the assassin was and that no one else was involved, and we knew that was the agency position. It was very evident. But we did not rely on anything like that. We sought detailed evidence and if we didn’t get the evidence we asked for, we sent back time after time to get it. We treated their report in which they promptly found Oswald as the assassin and that was no conspiracy as though that was just an interesting document, but we are not there to ratify that; we were to find out if it was true and I think we were probably quite offensive, especially some of the younger members of our staff who looked forward to the opportunity of finding that the FBI was wrong, at least on as much as they could find. So that often times they were challenging the agents, I had difficulty with some of our relationships because of that. I do not think it affected our people at all, but, of course, I recognize that it would have been lése majesty for anybody to tell Mr. Hoover, that the report was wrong. Mr. PREYER. Just one final question along the problems that could arise where you use the FBI as your major investigative arm. You told Mr. Sawyer, I believe, that you did not know about the destruction of the Hosty note. Do you think if you had had inde- pendent investigators rather than relying on the FBI that you would have learned about the destruction of that note? Mr. RANKIN. There is always the possibility that we might. It seems to me there is a possibility it might have leaked out some way from the FBI, but it did not. I think that it would have been helpful to know that, although I do not suppose we would have changed about using the FBI and the other government intelli- gence forces, if we had discovered the note. Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Rankin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rankin, you were in Dallas with Chief Justice Warren and President Ford on the occasion of the interview with Jack Ruby. Mr. RANKIN. Yes. 626 Mr. DeEvINE. Did you participate in the questioning of him, or were you merely present, if you recall? Mr. RANKIN. It is hard to recall because I know I questioned him some, but whether I did the general examination, I cannot now recall. Mr. DEVINE. He indicated at that time, if you were in the room this morning when President Ford testified, that Ruby requested that he be brought to Washington in order that he might tell the full and the true story. The President said that after discussing it with the Commission and the Commission staff they felt no mean- ingful purpose would be served by doing that. Did you agree with that dicision? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Mr. DeEvINE. Do you agree at this time that that was a proper decision? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. As I said earlier, when Congressman Sawyer asked me, I felt that he really wanted a trip to Washington rather than to help us in our problems. Mr. DEVINE. In your interrogation or in the files of the Commis- sion in having interrogated Jack Ruby, did the Commission ever come to a conclusion as to his motive in shooting Lee Harvey Oswald? Mr. RANKIN. I do not think they were ever satisfied as to what his motive was. Mr. DEvINE. Did not the Commission receive testimony that Ruby was known in Dallas as a “police buff,’ that he had a habit of hanging around police headquarters and that his presence there was not unusual? Mr. RANKIN. That is correct. Mr. Devine. And was there not also testimony before the Com- mission or at least reported to the Commission, that Ruby’s motive probably was that as an obscure nightclub operator of some ques- tionable reputation that he thought he would become a national hero if he killed the person that assassinated the President? Mr. RANKIN. I think that is true. I am not sure the Commission was satisfied that that was the answer. Mr. DEvINE. Does that seem to make some degree of logic to you as chief counsel of the Commission? Mr. RANKIN. Well, it always seemed to me that it was quite a step for a man to take, with all the risks that were involved, just for that kind of a purpose. Mr. DeEvINE. I do not believe the Commission in its very thorough investigation ever tied Oswald and Ruby together in any associ- ation, did they? Mr. ened They did not. Mr. Devine. In another area, Mr. Rankin, there was some testi- mony this morning about 17 or so FBI agents being subjected to disciplinary administrative procedures within the Bureau for lack of discretion or failure to meet the necessary standards on the preassassination investigation of Oswald and the fact he was never placed on the security index. Were you aware of this administrative action within the Bureau? Mr. RANKIN. No, I was not. My relations with Mr. Hoover dete- riorated a great deal after the report came out, and I was quite 627 ‘surprised to learn that he took this position with the agents in light of his severe criticism of me and the report, but it appeared to me that this action was quite confirmatory of some of the criticism that the Commission had made in the report about some of the failures of the FBI in its liaison with the Secret Service. Mr. Devine. Had you known of this action prior to the conclu- sion of the final report of the Commission, do you think it would have affected the investigation in any way or led it in any way to different results or conclusions? Mr. Rankin. I do not think it would have changed the results or conclusions. I think that if we had been aware of it, we would have wanted to inquire about each one of the situations and see if there was anything there that could help us in our investigation. Mr. Devine. It was not surprising to you, was it, Mr. Rankin, with your vast experience in and out of Government, to recognize that administrative steps were taken within many Government agencies, disciplinary steps were taken without airing the laundry publicly? Mr. RANKIN. No; but I was naive enough with regard to this | particular task, as general counsel, to think that when the Presi- dent of the United States told everybody to cooperate with us that | they would understand that was an order and mandate and part of \the law that governed public servants and that they would do it. It seemed to me that the question of what they failed to do in each of these instances was a matter that would be of interest to the Commission and each of the Commissioners and that Mr. Hoover had an obligation on his own to inform us and let us take whatever proper action the Commission thought should be taken to find out what acts were being criticized and whether there was /something that would affect the Commission’s work. _- Mr. Devine. Finally, Mr. Rankin, recognizing that nearly 15 years have intervened since the event and 14 years since the filing of the Warren Commission report, learning the things that you have learned during the intervening period, the new technical exotic crime detection techniques that have developed, additional _witnesses that were not available to you, the meeting of the Rocke- feller committee, the Church committee, the Assassinations Com- mittee and all, as you sit here today, do you feel that the Warren Commission, had they had the benefit of all this additional infor- -mation, would have reached a conclusion different than that which you actually did? Mr. Rankin. No; I think the Commission would not have arrived at any different conclusions. Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Strokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The _gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. Mr. Dopp. Mr. Chairman, in light of the fact I arrived a little bit after Mr. Rankin completed his statement, I will pass for the moment, if I can. Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. Firuian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rankin, we want to thank you for coming and for cooperating with our committee. I have several questions that I would like to pursue, if time permits, and I might have to beg of the chairman some additional time. 628 First, I would like to ask whether or not the Commission and yourself, in particular, reviewed and approved the firearms tests that were administered by the FBI on the Mannlicher-Carcano that was alleged to be the Oswald weapon. Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Mr. FirHi1an. And was a part of that test to determine how fast it could be fired? Mr. RANKIN. That is right. Mr. FITHIAN. And the FBI performed those tests. Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Mr. FITHIAN. Do you remember what the results were? Mr. RANKIN. I remember that the results were positive that the three bullets could have been fired within the time limits that I think were computed on the film. } Mr. FirHian. The 2.3, or as one witness I believe had it, 2.25 seconds between firings as the minimum time, it is your impression the three shots would fit in? Mr. RANKIN. That is right. Mr. FirH1an. And is it also your understanding that the fire- arms experts who performed these tests made use of the telescopic sight? Mr. RANKIN. That is right. Mr. Firui1an. Did the Commission order firing the tests of the weapons without the scope? Mr. Rankin. I do not recall that they did. Mr. Firuian. Did it ever occur to anybody on the Commission that it might have been fired without the scope? Mr. Rankin. I do not think any of the Commissioners in discuss- ing it thought that anybody could have shot with that accuracy without a scope. Mr. Firuian. After you heard Governor Connally, did this give you any problems then? Mr. RANKIN. No. ay FITHIAN. In trying to square his testimony with the FBI tests! Mr. Rankin. I heard him before when he testified before the Commission. Mr. FirHian. I meant, at that time, at the Commission’s testimony? Mr. Rankin. I think he is just mistaken and I think that the more evidence that is adduced will establish that where he was he had to be shot by that same bullet. Mr. FirH1an. But did the Commission’s understanding of the firing time of the Oswald weapon cause any problems in interpret- ing other evidence, including the Zapruder film, or eye witness accounts? Mr. Rankin. I don’t recall any. If you could refresh my memory. Mr. Firu1an. You will recall that Governor Connally said he heard a shot and he turned. Mr. RANKIN. Yes sir. Mr. Firuian. And the Zapruder film shows that turning, which tends to corroborate what the Governor said, I mean just to the layman. I am wondering if you had any problem with that? 629 Mr. RANKIN. Well, the fact that he turned I think is well estab- lished by the film. Whether he heard the shot after he had been shot isn’t established by the Zapruder film. Mr. FiTHIAN. Well, now, if it can, and as it has in a tentative way by this committee, been established that the weapon can be fired with pretty good accuracy, and a lot faster than the FBI said, if you had had that information, what would this have done to your sort of adjustment of your interpretation of the evidence? Mr. RANKIN. Well, I don’t think it would have changed unless you are thinking of something that I am not. We took into account, the Commission did, that there were three casings there and that there was testimony about three shots and other factors along with the time element. Mr. FiruHiAn. But there was also conflicting testimony, though I believe not given as much credibility by you and your staff and the Commission, that indicated that eye witness accounts heard other shots from other areas, particularly the grassy knoll area. Wouldn’t your firing time limitation of necessity almost have to come to bear on that kind of testimony beyond the three cartridges that you found? Mr. RANKIN. We never thought that the testimony of shots from other points was impressive in the light of the wounds. Chairman SToKEs. Time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. FiruHiAn. I would ask either unanimous consent, to let me finish up this line of questioning, but I do have another area | would like to question after everybody else has completed, if I may. Chairman SToKEs. Without objection. Mr. FirHiAn. But it just seems to me that someone, somewhere, who had a modicum of experience with firearms, would have dis- covered right off, even if you go down to the Archives today and look at the rifle, it is not a particularly difficult problem to pick it up and look at it and see it can be fired without the telescopic sight, and anybody who has fired with a scope would know you can fire a lot faster if you are looking for a moving target, you don’t have to find it in the scope, if it can in fact be fired faster. For 15 years we have been told it couldn’t be fired faster. We now know that it is not true. It seems to me someone on the Commission having some evidence which appears to me not to be able to fit into the 2.25, which is the minimum time of the FBI, might have requested another kind of test firing, and I am curious that it did not occur to a single person on the Commission or on your staff or in the FBI, or anywhere else, along the line. I guess my final question is, Was there no consideration given by the Commission, as far as you know by the FBI, to another kind of test firing of that weapon? Mr. Rankin. Not that I know of. Of course, there were also problems of the leaves on the trees and how you fit them in, and the point where the Zapruder film showed the impact had to be, that is, that it had to be within certain spaces. All of that had to be fitted in too. So you are not just free to say, well, I can shoot this weapon so many times within so many minutes. There are other problems that you have to deal with and fit within. Mr. Firutan. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. 630 I would just like to make sure that we have in the record at this point that our own final test firings will become a part of this record as they are completed. Chairman STokEs. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar. Mr. Epacar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for not being here during the earlier questioning of you, Mr. Rankin, but I do have some questions that grow out of earlier discussions about the way in which the Warren Commission began its investigation. You have indicated, I think, that within a relatively short period of time, after the assassination, the Warren Commission was formed and the Warren Commission did put a document out, did they not, indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald was essentially the lone assassin, shortly after the beginning of the Commission? Mr. RANKIN. Not that I recall. Mr. Epcar. Well, not necessarily a lone assassin but that he was the assassin, is that correct? Mr. RANKIN. I don’t remember that either. Mr. EpGcar. When was the first time that the Warren Commis- sion went public with any of their preliminary findings? Mr. RANKIN. I just don’t recall. Mr. Epcar. Let me ask it in a different way. Did the Warren Commission have an investigative plan? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Mr. Epcar. How was that plan developed? | Mr. RANKIN. It was developed by my making a draft of a plan and submitting it to the Commission for its acceptance or modifica- tion or rejection. : Mr. Epcar. The members of the Commission had an opportunity to review the plan and decided where the investigation and study would go? Mr. RANKIN. That is right. Mr. Epear. In making that plan, did you bring in the FBI or CIA to help assist you in areas of investigation, such as conspiracy? Mr. RANKIN. No. Mr. Epaar. At any time, in the beginning phases of the Warren Commission study, did you bring in the FBI and the CIA and the Secret Service to try to coordinate what information they had available to them and have a discussion among them about what information would be available to them? Mr. RANKIN. No; I didn’t. At that period of time, the relations between the Secret Service and FBI were terribly strained in con- nection with what happened and the fact that the President had been assassinated and there was some feeling that neither one had done themselves proud in connection with the whole event. Mr. Epcar. Would it have been a relevant possibility to bring them together to put aside those bickerings and differences and to say now that the assassination has taken place, and the Warren Commission has been formed, we now have to provide to the American public the most accurate information of what was availa- ble to us at the time of the death and what transpired following the assassination? Mr. RANKIN. I don’t think so, because I think it would have appeared that the Commissioners were putting themselves under 631 the domination of the FBI. The FBI had already come forward with their report in which they said that Oswald was the assassin and there was no conspiracy involved. That had leaked out. To have brought the different groups together would seem to me, in the at place the Secret Service is much smaller, less powerful and—— Mr. Epcar. Wouldn’t that have given the Secret Service and CIA ST an opportunity to pose an alternative possibility to the already established rumor of the FBI? Mr. RANKIN. No; because I gave each of them in separate discus- sions with the Directors ample opportunity to suggest anything they wanted to and asked for their help in every way possible. Chairman SToKEs. Time of the gentleman has expired. _ Mr. Epcar. Just one additional question, if I may. May I ask unanimous consent to proceed? Chairman STOKEs. The gentleman is recognized. Mr. Epaar. In December and January of 1963 and 1964, when the FBI was disciplining 17 individuals for their role in the preas- sassination information of Lee Harvey Oswald, was that informa- tion made known to you in December and January of 1963 and 1964? _ Mr. Rankin. No, it was not. _ Mr. Epcar. Was it made known to you at any time during the _ Warren Commission? Mr. RANKIN. No; it was not. Mr. Epaar. Thank you. Chairman STOKEs. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney. Mr. McKinney. You were basically in charge, Mr. Rankin, were _ you not, of assignments of the staff? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. _ Mr. McKinney. Was it true that the counsels Hubert and Griffin _ were essentially assigned to the investigation of Jack Ruby? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. _ Mr. McKinney. Why under those conditions and whose decision _was it, that they then did not go to Dallas to interview Jack Ruby _when the Chief Justice and Congressman Ford went? _ Mr. Rankin. I think it was in a discussion by myself with the Chief Justice and former President Ford and they said this matter is of sufficient importance we want you to supervise the examina- tion. Mr. McKinney. But in essence you were required to have a generalized knowledge of everything that was happening, rather, than the specifics of Jack Ruby? Mr. RANKIN. Well, I was watching it in detail in every area, too. I had to. Mr. McKinney. One of the criticisms of the Commission report has been the depth of the Ruby investigation, and there have been many critics who questioned why the two counsels who were charged with investigating Jack Ruby were not present at the time he was questioned extensively in Dallas. Mr. RANKIN. Well, I don’t think the criticism relates itself to the examination of Ruby. The criticism is whether or not the various 632 leads were followed to the extent that they should have been. That was a function that they both had. | Mr. McKinney. In other words, you depended on their following through on Jack Ruby as to, for instance, the question of his ties to organized crime rather than on the FBI doing that, or did you depend on both? Mr. RANKIN. Both. Mr. McKinney. When did you become aware of the animosity of the FBI, or at least of J. Edgar Hoover toward the Warren Commis- sion. It is expressed quite frankly in what we have listed as Kennedy exhibit F-471, which is the Belmont to Tolson letter. In that letter it is pretty well stated that the FBI itself is not going to send a liaison to the Warren Commission’s meeting called by the Chief Justice, that the request of Attorney General Katzenbach that he be briefed so at least he could answer questions. | I believe Mr. Belmont states: That would be very undesirable because there was really only one answer, that is, the question raised as to what the FBI is doing. There is a very simple answer, namely, we are pressing the investigation in the writing of the report. This is our major goal. Until that is completed there is nothing we can contribute. In other words, the Chief Justice of the United States of Amer- ica, the head of a Presidential Commission investigating the assas- sination of a President of the United States, was in essence told to forget it when he asked the FBI to have a liaison person there. How did you react to that? Mr. RANKIN. I tried to avoid an open fight. It was obvious to me that I certainly had a reluctant relationship with the FBI in many respects and I was also making unreasonable demands everyday upon them and—— Mr. McKinney. Excuse me. Is that your wording, unreasonable demands, or would that be the Bureau’s wording? Mr. Rankin. That is my wording, too. It was unreasonable but I couldn’t do anything else. I needed that help. The staff needed it and the Commission needed it and we didn’t have enough other intelligence agencies to just forget about the FBI, and they had people stationed in various parts of the country, who it was logical to use. The Secret Service had people occasionally in various places but they didn’t have them stationed there all the time, and the FBI had a great group of personnel that could be used if they would be cooperative and help. So I was constantly asking for hundreds of investigations in places all over the country, and as soon as I got the reports on that and the responses, I would ask for some more, and I would ask for more complete reports on the ones that I thought were unsatisfactory. That in itself made a very difficult relationship and I don’t blame them for feeling that they were being ridden pretty hard, which was true, but we never got to the place where they either apparently dared or would say they wouldn’t do it. And as long as they didn’t, I kept on. Then I had to be careful to watch everything they did to see that I was getting something worthwhile and that it was well done, and I knew pretty well what an FBI agent was capable of doing, from my experience in the Department, and I knew when it wasn’t up to standard. 633 So when it wasn’t up to standard we came back to them and said this has got to be done, get another agent on it if you can’t get it done right. Mr. McKinney. This was an actual memorandum dated Decem- ber 3, 1963, right at the very beginning, and there is a clear implication that the FBI just was not going to cooperate with any preliminary facts nor were they going to send anyone to answer any questions. Wasn’t any attempt made at that point, with this sort of dramat- ic refusal, to have anyone in a higher position in the Government such as the Attorney General or the President of the United States, turn around to Mr. Hoover and say cooperate? In the terms of at least sending a liaison person? That is the one question here. Mr. RANKIN. I don’t know in my experience with Government that anybody ever did that with Mr. Hoover during his lifetime. Mr. McKinney. I would think almost nobody would have done it because I am sure Mr. Hoover had something on all of us, but, I also recognize the Chief Justice of United States, Earl Warren, as a rather controversial and opinionated gentleman who didn’t like to take orders from anybody. I just find it amazing, since you were chief counsel between these two, that in essence the Chief Justice would sit- back and take this sort of cavalier treatment from a subagency of the United States? Mr. RANKIN. I think the Chief Justice was shrewd enough to realize that the way to handle that was to put them to the test and see whether they would refuse, and when it came down to actually doing the work, they never did refuse. Mr. McKinney. So even though the attitude was wrong, the answers were all right, so it was shunted aside? Mr. RANKIN: Yes. Now, except for these things they didn’t tell us. It is apparent now that there were certain things they with- held, and that is something different. Mr. McKinney. The whole catalog of horrors which some of my | colleagues have addressed for the record. I thank you. Chairman SToKEs. Your comment, Mr. Hoover had something on | all of us, someone said speak for yourself. [Laughter.] Chairman Sroxgs. I ask that the clerk mark the exhibit I have handed her JFK F-447. I request she show it to the witness, please. [Document handed to the witness for his inspection.] Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Chairman Sroxgs. All right, the Chair requests unanimous con- sent that this document be made a part of the record at this point. Without objection, it is so ordered. [The exhibit follows:] 634 JFK Exuisit F-447 WDS: mfd:24Jun =a Was FO | MEMORANDUM ye tives SORE taken Sane: 24, 1G6R Loi ig LOE eh Ey WAT ea Pere me Ts =? ke: ‘ ¢ . | Ss : Seas : - | . . TO; © \The Commission e's , =e, Pr re ee —— : ell ee al a FROM: — William T. Coleman, Jr., We. David Slawson SUBJECT:.. Yuri. Ivanovich Nosenko |. .. The Commission has asked us to prepare a short memorandum outlining in what respects the information © - obtained from Nosenko confirms or contradicts information we have from other sources, Nosenko's testimony to the FBI 13 the only infor- mation we have on what he knows about Lee Harvey Oswald, (Commission Documents No. 434 and 452.) Perhaps more useful information could be gained if we were to question Nosenko : directly, but it 4s unlikely. Nosenko told the representative ef the FBI who questioned him that he had BZiven all the information on Cswald he possessed. Most of what Nosenzo told the FBI confirms what ve already know from other sources and most of {t does not involve important facts, with one extremely significant exception. This exception is Nosenko's' statement that Lee Harvey Oswald was never trained or used as an azent of the Soviet Union for any purpose and that no contact with him vas mace, attem or pted contemplated after he left the Soviet Ynton and returned to the United States. Nosenko's opinion an these points is especially valuable because, according to his own testimony at least, his position with the KGB was such that had there been any subversive relationship between the Soviet Union and Oswald, he would have known about it. Nosenko's statement to the FBI confirms our infer- mation from other sourses in the following respects: ‘1. Prior to Oswald's arrival in Russta in the fall of 1959 he had no contacts with agents of the Russian government or of the International Communist Party who were in turn in contact with the Russian government. (Our Ps ecg ages | cc; Mr. Rankin's SSIFIED = - File -_ Mr. Colem’ popei> Sea s ne652, Sec SEK ~ : Mr. Slawso r—— == == [sic hs er tppafis Mail Room Files “ ATs NARS Date— 635 ae L - 3 . - o%f-3 = . =~ Sere: ay pared oneae nin sources’ ‘on “thas are ore Weal moneverivese We simpl hege aaa much dbs ignites on this Pag GSS: subject. 2. When Oswald el te in the Soviet Ulich he was env eliric on a temporary tourist visa but very quickly made known to the Russian authorities that he desired to remain permanently in the USSR and wanted to become a Soviet citizen. He made known his intention to his Intourist guide at the Hotel’ Berlin in BORON: This Intourist ouge was a KGB 4nformer. --- - ere pe ea . 3. Aree was advised rier ao the Intourist inter~ preter that he would not be permitted to remain in Russia — permanently and that he would therefore have to leave that country when his temporary visa expired. 4. Upon learning that. his request to pemain the Russia permanently had been denied, Oswald slashed his wrist 4n his room at the Hotel Berlin in an apparent attempt to commit suicide, was found by the Intourist interpreter when. he failed to appear for an appointment that evening, and was immediately taken to a hospital in Moscow for treatment. This hospital was the Botkinskaya Hospital. — 5. Oswald was questioned by doctors at the hospital and told them that he attempted suicide because he was not granted gst eras to remain in Russia. 6. Osvald was assigned.to Minsk. probably because it a is above average for cleanliness and modern facilities, and mont thaxefore ereate a good impression for him. pt Oswald appeared at the. bedkek Embassy in Mexico pity and asked for a Soviet re-entry visa. ~ 8. Nosenko was shown certain portions of our file ononantas 4noluding a section which stated that Oswald received a monthly subsidy from the Soviet Red Cross. On seeing this statement, Nosenko commented that it is normal practice in the Soviet Union to cause the Red Cross to make payments to emigres and defectors in order to assist them to enjoy a better standard of living than ordinary Soviet citizens engaged in similar occupations, - (Nosenko also said eet the. Bupeddy Oswald received was propane the minimum 636 given under such circumstances. Thisis news to us, although . itis not inconsistent with other information we have.) . .. 9,. Oswald was in possession of a gun which was used to shoot rabbits while he was livingin Minsk (Nosenko said he learned this upon reviewing Oswald's file after the assassination of President Kennedy when, under the circum- stances, he took particular note of this fact.) - .210. ‘There18 no KGB or GRU training school.in the , Vicinity. of Minsks<) cM RGRa ne. Glee “o HOS" A. hae dl. All mail addressed to the American Embassy in Moscow, therefore, also including Lee Harvey Oswald's mail so addressed, is "reviewed" by the KGB in Moscow. Nosenko said that this is routinely done but he added that he personally had no part in the review of, or knowledge of such review, of Oswald's correspondence. =... ; . 12. No publicity appeared in the Soviet press or j Soviet radio regarding Oswald's arrival or departure from the Soviet Union or on his attempted suicide, (Our evidenceon this is simply negative, that is, we have no evidence that there was any such publicity.) “23. Oswald was regarded as a "poor worker" by his superiors in the factory at Minsk. The following information obtained from Nosenko is not available to us from any other source, As will be seen, it generally does not add much to our knowledge about Oswala but rather supplies background information on Soviet activities relating to.his residence in Russia. | : 1. The-KGB in Moscow, after analyzing Oswald through various interviewsand confidential informants, determined that Oswald was of no use to them and that he appeared "some- what abnormal." 7. * 2. The KGB did not know about Oswald's prior mili- tary service and even if they did, it would have been of no particular significance to them. _ 3. When the KGB was advised by some other Ministry of the Soviet State. that the decision had been made to permit SA Bo 637 —-- i? s en a . -*¢ Oswald to stay in Russia and that he was to reside in Minsk, © 4t brought Oswald's file.up to date and transferred it to its branch office in Minsk. The cover letter forwarding the ‘file to Minsk, prepared by one of Nosenko's subordinates, briefly summarized Oswald's case and instructed the branch office to take no action concerning him except to "passively" observe his activities to make sure he was not an American intelligence agent temporarily dormant. (Oswald did tell an. ‘American friend once that on one or two occasions in Minsk he _- had heard that the MVD had inquired of neighbors or fellow workers about him.).. | ous eee 4. According to the routine of the KGB, the only coverage of Oswald during his stay in Minsk would have con- sisted of periodic checks at his place of employment, inquiry of neighbors, other associates, and review of his mail. 5. When the KGB was asked about Oswald's applica- tion for a re-entry visa made in Mexico City, it recommended that the application be denied. . , 6. Shortly after the assassination, Nosenko was called to his office for the purpose of determining whether his Department had any information concerning Oswald, When a search of the office records disclosed that information was availiable, telephone contact was immediately made with the KGB branch office in Minsk. The branch office dictated a summary of the Oswald file’ to Moscow over the telephone. This — summary. included a statement that the Minsk KCB had endeavored to “influence Oswald in the right direction." This statement greatly alarmed the Moscow office, especially in view of their instructions to Minsk that no action was to be taken on Oswald except to "passively observe" his activities. Accordingly, the complete Oswald file at Minsk was ordered to be flown at once via military aircraft to Moscow for examina- tion. It turned out that all this statement referred to was that an uncle of Marina Oswald, a lieutenant colonel in the local militia at Minsk, had approached Oswald and suggested that he not be too critical of the Soviet Union when he returned to the United States. 7. Marina Oswald was once a member of Komsomol but was dropped for nonpayment of dues. (Marina told the Commis- sion she was a member of Komsomol, but she has been inconsis~ _ tent on why she was dropped.) ° Fe asses 41-372 O - 79 - 41(Vol. 3) 638 8. The Minsk KGB filé on Oswald contained statements from fellow hunters. that he was an extremely poor ‘. shot and that it was pene bissdcte ty Lee ie “eS Raters veri “him with game, <0 51 P98 6/78 ai eT Bs errs” After the Be Ea aaa eter ‘the Soviet Senin belt provided about 20 English-speaking men who were assigned to the immediate vicinity of the American Embassy in Moscow to insure that no disrespect was shown by the Soviet citizens during this period. a - 10, Some other agency, ~gust which agency Nosenko. -: -. '. says he does not know, Subsequently dectded that Oswald would d _ be permitted to stay in Russia, on-its responsibility. . Nosenko speculates that this other agency was either the Soviet Red Cross or the Ministry cf Foreign Affairs. (This bit of information fits in especially neatly with Oswald's own statements that the Soviet officials he met after Ais suicide attempt were new to him, and did not seem to have been.told by his earlier Anterrogators anything about. him.) - The following fnformation given by Nosenko tends to contradict information which we have from other sources: rv 1. Nosenko says that after Oswald was released from the: hospital where he was treated for an attempt to commit Suicide, he was told again that he would have to leave the Soviet Union and thereupon threatened to make a second attempt to take his own life. Oswald's own diary of this time contains no mention of a threat to make a second attempt at suicide or of any post-hospitalization statement by the Soviets that he .would still have to return to the United States. Of course, Oswald's own account of these activities is not entities toa high degree of Greet Euys : etd Nosenko says that ae are no Soviet Peaniad tions which would have prevented Oswald from traveling from Minsk to Moscow without obtaining first permission to do so. We have information from the CIA and the State Department that Such regulations exist, although they are apparently Seg easily -- and frequently -~- violated, ay pestsSsIIED E.0, 11852, See 502) ee eet 639 Mr. Rankin, have you had a chance to review this document? Mr. RANKIN. I have. Chairman Strokes. And can you tell us what it is? Mr. RANKIN. It is a communication from William T. Coleman, _ Jr., and David Slawson to the Commission regarding Mr. Nosenko. Chairman Stokes. And was a copy of this document provided to you and does it indicate thereon? Mr. RANKIN. It does, yes. Chairman Stokes. All right. Now, this document or this memo- randum was prepared from information furnished on whom? Mr. RANKIN. It was furnished regarding Oswald. Is that what you mean? Chairman STOKES. Well, the subject matter. Mr. RANKIN. It was concerning what the FBI had learned from Nosenko about what he claimed he knew about Oswald. Chairman Strokes. And this is a five page document prepared by members of your Commission staff? Mr. RANKIN. That is right. Chairman Stokes. And my understanding is that Nosenko was in the possession of the CIA? Mr. RANKIN. That is right. Chairman Strokes. And that this memorandum was prepared as a result of an interview of Nosenko by the FBI? Mr. RANKIN. Yes sir. Chairman SrTokEs. Is that correct? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Apparently, I don’t know how they ever got to him, because they were not supposed to have jurisdiction in that area but—— Chairman STokEs. Our understanding is that the FBI would have to submit to the CIA the questions they wanted to ask Nosenko, the CIA would then ask Nosenko those questions and submit his answers back to the FBI. Is that your recollection of the procedure? Mr. RANKIN. No; I don’t know what the procedures were. Chairman SToKEs. But, at any rate, with reference to this memo- randum, can you give us some idea of how heavily the Commission relied upon this memorandum in its determinations? Mr. RANKIN. It is my impression now that the Commission did not rely on it at all, that the fact that the CIA was telling them that Nosenko was not a KGB officer and could not be relied upon, dissipated anything that the memo says about him and what he claimed to know about Oswald and caused the Commission to think that he was unbelievable about any of that. Chairman SToKEs. Thank you. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar. Mr. Epcar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fithian will be back with some additional specific questions. Let me just ask you some general questions to help me focus on pes aun with the Warren Commission and its relationship with the : Did you personally meet with J. Edgar Hoover? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Mr. Epcar. What was his attitude toward you personally? Mr. RANKIN. It had changed. Mr. Epcar. Changed from when to when? ———e —_ 640 Mr. RANKIN. From the way our relationship was when I was with the Department of Justice. He was quite cold and uncommu- nicative. Mr. Epcar. During your period of time with the Warren Com- mission? Mr. RANKIN. No. You asked me about when I saw him and I thought that was what you were dealing with. I went over to see him—— Mr. Epcar. Just clarify for me what you are talking about. His mood about you changed and you said he was cold. Was that on your personal visits to him, while you were with the Warren Com- mission? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. I don’t think I had more than two, if I had that many. I was dealing constantly with people below him. Mr. Epcar. And could you further describe what you mean by the coldness, what were some of the conversations that he would share that would indicate this coldness? Mr. RANKIN. Well, by the nature of our work, when I was an Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Coun- sel, I had conferences with the President involving legal problems and some of them necessarily involved the FBI, and so we had consultations about such matters. The same is true when I was Solicitor General. At all times our relations were warm and cordial and we seemed to have an understanding between each other and cooperation; in trying to get the work accomplished that we had before us. When I saw him during my work with the Warren Commission, in his office, he acted as though he felt that the Commission was hostile to him and to the FBI, and he commented upon all the man-hours we were demanding of him and how it was a burden to the FBI in its carrying on its other work. Without actually abusing me he made it plain that he was not pleased with our relationships. Mr. Enear. Did he resent the fact that you were doublechecking the FBI’s investigation? Mr. RANKIN. Every agent that I had anything to do with when I did that resented it. But I just had to do it anyway and I kept on doing it. Of course, that didn’t help with any of them. They soon could find that out. Mr. EpcGar. What is your feeling now in retrospect looking back in terms of your relationship and coldness and the resentment that the ae felt about their alleged withholding from you of informa- tion‘? Mr. RANKIN. Well, you know, I assumed at that time, apparently mistakenly, that they were professionals and even though they didn’t like whatever I would demand as a lawyer, or if I was too insistent about the investigation or wanted a better investigation or something more complete, or more information or more disclo- sure, that they would recognize that I was acting as a lawyer in trying to carry out my work, and if they didn’t like it they still would appreciate that it was necessary to my work. Therefore, the thought never crossed my mind that they would deliberately with- hold something as important as information about what had hap- pened in connection with this assassination, which I thought was of major importance to the country. I didn’t think the FBI’s interests 641 in its own Bureau, as important as I appreciated it could be to an agent or Mr. Hoover, still was more important than that of the interests of the country as a whole, so I never thought that they would deliberately conceal or withhold anything. I thought there might be some times when I would have to pull it out of them, and I might have to keep after something a good many times that I should have been able to get the first time, but the other never crossed my mind, as I say, and I never believed that Mr. Hoover would deliberately lie to the Commission. Mr. EpGar. One final question, just in terms of your own intu- itive speculation relating to a question I asked former President Ford earlier this morning. Where do you think Oswald was going when he left the rooming house and walked behind the back alley there and up the street and shot Officer Tippit and went to the theater? Where was he heading? Was he just walking aimlessly or did he have a direction he was going? Mr. RANKIN. I have nothing except speculation and I have always thought he was just trying to get away and that is a curious thing about life, that Officer Tippit would show up in that situa- tion. Mr. Epcar. Did you have occasion to visit Jack Ruby’s apart- ment? Mr. RANKIN. No. Mr. Epaar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have no further ques- tion. Chairman STokEs. Time of the gentleman has expired. We have a time problem, I am informed, with reference to the next witness to follow Mr. Rankin. Mr. Rankin, I wondered this. Several of the members have indi- -cated they have some additional questions they would like to ask you. I wonder if you would agree that if we submitted those to you that you would be able to answer them for the record for us. Would that pose any problem for you? Mr. RANKIN. No; I would be glad to do that. Chairman STOKES. Fine. All right. Then at this time let me extend to you on behalf of the committee 5 minutes, which you are entitled to as a witness before this committee, at which time you may make any comments you would like to make with reference to your testimony, and you may add to it or subtract from it, or whatever you like. I extend to you at this time that 5 minutes for that purpose. Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to take up 5 minutes of this committee’s time but I do wish to express myself that I am maybe not happy to be here but I am quite willing to be here to assist in your deliberations in any way and I hope that any enlight- enment that you can contribute with your work and your staff's efforts toward these problems will soon be available to the Ameri- can people and will be helpful to their understanding of what happened. Thank you. Chairman. Strokes. Thank you very much, Mr. Rankin. We ap- preciate your cooperation and your presence and your testimony here, and again we thank you. You are excused. 642 Prior to the recognizing of counsel, I would like the record to reflect the fact I am informed by counsel for the committee that prior to April 4, 1964, that is, February 1964, to April 4, 1964, that the FBI did have access to Nosenko, although Nosenko was under the control at that time of the CIA. After April 4, 1964, they did not again have access to him until 1969. | The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. Mr. Buakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is time now to consider the role of the Department of Justice in the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy. Senior officials at Justice were, of course, active in supervising the investigation, though the responsibility for carrying it out was in the hands of the FBI. In the de facto absence of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in the days following his brother’s — murder, the job of coordinating the Department’s activities was up to Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach. Soon after the assassination, Katzenbach became a proponent of an independent Presidential commission to investigate the assassi- nation. The proposal he and others suggested to President Johnson called for the creation of a blue ribbon body that was to become the Warren Commission. It would, he recommended, be composed of present and former Government officials of eminent stature, such as the former Commission members who have testified here today. When the Commission was created on November 29, 19638, the Department of Justice no longer was involved in the investigation in any way, although it continued to perform liaison functions for the Commission. Here today, Mr. Chairman, is the Honorable Nicholas Katzen- bach, former Attorney General of the United States. Mr. Katzen- bach became Attorney General in 1964, when Robert Kennedy ran successfully for the Senate from New York. Mr. Katzenbach was an named by President Johnson to serve as Undersecretary of tate. 4 Presently, he is general counsel and vice president of the IBM orp. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Katzenbach. Mr. PREYER [presiding]. The committee calls Mr. Katzenbach. TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES Mr. Preyer. Mr. Katzenbach, it is good to have you with us today. I ask that you stand and be sworn in at this time. Do you solemnly swear the evidence you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. KatTzENBACH. I do. Mr. Preyer. We have a rather slim attendance at this moment because of a vote that is on on the House floor. I think Members will be returning momentarily. Mr. KatzENnBACH. Not a new experience for me. : 643 | Mr. Preyer. I suggest that we take a several minute recess in place, if you do not mind. We would like to have—here is Mr. McKinney here right now. I think we are ready to proceed. The committee will recognize Gary Cornwell, counsel for the | committee, to begin the questioning of the witness. Mr. CorRNWELL. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared at this time to question the witness. However, I had the opportunity to take a lengthy deposition from Mr. Katzenbach previously. That deposi- tion has been provided to the committee and I have been informed that the committee has had an opportunity to study it carefully. In light of that, I might suggest, in view of the late hour, perhaps the committee might simply like to begin first and ask the ques- Bole of Mr. Katzenbach in those areas that we are most concerned _ with. _ Mr. Preyer. Is the deposition a part of the record or do you wish _ it introduced into evidence at this point in the record? __ Mr. CornweELt. It is in the files. Mr. Katzenbach has not yet had _ an opportunity to read it carefully himself and to sign it. As soon as he does so, it will be made a permanent part of the record, Mr. _ Chairman. _ Mr. Preyer. Fine. The Chair recognizes Mr. McKinney to begin _ the questioning of the witness. Mr. McKinney. Mr. Attorney General, it is a pleasure to see you again. We really appreciate your coming to help us in these delib- erations. I would like to start out by asking the question as to your exerting tremendous pressure right after the assassination to get the FBI report out and to get a report in front of the American people. This is somewhat evidenced by your memorandum to Mr. Moyers of November 25. What was your basic motivation in look- -ing for such speed? Mr. KatzENBACH. I think my basic motivation was the amount of speculation both here and abroad as to what was going on, whether there was a conspiracy of the right or a conspiracy of the left or a lone assassin or even in its wildest stages, a conspiracy by the then Vice President to achieve the Presidency, the sort of thing you have speculation about in some countries abroad where that kind of condition is normal. It seemed to me that the quicker some information could be made available that went beyond what the press was able to uncov- er and what the press was able to speculate about was desirable in that state of affairs. Mr. McKinney. In your deposition to the committee on page 8, you suggested that one of your interests was that the facts, all of them, had to be made public and it had to be done in a way that would give the public, both in this country and abroad, the confi- dence that no facts were being withheld at all. Do you think that pushing for this type of speed might have hurt the accuracy of the report or brought about the fact that some people would question the speed of its issuance its thoroughness, its completeness? Mr. KATzENBACH. I do not think the two notions are connected, Congressman. I think the motivations for getting some kind of report out, some facts out early were the ones that I have stated. 644 The memorandum of Mr. Moyers and a number of other conversa- tions and things that I have said really related to the desirability of a totally thorough, complete investigation by a commission, such as the Warren Commission, which should point out all of the facts available and all of the reasons for their conclusions. I never intended at any point that the investigation done by the FBI would be a substitute for the kind of investigation of President Kennedy’s assassination. Mr. McKInney. Perhaps for the general public and for the com- mittee, you could discuss for us your recollection of when and how the idea of a Presidential Commission came forth. I know you mention it in your memorandum to Mr. Moyers again. How did you feel about it, at first? Were you opposed to it or not, and when it was finally firmed up, how was it finally decided? Mr. KatTzENBACH. I think an idea like that perhaps has several apparents. It was something that very soon after the assassination I thought was a good idea, that such a Commission should be formed of people of impeccable integrity, people who would search for the truth and who would make that truth public because I did not believe that if it remained entirely within the executive branch that that effect could ever be achieved as far as the general public here or abroad was concerned. So, I thought very early that such a Commission was essential to, really to the political process, to getting all of the facts out on such an occasion as the assassination of a popular and respected Presi- dent. So, I pressed for that very early. I was never opposed to it. I was, however, in a somewhat awkward position because of my responsi- bilities in the Department of Justice as Deputy Attorney General at that time and, in effect, very nearly acting Attorney General at that time because of Robert Kennedy’s tragic loss and reaction that he had to the assassination of his brother. My awkwardness was because it was perfectly obvious to any- body who knew anything about the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion that they were certain to resent the appointment of any such commission. So, on the one hand, and if I were thought to be the source of that or to recommend that, then it would very seriously affect my relations with Mr. Hoover and the Bureau. Mr. McKinney. In other words, it is safe to say that with the mere mention of another investigation or another investigation or an investigative commission, Mr. Hoover would have considered it a somewhat of an insult to the FBI in its activities in this area. Mr. KaTzeENnBACH. Absolutely. Mr. McKinney. You brought up the subject of the Attorney General, so I will move to that for just a moment. I think it also might be of benefit to the committee and the public if you were to describe to us as best you could the Attorney General’s role and his feelings at that time. It has been difficult, I think, even though everyone is aware of the tremendous loss, for many people to understand why the Attorney General, who had had task forces all over the United States looking into organized crime, who had been an active prosecutor of organized crime, who had been an extreme- ly activist Attorney General, why he never took more of a role in ordering the FBI to do things and in ordering his in-the-field people 645 who had connections with the Mafia to move into any areas such as the Cuban area. Mr. KATZENBACH. Well, when the assassination occurred, Robert Kennedy’s world just came apart, in that not only his affection for his brother, but everything that they had been trying to do, every- thing they had worked for a long time just went with that shot. He was very devastated both I think by the personal loss and by the sudden crashing halt of all of the things that he had worked for with his brother for a long period of time. His attitude was not difficult, I think, for those who knew him well to understand. He said nothing that was done was going to bring his brother back to life and it was, I think, almost as simple _as that, as far as he was concerned. Mr. McKinney. In other words, not only was his devastation personal but it was political in that it was just over, the whole dream. Mr. KaTzENBACH. I think it was both. Both the two were so intertwined that it is difficult to distinguish them, I think. I think I would put them both under the feeling of personal. Everything that you were doing in life, a brother who was beloved just sudden- ly turned to dust. Mr. McKinney. Throughout your deposition, you bring up a point that I do not think as a committee member I was aware of. Even in discussing the formation of a commission on page 13 of -your deposition, you said, “I thought Chief Justice Warren prob- ably had more credibility abroad than any other American.” And you go on throughout your deposition in describing a tre- mendous amount of pressure from the State Department. I wonder if you would like to go into that in any more depth for the commit- tee as to exactly why that pressure and in what forms it took. We have several exhibits suggesting the international repercussions, which I will put in the record later, which are essentially memos - from Belmont, Jenkins, and Donahou and others. I thought perhaps you might like to go into the background of — that. Mr. KaTzENBACH. I was certainly communicated with several times by the State Department and I suppose in a sense that is pressure, although I do not know that I really felt it as pressure. I felt they had their problems and they wanted some help in trying to resolve them. We have 120, or whatever it is, Embassies around the world and every Ambassador there was being asked about this, being asked _ by that government what was happening, what was the story on it, as well as what effect it would have on our foreign policy, and I think they were very—being no information really available to them, they were simply feeling the lack of it and feeling that affected their credibility in foreign governments. Mr. McKinney. Were they suggesting or did you have any con- versations with the White House that suggested that perhaps President Johnson’s viability as a world leader was in question or weakened until the whole issue of who shot President Kennedy was resolved to the world’s satisfaction? Mr. KatzENBACH. I do not now recall any conversations as specif- ic as that. It seems to me that had to be an underlying factor and, 646 in addition, perhaps it is important to remember that President Kennedy had worked a long time and had achieved a considerable amount of stature after some fairly difficult beginnings. That here was not a totally unknown President, not totally un- known, relatively certainly unknown person in the Presidency. Mr. McKinney. As essentially, although certainly not officially, acting Attorney General during this period would you describe to the committee what your relationship was with Mr. Hoover at that time? Mr. KaTZzENBACH. I had never had a great deal of relationship with Mr. Hoover in terms of personal relationship with him. I suppose I had seen him a half dozen times maybe while I was in the Department of Justice. He had a considerable animosity, I think, toward Robert Kennedy. I think he had never been in a position of having an Attorney General who was closer to the President than he was and that was a new situation for him, and one I do not think he liked. His relationship with Mr. Kennedy was very, I think, cold formal and I suppose as Robert Kennedy’s deputy, some of that shed off on me. Mr. McKinney. Wasn’t it true or isn’t it inferable that Bobby Kennedy’s very drive against organized crime was, in effect, a slap in the face to Mr. Hoover in that it implied that the FBI had not been the gangbusters that we were all brought up to think they were? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, I think that is true and, of course, the drive in civil rights was one that kept exposing the Bureau to criticism, right or wrong, and that was resented by Mr. Hoover. Mr. Hoover resented criticism to a degree greater than any other person that I have ever known. | Mr. McKinney. I do not know whether you were in the room earlier, but I mentioned and brought up to Mr. Rankin a letter to Mr. Tolson in which the FBI, in essence, refused to go to the Warren Commission meeting as liaison and in essence refused to brief you as to what they were doing, stating that they would have nothing further to say to either the Commission or anyone else until their investigation was finished. This was somewhat a slap to you as well as to the Warren Commission. How did you react to this? Mr. Katzensacu. I think, Congressman, the first thing to re- member is that was a letter from Allen Belmont to Tolson, not a piece of paper that I saw at the time or the Chief Justice saw at the time or that anybody other than those within the Bureau. I think it is also important to remember that no memorandum, no letter written in the Bureau was really written for anyone other than Mr. Hoover. That is, it would reflect whatever the author thought Mr. Hoover’s views were. I do not believe that Al Belmont put to me or had me put to the Chief Justice any flat refusal of that kind to go as a liaison. My recollection is that the Bureau’s attitude at that time was that it would be better if we did not go to this organizational meeting of the Commission because we will be asked a lot of questions about a report that is not complete, which we do not wish to answer until the report is complete; not an unreasonable posi- 647 tion to take and not one which reflects the attitudes reflected in the memorandum which you are reading. And I believe that I probably, although I have no specific recol- lection of it, conveyed to the Chief Justice that view and those reasons and that he accepted them. Mr. McKINNEy. How did you feel, as the Warren Commission moved on in its work? How did you feel about the FBI’s thorough- ness and the FBI’s cooperation with the Commission? Mr. KATZENBACH. It was always my view, the whole time that I was in the Department of Justice, that the Bureau would do what you asked the Bureau to do and that they would do it well and professionally. They did not like what they were doing. They might want something more specific in the way of instructions than if they liked what they were doing. For example, if you were to look at the files now on civil rights matters and compared them with ordinary crimes that the Bureau was investigating, you would find very detailed memorandum to the FBI from John Door in the Civil Rights Division, Burke Mar- shall saying please do this and then answers to that or this, do something else, three and four page instructions. Whereas if it was a kidnapping, you did not really have to give them any instructions. They were there and doing things as they ought to be done. I regarded then and I regard now, despite all that has come out, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is probably the most highly trained, the most effective investigative agency in the world. Mr. McKinney. How do you tie that though to the fact that we now know they actually withheld from the Warren Commission any information they had regarding the CIA’s overtures to the Mafia and the assassination attempts against Castro? Mr. KATZENBACH. I am very surprised that they did that and I really have no explanation as to why they did that. It may have been because Mr. Dulles was a member of the Commission and they thought that was his job to do it, but I am quite surprised, given relationships between the FBI and the CIA, I am surprised that the FBI did not seize the opportunity to embarrass the CIA. Mr. McKinney. I am glad you used that word “embarrass” the CIA because I was going to ask you if you would describe your understanding at this period. My understanding is that the Direc- tor of the FBI had removed liaison from the CIA and the CIA retaliated. We had a situation where neither agency was talking to the other, basically on the basis of personal animosity rather than anything factual. Is this your understanding of their relationship at this time? Mr. KATZENBACH. There may be some overstatement in that. Essentially that was strained for that reason. On the other hand, whenever that occurred and it occurred on other occasions, liaison es acai simply because it had to be maintained at a lower evel. Mr. McKINneEy. You state in your deposition—we will move on to the CIA, on page 19. You say and I quote: Perhaps naively, but I thought that the appointment of Allen Dulles to the Commision would insure that the Commission had access to anything that the CIA had. I am astounded to this day that Mr. Dulles did not at least make that _ 648 information available to the other Commissioners. He might have been skeptical about how far it was to go to the staff or how it might be further investigated because there was somewhat more of an aura of secrecy surrounding the CIA in 1964 than there is in 1978. And then you went on to say that you are referring to generally anything that the CIA had in its files. Are you somewhat appalled at this point when you find out that not only were the files not thoroughly given to the Warren Commission but that such impor- tant things as Nosenko were not really given very happily? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, I am. Mr. McKinney. Do you think that there is anything that this committee could possibly propose, should this terrible type of horror happen again, that would give a Commission such as the Warren Commission any type of authority which would override the bureaucratic malaise that we seemed to have had back during the Warren Commission days? Mr. KATZzENBACH. I really cannot think of anything offhand. In the final analysis in government, you have to rely on the integrity and the competence of people in high position. They may not always have the integrity they should have and they may not always have that competence, but if you do not have that, it is pretty hard to scotch tape a solution around. Mr. McKinney. There are two letters, as you probably know, which are Kennedy exhibits F-466 and F-473 from Mr. DeLoach, one of them on 11-25 and one on 12-20 concerning the leaks of the FBI information and a report, in essence, in one accusing you of leaking information. In your deposition you indicated it would be difficult for you to do so because you did not know the information. And I just wondered what you could give this committee that would enlighten us at to why the FBI instead of simply putting out their report with the facts as they saw them started this process of slowly leaking to their favorite reporters? Mr. KaTZzENBACH. I think it was largely because of the appoint- ment of the Warren Commission. Mr. McKInney. I am sorry. Mr. KaTzENnBACH. It was largely because of the appointment of the Warren Commission and their resentment about that. They very much wanted the report to be made public. They very much wanted to get all the credit for it. They very much wanted the center stage. When that was frustrated, I think they took steps of leaking the information. They have done that in much lesser contexts many, many times when I was in the Department. Mr. McKinney. Isn’t it also possible that there is a definitive feeling on their part that a leak would not show a deficiency in an investigation as much as a report would be criticized for deficien- cies? Mr. KaTzENBACH. I doubt that. It is a speculation one can make. I doubt it for only one reason. I doubt very much that the Federal Bureau of Investigation thought there were any deficiencies what- soever in their report. Mr. McKinney. Or as least they thought there would be no deficiencies. Mr. KaTzENBACH. They thought there were none; yes. 649 Mr. McKinney. Well, I am fascinated that the Senate came to the conclusion that, quoting from book V on page 6: The committee had developed evidence which impeaches the process by which intelligence agencies arrive at their own conclusions about the assassination and by which they provided information the the Warren Commission. They go on to state that “Facts that might have substantially affected the course of the investigation were not provided the Warren Commission.” Then you state on page 30 of your deposition that “Mr. Hoover resented greatly when Mr. Kennedy or I talked directly to any agent in the field.” On page 47 of your deposition you said: You see, nobody really could do it other than the Bureau, with the Bureau’s acquiescence. Nobody else knew. I did not know what was going on. Nobody in the government knew what was going on other than very short conclusionary state- ments which you got from liaison people, from the Director himself. In other words, isn’t this really sort of a stone wall attitude toward the Commission, toward the Attorney General, the Assist- ant Attorney General and almost everybody else involved? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, it can be viewed that way. The Bureau, during the time that I was in the Department of Justice, had a very strong view that they were to do investigations. That was their responsibility and their responsibility ran essen- tially to Mr. Hoover on that, and they wanted suggestions. They would follow suggestions, orders with respect to an investigation from prosecutors, from the attorneys in the Department who had responsibility for the development of a case. But essentially how they went about it and how they did it, who was assigned to it, what they said was received up through their bureaucracy. What they resented was our talking with an agent in the field about an investigation he was doing, or about something _-he was familiar with rather than get that report coming back through the FBI bureaucracy and coming out with Mr. Hoover’s signature and a memorandum to the Attorney General from one of the Assistant Directors, as a memorandum for an Assistant Attor- ney General or whatever. That is not all bad. They simply did not want to be pinned with the views expressed by some agent in the field. If they did not acquiesce in those views or if they had other information available to them which cast some doubt upon those veiws, and I can under- stand that, as frustrating as it often was. I can understand that. I mean, when I was in government or even today—I have lot of lawyers working for me. Not every one of those people is expressing my views. Mr. McKInneEy. I guess one of the bottom lines, then, of all of this, is to ask the question: If the FBI and if the CIA had been wholly cooperative and wholly open to the Warren Commission, do you, No. 1, feel that there would have been any different result in what the Warren Commission came up with or how long it took to come up with that answer? Or do you feel that perhaps the Warren Commission’s final conclusions would not have been open to such tremendous criticism and skepticism? Mr. KaTzENBACH. Well, I think obviously things would have been investigated that were not investigated or investigated in more 650 depth than they were investigated. I have no way at all of knowing whether what light that would have cast. I have been personally persuaded that the result was right and I do not think it would have changed any of the evidence that they had that led to that result. But I suppose one has to say, an investigation that did not take place, it is impossible to know what would have come out of it. And I think on the third part of your question, it is clear to me that had that been done, had that been investigated, had those facts been made public, perhaps what is going on here today would — not have taken place, would not have been necessary. Mr. McKinney. In other words, the opening would not have been there. It is luck perhaps that the Warren Commission may have hit the right result but there were so many avenues in which individu- al bureaucratic decisions were made not to open and were not discovered that it is relatively lucky they did not lead anywhere. Mr. KaTzENnBACH. I think lucky is too strong a word. They did an awful lot of work and had an awful lot of facts and an awful lot of good investigation was done in the areas where it was done. Mr. McKinney. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions—one more question I guess I would ask. In general, we discuss the pressure from the State Department in the beginning and the reasons for that pressure and your memorandums. Do you feel that the pressure from, say, the State Department, the pressure from the White House, general pressures of the time really made the Warren Commission do its work too quickly and the FBI do its work too quickly so that also subjected them to criticism? Mr. KatzensBacu. I think more true of perhaps the initial FBI report, but I don’t think it is possible in that period of time to do the kind of investigation that had to be done, nor do I think in essence that was what they were doing. I think they were trying to arrive at a conclusion on the basis of a very intensive, massive, but hasty investigation so as to get the most salient facts out. The Warren Commission, my recollection is, too, about a year, and it would seem to me that is not—I don’t think there was any great pressure to get it out within a year. If they felt it was 18 months, I think it would have taken 18 months. Mr. McKinney. It is known the Chief Justice definitely wanted a ee it out before the heat of a political campaign rose to the ront: Mr. KaTzensacu. Yes, and I am sure he wanted to get back on the bench. Mr. McKinney. It is safe to say you found yourself in the uncom- fortable position of being pressured to get information out but at the same time realized that speed was certainly not going to make the FBI investigation as accurate as you would like to see it? Mr. KatzeNBACH. The conclusions might be accurate but the investigation couldn’t conceivably be as thorough in that period of time as the assassination of a President ought to require. Mr. McKinney. Thank you very much. I really appreciate your answer. I am finished. Chairman Sroxgs. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer. 651 Mr. PREYER. Just one question, Mr. Chairman. You have served as Attorney General, and a very good one, and you were also instrumental in setting up the citizens committee. In the awful chance that we might ever have had to go through this kind of thing again, would you recommend the setting up of a citizens committee once again, or would you prefer to rely on the judicial system solely to investigate such an assassination? Mr. KATZENBACH. The question is difficult, Congressman, because had Ruby not shot Oswald, then I think you would have had a very different state of facts. I assume in those circumstances that it would have been investigation by the agencies of the Government developing the evidence they had, for prosecution—at the time by State authorities—of Oswald for the murder of the President. _ Whether subsequent to that, depending on what then happened, _ you would have had a commission, a citizens group, such as the _ Warren Commission, I suppose, would have depended on what all the surrounding facts were at that time. Given the identical situation; yes, if that occurred I would take the same course again, and I think I would do it the same way. I think I would rely in the same way and hope that the reliance was not misplaced. Mr. PrREYER. So the fact that there was no public trial possible in the Kennedy assassination is one good reason for having a citizens committee? Mr. KaTzENBACH. Yes sir. You might need one in any event, because a trial—— Mr. PREYER. Pardon me? Mr. KATZENBACH. You might need one in any event, because the nature of a trial might leave out, leave a lot, might establish the guilt of murder of the defendant without bringing in all of the collateral things which—— Mr. Preyer. That was going to be my next question, such as the guilty plea in the James Earl Ray case? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes. Mr. Preyer. Of Martin Luther King? Mr. KATZzENBACH. Sure, exactly. Even without the guilty plea the limits of relevant evidence, there may be a lot of unanswered questions after the judicial process has been completed. Mr. Preyer. You mentioned the FBI, you felt, was the most effective investigative agency in the world, but you have also noted a number of the difficulties of the citizens committee working with the FBI, certain institutional jealousies there. Do you think if you had to do it again that you would advise the Warren Commission to go the route of employing independent investigators, or would you rely on the FBI as the major investigative arm? Mr. KatTzENnBACH. I think the question is somewhat hypothetical because, you see, I don’t think there are other investigators who have nearly the competence. I don’t think they are available in the numbers that you would need them. So it seemed to me that even today, as then, not to use the investigative agencies of the Govern- ment, and particularly the FBI, is probably to waste one of the most valuable assets that you have. Mr. Preyer. Thank you very much. Chairman Sroxes. Time of the gentleman has expired. 652 The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. Mr. Dopp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Katzenbach, nice to have you here with us today. I suppose that an awful lot of the speculation that grew out of the Warren Commission, after the completion of its work, over the past 15 years, a lot of it stemmed, and I will ask if you agree or disagree with this—stemmed from the memorandum, the so-called memorandum from Mr. Moyers, the November 25 memorandum that you drafted and sent to Bill Moyers. As I recall, over the past 15 years, on any number of occasions I have either read or heard people refer to that first paragraph in that memorandum, three points, and I will quote it for you, then— I don’t know if you have a copy or not, I will see that you get one in front of you. I am quoting here: 1. The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin; that he did not have confederates who are still at large; and that the evidence was such that he would have been convicted at trial. This was November 25, 1968, 3 days after the assassination. Now, unfortunately they don’t always quote the other para- graphs in that memorandum, which I think to an extent mellow that single paragraph, but still that paragraph has been quoted extensively as an indication that the Warren Commission was really a self-fulfilling prophecy, that it was not designed to investi- gate the assassination of the President from a de novo position, but rather to confirm what the FBI had already concluded, what the Dallas police had concluded, and that, therefore, the Warren Com- mission didn’t really fulfill its obligation, the obligation that Chief Justice Warren outlined when he said our responsibility is to get at the truth. I am creating that scenario for you because that is how I think it has been portrayed over the years. I have listened today to you talk about the various motivations, and it is hard, one can only sympathize, not empathize, with your position in those days, what it must have been like to be in the position you were in and have the responsibilities you had. Can you tell this committee, or help us try and straighten out what your motivation was at that moment that you wrote those words—and this is 3 days after the assassination—“the public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin.” Why was it so important that the public be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin? Mr. KATZENBACH. Because, very simply, if that was the conclu- sion that the FBI was going to come to, then the public had to be satisfied that that was the correct conclusion My whole attitude in that memorandum, and I think it is con- tained or reflected in other paragraphs that you mentioned, I think it was reflected in other conversations, other memorandums that you have, one overwhelming feeling that I had, and that was in the assassination of the President of the United States, all of the facts, all of the evidence, everything that was relevant to that had to be made public. Mr. Dopp. You say then, I should quote—in fact, Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that this memorandum, if it is not already admitted into evidence, be admitted now. 653 Chairman Sroxes. I believe it is already in part of the evidence. | Mr. Dopp. I think all of it should be there. You say in the first paragraph: _It is important that all of the facts surrounding President Kennedy’s Assassina- _ tion be made public in a way which will satisfy people in the United States and _ abroad all that the facts have been told and a statement to this effect be made now. I think that is fine, but still I am perplexed, absolutely per- _ plexed, on why it was in the public interest to prove that Oswald _was the one, and that as reflected in the next sentence, did not _have confederates who were still at large. | wks was it so important to prove that 3 days after the assassina- tion? | _ Mr. Karzensacu. Because for the very simple reason, if that was _not a fact, and all the facts were not on the table, then it seemed to me that nobody was going to be satisfied, and I thought that the public was entitled—if there was a conspiracy, then we ought to say there was a conspiracy. If there were confederates at large, it _ ought to be said there were confederates at large. I knew then already that Oswald had been in Russia, Oswald had been in Mexico. Now, if you are going to conclude, as the Bureau was concluding that this was not part of a conspiracy, that there || were no confederates, then you had to make that case, with all of 1thefacts, absolutely persuasive. If you didn’t reveal these facts, somebody else was going to reveal them. Now, if there was a conspiracy, there was a conspiracy, and you | put those facts out. But if you were persuaded Oswald was a lone killer, you had better put all of the facts out and you better not | cover up anything, and you better say now all of the facts are going to be made public. _ That was the advice I was giving Moyers and that was the advice I was giving the President and that was the motivation for the . Warren Commission. I don’t think this is artistically phrased. Perhaps you have never written anything that you would like to write better afterwards, _ Congressman, but I have. Mr. Dopp. You won’t get me to say that. Mr. KATZENBACH. But I think if you take that, take the other | paragraphs of it, take other things I was quoted as saying, other things I said, that there is a consistent view on my part. Mr. Dopp. I didn’t want to pull this out of context. I want to ease sure it is all in there. In fairness to you, it should all be in there. Mr. KATZENBACH. I was very conscious of those facts which were going to be seized upon. Is this a Russian conspiracy? And I was very conscious, perhaps as a little bit of a history buff, that nobody ever put to bed satisfactorily the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. Mr. Dopp. You seemed in the next paragraph—I quote you again here—you say: Unfortunately the facts on Oswald seem about too pat—too obvious (Marxist, Cuba, Russian wife, et cetera). The Dallas police have put out statements on the Communist conspiracy theory and it was they who were in charge when he was shot and thus silenced. Am I off base there in detecting a feeling that you had on November 25, 1963, that there was something more to this, that : : 41-372 O - 79 = 42(Vol. 3) 654 you felt, in fact, whether intuitively or based on other information, | that this guy had been set up, Oswald was not alone? I sense that in that paragraph, reading it word for word, and | carefully, that you had some thoughts running through your mind, and you were expressing them to Bill Moyers in those words. Mr. KaTzENBACH. I don’t think I had a view one way or the other, other than what I was being told the FBI investigation had, but I was saying you have got a lot of facts here, if you say Oswald was the lone killer, he wasn’t in conspiracy with anyone, had nothing to do with any foreign government, you have got a lot of awkward facts that you are going to have to explain, and you had better explain them satisfactorily. You had better put it all out on the table. Chairman SToxkEs. Time has expired Mr. Dopp. May I have 1 more minute and I will terminate? Chairman SToKEs. Without objection. Mr. Dopp. On page 22, when asked by Mr. Cornwell—I won't read the question to you, but basically he is talking to you about the assassination plots, asking, during the deposition, about the assassination plots, and your response is this: No. In fact, I never believed there were such plots. I testified to this before but I remember at one time they were in the White House at the time of the Dominican upheaval and I remember Lyndon Johnson asking a direct question to Dick Helms about assassination and got a flat denial from Mr. Helms that the CIA had anybody involved. It was a short conversation and you can qualify it any way you want to, but I went home pretty confident. Did you prepare any memorandum at that time, after that con- versation, or do you remember that conversation so clearly that you have no doubt in your own mind that Mr. Helms told the Sientay of the United States in 1965 there were no assassination plots: Mr. KATZENBACH. I remember the conversation. It is hard to remember verbatim word for word. The question may well have been “Have we ever been involved in any assassination of any- body,” and the answer to that may have been the flat “no.” I don’t know, I don’t remember exactly how the question was phrased, but it obviously had to do at that time with Vietnam, and I was satisfied from that that we didn’t engage in that kind of activity in this country, and I suppose I was satisfied in part, pene rerenat because it was so incredible to me that we should ave. Mr. Dopp. You didn’t take any notes? Mr. KATZENBACH. I almost never did. I never had time. Mr. Dopp. Thank you, Mr. Katzenbach. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKEs. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. SAwyeEr. I just have a single question. Mr. Hart, who was a spokesman for CIA here in connection with their having taken into custody for some 3 years Yuri Nosenko, the Russian defector, said that their authority for putting this man in a specially built isola- tion cell for 3 years, was you, that Helms had gone to you and gotten an OK for this. Is that true? | 655 : Mr. KatzENBACH. I have no recollection of any conversation involving Mr. Nosenko with Mr. Helms. There may have been such a conversation. I don’t think that I authorized putting anybody in jail for 3 years. I simply have no recollection of any such conversa- _tion occurring, but there may have been a conversation about a defector. I don’t know. _ Mr. Sawyer. But you don’t believe that you would have author- _ized that kind of thing, if you had been asked? _ Mr. Karzensacu. No, I think I would have—I think if somebody said we have a defector, we don’t know whether he is a true defector or not, we have got him under some questioning, I wouldn’t have—I don’t suppose that would have bothered me that | much. But when you talk about incarceration for 3 years, and so | forth, that seems to me a different proposition. _ One would expect a defector to be questioned by CIA. | Mr. Sawyer. But not put in solitary for 3 years in a specially | constructed vault, in effect? | Mr. Katzensacu. No. But I would not have been surprised if he | had been questioned intensively for a week or two. |I Mr. Sawyer. Thank you. | That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. ) Mr. Forp. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have questions at this time. I r yield my time to the Chair. ; Chairman SToKkEs. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. Firutan. I didn’t expect Mr. Ford to pass. I don’t have my _document out here I wanted to talk to you about. It has to do with your views as to how, in keeping with your deposition, you said that we should leave no stone unturned and pursue every possibility, and so on, and particularly with regard to conspiracy. There have been some questions here of the Cuban situation. What I would like to do is ask if you could shed any light as to how you would have advised the FBI to proceed with the alleged con- nections between Jack Ruby and organized crime? Mr. KATZENBACH. Well, I think it should have been explored in normal investigative ways, that is, they have some sources they were using and still use, to some extent, electronic devices, in appropriate circumstances, and I would have thought they would have made any effort, every effort that was possible, to see what those connections were, if any. There is certainly a massive amount of data in the FBI with respect to organized crime. There even was at that time. I suspect there is a lot more today. Mr. FITHIAN. I wonder if we might provide the witness with the February 24 memorandum from Hubert and Griffin to Howard Willens. JFK F-448, I think, is the number. If we could provide that to the witness, I would ask that it be introduced into the record at this time. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it might be entered into the record at this time. [The exhibit follows:] 656 JFK Exuisit F-448 lf acer arasdin ; | aie ie acing i , 7 pet PR ek so ot , February 24, 1954 . Exhibit 8 S TAPES se Regt <3 CEn 8 E299 cia: LS. Seuss ie ts eee SBEHi,Ts 'e BE.rind 2 st ay ~“ 2 we apie Bah Sere Voto WG _ 2 ve ee hg te Sl ws”. ‘ reed - =. % a * =e 2 a>. a02 vy : peete ° p ~ ve ORS.Ft ee Sl eee {Phy a : ‘ se - FROM: ©-Mr, _Leon D. ilubert Agi: re | | ; Mee Burt W. Griffin. SUBJECT?’ Televhone Rees Obtsins’ for the Comnisstongy "iitJnDurthiavance of your eonversaiion pith ur. Griffin on’February © eis - 20th ana our’ joint memorandua’of February'19; the following steps ara ~~ * =. - .Buggeatea to be taken 388 soon ap possible for obtaining and preserving -. <-: teleghane records which may be pertinent to the workof this Comission, ° - Some of the suggestions may inposa burdens upon private parties *. which ore nob justified by the possible results to be obtained. If so, they should be rejected and the reason for such rejection recorded in order to assure future crities that suck efforts vere carefully con- ~ Bidered. SU OS OS RR ee SN ER Tara Te «<4 © so” s* oe ' Paragraphs one,-two and three sask telephone numbers af phones ~ e "reasonably avallahle” to Ruby plus records of calls placed frog phones be under Ruby's direct control. = = -—i«— o oe Ah ~ Paragraph four’ seeks telephone numbers of all phores reasonably a i. +S Peregraphi five peeks only phones Listed -to or under the contro Ee | . Of certain peoples’. 6 ei re ae. Sate Wee tA P .., Bowld not, involye contact with non-residents of Daliss. Bye ni hate eS Als eegatecle oe. Spee e e REO cane eee enn 657 lay dirs ‘Homard P, ¢illens hates, f “ebruary a ; 1964 2. . The FBI should immediately obtain with respect to Jock Ruby, . (for the poriod August 1b to Novenber 2571963, copies of all original ~ “telephone company records bearing upon the dates, time, lensth of* colt: calling mmber, billing number, person calling and number called with respsct to all telephone calls (including Iocal calls) utilizing any telephona listed to Jack Ruby or any of his Clubs, including pay phozes . on or near the premises, If the telephone comany hag no records which would provide SS yeah soeconcerning locsl -calis,; the FBI aot so ean be Tt: is umacessary ‘at thie point to.obtain call Secaita froma .alh - +t= oe SS “reasonably available to Ruby” sincs onalysis of celts fran such” _ phones would be impossible without further information. Hovever, we contemplate that Lf we establish a list of suspected intermediaries . between Puby and Csyald, Lt vould. be valuable to check telephones "ovallodle” to Ruby against calls to the "intermediaries". In addition, it may be valuable to examine recoras of telephones listed to or used regularly by ST oviay eave oN for, oe to ae a8 Sa LBUE to Bae ho 8 => 33. with Seiesce ‘3alt:eases feet hs ‘toeaageete rae Pere FBI should indicate in its eons what telephons company personnel ‘were questioned, the queations asked and the answers received, in all investi- gations which were conducted, so that it may be determined that the records obtained ere cazmplete and accurate. We believe that the rethsd. of searching for recorés must be dctsiled since telephone information. “iene so far has been spotty and inaccurate,, ; Gs ‘Po the extent not already providea,: the FBI shoula ba requested — Baty ciphers for the Comission e list of 81% telephones (but not call records) reasonably avollable te the following persons since ate 1, 19633. » Andrew Aenstrong, 302. Dickson: Circle , Apartnent C, Delas 5 ‘Texas, ¢ Raven‘Barnett Cardin, aka eaten Bennet Kari)fa, aka "Little dyn’, 3509 Mestovhrook, Fort Worth,- Texas. - ; Ahi Carlin, aks Bruce Karlin, 38039 Méedoviroo', yore Yorth, roe. oO Marion (aka Marton) Rubenstein Carro21, O44 Te ah ee Cnlcago, npr Etleen Rubsnstein Karinsky, 6724, N. Tolmon, SAEED Diinois Levis J. MoWillio, Lue Vegas, Heveda oe ; 2 wha eg Eapenstedn y:ADS We. pid ml Ohtongo,> romeo 7 ! > Shen (Rubenstein) iby, hase Janestom Road, Dalles , “Toxas. ete 658 Nr, Woward P, eRe SF iF February 24 2954, ) Bap prseastels) 3 Buby, Py 25,Hoodtand Babe,Syuhtteld, Michigan . -_ Pi anSas ‘Eva| Rubenstein “(Qsgia) * Grant; BD polling, Dallno, Texas, ae i+ : cae seNeher axLington, Texas soroatoe £f - 3a ‘te an ica a ee Eg a ee ee NR 8 em me ee oe Somefabenstitsva,“souk We Saksendzage,tiuinots: ae - os ney: ‘Zhe date March 1 a, chosen because 2 establis hed a pate nargin a inquiry prior to Oswald's trip to New Crleans, With respect to each | £ the above bersons, the FBI should provide numbers, to the extent a paeeintee not only cf hone telephones but nearby pay phones, telephones — . of any buainesses in which the individual ts employed, telephones of business partners or other simile close business assotiates y telephones > of friends end reletives visited frequently, and telephones at restaurants and other businesses which the indtvyidual is knoyn to frequent. For esch telephone the FBI should indicate the types of service (pay phone, sub- ™ seriber phone, Lintted service telephone);2 none of subseriber 2 location of phone, and reason for concluding the phone wes accessible to the — individual under investigation. This inforaation should be obtained. primarily hy examining records which will not involva porsonol contact with persons outside of the telephona cospanies and without cosmmicating ~ the-nanes of suspects to persors outside the FBI. We realize that such - - 8 means of investigetion will not provide-a complete answer to our cmeations, but we believe other modes of inquiry would be unwise ot this time. As “to each Individual under investigation, tha FBI report chould ‘indicate ip what sources were chacked and what other information os to possibly aceesoible sg night. be available y direct contact vith individuals. wo . 5. Tha FBI should obtain fron 3 Biegats company recoris check” Fs ‘personal, family and business phones of the Ae ee persons Guring the period March 1, 1963 to present: ee Barnay Baker, 5900 Sheridan Road, Chicago, Tinos peer . Chicago Locp Auto Refintoning Co., Inc. ; 3216 South Shiolds Ave., Chicago, 111. (business) Curtis LaVerne Crafarda, aka Larry Crafard Senne? cep available -t0 eeson.eos $Eiighb. from Dallas to Hiontenni)e. ~~ ao + - er . ne ae aaa ° - - ~~ 3 659 ite, Movard PL wtLlers oft ¢: Yourvary 24, L964 “ae SassConton, 799 Crescent Drive, Pola ere calis, t Pas Alex cuiber, 5222 vy,Olysold, “1os"Aovcles, Goltt,: (ie 522032)" | Fronk Goldstein, 619 Teresita Boulevard, Sun Francisco, Calif. “pe , (HU 7~75'74) © “(ST 21-7343) - | ; ae Meyers, 3950 4, Eakn Shore Driva, Chteago, Dtinois (hase) Fro Mtge Cory M4 Yost temroe, Chicago, TH, (business) Sil Bayities eet nis ios Tyan, 234), Comsottout tans, tote ua . Minesh Usborto, Chicago, ‘ritiaots ‘ Hari Usberto, Chiengo, Diinole on Shp Weinstein, ieee: moza bed pieey Dallee,Toxas. Lay “3 "6, he EBT shed hiker ‘with the sopropiats officials of telentins - ‘ cxpantes in Chisago, Pallas, Detroit, Nex York, San Francisco, Los purbles. and New Crlems to determine what mous, if any, are aynilable ox obtaining infceration as to Inconing long distance telephone calls ts ae particular nucber if the nan of ths caller is untnoma. It is con- ceivame, for axonple, thet conmecting or trunk-line telephone carriers my have sutcantic recording devices which record the celling exchange ., end the dialed miaber wlth respect to calle which thay tronsnlt, Or, it - pay bo that most teleshona comantes in lerge cities are now so felly. . sutecated that such infoomation is contained on thelr IL carta ond these -- Is cards could be rua through a ccupnter or.other deyico for evecy telepnore subseriber In the arca co that such information could be ca Shtl mechanically witboxrt untins expense cr personzl effort. Information as to city ox telephone company from which 8 long distance call originated could . conoeLvabhy be 2 aein Light of other dats which ye have. - . ee as : wpe ane FBr oats coufer with tellephons chmaany offictiels of each company serving Jack Ruby and the persons listed in parysraph Sour end five to ascertain if that company has Bay meass Of providing infcr=etion,- concerning cecal calts to or fron the phones of these persms, Even if no records ore maintainal by such companies in the ortinery course of business, it may be that certain electronic, mechanical or other entries ere routinely made either by telephone tranantttsIng sep aaetl or in connection with business records ordinarily nointaine’ by the telephones ccxpany so that by careful. exaaination of auch dats inforantlon con - ‘gerning local telephone activity on a particular telephone could be “obtained. *To whatever oxtont infornation éan be obtained coacoming - local telephons actlyity, the Agent shouli repsrt to the Comission the ~ nature of the information which can be obtained and tho means bz which 34 would be odtnined. nis dota should be secured without aii teseae particular naces or telephone mubers. Ao 660 ‘Mr, Howard P, Willens wen ag ee February2,, 1964 8 The FBI showld obtain a List of all talephona companies and ~ 2.9 the Chisf Exeoutive Officer psrying thefollowing areas: ta™ =k > Texas . a t ee tm Nevada > - Los Angeles, California _ San Francisco, California Peron + Chicago, Dlinois — eae ¥ W hear 7 Detroit, Hichigan and@ adjacent suburbs in the Detroit matropaliten _ aerca, Including Southfield, Michigan . | ig a . .,- Boston, Mossachusotts- ang adjacent suburbs; including Belnont, Hass,4_ +7, Hew York metropoltten srea,- including suburban Long Toland, ¢.0 Soa Comeoticaut ank New Jorsay. -. oe ee hi. Miami, Florida ee hen Washingten, D. ©. and adjacent subxrba _ New Orleans, Louisiana = ie . 9, “Mr, Rankin should address a letter to the Chief Executive ef- ench of the. teRephone companies mentioned in paragraph eight requesting . that such companies not destroy until Jima 1, 1964 any records they: a "may have with respect to telephone service of o13 subscribers.” The> - Letter ghovld request that the source of this polley not ‘be disclosed,: - aa ; x ; 5 : : + “, '" Retention of records on © Ddlanket basis would preserve security as to the thinking of the Commission and will afford the maxirnm assurance that telephone recards will be preserves with respeat to persons not yet suspect, We realize that blanket retention may be so burdetsome o» expensive as to - nose our request seea unressonable, If there is agy suggestion olong these . dines; & conferences }o work out a reesonable’ system, should be sugzested.--.°- MA A 3: °F - 6 ehie-.g. MEE or) ae Bets ete oS Lis ps vit lata the het Se. Gy, DAMet oan, aE : a 10. As soon as possible after the Ruby trial and after consultation with the Commission, the FBI should obtain copies of original telephone records uncovered os a result of the Investigations requested in paragraphs four and five. These records should be analyzed to determine possible’ > Links.to Ruby or Oswald. Thereafter, if deemed edyisable, records of phonss “reasonably available" to Ruby would be analyzed for possible csiis to phones "reasonably available to suspected intexmediaries batween Ruby oni Oswold, ‘ mY Lorine a) 8 : Mr. FITHIAN. It is in today’s briefing book under exhibit 5. At least that is its number. Mr. KATZENBACH. Did you want me to read it? | Mr. Firutan. If you would just glance over it quickly. As I understand your experience in the Department during At- | torney General Kennedy's tenure, you became fairly familiar with the whole effort on organized crime; is that not correct? | Mr. Kartzensacu. Not really terribly familiar, Congressman. That was one of the areas that Robert Kennedy was most interest- ed in himself and, therefore, one of the areas where he had far | more extensive knowledge than I. What I usually picked up from | him as deputy was the areas where he had less interest, so I was | not an expert on organized crime. | Mr. Frrutan. If you would like, just as we chat back and forth here, to glance over that four or five pages, I think you will find | that there are recommendations here from these two junior attor- neys on the Warren Commission that at least lead me to believe | that they were recommending a much more ambitious program | than obviously was pursued and, in fact, if you go to the page 5 | with me, paragraph 9, their recommendation is really precise, and ‘it said that Mr. Rankin should address the letter to the chief | executive of each of the telephone companies mentioned in para- | graph 8, requesting such companies not destroy until June 1, 1964, | any records that they may have with respect to telephone services -of all subscribers, and so on. | If you look above that it is a number of towns. If you look on the back in the document there are a number of names that they suggest that they might pursue, and if you look earlier on in the 'document you find a suggestion that they survey any telephone within the reach of Jack Ruby. _- Now, I am not really vitally concerned about this document with this particular witness, Mr. Chairman, but I am interested in what recommendations you ‘would have made to the Bureau to pursue, or either you or the Department would have made to the Bureau, 'to pursue the possible organized crime complicity in the assassina- tion, and that is the first part of the question. The second part is, isn’t it reasonable to expect, given the exper- tise of Justice in this particular field, that this might be one of the areas that we as a committee could expect the greatest amount of interaction between Justice and the Bureau, given your widespread experience down at Justice in this and the necessity of the two groups really to cooperate? Am I way off on that, Mr. Katzenbach? Mr. KATzENBACH. No. I don’t know how you are using the term Justice on that. I think with respect to the Commission that we felt, in fact, the Commission should have, whatever investigation the Commission wanted should be done and should be performed in accordance with what they wished. I don’t recall making any sug- gestion to the Commission as to what I thought they should go into. Mr. Willins was liaison from the Department, using Department in the narrow sense of the lawyers in the Department. He had considerable experience with organized crime and I would have expected, because of the strange shooting of Oswald by Ruby, and 662 because of allegations of organized crime connections—I would have expected the Commission to go into those to whatever depth they thought appropriate in terms of coming to whatever conclu- sions they came to. My point is I wouldn’t have either interfered or wanted them to. interfere or told them what to do. | Mr. FirHian. Wouldn’t that expectation have been heightened by what Mr. Rankin told us today that is section No. 4 of their | investigative plan had to do with the whole conspiracy, did any- ) body at least assist? | Question. I guess what I really want to get to, Mr. Katzenbach, is’ in light of the FBI’s role as really the investigative arm, granted the Commission had some lawyers, but the real investigation was done by the Bureau? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, sir. | Mr. Firu1an. And the Bureau under the Justice Department. Are you satisfied —— Mr. KatzENBACH. The Bureau under the Warren Commission, - really. | Mr. Firuian. All right. Are you satisfied, as you review the case, that the FBI, in assisting the Warren Commission, did an adequate job with regard to the approach to investigating the question of any possible complicity of organized crime via the Jack Ruby link? Mr. KatTzENnBACH. I don’t really feel in a position to answer that question. You gentlemen could answer that question far better than I because you have gone over all of this to a much greater | degree than I have. ! Mr. Firuian. At any time during the whole Warren Commission existence, did anyone from either the FBI, to your knowledge, or the Warren Commission, come over and sit down with the Orga- nized Crime Section of the Justice Depoartment, or the Attorney | General himself, or anybody, you or anyone else, and sort of review | the bidding as to the approach that they might use in trying to ferret out any possible association? Mr. KatTzeNnBaAcuH. I know of no such thing, no such occasion. They certainly did not with me, but Mr. Willins, who was the liaison there, he was a very good lawyer, had a lot of experience in organized crime, and would have been quite competent to have helped to assist them as they wanted in this respect, and I simply have no knowledge as to what conversations he had with the Warren Commission or the staff on that subject, but he was cer- tainly competent to do so. Mr. FiTHIAN. He never made any—— Chairman Stoxss. Time has expired. Mr. FirHian. He never made any reports to you? Mr. KaTzenBAcu. No. He occasionally told me orally, but it was my view that the Warren Commission was doing this and our job was to do what they wanted done, to give them what support they wanted in the job that they were doing, and not to interfere in any way. Mr. FirHian. And the last question, you never felt that Justice or the FBI ought to go to the Commission and say, ‘Look, if you are really going to look into the organized crime section, this is the way you want to do it.” 663 Mr. KATZENBACH. No, I don’t think any occasion came up where I felt that was appropriate or necessary. Mr. FiTHiANn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKEs. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. Mr. Devine. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Chairman STokEs. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Katzenbach, Mr. Sawyer asked you about the decision to sign off for Mr. Nosenko. Can you tell us whom it was that came to you Sosa for your permission to begin the interrogation of No- senko‘ Mr. KATZENBACH. I don’t recall anybody doing so, Mr. Chairman. I understand that Mr. Helms has said that he had a conversation with me, or recalls that he had a conversation with me on it. I have no recollection of that conversation. But perhaps his recollec- tion is better than mine. I don’t know. I don’t recall any such conversation. Chairman STokEs. Was this your testimony, that you don’t recall anyone talking to you about it? | Mr. KatTzENBACH. Yes, sir, that is my testimony. | Chairman Sroxgs. At any time? | Mr. Katzenpacu. At any time. Chairman Stokes. How did you learn of it? |_| Mr. Karzensacu. I learned of it when the gentleman writing a | book called me up about 3 or 4 months ago or 6 months ago, and | asked me about it. And I said, ““Who is Nosenko’’? Chairman SToxes. That would be Mr. Epstein? _ Mr. KartzEnBACH. Yes, sir, Edward J. Epstein, right. And that | was the first that I heard of it, to my recollection. | Chairman Stokes. So then, so that the record is patently clear on 'this point, during your tenure you knew absolutely nothing at all of this situation? | Mr. Karzensacu. Nothing that I can recall at this time. It was quite a while ago, but I have absolutely no recollection of Mr. 'Nosenko or anything to do with him during that period of time. Chairman Stoxes. And while you held the office that you held, -were you at any time requested to give your approval to treating _ any defector in this manner? | Mr. KatzEnBacu. No, sir, the only connections that I can recall with the CIA at all fell into two categories: One was when they 'wished to wiretap or some electronic device to be put within this country they came to me; and the only other thing is whenever 'they wanted a book suppressed they came to me and I told them not to do it. Chairman SToKEs. Told them what? Mr. Karzensacu. Told them not to do it, that there wasn’t any 'way you were going to do it. And those are the only, at least _ offhand the only—I had very little connection with the CIA when -J—none that I recall as deputy, a little bit, I guess at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and perhaps some at the time of the _ Cuban prisoner exchange. But I had very little connection with the CIA. And I don’t recall, except for those occasions, their ever asking me any legal advice whatsoever, perhaps for good reason. 664 Chairman Strokes. And you are absolutely certain that you cannot recall any conversation with Mr. Helms about Nosenko? Mr. KaTzENBACH. I am certain that I don’t recall it; yes, sir. I can’t flatly deny that such a conversation occurred, but I have no recollection of it. It is quite a while ago, and I believe—I believe if it was as dramatic as it was put by Congressman Sawyer, I would remember it. If I was simply informed that somebody was being questioned, there was a potential defector, I might not recall it. Chairman StToxkEs. Thank you. Any other questions? Mr. SAWYER. Yes. Mr. Katzenbach, I don’t know whether you are informed on the details of the situation, but we had testimony by a spokesman for the CIA, so that it is not just a statement of some employee or something, he was designated by the present Director to come here and present the story because he was supposedly the most familiar | with it, since he had reviewed it for the CIA. And he stated in substance that Mr. Nosenko was taken into custody in this country by the CIA after defection, or after alleged defection, held in a so-called safe house on a diet of tea and porridge twice a day, was allowed no reading material, the guards were instructed neither to talk to him nor smile at him, he was subjected to 48 hours at a crack interrogation. This being while they built a separate facility somewhere else in the country; namely, a device described by him as a bank vault, and then built a house around the bank vault to put this man in, and then kept him there under equivalent conditions for some 3 years, with that kind of thing, 1,277 days, to be specific. At which point they finally gave up and gave him some emolu- ment and put him on their payroll and let him go. And then they gave, as I questioned on the authority to do a thing like that, did they have any kind of process, and they said other than the fact that Mr. Helms had conferred with you and gotten your OK that this would be legal. And I just found it awfully difficult to believe that. And that is why—and I also don’t imagine it would be the kind of thing that you would be asked to OK enough that you wouldn’t rather clearly remember the incident, if it had occurred. Mr. KATZENBACH. If the facts as you have just set them forth to me, Congressman, had ever been made known to me, (A), I would recollect it, I am certain; and I hope to goodness I wouldn’t have given the legal advice that it is claimed. Mr. Sawyer. It makes me feel better about it. Thank you. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Chairman StToKkgEs. The time of the gentleman has expired. Does counsel, Mr. Cornwell, desire to be recognized? Mr. CORNWELL. I only note, Mr. Chairman, that during the ques- tioning by the committee members there have been various exhib- its which have been referred to directly or indirectly. They include exhibits which have been marked for identification as JKF F-462, F-463, F-465, F-466, F-458, F-471, F-472, F-473, and F-448, and I might ask they be placed in the record at this time. Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this time. [The above mentioned JFK exhibits F-462, F-463, F-465, F-466, F-471, F-472, and F-478, follow:] [JFK exhibits F-448 and F-458 were entered previously. | | 665 OPO POOe MO. BD 4 | am joNrTeD STATES GOVERNM>_AT | ant eee eet eee F-Yee— mee ’Seen ‘0 mp.ayrxong [dT 4 le S. B. B. Df Sa - SuBjECT: ASSASSINATION he! FieviissiDENr cffeah ha | or tn" > : ede, AU, | - _ begnty een cabsGaneret as ES called at 5:09 p.m. He said he realized that things were happening very fast and he Fe ‘was calling to ask that he be | kept informed if there are going a: to be any arrests of the person or persons who assassinated the - $20 > President. In other words, he would like to be eS ign when Agssorte ee s is apparent there is going to- be a solution. 0 Peres stem Shoko ga The Lreinciey Attorney General wie commented ‘that ar <2; ies See neveXeid that Oswald is the man who did the assassination or) -..*~ 2°! was involved in it, then his pro-Cuban and pro-Soviet activities aes will come into mounting prominence. He said if Oswald is so. t0ivs identified, the State Department should be advised as thera™ are definite oo a policy considerations and decisions ehh - ; ~ " Assistant Deputy Attorney General William A.- Geogheran -take called at’ 5:15 p.m. on behalf of the Deputy Attorney General, . sui ‘advised that two men in the State Department have definite a BBs, - coordination responsibility in connection with any State Department : action Which would be required, if it develops that Oswald pe: im ge ~~ ee - es « - implicated in the assassination. If this implication develops 45 State Department will need full details on Oswald's background, *-; The people at State “Hea to be ee aie this nas BAL as follows: bie ne ea 2h fied = ie ; “eae? remee ci prs os : = id WC, “ ba "John Crimmins ah me a ere W111iam Bowdler (Se ores _ Extension 4586 "0°"... .°.". Extension 37360 *"=* ~~ cas" Tome eel ai FR 4-6151_ cores Home Bais FE 77-4712) 5 : eae ae eee te Se ane ; : ‘x eniphasized £6 Bonenanen that he aut recognize, and x AN Se sure the Deputy Attorney General so understood, that we could not -:. Give out any blow-—by-blow account of what ‘is happening and that ; we would only be acting in this regard when it became pebarent that - the solution is imminent. Mle was in agreement... nares es ead : es _, Our gfeports on Oswald are in the Kpotsesston of State Wears SBD: hn ia nd Supervisor E.T.Turner of the Domestic egerce ent 6) Aa GF pag As so advising Crimmins or Bowdler Sons t - . 1 = Belmont a NA Hi: see hart. at e s See cia ere al i pateot a REC- B eg ets anidegiesfa). eesCc lic. jd —Byctor Jad fos Sullivan 2 wre 43 : oy & ees Donahoe pi bie sta: gs BG REP na pe BIBI os > uaaeaine pesky Ho ie : =. ; e s ; are 3030". et Be Pee eraae = noe 79 DECé ; JFK Exursit F-462 666 JFK Exuisit F-463 AE a oom, wit “1p “ise TPE - NITLD ATATES GOVERF a Se etaSoraes 2 TEE femorandum Beg, SE ig oe AS omnes | oo ERS wistSee ht shaw.- + SN EE Kearee een crea - os m5 op * pa ae : et ede an = o. 3 pa Pree & . "See =a eee Se. SSSSRIS AS A b2- ———_——r em: - tee ro = aS SS i <2 180 em me LEE PyeVEY O$TALD* asec _ Bir. Rosen f | {pS ASSAULTINGsf GOVERMENT. opFicen ‘sare cok eB | ee ae eked THEE, Seca SS ASES Sees wes ve | “This afternoon bo advised SAC Shanklin. in “Dallas tase @ we are 3 sending down Supervisors Rogge and Thompson for the purpose of going Sey | } carefully over the written interview and investigative findings of-our - 7 : Agents in the Oswald matter so that we can prepare a memorandum to the ‘a \ Attorney General, attaching exhibits such as photographs, et cetera, 9“. to set out the evidence showing that Oswald is responsible for the —==—— / shooting that killed the President. We will show that Oswald was anee a | avoved -Harxist, a former defector to the Soviet Union and an active SE menber of the FPCC, which “as been financed by Castro. We will then ~ show the background of Osveld, when and vhere he was born, et ceterasi=s:- and then the story of what happened when the President was shot and seoo subseguently until Oswald was picked up in the theatre. . We will set” orth the items of evidence which make it clear that Osvaid is the > man who killed the President. ow. u tei ESE ne Sane ryt tees ot ete at te ear an Se ere. arth starsSole \shaninin’ said results of the investigation have been reduced . to written form and consequently the information wall all be availabiec ior these two Supervisors. .. eee ‘ mete prs Tose Sere ye ne weeSo erat Sochene — is % : i - SO eo te. z<* Supervisors Rogge tena Thosinden, are caving: the night oF 2-2ee Hovember 24 for Dallas [ by AIR Force Plane) Rp ag 4a Be) se i ae Ta en ee =< ae Ny told Shanklin that a should contact the Chief of sPolice ite. ,and arrange to be sure that any evidence such as the rifle, Asim } paper bag containing Oswald's fingerprints, et cetera, be Lock iin custody of the Chief so -that no souvenir hunters or other‘ ea “Sn. , would destroy or take away the evidence.- Despite the fact tbat Osvalad : is dead, this evidence will be necessary to back up any statoment that | Dsvald vas the man who killed the President. ee — ee SE See ee wet: fe ee - o. ~ % = : -_- iets eee wo tla seer ~~ 7° o cea erce wee cea ce a eae Veealso alerted our” ‘Laboratory to retain the bulicts that ~= vere compared with the rifle and to hold on to any other evidence - ~*~". Poe eh to this CBSC6 I Se aN ES ee FES Drakes I ASa EY OS sara —\xZI to1a Shanklin that Deputy Attorney General Katzepbach is ere Sending Assistant Attorney General Miller of the Crisinal> Division down to Dallas to speak to the Mayor to see if he can keep =%. <5 the Chief of Police and Lieutenant Fritz, OFT television and radio. iil. . *. Boe Se ARE re mt — Ayed te ra ne ran‘ ‘qre: re a oe SF yee Fe OI a en She Pee b* sone ohye ce Asis >= sre < ak SRS SS RE See axe 4: 15 p,n> Wir. DeLoach advised that Eatconba ows put outm statement, “We are now persuaded that Osvald killed the s@S=—.- Sa President; hovever, the investigation by the Department of Justice ‘and s se -the FBI is continuing.” Guthman of the Department wanted the PBY eal 22> to put this statement out. lr. DeLoach advised Guthman that the FBY === _yRould not put out the statement and we are opposed to oe Statement Essien ‘elng put out plone At line. cate el SE Dee =Seisise =—— Sits: eee Ht :be See Scie 8© oF meme er, LE: em ° ae i - «© Vas bo.id PER ar HAVES ; my : regeas ie2 wet © oeis oo ons BGS went mm Ge Veet. ee terete ee erereee aietetes pwr SoS ne iser eyes nodte etree ee we ee & - rae te P Rerem MSL. Le ee a Or hae eee Lt oe co wat ott. ————. Cpr rat pe SPST — 2-2 Amann = Rese ieee =< FEV ere, 2 SRS ot Soe ee LN rs cto ates whee ee area Zee we = - ea . Spe 2” Bite sels Sis el se. t+ wom * (DeEME Ar er meerPan Este ere ES —_ Oe. meee ee tem at eet fo Ss Be LE Pm ed Rae hg > m SN TF Re 8S. ie er:me se eee ae ypu) S OTe Sm = Se mens ere ee DS omne won: te ee Rr 3 oe: seta tec ees Se Per eS ae elt ne tes mS : Maem tot se. eh ee a - Syl BTS : Sy ti ; <9. ~. * + ete ost Co a. J ~ >SPT Se Bere oor ee me eS 8 Swe - 7e- a7.“ baa ead<3 os Speerac5 Oe Le ~ee “a EAE TST aeaRa ee a ey caeSe Stell BM te keene ; ee ee ee ad eee —— - eae ae abe Bac ng nicest 7 ecm =e => a= "aeeee A Eee: = mee ~ eee os tee x SO et wm mete on te wat wy ae ee . Deets ee re Ra cee ee Sete tent mop epee — ee eR ee WF Des. oe. Su. ce .eewee wawrs® ae ae ee St a see ied tea te Mees. oe ayn, ~* < penewin ° - 5 -=PA. we © ne ee tereee = fesh| | STATES GOVERY “NT UNIZED Memorandum _, P : a Dave: es mk. syuLivas we sei Fo 21/25/63_ oeFen i ~"" 6c Mr. Belmont? = ma Rom: AH.+ am Ue i _ Mr. Bullivan _ My. Rosen eer i os Mr eo &de¥Y~MO ry =" sUnyect: LEE HARVEYeer eet ~ te Assassination of she President nag - The Director aneieed: that he had talked te xeteocaeae whe haa gee trlxing to the White House relative to the report ve are to rende ‘im the Oswald case. It is Katzenbach’s. feeling that this report shoul include everything which pay_ raise a_question in the mind of the pubii or the press regarding this matter, including suc ings begs AS The Totu -. o£ the passport to Oswald in Noscoy, and the rimnishings of money to h by t: the State Department for the purpose of returning fe tas U.S, I the State Department regulations or law required State to = these things, we should get a copy of the lay. - pers This report “will have to contain auth Salesof relevance. e to the case, We should get from the Defense Department Oswald's "= record and aisciplina action and discharge. We should cover the oe of mer going down to exico city,and his contacts down there. — % * . in other words, this report is to settle the ‘dust, rr 50 Px Sys as Oswald and his activities are concerned, both Zrom the standpoint that he is the man who assassinated the President, and relative to .- Gswnld hinself and his activities and background, et cetera. eos :* eer}: such tine as the report is finished, tr. Katzenbach will so over it, and will furnish it to other officinls of the governnent, such as McCone of CIA, the Secretaries of Navy, Defense, and State,” ry so that they can look At over and make sure sgt gehen Bee Go not have any objections. pb 5 a, oo es : va na ree The above change will, of course, eechiee- nore ue for the rs preparation of this report. However, the Director desires that it be eut as guickly as possible. Division-Sis_will continue to handle the portion of the-report dealing with the assassination attempt and the ‘evidence. gathered to show that Oswald is responsible. This means that we will have to carefully check the evidence and Osvald’s possessions that the police are now turning over to us, to see if additional Anformation shonld go into the *ePeEC.nie this. - 7 - el “ = aes — -- Division Five will han nee neeEreagihae of the xeport, Lys a eee backeroun cLations, et cetera, of Csvald. ve must be certain that anything Mitat is put into the’ report gan be backed up, 2S it will be subject to inute scrutiny from the press_an @ public ¥or Division ¥ive's -Aaache ° xt we should be certain also that TD +9of “hand” ..— ell de ss es, a ae we. 2s Bee ose ‘% 669 |ur. Sullivan 2-25-83. . | ES passport: back tohin, ot paierae oe ‘should bs certain ~~" ‘that agents thoroughly go through Osvald’s effects to sea if they _/@an pick up any correspondence with a Communist Sine ‘the eee) “Bobassy, . be Cetera. inne See - Ce ae ee . This is a a@itricuitces nen) aprepare, ‘but. ve wilt reer to “concentrate our : on on it in order to protuce the’ desired SOSUL ES s: eee phates TS Teg Dre ete Van thorts mets coe 5 get bet | -*, = | 2 “ ‘ Pbgt $2, ; 41-372 O = 79 - 43(Vol. 3) 670 JFK Exuisit F-466 or ted trom Ks nt <—| : Tees * rT “UNITED § STATES t Ne feviecs eaege: ee‘xhbiz feeae ae6 Ces | iMae pace a te hogs : oe: 2 Dees ee . eared 2 : a 2 pie A oF 2 Copa i TO : Mr. Mohr 4 Me “ a DATE: November 25, 1983 > ete5 si 1 FROM”: } - : a ¥ C.D, DeLoach ) 0 we ay F ens - au ae = x neee = ASST me 2Rent a ci. 2. weeee if winte Ja:Pyetei Ap itheé a SUBJECT: _ ASSASSINATION ON OF ate PRESIDENT Jranean eae : “"* "+ Guthman of the Denaricient called at approximately’: 00 p.m. He set that the Attorney General of the State of Texas was having a press conference this .~ate ‘ afternoon in Washington and would undoubtedly indicate to the press that the State of _ Texas would convene a Board of Inquiry into the assassination of the President and Ge x murder of Lee Harvey Oswald. Guthman stated that the Department had to prepare had answer a large number of inquiries which they undoubtedly will receive following the= State Attorney General's press conference, Guthman then read. to me the following’.asvs PrOpUses pelegac he ye to makes $ ' ue wing Walid) > 5 on aee Pie wawsihs lack pera Py aes = eer 2-fe tN ba re A ah Prion Mec “0 oe = > : “ ean he ~ - Cd 3 se PPac t€oiseys . “President J aene has. directed the FBI to iuvent rae eve lead and every shred of evidence in the assassination of presidents Kennedy and the shooting of Oswald. A full report on the FBI's findings 2 in the assassination of President Kennedy will be made public. All . <. evidence in the shooting of Oswald will be made available to local ° 7!” authorities in Dallas who will have responsibility for the trial of Jack . Ruby. The Department of Justice, of course, will lend whatever = :::- ‘ assistance i can fo any properly constituted Shacoe Gout “OF inguiry. n fogs ees aS =. ss ‘s ey "he Hosen ere me what I thought ‘of the réleash I told him I disagreed -? with the plan to make a release. JI mentioned that everything had already been saidi an the release which was made last night and, therefore, there was no further need to- state anything else. -I told him that it would be far better to’wait until the FBI had =- + procured all facts in the matter and had submitted an investigative report. J told °.= <= Guthman that it was particularly bad that he wanted to make the statement that, *'All -.-:: evidence in the shooting of Oswald will be made available to local authorities in Dallas’ “ who will have responsibility for the trial of Jack Ruby."’ I mentioned that despite the | ‘truthfulness of this statement it will invite criticism. Many responsible individuals "s across the Nation are pointing to the inefficiency of the Dallas Police Department and- « Statement of this pair’ will merely add fuel to theMeee, Ptevbos i IG aging oe oe oe AT) ce COR 5 eee 5 eis ys Sy,rau ne Mr. ‘Belmont’ See canes M_sacg 1 Son net36 ong ae aay, ib:AD: | >DD; = ve. ices RY sine: ss Sf Be,caer e ie ie Saryew HOY . fees 2foe if ee 671 11-25-63 - °° DeLoach to Mohr Re: Assassination of the President ” ae Guthman ee tod he a Ringe remove “ay oe ete ieonce, enpwevene wanted to go ahead and make the remaining statements. I told himI still disagreed, ne that there appeared to be no need whatsoever for any further press releases to be .+ made by the Department. I told him that I, personally, believe that he should answer. : eed in the matter. He replied that he eit Sat ay ae meections in question. = Serer tein, Cth the mirestor tTcalled Gattuso bacon ie tee S i wanted to reiterate my. objections in the above regard. Guthman stated he had given. the matter further thought and in view of FBI objections would not issue a press ° “ eet By he merely es answerPee ae I told hina i eliegerwas eps aavis2ple, - i ile te a a: Xe ye (Snapp ao| For record purposes. 9-77 672 JFK Exnuisit F-471 Binet Re eee ge ne a ot Ee yh oe ¥70) Higgs “es saad * * “AQYNITED STATESGC (°RNMEN: sy ae ‘3 teLeal Memorandum? ° (o> —™ a Be : y Pay macalt ee { 3 c TO : Mr. Tolson - = > DATE: 12-3-B3 FROM : “ H. Belmont . - ese oe a ‘SUMECT: ASSASSINATION OF THE.PRESIDENT. - + 3... November 22,1963. Lekaoar: Pere ay ule Ane “Wye iS wit So as ee sn ee sings“: et Mery >". St 6:10 P.M,, Deputy Attorney Gadueee Katzenbach called. ... He said Chie? Justice Warren had called a meeting of the Commission; _; appointed by the President for 10:00 A.M., Thursday morning. . * ~ Justice Warren wants a high-level liaison man from any interested “gagency. Katzenbach will attend the meeting but he feels that the FBI should have someone. there also to answer any questions the ’ : {Commission might have regarding the scope of the investigation, etc. -|Katzenbach thinks the Bureau representative should be the Director '+ yor Belmont. X made no commitment to Mr. Katzenbach, but ¥ . is , precommend we advise him that our report in this matter will speak for itself and until the report is ready, there is no real purpose in an FBI representative being present at the Commission meeting. With respect to this, it is noted that Katzenbach felt it was bettex to show willingness to cooperate with the Commission in every espect ee eign ah Ey Ses. a | Ys -Y~ ioe gn, EY ; a en A1 freee ‘ -Katzenbach said that there rare problems arising between 5 thevrexas Board of Inquiry/headed by Texas Attorney General Carr’ _ and the Presidential Commission headed by Justice Warren; that ‘/_ Texas wants to go ahead with an inguiry and Warren -wants them’ to” boldtoff., Attorney Generak7Carr and the past president of the _ .Texas\Bar Association are to-~come and see Katzenbach tomorrow, at _ ~ which time he will try to calm the waters and establish ground es Katzenbach wanted to know if we wanted to talk to .. hh wey Fb baer /fiol my Attorney General Carr and the others. I told him we did not, that z we were busy investigating this matter and trying to get ent our 3 e ort. e Ss “ 5 Wwe: . Faye oes +} Te % . beak e ahs ae a . : »: : 3 é¢ ; j sie I u m the \ Katzenbach asked whether I conld give him w timetable repor ZI told bim no I conld hot, that we were working as a par 55 © - [rs Th ey Rimes shite’ RAGS Srlnermepiast pd Lane ae PS ap Brana j~. re DeLoach i te 1{- ur. Rosen 7 Aes ——f- copies eid’ z 2 1983 a'— Mr. Sullivan (fe &, Tor po+tew s+ AEB :njs LEE ¢xesox 71H PAIL, (6) a/ = bre' 1s eat yl eee attic terrae : —= — 673 . Mr. Tolson. ~ .On the morning of 12/4/63 I called Mr. Katzenbach—- a . {and advised him that we see no rexl reason for us to have anyone at the meeting of the commission on Thursday morning; that there -- is nothing that we can contribute at this time. I pointed ont that we were working on the investigetion and the report, and will submit it to the Department as soon as possible, | and. until . that Sad ve are not paying. anything. ia Sp deseo IP pintiet = Ane. te og : -Katzenbach said he’ ‘felt this puts him in a wares 0 Fra |pocuttar position: and at least he would like to have someone come down before the Thursday morning meeting and brief him as to what we are doing, so that he could be in-a position to answer guestions. I told him that this was undesirable; that if the question is raised as to what the FBI is doing, there is a very simple ausweT, namely that we are pressing the investigation and the writing of the report; that this is our major goal and until this is completed there’ is nothing we can contribute. fi pointed out that there is no question of any reluctance on the part of the FBI, as we are bending every effort to pEpduce, the informat on the’ commission will need, : s 7, ; Relat: ve to the second point, about the ‘Texas board. of inguiryNI told Mr. Katzenbach that the Director feels it would be very unwise for this board to conduct an inguiry now; that. they would have to use our evidence, and this evidence is being - made available first to the President’s commission; therefore, the two inquiries would be at cross purposes. Katzenbach was in full agreement and said his problem, is one of Sad pegs as? ,e 9) Re the ct commissio‘ao We f Ce ee ais th heen | Ka RS Nada that he had bieneaneuae to Chiez "qastsees ] acronis and Warren had indicated to him that the chief counsel & for the President's commission will be Warren Olney. Katzenbach thought that this would be most undesirable. ‘Katzenbach said that, &¢ we probably know, Chief Justice Warren thinks that Olney can do no wrong, and he (the Chief Justice) had made the point that - Olney is conversant with the FBI's procedures and thus would be -: operating in a familiar field. Katzenbach said if we have any idezs as to how Olney can be blocked as chief counsel, be would like to have them. I told him that, as far as I was concerned, Olneywas an undesirable choice, and if we had any EpoUsHt we wenld get them to hin. x Po by 674 JFK Exuisit F-472 A I Cl Af FEE Extibrs F-? 7R gees LIV Gae Decenber 8, 1983 “‘ThaChier susties = asieg Renamer pe scar disap Eee . The Sagtass Court | net wecsabeee ori ates = Weahisatons: De: oe CELY att aie! Crippen eae be ny : ee ws K oss) BSH “are$ =: TE 2 Ft ‘ a ChiafJantlosr. sgh srr sq nari eh a). Fab engage ae. eh afeny ae Fee aes ve “tha. bar Ponti ok of.Siatagte® “aie x speatsrangnitting hertsish to you and to tha other pesbars. -oF the Coumission ¢pplis of the report of tha Feiieral Bupseu of Investicaricn othe aosassin~- “ation of. President: Xeanséy and on the subasquent.. = ghootibe of Lee Harvey. Gsvald. You will note that % in stm “aspects | the investigation is continuing = {8further information will ba wade available to the ~~ “Commission as ft Foss a “Khe Sacre? Sarview ond :the Departrent of State have also prepared reports “with roapees te tha preparations mada to mard the Sh pe csc end.certain background information En . the Rants of the.Stata Dapartment.uith raspet to “ Geyaids You wei. Paver “Thess -staal abit ; sa eisca wae oe oe te >. é ak ee Ae Le Se SS emt pees is. net a olashSithaaeaccueil Pigsaee tke oan nok. sbntoin dofensa Invormetion, - — Shes yeescae we bave basnftreagting it as a highly -¢- ~ i @hassiPied dochtentcand -Eitrusyt that you Shd ths! Fees eS > Dthar -rembars. oF. tho :oeetenion will do itkewtss = uptit sock. tins se you detareine to relossa marters eonteinad vithin ite --Bithin the Government tie ie ~ batng road dy. 2: VSTy Linited niber. eeee ons, a “need to. nes) bualne >F a Sf “You: ‘Guaysicals tharcine“the eee art ae ths Federal Burnan of Invastivation Aeipscn nce yas ang prior to the eppaintmant of . the Commission, President Johnson announced thar *- te ShesRid deebaS Be Pade padlics ‘(oT have, i ee Yee ay 675 however, informed him of your request that this report. not be releases until the Cemsiusicn has had tine te revies 611 of thea faeta and evaluate theme At the snrne_ tine I am sura- you are avsre that there is euch public spacvlotion and rumor in this connection which vexld de Goniradle to Aliay ao qulekly as possibla. For exarpla,. the latwsr Gallup poll shows that over half tha Acerican . preple believe that Oswald acted os part of a conszirsey. jn sheoting Prasident Zennedy, and there is consicerahlo _ ruaor in this country and abroad to the effeet that Fuby pee cies cer. of the Bane .or 4.pesacec ane RE Mr Pace “ eg ‘x xine Pettis bons. Nene: ore feution aoste Powers releasing——or cit ae the Departeent of “Justices to release--a ghort preas xtutenent whicr : tees ee aaaiats eds the Ge OANA pointes Fneese fee CR the yar pes eer: gh velentifie vexaatnation of svidencs, tostiaony und intensive Sdinvestigation, establishes beyond = rsasonabla - Govbt that Lee Harvey Oayvyald shot President Pee hic i Bovember 72, 1953. The ovicence tneladcss baliis teats, finegarprints end pale printa, clothing Fie che _. end ether technical data wees. ploeees Csunle ae the _geane-of the erfss and establishes that be fired the whots which killed President OLAS and vouaded _Soverner Sete aAe SORES © SAINe: ¢2)- aie: Fat oe a pn werner neies Cie “pation tors whether Cawald say have cenapired with er. Deen agsisted by any organisation, group or PRISE, forefgn or cumsstic, In carryiny out this Gastardly Rot. tn thia regard, the FSI has questicnad bundrads of per -80On3 and checked ost nusereus rusers anid reports. To “gata this aspect of ths investigation has bean negative. Bo evidence haa been uncevarad indicating that any =.orsaaization, group or person, including Dallas Paap eon “lab ovner, Jack Swudy, wa» favelvec vith Gavate in th assassination of rrasident Eennedy, or thet the subk- ae _waguent. shooting of Oavald was pert of o Conspirrevye 8 a << ese ae ae : Rehan A at eF ~ p EPS yee ets lacie soe * “gene Bs A RE. Chr _Oate Pe U8 2g, SP. “r. £ #3. ay 4 : a ,," - . _ rot ee . eens = : he -* Poa “aye - ~e . * LT would be happy to discua any zaof the2? matters’ contained ia this letter or in the rapore” | with you or othaxy manbers of the Copefastcn att-any.. tine yar shonld desire. Yan, of courses, Always -- at your service. = =>. al7 ft fr. Li ies, SPER Be ER 2 incerely yours, . 4 TE eS OD. Gs Cen eral. ~.tates a SF eae SUS SS © 677 JFK Exuisit F-473 Loe | a - 3 ye 6 Sean cin gre.wns39 oo - UNITED STATES oe NM: esl ehae FATS GME: if "Memorandum - a Mr. Mohr 5 ae me pare: December 20, 1963 Pez Saas a D. 68ace PALO e he oe Bsety VRS es - . Ze ibe! © osha e % pa Ree a Sh pyesiDEN | sup fer: seASSASSINATION oF lit: re erst 4 ms mies Pieatiant the Director's fastriction®. I met with Se Lt i SEED EPRB. Senator Richard Russell. waGa.) at 3:45 p.m. ns DeCLor Jim Malley accompanied . mits I told the Senater that the Director probably had the ercatest peep Aeon for = ‘than any other man on the_Presidential Commission; consequently, the Director was most anxious that any misimpression on which the Senator might have gotten, regarding leaks cencerning the captioned matter, be straightened out immediately. I mentioned that the Director had maintained throughout that there should be no press release unless it emanated from either the President or either the Presidential Commission. [I told “AE Senator Russell that the Director had issued specific instructions that no information ziven from the FBI and that we had religiously adhered to these instructions. I told also that there had been others who thought that a press release, based upon the FBI \aS peport, should be issued immediately, I reiterated that under no circumstances had ve ‘Meaked" any information; however, ,we certainly knew that it had been Sensefoe ees sources, ; Re Rt '}- pe S es ry aia > N. Has: 4 i. wate 3 The Senator inquired as to the identity of the sources who had been v4 eaking” information. I told him it appeared quite obvious that considerable of the | i ctmation came from the Dallas Police who had received the results of our Laboratdrys. | and identification examinations. He stated he recognized this fact. I told him also thatQ, ‘the Department undoubtedly had "leaked" considerable information as it was quite ! apparent that a number of their "favorites" had carried rather ea articles concern 2 information contained in the FBI ep Gite * Senator Russell told Mr. Malley and me that he wasene to hear an FBI ZI _ denial in this matter. He stated that Deputy storey General Katzenbach haddirectly‘WNKECOREED ? | implied that the "leaks" had come from the FBI. ‘quoted quoted Katzenbach as telling the- peenibers oltheate fal Commission ny,SSO “Hoover RaTT has ha chewed _ae ee his men out. for ne ne one Og en os oes EC 2: 2 < be ve. re ed Oy a Y (CONTINUED NEAR: , 7 | i- Mr. Belmont pe ORC Sistas” assistance to him on an informal basis in connection with the inquiry by the Presidential Commission. He was advised that Inspector Malley had been appointed by the Director ~ -O serve as liaison man with Lee Rankin, the Chief Counsel, and that Malley also would ve at his disposal any time service was needed. The Senator confided that he had argued with the President about being appointed to the Presidential Commission. He stated the President had called him early one afternoon to advise that he was being ~-~ sppointed to this Commission. Senator Russell told the President that he could not take - -ne appointment, that he considered this to be somewhat of a nasty job, ‘The President ‘hen asked Senator Russell if he would recommend any,member of, the Supreme Court. Senator Russell stated that he didn't Know a single member of th¢ Supreme Court he - - om vould recommend for anything. The President called Senator Russell back early inthe ~ ovening of the same day and named the members of the Presidential Commission. When - 2 came to the Senator's name, the Senator stopped him and told him again that he : 2ouldn't be on the Commission. The President told Senator Russell that he had already -Ssued a press release reflecting that he was a member. The Senator stated his hands were, therefore, tied and there was nothing he could do about the matter. He added it vas very distasteful to him, however, to serve on the same Commission as Chief ;ustice Warren inasmuch as he had no respect for Warren, _ at ERS ar a 2 . rea eae ef e)¢ 2 s 3 arf oo oe as arn SESS : 4 Abe me. We discussed a number of. mutual interests in the State of Georgia before caving. The Senator is driving home tonight and plans to take the FBI report with him, ‘e has not yet had a chance to read it, He stated that upon his return, he would call if “ny questions whatsoever arose regarding the problems of the Presidential Commission, > 05... ged For record purposes, ae it ef an'hoiug is i é ad Bera pte Heels AY rae : s Pa os pts — « RCTS ISE "Sarin PGA matt Jo BI cate f° 1% of 60} noha 5 + 3 ks 2. ; - rh 679 Mr. CORNWELL. I have nothing further, thank you. Chairman Stokes. Mr. Katzenbach, as a witness before our com- mittee, you are entitled at the conclusion of your testimony to have 5 minutes in which to make any comment that you so desire relating to testimony before this committee, and I extend to you at this time 5 minutes for that purpose, if you so desire. Mr. KATZENBACH. I will be very, very brief, Mr. Chairman. I regret that the Warren Commission report was inadequate, if it was inadequate in any respects, and that as a consequence this committee has felt, the Congress has felt through this committee, the necessity to reexamine the assassination. I am sure that you, sir, and all the members regret that equally. I have confidence that what this committee is doing and will do in its report, will reflect the wisdom and integrity of its members. Chairman Stokes. Thank you very much, and on behalf of the committee, we certainly thank you for your appearance here and for the cooperation you have given this committee and the time you have expended in giving us the benefit of your testimony. Thank you very much. Mr. KATZENBACH. Thank you. Chairman STOKES. You are excused. There being nothing further to come before the committee, the committee adjourns until 9 a.m., tomorrow morning. [Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the committee was recessed, to recon- vene Friday, September 22, 1978, at 9 a.m.] [The deposition of Mr. Katzenbach referred to previously follows:] 680 Stenographic , Transcript Of HEARINGS Before The President John F. Kennedy SELECTSCOV MITT EE ON ASSASS LV acle uae HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH Washington,D.C. August 4, 1978 Alderson Regorting Company, Inc. ‘a ays Od 1, 5 ny ak O Lye Repereve way) SOO Seventn St. S: W. Washington, Dye 954-2345 681 Assass. Comm. 8/4/78 LaFrance SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS vma l Friday, August 4, 1978 U. S, House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Assassination of President John F, Kennedy Washington, D, C, Deposition of NICHOLAS KATZENBACH called for examination by counsel for the Committee, pursuant to notice, in the offices of the Select Committee on Assassinations, Room 3501, House Annex No, 2, Second and D Streets, Southwest, Washington, D. C,, beginning at 10:00 o'clock a.m, before Albert Joseph LaFrance, a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, when were present on behalf of the respective parties: For the subcommittee: Gary Cornwell Michael Ewing 554-2345 (202) 20024 D.C. WASHINGTON, BUILDING, REPORTERS S.W. STREET, 7TH 300 , Kenneth Klein James McDonald For the deponent: (There was no representation.) 24 25 682 PROCEEDINGS Mr, Cornwell, We will go on record, Please state your name, Witness. Nicholas Katzenbach, Mr. Cornwell. What is your present home address? Witness, 117 Library Place, Princton, New Jersey. Mr. Cornwell, Mr, Katzenbach, my name is Gary Cornwell, deputy chief counsel of the Select Committee on Assassinations, I have poen designated as counsel to take statements under oath in depositions pursuant to House resolution 222 and committee rule four, The deposition will be recorded, There is a certified short- hand reporter here, Will you administer the oath? Whereupon, NICHOLAS KATZENBACH was called as a witness by the committee and, having been first duly Sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION By Mr. Cornwell: Mr. Cornwell. Mr. Katzenbach, you are appearing here volun- tarily and not pursuant to a subpoena, Is that correct? 24 Mr. Katzenbach, Yes, 25 Mr, Cornwell, You have been provided copies of the committee's 683 _ rules and House resolutions 222, 433 and 760, Is that correct? Mr. Katzenbach, Yes. Mr. Cornwell, In particular, have you had a chance to read +S rule four of the committee rules which govern the taking of depo- uw sitions? Mr. Katzenbach, Yes, Mr. Cornwell, Do you have any questions about that? Mr. Katzenbach, No, Mr. Cornwell, Among other things, I take it you have noticed you have a right to counsel in connection with depositions before this committee? Mr. Katzenbach, Yes. Mr, Cornwell. The deposition of course will be transcribed and after it is transcribed, we will mail a copy to you and ask that you make any changes you desire in it to reflect accurately your testimony and to sign it and verify it and then return it to us at which time, if you desire, we will be happy to supply you with a copy. I would like to direct your attention to November 22, 1963 and ask you if you will recall where you were on that day, Mr, Katzenbach, I was in my office on that day in the Department of Justice, I was having lunch at a seafood restaurant the name of which I forget, with one of my deputies, Joe Dolan at the time I heard the news of the assassination, I left immediatel and returned to my office, 684 Mr, Cornwell, On that date, what was your official position with the Department of Justice? Mr. Katzenbach, I was deputy attorney general, Mr. Cornwell. Upon returning to your office, do you recall what conversations you may have had concerning the event that afternoon? Mr. Katzenbach, I actually went directly to the attorney general's office, Mr. Kennedy. He was at home at the time and I asked his secretary, Angela Novello, what the latest news was from Dallas, Mr. Cornwell, Did you that afternoon have a discussion with the attorney general? Mr. Katzenbach, Yes, I did, I talked to him once, perhaps twice. He was out at Hickory Hill, Mr. Cornwell. I would like to know if you can recall generally what the nature of the conversation was but in particular what, if any, problems were identified that the pepartment faced at that point in time? Mr. Katzenbach, I can recall what I believe were two conver- sations, but it might have been one, The first one I simply calle him to tell him how devastated I was at the news, The second con- versation was when he telephoned me and said that the vice presi- dent, Mr. Johnson, had called him from Texas and wanted to know where he should be sworn in and would I please call him back and tell him whatever my advice was on that subject, which I did, Mr. Cornwell, Were there any other problems that were iden- tified at that time that the Department of Justice or you needed to focus upon? Mr. Katzenbach, I do not believe so, The first conversa- tion that Robert Kennedy said to me was that he had heard the news from Mr. Hoover and he made some comment that Mr, Hoover had calle him and been very blunt in the conversation, But as far as what the Department was doing in the investigation or anything of that kind, I had no discussions of that kind with Bob Kennedy, Mr. Cornwell, Did you discuss what position the Department should take or any other problems with other persons in the Depart ment that afternoon that you can recall? Mr. Katzenbach. Apart from the fact that the Bureau was investigating it under whatever rather slim authority that it had to do it, I had a conversation with Mr, Hoover, maybe more than one. I had a number of conversations with my associates at the Department because they were all kind of gathered into my office at that point as we were awaiting news of what was happening, what were the arrangements with respect to President Kennedy's body, with respect to an autopsy, that kind of thing, Mr. Cornwell, Let me ask you first about the question of jurisdiction. Did the FBI seek from the Department authorization to proceed with the investigation and, if so, what was your reply? 24 What statutes or whatever did you cite as authority for that? 25 Mr. Katzenbach, I do not really recall, I probably cited 41-372 O- 79 - 44(Vol. 3) 686 some civil rights statute but I do not recall, I do not think there was ever any question as to the Bureau getting into it heavily although we all recognized that obvioulsy primary juris- diction lay with the state as far as the murder was concerned. When the Bureau was in the mode of assisting or investigating or whatever they were into it and there was never any question that they would be into it heavily and pretty massively. Mr. Cornwell. Without confining the question then to the afternoon of the 22nd, let me ask you with respect to, say, the next two to three days going up through Sunday afternoon, what additional problems did you focus upon? Mr. Katzenbach, I had a number of conversations that evening of the 22nd until sometime after midnight, primarily with Barefoot Sanders, who was U. S. Attorney in Dallas. I had a number of con- cerns which I expressed to him about the numerous public statenents that were being made by the various police officials down there, I had a particular concern, if indeed Oswald was in fact the sole assassin of the President, as to whether the public statements they were making, what they were doing might not lead to have his counsel talking about the possibilities of fair trial, no right to counsel and that kind of thing and I thought it would be an absolute disaster if the President of the United States were assassinated and for some due process reasons the police had screwed 24 it up to the point that you could not convict that person, assumin 25 him to be the guilty party. 687 1 There were a number of conversations about that, I had conver 2 | sations I believe with Bernard Siegel in the ABA, perhaps with 3 | other people, in an effort to make sure that Oswald had somebody 4 who was representing him and advising him, and awkward situation 5 for me to be in, but one that I felt was important, 6 Mr. Cornwell. Do you recall any other problems that were 7 | identified on that day? 8 Mr. Katzenbach, That is a problem that sticks out in my mind, g | I was getting reports from the Bureau throughout that evening, I 10 | guess I probably was on the phone virtually -- I got home maybe 1 7:30 or 8:00 o'clock that night and I guess I was on the phone 12 || until 1:30 or 2:00 a.m.. That was the predominant problem, That 13 | is the one I recall. 14 Mr. Cornwell, Going back to the earlier question, expanding 15 | the subject to cover the two or three days up through Sunday, whic 16 | would have been the 24th, were additional problems identified and, 17 | if so, what was their nature? 18 Mr. Katzenbach. Certainly, one additional problem that was 19 | dramatically identified was the murder of Oswald by Ruby, which I 20 | guess like millions of others, I saw on television. There were a 2) ||Lot of problems, I think, but not of great relevance to your inquiny, 22 | simply with respect to a number of arrangements, final arrangement 23 || and that sort of thing with respect to President Kennedy, trying 24 || to handle the Department personnel, 25 As far as the investigation is concerned I had numerous 688 reports from the Bureau of things that were going on, Again, I cannot exactly tell you the time frame on this, but there were questions of Oswald's visit to Russia, marriage to Marina and the visit to Mexico City, the question as to whether there was any connection between Ruby and Oswald, how in hell the police could have allowed that to happen. Those were the sorts of considerations at least that we had during that period of time, I guess, The question as it came along as the result of all those things was whether this was some kind of conspiracy, whether foreign powers could be involved, whether it was a right-wing conspiracy, whether it was a left-wing 12 conspiracy, whether it was the right wing trying to put the con- 13 spiracy on the left wing or the left wing trying to put the con- 14 spiracy on the right wing, whatever that may have been, There were many rumors around, There were many speculations around, all of which were problems, Mr. Cornwell. What can you tell us about the mechanisms that were designed or contemplated during this same period for solving the kinds of problems you just identified? Mr. Katzenbach. The principal recognition I have is that I felt very early and continued to feel throughout, that the facts, all of them, had to be made public and it had to be done in a way that would give the public both in this country and abroad the 24 confidence that no facts were being withheld at all, 25 I felt that this would be difficult to do if the FBI, despite 689 the reputation of the FBI, were the only party involved in inves- tigating or doing the report and that would have to be reviewed by somebody in whom the public had confidence, I think the FBI at that time had been able to satisfy domestic public opinion with its conclusions because of the reputation it had had, I doubted that anybody in the government, Mr, Hoover, or the FBI or myself or the President or anyone else, could satisfy a lot of foreign opinion that all facts were being revealed and that the Puydatigation would be complete and conclusive and with- out any loose ends, So, from the beginning, I felt that some kind of commission would be desirable for that purpose; and, in addition, because if that were not done then it seemed to me that there would be a number of commissions, because an event like the assassination of a president of the United States is one that attracts a lot of political inquiry. That, in fact, developed in Texas perhaps that week, I do not know when, and there were certainly House and Senate resolutions contemplated, if not introduced. I do not recall, So that I felt that it would be desirable, I felt from the beginning, it would be desirable for the President to appoint some commission of people who had international and domestic public stature and repu- tation for integrity that would review all of the investigations and direct any further investigation, That was a difficult position in one sense for me to take 690 10 because the Bureau was at least formally under my jurisdiction and anybody who had even a nodding acquaintance with Mr, Hoover would appreciate the fact that he would regard that as a slap at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, So that while I felt strongly that way and communicated that view to people in the White House, it was not easy for me to cope with it within the Department itself. Mr. Hoover was strongly opposed to it, Mr. Cornwell. Was the opinion at least at the high naiiseeate levels in the Department, essentially unanimous and in agreement with you on that issue? Mr. Katzenbach, I think there was nobody who disagreed with it. I cannot remember now whom I talked it over with, but I would be certain that I talked it over with a number of the assistant attorneys general, I am sure I mentioned it to Robert Kennedy, but he really was not particularly interested one way or another, His view, as he communicated it to me at that time, was do whatever I wanted to do, but nothing was going to bring his brothe back to life. Mr. Cornwell, What, if anything, specifically led to your feeling that some external review was necessary? Mr, Katzenbach, I think a number of things. The first was the fact, almost unavoidable I suppose in an event of that kind where a lot of conflicting information and rumors did in fact come 24 out from the various mouths of Texas law enforcement authorities 25 691 11 and others, that there were a number of things of that kind, state ments of that kind, that would have to be reconciled or would have to be explained, There were a number of speculations about conspiracy made more dramatic by the facts that were uncovered fairly quickly about Oswald's own background, the ones I have already mentioned, The thing that influenced me personally perhaps more than anything else was the Lincoln assassination and the fact that a century later people were still coming out with books about Lincoln, 10 who was the real assassin, who conspired and so forth and so on, im I thought it had foreign policy implications because of specu+ lations about whether the Russians were behind this, could they have done this? Was it in retaliation for the Bay of Pigs? Finally, I think in terms of protecting President Johnson 15 because people abroad in many countries, if they had a head of 16 state assassinated, assumed that the person who succeeded him had 171 something to do with it, That was a reason why it seemed to me in a sense President Johnson was disqualified and why some other people of enormous prestige and above political in-fighting, political objectives, ought to review the matter and take the responsibility. My hope, I guess naive in view of my testimony today, was that if all the facts were put out, if everything were there, if 24 the investigation were really done, however it came out, whatever happened, that would be the truth and we would not be exposed to 25 692 alle. re-investigations as was the case with Lincoln, every five or ten or fifteen years whenever anybody was inspired to do it, Mr. Cornwell. Do I understand from your last answer that the perceived need to protect President Johnson from allegations of involvement would also be the primary reason that you requested as an alternative the Department of Justice's conducting or hand- ling the review function? Mr. Katzenbach, That would be one factor, I do not think the most important one, I think it was just the fact that the Department of Justice would be identified, atleast in foreign countries, so closely with the government that there would be some question as to whether all the facts had been put out or something was being concealed, The relations between Bobby Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson were such that perhaps that would not have been suspected. On the other hand, it seemed to me extraordinarily distasteful for Bobby to head that up. In any event, he would not have been willing, Mr. Cornwell. What specifically did you contemplate as the best solution to the problem, the best mechanism? Was it the Warren Commission or did you have some other view? Mr, Katzenbach, It would be essentially the Warren Commissio or something very much likeit, As far as the particular people are concerned, I had not any great thoughts of particular people 24 outside of the fact that if you do not want to have a separate 25 House or Senate investigation, it would probably involve people of 693 13 prestige from those two bodies and whatever other persons were _ acceptable and somebody of enormous prestige to head it, nN I thought Chief Justice Warren probably had more credibility w abroad than any other American at that particular time in history, > I thought he would be ideal but I also was aware, as any lawyer wn would be, of the fact that the Chief Justice of the United States o would find problems in undertaking that kind of role while a sitting N fos] Chief Justice. It was sort of hard to think of anybody who could serve that so role better than he, 10 Mr. Cornwell. You told us that of course Mr. Hoover dis- 11 agreed with this view and that the Department basically agreed 12 with you in the view, What about the President's view, for 13 14 instance? Mr, Katzenbach, Well, initially, the President neither 15 rejected nor accepted the idea. He did not embrace it, I thought 16 there was a period of time when he thought that it might be unnec- 17 18 essary to do. Mr. Cornwell. What was that, necessary or unnecessary? 19 Mr. Katzenbach. Unnecessary to do, but I really do not know, 20 I think you have to also realize that I was working as Bobby 21 Kennedy's deputy and that they were not particularly close people, 22 that he would be suspicious, it seemed to me, of information at 23 that particular time, of what advice he might be getting from 24 either me or from the White House staff left over from President 25 694 14 Kennedy, that he would want his own advice from people in whom he had confidence as the result of long friendship or political association, Mr. Cornwell. Did you speak with anyone else about this solu tion to the problems that you faced before the decision, of course was ultimately made? Mr, Katzenbach, I believe I recommended it to Bill Moyers, whom I knew slightly at that time, I believe I raised it with Walter Jenkins and I believe I raised it with President Johnson, Mr. Cornwell. What about people outside the President's immediate circle? Mr. Katzenbach, I talked with people outside of the Presi- dent's immediate circle, | Mr. Cornwell. Did you talk with the CIA? Mr. Katzenbach, No, I did not talk with anybody at the CIA that I can recall now. I might have talked with somebody at the State Department about it, conceivably with Dean Rusk, more likely with Alexis Johnson, Mr. Cornwell. Do you mean about what their views were? Mr. Katzenbach, Yes. I am sure I talked about it with peopl outside the government entirely who called me and suggested old friends or former colleagues, Mr. Cornwell, What were the views of the State Department and Dean Rusk? Mr. Katzenbach, I think Dean Rusk was for it, but he is a 695 5 Ba fellow who played things quite close to his vest, Whether he said i to me before it was decided or he said it was a good idea after the President decided to do it, I simply do not know, Mr. Cornwell, What about Alexis Johnson? Mr. Katzenbach, I think he thought it was a good idea. But they were very much interested in time, They wanted to get some- t hing out in a hurry, The State Department was constantly pressing because, I guess, of the rumors abroad or the accusations, Mr. Cornwell, Did you speak to Earl Warren about the subject? 10 Mr. Katzenbach, When the President decided he wanted to 1] do that, he asked me to go speak to the Chief Justice and ask him to serve in that capacity, which I did, and he declined. Later in the day, the President had him over to the White House and he changed his mind, Mr. Cornwell, What, if any, arguments did you use to try to persuade him? Mr, Katzenbach., Essentially the same ones I have given you now, that I thought that everything had to be done that would give public opinion all over the world confidence that the true facts had been revealed, that everything was out on the table, whether they were difficult facts or whether they were not, that they be made public and not subject to later discovery or like, this or that. I thought it took a man of his experience and his prestige to do it. He, it seems to me, rather predictably said he thought tha 696 16 was in conflict with being the Chief Justice and, therefore, thought somebody else ought to do it. I argued there was no other person, being the kind of man he was, which the Chief Justice vehemently denied. Mr. Cornwell. Was there anything specific which had come to your attention out of the investigation which was known by any of the senior officials at the government at the time which made the international repercussions or potential repercussions particularl severe? Mr, Katzenbach. No, other than what was really public information at the time, There was a great deal of writing about it in the foreign press as there was domestically, There was a great deal of speculation about the possibility of conspiracy from almost any direction you could make conspiracy. The inherent facts of it were what kept fueling those rumors, Probably the most important was simply Jack Ruby's killing of Oswald, Why should that happen? Why should he have done this? I must confess to this day, I find that absolutely incredible, how it could have happened or even why it could have happened, A number of the things I have mentioned, the connections, whether real or tenuous, that Oswald had with the Soviet Union, his trips to Mexico City, his marriage to Marina, all of those things were obviously risks for speculation, Mr. Cornwell. Was there anything specific which had come to your attention in terms of either an agency relationship, FBI, CIA 697 af State or anything else with Oswald or their involvement in any other matters which also pushed your thinking in the same direc- tion which led you to conclude that it was necessary to have an independent review function over the agency's investigation? Mr. Katzenbach, I think, apart from the things I have men- tioned, nothing that occurs to me, I guess I had memos about the Department of State's returning the passport to Oswald or giving him money to get home or something of that kind, It seemed to me, in view of the facts, that in all probability it appeared he had killed the President of the United States, an unhappy public relations situation, I take it your question is probably directed against CIA connections of one kind or another and I have no knowledge of that whatsoever. Mr. Cornwell. As merely an example and not meaning to make this an exclusive list of possibilities, had anything like Mafia plots, CIA mafia plots against Castro come to your attention? Mr, Katzenbach. No. I think if they had, I would have dismissed them as ridiculous, but I never heard of them, Mr. Cornwell. You never heard of anything like that, that the CIA might have been reluctant to get into it and, therefore, you thought an independent review function was necessary? Mr, Katzenbach, No, nothing really of that kind at all, It 24 naive, but it never occurred never occurred to me, Perhaps I was 25 to me that the CIA would be involved among its covert activities. 698 18 I was aware they had covert activities although I did not pretty much know what they were. But that they would have been involved in the assassination quite honestly never entered my mind, It would have seemed to me then as it seems to me now, not on moral grounds, but on pragmatic grounds a very poor idea for the United States to expose its president to that kind of thing, Mr. Cornwell, Apart from just general speculation that some law enforcement agency may have been culpable because people had a hard time believing that the event had occurred or was allowed to occur, was there anything specific along those lines about a con- nection between any agency of the government and Oswald that led you to believe that an independent review was essential? Mr. Katzenbach, No, there was nothing of that kind, Mr. Cornwell, Would you tell us what your views are today, using all the hindsight that is now available-to you about the adequacy of the mechanisms that were ultimately chosen? Mr. Katzenbach. I think the mechanisms were first-rate, wet did not work entirely. If I were doing it again, I would do exactl the same thing. I think you have two inherent facts that you have to live with. One was that there is no investigative agency in the world that I believe compares with the Federal Bureau of Inves r tigation then and I suppose it is probably true today. The notion that you could create a separate investigative agency to investi- gate something of that kind that would do the job better than the FBI I would have rejected then and I would reject now. 699 19 That does not mean that, as in many other instances that you had with the FBI and the Department of Justice, you did not ask the FBI, reading their reports, to go back to re-interview so and so to ask these questions and check on this and that which I thought ought to be done. In other words, I did not think you should take their summary reports and conclusions without examining all of the stuff that came into the FBI, Perhaps I could put it differently and say in terms of the capacity of the FBI, they are extremely good, When it comes to the synthesis of the information it seems to me at that point my own experience was that it was worth having other people review it and ask for, as we often did in civil rights matters and quite often in criminal matters, further investigation of various leads that had been rejected as being unproductive. That is what I asked the Warren Commission to do. The other problem quite honestly never even occurred to me and I do not know how it would resolve other than in a strong direction to the President and that is the question of the CIA, or the FBI for that matter,concealing information, Perhaps naively but I thought that the appointment of Allen Dulles to the Commission would ensure that the Commission had access to anything that the CIA had, I am astounded to this day that Mr. Dulles did not at least make that information available to the other commissioners. He might have been skeptical about how 700 20 far it was to go to the staff or how it might be further investi- @ted because there was somewhat more of an aura of secrecy sur- rounding the CIA in 1964 than there is 1978, If there is a secret left, I do not know what it is. Mr. Cornwell, And the information you are referring to is the Mafia plots? Mr. Katzenbach. That is not really the information I am referring to. I am referring to generally anything that the CIA had in its files. I think if you were asking me then, I would have thought much more in the way of foreign intelligence, any- thing they had about Oswald, Oswald's connections, about Marina's connections, about marriage as connections, probably not Ruby unless Ruby had foreign connections, We were unaware then of any Mafia plots, It would not really have gone through my head that that would have been a matter, It never would have occurred to me that the FBI would cover up anything. If you ask me the question, if the FBI failed to do s omething it should have done, would they have covered that up? My answer to you is, even then, would have been yes, they probably would, not covering up information that somebody else was guilty of or something of this kind, but if the Bureau made any mistake or anything for which the public could criticize the Bureau, the Bureau would do its best to conceal the information from anybody, 24 Mr. Cornwell, Let us go back a small bit to your answer abou 25 the CIA, As I recall the way you worded it, it was in terms of 701 21 being astounded that Dulles did not make that information availabl to the other Warren Commission members. The implication is that you had some specific information in mind that you are now aware of that Dulles possessed and did not make available, My question is what ts the specific information? Mr, Katzenbach, It would be all of the various assassination attempts with respect to Castro because certainly the Commission ought to have known that, Mr, Cornwell, In other words, not just Mafia plots, but all of the CIA plots against Castro? Mr, Katzenbach, Yes, all of that, There may have been other stuff. I do not know, It would seem to me clearly that was some- thing for the Commission to know. Whatever the conclusions from it might or might not be, it clearly was something that they shoul have been informed of, I know to this day Mr. Rusk resents very strongly that the information was not made available to him at that time or as Secretary of State. I rather agree with him, Mr. Cornwell. What have been your sources of information that Dulles did possess that information? Mr. Katzenbach. I have none, I just assumed that the head of the CIA knew about covert activities of that kind of importance He had been involved in the CIA for a very long period of time, If he did not know that, I would have suspected he would have at least the capacity to get it, 25 Mr. Cornwell, I believe some of the materials we sent you 702 22 included the Senate Report, book five, the Church committee's report, That, of course, has references in part to the extent of Dulles' knowledge of those matters. What I really want to find out is do you have any independent knowledge, did you ever talk to Dulles at any time or any of his associates by which directly or indirectly you obtained knowledge about the extent of his familiarity with the plots? Mr, Katzenbach, No, In fact, I never believed there were such plots. I testified to this before but I remember at one time they were in the White House at the time of the Dominican upheaval and I remember Lyndon Johnson asking a direct question to Dick Helms about assassination and got a flat denial from Mr, Helms that the CIA had anybody Seevoleeds It was a short conver- sation and you can qualify it any way you want to, but I went home pretty confident, Mr. Cornwell. What year was this? Mr, Katzenbach, I can only relate it to the Dominican, I would relate it to being something like February or March of 1965, I could be off on that date, but that is about right. Mr. Cornwell. Do you know how much prior to that date the President may have had at least question in his mind about the existence of such plots? Mr. Katzenbach. I do not know, I do not think the President 24 knew explicitly about any plots, I think Lyndon Johnson was 25 deeply suspicious of what the CIA was doing and how much they were 703 23 1 | telling him. That is why he sent the FBI down to the Dominican 2 | Republic. 3 Mr, Cornwell, Do you have any reason to believe that the 4 | President may have considered the possibility of such plots back 5 | as far as 1963 and 1974? 6 Mr, Katzenbach. I have no reason one way or the other, I 7 | just do not know, 8 Mr. Cornwell. You have told us that you were astounded that 9 | information about the plots was not made available at least to the 10 | Comission members. Obviously, that implies that you think it woul 11 | have been relevant to the inquiry. 12 Mr. Katzenbach. Oh, yes, I think given that information, you 13 | would have pursued some lines of inquiry probably harder than you 14 | might have otherwise pursued them, 15 I have no reason to believe one way or the other it would 16 | have changed the result or turned it around or anything of that 17 | kind. I have no information on that, It is simply I believe if 18 | I had been a member of the Warren Commission, I would have believe 19 | that to be relevant information which would require investigation, 20 Mr. Cornwell. Looking back again, using hindsight, even 21 | though during 1963 and 1964 no one explicitly stated to you that 22 | there had been plots directed at Castro, were there any conver- 23 | sations you had with the President or any of his advisors or Bobby 24 | Kennedy during that period which again as I stated from hindsight (eae they had either a suspicion or some knowledge of the 704 24 plots? Mr. Katzenbach, No, nothing that I can recall. You phrased your question fairly broadly. I assume you mean assassination plots? Mr. Cornwell. Yes, Mr, Katzenbach. Because certainly there was the Bay of Pigs and certainly there was a lot of effort to get intelligence out of there. There were a lot of Cubans in this country that would have been quite happy if the opportunity arose to have assassinate Castro, Fidel or Raoul or Che Gueverra or any of the other people In that sense, I suppose any citizen had to be aware of that, But there was nothing at any time that ever led me then or now, any conversation I had or any memo I had, to believe that the United States was directly involved in this kind of activity. Mr. Cornwell, Or that Johnson, his associates, or Bobby Kennedy had a suspicion that that may have existed? Mr, Katzenbach. That is a little more difficult. The only person it is more difficult with is Lyndon Johnson who did from time to time come to take a conspiratorial view of the world, He was concerned about the CIA because he did not really know what they were doing and he was not sure they were telling him the truth, Only in that context, nothing more specific, Mr. Cornwell, With respect to the FBI, was there anything that they possessed that you are now aware of which they did not communicate to the Warren Commission and should have? 705 25 Mr. Katzenbach, Apparently they were aware, if I read the report correctly, of some of the CIA activities, of at least the connection with the Mafia, That certainly should have been repor- ted. I am very surprised that it was not. There was no love lost between the FBI and the CIA. I guess it must have been the FBI's view that they would have been as embarrassed as the CIA b ecause I think they would have no hesitation telling the Warren Commission about it, Mr. Cornwell. Do you have any other thoughts about the fail- 10 ure of the mechanism? Did it fail to perform in any other respect 1 Mr. Katzenbach, I really cannot think of any. I think the Commission itself hired as good a staff as they could get, I thin the staff they had was dedicated, they tried to get all the facts and get the truth out, Obviously, some Commission members were stronger than other Commission members in this regard. I think the staff was well run, At the time they made a genuine effort to get at it, Probably the failure of the mecha-~ nism -- there was one that was inherent in that situation, was then at least,and that is really the unwillingness of the FBI, and I assume the CIA, although I know less about it, to really open up f iles. They did produce them and they did produce the raw material for the Warren Commission, but it was subject to at least the potential, perhaps in actuality,of not producing all of the relevant information, There must have been information in the 106 26 files with aapent to the Mafia which was not produced, I do not know how you solve that problem, The people who have files are the people familiar with files, If they are not leveling with you, it may be difficult to get it, Mr, Cornwell, Was the focus of the investigative effort broad enough? not Mr. Katzenbach, It may/have been in retrospect, I do not know. I thought it was pretty broad at the time, I thought I was tryin to make it as broad as possible. I thought that any of these fact had to be put out on the table and tell us what you knew about it, I realize the Senate committee thought it was more focused than certainly I thought it was focused, I do not think that had to do with the focus of it. I think that had to do with the reluctance of the CIA to divulge this information and the reluctance of the FBI to divulge it, not with what the focus of the investigation was, The Warren Commission would not have any hesitation at all in thinking that was relevant and within the focus of their investigation, Mr. Cornwell. Were there any specific problems which you observed in terms of the ability to put together the various agencies in the Warren Commission and make the whole process work? Mr. Katzenbach. None that I can really think of. Anybody in the government knew that there would be some tension between the 24 FBI and the CIA, less with the Secret Service than the FBI because 25 the Secret Service was so utterly dependent on a lot of FBI 707 27 information that they were really in the position of a poor relation, We did review fairly quickly, within I guess a few days of the assassination, whether the measures that were taken to put people in the security index were the proper measures or not, There was a meeting with all of the involved people, the Secretary of the Treasury, the head of the Secret Service, head of the CIA, Mr. Hoover and myself, I guess Allen Belmont was there, perhaps Sullivan, I do not remember, We reviewed that procedure, I think you could review that procedure many hundreds of times without coming out with a very satisfactory procedure because the problem is that the list gets unmanageably big. Mr. Cornwell. What contributions, if any, did the Department of Justice provide for the overall investigation? Mr. Katzenbach, Relatively little in the sense that the Commission used its own legal staff, not the Department of Justice!s legal staff, and then Howard Willens, the first assistant in the Criminal Division to be liaison with the Commission and try to help the Commission attorneys because of his familiarity with FBI investigative processes and so forth, help to get them the infor- mation that they wanted, I think the Department of Justice was not really involved in it, excluding the FBI. 24 Mr, Cornwell. Directing your attention to your analysis 25 earlier that it would have been ill-advised to attempt to create 708 28 an investigative organization specifically for the purpose of doin t his job and that, therefore, it was necessary to utilize the resources of the FBI primarily, and the other agencies secondarily why was there no parallel thinking or implementation with respect to the question of attorney resources, in other words, the existin body of expertise in criminal investigations in the Department of Justice but the decision to select an investigative staff from scratch for the Warren Commission? Mr. Katzenbach. That would be a question you would have to address to the Warren Commission, Certainly, there was no reluc- tance to provide any assistance or help that they wanted, I am inclined to think that they had the view -- this is a somewhat speculative answer -- they had the view that their own independence was better established by an independent staff rather than relying too heavily on the Department of Justice lawyers, I would not be surprised if they thought the quality of the staff they could attract would be better on the average than the quality of the staff that the Justice Department could provide, which I believe was in fact true, Mr. Cornwell, Was the possibility of utilizing the Justice Department's staff and running their own grand juries or anything like that ever considered or specifically discussed? Mr. Katzenbach, Not with me. I am sure I told Mr. Willens 24 when he was over there that the Department of Justice was totally 25 at the disposition of the Commission to be used as they wanted. 709 29 I do not recall now any specific conversations, They did not make any requests, They had all kinds of powers themselves. They were given all kinds of powers so far as supboenas were concerned, testimony under oath, They had all the legal paraphenalia that was necessary, Mr. Cornwell, Apart from however the question of the legal talents which were available, which in your opinion were very high with respect to the Warren Commission staff, let me ask you to comment on the differences between the Warren Commission staff! experience and knowledge in the organized crime field for instance as compared to the Department and Bobby Kennedy's staff who had been working on those matters for a long period of time? What, if anything, was done to compensate for that apparent inequity? Mr. Katzenbach. They had Mr. Willens who was totally and thoroughly in the organized crime thing working as liaison. Mr. Cornwell, So there was no other reason particularly for failing to use the Department of Justice's staff? Mr. Katzenbach. No. I think it would be wrong to act on the assumption that we thought organized crime had very much to do with the assassination. Now, if the CIA or the FBI had come out and talked about the so-called Mafia plot, then it may have been the Commission would have dug more into the organized crime picture and certainly there were lots of people in the Department who knew that, 710 30 On the other hand, after all, that was the FBI's baby, too, In terms of knowledge about organized crime, the FBI could cer- tainly duplicate what attorneys in the Department of Justice could duplicate about names and numbers of all players, That was within Belmont's area of responsibility. Mr. Cornwell. The Senate report, book five at page six, reaches a conclusion that "The committee has developed evidence which impeaches the process by which the intelligence agencies arrive at their own conclusions about the assassination and by which they provided information to the Warren Commission," and they go on to state that "Facts which might have substantially affected the course of the investigation were not provided the Warren Commission." You, I take it, essentially agree with their conclusions? Mr. Katzenbach, I think so, The first part is difficult for me, just in the way government operates, Let me see if I can explain what I mean by that, Repeatedly when I was in the Depart- ment, I wanted to get information from the Bureau promptly, mainly about civil rights demonstrations and that kind of thing. The Bureau had its own very tight bureaucracy, Mr, Hoover resented greatly when Mr. Kennedy or I talked directly to an agent in the field. If we wanted information, he wanted it to come through him 24 or through Tolson or one of the assistant directors, at least have 25 them go through the Bureau and get the information, which would 711 sul come back in and then there the Secretary would write a report and they would send it to me, They could do it amazingly fast, but still another hour longer than if you simply had a conversation directly. As long as Mr. Hoover was alive it was very hard to break that down. Agents really did not want to talk to you, so that you had this rather awkward way of getting everything filtered, I think this Warren Commission ran into that same problem, It was not simply a problem of Mr. Hoover although it may have been a problem because of his feelings about the Bureau, his very tight control of it, but still I think almost every Bureaucrat or almos every head of a department has a little bit of the same problem, I did not like White House staff calling attorneys in the Department of Justice about a problem and I put a stop to it, "If you have something, call me,” I felt responsible for their advice and I did not want people in the White House shopping around for advice or information, So I say that because I have been critical of Mr, Hoover, but I am not unsympathetic with the notion that he is responsible for that group of people and, therefore, he wants to know what it is they are saying and whether or not he agrees with it. That certainly is different from the point of view of superimposing Warren Commission staff on an agency of the government, 24 The same thing I suspect is true of the CIA, I do not know 25 how you beat that problem. The Senate can be critical of it, I 712 32 think if you did it today you would have an identical problem, Indeed, I think the Senate in its own investigation ran into that problem, Mr. Cornwell. The second part --- Mr. Katzenbach, The second part I agree with, yes. Clearly there was information they had that should have been made availabl to the Commission, Mr. Cornwell. Let me ask you if you have any insight into what may be the ultimate question, also posed in the Senate report, and to which they provide there was no answer, Their statement is: "Why senior officials of the FBI and the CIA permitted the investigation to go forward in light of these deficiencies and why they permitted the Warren Commission to reach its conclusion without all relevant information is still unclear," That is the Senate report, page seven. Do you have any information which would shed light on that question, the answer to that question? Mr. Katzenbach, I think I probably have already exhausted my intuition about it, Speaking of the FBI with which I am more familiar I see very little way that they could have made that infor- mation available without revealing to the Commission some of their own deficiencies and this being subjected to some criticism. Mr. Hoover just could not stand criticism, As a small exampl of that, from time to time I would get information about the 24 Bureau doing something that it should not have done and I would 25 713 33 1 inquire. I would get back a five-page memo that everything the 2 | Bureau had done was absolutely right, I would find out sometimes 3 | a month later that the agent involved was now in Nome, Alaska, I 4 | was never told that, anything about disciplinary action, 5 We used to joke about it. I tell you once an agent was driving 6 | me out to the airport at LaGuardia and he missed a turn, I said 7 | to him, "Have you missed a turn?" He looked at me, He said, "No, 8 | I said, “You have." He said, "Do you not know that the Bureau 9 | can make no mistakes?" Whereupon he did a "U" turn and went back. 10 I read the Senate report and the disciplinary action taken, 11 I find it kind of incredible because I do not think that Oswald, 12 | under the criteria that then existed, would have been on any such 13 aeli Ste bdo think the agents were disciplined because history 14 overtook them. The destruction of the letter and so forth, I can 15 | understand, An agent would be disciplined for that, 16 Mr. Cornwell, The letter that was delivered to Special Agent 17 | Hosty? 18 Mr. Katzenbach, I do not blame Hostv for not doing anything 19 | about it particularly, At the time he had things that he regarded 20 | as much more important, not having any idea that Oswald was going 21 to shoot thePresident. It certainly does not surprise me that 22 | the Bureau would have covered that up and dealt with their own 23 internally, in their own way, which they always did, 24 Mr. Cornwell, Among the records that we sent to you to 25 || review prior to your coming here, was a November 22, 1963 memo 714 34 from Donohoe to Belmont in the Bureau which in part states: "The deputy attorney general also commented that if it develops that Oswald is the man who did the assassination or was involved in TCI a 6, the State Department should be advised as there are definite foreign policy considerations and decisions here," That, of course, is essentially what you told us earlier, that that was a dominant concern of yours during this period, Mr, Katzenbach. And of the State Department, I am sure that that comment came because somebody in the State Department had called me and said that to me, probably Alexis Johnson, Mr. Cornwell. There is a similar statement in a memo written by Walter Jenkins recording a conversation with Mr, Hoover dated November 24 wherein apparently Mr, Hoover expresses the view that he is opposed to the Warren Commission, to the possibility that a presidential commission would be formed, He explained there are several aspects which would complicate our foreign relations. For instance, Oswald made a phone call to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City which we intercepted, It was only about a visa, however. He also wrote a letter to the Soviet Embassy here in Washington. This letter referred to the fact that the FBI had questioned his activities on the"Fair Play for Cuba' Committee and also asked about extension of his wife's visa, That letter from Oswald was addressed to a man in the Soviet Embassy who was in charge of assassinations and similar activities on the part of the Soviet 715 ntl 35 government, "To have that drawn into a public hearing would muddy the waters internationally." Mr. Katzenbach, I would not want the impression that I was ever aware of that, that any of the statements that Jenkins attrib utes to Hoover there were statements made to me, Mr. Cornwell, The reason I direct your attention to it is that it has the same flavor, same general drift of the testimony you provided here today and of the first memo which reflects your ~ comments that I read, mainly to the effect that there are inter- national considerations that weighed very heavily in the minds of the people who were making decisions about how to investigate the matter at the time, Mr. Katzenbach, I think they are two entirely different things. Let me explain why I believe that, There is no question — aaa eee in my mind that there were international ramifications and the State Department had problems on this, It has 125 embassies abroad and every American ambassador is being asked about this and they want to get as much information as they can on this and they do not know, They are reading speculation, hearing specu- lation about foreign conspiracies, about a plot by Vice President Johnson to take over the administration from Kennedy, They had all those problems on their hands, That was the problem that I was focusing upon. Mr, Hoover is talking about a very different problem, as I understand it. As I understand that memo, he is saying: "Gee whizz, if we put all of this out, then 716 36 they will know we had a tap on the Cuban Embassy, They will know we had a mail cover on the Soviet Embassy, and that would be very embarrassing." That is not what the State Department was saying to me and that is not what I focused on at all, In fact, I did not give a damn about embarrassment, I cared about getting the facts out. Mr. Cornwell, You, of course, were aware of those types of investigative resources? You knew that sort of thing existed, I take it? Mr. Katzenbach, I knew that sort of thing existed, At that time I was deputy attorney general and I had never seen any wire tap authorization and I would not have known what the attorney general knew or did not know about it. That the Bureau made wire taps I was certainly aware of, I probably was aware of -- I do not remember when -- observation of the embassy, that kind of thing. I became more aware of it later, It is hard to separate in t ime what I knew in 1964 from what I knew in 1965 of 1966, It seams to me that Mr, Hoover is using foreign policy in a rather different way than the State Department was using it, Mr. Cornwell, Let me ask you this then, Mr. Katzenbach, I was not concerned about straining our relations with anyone, 24 Mr. Cornwell, Had you ever run into the expression of that 25 view, the one that you say was uniquely Hoover's and not yours, 717 a7, in these two memos? Mr, Katzenbach. No, Mr. Cornwell, Did anybody express their views during this time period? Mr. Katzenbach. I do not recall anyone expressing their views during this time period, nor would it have concerned me, frankly. You had two conceivable problems, both of which were difficult although for very different reasons, One was if Oswald is the lone assassin and not connected with the Soviet Union or any other group, right wing, left wing, foreign, whatever it may be, and just a nut, how do you convince people that you have done a thorough investigation and if that is true, when you had enough information -- I have already mentioned, marriage to Marina, visit to Russia, Mexico City -~- you have to put all that out on the table. You cannot cover that up. You have to put all of that out on the table, all the facts, everything you have done. You had another potential problem although nobody seemed to believe that. The belief was that Oswald had acted in this way, and indeed that would have been the belief, alone and so forth, that I would have arrived at as the probability. But if indeed this were a foreign assassination plot, then you had a different kind of problem, very different kind of prob- lem. If you did not have any problem with believing that was a foreign assassination, then you had a diplomatic problem, I do 718 38 not think that was a strong possibility but I did not know how you could investigate one without the other, You had to follow up all that information, Then you have to come to one conclusion or another, You have to put all the facts out on the table, Now, Mr. Hoover does not seem to be saying that to Jenkins, Mr. Cornwell. Would you agree that it indicates the possi- bility that the investigation within the Bureau could have been distorted from that sort of pressure, the feeling that there were things that could not be revealed or discussed or looked into if there were an independent review board? Mr. Katzenbach, I do not think I would read it that way myself, I would read it as Mr. Hoover reaching for arguments not to have an independent review board and pulling out anything he could find to avoid that which he took in and of itself to be a reflection on the Federal Bureau of Investigation and probably in the light of facts, now known but not known then, probably because he was concerned about some of the goofs that the Bureau had made and that they might come out and the commission might then criti- cize them. You know of his reaction to the actual commission report which was -~ I doubt whether you, sir, would have felt differently if you were the head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that 24 would have been highly critical of you, For Mr. Hoover anything 25 that was not lavish praise was terrible criticism, unjustfied also, 719 39 I think you have to read internal Bureau memoranda in mysterious ways. In the first place, most of those fellows when they write, in most memoranda want to tell the director something he wants to hear. It is only when they are pushed against the wall that they tell him something that he did not want to hear. I think when you are quoting internal Bureau memoranda, you are quoting somewhat selectively in the light of what would serve the Bureau's purposes and not what will not. Mr. Cornwell, Let me ask you about whether the next memo is accurate, I am going to assume although I have a poor copy that this is dated November 28, 1963, I will show it to you, I do not know whether you would read that as the 28th or not, Mr, Katzenbach, I believe that is the 25th, Mr, Cornwell, Let us say it is November 25, 1963, The first sentence in the memo from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Sullivan of the FBI reads: "The director advised that he talked to Katzenbach who had been talking to the White House relative to the report that we are to render in the Oswald case, It is Katzenbach's feeling that this report should include everything which may raise a ques- tion in the minds of the public or the press regarding this matter Now that, of course, is very similar to the view that you previously told us you had during this period of time, What I 24 wanted to ask you about is further in the memo it describes this 25 view as a change. It says: "The above change will, of course, 720 40 require more time for the preparation of this report,” Are you aware of any changing viewpoints on what should be the scope of the investigation or the scope of the report during this period? Mr. Katzenbach. Again, this is an internal Bureau report, It may be that I had put this to the director so broadly that it was broader than what they were then doing, Since I did not know what they were then doing outside of being assured that they were investigating everything, I would not have known whether there was a change or not, It was not a change from my viewpoint. 10 Mr. Cornwell. Your view then was from the beginning that 11 all allegations and all rumors should be investigated and every- thing should be laid out before the public? Mr. Katzenbach, It had to be, And if there were problems in doing that, you faced it at the time you did it. Mr. Cornwell, In the materials from the Senate which we provided to you at page 41, there is the statement: "Richard Helm sentiments coincided with this Bureau's supervisor's." The super- visor they had made reference to above that -- "In his November 28, 1963 cable to the CIA's Mexico station chief, Helms stated: For your private information their distinct" -- I suppose the word) "is" should be in there, but it is not in the quote, It reads: "Their distinct feeling sere in the agencies, CIA, FBI, State, that ambassador is pushing this case too hard and that we could well create flap with Cubans which could have serious repercus- sions." 721 41 I would ask you whether you would interpret that to mean that | he was worried about Pushing an investigation into the Cuban field | too far. Mr. Katzenbach, Subject to that interpretation. I do not | know. Mr. Cornwell, Did you ever have any discussions with Helms or anyone else at the CIA during that period by which you could | tell us more precisely what their viewpoint was on such matters? Mr. Katzenbach, Not that I can presently recall, I remember | the Mexican incident only because of complaints Mr. Hoover made | to me and discussions again I had I think probably with Alexis | Johnson, but they came in a somewhat different light, Mr, Hoover was telling me that "The ambassador is trying to this investigation. I want to run this investigation, He run not know. He is not experienced and he is interferring with | does it. Mr. Cornwell, That, of course, is in a somewhat different concept. Mr. Katzenbach, In a somewhat different concept, I was concerned about that for an entirely different reason, I again know the nature of his interference, but that was one did not ambassadors who was quite close to Lyndon Johnson, He of the few was a fellow Texan. So, I had a totally different perspective on it. In other words, you were worried about the Mr, Cornwell, 722 42 same potential allegations about tainting the investigation that you mentioned to us earlier? Mr, Katzenbach, Yes. I was more worried about the other side of the coin, I was perfectly happy to have whomever the legal attache in Mexico City was who wanted to help to follow everything up. But I did believe, A, that they could do it more professionally than the ambassador and I was not unaware of Mr. Hoover's strong feelings that he did not like people mucking aroun in FBI investigations, even attorneys general, Mr, Cornwell, Following the same line of inquiry in order to determine whether or not there is anything that came to your attention indicating that the investigation may have been distorte or sidetracked because of considerations of potential internationa repercussions, on the same page of the Senate report, page 41, there is reference to a legat cable to FBI headquarters suggesting in pertinent part, "The Bureau may desire to give consideration to polling all Cuban sources in United States in effort to confirm or refute this theory,” meaning the theory that Oswald may have been involved with the Cubans, And on the cable, according to the Senate report, at FBI headquarters the supervisor wrote a handwritten notation, "Not desirable. Would serve to promote rumors," The same question from the perspective of the Bureau: When, if ever, did it come to your attention that there may have been that sort of thinking in the FBI? 123 43 Mr, Katzenbach, I do not know. Never, I can understand the supervisor's comment, depending on how you go about the investigation, Maybe the idea was a good or bad one, I do not know. That it occurred or that it was recommended by the legal attache, I did not know that. All I am saying is whether going around to the Cuban sources is a good or bad idea to nail that point down, I did not know, I did not know who they were, Whethe that would promote rumors, I did not know, if done in the way that was suggested, It should have been followed up or anything should be followe up that would be productive, I certainly expected, It would have been consistent with what I thought had to be done, Mr. Cornwell. To do what? Mr. Katzenbach, To follow up in any way that you could. Whether this particular way of investigation is the best way of going about solving that problem or not, I do not know, We should have checked into every conceivable connection that Oswald had, potential connection, and done our best to follow it up, and Lt should have been done. Mr. Cornwell. I suppose at least in theory more so if it were known that there were plots, assassination plots against Castro perhaps, Mr. Katzenbach, Yes, I think so, Quite apart from that, I think that should have been done, If you do not do it, somebody else is going to do it, My point was, don't leave anything here 124 44 for somebody else to uncover, get it all out, Mr. Cornwell, How big a role in the thinking of yourself and those who were making decisions at those levels of government during 1963 was the consideration that any investigation should be possibly foregone, if it had the possibility of creating additional rumors? Mr, Katzenbach. It never entered my mind or anybody else's that I ever talked to, This was the President of the United State who had been assassinated, Not only would the government want to know anything they could about it, but so would the public and so would the world. Mr. Cornwell. I take it, however, that even though neither you nor the persons with whom you spoke considered diverting or foregoing an investigation because of the possibility of rumors, there was a substantial pressure to quash abounded rumors at an early stage, Is that correct? Mr. Katzenbach, Yes, that is correct. In a very modest way, I would have liked the Bureau to say we have not uncovered any evidence that Oswald did not act alone, but the investigation was continuing, I would have liked some statement of that kind, which I knew in fact'to be true, I knew in fact what they were telling me. Mr. Cornwell. The memos that we forwarded to you included one on November 24 from Belmont to Tolson in the FBI, one on November 25 which was a memo from you to Mr, Moyers and had also 125 45 been attached to a memo of the same date from Evans to Belmont in the FBI? Mr. Katzenbach, Yes. Another one of November 26 from Evans to Belmont. Those memos, I suppose we could say in part, reflect what appears to be a disagreement between you and the FBI on the very subject matter you just mentioned, which was your feeling that some press release should be made in order to tell the public that no hard evidence of conspiracy had been developed, Is that correct? Mr, Katzenbach. Yes, If that were the fact, then it was the fact that they were telling it to me orally, I think equally important in that what I wanted was a public commitment that we would put all the facts on the table, When the report was done it would all be available, I would have liked to have done that, but obviously, the Warren Commission did not want that done, Mr. Cornwell, There is a similar letter which I believe we also forwarded to you which you wrote to Earl Warren attaching the first FBI report. Mr. Katzenbach, It would probably be accurate to say which I signed. It reads to me very much as though the Bureau drafted it. Mr, Cornwell, Dated December 9, 1963? Mr. Katzenbach, I would be surprised if it were not a 24 25 Bureau letter, 41-372 © - 79 - 46(Vol. 3) 726 46 Mr. Cornwell, Why in your mind was there such an urgency to make the preliminary findings of the FBI that there was no con- spiracy available to the public? The memos and the letter are all dated within days of the assassination, Mr. Katzenbach, ‘I think because the speculation that there was conspiracy of various kinds was fairly rampant, at that time particularly in the foreign press, I was reacting to that and I think reacting to repeated calls from people in the State Department who wanted something of that kind in an effort to quash the beliefs of some people abroad that the silence in the face of those rumors was not to be taken as substantiating it in some way, That is, in the face of a lot of rumors about conspiracy, a total silence on the subject from the government neither con- firming nor denying tended to feed those rumors, I would have liked a statement of the kind I said, that nothing we had uncovere so far leads us to believe that there is a conspiracy, but investi gation is continuing, everything will be put out on the table, Indeed, I still think today it would have been a good idea to have done it. We might have gotten a better report, Mr. Cornwell. That last comment is sort of related to the question I was getting ready to ask you, You said you might have gotten a better report, Is that true even in light of what you testified earlier was the Bureau's apparent inclination to justify their own acts and their failure to admit their shortcomings? 127 47 Mr. Katzenbach, Probably not in the light of that, but at the time they were complaining about pressure to get the report out, Insofar as that could be used as an excuse not to follow everything up or something of that kind, I believe if you had been able to make an interim statement of the kind that I suggested, you would have taken some timing pressure off getting the report out because the failure to make that statement was the only alternative you had in view of the adamant position that the Bureau was taking, which I understand, You see, nobody really could do it other than the Bureau, with the Bureau's acquiescence, Nobody else knew, I did not know what was going on, Nobody in the government knew what was going on other than very short conclusionary statements which you got from liaison people, from the director himself, I did not know who they were interviewing or why they were interviewing, what they uncovered. Mr. Cornwell, Was there in fact a disagreement, apart from what these memos say, between you and the Bureau on the releasing of information about the progress of their investigation? Mr, Katzenbach, Sure. You know, it would drive you absolutely wild to see the Bureau release it, Mr. Cornwell, That was the point of the question, Mr. Katzenbach, I do not know who the Washington Star 24 reporter was, but my guess would be that it us Jerry O'Leary, 25 728 48 You could bet it would be the Star or the News and not the Post, I would go further than that, The ticker on the day the Bureau delivered the assassination report to my office, five minutes before it came to my office, Ed Guthman came running in, or Rosenthal, with the ticker saying I have the report, I said, "Where is it?" He said, "I haven't got it yet." While he was standing in the office, the report was delivered to me, The Bureau took the position that it must have been leaked by my office and not by them, I said, "I cannot leak something I do not know." Mr. Cornwell. We found a memo relating to such a matter, I do not know if we found it in time to provide it to you or not, It was dated December 20, 1963. Near the bottom of the first page it reads: "Senator Russell stated that Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach had directly implied that the leaks had come from the FBI, He quoted Katzenbach as telling the members of the prestig- ious commission J, Edgar Hoover has chewed his men out for leaking information and they will not be doing any more of this, "I told the Senator that Katzenbach was lying in implying such action on the part of the FBI representatives. The point is made that sometimes a person tries to cover up his own guilt by blaming others." 24 Let me ask you first about the facts. 25 Mr. Katzenbach, I cheated because I knew when I read it who 129 49 had written that memo, I see that it was Mr. DeLoach, Mr. Cornwell, I take it your testimony would be that it was not you who leaked the information? Mr, Katzenbach. That is correct. Mr. Cornwell, Do you have reason to believe then that it was the Bureau? Mr, Katzenbach. Yes. The Bureau knew it and I think that the Bureau leaked it, The Bureau constantly leaked things of this kind and constantly denied it and constantly blamed it on other people, There is not a reporter in town who does not know that, Mr. Cornwell. Why would the Bureau have overtly opposed your earlier request that a limited press release be made if they were intending to leak the information themselves? Mr. Katzenbach. I do not know, For one thing, they did not really leak on matters that they were investigating, having state- ments about them made by the Department of Justice, They wanted to make their own statements about them, Secondly, I suppose with their own leaks, they controlled what was said, If it is done in the form of a leak, it is deniable. I wanted a rather formal statement. The Bureau really had a policy, and quite a good one, of saying that they did not want to make any partial statements about an investigation until the investigation was completed, That is 24 perfectly sound policy. Like all policies, it is conceivable ther 25 might be circumstances that would justify an exception. But 730 50 basically, it was a good policy, When the Bureau leaked, it leaked as a formal matter, The bureau agents did not leak, It was their form of press release, Mr, Cornwell, Directing your attention to a memo dated — December 3rd, 1963, from Belmont to Tolson, the general subject matter concerns the first meeting of the Warren Commission and your view, as recorded by the memo at least, that you felt the FBI should have someone at the first meeting and Belmont stating that he made no commitment to you, "But I remember we advised him that our report in this matter will speak for itself. Until the report is ready, there is no real purpose in an FBI representative being present at the Com- mission meeting." It concludes thereafter stating, “Katzenbach felt it was better to show willingness to cooperate with the Commission," Were there any specific examples that come to your attention along this line of specific FBI antagonism toward the Commission, failure to cooperate with it, other than what we have already discussed? Mr. Katzenbach, I do not think so, I was satisfied at the time -- obviously wrong -- that the Bureau was cooperating, They were in fact doing more than I think they would have ever done for me in terms of making the raw data available and so forth 24 So I was satisfied that they were, I am not surprised, 25 This is the kind of thing you get from Belmont to Tolson, Hoover, 731 51 knowing Hoover's opposition to the Commision, not really wanting to have anything to do with it and also thinking it fairly funny having me sitting over there and not knowing what was going on, The reason I wanted the Bureau there was I wanted somebody telling me what was going on. I did not know. I could not even suggest the answer that I would give which was that I am sure that they were thoroughly investigating everything, Mr. Cornwell. Were you aware of the FBI's maintenance of dossiers on the Commission members at the time? Mr. Katzenbach, No, I do not believe so, except that it may have been that the Chief Justice asked for the FBI checks to be done on people he was putting on his staff, I do not know, If he did, I would be obviously aware of that request and whatever dossier was the result of it, but nothing else. Mr. Cornwell, You, I take it, read the part in the Senate report that we forwarded to you on that subject? Mr. Katzenbach, Yes. Mr. Cornwell, Which was not a security background investi- gation of the nature you just referred to, but in fact a dossier in terms of derogatory material that, if the Senate report is correct, Hoover gathered in order to potentially have leverage over Commission members? Mr. Katzenbach, Apparently so, at least according to the 24 Senate report, I was unaware of that at the time, although I knew 25 his opposition to the Commission -- he was concerned about the 732 52 Commission. I thought he had less so, in all candor, because he had some very strong friends on the Commission and I thought maybe that would relax him, Mr, Cornwell, What was your assessment of the impact that the formation of the Commission had on the FBI's or CIA's willing- ness to continue the investigation in fact in an openminded fashio until it was concluded? Mr, Katzenbach., I do not know, That would be very specu- lative. Mr. Cornwell, Let me ask you to focus on a couple of time periods, First, what the FBI generated on its own prior to the time that the Commission was selected and empaneled versus what they produced based on specific requests of the Commission there- after and, second, the pledges that both the CIA and the FBI gave at the termination of the Warren Commission and then the fact as we know it today, that no investigation was thereafter conducted? Mr. Katzenbach. With respect to the first part of the ques- tion, I would not have expected any problems from the Bureau in terms of going out and following up all the things that the Com- mission wanted to do. In the ordinary course of things that was done repeatedly in the Department of Justice prosecutions and I would not have expec- ted great problems from that if they were satisfied, as they appeared to be, with the conclusions they came to and the basic Fores g they came to, I would have thought they would have no | 733 Sa 53 particular problems in running down a lot of alleys they had not run down if it did not develop any information that was flatly contrary to their conclusions, What would have happened if they came across that kind of information, God only knows. What the reverberations of that in the FBI would have been, again, speaking of the FBI talking about minor embarrassment -- in really uncovering samething that would have changed some result they had reported, God only knows, I think people's heads would have rolled and they would have swallowed hard and done it. I think my view at the time would have been that in a matter as important as the assassination of a president, I think the Bureau would have swallowed and taken it and found some graceful way out, Explaining why they had come to the wrong conclusion would have been a fairly high-powered neutron bomb in the Bureau, questioning any basic conclusion that they had come to, With respect to the second part, I regarded the investigation continuing as pretty much a formal statement that they made at the time, that "if something comes up that seems to be sufficiently important, I assure you we will follow it up." I do not think anybody thought that was going to happen, I think it was fairly pro forma, Mr, Cornwell. The question really is in your assessment, would either one of those have been different, either one of those simations been different, had someone else conducted the 734 54 investigation? Had the Department of Justice assumed primary responsibility, would the FBI's investigation have in fact been more openminded? If the Department of Justice had made the inves- tigation, would in fact it have continued until everything was run out as opposed to what apparently was the fact in 1964, that there was a time deadline set and the Warren Commission went out of business? What kind of impact did the existence of the Com- mission have on those problems? Mr. Katzenbach, I would think, if anything, they would have had more clout than the Department of Justice would have had in terms of getting the Bureau to follow up, at least in the time period of its existence, all of those things, Mr. Cornwell. In your view, no substantial price was paid in terms of the effective duration of an open-ended investigation which accrued by virtue of the formation of the Warren Commission? Mr. Katzenbach,. I think not, I think in that period of time what information would have been available in that period of time would have been followed up under its direction, My only qualification is that sometimes something happens five years later, There was no way that you could have known at the time, Mr, Cornwell, Of course the Senate report suggests an exampl of that, It did come up later and conclude that the Bureau failed tOILOLLOW LC UD, Mr. Katzenbach, Yes, but the only one I remember is the 735 3) Drew Pearson one, If you had told me those facts and asked me whether the Bureau was likely to have followed up something Drew Pearson told them or attributed to Drew Pearson, I would have said no. The bias against Drew Pearson was very strong, I think that is a more plausible explanation for anybody familiar with the Bureau than unwillingness to engage in the assassination investigation, They would not believe Drew Pearson under oath, Hoover hated him and Johnson liked him, Mr. Cornwell, The dominant result would not have been that the Commission terminated and the Bureau at that point in time washed its hands of the investigation? Mr. Katzenbach, Not in my view, Drew Pearson had committed serious errors from the Bureau's viewpoint because he had been critical of the Bureau, Mr. Klein, You alluded to Bobby Kennedy's desire to be detached from the entire investigation. Could you go into that a little bit more about what he said and when he took this positio for the first time? Mr. Katzenbach. I guess he took it from the outset, He was about as devastated a human being as I had ever seen, He really never had any interest in any part of the investigation, I doubt if he ever read the FBI report, I do not know whether he ever read the Warren Commission's report, I told him at the time it 24 came out it probably would be helpful if he would say he thought 25 it was a thorough investigation, if that was the way he felt, and 736 56 I think he said it, but I never had any great confidence that he read it. I attributed it simply to what I said, the fact that his brother was dead and what the hell difference did it make apart from that fact. Mr, Klein. Do you have any knowledge as to whether Bobby Kennedy had any inkling about the CIA's Castro plots? Mr. Katzenbach, I do not know, Independently, I have no knowledge at all of that other than what is obvious and that is that after the Bay of Pigs fiasco he got heavily involved in the Cuban thing, sitting on the committee with Dulles and Maxwell Taylor, if I recollect correctly, reviewing what had happened on the Bay of Pigs, He afterwards took an interest in the brigade, the Cuban prisoner exchange, that kind of thing, So, he obviously knew whatever the members of that review committee knew about the Bay of Pigs. Those were not areas that he very often shared very much with me, During those periods when he was heavily doing that, I was running the Department and when we had conversations, it was usually about my problems in running the Department, not what he was doing over in the CIA building, Mr. Klein, From what you knew about his character, his personality, was it surprising that his attitude would be that "He is dead and nothing can bring him back" or "I do not want anything to do with it," as opposed to the attorney general of 737 Si of the United States, "I will turn over every stone to make sure if anybody else was involved they are brought to justice?" Mr. Katzenbach. No, his attitude was exactly what I would have expected his attitude to be, Mr. Klein, That is all I have, Mr. Cornwell. To be sure you are focusing on that last ques- tion that was asked, was anything ever said, again looking back -- I know at the time it did not hit you this way -- by Bobby Kennedy that indicated he felt any personal responsibility for the assassi nation, that he had known something or possessed some information that if he had acted differently on the basis of it, could have averted the assassination? agai the possibility, among others, that he had knowledge of the plots and after the assassination occurred he felt that his knowledge of that he should have used differently? Mr, Katzenbach, There was nothing he ever said to me on that subject that would have led me to believe that was of any concern whatsoever to him, He found parts of it distasteful, maybe what Jackie did, I do not know, the whole autopsy business, revealing all that medical information he just found extremely distasteful, I would say I would have also under erie same circumstances, With respect to that kind of matter, he would ask, "Is it neces- sary?" and I would say, " es, it is. You know, we do not have to 24 circulate those pictures around to everybody. Competent people 25 have to look at them and examine them," and so forth, and he would 738 58 accept that. Those are the only areas that I ever recall even talking to him about with respect to the assassination, I never saw anything that indicated he felt any responsibilit at all for what had occurred, Mr, McDonald, Mr, Katzenbach, your testimony here and the record of the Warren Commission and just history reflect there was great concern to allay public fear of a conspiracy, and the Bureau within weeks after the assassination, Mr, Hoover apparently within a few days, concluded that in his estimation, Oswald acted 10 alone and then the public report came out a few weeks later, 11 In light of that, I am going to show you a memo dated June 3rd, 1960. It is an FBI memo from J, Edgar Hoover to the Office of Security, Department of State, The subject of the memo -- agai this is 1960 -- is "Lee Harvey Oswald, Internal Security." The memo is regarding Oswald's trip to Russia and the whole matter of his passport, and then Hoover's memo and it is interesting because it is a memo from Hoover, The Xerox copy indicates J, Edgar Hoover in the last para- graph saying: "There is a possibility that an imposter is using Oswald's birth certificate, Any current information the Departmen of State may have concerning subject will be appreciated," It is an interesting memo dated almost three and a half years prior to the assassination. First of all, were you ever aware of that memo? Mr, Katzenbach., No, 739 59 Mr, McDonald, If you had been aware of that memo and the attachments, at the time of the assassination, what would your reaction have been to that kind of information, the fact that the Bureau had a case file on him, an internal security file vis-a-vis the possibility of foreign involvement, foreign conspiracy? Would that have changed your outlook in the early days after the assassi nation and your outlook as to what occurred subsequently? Mr. Katzenbach, You mean if I had been aware of this kind of memo I would have wanted to know what the follow up was, was there an imposter? Mr. McDonald, Yes, Mr. Katzenbach, Was this Lee Harvey Oswald? That kind of question? Apart from that, I would not have been the slightest bit surprised if they had the file, In fact, I probably knew they had a file on Lee Harvey Oswald because if there had not been a file on him, there would not have been a question of whether he should have been on the security, what do you call it, potential assassins' list, I would have just wanted to know more detail about this if I had known this. Perhaps I am repeating myself, but everybody appeared to believe that Lee Harvey Oswald had acted alone fairly early. There were rumors of conspiracy. Now, either Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone or he was part of a conspiracy, one of the two, 24 or somebody paid him, That is what I mean by conspiracy, somebody 25 else was involved, 740 60 If he acted alone and if that was in fact true, then the prob lem you had was how do you allay all the rumors of conspiracy, If he, in fact, was part of a conspiracy you damned well wanted to know what the conspiracy was, who was involved in it and that would have given you another set of problems. The problem that I focused on for the most part was the former one because they kept saying he acted alone, How do you explain? You have to put all of this out with all your explanations because you have all of these associations and all of that is said, you put out all the facts, why you come to that conclusion. I say this because the conclusion would have been a tremendously important conclusion to know, If some foreign government was behind this, that may have presented major problems, It was of major importance to know that I want to emphasize that both sides had a different set of prob- lems, If there was a conspiracy, the problem was not rumors of conspiracy, The problem was conspiracy, If there was not con- spiracy, the problem was rumors, Everything had to be gone into, If another president, God forbid, ever gets assassinated we will face the same problems and not all the facts will ever come out. I think it is almost hopeless, It is an objective, but it is almost hopeless. Fifteen years from now, 25 years from now, somebody will dig through all of this and come out with a new book Mr. McDonald. If there was a conspiracy and Hoover apparentl within a few days was satisfied in his mind that Oswald had acted 741 61 alone, and it has been speculated that that would have been a fact even though Hoover had not officially concluded that inform- ally in the Bureau, if the old man said this, do you think that would have colored the way the Bureau subsequently investigated, if they really were not looking for a conspiracy, but were trying to bolster the conclusion? Mr. Katzenbach, I do not know, That is difficult to specu- late about. It would seem to me in any event they would have had to have done what I was asking them to do and that is follow down everything because if you are persuaded that there is no conspir- acy and you believe that to be correct and that is the conclusion you want to publicly come out with, you are going to have to follow down everything that anybody who believes that there might have been a conspiracy is going to suggest establishes the possi- bility of a conspiracy. I do not know whether I have phrased that in a way that you have asked it. It may be just proving a negative, if you are in fact right, but you had better do it and you had better follow that I cannot say if you did that and it turned out that this was some- thing more and something more and something more, why you would not change your mind about it or begin to wonder, So, even if you went into it with a bias of the kind you described, I would think that your investigation itself would 24 begin to create problems. I continue to this day to have a high 25 regard for FBI agents and for their ability to uncover facts, 41-372 O- 79 - 47(Vol. 3) 742 62 Mr. Cornwell, If I could hopefully summarize your testimony in order to ask you one final question -- if I misstate your views I am sure you will let me know -- but as I understand, basically what you have told us is that when confronted with the enormous problem that the Department, the FBI, and all the leadership of our country faced in the days right after the assassination, you perceived that one of the most pressing problems was Johnson's ability to take over the government and to be able to operate, particularly in the international field, without suspicion and that perhaps the two principal mechanisms that you suggested or were in favor of to accomplish that were an independent commission to supervise the FBI's reports or suggest any additional investi- g ation coupled with limited press releases stating that the investigation which had been conducted disclosed no conspiracy. Is that correct? Mr. Katzenbach., Yes, but the investigation was continuing, There was no evidence of the conspiracy at the fine’ Mr. Cornwell. Right, In addition, I believe you stated to us -- these are not the words you used, but I gather the gist of what you were saying is that you did obviously have to pay potentially some price for the suggestion that an early press release go out, the price being that at least it was possible that that would tend to distort the Bureau's investigation, It would tend to lock them into the early investigation results, but you had to be told the results of the investigation 743 =~, 63 and the facts suggested no conspiracy and, therefore, that seemed to be the best of the alternatives available to you, Is that essentially correct? Mr. Katzenbach, I think that is correct. You left out one thing in terms of what was important. That was an important con- sideration, what you described. I think an equally important con- sideration was that the American people had a right to know, when their President is killed,everything about it, Mr, Cornwell, Of course, I take it that the urgency of their need to know might be somewhat less? Mr. Katzenbach, That is correct, Mr. Cornwell. They would have had absolute right to know ultimately at some point in time, Mr. Katzenbach, Yes, I wanted to couple that press release you talked about with the statement that "We will make all the facts available at the conclusion of our investigation," Mr. Cornwell, Right, Mr, Katzenbach, I wanted both, Mr, Cornwell. JI understand, At least, there was an element of hard decision in there from your point of view because if you pushed for some press release you made some sacrifice in exchange, Mr, Katzenbach, Yes, I think I was pushing largely because the State Department was pushing me, Mr. Cornwell, I understand. That brings me to the question, if you had known at that point in time what you now know or have 744 64 reason to believe, based on the Senate report and other sources of information, that there were plots directed at Castro, that Hoover in fact was worried about internal repercussions, if the Jenkins memo is correct, that the FBI at least in one small segment had destroyed a piece of evidence indicating on its face, maybe not in reality but at least on its face, the possibility of some association between the FBI and Oswald -- there is, incidentally we did not show you, a CIA memo which indicates that they had contemplated using Oswald as an agent -- if you had known those types me things, been told them within a day or two of the assassi nation, would you have opted for the early press release, early FBI report, that you had suggested? Mr. Katzenbach, I do not think under those circumstances you could have. I think you would have had to say there is more here to sort out than we are now able to sort out. If I had known about those things, I would have said, "How are we going to cope with all this? We had better wait," I might add to that something that I suppose is obvious, that those rea- sons were never given to me as reasons not to do this, In fact, no reasons were ever given to me other than "The investigation is not completed, We do not want to make a state- ment." Mr. Cornwell, Taking that idea one step further, let me ask you in light of the revelations that we just talked about, which have come out in the years since 1963, do you feel confident with 745 65 1] the Warren Commission's conclusions today? 7 Mr. Katzenbach, I think the Watoan Commission's conclusions 3 | are probably right. There are obviously some things that should 4 have been checked at that time and it may be more difficult to 5 | check on now. It always seems to me inherently improbable that 6 | Oswald was acting as part of a conspiracy, Mainly because of the 7 || number of footprints, 8 It seems to me if the Russians were prepared to do this kind 9 | of thing to an American president, which is an extremely volatile 10 | potentially explosive kind of thing to do, talking about the 11 | Russians, you know, it could lead to war, it could lead to almost 12 janything. 13 If they were prepared to do that, which seemed to me improb- 14 | able, they surely would be prepared to do it with somebody else 15 | with less footprints around than Lee Harvey Oswald, 16 I think in general I would feel the same way about the Cubans 17 ||but with less confidence because I do not think that Fidel Castro | 18 ||has quite the rationality of the leading Russian politicians. | 19 | That still seems to me to be the fact, that I really think putting 20 ||the Russians into it is virtually incredible, 21 Even with the Cubans, one would think that you would not have 22 | had somebody who was a member of the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee, 23 | had all of those obviously traceable associations back to Cuba, i] 24 ||and as unstable as Oswald appears to have been, to be your assassin ! 25 | Nor do I think that in a well-thought out assassination scheme you 746 66 would have done something so inherently chancey as the assassi- nation of President Kennedy, By that I mean you would have been more sure to get your target than Lee Harvey Oswald could conceivably have been in that situation. That is a long answer, I am inclined to think that the conclusion of the Warren Commission is probably correct, Mr, Cornwell. We supplied you, of course, with a number of pieces of documentation for background in order mainly to refresh your memory before we asked you questions, Is there any subject shbesrenhsut theinvestigation as it was conducted or anything that has come to your attention since that you wish to offer to us or could offer to us for consideration, anything outside of the paperwork or the questions that we have asked you? Mr. Katzenbach, I really cannot think of anything, I think we have covered it. Mr. Cornwell, We certainly appreciate your taking the time to talk to us, I guess there are no further questions, I think for the record, we will incorporate into it both the specific memos we asked you about and those we sent to you to refresh your memory in advance. Mr. Katzenbach, Fine, (Whereupon at 12:25 p.m, the taking of the deposition was concluded. ) ends vma 24 25 TAT 67 CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC I, Albert Joseph LaFrance, the officer before whom the fore- going deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by me in shorthand to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction, that said deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to 10 the Béeion in which this deposition was taken; and further that 11 I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employe by the parties thereto, or financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action, = *'} a = oA j bite fee 7 -, « Af farang ious Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia My commission expires November 14, 1980. 24 25 748 68 I have read the foregoing pages one through sixty-six, inclusive, which contain a correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded, Signature is subject to corrections, {[S/Nicholas Katzenbach I, /S/Flora A. Marchigiani_, Notary Public in and for the County of Westchester, State of New York, do hereby certify that I am notarizing and witnessing signature for the deposition of Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach on this 15th day of February 1979 - /S/Flora A. Marchigiani Notary Public in and for the County of Westchester State of New York My commission expires March 30, 1980 24 25 749 On September 25, 1978, Mr. Katzenbach mailed to the committee the following letter supplementing his testimony: Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Old Orchard Road, Armonk, New York 10504 September 25, 1978 The Honorable Louis Stokes Select Committee on Assassinations "Wihwue U.S. House of Representatives ~ 331 House Office Building, Annex 2 Washington, D. C. 20515 Dear Mr. Chairman: In my testimony before the Committee on Thursday, September 21, I stated that I had absolutely no recollection of meeting with Mr. Helms with respect to the Nosenko case. I understand that Mr. Helms said there was such a meeting, and it took place on April 2, 1964. On my return to my office this morning I checked on the notes of meetings which were kept by my secretary, and they confirm Mr. Helms' recollection. I am attaching a copy of the relevant page of the calendar. Although it is clear from this page that there was such a meeting, I continue to have absolutely no recollection of it, and there- fore cannot tell you what was discussed beyond what is stated in the calendar itself. It was not my custom to make notes on such meetings, and I doubt that there are in the files of the Department any notes made by me. However it is possible that Mr. Yeagley or Mr. Foley made such notes. I believe Mr. Foley is now deceased, but Mr. Yeagley is now a judge in the District of Columbia, and perhaps he would have some recollection of the meeting. I had, prior to my testimony, checked my calendar diary for the period dealing with the assassination and the creation of the Warren Commission, but had not thought it relevant to the Committee's investi- gation to go as far as April. Hence I was unaware of this entry. While 750 this calendar does not refresh my recollection and therefore would not change my testimony, it did seem to me that in fairness to both the Committee and Mr. Helms I should make it available to you. Respectfully yours, Joly BS Woyhak gee Mr. Gary Cornwell Hon. Richard C. Helms Edward Bennett Williams, Esq. 751 Thursday, Aoril 2, 1964 larOlLG kKels Bes oe cai Sol Lindenbaum pes ehzeae Be her Joseph Dolan. ) Rights S35) cas ts David Tilvaroff Ne ei oietho ed y ee John Douglas (?) th Soe reine Jack Rosenthal ) Disougcdell« Burke Marshall ) S13 Sadi. he David Filvaroff Pye5 Sea. os William Foley ES ate IPs William Orrick SUA aea Marshal McShane ae Hl Ogi David Filvaroff CeAUG ey dJilliam Ceoghegan Pros Hy pon Bares Edger Cahn, 0.L.C. Sees ea Eis Burke Marshall a So) Coa ke Burke Marsnall. e077 pin. [Lawrence immston, CIA 4:08 p.m. {kichare iielms, CIA H:08 p.m. [David Murphy, Cis “4:08 p.m. til deiter Yeasgley BO Oe ait. Tjueeeemeroley, Crim. Div. sO. De patte [Defector Case] AddressecG Brandeis Univ. 4:40 p.m. Stucents (40) in AG's office Sol Lindenbaum GS ails John Douglas 6156 Osis “william Orrick pre basins David Tilvaroff Tents Cie Joseph Dolan fatesRT Prveev Aprt) 3, 1964 Jonn Dultiner (unite motor) Goalie Sol Lindenbaum ) 9:30 a.m. Harold Reis. peesRSyea Wart) arSEAe ri David Filvaroff ) Rights Ge 30D Gaels Burke Marshall briefing ©9330 "acm Jack Rosenthal ye G30 mals Joseph Dolan ) 9: 30a ie. NdeBK to Puerto Rico LO Soto che MN _ ata, ee veel, 7 — he ag oa > an | os ) Yi, a 4 - : # ’ : ee 7 ; ps ip Thy phe ates : : " u Ti ny 5. re ay rex ets. Ly = sls he thls gage iF anes tt re en it in fe rier chery Poy seating, a % * oe hi : ° conExper wack Ma asec gt . poulays ol oh in@ e€:e nani leixd c tiotsv. KAS cece Reape Orgy gers 2sijtx WAZ Meh CLsel S, dine WAS viteh CESC cA} t AS site e2silf Dk viAe «(2G TEe-SL bhAd am. O2:f tAe 202.0 TE: wAg sme? OLck Viorwsvisti C yer. Vary Coroe ers»£ sy sigo08D a . am. 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