MMMMMMMl mmmfamemtmum Government Documents GOVERrMMEMT DOCUMENTS DEPARTMEjs^T BOSTON PUBLIC UBRARY , iOVERNMEiT DOCUMENTS DEPARTMENT BOSTON PUSIIC LIBRARY \ P0 tM C't r: \ 5 %. / /-K-^' ,a Union Calendar No. 962 95th Congress, 2d Session House Report No. 95-1828 QOVERWDEP MbNART I MEN DOCTUMENT^ BOSTON PUBUC UBRARY FINAL REPORT ^ OP THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS January 2, 1979. — Committed to tlie Committee of tlie AVhole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1070 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS LOUIS STOKES, Ohio, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio WALTER E. FAUNTROY, STEWART B. MrKINNEY. Connecticut District of Columbia CHARLES THONE, Nebraska YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, HAROLD S. SAWYER, Michigan California CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut HAROLD E. FORD. Tennessee FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana ROBERT W. EDGAR, Pennsylvania Siiheommittce on the Suln'ommitlee on the Axxfissination of Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. ■John F. Kennedy \VALTI:R E. FAUNTROY, chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, Chairman HAROLD E. FORD YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE FLOYD J. FITHIAN CHRISTOPHER J. DODD ROBERT W. EDGAR CHARLES THONE STEWART B. McKINNEY HAROLD S. SAWYER LOUIS STOKES, ex officio LOUIS STOKES, ex officio SAMUEL L. DEVINE. ex offiiclo SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio G. Robert Blaket, Chief Counsel and Director H.R. 1828 :OraNME:.T DOCUMENT S DEPARTMENT BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRAR Y LETTER OF SUBMITTAL U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations, Washington^ D.G.^ December 29, 1978. Hon. Edmund L. Henshaw, Jr., GJerk of the House, U.S. Capitol, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. Henshaw : On behalf of the Select Committee on Assas- sinations, and pui'suant to the mandate of House Resolutions 222 and 433, I am filing- for presentation to the House of Representatives the enclosed Summary of Findings and Recommendations of the Select Committee on Assassinations. As has been agreed upon with the Speaker of the House, the Com- mittee isfiling this Smnmary of Findings and Reconnnendations while the preparation of the complete volumes of its Final Report continues under your auspices. The complete Final Report will include Volume I, the Findings and Recommendations of the Select Couimittee witli an analysis of the evidence concerning each finding and reccmimendation ; and Volumes II and sequential volumes, which will contain the Com- mittee's hearings, scientific reports, and other materials pertinent to the Committee's investigation. These volumes will be presented to the House as soon as they can be suitably prepared for publication, includ- ing, where appropriate, the declassification of classified infoimation. It is anticipated that the entire Final Report will be published by March 30, 1979. Sincerely, (HI) Louis Stokes, Chairman. H.R. 1S28 5^^'^''-^ A.noG Ti:^«\'^" GOVERNMENT DOCU DEPARTMENT MENTS BOSTON PUBLIC LIB RARY CONTENTS I. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations in the assassina- ^aee tion of President John F. Kennedy 3 11. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations in the assassina- tion of Dr. Marthin Luther King, Jr 5 III. Recommendations of the Select Committee on Assassinations 6 Union Calendar No. 962 95th Congress ) HOUSE OP REPKESENTATIVES ( Keport M Session ] t No. 95-1828 REPOET OF ACTIVITIES— SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS January 2, 1979.— Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed Mr. Stokes, from the Select Committee on Assassinations, submitted the following REPORT H.R. 182S I. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations in the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas, Tex., November 22, 1963 A. Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots at President John F. Ken- nedy. The second and third shots tired struck the President. The third shot lie fired killed the President. 1. President Kennedy was struck by two rifle shots fired from behind him. 2. The shots that struck President Kennedy from behind hhn were fired from the sixth floor window of the southeast corner of the Texas School Book Depository building. 3. Lee Harvey Oswald owned the rifle that was used to fire the shots from the sixth fioor window of the southeast corner of the Texas School Book Depository building. 4. Lee Harvey Oswald, shortly before the assassination, had excess to and was present on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository building. 5. Lee Harvey Oswald's other actions tend to support the con- clusion that he assassinated President Kemiedy. B. Scientific acoustical evidence establishes a high probability that two gmimen fired at President J ohn F. Kennedy. Other scientific evi- dence does not preclude the possibility of two gunmen firing at the President. Scientific evidence negates some specific conspiracy allega- tions. C. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that President Jolin F. Kennedy was probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy. The committee is unable to identify the other gumnan or the extent of the conspiracy. 1. The coumiittee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that the Soviet Government was not involved in the assassina- tion of President Kemiedy. 2. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that the Cuban Government was not involved in the assas- sination ofPresident Kemiedy. 3. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that anti-Castro Cuban groups, as groups, were not involved in the assassination of President Kemiedy, but that the available evidence does not preclude the possibility that individual members may have been involved. 4. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that the national syndicate of organized crime, as a group, was not involved in the assassination of President Kemiedy, but that the available evidence does not preclude the possibility that individual members may have been involved. 5. The Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Central Intelligence Agency, were not involved in the assassina- tion of President Kennedy. (3) H.K. 1S2S D. Agencies and departments of the U.S. Govonnnent performed with varying degrees of competency in the fultilhiient of tlieir duties. President John F. Kennedy did not receive adequate protection. A thorough and reliable investigation into the responsibility of Lee Harvey Oswald for the assassination of President John F. Kennedy was conducted. The investigation into the possibilit}' of conspiracy in the assassination was inadequate. The conclusions of the investiga- tions were arrived at in good faith, but presented in a fashion that was too definitive. 1. The Secret Service was deficient in the performance of its duties. (a) The Secret Service possessed information that was not properly analyzed, investigated or used by the Secret Serv- ice in connection with the President's trip to Dallas; in ad- dition. Secret Service agents in the motorcade were inade- quately prepared to protect the President from a sniper. (b) The responsibility of the Secret Service to investigate the assassination was terminated when tlie Federal Bureau of Investigation assumed primarv investigative responsibil- 2. The Department of Justice failed ity- .* to exercise initiative in supervising and directing the investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the assassination. 3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation performed Avith vary- ing degrees of competency in the fulfillment of its duties. (a) The Federal Bureau of Investigation adecpiately in- vestigated Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination and i:)roperly evaluated the evidence it possessed to assess his po- tential to endanger the public safety in a national emergency. (h) The Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted a thorough and professional investigation into the responsi- bility of Lee Harvey Oswald for the assassination. (c) The Federal Bureau of Investigation failed to investi- gate adequatel}' the possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President. (rl) Tlie Federal Bureau of Investigation was deficient in its sharing of iirformation with other agencies and depart- ments. 4. The Central Intelligence Agency was deficient in its collec- tion and sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the assassination. 5. The "Warren competency in the Commission fulfillment ofperformed its duties. with varying degrees of (o) The Warren Conmiission conducted n thorough and professional investigation into the responsibility of Lee Har- vey Oswald for the assassination. (h) The Warren Commission failed to investigate ade- f|uately the possibility of a cons])iracy to assassinate the Pi-esident. This deficiency was atti'ibutable in part to the failure of the Commission to receive all the relevant informa- tion that was in the possession of other agencies and depart- ments of the Government. (c) The Warreiit Commission arrived at its conclusions, based, on the evidence available to it, in good faith. {(l) The AVarren Commission presented the conclusions in its report in a fashion that was too definitive. 11. Findings of tile Select CoMMrrxEE on Assassinations in the Assassination of Dk. Maktin Luthek King, Jr., in Memphis, Tenn., April 4, 1968 A. James Earl Kay hied one shot at Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The shot killed Dr. King. 1. Dr. Kmg was killed by one rifle shot hred from in front of him, '1. The shot that killed Dr. King was hred from the bathroom window at the rear of a rooming house at 4221^ South Main Street, Memphis, Tenn. 0. Jaines Earl liay purchased the rifle that was used to shoot Dr. King and transported it from Birmingham, Ala. to Memphis, Tenn., where he rented a room at 4221/2 South Main Street and moments after the assassination, he dropped it near 424 South Main Street. 4. It IS highly probable that James Earl Ray stalked Dr. King for a period inmiediately preceding the assassination. 5. James Earl Ray fled the scene of the crime immediately after the assassination. 6. James Earl Ray's alibi for the time of the assassination, his story of "Raoul", and other allegedly exculpatory evidence are not worthy of belief. 7. James Earl Ray knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pleaded guilty to the hrst degree murder of Dr. King. B. The committee believes, on the basis of the circumstantial evi- dence available to it, that there is a likelihood that James Earl Ray assassinated Dr. Martin Luther King as a result of a conspiracy. C. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that no private organizations or individuals, other than those dis- cussed under section B, were involved in the assassination of Dr. King. D. No Federal, State or local go\ I'lnment agency was involved in the assassination of Dr. King. E. The Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion performed with varying degrees of competency and legality in the fulfillment of their duties. 1. The Department of Justice failed to supervise adequately the Domestic Intelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation. In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in the Domestic Intelligence Division's COINTELPRO campaign against Dr. King, grossly abused and exceeded its legal authority and failed to consider the possibility that actions threatening bodily harm to Dr. King might be encouraged by the program. 2. The Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion performed a thorough investigation into the responsibility of James Earl Ray for the assassination of Dr. King, and conducted a thorough fugitive investigation, but failed to investigate ade- quatel}' the possibility of conspiracy in the assassination. The Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation manifested a lack of concern for constitutional rights in the manner in which it conducted parts of the investigation. III. KeCOMMEXDATIOXS of the tJELECT CuMMITTEE OX ASSASSINATIONS /. Ltyislatlve RtcohWiendatio}\s on Issiua Incolviny the Fiohlbitlon^ fi't^ventloii and Fiosecution oj Assassinations and Federally Coy- nizablt Homicides A. Prohibition and prevention — 1. The Judiciary Committee should piocess for early considera- tion by tlie House legislation that would make the assassination of a Chief of fcjtate ot any country, or his political equivalent, a Federal otiense. ii the oltender is an American citizen or acts on behalf of an American citizen, or if the ohender can be located m the United btates. 2. The Judiciary Committee should process for early consider- ation by the House coinpreheiisive legislation that would codify, revise and reform the jc'ederal law of homicide, paying special attention to assassinations. The Judiciary Committee should give appropriate attention to the related olienses of conspiracy, at- tempt, assault and kidnapping in the context of assassinations. ;Sucii legislation should be processed independently of the general proposals for the codiiication, revision or reform of the J^ederal criminal in law. 'liie considering comnntLee : should address the following issues tlie legislation (a) Distinguishing between those persons who should re- ceive the protection of Federal law because of the olHcial posi- tions they occupy and those persons who should receive protection of Federal law only in the performance of their official duties, {b) l^xtending the protection of Federal law to persons who occupy high judicial and executive positions, including J ustices ol the fciupreme Court and Cabinet officers, (6) The applicability of these laws to pri\ate individuals in ihe exeieir^e of constitutional rights, {d) The penalty to be provided for homicide and the re- lated oiiense^, inciudJug tne applicability and the consititu- tionality of the death penalty, (e) The basis for the exercise of Federal jurisdiction, in- cluding domestic and extraterritorial reach, (/) The preemption of State jurisdiction without the neces- sity of any action on the part of the Attorney General where the Pi-esident is assassinated, {y) The circumstances under which federal jurisdiction should preempt State jurisdiction in other cases, {h) The powei- of Federal investigative agencies to require autopsies to be performed, {i) The al)ility of Federal investigative agencies to secure tlie assistance of other Federal or State agencies, including the military, oilier laws notwithstanding, (j) The petratorsauthority ofthe crime,to oii'er rewards to apprehend the per- {k) A requirenieiit of forfeiture of the insti-umentalities of the crime, (l) Tlie condemnation of personal or other elfects of his- torical interest, (vi) The advisability of providing, consistent with the first amendment, legal trust devices to hold for the benefit of victims, their families, or the General Treasury, the profits realized from books, movie rights, or public appearances by the perpetrator of the crime, and (/() Ihe applicability of threat and physical zone of pro- tection legislation to persons under the physical protection of Federal investigative or law enforcement agencies. 3. The appropriate conunittees of the House should process for early consideration by the House charter legislation for the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The conunittees should address the following issues in considering the charter legislation : [a) The proper foreign and domestic intelligence functions of the intelligence and investigative agencies of the United States, (5) The relationship between the domestic intelligence functions and the interference with the exercise of individual constitutional rights, (c) The delineation of proper law enforcement functions and techniques including: (i) the use of informants and elec- tronic surveillance, (ii) guidelines to circumscribe the use of informants or electronic surveillance to gather intelligence on, or investigate, groups that may be exercising first amendment freedoms, and (iii) the proper response of intelligence or in- vestigative agencies w^iere information is developed that an informant has committed a crime, (d) Guidelines to consider the circumstances, if any, when an investigative agency or a component of that agency should be dis(|ualified from taking an active role in an investigation because of an appearance of impropriety growing out of a particular intelligence or investigative action, (e) Definitions of the legislative scope and extent of "sources and methods" and the "informant privilege" as a rationale for the executive branch withholding information in response to congressional or judicial process or other demand for information, (/) Institutionalizing efforts to coordinate the gathering, sharing, and analysis of intelliiience information, (f/) Insuring those agencies that primarily gather intel- ligence perform their function so as to serve the needs of other agencies that primarily engage in physical protection, and (/() Implementing mechanisms that Avould permit inter- agency tasking of particular functions. B. Prosecution— 1. The Judiciary Gommittee should consider the impact of the provisions of law dealing with third-party records, bail and speedy 8 trial les of acoustics to forensic questions, using the materials available in the as- sas ination ofPresident John F. Kennedy as a case study, C. The Department of Justice should review the committee's findings and repoit in the assassinations of President John F, Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr„ and after completion of the recommended investigation enumerated in sections A and B, analyze whether further ofticiaf investigation is warranted in either case. The Department of Justice should report its analysis to the Judiciary Committee. o Union Calendar No. 962 95th Congress, 2d Session House Report No. 95-1828, Part 2 REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS March 29, 1979.— Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1979 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 Steele No. 052-071-00590-1 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS LOUIS STOKES, Ohio, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER. North Carolina SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio WALTER E. FAUNTROY, STEWART B. McKINNEY, Connecticut District of Columbia CHARLES THONE, Nebraska YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, HAROLD S. SAWYER, Michigan California CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut HAROLD FORD, Tennessee FLOYD J. FITHIAN. Indiana ROBERT W. EDGAR, Pennsylvania Bubcommittee on the Subcommittee on the Aaaaaainatlon of Aa8a88ination of Martin Luther King, Jr. John F. Kennedy WALTER E. FAUNTROY, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, Chairman HAROLD E. FORD YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE FLOYD J. FITHIAN CHRISTOPHER J. DODD ROBERT W. EDGAR CHARLES THONE STEWART B. McKINNEY HAROLD S. SAWYER LOUIS STOKES, ex ofBclo LOUIS STOKES, ex officio SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio Staff O. Robert Blakbt, Chief Counsel and Staff Director Gary T. Cornwbll, Deputy Chief Counsel Peter G. Bbeson, Aggistant Deputy Chief Counsel iU) LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations, Washington, B.C., March W, 1979. Hon. Edmund L. Henshaw, Jr., Clerk of the House., U.S. Capitol, Washington, B.C. Dear Mr. Henshaw : On behalf of the Select Committee on Assas- bjnations, and pursuant to the mandate of House Resolutions 222 and 438, 95th Congress, and House Resolution 49, 96th Congress, I am hling for presentation to the House of Representatives the enclosed Final Report with Additional and Dissenting Views of the Committee. This supplements the Summary of Findings and Recommendations filed on January 2, 1979 (H.R. Rept. No. 95-1828, 95th Congress, 2d session (1979)). Sincerely, Louis Stokes, Chairman. (in) "Page CONTENTS Summary of findings and recommendations 1 Introduction 9 History of the committee 9 Nature and scope of the investigation 10 Structure of the investigation 18 I. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations in the assassina- tion of President John F. Kennedy 21 Introduction: The Kennedy Presidency in perspective 21 Presidential assassinations in the United States 21 A new President 24 Foreign affairs: A fragile peace 25 The Cuban threat 25 Combatting Communism in Latin America 27 The arms race - 27 The missile crisis 27 Southeast Asia 28 Pledge to defend Europe 28 Cold war thaw 29 Growing involvement in Vietnam 29 Detente 30 At home: A troubled land 30 Civil rights progress 30 Economic policies 32 Government reform 33 War on organized crime 33 Opposition from the far right 34 November 1963: A trip to Texas 35 A. Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots at President John F. Kennedy. The second and third shots he fired struck the President. The third shot he fired killed the President 41 1. President Kennedy was struck by two rifle shots fired from behind him 41 (a) Reliance on scientific analysis 42 (1) The medical evidence 42 (2) Reaction times and aUnement 44 (3) Neutron activation analysis 45 (4) Photographic evidence 45 (5) Acoustical evidence and blur anal- ysis 46 2. The shots that struck President Kennedy from behind were fired from the sixth floor window of the south- east corner of the Texas School Book Depository building 47 (a) Scientific analysis 47 (1) Trajectory analysis 48 (2) Photographic evidence 49 (b) Witness testimony 49 (c) Firearms evidence 50 (d) Summary of the evidence 51 3. Lee Harvey Oswald owned the rifle that was used to fire the shots from the sixth floor window of the southeast corner of the Texas School Book Deposi- tory building 52 (a) Biography of Lee Harvey Oswald 52 (b) The committee's approach 54 (1) Handwriting analysis 54 (2) The backyard photographs 54 (V) VI Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations — Continued A. Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots — Continued 4. Lee Harvey Oswald, shortly before the assassination, had access to and was present on the sixth floor of P»w the Texas School Book Depository building 56 (a) Testimony of book depository employees 57 (b) Physical evidence of Oswald's presence 57 (c) Oswald's whereabouts 57 (1) Lovelady or Oswald? 58 (2) Witness testimony 58 5. Lee Harvey Oswald's other actions tend to support the conclusion that he assassinated President Kennedy. 59 (a) The Tippit murder 59 (b) Oswald: A capacity for violence? 60 (c) The motive 61 B. Scientific acoustical evidence establishes a high probability that two gunmen fired at President John F. Kennedy. Other scientific evidence does not preclude the possibility of two gunmen firing at the President. Scientific evidence negates some specific conspiracy allegations 65 (a) Warren Commission analysis of a tape 65 (b) Dallas Police Department recordings 66 (1) Analysis by Bolt Beranek and Newman 66 (2) Weiss- Aschkenasy analysis 72 (3) Search for a motorcycle 75 (c) Other evidence with respect to the shots 79 (d) Witness testimony on the shots 87 (1) Analysis of the reliability of witness testi- mony 90 (e) Certain conspiracy allegations 91 (f) Summary of the evidence 93 C. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence avail- able to it, that President John F. Kennedy was probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy. The committee was unable to identify the other gunmen or the extent of the conspiracy 95 1. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that the Soviet Government was not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy 99 (a) United States-Soviet relations 99 (b) The Warren Commission investigation 99 (c) The (1) committee's investigation Oswald in the U.S. S.R 99 100 (2) Treatment of defectors by the Soviet Government 100 (3) Yuri Nosenko 101 (4) Opinions of other defectors 102 (5) Marina Oswald 102 (6) Response of the Soviet Govern- ment 103 (d) Summary of the evidence 103 2. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence 103 available to it, that the Cuban Government was not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy 103 (a) United States-Cuban relations 104 (1) Bay of Pigs 105 (2) Cuban missile crisis 105 (b) Earlier investigations of Cuban complicity... 106 (1) The Warren Commission investi- gation 107 (2) The U.S. Senate investigation 107 (3) The CIA's response to the Senate.. _ 108 vn I. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations — Continued C. The committee — Continued 2. The committee — Continued (c) The forcecommittee's report analysis of the CIA task "P^se 109 (1) AMLASH 111 (2) CIA-Mafia plots 114 (3) Summary of the evidence 117 (d) Cubana Airlines flight allegation 117 (e) Gilberto Policarpo Lopez allegation 118 (f) Other allegations.. 121 (g) The committee's trip to Cuba 126 (h) Deficiencies of the 1963-64 investigation 127 (i) Summary of the findings 129 3. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that anti-Castro Cuban groups, as groups, were not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy, but that the available evidence does not preclude the possibility that individual members may have been involved 129 (a) The anti-Castro Cuban perspective 130 (1) The missile crisis and its aftermath- 132 (2) Attitude of anti-Castro Cubans to- ward Kennedy 132 (b) The committee investigation 133 (1) Homer S. Echevarria 133 (2) Antonio Veciana Blanch 135 (3) Silvia Odio 137 (c) Oswald and anti-Castro Cubans 139 (1) Oswald in New Orleans 140 (2) Oswald in CUnton, La 142 (3) David Ferrie 143 (4) 544 Camp Street 143 (5) A committee analysis of Oswald in New Orleans 145 (6) Summary of the evidence 146 4. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that the national syndicate of orga- nized crime, as a group, was not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy, but that the available evidence does not preclude the possibility that individual members may have been involved.. 147 (a) The Warren Commission investigation 148 (b) The committee investigation 149 (1) Ruby and organized crime 149 (2) Ruby and the Dallas Police De- partment 156 (3) Other evidence relating to Ruby 158 (4) Involvement of organized crime 159 (5) Analysis of the 1963-64 investiga- tion 168 (6) Carlos MarceUo 169 (7) Santos TraflScante 172 (c) Summary James (8) R. Hofi^aof the evidence and analysis 176 179 5. The Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Central Intelligence Agency were not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy 181 (a) The Secret Service 181 (1) Connally testimony 182 (2) Choice of the motorcade route 182 (3) Allegation a Secret Service agent was on the grassy knoll 183 (4) Conclusion 184 vin Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations — Continued C. The committee — Continued 5. The Secret Service, FBI— Continued Page (b) The Federal Bureau of Investigation 185 ( 1) Early rumors that Oswald was an in- formant 185 (2) Thebook Hosty entry in Oswald's address 186 (3) FBI contacts with Oswald (Fort Worth, 1962) 190 (4) FBI contacts with Oswald (New Orleans, 1963) 191 (5) FBI contacts with Oswald (Dallas, 1963) 194 (6) The destruction of Oswald's note 195 (7) Conclusion 196 (c) The Central Intelligence Agency 196 (1) CIA personnel in the Soviet Russia Division 198 (2) CIA personnel abroad 198 (3) Oswald's CIA file 200 (4) Why the delay in opening Oswald's 201 file? 200 (5) Why was he carried as Lee Henry Oswald in his 201 file? 202 (6) The meaning of "AG" under "Other identification" in Oswald's 201 file 202 (7) Why was stricted? Oswald's 201 file re- 203 (8) Were 37 documents missing from Oswald's 201 file? 203 (9) Did the CIA maintain a dual filing system on Oswald? 204 (10) Did Oswald ever participate in a CIA counterintelligence project?. 205 (11) Did the CIA ever debrief Oswald?. 207 (12) The Justice Department's failure to prosecute Oswald 209 (13) Oswald's trip to Russia via Hel- sinki and his abiUty to obtain a visa in 2 days 211 (14) Oswald's contactUnion in the Soviet with Americans 213 (15) Alleged intelligence contacts after Oswald returned from Russia 217 (16) Alleged intelligence implications of Oswald's military service 219 (17) Oswald's military intelligence file.. 221 (18) The Oswald photograph in Office of Naval Intelligence files 224 (19) Oswald in Mexico City 225 Conclusion 225 D. Agencies and departments of the U.S. Government performed with varying degrees of competency in the fulfillment of their duties. President John F. Kennedy did not receive adequate protection. A thorough and reliable investigation into the responsibility of Lee Harvey Oswald for the as- sassination was conducted. The investigation into the possibility of conspiracy in the assassination was inade- quate. The conclusions of the investigations were arrived at in good faith, but presented in a fashion that was too definitive 227 1. The Secret Service was deficient in the performance of its duties 227 I. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations — Continued D. Agencies and departments — Continued 1. The Secret Service — Continued (a) The Secret Service possessed information that was not properly analyzed, investi- gated or used by the Secret Service in con- nection with the President's trip to Dallas; in addition, Secret Service agents in the protect the were motorcade inadequately President prepared to from a sniper I*»8« 228 (1) The committee approach 228 (2) Significant threats in 1963 230 (3) Inspection of the motorcade route. _ 233 (4) Performance at the time of the assas- sination 234 (b) The responsibility of the Secret Service to investigate the assassination was termi- nated when the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation assumed primary investigative responsibility 236 2. The Department of Justice failed to exercise initia- tive in supervising and directing the investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the as- sassination 237 3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation performed with varying degrees of competency in the fulfillment of its duties 239 (a) The Federal Bureau of Investigation ade- quately investigated Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination and properly eval- uated the evidence it possessed to assess his potential to endanger the public safety in a national emergency 239 (b) The Federal Bureau of Investigation con- ducted athorough and professional investi- gation into the responsibility of Lee Harvey Oswald for the assassination 239 (c) The Federal Bureau of Investigation failed to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President. 239 (d) The Federal Bureau of Investigation was deficient in its sharing of information with other agencies and departments 239 (1) History of the FBI 239 (2) The FBI investigation 241 4. The Central Intelligence Agency was deficient in its collection and sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the assassination 246 (a) Establishment of the CIA 246 (b) Rockefeller Commission investigation of CIA activities * 248 (c) The committee investigation 248 (1) CIA preassassination performance — Oswald in Mexico City 248 (2) The CIA and the Warren Com- mission 252 (3) Post- Warren report CIA investiga- tion 255 5. The Warren Commission performed with varying degrees of competency in the fulfillment of its duties 256 (a) The Warren Commission conducted a thor- ough and professional investigation into the responsibiUty of Lee Harvey Oswald for the assassination 256 I. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations — Continued D. Agencies and departments — Continued 5. The Warren Commission — Continued (b) The Warren Commission failed to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President. This deficiency was attributable in part to the failure of the Commission to receive all the relevant information that was in the possession of other agencies and departments of the 5**^ Government 256 (c) The Warren Commission arrived at its con- clusions, based on the evidence available to it, in good faith 256 (d) The Warren Commission presented the con- clusions in its report in a fashion that was too definitive 256 II. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations in the assassina- tion of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr 263 Introduction: The civil rights movement and Dr. King 263 A history of civil rights violence 263 Equality in education — the 20th century objective 265 A new leader emerges 266 A philosophy of nonviolence 268 1960: The year of the sit-ins 268 1963: A year of triumph and despair 270 The road to Memphis 277 The last moments: Memphis, Tenn., April 4, 1968_ 282 A. James Earl Ray fired one shot at Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The shot killed Dr. King 287 (a) Biography of James Earl Ray 287 (b) The committee's investigation 288 L Dr. King was killed by one shot fired from in front of him 289 2. The shot that killed Dr. King was fired from the bath- room window at the rear of a roominghouse at 422'/^ South Main Street, Memphis, Tenn 290 3. James Earl Ray purchased the rifle that was used to shoot Dr. King and transported it from Birmingham, Ala., to Memphis, Tenn., where he rented a room at 422)4 South Main Street, and moments after the assassination, he dropped it near 424 South Main Street 293 4. It is highly probable that James Earl Ray stalked Dr. King for a period immediately preceding the assassination 296 5. James Earl Ray fled the scene of the crime immediately after the assassination 299 6. James Earl Ray's alibi for the time of the assassination, his story of "Raoul," and other allegedly exculpatory evidence are not worthy of belief 303 (a) Ray's alibi 303 (b) Ray's "Raoul" story 305 (1) Conflicting descriptions of Raoul 305 (2) Absence of witnesses to corroborate Raoul's existence 305 (c) Preassassination transactions 306 (1) The rifle purchase 307 (2) Fingerprints on the rifle 308 (3) Rental of room 5-B at Bessie Brewer's roominghouse 309 (4) The binocular purchase 310 (d) Grace Walden Stephens 310 II. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations. — Continued A. James Earl Ray fired one shot at Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., The shot killed Dr. King — Continued 7. James Earl Ray knowingly, intelligently, and volun- Dr. Martin tarily pleaded guiltyKing, Luther to the Jr first degree murder of 'P««» 315 (a) Irreconcilable conflicts of interest of Foreman and Hanes 318 (b) Foreman's failure to investigate the case 319 (c) Coercion by Foreman and the Federal Gov- ernment 321 (d) Ray's belief a new trial a guilty plea would not preclude 323 B. The committee believes, on the basis of the circumstantial evidence available to it, that there is a likelihood that James Earl Ray assassinated Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. as a result of a conspiracy 325 1. The FBI investigation 325 2. The committee investigation 326 (a) Transactional analysis 326 (b) Ray's associates examined 326 3. Investigation of Ray's motive 327 (a) Ray's racial attitudes examined 327 (b) Ego gratification as a motive 330 (c) The prospect of financial reward 331 (d) Conclusion on motive 333 4. General indications of conspiracy 333 (a) Transactions as evidence of associations 334 5. The brothers, John and Jerry Ray 336 (a) Evidence of Ray's contact with his brothers, 1967-68 337 (b) Missouri State Penitentiary escape 339 (c) The Alton bank robbery 342 (1) Bank robbery modus operandi analysis 348 (d) A brother was Raoul 350 (e) The brothers and the rifle purchase 354 (f) Motive with respect to John and Jerry Ray__ 358 6. Evidence of a conspiracy in St. Louis 359 (a) The Byers allegation 360 (b) The backgrounds of Kauffmann and Sutherland 364 (c) Connectives to James Earl Ray 366 7. Conclusion 371 C. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that no private organizations or individuals, other than those discussed under section B, were involved in the assas- sination of Dr. King 375 1. Rightwing extremist organizations 375 (a) The Minutemen 375 (b) Klan organizations 377 (c) J. B. Stoner 381 (d) William Hugh Morris 382 2. Conspiracy allegations: Memphis 383 (a) Citizen's band radio broadcast 383 (b) John McFerren 385 3. Conspiracy allegations: New Orleans 387 (a) William Sartor 387 (b) Raul Esquivel 389 (c) Reynard Rochon 390 (d) Herman Thompson 390 (e) Jules Ricco Kimble 392 (f) Randy Rosenson 393 II. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations — Continued C. The committee believes, etc. — Continued P^R^ 4. Conspiracy allegations: Atlanta 394 (a) Edna Matthews Lancaster 394 (b) Claude and Leon Powell 394 (c) Robert Byron Watson 395 5. Conspiracy allegations: Birmingham 396 (a) Morris Davis 396 (b) Walter Maddox 398 6. Conspiracy allegations: Louisville 399 (a) Clifton Baird 399 (b) Charles Lee Bell 400 7. Conspiracy allegations: St. Louis 401 (a) Delano Elmer Walker 401 8. Conspiracy allegations: Miami 402 (a) William Somersett 402 9. Conspiracy allegations: Texas 404 (a) Otis Moore 404 10. Conspiracy allegations: New York 404 (a) Myron BiUett 404 D. No Federal, State or local government agency was involved in the assassination of Dr. King 407 1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation 407 (a) The Lorraine Motel issue 409 (b) The inciting of violence by informants issue. 411 (c) The FBI foreknowledge issue 413 (d) The FBI assistance for Ray issue 414 (e) FBI surveillance files in the National Ar- chives 415 2. Memphis Police Department 416 (a) Withdrawal of the security detail 417 (b) The removal of Detective Redditt 418 (c) The transfer of two Black firemen 423 (d) The postassassination performance of the Memphis police 424 3. Missouri State Penitentiary 428 E. The. Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation performed with varying degrees of competency and legality in the fulfillment of their duties 431 1. The Department of Justice failed to supervise ade- quately the Domestic Intelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in the Domestic Intelligence Division's COINTELPRO campaign against Dr. King, grossly abused and exceeded its legal authority and failed to consider the possibility that actions threatening bodily harm to Dr. King might be encouraged by the program 431 (a) Security investigation and COINTELPRO.. 432 (1) Hoover's dislike for Dr. King 434 (2) Electronic surveillance of Dr. King.. 436 (3) Manipulation of the media 437 (4) Analysis of the impact of the FBI- inspired editorial 439 2. The Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation performed a thorough investigation into the responsibility of James Earl Ray for the assassination of Dr. King, and conducted a thorough fugitive investigation, but failed to investigate ade- quately the possibility of conspiracy in the assassi- nation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation mani- fested alack of concern for constitutional rights in the manner in which it conducted parts of the investigation 441 (a) The FBI chain of command 442 xm II. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations — (Continued E. The Department of Justice, etc. — Continued 2. The Department of Justice, etc. — Continued ^«6« (b) The fugitive investigation 443 (1) James Earl Ray identified 445 (2) Surveillance of Ray family con- sidered __ 446 (3) Ray arrested in London 449 (c) The conspiracy investigation 449 (1) The method 450 (2) The focus 453 (d) Investigative excesses 456 (e) Conclusion 459 III. Recommendations of the Select Committee on Assassinations 461 A. Legislative recommendations on issues involving the pro- hibition, prevention and prosecution of assassinations and federally cognizable homicides 464 (a) Prohibition and prevention 464 (b) Prosecution 472 B. Administrative recommendations to the executive 473 C. General recommendations for congiessional investigations 475 D . Recommendations for further investigation 480 IV. Separate Remarks, Views and Dissent of Members of the Com- mittee 483 Separate remarks of Christopher J. Dodd 483 Separate views of Samuel L. Devine and Robert W. Edgar 491 Dissent of Robert W. Edgar 494 Dissent of Harold S. Sawyer 503 Appendix I : Staff of the Select Committee on Assassinations 513 Appendix II: Consultants to the Select Committee on Assassinations 516 Appendix III: Contractors for the Select Committee on Assassinations 519 Appendix IV: Statistical data and expenditures 520 Appendix V: Affirmative action program 533 Appendix VI: Enabling resolutions .- 534 Appendix VII : Index for the investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy 573 A. Public hearings of the committee 573 B. Exhibits — John F. Kennedy pubhc hearings 574 C. Supplemental exhibits — John F. Kennedy public hearings 583 D. Appendices to the John F. Kennedy public hearings 583 Appendix VIII: Index for the investigation of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr 584 A. Pubhc hearings of the committee 584 B. Exhibits — Martin Luther King, Jr. public hearings 585 C. Appendices to the Martin Luther King, Jr. public hearings 592 Appendix IX: Index for the pubhc hearings of the Committee on Legislative and Administrative Reform 593 References for the: Introduction 595 I. Report on the investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy 597 II. Report on the investigation of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr 645 III. Recommendations of the committee 683 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations in the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas, Tex., November 22, 1963 A. Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots at President John F. Ken- nedy. The second and third shots he fired struck the President. The third shot he fired killed the President. 1. President Kennedy was struck by two rifle shots fired from behind him. 2. The shots that struck President Kennedy from behind him were fired from the sixth floor window of the southeast comer of the Texas School Book Depository building. 3. Lee Harvey Oswald owned the rifle that was used to fire the shots from the sixth floor window of the southeast comer of the Texas School Book Depository building. 4. Lee Harvey Oswald, shortly before the assassination, had access to and was present on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository building. 5. Lee Harvey Oswald's other actions tend to support the con- clusion that he assassinated President Kennedy. B. Scientific acoustical evidence establishes a high probability that two gunmen fired at President John F. Kennedy. Other scientific evidence does not preclude the possibility of two gunmen firing at the President. Scientific evidence negates some specific conspiracy allegations. C. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that President John F. Kennedy was probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy. The committee is unable to identify the other gunman or the extent of the conspiracy. 1. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence avail- able to it, that the Soviet Government was not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. 2. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence avail- able to it, that the Cuban Government was not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. 3. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence avail- able to it, that anti-Castro Cuban groups, as groups, were not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy, but that the available evidence does not preclude the possibility that individual members may have been involved. 4. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence avail- able to it, that the national syndicate of organized crime, as a group, was not involved in the assassination of President Ken- nedy, but that the available evidence does not preclude the possi- bility that individual members may have been involvec^. (1) 5. The Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency were not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. D. Agencies and departments of the U.S. Government performed with varying degrees of competency in the fulfillment of their duties. President John F. Kennedy did not receive adequate protection. A thorough and reliable investigation into the responsibility of Lee Har- vey Oswald for the assassination of President John F. Kennedy was conducted. The investigation into the possibility of conspiracy in the assassination was inadequate. The conclusions of the investigations were arrived at in good faith, but presented in a fashion that was too definitive. 1. The Secret Service was deficient in the performance of its duties. (a) The Secret Service possessed information that was not properly analyzed, investigated or used by the Secret Service in connection with the President's trip to Dallas; in addi- tion, Secret Service agents in the motorcade were inade- quately prepared to protect the President from a sniper. (h) The responsibility of the Secret Service to investigate the assassination was terminated when the Federal Bureau of Investigation assumed primary investigative responsibility. 2. The Department of Justice failed to exercise initiative in supervising and directing the investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the assassination. 3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation performed with vary- ing degrees of competency in the fulfillment of its duties. (a) The Federal Bureau of Investigation adequately in- vestigated Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination and properly evaluated the evidence it possessed to assess his po- tential to endanger the public safety in a national emergency. (6) The Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted a thorough and professional investigation into the responsi- bility of Lee Harvey Oswald for the assassination. (c) The Federal Bureau of Investigation failed to in- vestigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy to assas- sinate the President. (d) The Federal Bureau of Investigation was deficient in its sharing of information with other agencies and depart- ments. 4. The Central Intelligence Agency was deficient in its collec- tion and sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the assassination. 5. The Warren Commission performed with varying degrees of competency in the fulfillment of its duties. (a) The Warren Commission conducted a thorough and professional investigation into the responsibility of Lee Har- vey Oswald for the assassination. (h) The Warren Commission failed to investigate ade- quatelv the possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the Presi- dent. This deficiency was attributable in part to the failure of the Commission to receive all the relevant information that was in the possession of other agencies and departments of the Government. (c) The Warren Commission arrived at its conclusions, based on the evidence available to it, in good faith. (d) The Warren Commission presented the conclusions in its report in a fashion that was too definitive. II. Findings of the Select Committee on Assassinations in the Assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in Memphis, Tenn., April 4, 1968 A. James Earl Kay fired one shot at Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The shot killed Dr. King. 1. Dr. King was killed by one rifle shot fired from in front of him. 2. The shot that killed Dr. King was fired from the bathroom window at the rear of a roominghouse at 4221/^ South Main Street, Memphis, Tenn. 3. James Earl Kay purchased the rifle that was used to shoot Dr. King and transported it from Birmingham, Ala. to Memphis, Tenn., where he rented a room at 4221/^ South Main Street, and moments after the assassination, he dropped it near 424 South Main Street. 4. It is highly probable that James Earl Ray stalked Dr. King for a period immediately preceding the assassination. 5. James Earl Kay fled the scene of the crime immediately after the assassination. 6. James Earl Ray's alibi for the time of the assassination, his story of "Kaoul", and other allegedly exculpatory evidence are not worthy of belief. 7. James Earl Ray knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pleaded guilty to the first degree murder of Dr. King. B. The committee believes, on the basis of the circumstantial evi- dence available to it, that there is a likelihood that James Earl Ray assassinated Dr. Martin Luther King as a result of a conspiracy. C. The committee believes, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that no private organizations or individuals, other than those dis- cussed under section B, were involved in the assassination of Dr. King. D. No Federal, State or local government agency was involved in the assassination of Dr. King. E. The Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion performed with varying degrees of competency and legality in the fulfillment of their duties. 1. The Department of Justice failed to supervise adequately the Domestic Intelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Inves- tigation. In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in the Domestic Intelligence Division's COINTELPRO campaign against Dr. King, grossly abused and exceeded its legal authority and failed to consider the possibility that actions threatening bodily harm to Dr. Kins: might be encouraged by the program. 2. The Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion performed a thorough investigation into the responsibility of James Earl Ray for the assassination of Dr. King, and conducted a thorough fugitive investigation, but failed to investigate ade- quately the possibility of conspiracy in the assassination. The Federal Bureau of Investigation manifested a lack of concern for constitutional rights in the manner in which it conducted parts of the investigation. III. Recommendations of the Select Committee on Assassinations /. Legislative recoirvmendations on issues involving the prohibition, prevention and prosecution of assassinations and federally cog- nizable homicides A. Prohibition and prevention — 1. The Judiciary Committee should process for early considera- tion by the House legislation that would make the assassination of a Chief of State of any country, or his political equivalent, a Federal offense, if the offender is an American citizen or acts on behalf of an American citizen, or if the offender can be located in the United States. 2. The Judiciary Committee should process for early considera- tion by the House comprehensive legislation that would codify, revise and reform the Federal law of homicide, paying special attention to assassinations. The Judiciary Committee should give appropriate attention to the related offenses of conspiracy, at- tempt, assault and kidnaping in the context of assassinations. Such legislation should be processed independently of the general proposals for the codification, revision or reform of the Federal criminal law. The committee should address the following issues in considering the legislation : (a) Distinguishing between those persons who should re- ceive the protection of Federal law because of the official positions they occupy and those persons who should receive protection of Federal law only in the performance of their official duties, (b) Extending the protection of Federal law to persons who occupy high judicial and executive positions, including Justices of the Supreme Court and Cabinet officers, (c) The applicability of these laws to private individuals in the exercise of constitutional rights, (d) The penalty to be provided for homicide and the re- lated offenses, including the applicability and the constitu- tionality ofthe death penalty, (e) The basis for the exercise of Federal jurisdiction, in- cluding domestic and extraterritorial reach, (/) The preemption of State jurisdiction without the neces- sity of any action on the part of the Attorney General where the President is assassinated, (g) The circumstances under which Federal jurisdiction should preempt State jurisdiction in other cases, (h) The power of Federal investigative agencies to require autopsies to be performed, (i) The ability of Federal investigative agencies to secure the assistance of other Federal or State agencies, including the military, other laws notwithstanding, (j) The authority to offer rewards to apprehend the perpe- trators ofthe crime, (k) A requirement of forfeiture of the instrumentalities of the crime, (I) The condemnation of personal or other effects of his- torical interest, (m) The advisability of providing, consistent with the first amendment, legal trust devices to hold for the benefit of victims, their families, or the general treasury, the profits realized from books, movie rights, or public appearances by the perpetrator of the crime, and (n) The applicability of threat and physical zone of pro- tection legislation to persons under the physical protection of Federal investigative or law enforcement agencies. 3. The appropriate committees of the House should process for early consideration by the House charter legislation for the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The committees should address the following issues in considering the charter legislation : (a) The proper foreign and domestic intelligence functions of the intelligence and investigative agencies of the United States, (b) The relationship between the domestic intelligence functions and the interference with the exercise of individual constitutional rights, (c) The delineation of proper law enforcement functions and techniques including: (i) The use of informants and electronic surveillance, (ii) guidelines to circumscribe the use of informants or electronic surveillance to gather intel- ligence on, or investigate, groups that may be exercising first amendment freedoms, and (iii) the proper response of intel- ligence or investigative agencies where information is devel- oped that an informant has committed a crime, (d) Guidelines to consider the circumstances, if any, when an investigative agency or a component of that agency should be disqualified from taking an active role in an investigation because of an appearance of impropriety growing out of a particular intelligence or investigative action, (e) Definitions of the legislative scope and extent of "sources and methods" and the "informant privilege" as a rationale for the executive branch withholding information in response to congressional or judicial process or otljer de- mand for information, (/) Institutionalizing efforts to coordinate the gathering, sharing, and analysis of intelligence information, (g) Insuring those agencies that primarily gather intel- ligence perform their function so as to serve the needs of other agencies that primarily engage in physical protection, and (h) Implementing mechanisms that would permit inter- agency tasking of particular functions. B. Prosecution — 1. The Judiciary Committee should consider the impact of the provisions of law dealing with third-party records, bail and speedy trial as it applies to both the investigation and prosecution of federally cognizable homicides. 2. The Judiciary Committee should examine recently passed special prosecutor legislation to determine if its provisions should be modified to extend them to Presidential assassinations and the circumstances, if any, under which they should be applicable to other federally cognizable homicides. //. Administrative reconvmendations to the Executive The Department of Justice should reexamine its contingency plans for the handling of assassinations and federally cognizable homicides in light of the record and findings of the committee. Such an examina- tion should consider the following issues : A. Insuring that its response takes full advantage of inter- and intra-agency task forces and the strike force a]3proach to investiga- tions and prosecutions, B. Insuring that its response takes full advantage of the advances of science and technology, and determining when it should secure independent panels of scientists to review or perform necessary scien- tific tasks, or secure qualified independent forensic pathologists to per- form aforensic autopsy, C. Insuring that its fair trial/free press guidelines, consistent with an alleged offender's right to a fair trial, allow information about the facts and circumstances surrounding an assassination promptly be made public, and promptly be corrected when erroneous information is mistakenly released, and D. Entering at the current time into negotiations with representa- tives of the media to secure voluntary agreements providing that photographs, audio tapes, television tapes, and related matters, made in and around the site of assassinations, be made available to the Gov- ernment byconsent immediately following an assassination. ///. General recommendations for congressional investigations A. The appropriate committees of the House should consider amend- ing the rules of the House to provide for a right to appointive counsel in investigative hearings where a witness is unable to provide counsel from private funds. B. The appropriate committees of the House should examine the rules of the House governing the conduct of counsel in legislative and investigative hearings and consider delineating guidelines for profes- sional conduct and ethics, including guidelines to deal with conflicts of interest in the representation of multiple witnesses before a committee. C. The Judiciary Committee should examine the adequacy of Fed- eral law as it provides for the production of Federal and State prison- ers before legislative or investigative committees under a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. D. The appropriate committees of the House should examine and clarify the applicability to congressional subpenas of recently enacted legislative restrictions on access to records and other documents. E. The appropriate committees of the House should consider legisla- tion that would authorize the establishment of a legislative counsel to conduct litigation on behalf of committees of the House incident to the investigative or legislative activities and confer jurisdiction on the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to hear such lawsuits. F. The appropriate committees of the House should consider if rule 11 of the House should be amended, so as to restrict the current access by all Members of the House to the classified information in the posses- sion of any committee. IV. Recommendations for further investigation A. The Department of Justice should contract for the examination of a film taken by Charles L. Bronson to determine its significance, if any, to the assassination of President Kennedy. B. The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the Department of Justice and the National Science Foundation should make a study of the theory and application of the principles of acoustics to forensic questions, using the materials available in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy as a case study. C. The Department of Justice should review the committee's find- ings and report in the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and after completion of the recom- mended investigation enumerated in sections A and B, analyze whether further official investigation is warranted in either case. The Depart- ment of Justice should report its analysis to the Judiciary Committee. INTRODUCTION* History of the Committee The House Select Committee on Assassinations was established in September 1976 by House Resolution 1540, 94th Congress, 2d Session. The resolution authorized a 12-member select committee to conduct a full and complete investigation of the circumstances surrounding the deaths of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The committee was constituted for the four remaining months of the 94th Congress, and it was mandated to report the results of its investi- gation to the House of Representatives as soon as practicable. House Resolution 1540 had been introduced a year prior to its pas- sage. It was a refinement of several similar resolutions sponsored by some 135 Members of the 94th Congress. Substantial impetus for the creation of a select committee to investigate these assassinations was derived from revelations in the report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activ- ities, dated April 1976 and released in June 1976. The Senate select committee reported that the Central Intelligence Agency had with- held from the Warren Commission, during its investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy, information about plots by the Government of the United States against Fidel Castro of Cuba ; and that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had conducted a counter- intelligence program (COINTELPRO) against Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. The House Select Committee on Assassinations created by House Resolution 1540 officially expired as the 94th Congress ended its term on January 3, 1977. On January 4, 1977, a unanimous consent request was introduced to consider House Resolution 9, a resolution to reconstitute the com- mittee. An objection was heard, however, and House Resolution 9 was not brought to an immediate vote on the floor of the House. It was instead referred to the Rules Committee, which began hearings on it on January 25, 1977. House Resolution 9, as amended, was favorably reported by the Rules Committee as House Resolution 222 on Feb- ruary 1,1977. The creation of a congressional committee to investigate assassina- tions, as well as issues concerning the nature and cost of the proposed investigations, created considerable controversy. House Resolution 222 proposed to constitute the committee for only an additional 2 months, to the end of March 1977, so that these issues could be more closely examined. On February 2, 1977, House Resolution 222 was considered ♦Italic numerals in parentheses in the middle of or at the end of sentences indicate references which can be found at the end of the report. (9) 10 by the House of Eepresentatives as the Committee of the Whole, so that amendments could be offered from the floor and Members given an opportunity to express objections. House Kesolution 222 authorized and directed the committee to : * * * conduct a full and complete investigation of the circumstances surrounding the assassination and and study death of President John F. Kennedy and the assassination and death of Martin Luther King, Jr., and of any other persons the select committee shall determine might be related to either death in order to ascertain (1) whether the existing laws of the United States, including but not limited to laws relating to the safety and protection of the President of the United States, assassinations of the President of the United States, deprivation of civil rights, and conspiracies related thereto, as well as the investigatory jurisdiction and capability of agencies and departments of the U.S. Government, are ade- quate, either in their provisions or in the manner of their enforcement; and (2) whether there was full disclosure and sharing of information and evidence among agencies and de- partments ofthe U.S. Government during the course of all prior investigations into those deaths ; and whether any evi- dence or information which was not in the possession of any agency or department of the U.S. Government investigating either death would have been of assistance to that agency or department, and why such information was not provided to or collected by the appropriate agency or department; and shall make recommendations to the House, if the select com- mittee deems it appropriate, for the amendment of existing legislation or the enactment of new legislation. House Resolution 222 was passed by the House on February 2, 1977. On March 8, 1977, Representative Louis Stokes of Ohio was named chairman of the committee to replace the previous chairman who had resigned. Two subcommittees were created — a subcommittee on the assassination of President Kennedy, with Representative Richardson Preyer of North Carolina as its chairman, and a subcommittee on the assassination of Dr. King, with Walter E. Fauntroy, Delegate of the District of Columbia, as its chairman. The staff was divided into two task forces designated to assist each of the subcommittees. On March 30, 1977, the House approved House Resolution 433 which constituted the committee until January 3, 1979, the duration of the 95th Congress. In June 1977, G. Robert Blakey was appointed chief counsel and staff director to replace the former chief counsel who had resigned on March 30, 1977. The committee established a program that consisted of three primary activities — the investigation, public presentation of evidence and preparation of the final report. Nature and Scope of the Investigation The committee identified four main issues to be investigated to ful- fill its mandate set forth in House Resolution 222. First, who was or 11 were the assassin (s) of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.? Second, did the assassin (s) have any aid or assist- ance either before or after the assassination ? Third, did the agencies and departments of the U.S. Government adequately perform their duties and functions in (a) collecting and sharing information prior to the assassination; (b) protecting John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. ; and (c) conducting investigations into each assassi- nation and coordinating the results of those investigations? Fourth, given the evidence the committee uncovered, are the amendment of existing legislation or the enactment of new legislation appropriate ? The necessity for the committee to explore each of these issues, as well as the manner in which they could be investigated, was carefully considered by the committee because the committee was acutely aware of the potential risks and dangers inherent in a congressional commit- tee addressing aspects of these issues. The issues that posed particular risks and dangers were the committee's investigation of who the assas- sin (s) was or were, and if the assassin (s) had help before or after the assassination. Necessarily, the committee's inquiry into these issues would entail an examination of the conduct of individuals. Further, the conduct to be examined might also be found to be criminal in a judicial proceeding, and might well carry with it, in the minds of the general public, the severest moral disapprobation because of the nature of the crimes committed. Possible injury of the reputation of potential "subjects" or "targets" of the investigation was, therefore, a significant danger or risk clearly recognized by the committee. The committee also recognized other risks and dangers inherent in the special character of its investigation. For example, associates of a "target" might have to be investigated fully. The associate may not have engaged in any activity connected with the assassination, but dis- closure of the facts of the investigation alone might carry with it an invasion of privacy of the associate. The risk and danger were also considered by the committee. The committee recognized that, unlike a criminal trial in a court, no matter how definitively the committee's findings were presented in its report, no legal sanctions such as fine or imprisonment could be im- posed as a direct result of its investigation. Nevertheless, the danger of injury to reputation and invasion of privacy of the individuals the committee had investigated required that the committee responsibly assess precisely how its investigation would be conducted and its re- sults disclosed. Many of the potential risks and dangers from Congress undertaking an investigation into conduct that is also criminal primarily arise be- cause of the nature and scope of a congressional investigation and the procedures a congressional committee employs to conduct an investiga- tion. The procedures that Congress uses are dramatically different than those employed when individual conduct is examined by either the executive or judicial branches of Government. The manner in which the investigations differ should be understood by each person reading this report and should be considered by Congress in deciding when an investigation of this character is appropriate in the future. The primary determinant of the character or scope of any govern- mental investigation is dependent upon which branch of Government is responsible for conducting it. Each of the three branches of govern- 12 ment — leo^slative, executive, and judicial — is panted differing powers and privileges by the Constitution. These powers and privileges differ to reflect the differing societal goals and values intended to be achieved by the functioning of each branch. Accordingly, the nature and scope of a congressional investigation are determined by the powers and privileges granted to Congress by the Constitution. The Constitution assigns to Congress the power and responsibility for legislating in particular areas. Although the Constitution does not expressly grant Congress the power to investigate, it had been recog- nized bythe Supreme Court that "the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it— is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legis- lative function." (i) The Supreme Court recognized that for Congress wisely or effectively to legislate required that it have access to infor- mation and be able to compel the production of the information before it. Consequently, it has long been recognized that the failure of a citizen to respond to a subpena to testify at a congressional hear- ing can result in fine and imprisonment, if the witness is convicted in court of contempt of Congress. Similarly, a witness who appears before a congressional committee may be found guilty of contempt if he re- fuses to testify or respond to particular questions. The limits on con- gressional power to compel testimony that can constitute a defense for a witness in any contempt trial are few. A fundamental defense is that the investigation is not in an area in which Congress can constitutionallv legislate. This defense, how- ever, is, as a practical matter, very limited, as Congress can enact legislation in many areas. Further, even the ability of Congress to legislate concerning particular activity has expanded over time. For example, under current Supreme Court rulings, American society todav is such that an activity would probably bo construed as affect- ing interstate commerce where it might not have been so construed in the less complex economic markets of the early 1800's. As such, the authority of Congress to legislate and investigate has grown. That an investigation must be in an area in which Congress can legislate is, therefore, not a substantial restriction on the scope of Congress to investigate.* Perhaps the most significant limitation on the scope of a con- gressional investigation is that the questions propounded to the wit- ness must be pertinent to the investigation. Yet that concept is not readily capable of precise definition, and, most importantly, its appli- cation to a set of facts is not ultimately resolved while the witness is before the committee. These two factors also shape congressional hearings. For example, before the committee pertinent questions about motive of a suspected "target" might include, in the Kennedy investi- gation, attitudes about American policy toward the Cuban Govern- ment, or, in the King investigation, questions concerning attitudes on racial relations. Even questions about conduct occurring after the assassination might be considered pertinent if the answers to them might be used to demonstrate similar conduct prior to the assassination or to illuminate personal character traits, including trustworthiness or 1 Jast because ConBrens can legislate and therefore Investigate In an area does not. of course, mean that It may enact any leelslatlon that It desires In the area. The leplslTtlon itself may be successfully challenged If, for example, It unnecessarily Infringes on consti- tutional rights. 13 propensity to violence. Accordingly, pertinency in the context aofsubject a con- gressional hearing is an elastic concept that, when exploring as broad as the assassination of two of the Nation's leaders, is not in fact very restrictive on the scope of the investigation. Even when a question is propounded that the witness believes not pertinent^ there is substantial pressure on the witness to answer the question. The witness may object to the question and ask the Chair to rule on the objection. Pursuant to the rules of the House, the chair- man of the committee is the person responsible for ruling on a wit- ness' objection to a question. Should the Chair sustain the objection, the witness does not have to answer the question. Should the chair- man overrule the objection and direct the witness to answer, the wit- ness faces a difficult choice. The witness may, of course, decide to answer the question. If he refuses to answer the question, however, he runs the risk of being prosecuted in a court for criminal contempt. In any prosecution, the witness will be able to raise the defense that he refused to answer the question because it was not pertinent to the inquiry. If he prevails, he will be found not guilty. If his defense is rejected, he will be found guilty and face fine and imprisonment. Nevertheless, the contempt trial may come months or longer after the witness' refusal to testify before the committee. The witness does not get an opportunity at the time of his appearance before the committee to have a judicial ruling on the merits for his refusal to answer. Accordingly, witnesses are under substantial pressure at the hearing to answer questions; they are naturally reluctant to risk fine and imprisonment at a later date. The pertinency objection, therefore, is also a restriction on the scope of a congressional investigation that may be of limited impact. The procedures of a congressional hearing also affected the commit- tee's assessment of the risks and dangers inherent in its addressing all four issues it had tentatively identified. The procedures of a congres- sional hearing are fundamentally different than those in a judicial con- text. A few clear examples are sufficient to demonstrate the differences. First, there is no impartial judge presiding over the congressional pro- ceeding. An objection that a committee member's question is imperti- nent is in fact ruled upon by the chairman of the committee. Second, a "target" in a congressional hearing may be compelled by a grant of immunity to testify despite his claim of the fifth amendment. In a trial, a defendant may not be compelled to take the stand and testify. Third, there are no constraints on what committee members may say publicly prior to the appearance of a "target" of an investigation before a hearing; a prosecutor in a criminal case is constrained by law to refrain from public comment prior to the commencement of a trial. Fourth, unlike a defendant in a trial, a witness before a committee has no right to object to the admissibility of evidence. Hearsay, for example, is freely admissible in a congressional hearing, and witnesses may be questioned on the basis of secondhand statements. Fifth, in the case of a witness who is a "subject" or "target" of a congressional investiga- tion, the witness, unlike in a trial, has no absolute right to: — Cross-examine witnesses who have testified against him ; — Have partioulnr witnesses whom he desires to be subpenaed to appear before the committee ; or even — Make a statement in his own behalf. 14 Sixth, and just as important, the right of a witness before a com- mittee to be accompanied by an attorney, and the role of the attorney, are radically different in a congressional hearing than in a judicial trial. Unlike a trial, a witness before a congressional committee has no constitutional right to have an attorney with him. The rules of the House do grant a witness the right to have an attorney present, but it is a right conferred by the House and not the Constitution ; the scope of the right is defined by the House and not by judicial authority. The rule provides that witnesses can be accompanied by counsel only "for the purpose of advising them concerning their constitutional rights." The committee recognized that by modifying its own procedures, it could ameliorate some of the effect of the inherent dangers congres- sional procedures might entail in the context of the special character of its inquiry. Consequently, comment outside of the committee's hear- ings was severely restricted by the committee rules. The committee also provided in its rules that it would provide counsel for a witness who was financially or otherwise unable to afford counsel ; it allowed counsel to submit questions to the committee to be asked of his or her client; and it allowed a witness or counsel time at the conclusion of his testi- mony to make any statement to explain or amplify the witness' testi- mony, or the opportunity to supplement the record. In addition, in its hearings, the committee followed the practice of having the chairman of the committee relinquish the Chair temporarily when he wished to ask a substantial numlDer of questions.^ Nevertheless, distinctions between a congressional hearing and a trial remain, and they cannot be eliminated without remaking the legislative function in the image of judicial power. The outcome of a congressional hearing differs radically from that of a trial. A congressional commit- tee votes on its findings, but, as witnessed in this report, there is no requirement for unanimity. Simple majority vote suffices to issue a report of conclusions. In addition, a congressional hearing need not, in its finding of facts for the purpose of legislation, establish facts beyond a reasonable doubt. A committee may base its legislation on facts it finds as prob- able, or even likely. dication of his Consequently, claims of innocencea that "target" maybenot would obtain the associated vin-a with judicial verdict in his favor. Suspicion about the "target" may linger, and the most dangerous injury to reputation may, in fact, stem from lingering suspicion. The differences in the nature and purpose of a congressional com- mittee hearing and a judicial trial are apparent — they exist because each proceeding is designed to achieve differing societal goals. Some of the dangers considered by the committee arise when a congressional hearing investigating conduct that is criminal is mistaken for or con- fused with a criminal trial adjudicating whether a person committed criminal acts. Others may be inherent in a congressional hearing. It can be forcefully argued that when evidence of conduct that may be termed criminal is introduced before a congressional committee, but in the end falls short of a clear and convincing or similar high stand- * The committee also strictly adhered to the rules of the House and first took testimony that miKht tend to defame, degrade or incriminate a person in executive session, so that the committee could evaluate the testimony and not publicly present unfounded or base- less accusations that might harm a person's reputation. 15 ard of persuasion, the responsible course would be to refrain from mak- ing the evidence public to protect the reputation of the person involved. Similarly, the committee considered whether it should disclose infor- mation relevant to its investigation out of concern for the privacy rights of individuals who were not "targets" of the investigation. The committee evaluated each of the four issues it had identified for examination in fulfillment of its mandate in light of the perceived risks and dangers to the reputations and rights of privacy of persons inves- tigated, risks and dangers arising from the character of a congressional investigation. The committee determined that a complete analysis of all four, and public disclosure of that analysis were necessary to fulfill its legislative responsibilities under the Constitution. In addition, the committee determined that a complete analysis of all four, and public disclosure of that analysis, were necessary to fulfill its constitutional duty of informing the public. The fourth issue the committee identified — whether the amendment of existing legislation or the enactment of new legislation is appro- priate— is, of course, the essence of the legislative function. In order to fulfill this responsibility, the committee had to have an independent and objective analysis of the facts that surrounded each assassination, as well as the prior investigations into the assassinations. The com- mittee realized that to address satisfactorily the fourth issue required, in essence, a complete analysis of the other three issues. To consider intelligently issues related to, for example. Presidential protection and deprivation of civil rights, it was necessary that the committee deter- mine the facts in President Kennedy's and Dr. King's assassinations, and the earlier investigations of those assassinations. Further, it was important to the committee that it was investigating areas in which there had been prior legislation. Statutes had assigned numerous duties to agencies and departments of the Federal Govern- ment. For example, the Secret Service had responsibility for protect- ing President Kennedy, and the FBI conducted the investigation into the assassination of Dr. King on the basis of its being a possible con- spiracy toviolate Dr. King's civil rights, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. The responsibility of the House to oversee the performance of particu- lar agencies and departments of the executive branch is of paramount importance in insuring efficient, responsive and constitutional govern- ment. As Woodrow Wilson observed : "Quite as important as legislat- ing is vigilant oversight of administration." (2) An assessment of the performance of agencies such as the CIA, Secret Service, and FBI was consequently considered essential by the committee. A careful and complete investigation into the third issue the committee had identi- fied— the performance of the agencies — ^^was necessary to fulfill the committee's responsibilities for oversight of the administration and the determination of the adequacy of existing laws. To address satisfactorily the performance of the agencies, however, the committee required an independent determination of the facts in each assassination. For example, it would be irresponsible for the com- mittee to criticize the manner in which the FBI conducted its investi- gation and the conclusions it reached without the committee having made an independent determination of what it believed to be the facts. Accordingly, it was necessary for the committee to explore the first 16 and second issues it identified — who the assassin (s) of President Ken- nedy and Dr. King was (were) , and if there was a conspiracy in either case — so that the committee could effectively perform its oversight responsibilities in evaluating the performance of the executive. As discussed, a resolution of these issues was also necessary to determine whether the amendment of existing legislation or the enactment of new legislation was appropriate. Despite the acknowledged risks and dangers to the reputation or privacy of some individuals, the committee believed that a complete analysis and disclosure of all the issues it had identified was necessary to fulfill its legislative mandate. There was an equally important rea- son, the committee believed, for public disclosure of the facts bearing on these issues. The committee had an obligation pursuant to its in- forming function under the Constitution to make public to the Amer- ican people the facts about each of these assassinations and to respond to public concern about the performance of Government agencies and departments. The House of Representatives recognized that these two assassina- tions had been of extraordinary concern to the American people when it debated and authorized the creation of this committee. The Ameri- can people clearly disbelieved the conclusions that had been the oflficial position of the U.S. Government. Despite the official position of the Government that Lee Harvey Oswald and James Earl Ray were lone assassins, a Gallup Poll indicated that 80 percent of the American people believed Lee Harvey Oswald had help and 70 percent believed James Earl Ray had help. This public disbelief in the conclusions of the official governmental investigations was a substantial factor in the creation of the committee. (3) The public concern, however, was far more significant than mere doubt about the official conclusions of the investigations. Such doubt extended to far more serious allegations concerning the agencies and departments of the Government. These allegations ranged from inten- tional coverup of known coconspirators to actual governmental com- plicity inthe assassinations. Such allegations called into question the very integrity of the governmental structure. The committee did not believe it would suffice to respond to public concern simply by issuing a finding on the question of agency and department complicity in the assassination. No finding would receive public acceptance if support- ing facts were not presented ; in fact, it would most likely increase sus- picion ofgovernmental involvement in the assassinations if the finding was simply that agencies and departments were not involved. The com- mittee had a responsibility to state who it believed had participated in each assassination, and what the factual bavsis was for that conclusion. To respond to public concern about the assassinations and the per- formance ofthe executive agencies and departments, the committee be- lieved its informing and legislative functions required an independent determination and public disclosure of the facts. Woodrow Wilson wrote about the informing function of Congress : It is the proper duty of a representative body to look dili- gently into every affair of Government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. Unless 17 Congress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of the Government, the country must be helpless to learn how it is being served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these things and sift them by every form of discussion, the country must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important that it should understand and direct. The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function. (4) The Supreme Court has similarly stated that it "does not doubt the importance of informing the public about the business of Congress." ^ The committee's independent analysis of all four issues, and its in- forming the public of that analysis, will allow each American to make an intelligent judgment on the validity of allegations concerning the performance of agencies and departments of the executive branch, as well as enable people to assess the committee's own performance. It is essential not only that persons be able to judge the performance of the executive agencies, but that they be able to judge this committee's performance as well. Such is the very essence of representative democracy. The committee determined, therefore, that, despite the potential dangers and risks inherent in its analysis of some of the issues it had identified to fulfill its mandate, an analysis and the public disclosure of all of the facts relating to the four issues was necessary to fulfill its legislating functions under the Constitution. Further, the com- mittee determined that an analysis and disclosure of the facts relating to each issue was also necessary to fulfill its constitutional informing responsibilities. The committee's findings in this report are stated so as to be faith- ful and accurate to the facts as found by the majority of the committee. The committee found each fact in this report with no goal or standard except the committee's commitment to ascertain the truth to the best of its ability. The committee hopes that each person who reads this re- port appreciates the nature of a congressional investigation, and that any potential dangers or harms from a misunderstanding of the com- 3 Doe V. McMillian (412 U.S. 306, 314 (1972)). The Doe case was carefully considered by the committee as its investigation was conducted, its hearings held, and the report prepared. Doe addressed the relationship between the informing function of Congress and the availability of speech and debate inimunltv for distribution of a report that might infringe on the rights of privacy of individuals. The majority opinion in the Doe case, the committee believed, does inhibit Congress exercise and performance of its responsi- bilities and duties. The committee noted that the opinion of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on remand from the Supreme Court, Doe v. McMillian (566 F. 2d 713 (1977)), also emphasized the importance of the informing function of Congress; it inter- preted the Supreme Court decision as only stating that public dissemination of a report was "not necessarily" the committee withinaware was acutely the speech of the and debate injury potential immunity. As detailed to reputation or in the text, invasion of privacy lieved, thathowever, mightthat occur by distribution its legislative of the responsibilities and informing committee's report. The that required committee be- this report be prepared and distributed in the manner the committee has done. For a committee ad- dressing questions about controversies that have arisen concerning the assassination of two of the country's leadlner figures, public dissemination of the report is vital to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities. Congress should be able to disseminate such a report without fearing spurious lawsuits, for the very fear of such lawsuits may shape the manner in which facts are presented. If Congress is limited to official or qualified immunity for public distribution of a report, the committee recognizes that this might serve to insure against reckless public presentation of false facts. Such a benefit, however, can only accrue at the cost of Congress being Inhibited In fulfilling its constitutional informing rcsponsibiUties. 18 mittee's work will therefore be minimized. The committee also hopes that the Congress and other committees will carefully consider in the future the nature and scope of congressional investigations in deciding what issues to investigate, how they will be investigated, and in what manner the results of the investigations should be disclosed. Structure of the Investigation The investigation was broken into an exploratory phase and a con- centrated factfinding phase. During the exploratory phase, primarily prior to December 31, 1977, the committee undertook to master the critical literature that had been written on the issues. The exploratory phase was also used for the purpose of deciding what specific subjects were worthy of further investigation, taking into account such factors as the passage of time since the assassinations were committed. Many issues were scrutinized and given due consideration, but not every possible lead nor every allegation that has been raised concerning these assassinations was investigated by the committee. The committee recog- nized it had finite time span and "limited resources.* The committee established priorities among the issues and investigated those which it deemed to be most apt to resolve significant issues of public concern. The concentrated phase of the investigation spanned the period from January to July 1978. It was based on a detailed investigative plan that entailed a step-by-step process of factfinding. The plans were de- signed to address the first three questions the committee identified to fulfill its legislative mandate : Who assassinated President Kennedy and Dr. King? Was there a conspiracy in either case? How well did the Federal agencies perform ? The plans were also structured to ac- count for the natural interrelationships among the three questions. The committee was acutely aware of the need for strict security pre- cautions as the investigation proceeded. This was necessary not only because of the classified nature of the material the committee reviewed, but also because the effectiveness of the committee's investigation could have been undermined by premature disclosure of information. Further, the committee recognized that unverified information con- cerning a person that was prematurely disclosed might unjustly injure the reputation of that person. Accordingly, the committee adopted stringent security procedures, requiring each member of the staff to receive top-secret clearance. As an accommodation to the com- mittee, the FBI conducted background investigations, which were reviewed by the CIA. After consultation witli the FBI and CIA, the committee made its own determination on each clearance. At the same time that the committee was undertaking to assure the integrity of its security system, it was making arrangements with Federal agencies — principally the FBI and CIA — for the review of their materials, many of which were classified. Memoranda of under- standing between the committee and the agencies were signed. They established a procedure for how the materials would be handled. The * For pxnmplp. the rrpsklontV rommlvsion on thp AssnssinntJon of Prpsidont Konnedy (Warren Commission) came Into existence on Nov. 30, 1963 and submitted Its final report on Sent. 24. 1UC,4. Dnrintr tlinf lOmontli T'Tiod. its foecome a Las Vegas and Havana gambling figure. Here the Teamsters and the mob golfed and drank together. Here they no doubt reflected that, as long as John Kennedy was President, Robert Kennedy would be unassailable. (12) As with the Civil Rights Division, Robert Kennedy expanded the Organized Crime Division at Justice. As a result of information col- lected by the FBI, .syndicate operations were seriously disrupted in some cases, and leading organized crime figures were concerned about the future. Opposition from the far right As the policies of the Kennedy administration broke new ground, political extremists in the United States seemed increasingly willing 35 to resort to violence to achieve their goals. In an address at the Uni- versity of Washington in Seattle on November 16, 1961, President Kennedy discussed the age of extremism: two groups of frustrated citizens, one urging surrender and the other urging war. He said : It is a curious fact that each of these extreme opposites resembles the other. Each believes that we have only two choices: appeasement or Avar, suicide or surrender, humilia- tion or holocaust, to be either Red or dead. The radical right condemned Kennedy for his "big Goyernrnent" policies, as w^ell as his concern with social welfare and civil rights progress. The ultraconservative John Birch Society, Christian Anti- Communist Crusade led by Fred C. Schwarz, and the Christian Cru- sade led by Rev. Billy James Hargis attracted an anti-Kennedy fol- lowing. The right wing was incensed by Kennedy's transfer of Gen. Edwin A. Walker from his command in' West Germany to Hawaii for distributing right-wing literature to his troops. The paramilitary Minutemen condemned the administration as "soft on communism" and adopted guerrilla warfare tactics to prepare for the fight against the Communist foe. At the other extreme, the left labeled Kennedy a reactionary disappointment, a tool of the "power elite." President Kennedy saw the danger of a politically polarized society and spoke against extremist solutions, urging reason in an ordered society. In the text of the speech he had planned to deliver in Dallas on November 22, 1963, he wrote : Today * * * voices are heard in the land — voices preach- ing doctrines wholly unrelated to reality, wholly unsuited to the sixties, doctrines which apparently assume that words will suffice without weapons, that vituperation is as good as victory and that peace is a sign of weakness. NOVEMBER 19 63: A TRIP TO TEXAS {13) At the beginning, John F. Kennedy had been an extremely popular President. His ratings, ironically, were highest in the aftermath of the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, w-hen he received a remarkable 83 percent approval rating in the Gallup Poll. But by the fall of 1963, he had slipped to 59 percent, and he became concerned about the po- litical implications. In October, Newsweek magazine reported that the civil rights issue alone had cost Kennedy 3.5 million votes, adding that no Democrat in the White House had ever been so disliked in the South. In Georgia, the marquee of a movie theater showing PT i^P read, "See how the Japs almost got Kennedy" (i^) An inveterate traveler, Kennedy interspersed his diplomatic mis- sions abroad with trips around the country. He made 83 trips in 1963. In June he visited Germany, Ireland and Italy ; later in the summer he toured the western United States — North Dakota, Wyoming, Mon- tana, Washington, Utah, Oregon, Nevada and California — to gain support for his legislative program. Not only did Kennedy enjoy traveling, but he almost recklessly resisted the protective measures the Secret Service urged hini to adopt. He would not allow blaring sirens, and only once — in Chicago in November 1963 — did he permit his limousine to be flanked by motor- 36 cycle House police detailofficers. that heHedidtoldnotthewant special igent agents to in ridecharge on theof rear the "White of his car. Kennedy was philosophical about danger. According to Arthur M. Schlesinger, "A Thousand Days," Kennedy believed assassination was a risk inherent in a democratic society. In 1953, Schlesinger recounted, then-Senator Kennedy read his favorite poem to his new bride, Jac- queline Bouvier Kennedy. It was "I have a Rendezvous with Death," by Alan Seeger.(i5) It may be he shall take my hand And lead me into his dark land And close my eyes and quench my breath . . . But I've a rendezvous with Death At midnight in some flaming town, "WhenI to And Spring trips north my pledged word again this year, am true, I shall not fail that rendezvous. During House the November assistant : 1963 Texas trip he told a special "White * * * if anybody really wanted to shoot the President * * * it was not a very difficult job — all one had to do was get on a high building someday with a telescopic rifle, and there was nothing anybody could do to defend against such an attempt. Kennedy had decided to visit the South to bolster his image in that region. He chose to visit Florida because it had voted Republican in 1960, and Texas because it only had been saved by Lyndon Johnson by an extremely slim margin. According to Texas Governor John B. Connally, Kennedy first mentioned a political trip to Texas in the summer of 1962 when Connally, a former Secretary of the Navy, was running for Governor. Kennedy broached the idea to Connally again the following summer. Despite some obvious political reasons for a Texas visit, some mem- bers of Kennedy's staff opposed it because the State was not favorably disposed to the President. From 1961 to 1962, the Secret Service had received 34 threats on the President's life from Texas. Political em- barrassment seemed a certainty. The decision to travel to Dallas was even more puzzling. Many perceived Dallas as a violent, hysterical center of right-wing fanaticism. There, in 1960, then-Texas Senator Lyndon B. Johnson had been heckled and spat upon. In October 1963, just a month before the President's scheduled visit. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson was jeered, hit with a placard and spat upon. Byron Skelton, the National Democratic Committee- man from Texas, wrote Attorney General Robert Kennedy about his concern for President Kennedy's safety and urged him to dissuade his brother from going to Texas. There are several probable explanations for the decision to visit Dallas. Kennedy was to visit four other cities — San Antonio, Hous- wouldton, harmAustin and his Fort image"Worth — and Kennedy in Texas. it was feared also that was ignoring Dallas anxious to win 37 over business, and Dallas was the place to address business leaders in Texas. As a result of his economic policies, particularly the rollback of steel prices, Kennedy believed he was perceived as hostile to busi- ness. Before the November Texas trip, he shared his concern with Governor Connallj^ : If these people are silly enough to think that I am going to dismantle this free enterprise system, they are crazy. All the other trips that summer and fall, including the visit to Florida, had been successful. In his testimony before this committee, Governor Connally explained that he believed that Texas was a State crucial to a Kennedy victory in 1964, and contended that Kennedy came to Texas for two i-easons : to raise money and to enhance his own political prospects in Texas. Word of the trip to Texas first appeared in the Dallas papers on September 13, and Kennedy's itinerary for Texas was announced by Governor Connally on November 1. The President was scheduled to address a luncheon of business leaders at the Trade Mart in Dallas on November 22. He decided to travel into the city in a motorcade that was to follow the normal Dallas parade route. Kennedy liked motorcades, for they aft'orded an opportunity to get close to the people, and he made a special point of arranging one in Dallas because he believed it would be his one chance that day to greet workers and minorities. The final motorcade route through Dealey Plaza in down- town Dallas was selected on November 15. In 1903, the Secret Service had identified six categories of persons who posed a threat to the President : right-wing extremists, left-wing extremists, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, Black militants, and a miscel- laneous category that included mental patients. It identified two cities as particularly threatening — Miami and Chicago. Dallas was con- sidered a potential source of political embarrassment. Prior to the trip to Dallas, the Secret Service had not uncovered any serious threats there, and no extensive investigation was conducted in the city. Beginning a week before the trip, defamatory posters and leaflets excoriating the President appeared throughout Dallas. Some carried Kennedy's picture with the caption, "Wanted for Trenson: This Man Is Wanted for Treasonous Activities Against the United ^States." It was suggested the President's Dallas parade route should not be published, but at the urging of Kennedy's staff, it appeared in the Dallas newspapers on November 18 and 19. The President and Mrs. Kennedy traveled to Texas on Novem- ber 21. That day, Kennedy visited San Antonio and Houston, where he was warmly greeted by enthusiastic crowds. He flew to Fort Worth that evening. One of the President's first acts on the morning of November 22 was to call the woman who had arranged the accommodations that he and the First Lady occupied at Fort Worth's Texas Hotel. She had hung the walls with original paintings by modern masters such as Vincent Van Gogh and Claude Monet, and the special effort of the citizens of Fort Worth greatly impressed the Kennedys. That rainy morning, the President addressed the Fort Worth Cham'ner of Commerce. The speech was well received and, as Governor Connally recounted, it was 38 laced with fun. Later in the morning, after a query from Dallas, the President said that if the weather was clear, he did not want the protective buhblc used on the Presidential limousine. The President and his entourage took off for Dallas at approxi- mately 11 :2() a.m. While the I'losidontial plane. Air Foire One, was airborne, the President looked out the window and remarked to the Governor with a smile, "Our luck is holding. It looks as if we'll get sunshine." A clear sky, brilliant sunshine, BS-decrrec temperature — a marvelous autumn day — provided the backdrop for the President and Mrs. Kennedy as they arrived at Love Field in Dallas. Tlie First Lady was presented with a bouquet of roses, and the couple attended a reception lield in their honor at the airport b}' the conmiunity leaders of Dallas. After greeting them, the President moved to shake hands with the enthusiastic crowd whicli. according to some estimates, may have numbered 4,000 persons. For a few minutes, the President and the First Lady walked along the security barrier, greeting people. Then they joined Governoi- and Mrs. Connally in tlie Presidential limousine. Two Secret Service agents, one the driver, sat in front. The President and his wife sat in the rear seat, with the President on the right, in keeping with military protocol, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Governor Connally sat on a jump seat directly in front of the President, with his back to Kennedy, and Mrs. Connally occupied tlie left jump seat. Two cars with members of tlie Dallas Police Department, including Chief Jesse Curry, and Secret Service agents, ])receded the Presidential limousine. Behind, a followup car carried Secret Service agents and members of the White House staff. To the rear of that car, the Vif^e President and Mrs. Johnson and Senator Ralph Yarborough rode in another limousine. Xext came the Vice President's followup car, and then a long line of limousines, trucks and various vehicles containing ^Members of Congress and other dignitaries, photographers, the President's physician, and mem- bers of the ^Miite House staff and the press. The motorcade left Love Field at about 11:50 p.m. Governor Con- Jially recalled he was worried, not about violence, but about the possibility that some incident might occur that would embari-ass the President and disrupt the atmosphere of confidence that had been building tliroughout the trip. That morning, n hostile full-page ad- vertisement, sponsored by the "America-thinking Citizens of Dallas," had appeared in the pages of the Dallas AForning Xews. It charged, among other things, that Kennedy liad igjiorod the Constitution, scrapped the Monroe Doctrine in favor of the "Spirit of "NIoscoav." and had been "soft on Communists, fellow-travelers, and ultra-leftists in America." The Governoi- was ap[)rehensive that there might be unfriendly demonstrations during the motorcade or that the crowd's mood would be indifferent or even sullen. The Governor's concern subsided as the motorcade passed through the outskirts of Dallas and neared the center of the city. The crowds grew larger and they were unmistakably friendly, with people smil- ing, wavincr, and calling the President's name. In Connally's words. The further we got toward town, the denser became the crowds, and when we got down on Main Street, the crowds were extremely thick. They were pushed off of curbs; they were out in the street, and they were backed all the way up 39 against the walls of the buildings. They were just as thick as they could be. I don't know how many. But, there were at least a quarter of a million people on the parade route that day and everywhere the reception was good. Governor Connally noticed that Mrs. Kennedy, who had appeared apprehensive the previous day, was more relaxed and enjoyed the Dallas crowd. The onlj'' hostile act he remembered was a heckler with a placard that read "Kennedy Go Home." The President noticed the sign, and asked Governor and Mrs. Connally if they had seen it. Con- nally said, "Yes, but we were hoping you didn't." "Well, I saw it. Don't you imagine he's a nice fellow?" Kennedy asked. The Governor said, "Yes, I imagine he's a nice fellow." He Connally's recalled : fear of an embarrassing incident seemed to be unfounded. The crowds were larger than I had anticipated. They were more enthusiastic than I could ever have hoped for. This enthusiasm was apparent in a number of incidents. A little girl held up a sign with the request, "President Kennedy, will you shake hands with me?" The President noticed the sign, had the car stopped and shook hands with the little girl. The car was mobbed by an admir- ing crowd that was only separated from the Presidential limousine by Secret Service agents. At another stop, as the motorcade approached downtown Dallas, the President caught sight of a Koman Catholic nun with a group of schoolchildren. He stopped and spoke with the group. Several times enthusiastic onlookers broke away from the curbside throng and attempted to reach the limousine. Secret Service agents cleared the admirers from the street. The crowds grew thicker as the Presidential parade approached downtown. The motorcade followed the traditional Dallas parade route into the downtown business district, turning onto Main Street, which brought it through the center of the Dallas commercial district. It moved westward along Main toward Dealey Plaza. People crowded the sidewalks, surged into the street and waved from office building win- dows. The motorcade tunneled through the throng. The Governor later remarked that the business community, the group Kennedy sought to impress, would have to be affected by this remarkable reception. Con- nally said "* * * the trip had been absolutely wonderful, and we were heaving a sigh of relief because once we got through the motorcade at Dallas and through the Dallas luncheon, then everything else was pretty much routine." President Kennedy was clearly delighted by his Dallas welcome. At the corner of Main and Houston, the motorcade made a sharp 90- degree turn to the right and headed north for one block, toward the Texas School Book Depository. As the limousine approached Houston and Elm, Mrs. Connally, elated by the reception, said, "Mr. President, you can't say Dallas doesn't love you." "That's obvious," the President replied. At Elm Street, the limousine made a hairpin turn to the left and headed west, passing the book depository. At about 12 :30 p.m., as the President waved to the crowds, shots rang out. 40 Mrs. Connally heard a noise, turned to her right, and saw the Presi- dent chitch his neck with both hands, tlien shimp down in the seat. Governor Connally immediately thought the noise was a rifle shot. He turned from his straight-backed jump seat in an attempt to catch sight of the President because he feared an assassination attempt. The Governor described the scene : I never looked, I never made the full turn. About the time I turned back where I was facing more or less straight ahead, the way the car was moving, I was hit. I was knocked over, just doubled over by the force of the bullet. It went in my back and came out my chest about 2 inches below and to the left of my right nipple. The force of the bullet drove my body over almost double, and when I looked, immediately I coulcl see T was drenched with blood. So, I knew I had been badly hit and I more or less straightened up. At about this time, Nellie [Mrs. Connally] reached over and pulled me down into her lap. I was in her lap facing forward when another shot was fired * * * I did not hear the shot that hit me. 1 wasn't con- scious of it. I am sure I heard it, but I was not conscious of it at all. I heard another shot. I heard it hit. It hit with a very pronounced impact * * * it made a very, very strong sound. Immediately, I could see blood and brain tissue all over the interior of the car and all over our clothes. We were both cov- ered with brain tissue, and there were pieces of brain tissue as big as your little finger * * * * * * * * * * When I was hit, or shortly before I was hit — no, I guess it was after I was hit — I said first, just almost in despair, I said, "no, no, no," just thinking how^ tragic it was that we had gone through this 24 hours, it had all been so wonderful and so beautifully executed. The President had been so marvelously received and then here, at the last moment, this great tragedy. I just said, "no, no, no, no." Then I said right after I was hit, I said, "My God, they are going to kill us all." Mrs. Connally initially thought the Governor was dead as he fell into her lap. She did not look back after her husband was hit, but heard Mrs. Kennedy say, "They have shot my husband." After one sliot, Mrs. Connally recalled, the President's "wife said, "They have killed mv husband. I have his brains in my hand." Roy Kellerman, the Secret Service agent in the right front seat, said, "Let's get out of here fast." Bill Geer, the driver, accelerated tremen- dously. "So we pulled out of the motorcade," Mrs. Connally recalled, "and we must have been a hori-ible sight flying down the freeway with those dyinc: men in our arms." She added, "There Avas no screaming in that horrible car. It was just a silent, terrible drive." The wounded President and Governor were rushed to Parkland Hospital. At 1 p.m., the SHth President of the United States was pronounced dead, 1,037 days after his term had begun. A. Lee Harvet Oswald Fired Three Shots at President John F. Kennedy ; the Second and Third Shots He Fired Struck the President; the Third Shot He Fired Killed the President 1. president KENNEDY WAS STRUCK BY TWO RIFLE SHOTS FIRED FROM BEHIND HIM The President's Commission on the Assassination of President Ken- nedy (Warren Commission) concluded that President Kennedy was struck ))y two bullets that were fired from above and behind him.(i) According to the Commission, one bullet hit the President near the base of the back of the neck, slightly to the right of the spine, and exited from the front of the neck. The other entered the right rear of the President s head and exited from the right side of the head, caus- ing alarge wound. (2) The Commission based its findings primarily upon the testimony of the doctors who had treated the President at Parkland Memorial Hospital in Dallas and the doctors who performed the autopsy on the President at the Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Md. (S) In forming this conclusion, neither the members of the Warren Com- mission, nor its staff, nor the doctors who had performed the autopsy, took advantage of the X-rays and photographs of the President that were taken during the course of the autopsy. (4) The reason for the failure of the Warren Commission to examine these primary materials is that there was a commitment to make public all evidence examined by the Commission. (5) The Commission was concerned that publica- tion of the autopsy X-rays and photographs would be an invasion of the privacy of the Kennedy family. (6") The Commission's decision to rely solel}^ on the testimony of the doctors precluded the possibility that the Commission might make use of a review of the autopsy evi- dence by independent medical experts to determine if they concurred with the findings of the doctors at Parkland and Bethesda. A determination of the number and location of the President's wounds was critical to resolving the question of whether there was more than one assassin. The secrecy that surrounded the autopsy proceedings, therefore, has led to considerable skepticism toward the Commission's findings. Concern has been expressed that authorities were less than candid, since the Navy doctor in charge of the autopsy conducted at Bethesda Naval Hospital destroyed his notes, and the Warren Commission decided to forego an opportunity to view the X-rays and photographs or to permit anyone else to inspect them. The skepticism has been reinforced by a film taken of the Presiden- tial motorcade at the moment of the assassination by an amateur movie photographer, Abraham Zapruder. In the Zapruder film, the Presi- dent's head is apparently thrown backward as the front right side of the skull appears to explode, suggesting to critics of the Warren Com- mission's findings that the President was struck by a bullet that entered the front of the head. (7) Such a bullet, it has been argued, was fired (41) 42 by a gunman positioned on the grassy knoll, a park-like area to the right and to the front of where the moving limousine was located at the instant of the fatal shot. (8) Since the Warren Commission completed its investigation, two other Government panels liave subjected the X-rays and photographs taken during the autopsy on President Kennedy to examination by independent medical experts. A team of forensic pathologists ap- pointed byAttorney General Ramsey Clark in 1968, (.9) and a panel retained by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission) in 1975, (i^) reached the same basic conclusion : the President was struck by two bullets from behind. But neither panel published the X-rays and photographs, nor did either explain the basis of its conclusions in a public hearing. Consequently, neither panel was able to relieve significantly doubts that have per- wounds.sisted over the years about the nature and location of the President's (a) Reliance on scientific analysis The committee believed from the beginning of its investigation that the most reliable evidence upon which it could base determinations as to what happened in Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963, was an analysis of hard scientific data. Accordingly, the committee contracted with leading independent experts in the fields of forensic pathology, ballistics, photography, acoustics, neutron activation analysis and other disciplines. The reports submitted by these experts were fully considered by the committee in formulating its findings. (1) The medical evidence. — The committee's forensic pathology panel was composed of nine members, eight of whom were chief medi- cal examiners in major local jurisdictions in the United States. (ii) As a group, they had been responsible for more than 100,000 autop- sies, {12) an accumulation of experience the committee deemed in- valuable in the evaluation of the medical evidence — including the autopsy X-rays and photographs — to determine the cause of death of the President and the nature and location of his wounds. The panel was also asked to recommend guidelines in the event of a future as- sas ination ofa President or other high Federal official. (7-5) The committee also employed experts to authenticate the autopsy materials. Neither the Clark Panel nor the Rockefeller Commission undertook to determine if the X-rays and photographs were, in fact, authentic. The committee, in light of the numerous issues that had arisen over the years with respect to autopsy X-rays and photographs, believed authentication to be a crucial step in the investigation. (7^) The authentication of the autopsy X-rays and photographs was accomplished by the committee with the assistance of its photographic evidence panel as well as forensic dentists, forensic anthropologists and radiologists working for the committee. (7.5) Two questions were put to thes^ experts : Could the photographs and X-rays stored in the National Archives b(> positively identified as l>eing of President Keimedy? Was tliere any evi(l( that any of these photographs or X- rays had been altered in any maimer? To determine if the photographs of the autopsy subject were in fact of the President, forensic anthropologists compared the autopsy 43 photographs with ante-mortem pictures of the President. This com- parison was done on the basis of both metric and morphological fea- tures. The metric analysis relied upon a series of facial measurements taken from the photographs, while the morphological analysis was focused on consistency of physical features, particularly those that could be considered distinctive (shape of the nose, patterns of facial lines, et cetera). Once unique characteristics were identified, posterior and anterior autopsy photographs were compared to verify that they, in fact, depicted the same person. The anthropologists studied the autopsy X-rays in conjunction with premortem X-rays of the President. A sufficient number of unique anatomic characteristics were present in X-rays taken before and after the President's death to conclude that the autopsy X-rays were of President Kennedy. This conclusion was consistent with the findings of a forensic dentist employed by the committee. (7^) Since many of the X-rays taken during the course of the autopsy included the Presi- dent's teeth, it was possible to determine, using the President's dental records, that the X-rays were of the President. Once the forensic dentist and anthropologists had determined that the autopsy pliotographs and X-rays Avere of the President, photo- graphic scientists and radiologists examined the original autopsy photoijraphs, neoatives. transparencies, and X-rays for signs of altera- tion. They concluded there Avas no evidence of the photographic or radiographic materials having been altered. (77) Consequently, the committee determined that the autopsy X-rays and photographs were a valid basis for the conclusions of the committee's forensic pathology panel. Wliile the examination of the autopsy X-rays and photographs was the principal basis of its analysis, the forensic pathology panel also had access to all relevant witness testimony. In addition, all tests and evidence analyses requested by the panel were performed. (75) It was only after considering all of this evidence that the panel reached its conclusions. The forensic pathology panel concluded that President Kennedy was struck by two, and only two, bullets, each of which entered from the rear.^ The panel further concluded that the President was struck by one bullet that entered in the upper right of the back and exited from the front of the throat, and one bullet that entered in the right rear of the head near the cowlick area and exited from the right side of the head, toward the front. This second bullet caused a massive wound to the President's head upon exit. There is no medical evidence that the President was struck by a bullet entering the front of the head, (75) and the possibility that a bullet could have struck the Pres- ident and yet left no evidence is extremely remote. Because this con- clusion appears to be inconsistent with the backward motion of the President's head in the Zapruder film, the committee consulted a wound ballistics expert to determine what relationship, if any, exists between the direction from which a bullet strikes the head and subse- 1 In many of its conclusions, the forensic pathology panel voted S to 1, with the dis- senting vote being consistently that of Cyril H. Wecht, M.D., coroner of Allegheny County, Pa. In all references to conclusions of the panel, unless it is specifically stated that it was unanimous, it should be assumed that Dr. Wecht dissented. 44 quent head movement, (i?^) The expert concluded that nerve damage from a bullet entering the President's head could have caused his back muscles to tighten which, in turn, could have caused his head to move toward the rear.(^/) He demonstrated the phenomenon in a filmed experiment which involved the shooting of goats. (^^) Thus, the com- mittee determined that the rearward movement of the President's head would not be fundamentally inconsistent with a bullet striking from the rear. (23) The forensic pathology panel determined that Governor Connally was struck by a bullet from the rear, one that entered just below the right armpit and exited below the right nipple of the chest. It then shattered the radius bone of the Governor's right wrist and caused a superficial wound to the left thigh. (£^) Based on its examination of the nature and alinement of the Governor's wounds, the panel con- cluded that they were all caused by a single bullet that came from the rear. It concluded further that, having caused the Governor's wounds, the bullet was dislodged from his left thigh. The panel determined that the nature of the wounds of President Kennedy and Governor Connally was consistent with the possibility that one bullet entered the upper right back of President Kennedy and, after emerging from the front of the neck, caused all of the Governor's wounds. (£5) A factor that influenced the panel significantly was the ovoid shape of the wound in the Governor's back, indicating that the bullet had begun to tumble or yaw before entering. (^(?) An ovoid wound is characteristic of one caused by a bullet that has passed through or glanced off an intervening object. (^7) Based on the evi- dence available to it, the panel concluded that a single bullet ])assing through both President Kennedy and Governor Connally would sup- port afundamental conclusion that the President was struck by two, and only two. bullets, each fired from behind. (38) Thus, tlie forensic pathology panel's conclusions were consistent with the so-called single bullet theory advanced by the Warren Commission. (^5) (2) Reaction tim-ps and alinement. — The hypothesis that both the President and the Governor were struck by a single bullet had origi- nally been based on the Warren Commission's examination of the Zapruder film and test firings of the assassination rifle. The time between the observable reactions of the President and of the Gov- ernor was too short to have allowed, according to the Commission's test firings, two shots to have been fired from the same rifle. (5^) FBI marksmen who test fired the rifle for the Commission employed the telescopic sight on the rifle, and the minimum firing time between shots was approximately 2.25 to 2.3 seconds. (J/) The time between the observable reactions of the President and the Governor, according to the Commission, was less than two seconds.^ The Commission determined that its hypothesis that the same bullet struck both the President and the Governor was supported by visual obsei'vations of the relative alinement of the two men in tJie limousine, by a trajectory analysis and by wound ballistics tests. The Commis- »In Us report, the committee's photographic evidence panel suEprested that Governor Connally reacted to his wounds approximately one second after PresWent Kennedy. This Interval might have been even less, but a sien obstructing Zapn'der's field of view made it Impossible to study the Governor immediately after the President first appeared to be reacting to having been shot. 45 sion said, however, that a determination of which shot hit the Gov- ernor was "not necessary to any essential findings." ( diffproiit reaction times; more- over, a person's reaction time often depends on where he has been hit. ■^The committee considered using frame .S28 as a possible base point. In this analysis, the h.-ad viliot occiuriiiK at Irani. ■ .-.lli would. acconliiiK to the acoustics results, have originated from the grassy knoll. This alternative, however, was rejected. 47 consultants concluded that the two earliest shots came from the deposi- tory, the shots (or at least their shock waves) would have reached the limousine at between frames 157 and 161 and frames 188 and 191. When coupled with the photographic evidence showing a reaction by President Kennedy beginning in the vicinity of frame 200, it appeared that he was first struck by a bullet at approximately frame? 190.^ Second, the photographic evidence panel also studied the blurs on the Zapruder film that were caused by Zapruder's panning errors, that is, the effect of a lack of smooth motion as Zapruder moved from left to right with his camera. This was done in an effort to determine whether the blurs resulted from Zapruder's possible reaction to the sound of gunshots. (tW) This analysis indicated that blurs occurring at frames 189-197 and 312-334 may reasonably be attributed to Zapruder's startle reactions to gunshots. The time interval of the shots associated with these blurs was determined to be approximately 6 to 7 seconds. The possibility that other blurs on the film might be attrib- dismissed utable to Zapruder's reactionsdata. without additional to gunshots could not be confirmed or Taken together with other evidence, the photographic and acoustical evidence led the committee to conclude that President Kennedy and Governor Connally were struck by one bullet at approximately Zapruder frame 190, and that the President was struck by another bul- let at frame 312. Thus, from the results of the analyses by its experts in the fields of forensic pathology, photography, acoustics, wound ballistics and neutron activation analysis, the committee concluded that President Kennedy was struck by two sliots fired from behind. 2. THE SHOTS THAT STRUCK PRESIDENT KENNEDY FROM BEHIND WERE FIRED FROM THE SIXTH FLOOR WINDOW OF THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE TEXAS SCHOOL BOOK DEPOSITORY BUILDING The Warren Commission concluded that the shots that killed Presi- dent Kennedy the sixth floor and wounded window Governor at the Connally southeast corner "*of * the * were firedSchool Texas from Book Depository." {51 ) It based its conclusion on eyewitness testimony, physical evidence found on the sixth floor of the depository, medical evidence and the absence of "* * * credible evidence that the shots were fired from * * * any other location," (5^) {a) ScientifiG analysis In investigating this aspect of the case, the committee relied heavily on the scientific analysis of physical evidence, and again the conclu- sions of the forensic pathology panel were relevant. The panel con- cluded that the two bullets that struck the President came from behind and that the fatal head shot was moving in a downward direction when it sti-uck the President. (J5)' Thus, forensic pathology provided reli- in •A moreI B. section detailed infra. description of the reasoning leading to this conclusion is set forth " The panel used both the location of the wounds and Zapruder frame 312 to determine the "downward" slope of the fatal head shot. It did not attempt to determine the slope of the bullet thiit struck the President s back because the moment of impact was not thought to be visible in the film. This decision by the forensic patholosy panel was made well before the photographic panel reached its conclusion regarding the President's and Governor Connally's reactions as shown in the Zapruder film. 48 able evidence as to the ori^rin of the shots : The ininman who fired the shot that hit President Kennedy and Governor Connally at approxi- mately frame 190 of the Zaprnder film fired from behind, and the gun- man who iired the siiot that hit the President in the head at frame 312 was positioned above and to the rear of the Presidential limousine. (1) Trajectory analysis. — Another project pertaining to the origin of the shots involved tlie trajectory of the bullets that hit the President. Although the Warren Conunission also studied trajectory, its analysis consisted of proving that a bullet fired from the southeast conier of the sixth floor of the book depository could have hit the President and then hit the Governor and that another bullet fired from that location could have caused the wound to the President's head. Basically, the purpose of the Connnission's trajectory analysis was to prove that it was possible for the prime suspect, Lee Harvey Oswald, to have hit both the President and the Governor from the sixth floor of the depository. The committee apj^roached the problem without making prior as- sumptions as to the origin of the shots. It was an interdisciplinary effort, drawing from the expertise of forensic pathologists, acoustical and photograi)hic analysts and an engineer from the staff of the Na- tional Aeronautics and Space Administration, who plotted the trajectories. (5^) The trajectory analysis was based on three types of data. From the acoustical analysis of the radio transmission, the timing of the shots was obtained. From the photographic analysis of the Zapruder film and the acoustical analysis, it was possible to know with relative precision when each of the shots struck — at approximately Zapruder frame 190, for the shot that struck the President in the back of the neck, and at Zapruder frame 312, for the fatal shot to the President's head. Through an analysis of those frames and still photographs taken at approximately the same time from the south side of Elm Street, it was possible to determine the location of the limousine in the plaza, the sitting positions of President Kennedy and Governor Connally and their alinement to one another. {55) By then coordinating this data with the forensic pathology panel's analysis of the exit and entry wounds sustained by President Ken- nedy, itwas possible to plot the path of the bullets out to their source. Separate direction and slope trajectories were developed for two bul- lets— the one that caused the President's back and neck wounds, and the one that caused his fatal head wound. (5tf) A third trajectory analysis was conducted to test the hypothesis that the first bullet also caused the wounds to Governor Connally, using for this analysis the exit wounds to the President's neck and the entry wound to the Governor's back. (57) All three trajectories intercepted the southeast face of the Texas School Book Depository building. (5<9) While the trajectories could not be plotted with sufficient precision to determine the exact point from which the shots were fired, they each were calculated with a mar- gin of error reflecting the precision of the underlying data. The mar- gins of error were indicated as circles within which the shots origi- nated. The southeast corner window of the depository was inside each of the circles. {59) 49 (2) Photographic evidence.— The photographic ofevidence panel ex- amined evidence possibly relevant to the question the origin of the shots, as follows : The panel examined a motion picture of the southeast corner win- dow of the depository taken a short time prior to the shots. (60) While there is an impression of motion in the film, the panel could not at- tribute itto the movement of a person or an object and instead attrib- uted the motion to photographic artifacts, (^i) The panel's findings were the same with respect to apparent motion in adjacent windows shown in the film.(^^) The panel studied two photographs taken within minutes of the assassination. (^,^) While no human face or form could be detected in the sixth floor southeast window, the panel was able to conclude that a stack of boxes in the window had been rearranged during the interval of the taking of the two photographs. (64-) There is evidence, a motion picture film made by Charles L. Bron- son, that some independent researchers believe shows a figure or figures in the sixth floor depository window several minutes before the shooting. The film came to the attention of the committee toward the end of its investigation. Some members of the committee's photo- graphic evidence panel did conduct a preliminary review (without en- hancement) ofthe film. While motion was detected in the window, it was considered more likely to be a random photographic artifact than human movement. Nevertheless, the limited review was not sufficient to determine definitively if the film contained evidence of motion made by human figures. (^5) Because of its high quality, it was recom- mended that the Bronson film be analyzed further. (b) Witness testimony While the committee relied primarily on scientific analysis of physi- cal evidence as to the origin of the shots, it also considered the testi- mony of witnesses. The procedure used to analyze their statements was as follows: First, all available prior statements were read by the committee and studied for consistency. The objective was to identify inconsistencies either betAveen the words of one witness and another or between the various words of a witness whose story had changed. The statements were obtained from the files of the Dallas Police Department, Dallas Sheriff's Office, the FBI, Secret Service and Warren Commission. Second, an attempt was made to locate the witnesses and to show them the statements they made in the course of the original investiga- tion. Each witness was asked to read his statements and to indicate whether they were complete and accurate. If statements were inac- curate, orif a witness was aware of information that was not included, he was asked to make corrections or provide additional information. In addition, where relevant questions had not been asked, the committee asked them. (66) There are inherent limitations in such a process. Any infonnation provided by a witness in 1978 — 15 years after the assassination — must be viewed in light of the passage of time that causes memories to fade and honest accounts to become distorted. Certainly, it cannot be con- sidered with the same reliability as information provided in 1963-64. 50 To the extent that they are based on witness testimony, the conchisions of the committee were vitally affected by the quality of the original investigation. The inconsistencies in the statements — the questions not asked, the witnesses not interviewed — all created problems that defied resolution 15 years after the events in Dallas. Nevertheless, the committee considered all of the witness statements and determined to what extent they corroborated or independently substantiated, or contradicted, the conclusions indicated by the scien- tific evidence. An example of such witness testimony is that relating to the dis- covery of the rifle and shell casings in the Texas School Book Deposi- tory. (Because detailed versions of witness testimony taken in the original investigation are a matter of public record, only brief resumes arc included here.) Deputy Sheriff Luke Mooney testified to the Warren Commission that at approximately 1 p.m. on Novemlx^r 22, 1963, he discovered three spent rifle shells on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. (07) lie stated that he was in the southeast corner of the building when he noticed boxes stacked high in the vicinity of the window. (08) He then squeezed in between a space in the boxes and saw three spent rifle shells in the vicinity of the window. (60) INIooney also told of seeing boxes stacked up avS though they were a prop or rest for a weapon. (70) Deputy Sheriff Eugene Boone told the Warren Commission that he arrived on the sixth floor of the depository subsequent to the dis- coveiy of the three spent rifle shells. (7 J) He said he went to the east end of the floor and began working his way across to the west end, looking in. imder and around l)Oxes and pallets. (7^) At the wall near a row of windows, he noticed a small space between some of the boxes. ^Vlien he squeezed through the opening, he saw a rifle between two rows of boxes. The time was 1 :22 p.m. (73) (c) Firearms evidence The rifle Boone found, a 0.5 millimeter Mannlicher-Carcano, was analyzed by the FBI in 1963-04 and by the committee's firearms panel in 1978, as was the other fireai-ms evidence that was recovered. It was determined in both investigations that the bullet found on a stretcher at Parkland Ilosj^ital had been fired from the rifle found in the depository, as were two fragments recovered from the Presidential limousine. (74) Further, the three cartridge cases found on the sixth floor of the depository were determined to have been fired in the Mannlicher-Carcano.* (75) Through neutron activation analysis, the committee found that the firearms evidence could be even moi-e directly linked to the wounds suffered by the President and Governoi- Connally. It is highly likely that the l)ullet found on the stretcher was the one that ])assed through Governor Connally's wrist, leaving tiny particles behind, and the frag- *The committee firearms panel determined that the evidence stored In the National Archives ballistically matched the bullets fired by the FBI In 1964 tests from the Mannlifhor-fMrciino found by liooiif. Since tlio ritlf liiid bocn t<'st firod numorous tinios sinco 1963, its barrel had been altered by wear, and bullets the panel fired from the rifle did not inatcli fitlior the FI'.I tfst cartridt,'cs or tliosc found on the sixth floor of depository or that foand on the stretcher. 51 merits retrieved from the limousine came from the same bullet as the fragments taken from President Kennedy's brain. (76) Over the years, skepticism has arisen as to whether the rifle foimd in the depository by Boone is the same rifle that was delivered to the Warren Commission and is presently stored in the National Archives. The suspicion has been based to some extent on allegations that police officers who first discovered the rifle identified it as a 7.5 millimeter German Mauser. (77) The controversy was intensified by the allega- tion that various photographs of the rifle, taken at different times, portray inconsistencies with respect to the proportions of the various component parts. (75) To resolve the controversy, the committee assembled a wide range of photographs of the rifle : a police photograph taken Avhere it was found in the depository ; a motion picture film taken by a television station showing the rifle when it was found by the police; a series of photographs of a police officer carrying the rifle from the depository; photographs taken as the rifle was carried through the halls of Dallas Police Department; and photographs taken later by the FBI and Dallas Police Department. (79) The examination by committee photographic consultants determined that all photographs were of the same rifle. Both a study of propor- tions and a comparison of identifying marks indicated that only one rifle was involved. (80) (d) Summary of the evidence In the final analysis, the committee based its finding that the shots that struck President Kennedy were fired from the Texas School Book Depository on the quantity and quality of the evidence, to wit : The findings of forensic pathologists that the shots that hit the President came from behind ; The results of the trajectory analysis that traced the bullets to the vicinity of sixth floor window of the depository ; The conclusion of acoustics experts that the shots came from the vicinity of the sixth floor window of the depository ; The positive identification by firearms experts that the rifle found on the sixth floor of the depository was the one that fired the bullet found on a stretcher at Parkland Hospital and frag- ments retrieved from the Presidential limousine ; The results of neutron activation analysis indicating that it was highly likely that the bullet found on the stretcher at Parkland Hospital was the one that passed through Governor Connally's wrist, and that the fragments found in the limousine were from the bullet that struck the President in the head ; T)ie conclusion of photographic experts that the rifle found in the (lepository was the same one that was repeatedly photographed in November 1963 and that is presently stored at the National Archives. The committee also weighed the firsthand testimony of witnesses but with caution, because of the problem of the passage of time. Besides the statements of law officers on the scene immediately after the assassination, it considered the accounts of bystanders in Dealey Plaza, bearing in mind that these were recollections of fleeting mo- 52 inents when emotions were running ^^ig^i- The committee noted, how- ever, that a number of the Dealey Plaza witnesses said they saw either a rifle or a man with a rifle in the vicinity of the sixth floor southeast corner window of the book depository. .•?. LEE IIAm-EY OSWAIJ) OWXED THE RTFIvE THAT WAS USED TO FIRE THE SHOTS FROM THE SIXTH FLOOR WINDOW OF THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE TEXAS SCHOOL BOOK DEPOSITORY BUILDING The AVarren Commission concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald owned the rifle found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. Since tlie Commission further concluded that Oswald was the assassin of the President, his background is relevant. (a) Biography of Lee Harvey Osioald Oswald was born in New Orleans, La., on October 18, 1939, two months after the death of his father. His mother remarried, and, from 1945 until 1952, the family lived in a number of cities in Texas and Ivouisiana. This marriage ended in divorce when Oswald was nine. In 1952, Oswald and his mother moved to New York City. His school record was marked by chronic truancy, and a psychiatric ex- amination suggested that he was emotionally disturbed. Oswald and his mothei" returned to New Orleans in 1954. After finishing the ninth grade, the 16-year-old Oswald dropped out of school. The following year, he joined the U.S. Marine Corps. Asserting the ill-health and distressing financial situation of his mother, Oswald obtained a release from the Marines in 1959. Follow- ing his discharge, he spent 3 days wuth his mother in Fort Worth, Tex., and then went to New Orleans. From there, he traveled to the Soviet Union where he tried to become a Soviet citizen. In A])ril 1961, Oswald married a 19-year-old Russian woman, Marina Nikolaevna Prusakova, whom he had met while working in Minsk. Having become disillusioned with Soviet life, he returned to the United States with his wife and baby daughter the following year. The Oswalds arrived in Fort Worth, Tex., on June 14, 1962, and soon became acquainted with a number of people in the Dallas-Fort Worth Russian-speaking community. Oswald moved to Dallas in October 1962 where he found a job with a graphic arts company. Marina fol- lowed in November, but their marriage was plagued by intermittent feuding. In March 1963, according to the Warren Commission, Oswald pur- chased aMannlicher-Carcano rifle and telescopic sight from a Chicago mail order house. He also ordered a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson pis- tol from a Los Angeles firm. According to Marina Oswald, he probably used the rifle in an attempt in April to kill Edwin A. Walker, a retired Army general who had been relieved from his post in We.st Germany for distributing rightwing literature to his troops. Walker was not harmed. In April 1963, Oswald went to New Orleans. Meanwhile, Marina and the l)aby moved to the home of a friend, Ruth Paine, in Irving, Tex., in late April. In May, she joined Oswald in New Orleans. On July 19, Oswald was dismissed from his job for inefficiency. In May 53 and June, Oswald had expressed an interest in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. In August, he distributed pro-Castro leaflets and also made two radio broadcasts on behalf of the Castro regime, Marina Oswald and her baby returned to Texas to stay with Ruth Paine in Irving on September 22. Oswald went to Mexico City in the latter part of September. He visited the Russian Embassy and Consulate and the Cuban Consulate there, but he failed to get permission to travel to either country. He re- turned to Dallas on October 3, 1963. He visited Marina in Irving on several occasions but continued to try to find a place to live in Dallas. On October 14, Oswald moved into a roominghouse on North Beckley Avenue in Dallas. He began work at the Texas School Book Deposi- tory 2 days later. On October 20, Marina gave birth to their second daughter. She returned to the Paine home in Irving where Oswald visited on November 1, and from November 8 until November 11. Oswald next visited Marina and his children in Irving on the evening of November 21. He returned to Dallas the following morning. Shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy on Novem- ber 22, 1963, Dallas Patrolman J. D. Tippit was shot and killed. At approximately 2 p.m., Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested in the Texas Theatre. He was subsequently charged in the murder of Tippit and named as a suspect in the Kennedy assassination. On November 24, 1963, while he was being escorted through the basement of Dallas police headquarters in preparation for being trans- ferred to the Dallas County Sheriff's office, Oswald was fatally wounded by a single shot fired from a pistol by Jack Ruby, a Dallas nightclub operator. As noted, the Warren Commission had traced the chain of possession of the alleged assassination rifle and determined that the name on the money order and purchase form used to buy the rifle was "A. Hidell," which it determined to be an alias used by Oswald. (81) It also determined that the rifle was sent to a Dallas post office box rented on October 9, 1962 by Oswald. (5^) Through handwriting analysis, the Commission determined that Oswald had filled out and signed the documents relative to the purchase and receipt of the ri^Q.{83) More- over, the Commission received testimony that Oswald owned a rifle and that it was not in its usual storage place at the residence of Michael and Ruth Paine in Irving, Tex., when police searched the residence on the afternoon of November 22, 1963. (8^) Photographs of Oswald holding a rifle were also recovered from among his personal possessions, and the Commission concluded that the rifle in the photograph was the one found on the sixth floor of the book depository. (55) A palmprint taken from the barrel of the rifle was identified as a latent palmprint of Oswald. (<5i) Copies tend to lose detail and include defects that impair accurate representation of the photographic image. After subjecting these original photographic materials and the camera alleged to have taken the pictures to sophisticated analytical techniques, the photographic evidence panel concluded that it could find no evidence of f akery. (7<9^) Of equal significance, a detailed scientific photographic analysis was conducted by the panel to determine whether the rifle held by Oswald in the backyard photographs was, in fact, the rifle stored at the Na- tional Archives. Tlie panel found a unique identifying mark present on the weapon in the Archives that correlated with a mark visible on the rifle in the Oswald backyard photographs, as well as on the alleged assassination rifle as it appeared in photographs taken after the assassi- nation in 1963. (76>5) In addition to the photographic analysis, the committee was able to employ handwriting analysis to aid in the determination of whether the photograph was authentic. During the course of the committee's investigation, George de Mohrenschildt, who had been a friend of Oswald, committed suicide. The committee, pursuant to a subpena, obtained de Mohrenschildt's personal papers, which included another copy of the Oswald backyard photograph. This copy, unlike any of those previously recovered, had an inscription on the back : "To my dear friend George, from Lee." It was dated April 1963 and signed "Lee Harvey Oswald." (y^*^) In an unpublished manuscript, de Mohrenschildt referred to this copy of the photograph and stated that after his return from Haiti, where he had been at the time of the assassination, he discovered the photograph among personal possessions that he had previously stored in a warehouse. {107) The committee examined the photograph to determine its authenticity and examined the handwriting to determine if Oswald had actually written the inscription and signed it. If Oswald did sign the photograph, his claim that he did not own the rifle and that the photograph was a fake could be discounted. The photographic panel found no evidence of fakery in the back- yard photographs, including the one found in de Mohrenschildt's effects. (76>5) The handwriting on the back of the de Mohrenschildt copy was determined by the questioned documents panel to be identical to all the other documents signed by Oswald, including the fingerprint cards. (76*5) Thus, after submitting the backyard photographs to the photo- graphic and handwriting panels, the committee concluded that there was no evidence of fakery in the photographs and that the rifle in the photographs was identical to the rifle found on the sixth floor of the depository on November 22, 1963. Having resolved these issues, the committee concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald owned the rifle from which the shots that killed President Kennedy were fired. 4. LEE IIARVEY OSWALD, SHORTLY BEFORE THE ASSASSINATION, HAD ACCESS TO AND WAS PRESENT ON THE SIXTH FLOOR OF THE TEXAS SCHOOL BOOK DEPOSITORY BUILDING The Warren Commission found that Lee Harvey Oswald worked principally on the first and sixth floors of the Texas School Book Depository, gathering books listed on orders and delivering them to "Previous studies analyzing the relative lengths of the component parts of rifles shown In various post-assasslnatlon photographs that questioned the Identification of the rifle failed to consider the effect of perspective on the way that an object Is Imaged In a photograph. 57 the shipping room on the first floor. (776>) He had, therefore, ready access to the sixth floor and to the southeast corner window from which the shots were fired. The Commission reached this conclusion by inter- viewing Oswald's supervisors and fellow employees. {Ill) {a) Testimony of school hook depository employees In its investigation, the committee also considered the statements and testimony of employees of the Texas School Book Depository who worked with and super\nsed Oswald. Roy Truly, superintendent of the depository, had stated to the Warren Commission that Oswald "had occasion to go to the sixth floor quite a number of times every day, each day, after books." (i7^) Truly and others testified that Oswald normally had access to the sixth floor of the depository, and a number of them said that they saw and heard Oswald in the vicinity of the sixth floor throughout the morning of November 22, 1963. (iivald to have attempted to infiltrate anti-Castro Cuban organiza- tions. (75<9) But the significant point is that regardless of his purpose for joining, it is another example of the dominance of political activity in Oswald's life. A short time before the assassination of the President, Oswald traveled to Mexico City, where he went to the Cuban Consulate and indicated an intense desire to travel to Cuba and Russia. (757) Once again, it appears that Oswald was ready to leave his family and his country to fulfill a political goal. Precisely why Oswald wanted to go to Cuba or Russia is not known, but it was certainly of significance that he chose those particular countries, both of which are Marxist. Finally, in considering the extent to which Oswald acted on behalf of his political beliefs, the Walker shooting also was relevant. As dis- cussed above, the committee concluded that Oswald attempted to murder Major General Walker in April 1963. In the city of Dallas, no one figure so epitomized anticommunism as General Walker, Consider- ing the various activities to which Oswald devoted his time, his efforts and his very existence. General Walker could be readily seen as "an ultimate enemy." It is known that Oswald was willing to risk death for liis beliefs, so it is certainly not unreasonable to find that he might at- tempt to kill Walker, a man who was intensely opposed to his ideology. In analyzing Oswald's possible political motive, the committee con- sidered the fact that as one's position in the political spectrum moves 63 far enough to the left or right, what may otherwise be recognized as strikingly dissimilar viewpoints on the spectrum may be viewed as ideologically related. President Kennedy and General Walker hardly shared a common political ideology. As seen in terms of American po- litical thinking. Walker was a staunch conservative while the Presi- dent was a liberal. It can be argued, however, that from a Marxist's perspective, they could be regarded as occupying similar positions. Where Walker was stridently anti-Communist, Kennedy was the leader of the free world in its fight against communism. Walker was a militarist. Kennedy had ordered the invasion of Cuba and had moved to within a hairsbreadth of nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis. Consequently, it may be argued that Oswald could have seen Walker and Kennedy in the same ideological light. The depth and direction of Oswald's ideological commitment is, therefore, clear. Politics was the dominant force in his life right down to the last days when, upon being arrested for the assassination, he re- quested tobe represented by a lawyer prominent for representing Com- munists. Although no one specific ideological goal that Oswald might liave hoped to achieve by the assassination of President Kennedy can be shown with confidence, it appeared to the committee that his domi- nant motivation, consistent with his known activities and beliefs, must have been a desire to take political action. It seems reasonable to con- clude that the best single explanation for the assassination was his con- ception of political action, rooted in his twisted ideological view of himself and the world around him. B. Scientific Acoustical Evidence Establishes a High Probability That Two Gunmen Fired at President John F. Kennedy ; Other Scientific Evidence Does Not Preclude the Possibility of Two Gun]men Firing at the President ; Scientific Evidence Negates Some Specific Conspiracy Allegations The committee tried to take optimum advantage of scientific analysis in exploring issues concerning the assassination. In many cases, it was believed that scientific information would be the most reliable infor- mation available, since some witnesses had died and the passage of time had caused the memories of remaining witnesses to fail and caused other problems affecting the trustworthiness of their testimony. As noted in the preceding section of this report, the committee turned to science as a major source of evidence for its conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots from the Texas School Book De- pository, two of which hit President Kennedy. The evidence that was most relied upon was developed by committee panels specializing in the fields of forensic pathology, ballistics, neutron activation, analysis, handwriting identification, photography and acoustics. Of these, acoustics — a science that involves analysis of the nature and origin of sound impulses — indicated that the shots from the book depository were not the only ones fired at President Kennedy. (a) Warren Commission analysis of a tape The Warren Commission had also employed scientific analysis in its investigation and had recognized that acoustics might be used to re- solve some questions about the shots fired at the President. It had obtained a tape recording, an alleged on-the-scene account of the assas- sination made by Sam Pate, a Dallas radio newsman, but an FBI examination of the tape "failed to indicate the presence of any sounds which could be interpreted as gunshots." (i) The FBI also informed the Commission that the newsman had stated that most of the tape was not recorded in Dealey Plaza at the time of the assassination, but was recorded in a studio several days later after he had been dismissed by his station, KBOX.(^) The Commission independently submitted the tape for analysis to Dr. Lawrence Kersta of Bell Telephone Acoustics & Speech Eesearch Laboratory. As reported in a letter from Kersta to the Commission on July 17, 1964,(5) spectograms (visual representations of tonal qualities in the sounds) were made of a key 8-second portion of the tape. The spectograms indicated there were six nonvoiced noises — one nonvoiced "spike" (a scientific term for a graphic display of a noise) followed by three other nonvoiced spikes of different acoustical characteristics occurring .86 seconds, 1.035 seconds and 1.385 seconds after the first. These, in turn, were followed by two events apparently caused by sound and believed to have been related to the previous ones. (65) Dr. Korsta did not indicate in his letter that he had found shots, and the results of his tests were not mentioned in the Warren Report. The committee was unable to locate the Kersta spectographs in the National Archives until late 1978 (they had been misfiled), but it did obtain the tape recording made on November 22, 1963, by KBOX reporter Sam Pate. On May 11, 1978, the committee submitted the tape to an acoustical consultant for analysis, with these results :(^) While a portion of the tape was recorded on November 22, 1963, in the vicinity of Dealey Plaza, it was thought not to be con- temporaneous with the assassination. Other portions of the tape, moreover, seemed to have been recorded, at least in large part, in a studio, since appropriate background noise was not present. And even if the tape had been made during the firing of the shots and had recorded them, Kersta's spectographic analysis would not have found them. The committee's consultant advised that spectographic analysis is appropriate only for detecting tonal, or harmonic, sound. To identify a gunshot, the analysis must be able to portray a waveform on an oscilloscope or similar such device. (h ) Dallas Police Department recordings To resolve questions concerning the number, timing, and origin of the shots fired in Dealey Plaza, the committee asked its acoustical consultant to examine recordings not analyzed acoustically by the Warren Commission, specifically, Dallas Police Department dispatch transmissions for November 22, 1963.^ These transmissions, received over the police radio network from officers in the field, were recorded at Dallas police headquarters. Two recording systems were in use at the time — a Dictabelt for channel 1, and a Gray Audograph disc recording for channel 2.^ {5) The committee held 2 days of public hearings — on September 11, 1978 and December 29, 1978 — in which it attempted to present the essential evidence from the acoustical analysis. Because of time limita- tions, itwas not possible to present all of the evidence in the hearings. (1) Analysis hy Bolt Beranek and Nenynian. — In order to identify the nature and origin of sound impulses in a recording, acoustical analysis may include, among other means of examination, a delinea- tion and study of the shape of its electrical waveforms and a precise measurement and study of the timing of impulses on the recording. In May 1978, the committee contracted with Bolt Beranek and New- man Inc. (BBN) of Cambridge, Mass., to perform this sort of anal- chief ysis. The study was supervised by Dr. James E. Barger, the firm's scientist. Bolt Beranek and Newman specializes in acoustical analysis and performs such work as locating submarines by analyzing underwater sound impulses. It pioneered the technique of using soimd recordings 1 Transcripts of thf> nnlln* flispntch transmissions had hnon providod to tho Warron Commission by the FBI and the Dallas Police Department. They were used to resolve issues not rolat^'d to tlio nniiitj) BBN was asked to examine the channel 1 Dictabelts and the tape that was made of them to see if it could determine : (1) if they were, in fact, recorded transmissions from a motorcycle with a microphone stuck in the "on" position in Dealey Plaza; (2) if the sounds of shots had been, in fact, i^corded; (3) tlie number of shots; (4) the time in- terval between the shots; (5) the location of the weapon or weapons used to fire the shots; and (6) the type of weapon or weapons used. BBN converted the sounds on the tape into digitized waveforms and produced a visual representation of the waveforms. (7i) By em- ploying sophisticated electronic filters, BBN filtered out "repetitive noise," such as repeated firings of the pistons of a motorcycle engine, (i^) It then examined the tape for "sequences of impulses" that might be significant. (A "sequence of impulses" might be caused by a loud noise — such as gunfire — followed by the echoes from that 3 Prior to the BBN analysis of the original Dictabelt and tapes, the firm was given a tape that had been supplied to the committee by a Warren Commission critic in the belief that it was an original. BBN determined that this tape was a second generation copy of the original. Because it was an imperfect copy, it was not used in the BBN work. (6) 43-112 0 - 7< loud noise.) Six sequences of impulses that could have been caused by a noise such as gunfire were initially identified as having been transmitted over channel 1. (JS) Thus, they warranted further analysis. These six sequences of impulses, or impulse patterns, were subjected to preliminary screening tests to determine if any could be conclu- sively determined not to have been caused by gunfire during the assassination. The screening tests were designed to answer the follow- ing questions : (i^) Do the impulse patterns, in fact, occur during the period of the assassination ? Are the impulse patterns unique to the period of the assassina- tion ? Does the span of time of the impulse patterns approximate the duration of tlie assassination as indicated by a preliminary analy- sis of the Zapruder film? (Are there at least 5.6 seconds between the first and last impulse ? *) Does the shape of the impulse patterns resemble the shape of impulse patterns produced when the sound of gunfire is recorded through a radio transmission system comparable to the one used for the Dallas police dispatch network ? Are the amplitudes of the impulse patterns similar to those pro- duced when the sound of gunfire is recorded through a transmis- sion system comparable to the one used for the Dallas police dis- patch network? All six impulse patterns passed the preliminary screening tests. (15) BBN next recommended that the committee conduct an acoustical reconstruction of the assassination in Dealey Plaza to determine if any of the six impulse patterns on the dispatch tape were caused by shots and, if so, if the shots were fired from the Texas School Book Deposi- tory or the grassy knoll. {16) The reconstruction would entail firing from two locations in Dealey Plaza — the depository and the knoll — at particular target locations and recording the sounds through nu- merous microphones. The purpose was to determine if the sequences of impluses recorded during the reconstruction would match any of those on the dispatch tape. If so, it would be possible to determine if the impulse patterns on the dispatch tape were caused by shots fired during the assassination from shooter locations in the depository and on the knoll. (77) The theoretical rationale for the reconstruction was as follows: The sequence of impulses from a gunshot is caused by the noise of the shot, followed by several echoes. Each combination of shooter lo- cation, target location and microphone location produces a sequence of uniquely spaced impulses. At a given microphone location, there would be a unique sequence of impulses, depending on the location of the noise source (gunfire) and the target, and the urban environment of the surrounding area (echo-producing stnictures in and surround- ing Dealey Plaza) . The time of arrival of the echoes would be the * The ii.G-spoond standard was baspd on a prpliminary pxamination of the Zapriulpr film that showed evidence of Kennedy and Connally reacting to their wounds. The difference Ijptwpcn approxiinatp impact iiioiiH'iits was i-alculatcd iisint; thf is.. 'I fi-aiiic |ipr spcond ratp of tlip Zajinidpr fariH-ra. This ."i.O spcoiid standard was dprivi-atrhps), 88 nprcpnt acain for imnnlsp nattern two (thrpp matchps) and a 75 nprcpnt rhancp that iTipnlsp nattprn four rpprpspntpd a shot from thP dpnositorv (two matchps^ {\n) At the timp of his tpstimony in Spptpmhpr 1978. Bareer pstimated that the probability of all four impulses actually representing gunshots was only 2'J percent. (l,h) 73 point indicated by Barker's tests, it was possible for Weiss and Asch- ke^asy to predict precisely what impulse sequences (sound finger- prints) would have been created by various specific shooter and micro- phone locations in 1963. (4<5) (The major structures in Dealey Plaza in 1978 were located as they had been in 1963.) AVeiss and Aschkenasy determined the time of sound travel for a series of sound trianorles whose three points were shooter location, microphone location and echo-generatino; structure location. While the location of the structures would remain constant, the different combinations of shooter and mi- crophone locations would each produce a unique sound travel pattern, or sound fingerprint. {If9) losing this procedure, Weiss and Aschkenasy could compare acoustical fingerprints for numerous precise points in the grassy knoll area with the segment identified by Barger on the dis- patch tape as possibly reflecting a shot fired from the knoll. (-56^) ^" Because Weiss and Aschkenasy could analytically construct what the impulse sequences would be at numerous specific shooter and micro- ph'^ne locations, they decided to look for a match to the 1963 police dispatch tape that correlated to within ±1/1.000 of p second, as op- posed to 7^6/1.000 of a second, as Banker had done.(.5i) By looking for a match with such T^recision, they considerably reduced the possi- bility that any match they found could have been caused by random or other noise, (5.^) thus substantially reducing the percentage proba- bility of an invalid match. Weiss and Aschkenasy initially pinpointed a combination of shooter- microphone locations for which the early impulses in pattern three matched those on the dispatch tape quite well, although later impulses in the pattern did not. Similarly, they found other microphone loca- tions for which later imoulses matched those on the dispatch tape, while the earlier ones did not. They then realized that a microphone mounted on a motorcycle or other vehicle would not have remained stationary during the period it was receiving the echoes. They com- puted that the entire impulse pattern or sequence of echoes they were analyzing on the dispatch tape occurred over approximately three- tenths of a second, during which time the motorcycle or other vehicle would have, at 11 miles per hour, traveled about five feet. By taking into account the movement of the vehicle. Weiss and Aschkenasy were able to find a sequence of impulses representing a shot from the grassy knoll in the reconstruction that matched both the early and late im- pulses on the dispatch tape. (-7-3') Approximately 10 feet from the point on the grassy knoll that was picked as the shooter location in the 1978 reconstruction and four feet from a m'crophone matched the dispatch location tape which, within Barger found, ±6/1,000 of arecorded a shot that second, Weiss and Aschkenasy found a combination of shooter and microphone locations they needed to solve the problem. It represented the initial position of a microphone that would have received a series of impulses matching those on the dispatch tape to within ±1/1.000 of a second. The micro- phone would have been mounted on a vehicle that was moving along the motorcade route at 11 miles per hour, (o.^) Weiss and Aschkenasy also considered the distortion that a wind- shield might cause to the sound impulses received by a motorcycle w Weiss and Aschkenasy examined only the impulse sequence that Bareer indicated had come from the grassy knoll. Due to time constraints, they did not analyze the three Im- pulse sequences indicating shots fired from the Texas School Book Depository. 74 microphone. They reasoned that the noise from the initial muzzle blast of a shot would be somewhat muted on the tape if it traveled throuf^h the windshield to the microphone. Test firings conducted un- der the auspices of the New York City Police Department confirmed this hypothesis. Further, an examination of the dispatch tape reflected similar distortions on shots one, two, and three, when the indicated positions of the motorcycle would have placed the windshield between tJie shooter and the microphone. ^^ On shot four, Weiss and Aschkenasy found no such distortion. (oJ) The analysts' ability to predict the ef- fect of the windshield on the impulses found on the dispatch tape, and havino- their predictions confirmed by the tape, indicated further that the microphone was mounted on a motorcycle in Dealey Plaza and that it liad transmitted the sounds of the shots fired during the assassination. Since Weiss and Aschkenasy were able to obtain a match to within ±1/1,000 of a second, the probability that such a match could occur by random chance was slight. Specifically, they mathematically com- puted that, with a certainty factor of 95 percent or better, there was a shot fired at the Presidential limousine from the grassy knoll. (-5^) Barger independently reviewed the analysis performed by Weiss and Aschkenasy and concluded that their analytical procedures were correct. (-57) Barger and the staff' at BBX also confirmed that there was a 95 percent chance that at the time of the assassination a noise as loud as a rifle shot was produced at the grassy knoll. AVhen questioned about M-hat could cause such a noise if it were not a shot, Barger noted it had to be something capable of causing a very loud noise — greater than a single firecracker. (r5t9) Further, given the echo patterns ob- tained, the noise had to have originated at the very spot behind the picket fence on the grassy knoll that had been identified, (5P) indicat- ing that it could not have been a backfire from a motorcycle in the motorcade. (^^) In addition, Barger emphasized, the first part of the sequence of im- j)ulses idcntifiod as a shot from the grassy knoll was marked by an X-wave, a characteristic impulse caused by a supersonic bullet. (61) The X-wave, also referred to as a supersonic shock wave, travels faster than the noise of the muzzle blast of a gun and therefore arrives at a listening device such as a microphone ahead of the noise of a muzzle blast. The presence of the X-wave was, therefore, a significant addi- tional indication that the third impulse on the police dispatch tape represented gunfire, and, in particular, a supersonic bullet. (tf^) The weapon may well have been a rifle, since most pistols — except for some, such as a .44 magnum — fire subsonic bullets. The X-wave was further substantiation for a finding that the third impulse repre>ented a shot fired in the direction of the President. Had the gim been discharged when aimed straight up or down, or away from the motorcade, no X-wavo would have appeared. (6'J) Of the im- pulse patterns on the dispatch tape that indicated shots from the book depository, those that would be expected to contain an X-wave, given the location of the vehicle's microphone, did so, further corroborating the conclusion that these impulses did represent supersonic bullets. {6/i) 11 T'p mo^^orcvflf. vas tmvpllni.' 120 fopt bohlnrl tho Prpsldentlal limousine when the shots were fired. This put shots one and two from the hook depository, as well as shot three from the grassy knoll, in front of the motorcycle windshield. 75 When questioned about the probability of the entire third impulse pattern rej:) resent in's. The first assumed the fourth shot was the fatal head shot to the President and occurred at frame 312. Its results are as follows: (76*7) Bullet reached Acoustical determi- limousine at Za- nation of source Channel time pruder frame No. of impulse Impulse pattern I.. 12-30-47.0 157-161 TSBD Impulse pattern II.. 12:30:48.6 188-191 TSBD. Impulse pattern III. 12:20 54.6 295-296 Grrssy knoll. Impulse pattern IV. 12:30:55.3 312 TSBD. The committee believed that the fourth impulse pattern probably reepresented that fatal liead shot to the President that hit at Zapruder frame 312. Nevertheless, the possibility of frame 312 representing the shot fired from the grassy knoll, with the fourth shot consequently oc- curring atframe 328, was also considered. The problem with this pos- dencesibility thatisthat it appeared established to be that all the inconsistent with o*^her shots that struck scientific and the President evi- the Governor came from the Texas School Book Depository. The forensic pathology panel concluded that there was no evidence that the President or Governor was hit by a bullet fired from the grassy knoll and that only two bullets, each fired from behind, struck them. (7^.^) Further, neutron activation analysis indicated that the bullet fragments removed from (lovernor Connally's wrist during sur- gery, those removed from the President's brain during the autopsy, and those found in the limousine were all very likely fragments from ]NIann- licher-Carcano bullets. {103) It was also found that there was evidence of only two bullets among all the specimens tested — the fragments re- moved from Governor Connally's wrist during surgery were very likely from the almost whole bullet found on the stretcher at Parkland Hos- pital, and the fragments removed from the President's brain during the autopsy very likely matched bullet fragments found in the limou- sine. (7^4) The neutron activation analysis findings, when combined with the finding of the committee that the almost whole bullet found on the .stretcher at Parkland Hospital as well as the larger fragment found in the limousine were fired from Oswald's Mannlicher-Carcano rifle. (7(95) established that only two bullets struck the President and the Governor, and each was fired from the rifle found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository and owned by Oswald. The committee considered whether proper synchronization of the tape to the film should assume that the shot from the grassy knoll hit the President at Za^jruder from 312. It did so l)ocause Dr. Michael Ba- den, chairman of the committee's forensic })athology panel, acknowl- edged there was a possibility, although highly i-emote, that the head wound depicted in Zapruder frame 312 could have been caused by a shot from the grassy knoll, and that medical evidence of it had been de- stroyed bya shot from the rear a fraction of a second later. {106) ^'^ The "In addition, the blur nnnlysis conductfd by thp photopraphif pvidcnce pnnol appoared to bp morp fonsistpnt with the Rrnssy knoll st>ot strikintr the President. Tlie analysis re- flected no sipnifirant panning' errors bv Zapruder after frame 200. Siuh errors would have iippn exi)eeted if the third f^'rassy knoll) siiot occurrpd (1.7 second bpfore tlie fatal head sliot. Assumintr the head shot was tiie jrrassy knoll shot, Zapruder made sienlficant nanninp er- rors after both tlie third and fourth shots. (See Blur Analysis. Appendi.\ to the HSCA-JFK hearings, vol. VI, par. 81ff.) 81 significance of this, the committee reasoned, was the realization that it could mean that the President's fatal head wound was caused by the shooter from the grassy knoll, not Oswald. Since the medical, ballistics and neutron activation analysis evidence, taken together, established that the President was struck by two bullets fired from Oswald's rifle found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository, the committee sought to determine if such shots could have struck the President, given the known position of his body, even if the grassy knoll shot struck him at Zapruder frame 312. The results of correlating the acoustical tape to the film, assuming the shot from the knoll was at Zapruder frame 312, are as follows :{107) Acoustical determination Zapruder frame of origin TSBD. Impulse pattern I.. TSBD. 173-177 205-208 Impulse pattern II.. Impulse pattern III. Grassy knoll. TSBD. Impulse pattern IV. 312 328-329 It was determined by medical, ballistics and neutron activation evidence that the President was struck in the head by a buHot fired from a rifle found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Deposi- tory. For that bullet to have destroyed the medical evidence of the President being hit at Zapruder frame 312, it would have had to have struck at Zapruder frame 328-329. But a preliminary trajectory analy- 329 sis, based onto the failed President's track location to a shooter and sixth in the body floor position at framecorner southeast 328- window of the depository within a minimum margin of error radius, (i6>5) thus indicating it was highly unlikely the President was struck in the head at Zapruder frame 328 by a shot fired from the sixth floor southeast corner window of the depository. Further, there is no visual evidence in the Zapruder film of the President being struck in the head at Zapruder frames 173-177 or 205-208, the frames at which shots one and two would have been fired if the shot from the knoll was a hit to the head at frame 312. Accordingly, if tlie shot from the grassy knoll occurred at frame 312, no shot fired from the Texas School Book Depository would have struck the President in the head at any time. Such a finding is contrary to the weight of the scientific evidence. The committee concluded, therefore, that the shot fired from the grassy knoll was not the shot visually represented at Zapruder frame 312; that the shot from the grassy knoll missed President Ken- nedy; ^^ and that the most accurate synchronization of the tape and the film would be one based on a correlation of impulse pattern four on the tape with the fatal head shot to the President at frame 312 of the Zapruder film. When the tape and film are so synchronized, the sequence on the film corroborated or substantiated tlie timing of the shots indicated on the 1963 tape. According to the more logical vSynchronization, the first shot would have occurred at approximately Zapruder frame 160. This would also "The committee noted there was no physical evidence of where a shot from the grassy knoll might have hit. Since a shot from the Texas School Book Depository hit the President in the head less than one second after the shot from the knoll, there would have been little apparent reason for a gunman on the knoll to fire a second shot. 82 be consistent with the testimony of Governor Connally, who stated that he heard the first shot and began to turn in response to it. {109) His reactions, as shown in Zapruder frames 162-167, reflect the start of a rapid head movement from left to right. {110) The photographic evidence panel's observations were also relevant to the acoustics data that indicated that the second shot hit the lim- ousine's occupants at about Zapruder frames 188-191. The panel noted that at approximate! V Zapruder frame 200 the President's movements suddenly freeze, as his right hand seemed to stop abruptly in the midst of a waving motion. Then, during frames 200-202, his head moves rapidly from right to left. The sudden interruption of the President's hand-waving motion, coupled with his rapid head movements, was considered by the photographic panel as evidence of President Ken- nedy's reaction to some "severe external stimulus." {Ill) Finally, the panel observed that Governor Connally's actions dur- ing frames 222-226, as he is seen emerging from behind the sign that obstructed Zapruder's view, indicated he was also reacting to some "severe external stimulus." ^® {112) Based upon this observation and upon the positions of President Kennedy and Governor Connally within the limousine, the panel concluded that the relative alinement of the two men was consistent with the theory that they had been struck by the same bullet. (i7K>ok depository. An analysis by the committee of the statements of witnesses in Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963, moreover, showed that al)out 44 percent were not able to form an opinion about the origin of the shots,(77-i) attesting to the ambiguity showed in the Augvist 1978 experiment. Seventy i)ercent of the witnesses in 1963 who had an opinion as to origin said it was either the book depository or the grassy knoll.2i(77^) Those witnesses who thought the shots originated from the grassy knoll represented 30 percent of those who chose between the knoll and the book' depository and 21 percent of those who ma6.3. The rumor was not founded on fact. In addition. Hunt gave the com- mittee a sworn deposition (179) in which he denied the allegation, and the committee found no evidence that contradicted Hunt's derosition. 92 tion, the committee independently determined that Clirisinan was not in Dealey Plaza on the day of the assassination. (7^i2) The committee sought,' by employing scientific analysis, to explore other allegations of conspiratonal activity. Estahlishing the authen- ticity of the autopsy photographs and X-rays Avas of fundamental importance, not only becaus? these evidentiary materials were a pri- mary basis for the committee's findings concerning the nature and causes of the President's head Avounds, but because allegations that they had been altered raised implications of a Avide-based conspiracy operating at high levels of the U.S. Government. As it has been noted, the committee found that the X-rays and photographs had not been altered. Another conspiratorial theory that implied there was an extensive and sophisticated conspiracy rested on the allegation that the photographs of OsAvald in his backyard holding a rifle Avere com- posites. Similar conspiratorial implications Avere raised by the allega- tion that the rifle currently in the National Archives Avas a different rifle than that seen in the backyard photographs of OsAvald Avith the rifle, as Avell as other photographs of the rifle taken on NoA^ember 22 and November 2o, 1963. As discussed in s?ction A 3, scientific analysis performed by the committee refuted each of these allegations. (i55) The final conspiratorial theory the committee investigated by scien- tific analysis Avas the so-called "tAvo OsAvald thoGi->\" This Avas an assertion by some critics that the I.ecause of thcs;> impediments to accuracy, the use of height charts in pictures is no longer a coinmon practice in laAv enforcement or industrial security \\oYk.{189) The committee also engaged the services of three handwriting ex- perts to explore the "tAvo OsAvald theory." These experts vicAved docu- examined ments documents purported to have from been Avritten'by the yeai-s Lee1963 1956 to Harvey Oswald. ifThey to determine the handwriting of the man Avho joined the Marines in 1956 AA'as the same as that of the man Avho had applied for a passport in 1959, tried to re- voke his American citizenship in 1959, returned to the United States in 1962. journeyed to Mexico in late September 1963, and ordered the rifle which was found on the sixtli floor of the Texas School Book De- pository on November 22, 1963. A careful examination of these docu- ments demonstrated that the man who signed those items was the same man throughout the entire 7-year period. (7.9(?) Accordingly, on the basis of the committee's scientific analysis, there was no evidence to support the allegation that the Lee Harvey Oswald who returned from Russia in 1962 was a different person than the Lee Harvey Os- wald who defected to Russia in 1959. (/) Summary of the evidence Where it was available, the committee extensively employed scien- tific analysis to assist it in the resolution of numerous issues. The com- mittee considered all the other evidence available to evaluate the sci- entific analysis. In conclusion, the committee found that the scientific accoustical evidence established a high probability that two gunmen fired at President John F. Kennedy. Other scientific evidence did not preclude the possibility of two gunmen firing at the President, but it did negate some specific conspiracy allegations. C. The Committee Believes, ox the Basis of the Evidence Avail- able TO It, That President John F. Kennedy Was Probably As- sas inated AS A Result of a Conspiracy. The Committee is Unable To Identify the Other Gunman or the Extent of the Conspiracy Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once simply defined conspiracy as "a partnership in criminal purposes."' (i) That defini- tion is adequate. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to set out a more precise definition. If two or more individuals agreed to take action to kill President Kennedy, and at least one of them took action in fur- therance of tli3 plan, and it resulted in President Kennedy's death, the President A/ould have been assassinated as a result of a conspiracy. The committee recognizes, of course, that Avhile the word "con- spiracy" technically denotes only a "partnership in criminal pur- poses," italso, in fact, connotes widely varying meanings to many peo- ple, and its use has vastly differing societal implications depending upon the sophistication, extent and ultimate purpose of the partner- ship. For example, a conspiracy to assassinate a President might be a complex plot orchestrated by foreign political powers; it might be the scheme of a group of American citizens dissatisfied with particular governmental policies; it also might be the plan of two largely isolated individuals with no readily discernible motive. Conspiracies may easily range, therefore, from those with important implications for social or governmental institutions to those with no major societal significance. As the evidence concerning the probability that President Kennedy was assassinated as a result of a "conspiracy" is analyzed, these various connotations of the word "conspiracy" and distinctions between them ought to be constanth^ borne in mind. Here, as elsewhere, words must be used carefully, lest people he misled.^ A conspiracy cannot be said to have existed in Dealey Plaza unless evidence exists from which, in Justice Holmes' words, a "partnership in criminal purposes" may be inferred. The Warren Commission's conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald was not involved in a conspiracy to assassinate the President was, for example, largely based on its findings of the absence of evidence of significant association (2) be- tween Oswald and other possible conspirators and no physical evi- dence of conspiracy. (5) The Commission reasoned, quite rightly, that in the absence of association or physical evidence, there was no conspiracy. Even without physical evidence of conspiracy at the scene of the assassination, there would, of course, be a conspiracy if others assisted Oswald in his efforts. Accordingly, an examination of Oswald's asso- ciates is necessary. The Warren Commission recognized that a first premise in a finding of conspiracy may be a finding of association. Because the Commission did not find any significant Oswald associ- 1 It might he supRested that hecause of the widely varying meanings attached to the word "conspiracy," it ought to be avoided. Such a suggestion, however, raises another objec- tion— the search for euphemistic variations can lead to a lack of candor. There is virtue in seeing something for what it is, even if the plain truth causes discomfort. (95) 96 ates, it was not compelled to face the difficult questions posed by such a findinfj. More than association is required to establish conspiracy. There must be at least knowing assistance or a manifestation of agree- ment to the criminal purpose by the associate. It is important to realize, too, that the term "associate'' may con- note widely varying meanings to different people. A person's asrociate may be his next door neighbor and vacation companion, or it may be an individual he has met only once for the purpose of discussing a contract for a murder. The Warren Commission examined Oswald's past and concluded he was essentially a loner. (^) It reasoned, there- fore, that since Oswald had no significant associations with persons who could have been involved with him in the assassination, there could not have been a conspiracy. (.'7) With respect to Jack Ruby,- the Warren Commission similarly found no significant associations, either between Ruby and Oswald or between Ruby and others who might have been conspirators with him.(<5) In particular, it found no connections between Ruby and or- ganized crime, and it reasoned that absent such associations, there was no conspiracy to kill Oswald or the President. (5) The committee conducted a three-pronged investigation of con- spiracy in the Kennedy assassination. On the basis of extensive sci- entific analysis and an analysis of the testimony of Dealey Plaza wit- nesses, the committee found there was a high probability that two gunuien fired at President Kennedv. Second, the committee explored Oswald's and Ruby's contacts for anv evidence of significant nssociations. TTnlike the Wnrren C'^m- mission, it found certain of these contacts to be of investigative sig- nificance. The Commission pnparently had looked for evidence of con- spiratorial association. Finding none on the face of the associations it investignted, it did not go further. The committee, however, con- ducted a wider ranging investigation. Notwithstanding the possibil- ity of a benign reason for contact between Oswald or Ruby and one of their associates, the committee examined the very fact of the con- tact to see if it contained investigative significance. Unlike the Warren Commission, the committee took a close look at the associates to deter- mine whether conspiratorial activity in the jissassination could have been possible, given what the committee could learn about the associ- ates, and whethei- tho anparent nature of the contact should, therefore, bo examined more closely.^ Third, the committee examined groups — political organizations, na- tional governments and so on — that mi^ht have had the motive, op- portunity and means to assassinate the President. The committee, therefore, directly introduced the hypothesis of conspiracy and investigated it with reference to known facts to de- termine ifit had any bearing on the assassination. 2 Thf Warren rommii?sion devoted its Appendix XVI to a hiojjraphy of .Tnrk R»iby in which his family baciiffround, psycholoRical maiieup. education and business activities were considered. While the evidence was sometimes contradictory, the Commission found that Ruby grew up in Chicago, the son of Jewish immiprants ; that he lived in a home disrupted hy dome-tic strife; (61 that he was troubled psvcholo<.'ically as a vouth and not educated bevond hicrh sc»^ool : f>nd that descriptions of bi>! temperament ranped from "mUd mannered" to "violent." (7) In IftG."?. Rn^^y was 52 and unmarred. He rnn a Dallas niirhtc'ub hut was not particularly successful in business His acquaintances included a number of Dpllas police officers who frequented his nightclub, as well as other types of people who comprised hii clientele. 3 The committee found associations of both Ruby and Oswald that were unknowm to the Warren Commission. 97 The committee examined a series of major groups or organizations that have been alleged to have been involved in a conspiracy to assas- sinate the President. If any of these groups or organizations, as a group, had been involved in the assassination, the conspiracy to assas- sinate President Kennedy would have been one of major significance. As will be detailed in succeeding sections of this report, the commit- tee did not find sufficient evidence that any of these groups or organi- zations were involved in a conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination. Accordingly, the committee concluded, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that the Soviet government, the Cuban government, anti-Castro Cuban groups, and the national svndicate of organized crime were not involved in the assassination. Further, the committee found that the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency were not involved in the assassination. Based on the evidence available to it, the committee could not pre- clude the possibility that individual members of anti-Castro Cuban groups or the national syndicate of organized crime were invohed in the assassination. There was insufficient evidence, however, to sup- port afinding that any individual members were involved. The rami- fications of a conspiracy involving such individuals would be signifi- cant, although of perhaps less import than would be the case if 9, group itself, the national syndicate, for example, had been involved. The committee recognized that a finding that two gunmen fired si- multaneously atthe President did not, by itself, estalDlish that there was a conspiracy to assassinate the President. It is theoretically possi- ble that the gunmen were acting independently, each totally unaware of the other. It was the committee's opinion, however, that such a theo- retical possibility is extremely remote. The more logical and probable inference to be drawn from two gimmen firing at the same person at the same time and in the same place is that they were acting in con- cert, that is, as a result of a conspiracy. The committee found that, to be precise and loyal to the facts it established, it was compelled to find that President Kennedy was probably killed as a result of a conspiracy. The committee's finding that President Kennedy was probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy was premised on four factors : (1) Since the Warren Commission's and FBI's investigation into the possibility of a conspiracy was seriously flawed, their failure to develop evidence of a conspiracy could not be given independent weight. (2) The Warren Commission was, in fact, incorrect in con- cluding that Oswald and Ruby had no significant associations, and therefore its finding of no conspiracy was not reliable. (3) While it cannot be inferred from the significant associa- tions of Oswald and Ruby that any of the major groups examined by the committee were involved in the assassination, a more lim- ited conspiracy could not be ruled out. (4) There was a high probability that a second gunman, in fact, fired at the President. At the same time, the committee candidly stated, in expressing its finding of conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination, that it was "un- able to identify the other gunman or the extent of the conspiracy." The photographic and other scientific evidence available to the com- mittee was insufficient to permit the committee to answer these ques- tions. In addition, the committee's other investigative efforts did not develop evidence from which Oswald's conspirator or conspirators could be firmly identified. It is possible, of course, that the extent of the conspiracy was so limited that it involved only Oswald and the second gunman. The committee was not able to reach such a con- clusion, for it would have been based on speculation, not evidence. Aspects of the investigation did suggest that the conspiracy may have been relatively limited, but to state with precision exactly how small was not possible. Other aspects of the committee's investigation did suggest, however, that while the conspiracy may not have involved a major group, it may not have been limited to only two people. These aspects of the committee's investigation are discussed elsewhere. If the conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy was limited to Oswald and a second gunman, its main societal significance may be in the realization that agencies of the U.S. Government inadequately investigated the possibility of such a conspiracy. In terms of its im- plications for government and society, an assassination as a conse- quence of a conspiracy composed solely of Oswald and a small number of persons, possibly only one, and possibly a person akin to Oswald in temperament and ideology, would not have been fundamentally different from an assassination by Oswald alone.* * If the conspiracy was, in fact, limited to Oswald, the second gunman, and perhaps one or r\>o oi,.(rs. Hip loinniitipp he^pves It was j)ossiI)le tlie.v shared Oswald's left-wing political pensity disposition. A consistent for actions with politicalpattern in Oswald's overtones. life (see It is quite lilielysection A 5)assassination that an was a pro- conspiracy liniltpfl to Os.nlrl nnil n fp..- a . o,intp< v as :n ! pppinp with that ji ttprn. Further, it is possible that associates of Oswald In the Kennedy assassination had been in- volved with him in earllpr activities. Two possibiliiies : the altempt on the life of (Jen. Edwinture inA.August Walker1963. in April With 196'^ and to respect the the distribution of Fair Play Walker incident, there forwasTuba Conimittppevidence substantial litera- that Oswald did the shooting (section A 5'), although at the time of the shooting it was not sufficient to Implicate Oswald or anyone else. It was not until after the Kennedy assassina- tion that Oswald became a suspect in the Walker attack, based on the testimony of his widow shot at Marina.Walker Marina's alone thancharacterization of Oswaldalthough his having assistance, is more atconsistent the time withof thehisshooting having there was testimony that tended to indicate more than one person was involved. Further, it is not necessary to believe all of what Marina said about the incident or to believe that Oswald told her all there was to know, since either of them might have been concealing the involvement of others. According to a general offense report of the Dallas police, Walker reported at ap- proximately 9:10 p.m. on .\pril 10, 190.3. that a bullet had been fired through a first floor window of his home at 4011 Turtle Creek Boulevard, Dallas. Detectives subse- quently found that a bullet had first shattered a window, then gone through a wall and had landed on a stack of papers in an adjoining room. In their report the detectives described the bullet as steel-jacketed, of unknown caliber. Police located a 14 year-old boy in Walker's neighborhood who said that after hearing the boy shot, said he he climbed then saw a some fence men and speeding looked into an alley down to the the alley in rear a lightof Walker's green or home. The light blue Ford, either a 1959 or 1900 model. He said he also saw another car, a 1958 Chevrolet, black with white down the side, In a church parking lot adjacent to Walker's house. The car door was open, and a man was bending over the back seat, as though he was placing something on the floor of the car. On the night of the Incidpnt. police interviewed Robert Surrey, an aide to Walker. Surrey said that on Saturday, April 0, at about 9 p.m., he had seen two men sitting in atwodark the men purple got outor ofbrown the car1903 and Ford walkeflat around the rear the ofhouse. Walker's Surreyhouse. said heSurrey also said was suspicious and followed the car, noting that it carried no license plate. If it could be shown that Oswald had a.ssoclates in the attempt on General Walker, they would he likely candidates as the grassy knoll gunman. The committee recognized, however, that this Is speculation, since the existence, much less Identity, of an Oswald associate in the Walker shooting was hardly established. Further, the committee failed in Its pffort to develop productive leads in the Walker shooting. With respect to the Cuba literature incident, Oswald was photographed with two associates distributing pro-Castro pamphlets In August 1963. As a res ;lt of a fitrht with antl-Castro Cubans, Oswald was arrested, but his associates were not. Of the two associates, only one was identified In the Warren Commission investigation (Warren Report, p. 292>. Althoueh the second associate wns clearly portrayed In photographs (see Pizzo Exhibits 45.3-A and 45.3-B. Warren Commission Report, Vol. XXI, p. 139), the Commission was unable to identify him, as was the case with the committee. 99 1. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES, ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO IT, THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE ASSAS- SINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY With the arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination of Presi- dent Kennedy, defection speculation to the Soviet Union arose from over the 1959 October sio;nificance to June of 1962Oswald's and his activities while living in that country. Specifically, these troubling questions were asked : Had Oswald been enlisted by the KGB, the Soviet secret police ? Could the assassination have been the result of a KGB plot?(i) (a) United States-Soviet relations To put these concerns in context, it is necessary to look at Soviet- American relations in the 1960''s. United States-Soviet relations had, in fact, been turbulent during the Kennedy Presidency. There had been major confrontations: over Berlin, where the wall had come to symbolize the barrier between the two superpowers; and over Cuba, where the emplacement of Soviet missiles had nearly started World War III. (^) A nuclear test-ban treaty in August 1963 seemed to signal detente, but in November, tension was building again, as the Soviets harassed American troop movements to and from West Berlin. (5) And Cuba was as much an issue as ever. In Miami, on November 18, President Kennedy vowed the United States would not countenance the estab- lishment of another Cuba in the Western Hemisphere. (4) (b) The Warre7iComTnissioninvestigati&)i The Warren Commission considered the possibility of Soviet com- plicity inthe assassination, but it concluded there was no evidence of it. (5) In its report, the Connnission noted that the same conclusion had been reached by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, among others. (6") Rusk testified before the Commission on June 10, 1964 : I have seen no evidence that would indicate to me that the Soviet Union considered that it had any interest in the removal of President Kennedy * * * j can't see how it could be to the interest of the Soviet Union to make any such effort. (c) The committee^ investigation. The committee, in analyzing Oswald's relationship to Russian in- telligence, considered : Statements of both Oswald and his wife, Marina, about their life in the Soviet Union ; (7) Documents provided by the Soviet Government to the Warren Commission concerning Oswald's residence in the Soviet Union ;(>> the tSoriet (7ovmi7n^nt. — The com- mittee examined the CIA and FBI files on others who had defected in the same period as Oswald and who had eventually returned to the United States. (7.9) The purpose was to determine the frequency of KGB contact and whether the treatment of Oswald appeared to be significantly different from the norm. The defectors studied by the committee were selected because their backgrounds and other charac- teristics were similar to Oswald's, on the theory that their treatment by the KGB could be expected to parallel that of Oswald, if he was not a special case, a recruited as.-assin, for example. The examination of the defector files was inconclusive, principally because the case of nearly every defector was unique. (20) In addition, the files available on the experiences of the defectors were often not adequate to extract meaningful data for the purpose of this investiga- 101 tion, since thoy were compiled for other reasons. (^7) As to contacts with the KGB, the experiences of American defectors appeared to have varied greatly. Some rei:)orted daily contact with Soviet intelligence agents, while others did not mention ever having been contacted or debriefed. (^^) (8) y?/r/ Nosenko — Of all the areas investi'^'ated by the committee with respect to possible Soviet involvement in the assassination, none seemed as potentially rewarding as an examination of statements made by KGB officers who had defected to the United States. In determining how the KGB treats American defectors, an ex-KGB officer would certainly be of great interest. In this re!f?ard, the copimittee had access to three such men, one of whom, Yuri Nosenko, claimed to possess far more than general information about American defectors. In January 1964,^ Nosenko, identifying himself as a KGB officer, sought asvlum in the United States. (^-?) He claimed to have worked in the KGB Second Chief Directorate whose functions, in many re- spects, are similar to those of the FBI. (^4) According to Nosenko, while working in 1959 in a KGB department dealing with American tourists, he learned of a young American who sought to defect to the Soviet Union. The American was Lee Harvey Oswald. (^5) Nosenko stated he had worked extensively on the Oswald case, and he provided the FBI and CIA with data pertaining to Oswald's re- quest to defect and remain in the Soviet Union, the initial rejection of that request by the KGB, Oswald's suicide attempt and a subsequent decision to permit him to remain in Russia. (^^) Although the KGB, according to Nosenko, was well aware of Oswald, it made no attempt to debrief or interview him. (^7) Never was any consideration given by the KGB to enlist Oswald into the Soviet intelligence service. (^5) The committee was most interested in Nosenko's claim that in 1963, after Oswald was arrested in the assassination, he had an opportunity to see the KGB file on the suspected assassin. As a result, Nosenko said, he was able to state categorically that Oswald was not a Soviet agent and that no officer of the KGB had ever interviewed or debriefed him. (^5) Nosenko's testimony, however, did not settle the question of Soviet complicity in the assassination. From the time of his defection, some U.S. intelligence officers suspected Nosenko was on a disinformation mission to mislead the American Government. Since o'^her CIA officials believed Nosenko was a bona fide defector, a serious disagree- ment at the top level of the Agency resulted. (30) The Warren Commission found itself in the middle of the Nosenko controversy — and in a quandary of its own, since the issue of Nosenko's reliability bore significantly on the assassination investiga- tion. (.57) If he was telling the truth, the Commission could possibly write off Soviet involvement in a conspiracy.*^ If, on the other hand, Nosenko was lying, the Commission would be faced with a dilemma. Wliile a deceitful Nosenko would not necessarily point to Soviet com- plicity, itwould leave the issue in limbo. The Warren Commission 5 Nosenko had first contacted the U.S. Government in June 1962. " The Commission as well as the committee reeo{;ni7ed that Nosenko could have been candid and that the connection between Oswald and the KGB could have been compart- mentalized, that is, known only to a select few people, not including Nosenko. 102 chose not to call Nosenko as a witness or to mention him in its report, apparently because it conkl not resolve the issue of his reliability. (J^) The committee, on the other hand, reviewed all available statements and files pertaining to Xosenko. (.?5) It questioned Xosenko in detail about Oswald, hndinor significant inconsistencies in statements he had given the FBI, CIA and the committee. (,?^) For example, Nosenko told the committee that the KGB had Oswald under extensive sur- veillance, including mail interception, wiretap and physical observa- tion. Yet, in 1964, he told the CIA and FBI there had been no such surveillance of Oswald, (f^^) Similarly, in 1964, Xosenko indicated there had been no psychiatric examination of Oswald subsequent to his suicide attempt, wliile in 1978 he detailed for the committee the re- ports he had read about psychiatric examinations of Oswald. (-56?) The committee also found that the CIA had literally put Xosenko in solitary confinement from 1964 to 1968. (,^7) Strangelj^ while he was interrogated during this period, he was questioned very little about Oswald. (-55) The Agency did not seem to realize Xosenko's importance to an investigation of the assassination. "While Richard Helms, then the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans, did tell Chief Justice Warren about Xosenko, the Agency's interest in him seemed to be largely limited to its own intelli.ring problem: did the KGB send Xo enko to the United States to deceive the CIA on many matters, only one of them perhaps related to the assassination ?(,?5) In the end, the committee, too, was unable to resolve the Nosenko matter. The fashion in which Xosenko was treated by the Agency — his interrogation and confinement — virtually ruined him as a valid source of information on the assassination. Xevertheless, the committee was certain Xosenko lied about Oswald — whether it was to the FBI and CIA in 1964, or to the committee in 1978, or perhaps to both. (4^) The reasons he would lie about Oswald range from the possibility that he merely wanted to exaggerate his own importance to the disin- formation hypothesis with its sinister implications. Lacking sufficient committee decided toevidence to distinguish limit its conclusion toamong alternatives,^ the a characterization of Xosenko as an unreliable source of information about the assassina- tion, or, more specifically, as to whether Oswald was ever contacted, or placed under surveillance, by the KGB. (4) Ojnnions of other defectors. — In addition to interviewing Xosenko, the committee questioned two other former KGB officers who had defected to the United States. While neither could base an opinion on any pei-sonal experience with that part of the KGB in which Xosenko said he had served, both said that Oswald would have been of interest to the Soviet intelligence agency, that he would have been debriefed and tliat he may have been kept under surveillance. (-^i) (5) Marina Ofiioald. — The connnitteo not only considered a j^ossible connection between Oswald and the KGB, it also looked into charges that his widow, Marina, was an agent of the KGB, or that she at least influenced her husband's actions in the assassination on orders from has' Beyond thosp reasons been speculation that for the falsification that can while Soviet Government, be attributed to Nosenlco not involved in the himself, there assassination, sput Nosenko fin a mission to iiIIhv Aincricjin Iciirs. Hence, while his story ahont no connec- tion between Oswald and the KGB might be false, his claim of no Soviet involvement in the assassination would be truthful. 103 Soviet officials. The committee examined Government files on Marina, it questioned experts on Soviet affairs and former KGB officers, and it took testimony from Marina herself. (4f) The committee could find no evidence to substantiate the allegations about Marina Oswald Porter. Mrs. Porter testified before the committee that Oswald had never been contacted directly by the KGB, though she assumed that he and she alike had been under KGB surveillance when they lived in the Soviet Union. (6) Response of the Soviet Government. — Finally, the committee attempted to obtain from the Soviet Government any information on Oswald that it had not provided to the Warren Commission. In re- sponse to a committee request relayed by the State Department, the Soviet Government informed the committee that all the information it had on Oswald had been forwarded to the Warren Commission. (4'^) The committee concluded, however, that it is highly probable that the Soviet Government possessed information on Oswald that it has not provided to the U.S. Government. It would be the extensive in- formation that most likely was gathered by a KGB surveillance of Oswald and Marina while they were living in Russia. It is also quite likely that the Soviet Government withheld files on a KGB interview with Oswald.^ [d) Summary of the evidence Its suspicions notwithstanding, the committee was led to believe, on the basis of the available evidence, that the Soviet Government was not involved in the assassination. In the last analysis, the committee agreed with the testimony of former Secretary of State Dean Rusk. To wit, there is no evidence that the Soviet Government had any interest in removing President Kennedy, nor is there any evidence that it planned to take advantage of the President's death before it happened or at- tempted to capitalize on it after it occurred. In fact, the reaction of the Soviet Government as well as the Soviet people seemed to be one of genuine shock and sincere grief. The committee believed, therefore, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that the Soviet Government was not involved in the assassination. 2. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES, ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO IT, THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY When the leader of a great nation is assassinated, those initially sus- pected always include his adversaries. When President John F. Kennedy was struck down by rifle fire in Dallas in November 1963, many people suspected Cuba and its leader, Fidel Castro Ruz, of in- volvement inthe assassination, particularly after it was learned that Lee Harvey Oswald, the alleged assassin, had sought to travel to Cuba in September 1963.(7) To evaluate those suspicions properly, it is *The eomnilttep concluded that it should not necpssarilv be inferred from the failure of the Soviet Government to cooperate with the committee that it was involved in the assas- sination. Just as agencies of the U.S. intelligence community are reluctant to share their confidential files, a similHr resnonsc mitrht he eviiected to coinf from the KGB. The Soviet Government, it could be argued, would have little to gain and much to lose bj- turning over its files. While the committee recognized the logic of this argument, it regretted that the Soviet Government, in the interest of historical truth, did not cooperate. 104 necessary to look at Cuban-Ainerican relations in the years immedi- ately before and after President Kennedy took office. (a) Ignited States-Cuban relations The trinmphant arrival of Fidel Castro in Havana on January 1, 1959, marking a victorious climax of the revolution he had led, was ini- tially heralded in the United States a:i well as in Cuba. Castro was hailed as a champion of the people, a man who would lead a free and democratic Cuba. While some suspected that Castro had Communist leanings, the maioritv of the American public supported him.(i?) The appointment of Philip Bonsai as U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, replacing Earl E. T. Smith, who was personally wary of Castro, Avas a clear signal that the Ignited States was interested in amicable relations with the revolutionary goveinment. On appointing Bonr^al, President Eisen- hower expressed the hope for an ''ever closer relationship between Cuba and the United States." (-?) By the end of 1959, however. United States-Cuban relations had de- teriorated tothe point that there was open hostility between the two countries. (4) President Kennedy was to inherit the i)rob]em in 1961, and bv the time of his assassination on Xovember 22. 1963, the antago- nism liad developc^d into a serious international crisis. To begin with, tlie T'nited States deplored the mass executions of officials of the Batista government that Castro had deposed. (-';) In re- ply. Castro cliargcd that the I'nited States had never voiced objections to killing and toi-ture by Batista. He said the ti'ials and sentences would continue. (0') In his revolutionary economic policies, Castro took steps that severclv challenged the tiaditional role of the United States. In March 1959. the Cu})an Government took over the United States- owned Cuban Tele])hone Co.: in May. I'.S. companies were among, those expropriated in the Cuban Government's first large-scale na- tionalization action; also in ^lav, the agrarian reform law resulted in the expropriation of large landholdings, many of them U.S.- owned.(7) Vice President Xixon met with Castro in Washington in April. Castro left the meeting conviuf^ed that Xixon was hostile. For his part, Xixon recommended to President Eisenhower that the United States take measures to quasji the Cuban revolution. (5) Disillusionment with Castro also s]>read to si.nrnificant elements of the Cuban populace. In June, the chief of the Cuban Air Force, Maj. Pedio Diaz Lanz. fled to the I'nited States, charging there was C'^m- numist influence in the armed forces a)id the Government r.f Cuba. (,9') A few weeks latei-. Manuel ITrrutria Lleo, the President of Cuba, stated on Cuban national television that communirm was not concerned with the welfare of the people and that it constituted n thi-nat to the revolu- tion. In the succeedini) On November 18, in Miami, Fla., just 4 days before his assassination, President Kennedy stated : * * * what now divides Cuba from my Country * * * is the fact that a small band of conspirators has stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and handed over the independ- ence and sovereignty of the Cuban nation to forces beyond this hemisphere. They have made Cuba a victim of foreign im- periaMsm, an instrument of the policy of others, a weapon in an effort d'cta'ed by external powers to subvert the other American Republics. This, and this alone, divides us.(34) (b) Earlier investic/ations of Cuban cmnplicity "When President Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, the basic outlines of the recent history of United States-Cuban rela- tions, ifn'^t the specific details, were known to every American who even occasionally read a newspaper. Thus, when speculation arose as to the possibility of cons])iracy, Fidel Castro and his Communist gov- ernment were natural suspects. While rationality may have precluded any involvement of the Cu])an Government, the recognition that Castro had such been amoy^g the late President's most prominent enemies compelled speculation. » Whpn i^ bpcimp known to antirastro Puhan exi'es thnt Konnedv hnd aprppd to ston the raids on C'lha. To them, it was tho p- i'psl.ptrayal another ronsklprpd (see tho Kpnncflv-Khriishchev section C 3 for details). deal anything but a victory 107 (1) The Warren Commission investigation. — Investiofative efforts into the background of Lee Harvey Oswald led to an early awareness of his Communist and pro-Castro sympathies, his activities in support of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and a trip he made in Septem- ber 1963 to ^Mexico City where he visited the Soviet Embassy and the Cuban consulate. (J-5) All of this information had been gathered prior to the beginning of the Warren Commission's investigation, and it was sufficient to alert the Commission to the need to investigate the possibility of a con- spiracy initiated or influenced by Castro. Tlie report of the Warren (Commission reflects that it was indeed considered, especially with re- spect to the implications of Oswald's Mexico City trip.(J6') In addi- tion, the Warren Commission reviewed various specific allegations of activity that suggested Cuban involvement, concluding, however, that there had been no such conspiracy. (J7) For the next few years, suspi- cions of Cuban involvement in the assassination were neither wide- spread nor vocal. Xevertheless, beginning with a 1967 column by Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson, press reports that suggested Castro's in- volvement inthe assassination began to circulate once again. (55) Spe- cifically, they posed the theory that President Kennedy might have been assassinated in retaliation for CIA plots agains!: the life of the Cuban leader. (2) The U.S. Senate investigation. — Thereafter, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to In- telligence Activities was formed to investigate the performance of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies. (J.9) The Senate committee detailed two general types of operations tliat the CIA had directed against Castro. One, referred to as the AMLASH operation, involved the CIA's relationship with an important Cuban figure (code-named AMLASH) who, (4^) while he was trusted by Castro, professed to the CIA that he would be willing to organize a coup against the Cuban leader. The CIA was in contact with AMLASH from ]VIarch 1961 until June 1965. (4^) A second plot documented by the Senate com- mittee was a joint effort by tlie CIA and organized crime in America. It was initiated in 1960 in a conversation between the agency's Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell, and the Director of Security, Col. Sheffield Edwards. According to the Senate committee, this operation lasted until February 1963. (//^) The Senate committee concluded from its review of the joint opera- tions of the CIA and organized crime that "* * * Castro probably would not have been certain that the CIA was behind the underworld attempts."' (4^) Xor, in the view of the Senate connnittee, would Castro have distinguished between the CIA-underworld plots and the numer- ous otlier plots by Cuban exiles which were not affiliated in anv way with the CIA. (44) Py emphasizing these two conclusions, the Seriate committee apparently intended to suggest that the efforts by the CIA and organized crime to eliminate Castro would not have resulted in anyTheretaliation against officials Senate committee of the the identified Ignited States. (4->) AMLASH operation as being "clearly different" from the CIA-underworld plots. (4^?) It was still in procuress at the time of the assassination, and it could clearly be traced to the CIA, since AMLASH's proposed coup liad been endorsed 108 by the CIA, with the realization that the assassination of Castro might be a consequence. (^7) Nevertheless, the Senate committee found "* * * no evidence that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban Govern- ment plotted President Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for U.S. operations against Cuba." (45) The Senate committee left the door open, however, stating, "* * * the investigation should continue in cer- tain areas, and for that reason (the committee) does not reach any final conclusions." (^,9) of (3) the The report CIA''s of the response Senateto committee, the Senate. —a In response special to publication internal CIA task force was assigned in 1977 to investigate and evaluate the critical questions that had been raised. The task force first considered the re- taliation thesis. It advanced the position that the Senate committee had essentially ignored the history of adversarial relations between the United States and Cuba which, if provocation were the issue, provided adequate grounds to support a theory of possible retaliation without t'le necessity of reaching for specific Agency programs such as the Mafia and AlVILASH plots. (.56^) In essence, the task force report sug- gests, those plots were only one aspect of a large picture and in them- selves were not sufficient to have provoked retaliation. {51). The 1977 CIA task force then specifically responded to the Senate committee w^ith respect to the AMLASH operation : Whatever the relationship with AMLASH, following the death of President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President Kennedy's life AMLASH had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro. (J^) With respect to the CIA-sponsored organized crime operations, the CIA task force noted : It is possible that the CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had underway * * * [I] n a sense CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contributions was also providing an aura of official sanction. {53) The task force argued, therefore, that the plots should have been seen as Mafia, not CIA, endeavors. A conclusion of the Senate committee had been that further investi- gation was warranted, based in part on its finding that the CIA had responded inadequately to the Warren Commission's request for all possible relevant information. The CIA had not told the Commission of the plots. (54) In response, the 1977 CIA task force observed: While one can understand today why the Warren Commis- sion limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms — the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the JFK 109 assassination because of the tensions of the time * * * The Agency should have taken broader initiatives, then, as well. That CIA employees at the time felt — as they obviously did — that the activities about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscious review. (55) () that he did not give the Cuban Government any information that would have led it to believe that the CIA was involved in a plot on Castro's life in 1963. In considering Cubela's testimony, the com- mittee took into account the possible influence of his confinement. After reviewing all the available evidence, the committee concluded that Castro may well have known about the AMLASH plot by No- vember 22, 1963, and, if so, he could have either documented or assumed it was backed by the United States and that it was directed at his life. The committee believed that the details of the AMLASH operation should have been provided to the Warren Commission, since the Commission might have been able to develop leads to participants in the Kennedy assassination. At a minimum, the existence of the plot, if it had been brought to the Commission's attention, would have served as a stimulus in the 1963-64 investigation. In conclusion, the committee believed a description of the activities of participants in the AMLASH plot should have been provided to the Warren Commission. It based this not only on the possibility that the plots could have increased Castro's motivation to conspire to assas- sinate President Kennedy (assuming he, in fact, was privy to the plot prior to November 22, 1963), but also because knowledge of the AMLASH plot might have increased the interest of the CIA, FBI, and Warren Commission in a more thorough investigation of the question of Cuban conspiracy. In stating this view, the committee did not reject the suggestion in the CIA's 1977 Task Force Report that Castro already had significant motivation to assassinate President Kennedy, even if he were not aware of the AMLASH plot. The com- mittee noted, however, that to the extent that that thesis was true, it did not negate the conclusion that the AMLASH plot was relevant 114 and that information about it should have been supplied to the Warren Commission. If it had been made available, it might have affected the course of the investigation. {2) CI A- Mafia Plots— TMTnm^ next to the CIA-Mafia plots, the committee found in its investigation that organized crime probably was active in attempts to assassinate Castro, independent of any ac- tivity itengaged in with the CIA, as the 1977 Task Force Report had suggested. (^/) The committee found that during the initial stages of the joint operation, organized crime decided to assist the CIA for two reasons : CIA sponsorship would mean official sanction and logis- tical support for a Castro assassination ; and a relationship with the CIA in the assassination of a foreign leader could be used by orga- nized crime as leverage to prevent prosecution for unrelated offenses. {92) During the latter stages of the CIA-Mafia operation, from early 1962 to early 1963, however, organized crime may no longer have been interested in assassinating Castro. (5^) The committee found little credibility in such an explanation for the President's death because, if for no other reason, it wouM have been unnecessarily risky. The com- mittee determined from CIA files that, in 1963, the Cuban Govern- ment had agents of its own in nearly every country of the Western Hemisphere, including the United States, who undoubtedly would have been more dependable for such an assignment. Even if Castro had wanted to minimize the chance of detection by using hired non- Cuban killers, it appeared unlikely to the committee that he would have tried to force Mafia members or their Cuban exile confederates to engage in the assassination of an American head of state. The committee found it more difficult to dismiss the possibility that the Mafia, while it was not turned around by Castro, might have voluntarily turned around with him. By late 1962 and 1963, when the underworld leaders involved with the CIA in the plots had per- haps lost their motivation to assassinate Castro, they had been given sufficient reason by the organized crime program of the Department of Justice to eliminate President Kennedy. The committee's investigation revealed that Mafia figures are ra- tional, pragmatic "businessmen" who often realine their associations and form partnerships with ex-enemies when it is expedient. (103) While Castro, by 1963, was an old enemy of organized crime, it was more important that both Castro and the Mafia were ailing financially, chiefly as a result of pressures applied by the Kennedy administra- tion. (7) At least, that was how Castro interpreted it when he met with Daniel on November 20, 1963. {191) In his interview with the committee, Castro referred to these two developments toward rapprochement, as he viewed them, suggesting that he would not have had a motive to eliminate President Kennedy. Instead, it would have been to his advantage, Castro insisted, to have pursued the prospect for better relations that had been portended. {192) (A) Deficiencies of the 19Go-G4 investigation In attempting to resolve the question of possible Cuban conspiracy, the committee concluded that a definitive answer had to come, if at all, largely from the investigation conducted in 1963-64 by the War- ren Commission and the FBI and CIA. What the committee was able to do 15 years later could fill in important details, but it could not make up for basic insufficiencies. Unfortunately, the committee found that there were in fact significant deficiencies in the earlier investiga- tion. The Warren Commission knew far less than it professed to know about Oswald's trip to Mexico and his possible association with pro- Castro agents in Mexico and elsewhere. This was true, in part, be- cause the Commission had demanded less of the FBI and CIA than called for in its mandate. (755) 128 For its part, the FBI mechanically ran out thousands of leads, but it failed to make effective use of its Cuban Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division or to develop and systematically pursue investi- gative hypotheses of possible Cuban complicity. It must be said that the FBI generally exhausted its resources in confirming the case against Lee Harvey Oswald as the lone assassin, a case that Director jT Edgar Hoover, at least, seemed determined to make within '24 hours of the assassination. {19Jf) With respect to the CIA, the committee determined that it could have been better equipped to investigate the question of Cuban com- plicity/^ The CIA had, at the time, only limited access to Cuban intelligence defectors, and most of its information sources inside Cuba were better equipped to report on economic developments and troop movements than on political decisions, especially sensitive ones, such as those involving political assassination. (755) As the CIA admitted m its 1977 Task Force Repoit, it could have taken "broader initiatives"' in pursuing the investigation. The com- mittee found that such initiatives could have included more compre- hensive instructions on debriefing Cuban sources and more explicit tasking of stations for specific investigative efforts. With respect to the CIA's investigation of possible Cuban com- plicity, however, the committee found that the Agency's shortcomings were not attributable to any improper motive. The committee found that the CIA did generally gather and analyze the information that came to its attention regarding possible Cuban involvement, at least until the Warren Commission made its report in 1964. Indeed, the committee noted that the Agency acted not only out of dedication, but out of a specific motivation related to Cuba! The officers, agents and employees in the Cuba-related divisions had devoted their careers to the overthrow of Castro, and evidence of his participation in the assassination, if it had existed and could have been brought to light, would have vindicated their long- frustrated efforts, if not, in fact, led directly to a U.S. invasion of Cuba and destruction of the Castro regime. That being said, the committee did not ignore the possibility that certain CIA officials who were aware that close scrutiny of IT.S.- Cuban relations in the early 1960's could have inadvertently exposed the CIA-]Mafia plots against Castro, might have attempted to prevent the CIA's assassination investigation or that of the Warren Commis- sion from delving: deeply into the question of Cuban complicity. The coiHinittee determined, liowever, that only CIA Deputy Directoi' Rich- ard Helms would have been in a position to have had lx)th the refjuisite knowledge and the power to accomplish such a coverup, and it was satisfied, on the basis of its investigation, that it was highly unlikely he in fact did so. (755) "' Witli rpsppot to thp inoiflont nt tho homo of Sylvia Odio In Oallns fspp sec. C 8), the CIA had dpvploped since 1968 the ability to identify from pliysical dp.scrii)tions possible intelliKPnoe agents ^vho may have been involved. In fact, at the committee's request, the CIA attempted members of Cuban to identify Odio's intelligence. (795)visitors, and it determined The committee that they supplied showed photopraphs may haveby been the CIA to Odio who stated they did not appear to be the visitors in question. (/96) The com- mittee came to the conclusion that bad she been shown photopraphs in 1003, when the event was clearer in her mind, she mipht have been able to mal7) On July 24, chief counsel J. Lee Rankin, 138 in a letter to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, noted, ". . . the Com- mission already possesses firm evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald was on a bus traveling from Houston, Tex., to Mexico City, Mexico, on virtually the entire day of Sei)tenil)er 2Q.-'{108) J. Wesley Liebeler, the Warren Commission assistant counsel who had taken Mrs. Odio's deposition, disagreed, however, that there was firm evidence of Oswald's bus trip to Mexico City.(/^,9) In a memorandum to another Commission attorney, Howard Willens, on September 14, 1964, Liebeler objected to a section of the Warren Report in which it was stated there was strong evidence that Oswald was on a bus to Mexico on the date in question. (776?) Liebeler argued, "There really is no evidence at all that [Oswald] left Houston on that bus." (777) Liebeler also argued that the conclusion that there was "persuasive" evidence that Oswald was not in Dallas on September 24, 1963, a day for which his travel was unaccounted, was "too strong," (77^) Liebeler urged Willens to tone down the language of the report, (77J) contend- ing in his memorandum : "There are problems. Odio may well be right. The Commission will look bad if it turns out that she is."(774) On August 23, 1964, Rankin again wrote to Hoover to say, "It is a matter of some importance to the Commission that Mrs. Odio's allega- tion either be proved or disproved." (775) Rankin asked that the FBI attempt to learn the identities of the three visitors by contacting mem- bers of anti-Castro groups active in the Dallas area, as well as leaders of the JURE organization. (77^) He asked the FBI to check the pos- sibility that Oswald had spent the night of September 24, in a hotel in Xew Orleans, after vacating his apartment. (777) Portions of this investigation, which were inconclusive in supporting the Warren Commission's contention that Mrs. Odio was mistaken, were not sent to Rankin until November 9,(/7(V) at which time the final report al- ready had been completed. (//,9) The FBI did attempt to alleviate the "problems." In a report dated September 26, it reported the interview of Loran Eugene Hall who claimed he had been in Dallas in September 1963, accompanied by two men fitting the general description given by Silvia Odio, and that it was they who had visited hGr.{120) Oswald, Hall said, was not one of the men.(/^7) Within a week of Hall's statement, the other two men Hall said had accompanied him. Lawrence Howard and AVilliam Sey- mour, were interviewed. (7^^) They denied ever having met Silvia Odio. (7^5) Later, Hall himself retracted his statement about meeting with Mrs. Odio. (7^4) Even though the Commission could not show conclusively that Oswald was not at the Odio apartment, and even though Loran Hall's story was an admitted fabrication, the Warren re[)ort published this explanation of the Odio incident : While the FBI had not yet completed its investigation into this matter at the time the report went to press, the Commis- sion has concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was not at Mrs. Odio's apartment in September 1963.(7^5) Not satisfied with that conclusion, the committee conducted inter- views with and took depositions from the principals — Silvia Odio, (7^6') members of her family, (7^7) and Dr. Burton Einspruch, 139 (128) her psychiatrist. (Mrs. Odio had contacted Dr. Einspruch for consultation about problems that could not be construed to aflfect her perception or crediljility.) (129) The committee also set up a confer- ence telephone call between Dr. Einspruch in Dallas and Silvia Odio in Miami, during which she related to him the visit of the three men. (130) Mrs. Odio and Dr. Einspruch concurred that she had told him of the nighttime meeting shortly after its occurrence, but prior to the President's Loran Hall assassination. (131) the committee in executive session on testified before October 5, 1977; Howard and Seymour were interviewed. (75^) The FBI agent who wrote up the Hall story also testified before the committee, (i^?^) From a review of FBI files, the committee secured a list of persons who belonged to the Dallas Chapter of JURE, and the committee attempted to locate and interview these individuals. Addi- tionally, staff investigators interviewed the leader of JURE, Manolo Ray, who was residing in Puerto 'Rico. (134-) Further, the committee secured photographs of scores of pro-Castro and anti-Castro activists who might have fit the descriptions of the two individuals who, Mrs. Odio said, had visited her with Oswald. (135) The committee also used the resources of the CIA which con- ducted a check on all individuals who used the "war" names of "Leo- poldo" and "Angelo", and the name "Leon," or had similar names. (136) An extensive search produced the names and photographs of three men who might possibly have been in Dallas in September 1963. (137) These photographs were shown to Mrs. Odio, but she was unable to identify them as the men she had seen. (138) The committee was inclined to believe Silvia Odio. From the evidence provided in the sworn testimony of the witnesses, it appeared that three men did visit her apartment in Dallas prior to the Kennedy assassination and identified themselves as members of an anti-Castro organization. Based on a judgment of the credibility of Silvia and Annie Odio, one of these men at least looked like Lee Harvey Oswald and was introduced to Mrs. Odio as Leon Oswald. The committee did not agree with the Warren Commission's con- clusion that Oswald could not have been in Dallas at the requisite time. Nevertheless, the committee itself could reach no definite conclusion on the specific date of the visit. It could have been as early as Septem- 'ber 24, the morning of which Oswald was seen in New Orleans, (755) but it was more likely on the 25th, 26th or 27th of September. If it was on these dates, then Oswald had to have had access to private trans- portation to have traveled through Dallas and still reached Mexico City when he did, judging from other evidence developed by both the Warren Commission and the committee. (7^) (c) Oswald and anti-Castro Cubans The committee recognized that an association by Oswald with anti-Castro Cubans would pose problems for its evaluation of the assassin life, the and what might committee found have motivated his actions and him. valuesIntoreviewing have been Oswald's those of a self-proclaimed Marxist who would be bound to favor the Castro regime in Cuba, or at least not advocate its ovei-tlii'ow. For this reason, it did not seem likely to the committee that Oswald would have allied 140 himself with an anti-Castro ajroup or individual activist for the sole purpose of furtherinc; the anti-Castro cause. Tlie committee recoirnized the possibility that Oswald mijrht have established contacts with such groups or persons to implicate the anti-Castro movement in the assas- sination. Such an implication mi.deral court of citizenship falsification. (227) He stated that he took the weekend trip to Texas for relaxa- tion. (^^5) Ferrie acknowledged knowing Jack Martin, stating that Martin resented him for forcibly removing him from Gill's office earlier that year. (^£9) " With Ferrie's employer. G. Wray Gill, as his counsel. Marcello was successfully resist- ing an attempt by the Government to have him legally deported or convicted of a crimei {217) 145 The FBI :md Secret Service investigation into the possibility that Ferrie and Oswald had been associated ended a few days later. (^5^) A Secret Service report concluded that the information provided by Jack Martin that Ferrie had been associated with Oswald and had trained him to fire a rifle was "without foundation." (^^-?) The Secret Service report went on to state that on November 26, 1963, the FBI had informed the Seci-et Service that Martin had admitted that his information was a "figment of his imagination." ^s {23£) The investi- gation of Ferrie was subsequentlv closed for lack of evidence against him.(^J^) (5) A cormnittee analysis of Oswald in New Orleans. — ^The Warren Commission had attempted to reconstruct a daily chronology of Os- wald's activities in New Orleans during the summer of 1963, and the committee used it, as well as information arising from critics and the Garrison investigation, to select events and contacts that merited closer analysis. Among these were Oswald's confrontation with Carlos Brin- guier and with Frank Bartes, his reported activities in Clinton, La., and his ties, if any, to Guy Banister, David Ferrie, Sergio Arcaoha Smith and others who frequented the office building at 544 Camp Street. The committee deposed Carlos Bringuier and interviewed or de- posed several of his associates. (^-55) It concluded that there had been no relationship between Oswald and Bringuier and the DRE with the exception of the confrontation over Oswald's distribution of pro- Castro literature. The committee was not able to determine Avhy Os- wald approached the anti-Castro Cubans, but it tended to concur with Bringuier and others in their belief that Oswald was seeking to infil- trate their ranks and obtain information about their activities. As noted, the committee believed the Clinton witnesses to be telling the truth as they knew it. It was, therefore, inclined to believe that Oswald was in Clinton, La., in late August, early September 1963, and that he was in the company of David Ferrie, if not Clay Shaw. The committee was puzzled by Oswald's apparent association with Ferrie, a person whose anti-Castro sentiments were so distant from those of Oswald, the Fair Play for Cuba Committee campaigner. But the relationship with Ferrie may have been significant for more than its anti-Castro Gill and Carlos aspect, Marcello.in light of Ferrie's connection with G. Wray The committee also found that there was at least a possibility that Oswald and Guy Banister were acquainted. The following facts were considered : The 544 Camp Street address stamped on Oswald's FFCC handouts was that of the building where Banister had his office; Ross Banister told the committee that his brother had seen Oswald handing out FPCC literature during the summer of 1963 ; {%S6) and Banister's secretary, Delphine Roberts, told the committee she saw Oswald in Banister's office on several occasions, the first being 28 It appeared to the committee that the FBI overstated Martin's recantation in its in- formation to the Secret Service. Martin had cautioned the FBI that he had no evidence to support his suspicions but that he believed they merited investigation. (253) 146 when he was interviewed for a job during the summer of 1968." {237) The committee learned that Banister left extensive files when he died in 1964.(^^(9) Later that year, they were purchased by the Louisiana State Police from Banisters widow. (^J/^) Accordins: to Joseph Cambre of the State police, Oswald's name was not the subject of any file, but it was inclutled in a file for the Fair Phiy for Cuba Committee. (^4^) Cambre said the FPCC file contained neAvspapcr clippings and a transcript of a radio program on which Oswald had appeared, (^^i) The committee was not able to review Banister's files, since they had been destroyed pursuant to an order of the superintend- ent of Louisiana State Police that all files not part of the public record or pertinent to ongoing criminal investigations be burned. (£4^^) Additional evidence that Oswald may have been associated or ac- quainted with Ferric and Banister was provided by the testimony of Adrian Alba, proprietor of the Crescent City Garage which was next door to the Reily CofToe Co. where Oswald had worked for a couple of months in 1963. (The garage and the coffee company were both located less than a block from 544 Camp Street.) Although Alba's testimony on some points wns questionable, he unrloubtedly did know Oswald who frequently visited his garage, and the committee found no reason to question his statement that he had often seen Oswald in Mancuso's Restaurant on the first floor of 544 Camp.(:?4'?) Ferrie and Banister also were frequent customers at Mancuso's. (^^^) (6) Summary of the evidence. — In sum, the committee did not believe that an anti-Castro organization was involved in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. Even tliough tlie committee's in- vestigation did reveal that in 1964 the FBI failed to pursue intelli- gence reports of possible anti-Castro involvement as vigorously as it might have, the committee found it significant that it discovered no information in U.S. intelligence agency files that would implicate anti-Castroites. Contact between the intelligence community and the anti-Castro movement was close, so it is logical to suppose that some trace of group involvement would have been detected had it existed. The committee also thought it significant that it received no infor- mation from the Cuban Government that would implicate anti-Castro- ites. The Cubans had dependable information sources in the exile com- munities inMiami, New Orleans, Dallas and other U.S. cities, so there is high probability that Cuban intelligence would have been aware of any group involvement by the exiles. Following the assassination, the Cuban Government would have had the highest incentive to report participation by anti-Castroites, had it existed to its knowledge, since it would have dispelled suspicions of pro-Castro Cuban involvement. The committee was impressed with the cooperation it received from the Cuban Government, and while it acknowledged this cooperation might not have been forthcoming in 1964, it concluded that, had such infor- mation existed in 1978, it would have been supplied by Cuban officials. On the other hand, the committee noted that it was unable to pre- clude from its investigation the possibility that individuals with anti- =9 The rommittee did not credit the Ro^^erts' lestimonv standlnp: alone. It came late In the investigation and without corroboration or independent substantiation, and much of Roberts' other testimony lacked credibility. 147 Castro leanings might have been involved in the assassination. The committee candidly acknowledged, for example, that it could not ex- plain Oswald's associations — nor at this late date fully determine their extent — with anti-Castro Cubans. The committee remained convinced that since Oswald consistently demonstrated a left-wing Marxist ideology, he would not have supported the anti-Castro movement. At the same time, the committee noted that Oswald's possible association with Ferrie might be distinguishable, since it could not be simply termed an anti-Castro association. Ferrie and Oswald may have had a personal friendship unrelated to Cuban activities. Ferrie was not Cuban, and though he actively supported the anti-Castro cause, he had other interests. For one, he was employed by Carlos Marcello as an investigator. (^4^) (It has been alleged that Ferrie operated a service station in 1964, the franchise for which was reportedly paid by Mar- cello.) {21^6) The committee concluded, therefore, that Oswald's most significant apparent anti-Castro association, that with David Ferrie, might in fact not have been related to the Cuban issue. In the end, the committee concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that anti-Castro Cuban groups, as groups, were not involved in the assassination, but it could not preclude the possibility that individual members may have been involved. 4. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES, ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO IT, THAT THE NATIONAL SYNDICATE OF ORGANIZED CRIME, AS A GROUP, WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY, BUT THAT THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED Lee Harvey Oswald was fatally shot by Jack Ruby at 11 :21 a.m. on Sunday, November 24, 1963, less than 48 hours after President Ken- nedy was assassinated. While many Americans were prepared to be- lieve that Oswald had acted alone in shooting the President, they found their credulity strained when they were asked to accept a conclusion that Ruby, too, had not acted as part of a plot. As the Warren Commis- sion observed, * * * almost immediately speculation arose that Ruby had acted on behalf of members of a conspiracy who had planned the killing of President Kennedy and wanted to silence Oswald, (i). The implications of the murder of Oswald are crucial to an under- standing ofthe assassination itself. Several of the logical possibilities should be made explicit : Oswald was a member of a conspiracy, and he was killed by Ruby, also a conspirator, so that he would not reveal the plot. Oswald was a member of a conspiracy, yet Ruby acted alone, as he explained, for personal reasons. Oswald was not a member of a conspiracy as far as Ruby knew, but his murder was an act planned by Ruby and others to take justice into their own hands. 148 Both Oswald and Ruby acted alone or with the assistance of only one or two confederates, but there was no wider conspiracy, one that extended beyond the immediate participants. If it is determined tliat Ruby acted alone, it does not necessarily follow that there was no conspiracy to murder the President. But if Ruby was part of a sophisticated plot to murder Oswald, there would be troublesome implications with respect to the assassination of the President. While it is possible to develop an acceptable rationale of why a 'at Ruby's namp )iad bppn mpnt'onpd frenupntly In the discussions with ChlcaRo underworld representatives, the committee's review of the tape recordings failed to disclose such references. Portions of the taoes were unln- tellielble and two entire recordincrs were discovered by Investigators in 1964 to be missing, so the evidence was not conclusive. (24) 151 tracts he had carried out and one he had only recently been assigned. While the committee found no evidence that Ruby was associated with Yaras or Patrick during the 1950's or 1960's,(^^) it concluded that Ruby had probably talked by telephone to Patrick during the summer of 1963. (J^) While Ruby apparently did not participate in the organized crime move to Dallas in 1947, he did establish himself as a Dallas nightclub operator around that time. His first club was the Silver Spur, which featured country and western entertainment. Then he operated the Sovereign, a private club that failed and was converted into the Car- ousel Club, a burlesque house with striptease acts. Ruby, an extro- verted individual, acquired numerous friends and contacts in and around Dallas, some of whom had syndicate ties. Included among Ruby's closest friends was Lewis Mc Willie. Mc- Willie moved from Dallas to Cuba in 1958 and worked in gambling casinos in Havana until 1960. ( The Warren Commission noted that Ruby 'made preliminary Innulrles, as a middleman" In regard to the possible sale of jeeps to Cuba, but stated that he "was merely pursuing a moneymaklng opportunlty.'MSO) 153 that makes a meeting between Ruby and Trafficante a distinct possi- bility, (^^) but the evidence was not sufficient to form a final conclu- sion as to whether or not such a meeting took place. While allegations of a Euby link to Trafficante had previously been raised, mainly due to Mc Willie's alleged close connections to the Mafia leader, it was not until recent years that they received serious atten- tion. Trafficante had long been recognized by law enforcement officials as a leading member of the La Cosa Nostra, but he did not become the object of significant public attention in connection with the assassi- nation of the President until his participation in the assassination plots against Castro was disclosed in 1975. In 1976, in response to a freedom of information suit, the CIA de- clas ified aState Department cablegram received from London on November 28, 1963. It read : On 26 November 1963, a British Journalist named John Wilson, and also known as Wilson-Hudson, gave information to the American Embassy in London which indicated that an "American gangster-type named Ruby" visited Cuba around 1959. Wilson himself was working in Cuba at that time and was jailed by Castro before he was deported. In prison in Cuba, Wilson says he met an American gang- ster-gambler named Santos who could not return to the U.S.A. * * * Instead he preferred to live in relative luxury in a Cuban prison. While Santos was in prison, Wilson says, Santos was visited frequently by an American gangster type named Ruby. (^5) Several days after the CIA had received the information, the Agency noted that there were reports that Wilson-Hudson was a "psychopath" and unreliable. The Agency did not conduct an investigation of the information, and the Warren Commission was apparently not in- formed of the cablegram. The former staff counsel who directed the Commission's somewhat limited investigation of organized crime told the committee that since the Commission was never told of the CIA's use of the Mafia to try to assassinate Castro from 1960 to 1963, he was not familiar with the name Santos Trafficante in 1964. {66) The committee was unable to locate John Wilson-Hudson. (Accord- ing to reports, he had died.) Nor was the committee able to obtain inde- pendent confirmation of the Wilson-Hudson allegation. The committee was able, however, to develop corroborative information to the effect that Wilson-Hudson was incarcerated at the same detention camp in Cuba as Trafficante. {67) On June 6, 1959, Trafficante and others who controlled extensive gambling interests in Cuba were detained as part of a Castro govern- ment policy that would subsequently lead to the confiscation of all underworld holdings in Cuba.(^^) They were held in Trescornia, a minimum security detention camp. (^5) According to documentation supplied by the Cuban Government, Trafficante was released from Trescornia'on obtained by the August 18, 1959.(7^) committee, as well Tourist card Warren as various documentation, also Commission documents, indicate Ruby's first trip to Cuba began on August 8, 1959.(7/) Thus, Ruby was in Cuba during part of the final days of Trafficante's detention at Trescornia. (7^) Mc Willie testified before the committee that he had visited another detainee at Trescornia during that period, and he recalled possibly seeing Trafficante there. McWillie claimed, however, he did not say more than "hello" to him. (75) McWillie further testified it was during that period that Ruby visited him in Havana for about a week, and that Ruby tagged along with him during much of his stay. (7^) Mc- Willie told the committee that Ruby could have gone with him to visit Trescornia, although he doubted that Ruby did so. (75) McWillie testified that he could not clearly recall much about Ruby's visit. (7^) Jose Verdacia Verdacia, a witness made available for a committee interview by the Cuban Government, was the warden at Trescornia in August 1959.(77) Verdacia told the committee that he could not recall the name John Wilson-Hudson, but he could remember a British journalist who had worked in Argentina, as had Wilson-Hudson, who was detained at Trescornia. (75) In his own public testimony before the committee, TrafRcante testi- fied that he did not remember Ruby ever having visited him at Tres- cornia. Trafficante stated. There was no reason for this man to visit me. I have never seen this man before. I have never been to Dallas, T never had no contact with him. I don't see why he was going to come and visit me. (75) Trafficante did, however, testify that he could recall an individual fitting British journalist John Wilson-Hudson's description, and he stated that the man was among those who were held in his section at Trescornia. (5(9) The importance of a Ruby-Trafficante meeting in Trescornia should not be overemphasized. The most it would show would be a meeting, at that a brief one. No one has suggested that President Kennedy's as- sassination was planned at Trescornia in 1959. At the same time, a meeting or an association, even minor, between Ruby and Trafficante would not have been necessary for Ruby to have been used by Traffi- cante to murder Oswald. (57) Indeed, it is likely that such a direct con- tact would have been avoided by Traffir^ante ii there had been a plan to execute either the President or the President's assassin, but, since no such plot could have been under consideration in 1959, there would not have been a particular necessity for Trafficante to avoid contact with Ruby in Cuba. The committee investigated other aspects of Ruby's activities that might have shown an association with organized crime figures. An extensive computer analysis of his telephone toll records for the month prior to the President's assassination revealed that he either placed calls to or received calls from a number of individuals who may be fairly characterized as having been affiliated, directly or indirectly, with organized crime. (5^) These included Irwin Weiner, a Chicago bondsman well-known as a frontman for organized crime and the Tenmsters Union; (5,?) Robert "Barney" Baker, a lieutonant of James R. Hoffa and associate of several convicted organized crime execu- tioners: (5.^) Nofio J. Pecora, a lieutenant of Carlos Marcello, the Mafia boss in Louisiana: (55) Harold Tannenbaum, a New Orleans French Quarter nightclub manager who lived in a trailer park owned 155 by Pecora;(<§^) McWillie, the Havana gambler; (57) and Murray "Dusty" Miller, a Teamster deputy of Hoffa and associate of various underworld figures. (<§c9) Additionally, the committee concluded that Ruby was also probably in telephonic contact with Mafia executioner Lenny Patrick sometime during the summer of 1963.(55) Although no such call was indicated in the available Ruby telephone records, Ruby's sister, Eva Grant, told the Warren Commission that Ruby had spoken more than once of having contacted Patrick by telephone during that per\od.(90) The committee found that the evidence surrounding the calls was generally consistent — at least as to the times of their occurrence — with the explanation that they were for the purpose of seeking assistance in a labor dispute. (57) Ruby, as the operator of two nightclubs, the Car- ousel and the Vegas, had to deal with the American Guild of Variety Artists (AGVA), an entertainers union. (5^) Ruby did in fact have a history of labor problems involving his striptease performers, and there was an ongoing dispute in the early 1960's regarding amateur performers in Dallas area nightclubs. (5^) Testimony to the commit- tee supported the conclusion that Ruby's phone calls were, by and large, related to his labor troubles. (94) In light of the identity of some of the individuals, however, the possibility of other matters being dis- cussed could not be dismissed. (55) In particular, the committee was not satisfied with the explanations of three individuals closely associated with organized crime who re- ceived telephone calls from Ruby in October or November 1963.(5^) Weiner, the Chicago bondsman, refused to discuss his call from Ruby on October 26, 1963, with the FBI in 1964,(57) and he told a reporter in 1978 that the call had nothing to do with labor prob- lems. (55) In his executive session testimony before the committee, however, Weiner stated that he had lied to the reporter, and he claimed that he and Ruby had, in fact, discussed a labor dispute. (55) The committee was not satisfied with Weiner's explanation of his relationship with Ruby. Weiner suggested Ruby was seeking a bond necessary to obtain an injunction in his labor troubles, yet the com- mittee could find no other creditable indication that Ruby contem- plated seeking court relief, nor any other explanation for his having to ffo to Chicago for such a bond. (100) Barney Baker told the FBI in 1964 that he had received only one telephone call from Ruby (on Nov. 7, 1963) during which he had curtly dismissed Ruby's plea for assistance in a nightclub labor dis- pute. (/W) The committee established, however, that Baker received a second lengthy call from Ruby on November 8. (702) The com- mittee found it hard to believe that Baker, who denied the conversa- tion ever took place, could have forgotten it. (J03) The committee was also dissatisfied with the explanation of a call Ruby made on October 30, 1963, to the New Orleans trailer park office of Nofio J. Pecora, the long-time Marcello lieutenant' (75.^) Pecora told the committee that only he would have answered his phone and that he never spoke with Ruby or took a message from him. (755) The committee considered the possibility that the call was actually for Harold Tannenbaum, a mutual friend of Ruby and 156 Pecora who lived in the trailer park, although Pecora denied he would have relayed such a message. {106) Additionally, the committee found it difficult to dismiss certain Ruby associations with the explanation that they were solely related to his labor problems. For example, James Henry Dolan, a Dallas AGVA representative, was reportedly an acquaintance of both Carlos Marcello and Santos Trafficante.(i6'7) While Dolan worked with Ruby on labor matters, they were also allegedly associated in other dealings, including a strong-arm attempt to appropriate the proceeds of a one-night performance of a stage review at the Adolphus Hotel in Dallas called "Bottoms Up. ' {108) The FBI, moreover, has identi- fied Dolan as an associate of Nofio Pecora. (i^5) The committee noted further that reported links between AGVA and organized crime figures have been the subject of Federal and State investigations that have been underway for years.^ {HO) The committee's difficulties in separating Ruby's AGVA contacts from his organized crime con- nections was, in large degree, based on the dual roles that many of his associates played.^ In assessing the significance of these Ruby contacts, the committee noted, first of all, that they should have been more thoroughly ex- plored in 1964 when memories were clearer and related records (in- cluding, but not limited to, additional telephone toll records) were available. Further, while there may be persuasive arguments against the likelihood that the attack on Oswald would have been planned in advance on the telephone with an individual like Ruby, the pattern of contacts did show that individuals who had the motive to kill the President also had knowledge of a man who could be used to get access to Oswald in the custody of the Dallas police. In Ruby, they also had knowledge of a man who had exhibited a violent nature «ind who was in serious financial trouble. The calls, in short, estab- lished knowledge and possible availability, if not actual planning. (2) Ruby and the Dallas Police Department. — The committee also investigated the relationship between Ruby and the Dallas Police Department to determine whether members of the department might have helped Ruby get access to Oswald for the purpose of shooting him. (777) Ruby had a friendly and somewhat unusual relationship with the Dallas Police Department, both collectively and with indi- vidual officers, but the committee found little evidence of any sig- nificant influence by Ruby within the force that permitted him to engage in illicit activities. (77^) Nevertheless, Ruby's close relation- ship with one or more members of the police force may have been a factor in his entry to the police basement on November 24, 1963. {113) Both the Warren Commission and a Dallas Police Department in- vestigative unit concluded that Ruby entered the police basement on November 24, 1963, between 11:17 a.m., when he apparently sent a telegram, and 11 :21, when he shot Oswald, via the building's Main Street ramp as a police vehicle was exiting, thereby fortuitously 5 According crime as a fronttoforFRI records, criminal AGVA has been used frequently by members of organized activities. " Mthoiigh it was d'ssatlsfied witii tlie explanations it received for tiiese calls, the committee also noted that the individuals called may have been reluctant to admit that Ruby was seeking their assistance in an illegal effort to settle his labor problems. 157 creating a momentary distraction. (7i^) The committee, however, found that Ruby probably did not come down the ramp,(-/75) and that his most likely route was an alleyway located next to the Dallas Municipal Building and a stairway leadmg to the basement garage of police headquarters. {116) The conclusion reached by the Warren Commission that Ruby entered the police basement via the ramp was refuted by the eyewitness testimony of every witness in the relevant area, only Ruby himself excepted. (i/7') It was also difficult for the committee to reconcile the ramp route with the 55-second interval (derived from viewings of the video tapes of the Oswald murder) from the moment the police vehicle started up the ramp and the moment Ruby shot Oswald. (ii^) Finally, the committee analyzed the finances of Ruby and of his family to determine if there was any evidence of financial profit from his killing of the accused assassin. (7^7) It was an analysis the War- ren Commission could not perform so soon after the assassina- tion. (148) Some financial records, including tax returns, could not be legally obtained by the committee without great difficulty, and others no longer existed. (7^) Nevertheless, on the basis of the information that it did obtain, the committee uncovered no evidence that Ruby or members of his family profited from the killing of Oswald. (150) Par- ticular allegations concerning the increased business and personal in- comes of Ruby's brother Earl were investigated, but the committee found no link between Earl Ruby's finances and the Oswald slay- ing. (757) Earl Ruby did say he had been approached by the Chicago bondsman and associate of organized crime figures, Irwin Weiner, who made a business proposition to him in 1978. the day before Earl Ruby was to testify before the committee. (152) Earl Ruby said he declined the offer, (75^) While it was not until August 1963 that Valachi's identity as a Federal witness became public, the surveillance tran- scripts disclose that syndicate leaders were aware as early as the spring of 1963 that Valachi was cooperating with the Justice Depart- ment. (^,^5) The transcripts disclose that the discovery that Valachi had become a Federal informant aroused widespread suspicion and fear over the possibility of other leaks and informants within the up- per echelons of the syndicate. (^^^) The televised Senate testimony by Valachi led to considerable doubt by syndicate leaders in other parts of the country as to the security of commission proceedings, with Genovese rapidly losing influence as a result of Valachi's actions. (^57) The greatest source of internal disruption within the commission related to the discovery in early 1963 of a secret plan by commission member Joseph Bonanno to assassinate fellow members Carlo Gam- bino and Thomas Lucchese. (238) Bonanno's assassination plan, aimed at an eventual takeover of the commission leadership, was discovered after one of the gunmen Bonanno had enlisted, Joseph Columbo, in- formed on him to the commission. (^JP) The Bonanno conspiracy, an unheard-of violation of commission rules, led to a long series of acri- monious deliberations that lasted until early 1964. (^^5) Bonanno re- fused to submit to the judgment of the commission, and his colleagues were sharply divided over how to deal with his betrayal, Gambino recommending that Bonanno be handled with caution, and Giancana urging that he be murdered. (^4-?) The committee concluded, based on the state of disruption within the commission and the questions that had arisen as to the sanctity of commission proceedings, that an individual organized crime leader who was planning an assassination conspiracy against President Ken- nedy might well have avoided making the plan known to the commis- sion or seeking approval for it from commission membei'S.(^4^) Such a course of unilateral action seemed to the committee to have been particularly possible in the case of powerful organized crime leaders who were well established, with firm control over their jurisdictions. (W) The committee noted a significant precedent for such a unilateral course of action. In 1957, Vito Genovese engineered the assassination of Albert Anastasia, then perhaps the most feared Mafia boss in the country. {£44) Six months earlier, Genovese's men had shot and wound- ed Frank Costello, who once was regarded as the single most influential 168 organized crime leader. (^4^) Both the Anastasia assassination and the Costello assault were carried out without the knowledge or consent of the national commission. (^4^) Genovese did. however, obtain approval for the crimes after the fact. (247) It was an extraordinary sequence of events that Attorney General Kennedy noted in September 1963, when he stated that Genovese "* * * wanted Commission approval for these acts — which he has received." The Genovese plot against Anastasia and Costello and the ex post facto commission approval were integral events in the rise to dominance of organized crime figures for the years that followed. It directly led to the assemblage of national syndicate leaders at the Apalachin conference 3 weeks after the Anas- tasia murder, and to the rise of Carlo Gambino to a position of pre- eminence inLa Costa Nostra. (^4^) (5) Analysis of the 1963-64- investigation. — In its investigation, the committee learned that fears of the possibility that organized crime was behind the assassination were more common among Government officials at the time than has been generally recognized. Both Attorney General Kennedy and President Johnson privately voiced suspicion about underworld complicity. (^4^) The Attorney General requested that any relevant information be forwarded directly to him, and there was expectation at the time that the recently created Warren Commis- sion would actively investigate the possibility of underworld involvement. (250) The committee found, however, that the Warren Commission con- ducted only a limited pursuit of the possibility of organized crime complicity. (^57) As has been noted, moreover, the Warren Commis- sion's interest in organized crime was directed exclusively at Jack Ruby, and it did not involve any investigation of the national crime syndicate in general, or individual leaders in particular. (^5^) This was confirmed to the committee by J. Lee Rankin, the Commission's general counsel, and by Burt W. Griffin, the staff counsel who con- ducted the Ruby investigation. (^5-5) Griffin testified before the com- mittee that "* * * the possibility that someone associated with the underworld would have wanted to assassinate the President * * * [was] not seriously exnlored" by the Warren Commission. (^5^) The committee similarly learned from testimony and documenta- tion that the FBI's investigation of the President's assassination was also severely limited in the area of possible organized crime involve- ment. While the committee found that the Bureau was uniquely equip- ped, with the Special Investigative Division having been formed 2 years earlier specifically to investigate organized crime, the specialists and agents of that Division did not play a significant role in the assas- sination investigation. (^.^5) Former Assistant FBI Director Courtney Evans, who headed the Special Investigative Division, told the com- mittee that the officials who directed the investigation never consulted him or asked for any participation by his Division. (^5^) Evans recalled, "I know they sure didn't come to me. We had no part in that that I can recall." (^.57) Al Staffeld. a former FBI official who super- vised the day-to-day operations of the Special Investigative Division, told the committee that if the FBI's organized crime specialists had been asked to participate, "We would have gone at it in every damn way possible." (^55) 169 Ironically, the Bureau's own electronic surveillance transcripts revealed to the committee a conversation between Sam Giancana and a lieutenant, Charles English, regarding the FBI's role in investigat- ing President Kennedy's assassination. (^5P) In the December 3, 1963 conversation, English told Giancana: "I will tell you something, in another 2 months from now, the FBI will be like it was 5 years ago. They won't be around no more. They say the FBI will get it (the investigation of the President's assassination). They're gonna start running down Fair Play for Cuba, Fair Play for Matsu. They call that more detrimental to the country than us guys."(^^6>) The committee found that the quality and scope of the investigation into the possibility of an organized crime conspiracy in the President's assassination by the Warren Commission and the FBI was not suffi- cient to uncover one liad it existed. The committee also found that it was possible, based on an analysis of motive, means and opportunity, that an individual organized crime leader, or a small combination of leaders, might have participated in a conspiracy to assassinate Presi- dent Kennedy. The committee's extensive investigation led it to con- clude that the most likely family bosses of organized crime to have participated in such a imilateral assassination plan were Carlos Mar- cello and Santos Trafficante.(^^7) While other family bosses on the commission were subjected to considerable coverage in the electronic surveillance program, such coverage was never applied to Marcello and almost never to Trafficante. (262) (6) Carlos Marcello. — The commitee found that Marcello had the motive, means and opportunity to have President John F. Kennedy assassinated, (^^5) though it was unable to establish direct evidence of Marcello's complicity. In its investigation of Marcello, the committee identified the pres- ence of one critical evidentiary element that was lacking with the other organized crime figures examined by the committee: credible associations relating both Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby to fig- ures having a relationship, albeit tenuous, with Marcello's crime fam- ily or organization. (^^4) At the same time, the committee explicitly cautioned : association is the first step in conspiracy ; it is not identical to it, and while associations may legitimately give rise to suspicions, a careful distinction must always be drawn between suspicions sus- pected and facts found. As the long-time La Cosa Nostra leader in an area that is based in New Orleans but extends throughout Louisiana and Texas, Marcello was one of the prime targets of Justice Department efforts during the Kennedy administration. (^^J) He had, in fact, been temporarily removed from the country for a time in 1961 through deportation pro- ceedings personally expedited by Attorney General Kennedy. (^^^) In his appearance before the committee in executive session, Marcello exhibited an intense dislike for Robert Kennedy because of these actions, claiming that he had been illegally "kidnaped" by Govern- ment agents during the deportation. (267) While the Warren Commission devoted extensive attention to Oswald's background and activities, the committee uncovered signif- icant details of his exposure to and contacts with figures associated 170 with the underworld of New Orleans that apparently had escaped the Commission. (^^^) One such relationship actually extended into Oswald s own family through liis uncle, Charles "Dutz" Murret, a minor underworld gambling ligure.(l^6'5) The committee discovered that Murret, who served as a surrogate father of sorts throughout much of Oswald's life in New Orleans, was in the 1940's and 1950's and pos- sibly until his death in 1964 an associate of significant organized crime figures affiliated with the Marcello organization. {270) The committee established that Oswald was familiar with his uncle's underworld activities and had discussed them with his wife, Marina, in 1963. (^7i) Additionally, the committee found that Oswald's mother, Marguerite Oswald, was acquainted with several men as- sociated with lieutenants in the Marcello organization. One such acquaintance, who was also an associate of Dutz Murret, reportedly served as a personal aide or driver to Marcello at one time. (^7^) In another instance, the committee found that an individual connected to Dutz Murret, the person who arranged bail for Oswald following his arrest in August 1963 for a street disturbance, was an associate of two of Marcello's syndicate deputies. (One of the two, Nofio Pecora, as noted, also received a telephone call from Kuby on October 30, 1963, according to the committee's computer analysis of Ruby's phone records.) {273) During the course of its investigation, the committee developed several areas of credible evidence and testimony indicating a pos- sible association in New Orleans and elsewhere between Lee Harvey Oswald and David W. Ferrie, a private investigator and even, per- haps, a pilot for Marcello before and during 1963.(^74) From the evidence available to the committee, the nature of the Oswald-Ferrie association remained largely a mystery. The committee established that Oswald and Ferrie apparently first came into contact with each other during Oswald's participation as a teenager in a Civil Air Patrol unit for which Ferrie served as an instructor, although Ferrie, when he was interviewed by the FBI after his detainment as a suspect in the assassination, (^75) denied any past association with Oswald. In interviews following the assassination, Ferrie stated that he may have spoken in an offhand manner of the desirability of having Pres- ident Kennedy shot, but he denied wanting such a deed actually to be done. (^7^) Ferrie also admitted his association with Marcello and stated that he had been in personal contact with the syndicate leader in the fall of 1963. He noted that on the morning of the day of the President's death he was present with Marcello at a courthouse in New Orleans. (^77) In his executive session testimony before the commit- tee, Marcello acknowledged that Ferrie did work for his lawyer, G. Wray Gill, on his case, but Marcello denied that Ferrie worked for him or that their rola^^ionship was close. (^7<9) Forrie died in 1967 of a ruptured blood vessel at the base of the brain, shortly after he was named in the assassination investigation of New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison. The committee also confirmed thnt the address, .5^4 Camp Street, that Oswald had printed on some Fair Play for Cuba Committee handouts in New Orleans, was the address of a small office building 171 where Ferrie was working on at least a part-time basis in 1963. {279) The Warren (commission stated in its report that despite the Commis- sion's probe into why Oswald used this return address on his litera- Committeeture, "investigation nor Leehas Oswald indicated ever that maintained neither the Fair Play for an office at Cuba that address." (^^^'j The committee also established associations between Jack Kuby and several individuals affiliated with the underworld activities of Carlos Marcel lo. (^67) Ruby was a personal acquaintance of Joseph Civello, the Marcello associate who allegedly headed organized crime activi- ties in Dallas; he also knew other individuals who have been linked with organized crime, including a New Orleans nightclub figure, Harold Tannenbaum, with whom Ruby was considering going into partnership in the fall of 1963. {282) » The committee examined a widely circulated published account that Marcello made some kind of threat on the life of President Ken- nedy in September 1962 at a meeting at his Churchill Farms estate outside New Orleans. (^^) Ironically, Attorney General Kennedy's strong interest in having Trafficante prosecuted occun-ed during the same period in which CIA officials, unbeknown to the Attorney General, were using Trafficante's services in assassination plots against the Cuban chief of state, Fidel Castro. (SOI) The committee found that Santos Trafficante's stature in the na- tional syndicate of organized crime, notably the violent narcotics trade, and his role as the mob's chief liaison to criminal figures within the Cuban exile community, provided him with the capability of formulat- ing an assassination conspiracy against President Kennedy. Trafficante had recruited Cuban nationals to help plan and execute the CIA's as- signment to assassinate Castro. (The CIA gave the assignment to former FBI Agent Robert Maheu, who passed the contract along to Mafia figures Sam Giancana and John Roselli. They, in turn, enlisted Trafficante to have the intended assassination carried out.) (302) In his testimony before the committee, Trafficante admitted partici- pating in the unsuccessful CIA conspiracy to assassinate Castro, an admission indicating his willingness to participate in political murder. (303) Trafficante testified that he worked \yith the CIA out of a pa- triotic feeling for his country, an explanation the committee did not accept, at least not as his sole motivation. (304) As noted, the committee established a possible connection between Trafficante and Jack Ruby in Cuba in 1959.(30-5) It determined there had been a close friendship between Ruby and Lewis McWillie, who, as a Havana gambler, worked in an area subject to the control of the Trafficante Mafia isLmi\y.(306) Further, it assembled documentary evi- dence that Ruby made at least two, if not three or more, trips to Havana in 1959 when McWillie was involved in underworld gambling opera- tions there. (307) Ruby may in fact have been serving as a courier for underworld gambling interests in Havana, probably for the purpose of transporting funds to a bank in Miami. (-5^^) The committee also found that Ruby had been connected with other Trafficante associates — R. D. Matthews, Jack Todd, and James Dolan — allof Dallas. (^6*5 ) Finally, the committee developed corroborating evidence that Ruby may have met with Trafficante at Trescornia prison in Cuba during one of his visits to Havana in 1959, as the CIA had learned but had dis- counted in19Q4:.(3J0) While the committee was not able to determine the purpose of the meeting, there was considerable evidence that it did take place. (577) During the course of its investigation of Santos Trafficante, the com- mittee examined an allegation that Trafficante had told a prominent Cuban exile, Jose Aleman, that President Kennedy was going to be assassinated. (57^) According to Aleman, Trafficante made the state- ment in a private conversation with him that took place sometime in September 1962. (.575) In an account of the alleged conversation pub- 174 lished by the Washington Post in 19T6, Aleman was quoted as stating that TraflScante had told him that President Kennedy was "going to be hit." (574) Aleman further stated, however, that it was his impres- sion that Trafficante was not the specific individual who was allegedly planning the murder. () Those associates. Barney Baker, Irwin Weiner and Dusty Miller, stated that Ruby had been in touch with them for the sole purpose of seeking assistance in a night- club labor dispute. (^57) The committee learned that Attorney General Kennedy and his aides arranged for the appointmen"" of Charles Shaffer, a Justice De- partment attorney, to the Warren Commission staff in order that the possibility of Teamster involvement be watched. Shaffer confirmed to the committor that looking into Hoffa was one purpose of his ap- pointment. (362) Yet, partly as a result of the Commission's highly circumscribed ap- proach to investigating possible underworld involvement, as well as limited staff resources, certain areas of possible information relating to Hoffa — such as the Ruby telephone calls — were not the subject of in-depth investigation. (^55) Nevertheless, in a lengthy Commission memorandum prepared for the CIA in February 1964, the Teamsters Union had been listed first on a list of potential groups to be investi- gated in probing "ties between Ruby and others who might have been interested in the assassination of President Kennedy." () When the committee apprised the FBI of the testimony of the two agents (first, the agent who coordinated the investigation; second, the one who prepared the memorandum that was incorporated in the December 23 report), the Bureau initiated its own inquiry. It pro- duced an FBI airtel (an interoffice telegram) dated December 11, 1963, that seemed to verify that the second agent's original instruc- tions were to set out investigative leads, rather than to transcribe the complete contents of the address book. (21) The FBI investigation also led to the discovery of a "tickler" copy of the December 23 report that did contain the Hosty entry on page 25.^(22) The two agents were then reinterviewed by FBI investigators. Based on his review and analysis of FBI documents, the second agent substantially revised the testimony he had given the committee. He told the Bureau investigators that since his assignment was to re- view the information contained in Oswald's address book and to set out appropriate leads where necessary, he initially reproduced by dictation those entries in the address book that he thought might re- quire investigative action. He recalled that he was vitally concerned with accuracy; consequently, he initially included the Hosty entry. Nevertheless, he explained that when he later had time to determine what investigative work remained to be done with regard to the ad- dress book, he decided that it was not necessary to include the Hosty data in his second dictation of an investigative "lead sheet." (^ O. Plnrk, former Speclal-Agent-ln-Charge Curtis O. Lynum, and Special Agent Kenneth C. Howe. 1^5 tial criminal informant for the FBI in Dallas. He suggested that someone could have heard Griffin talking about Ruby's contacts with the FBI and might then have repeated the story with the mistaken assertion that Griffin was talking about Oswald. (77) In support of Hosty's explanation, Shanklin stated to the commit- tee that the Dallas office did send the potential criminal informant file on Ruby to FBI headquarters in Washington after the Kennedy assassination. He added that he did not know whether this file was sent to the Warren Commission.^^ (78) Griffin told the committee in a second interview that soon after the Kennedy assassination he learned that the FBI in Dallas had approached Ruby in order to obtain infor- mation from him. He advised that, although his recollection was unclear, he might have seen an FBI informant file on Ruby and then may have talked to persons outside the Bureau about the FBI's con- tacts with Ruby. (7P) (6) The destruction of Oswald'' s note. — Approximately 2 or 3 weeks before the assassination of President Kennedy, Oswald alleg- edly delivered a note addressed to Hosty at the FBI office in Dallas. {80) The varying accounts of the note's contents suggest that it was threatening or complaining in tone, ordering Hosty to stop bothering Oswald's wife.(6'i) Several hours after Oswald was murdered by Jack Ruby, Hosty, according to his own admission, destroyed the note after having been instructed to do so by J. Gordon Shanklin, the special-agent-in-charge of the Dallas FBI office. (5^) Shanklin denied that he knew anything about the note until a reporter asked him about it in 1975.(5^) JBetween 1963 and 1975, the existence of the note and its destruction were kept secret by the Dallas FBI Office. In his committee testimony, Hosty stated that the note, according to his memory, did not contain Oswald's name and that he first deter- mined that the note might have been from Oswald on the day of the assassination of President Kennedy. Hosty explained that soon after Oswald's arrest, he was instructed to sit in on the interrogation of Oswald at the Dallas Police Department, and that when he identified himself to Oswald, Oswald became upset and stated that Hosty had been bothering his wife, Marina. Hosty suggested that Special- Agent-in-Charge Shanklin, who was told by another FBI agent about Oswald's reaction to Hosty, probably made the same connection be- tween Oswald and the anonymous note. Hosty advised that he was surprised that Shanklin wanted him to destroy the note because the note's contents were not particularly significant. (5.^) Hosty recalled that the note was complaining in tone, but that it contained no threats and did not suggest that Oswald was prone to violence. Hosty stated that he destroyed the note because Shanklin, his superior, ordered him to do so. When asked what motivation Oswald might have had for writing this note, Hosty suggested that Oswald might have wanted to prevent Hosty from contacting his wife because he was afraid that she would tell Hosty about Oswald's trip to INIexico in the fall of 1963 and of his attempt to shoot Gen. Edwin Walker in the spring of 1963. {85) "Thp pominittep fnund no evirtencp that this file was ever sent to the Warren Commis- sion, although details of the association were furnished to the Commission by letter. 1+3-112 0 - 79 - 14 196 The committee regarded the incident of the note as a serious im- peachment of Shanklin's and Hosty's credibility. It noted, however, that the note, if it contained threats in response to FBI contacts with Oswald's wife, would have been evidence tending to negate an informant relationship. The committee noted further the speculative nature of its findings about the note incident. Because the note had been destroyed, it was not possible \o establish with confidence what its contents were. (7) Conclitsion. — In summary, although there have been many al- legations of an Oswald-FBI informant relationship, there was no credible evidence that Oswald was ever an informant for the Bureau. Absent a relationship between Oswald and the FBI, grounds for suspicions of FBI complicity in the assassination become remote. () (7) Why was Oswald'' s Wl fie restricted? — The form used to ini- tiate the opening of Oswald's 201 file contains a notation indicating that the file was to be "restricted". (^^) This indication was considered potentially significant because of the CIA's practice of restricting ac- cess to agents' files to persons on a "need-to-know" basis. Further in- vestigation revealed, however, that restricting access to a file was not necessarily indicative of any relationship with the CIA. The individual who actually placed the restriction on Oswald's file testified that this was done simply to allow her to remain aware of any developments that might have occurred with regard to the file. (5^) The restriction achieved this purpose because any »erson seeking access to the file would first have to notify the restricting officer, at which time the officer would be ajDprised of any developments. This testimony was confirmed by a CIA records expert who further testified that had the file been permanently charged to a particular desk or case officer, as well as restricted, the possibility of a relationship with the CIA would have been greater. (55) There is no indication on Oswald's form that it had been placed on permanent charge. Finally, the committee reviewed the files of four other defectors that had been opened at the same time and by the same person as Oswald's, stricted. andEach determined of these other thatindividuals each of thewas filesonhad the been lists similarly re- of defectors that had been exchanged by the CIA and State Department. None of the files pertaining to these other defectors had any evidence suggestive of a possible intelligence agency association. (8) Were 37 documents missing from OswaWs Wl -file? — In the course of reviewing Oswald's 201 file, the committee discovered an unsigned memorandum \o the Chief of Coimterintelligonce. Research and Analysis, dated February 20, 1964, which stated that 37 documents were missing from Oswald's 201 file. (54) According to the memo- randum, this statement was based on a comparison of a m.achine listing of documents officially recorded as being in the 201 file and those docu- ments actually physically available in the file. (55) While the memo- randum mentioned that such a machine listing was attached, no such attachment was found in the 201 file at the time of the committee's ^u'^^'L^^.^' adhered *^.*^.'* f'onsideringr to its original this witness' position regarding recollection of the origin of the AG code; this issue. 204 review. The memorandum itself TDears the classification "Secret Eyes Only" and was one of the documents that had been fully withheld from release under the Preedom of Information Act. {66) In response to a committee inquiry, the CIA advised that, because Oswald's file had been so active during the course of the Warren Com- mission investigation, up-to-date machine listings were produced periodically. On this basis, the Agency stated that * * * it must be assumed that whoever was responsible for maintaining the Oswald file brought this file up-to-date by locating the 37 documents and placing them in the file. {67) Because this response was incomplete, the author of the memorandum was deposed. He testified that once adocuinent had l)een registered into a 201 file by the Agency's computer system, physical placement of the document in the file was not always necessary. {58) On this basis, he explained, the items listed in the memorandum were not missing but rather had either been routinely placed in a separate file because of their sensitivity or were being held by other individuals who needed them for analytical purposes. (J^*) He further stated that in the course of his custodianship of Oswald's file, he had requested perhaps as many as 100 computer listings on the contents of the Oswald file. While there had been many instances in which one or more documents had been charged out to someone, he stated that he had never discovered that any documents were actually missing. (^6>) According to his testimony, the 37 documents were, in fact, available, but they were not located in the file at the time.(^i) The committee regarded this to be a plausible explanation. (9) Did the CIA maintain a dual fling system on Oswald? — The committee was aware of the possibility that a dual filing system (one innocuous file and one that contained operational detail of a relation- ship with the CIA) could have been used to disguise a possible rela- tionship between Oswald and the Agency. This aw^areness became a concern with the discovery that at least two Agency officers had con- templated the use of faked files and forged documents to protect the ZR Rifle project from disclosure.i=(^^) The implications of this dis- covery interms of the possibility that the Oswald file might also have been faked were disturbing to the committee. In the Oswald case, two items were scrutinized because they were potentially indicative of a dual filing system. The first was a photo- graph of Oswald that had been taken in Minsk in 1961 ; the second was a copy of a letter that had been written to Oswald by his mother dur- ing his stay in the Soviet Union. At the time of President Kennedy's assassination, both of these items were in the CIA's possession, but neither was in Oswald's 201 file. The photograph of Oswald taken in Minsk shows him posing with several other people. According to the CIA, the picture was found after the assassination as a result of a search of the Agency's graphics files for materials potentially relevant to Oswald's stay in the Soviet 12 ZR niflp was an pxeciitlvp notion (as«aopinatIon of forolprn Ipadpr) pro?rnm iinrplnf-pfl to the Oswald case. Former CIA Director Helms testified that the assassination aspect of ZR Rifle was nevpr implemented and, in fact, was discontinued as soon as it was brought to his attention. (6a) Union. {^4) The Agency advised that this photograph, as well as several others not related to Oswald, were routinely obtained in 1962 from some tourists by the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division, an Agency component that regularly sought information on a nonclandes- tine basis from Americans traveling abroad in Communist countries. Committee interviews with the tourists in question confirmed that the photograph, along with 159 other photographic slides, had routinely been made available to the Domestic Contacts Division. Neither tourist had heard of Oswald prior to the assassination or knew which photographs had been of interest to the Agency. (^^) CIA records indicate that only 5 of the 160 slides initially made available were retained. (^7) Committee interviews with the two CIA employees who had handled the slides for the Domestic Contacts Divi- sion established that Oswald had not been identified at the time that these photographic materials were made available. (^<§) One of these employees stated that the Oswald picture had been retained because it depicted a Soviet Intourist guide; the other employee indicated that the picture had been kept because it showed a crane in the back- ground. (^5) Of these two employees, the one who worked at CIA headquarters (and therefore was in a position to know) indicated that the photograph of Oswald had not been discovered until a post- assassination search of the Minsk graphics file for materials pertain' ing to Oswald. (76*) Accordingly, this photograph was not evidence that the CIA maintained a dual filing system with respect to Oswald. The picture apparently was kept in a separate file until 1964, when Oswald was actually identified to be one of its subjects. The committee's investigation of a copy of a letter to Oswald from his mother that was in the Agency's possession similarly did not show any evidence of a dual filing system. This letter, dated July 6, 1961, and sent by Marguerite Oswald, was intercepted as a result of a CIA program (71) known as HT-Lingual,^^ the purpose of which was to obtain intelligence and counterintelligence information from letters sent between the United States and Russia. Typically, intercepted letters and envelopes would be photographed and then returned to the mails. (7^) In response to a committee inquiry, the CIA explained that because of HT-Lingual's extreme sensitivity, all materials generated as a re- sult of mail intercepts were stored in a separate project file that was maintained by the counterintelligence staff. (7) but the Commission's analysis apparently was made with- out access to the unit diaries of MAG 11.^° Moreover, even if Oswald, in fact, did make the trip with his unit to Taiwan, it is clear that any such service there was not for a sub- stantial time. The unit arrived at Atsugi on September 30, 1958, and by Noveinbor 2, 1958, Oswald had left from Japan to complete his tour of duty in the United States. (75^) Finally, with one exception, the circumstances surrounding Oswald's rapid discharge from the military do not appear to have been unusual. Oswald was obligated to serve on active duty until December 7, 1959, but on August 17 he applied for a hardship discharge to support his mother. About 2 weeks later the application was approved. (75J) ^^ It appeared that Oswald's hardship discharge application was proc- essed so expeditiously because it was accompanied by all of the necessary documentation. In response to a committee inquiry, the De- partment ofDefense stated that ". . . to a large extent, the time involved in processing hardship discharge applications depended on how well the individual member had prepared the documentation needed for ^This is contrary to statpments attributed to Lieutenant Cliarles R. Rhodes by Edward J. Epstein toinEpstein, according liis boolc, that"The Secret Oswald did World make theof trip Lee with Harvey the Oswald." main unit Rhodes but was maintains, sent bacli to Japan on October 6, 1958. ™' Similarly, a messngo sent on November 4, 1059, from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning Oswald, which states that he had "served with Marine Air Control Squadrons in .Tapan that indicated and Oswald Taiwan,"had(191) may sohave not been been issued without checking unit diaries which deployed. 31 By September 4, 1959, Oswald had been Informed that he would be discharged on September 11. I!i,j9. ( /9//) Tills exiilains why he was able to tell passport officials on that day that he expected to depart the United States for Europe on September 21, 1959. ^1 consideration of his or her case." (755) A review of Oswald's case indi- cates that his initial hardship discharge application was accompanied by all of the requisite documentation. Oswald had met the preliminary requirements of having made a voluntary contribution to the hardship dependent (his mother) and of applying for a dependent's quarters al- lotment =*-to alleviate the hardship. (i5^) Even though all of the sup- porting affidavits for the quarters allotment had not been submitted at the time that the hardship discharge application was filed, the endorse- ments on the application indicated that the reviewing officers were aware that both the requisite voluntary contribution and the applica- tion for a quarters allotment had been made.(iP7) Moreover, that ap- plication was accompanied by two letters and two affidavits attesting to Marguerite Oswald's inability to support herself. (iP5) Documents provided to the committee by the American Red Cross indicate that Oswald had sought its assistance and therefore was probably well advised on the requisite documentation to support his claim. (75.9) Indeed, Red Cross officials interviewed Marguerite Os- wald and concluded that she "could not be considered employable from an emotional standpoint." (^^(9) The Fort Worth Red Cross office indicated a quarters allotment was necessary for Marguerite Oswald, rather than a hardship discharge for Lee, and assisted her in the prep- aration of the necessary application documents. (^^7) Nevertheless, Oswald informed the Red Cross office in El Toro, Calif., where he was then stationed, that he desired to apply for a hardship discharge. The unusual aspect of Oswald's discharge application was that, technically, his requisite application for a quarters allowance for his mother should have been disallowed because Marguerite's dependency affidavit stated that Oswald had not contributed any money to her during the preceding year. (^^5) Even so, the first officer to review Oswald's application noted in his endorsement, dated August 19, 1959, that "[a] genuine hardship exists in this case, and in my opinion ap- proval of the 'Q' [quarters] allotment will not sufficiently alleviate this situation." (^6^^) This quotation suggests the possibility that ap- plications for quarters allotments and hardship discharges are con- sidered independently of one another. In addition, six other officers endorsed Oswald's application. (^6?5) The committee was able to con- tact three of the seven endorsing officers (one had died) ; two had no memory of the event, (206) and one could not recall any details. (^07) The committee considered their absence of memory to be indicative of the Oswald case having been handled in a routine manner. Based on this evidence, the committee was not able to discern any unusual discrepancies or features in Oswald's military record. (77) OswaId''s militarj/ intelligence fie. — On November 22, 1963, soon after the assassination. Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Jones, op- erations officer of the U.S. Army's 112th Military Intelligence Group offices in Fort (MIG), San Antonio Sam Houston. San Antonio, and Dallas and gave Tex'., those contacted the FBI offices detailed in- formation concerning Oswald and A. J. Hidell, Oswald's alleged alias. This information suggested the existence of a military intelli- 33 A dependent's serviceman and the quarters service. allotment Is one that Is jointly paid to the dependent by the 222 gence file on Oswald and raised the possibility that he had intelligence associations of some kind. (^^P) The committee's investigation revealed that military intelligence of- ficials had opened a file on Oswald because he was perceived as a possible counterintelligence threat. Robert E. Jones testified before the committee that in June 1063 he had been serving as operations officer of the 112th ^Military Intelligence Group at Fort Sam Houston, Tex.^^ Under the gi-oup's control were seven regions encompassing five States : Texas. Louisiana. Arkansas, New Mexico and Oklahoma. Jones was directly responsible for counterintelligence operations, background in- vestisrations, domestic intelligence and any special operations in this five-State i\ren.(2W) He believed that Oswald first came to his atten- tion in mid-1963 through information provided to the 112th MTG by the New Orleans Police Department to the effect that Oswald had been arrested there in connection with Fair Play for Cuba Committee ac- tivities. (^i7) As a result of this information, the 112th Military Intel- ligence Group took an interest in Oswald as a possible counterintelli- gence threat. (^7£) It collected information from local agencies and the military central records facility, and opened a file under the names Ijee Harvey Oswald and A. J. Hidell.(^/.5) Placed in this file were documents and newspaper articles on such topics as Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, his travels there, his marriage to a Russian na- tional, his return to the United States, and his pro-Cuba activities in New Orleans. (^7^) Jones related that on November 22. 1063, while in his quarters at Fort Sam Houston, he heard about the assassination of President Kennedy. (^7-5) Returning immediately to his office, he contacted IVIIG personnel in Dallas and instructed them to intensify their liaisons with Federal, State and local agencies and to report back any information obtained. Early that afternoon, he received a telephone call from Dallas advisino; that an A. J. Hidell had been arrested or had come to the attention of law enforcement authorities. Jones checked the MIG indexes, which indicated that there was a file on Lee Han^ey Oswald, also known bv the name A. J. Hidell. (^/^) Pullincr the file, he telephoned the local FBI office in San Antonio to notify the FBI that he had some information. (^77) He soon was in telephone contact with the Dallas FBI office, to which he summarized the docu- ments in the file. He believed that one person with whom he spoke was FBI Special-Agent-in-Charge J. Gordon Shanklin. He mav have talked with the Dallas FBI office more than one time that day. (^7.^) Jones testified that his last activity with regard to the Kennedy assassination was to write an "after action" report that summarizeil the actions he had taken, the people he had notified and the times of notification. ('^;,9) In addition. Jones believed that this "after action" report included information ol)tained from reports filed bv the 8 to 12 military intelligence acfents who performed liaison functions with the Secret Service in Dallas on the dav of the assassination. Cf,^^) This "after action" report was then maintained in the Oswald file. (^^7) Jones did not contact, nor was he contacted by, any other law enforce- "Onostions had bppn rnlspd abont thp oonfpnts of sonip FBI rominiinlpntions on Novom- bpr 22. lORr?. thfit rpflprtpd Informntfon nllptrpdlv nrovldpd bv military Intplllffpncp. In bis tPsHmony. communications. Jones clarified several points and corrected several errors in these 223: ment or intelligence agencies concerning information that he could pro- vide on Oswald. (^^^) To Jones' knowledge, neither the FBI nor any law enforcement agency ever requested a copy of the military intelli- gence file on Oswald. (^^^) To his surprise, neither the FBI, Secret Service, CIA nor Warren Commission ever interviewed h.im.{2£4-) No one ever directed him to withhold any information ; on the other hand, he never came forward and offered anyone further information rele- vant to the assassination investigation because he "felt that the infor- mation that [he] had provided was sufficient and ... a matter of record. . . ."(^^<5) The committee found Jones' testimony to be credible. His statements concerning the contents of the Oswald file were consistent with FBI communications that were generated as a result of the information that he initially provided. Access to Oswald's military intelligence file, which the Department of Defense never gave to the Warren Com- mission, was not possible because the Department of Defense had destroyed the file as part of a general program aimed at eliminating all of its files pertaining to nonmilitary personnel. In response to a committee inquiry, the Department of Defense gave the following explanation for the file's destruction : 1. Dossier AB 652876, Oswald, Lee Harvey, was identified for deletion from IRK (Intelligence Records and Reports) holdings on Julian date 73060 (1 ^March 1973) as stamped on the microfilmed dossier cover. It is not possible to determine the actual date when physical destruction was accomplished, but is credibly surmised that the destruction was accom- plished within a period not greater than 60 days following the identification for deletion. Evidence such as the type of dele- tion record available, the individual clerk involved in the identification, and the projects in progress at the time of dele- tion, all indicate the dossier deletion resulted from the imple- mentation ofa Department of the Army, Adjutant General letter dated 1 June 1971, subject : Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense (DOD) (Incl 1). Basically, the letter called for the elimination of files on non-DOD affiliated per- sons and organizations. 2. It is not possible to determine who accomplished the actual physical destruction of the dossier. The individual identifying the dossier for deletion can be determined from the clerk number appearing on the available deletion record. The number indicates that Lyndall E. Harp was the identify- ing clerk. Harp was an employee of the IRR from 1969 until late 1973, at which time she transferred to the Defense Investi- gative Service, Fort Holabird, Md., where she is still a civil service employee. The individual ordering the destruction or deletion cannot be determined. However, available evidence indicates that the dossier was identified for deletion under a set of criteria applied by IRR clerks to all files. The basis for these criteria were [sic] established in the 1 June 1971 letter. There is no indication that the dossier was specifically identi- fied for review or deletion. AH evidence shows that the file was 224 reviewed as part of a generally applied program to eliminate any dossier concerning persons not affiliated with DOD. 3. The exact material contained in the dossier cannot he determined at this time. However, discussions with all avail- able persons who recall seeing the dossier reveal that it most probably included: newspaper clippings relating to pro- Cuban activities of Oswald, several Federal Bureau of Investi- gation reports, and possibly some Army counterintelligence reports. None of the persons indicated that they remember any significant information in the dossier. It should be noted here that the Army was not asked to investigate the assassi- nation. Consequently, any Army-derived information was turned over to the appropriate civil authority. 4. At the time of the destruction of the Oswald dossier, IRR was operating under the records disposal authority contained in the DOD Memorandum to Secretaries of the Military De- partments, OASD(A), 9 February 1972, subject: Records Disposal Authority (Incl 2). The memorandum forwards National Archivist disposal criteria which is similar in nature to the requirements outlined in the 1 June 1971 instructions. It was not until 1975 that the Archivist changed the criteria to ensure non-destruction of investigative records that may be of historical value. < Upon receipt of this information, the committee orally requested the destruction order relating to the file on Oswald. In a letter dated September 13, 1978, the General Counsel of the Department of the Army replied that no such order existed : Army regulations do not require any type of specific order before intelligence files can be destroyed, and none was pre- pared in connection with the destruction of the Oswald file. As a rule, investigative information on persons not directly affiliated with the Defense Department can be retained in Army files only for short periods of time and in carefully regulated circumstances. The Oswald file was destroyed rou- tinely in accordance with normal files management proce- dures, as are thousands of intelligence files annually. (^^7) The committee found this "routine" destruction of the Oswald file extremely troublesome, especially when viewed in light of the Depart- ment of Defense's failure to make this file available to the Warren Commission. Despite the credibility of Jones' testimony, without access to this file, the question of Oswald's possible affiliation with military intelligence could not be fully resolved. (18) The Oswald photograph in Office of Naval Intelligence files. — The Office of Naval Intelligence's (ONI) Oswald file contained a photograph of Oswald, taken at the approximate time of his Marine Corps induction. It was contained in an envelope that had on it the language "REC'D 14 November 1963" and "CIA 77978." {228) These markings raised the possibility that Oswald had been in some way as- sociated with the CIA. In response to a committee inquiry, the Department of Defense stated that the photograph had been obtained by ONI as a result of 225 an October 4, 1963 CIA request for two copies of the most recent photo- graphs of Oswald so that an attempt could be made to verify his re- ported presence in Mexico City. The requested copies, however, were not made available to the CIA until after the President's assassina- tion.2* Because of the absence of documentation, no explanation could be given for how or when the Office of Naval Intelligence received this particular photograph of Oswald. (229) The committee's review of CIA cable traffic confirmed that cable No. 77978, dated October 24, 1963, was in fact a request for two copies of the Department of the Navy's most recent photograph of Lee Henry [sic] Oswald. Moreover, review of other cable traffic corrobo- rated the Agency's desire to determine whether Lee Harvey Oswald had, in fact, been in Mexico City. (230) The committee concluded, therefore, that the ONI photograph of Oswald bearing a reference to the CIA, was not evidence that Oswald was a CIA agent. Again, however, the destruction of the military file on Oswald prevented the committee from resolving the question of Oswald's possible affiliation with military intelligence. (19) Oswald in Mexico City. — The committee also considered whether Oswald's activities in Mexico City in the fall of 1963 were indicative of a relationship between him and the CIA. This aspect of the committee's investigation involved a complete review both of alleged Oswald associates and of various CIA operations outside of the United States. (^^7) The committee found no evidence of any relationship between Oswald and the CIA. ]Moreover, the Agency's investigative efforts prior to the assassination regarding Oswald's presence in Mexico City served to confirm the absence of any relationship with him. Specifi- cally, when apprised of his possible presence in ISIexico City, the Agency both initiated internal inquiries concerning his background and, once informed of his Soviet experience, notified other potentially interested Federal agencies of his possible contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. (^-5^) Conclusion Based on the committee's entire investigation, it concluded that the Secret Service, FBI, and CIA were not involved in the assassination. The committee concluded that it is probable that the President Avas assassinated as a result of a conspiracy. Nothing in the committee's investigation pointed to official involvement in that conspiracy. While the committee frankly acknowledged that its investigation was not able to identify the members of the conspiracy besides Oswald, or the extent of the conspiracy, the committee believed that it did not include the Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, or Central Intelligence Agency. was"* As noted, bytliethemilitary destroyed file on Department Oswald, presumably including the ONI photograph, of Defense. D. Agencies and Departments of the U.S. Government Performed With Varying Degrees of Competency in the Fulfillment of Their Duties; President John F. Kennedy Did Not Keceive Adequate Protection; a Thorough and Reliable Investigation into the Responsibility of Lee Harvey Oswald for the Assassi- nation Was Conducted; the Investigation into the Possibility OP Conspiracy in the Assassination Was Inadequate; the Con- clusions OF THE Investigations Were Arrived at in Good Faith, but Presented in a Fashion That Was Too Definitive 1. the secret service was deficient in the performance of its duties The assassination of President Kennedy was the first and only such crime since the Secret Service was assigned responsibility for full-time protection of the President in 1901, as a result of the assassination of William McKinley.(7) When originally formed in 1865, the Secret Service had not been given responsibility for Presidential protection, even though that was the year Lincoln was murdered. (^) Its primary purpose was to deal with counterfeiting, which had become a national outrage in the period before 1862 when a standardized national cur- rency was adopted. (^) By the end of the 1860's, the new agency had all but eliminated the problem. (4) For the balance of the 19th century, the Secret Service engaged in various criminal detection activities. It investigated the Ku Klux Klan in the 1870's,(5) Spanish espionage in the 1890's,(^) organized crime in New York City in the 1880's and 1890's,(7) and syndicated gambling in Louisiana at the turn of the century. (8) Even with the assignment of Presidential protection as its primary purpose, the Secret Service was not always given the necessary annual appropriations to carry out the task. (5) It was not until 1908 that the agency's mission was better defined (7<9) and, at that, for an ironic reason. When the Secret Service exposed the participation in land fraud schemes by Members of Congress from several Western States, legislation was passed restricting the operations of the Agency and creating a new Federal law enforcement body that ultimately would become the Federal Bureau of Investigation, (^i) Indeed, the original FBI men were eight agents transferred from the Secret Service, (i^) The law left the Secret Service with two concerns : Treasury mat- ters, or counterfeiting, and protection of the President, (i^) On occa- sion, however, it was given special assignments. During World War I, the Agency was concerned with German saboteurs, (7^) and in 1921 it investigated the roles of Secretary of the Interior Albert B. Fall and Atty. Gen. Harry M. Daugherty in the Teapot Dome Scan- dal. (75) From about 1930 on, however, the Secret Service was an anticounterfeiting agency with the additional assignment of protect- ing the President. In its protective role, on only two occasions before November 22, 1963, was it tested by an actual assault on a President. (227) 228 In February 1932, the car in which President Roosevelt was riding was fired on in Miami, killing the mayor of Chicago, Anton Cer- mak. (7(9) In Xovember 1950, members of the Puerto Rican Nation- alist Party tried to force their way into Blair House, the temporary home of President Truman. (i7) (a) The Secret Service possessed infm-mation that was not properly amaZyzed^ investigated^ or used hy the Secret Service in convnection toith the Presidenfs tHp to Dallas; in addition^ Secret Serv- ice agents in the motorcade loere inadequately prepared to pro- tect the President from asmj>er. President Kennedy posed a problem for the Secret Service from the start. As a policymaker, he was liberal and innovative, start Hngly so in comparison with the cautious approach of President Eisen- liower. (7(5) His personal style was known to cause agents assigned to him deep concern. He traveled more frequently than any of his pred- ecessors, and he relished contact with crowds of well-wishers. He scoffed at many of the measures designed to protect him and treated the danger of assault philosophically. (/,9) If someone wanted to kill him, he reasoned, it would be very difficult to prevent. (^6^) Comment- ing on the relationship between the President and the Secret Service, Presidential Assistant Kenneth O'Donnell told Gerald Behn, Special Agent-in -Charge of the White House Detail, "Politics and protection don't mix." (^7) The core of the Presidential security arm of the Secret Service is the White House Detail, which in 1963 was composed of 36 special agents. (^^) In addition, there were six special agent-drivers, eiglit special agents assigned to the Kennedy family and five special officers detailed to the Kennedy homo in H3^annisport, Mass. On the trip to Texas, there were 28 special agents in the Presidential entourage. (^) and the need for closer working ar- rangements between the PES and the advance survey teams that han- dled preparations for Presidential trips. (31) With respect to physical protection of the President, the Commis- sion found that some aspects could have been improved, citing spe- cifically the need for closer coordination and clearer definition of responsibilities among Secret Service headquarters, advance and pro- tective detail agents, and local police authorities ;(r?^) the failure to arrange for prior inspection of buildings along the motorcade route; (33) and a lack of discipline and bad judgment by some members of the Secret Service protective detail in Dallas, who were drinking on the night before the assassination. (34-) In its investigation, the committee relied heavily on Protective Re- search Section files. In addition, it took extensive testimony under oath from agents and officials who occupied pertinent positions in the Secret Service in 1963. The committee's investigation confirmed that the Warren Commis- sion'sThe founded. suggestions for improved committee SecretthatService also noted there performance wore issues were additional well not addressed by the Warren Commission. One important one not analyzed by the Commission was whether the information that the Secret Service did possess prior to November 22, 1963, was properly 230 analyzed and acted upon. The committee found that the Secret Service did in fact possess information that was not properly analyzed and disseminated within the Secret Service. Consequently, it was not put to use with respect either to a protective investigation or to physical protection of President Kennedy in advance of the trip to Dallas. The Warren Commission had found that the Secret Service should have taken a broader view of information that was considered a threat to the President. (^5) The committee also took a closer look at Secret Service files to see if they contained what could have been recognized as significant threats that were simply overlooked in connection with the Dallas trip. The committee discovered that the 1963 Protective Research Section files had since been summarized and computerized, (J^) and the origi- nal files then destroyed. The committee thus reviewed the computerized summaries of PRS case files for the period March to December 1963. (.^7) The sunmiaries indicated that during this period, the PRS received information on over 400 possible threats to the President, approximately 20 percent of which could have been attributed to politi- cal motivation. The committee then reviewed the trip files for 1963 to determine which threats the Secret Service had recognized as signifi- cant. (^5) Although there are other concepts of significance, the com- mittee decided to limit its review to those that actually caused cancella- tion of a trip, an alteration of the President's planned itinerary, or an intensive preliminary investigative effort by the Secret Service. By limiting the definition in this way, the committee believed it could reach a clear determination of the manner in which the Secret Service responded to significant threats. The Secret Service "trip files" actually consisted of two basic docu- ments— a preliminary survey report, reflecting the basic plans for a trip, and a final survey report, prepared after a trip had been com- pleted, and incorporating any changes that had been made in tlie origi- nal plan. (55) These files were intended by the Secret Service to reflect principal problems encountered on each trip. A comparison of the preliminary and final reports should have revealed not only altera- tions of the President's itinerary, Init the reasons for such changes. Because the final survey reports did not always reveal the specific nature of threats, (4^) other files on investigations conducted prior to the President's trips in 1963 were also reviewed, and intei-views with i gents who worked on each trip were conducted. (2) Signi-fieant threats in 1963. — The committee's review determined there were three significant threats to the President in the March to December 1963 period: fii-st, a postcard warned that he would be assassinated while riding in a motorcade — this resulted in additional protection being provided when the President went to Chicago in March ;(4i) second, a threat in connection with a November 2 trip to Chicago that was canceled ; (4^) third, a threat in connection with a trip to Miami on November 18, (.^?)^ resulting in an extensive prelimi- nary investigation. The nature of the threats on November 2 and November 18 revealed these had been tlie reason for the Secret Service- »A Miami journalist later reported that a decision was made to transport President Kennedy from Miami International Airport to a Miami Beach hotel by helicopter to avoid exposing him to assassins by having him ride in a motorcade. The committee could find no documentation for this report. (^/,) 231 to have investigated individuals identified with them in terms of future danger to the President. (4^) The committee was unable to determine specifically why the Presi- dent's trip to Chicago, scheduled for November 2, was canceled. The possibilities range from the condition of his health (^) to concern for the situation in South Vietnam following the assassination of Presi- dent Diem (^7) to the threat received on October 30. (-^) On that date, the Secret Service learned that an individual named Thomas Arthur Vallee, a Chicago resident who was outspokenly opposed to President Kennedy's foreign policy, was in possession of several weapons. (.^) Further, Vallee's landlady reported that he had requested time off from his job on November 2. (50) Vallee was subsequently interviewed, surveilled and eventually arrested by the Chicago police, who found an M-1 rifle, a handgun and 3,000 rounds of ammunition in his auto- mobile. (5/) Vallee was released from custody on the evening of No- vember 9,.{5£) The committee found that the Seci-et Service learned more about Vallee prior to the President's trip to Dallas on November 22 : he was a Marine Corps veteran with a histoi-y of mental illness while on active duty',{5S) he was a member of the John Birch Society (5^) and an extremist in his criticism of the Kennedy administration ; (55) and he claimed to be an expert marksman. (5^) Further, he remained a threat after November 2, because he had been released from jail. (57) The committee also learned that the information the Secret Service obtained on Vallee was not forwarded to the agents responsible for the President's trip to Texas on November 21-22, although it was trans- mitted to the Protective Research Section upon receipt on Octo- ber 30.(55) The potential significance of Vallee as a threat was illus- trated by the Secret Service's reports, which included a notation on November 27, 1963 of the similarity between his background and that of Lee Harvey Oswald, (5^) and a record of extensive, continued in- vestigation ofVallee's activities until 1968.(6'^) In addition, the committee obtained the testimony of a former Secret Service agent, Abraham Bolden, who had been assigned to the Chicago office in 1963. He alleged that shortly before November 2, the FBI sent a teletype message to the Chicago Secret Service office stating that an attempt to assassinate the President would be made on November 2 by a four-man team using high-powered rifles, and that at least one mem- ber of the team had a Spanish-sounding name. (^7) Bolden claimed that while he did not personally participate in surveillance of the sub- jects, he learned about a surveillance of the four by monitoring Secret Service radio channels in his automobile and by observing one of the subjects being detained in his Chicago office. (62) According to Bolden's account, the Secret Service succeeded in lo- cating and surveillance two of the threat subjects who, {63) when they discovered they were being watched, were arrested and detained on the evening of November 1 in the Chicago Secret Service office. (^4^) The committee was unable to document the existence of the alleged assassination team. Specifically, no agent who had been assigned to Chicago confirmed any aspect of Bolden's version. (^5) One agent did state there had been a threat in Chicago during that period, but he was unable to recall de^ai]s. (66) Bolden did not link Vallee to the supposed 232 four-man assassination team, although he claimed to remember Val- lee's name in connection with a 1963 Chicago case. (^7) He did not rec- ognize Vallee's photograph when shown it by the committee. (6>5) The questionable authenticity of the Bolden account notwithstand- ing, the committee believed the Secret Service failed to make appro- priate use of the information supplied it by the Chicago threat in early Xovember 1963. Similarly, the Secret Service failed to follow up fully on a threat in Miami, also in Xovember 1963. On Xovember 9, 1963, an informant for the Miami police, "William Somersett, had secretly recorded a convei-sa- tion with a riglitwing extremist named Joseph A. Milteer, who sug- gested there was a plot in existence to assassinate the President with a high-powered rifle from a tall building. (^5) Miami Police intelligence officers met with Secret Service agents on Xovember 12 and provided a transcript of the Somersett recording. (7^) It read in part : Somersett. I think Kennedy is coming here Xovember 18 to make some kind of speech. I don't know what it is, but I imagine it will be on TV. Milteer. You can bet your bottom dollar he is going to have a lot to say about the Cubans; there are so many of them here. Somersett. Well, he'll have a thousand bodyguards, don't worry about that. Milteer. The more bodyguards he has, the easier it is to get him. Somersett. What? Milteer. The more bodyguards he has, the easier it is to get him. Somersett. Well, how in the hell do you figure would be the best way to get him ? Milteer. From an office building with a high-powered rifle. ******* Somersett. They are really going to try to kill him ? Milteer. Oh, yeah ; it is in the working. ******* Somersett. * * * Hitting this Kennedy is going to be a hard proposition. I believe you may have figured out a way to get him, the office building and all that. I don't know how them Secret Service agents cover all them office buildings everywhere he is going. Do you know whether they do that or not ? Milteer. Well, if they have any suspicion, they do that, of course. But without suspicion, chances are that they wouldn't. During the meeting at which the Miami Police Department pro- vided this transcript to the Secret Service, it also advised the Secret Service that Milteer had been involved with persons who pi-ofessed a dislike for President Kennedy and were suspected of having committed violent acts, including the bombing of a Birmingham, Ala., church in which four young girls had been killed. They also reported that Milteer was connected with several radical right wing organizations and trav- eled extensively throughout the United States in support of their views. (77) 233 Although it would have been possible to read Milteer's threats as hollow speculation, the Secret Service did not dismiss them lightly. The case agent in the Miami office forwarded a report and a recording of the Somersett-Milteer conversation to the Protective Research Section. (7^) Robert I. Bouck, special agent in charge of PRS, then requested that the Miami office make discreet inquiries about Milteer.(7^) On November 18, 1963, Special Agent Robert Jamison of the Miami Secret Service office, in an interview with Somersett, had him place a telephone call to Milteer at his home in Valdosta, Ga., to verify he was in that city. (7.^) In addition, Jamison learned that Somersett did not know the identity of any violence-prone associates of Milteer in the Miami area. (75) The November 26 Miami field office report indicated that the information gathered "was furnished the agents making the advance arrangements before the visit of the President * * *."(7^) PRS then closed the case, and copies of its report were sent to the Chief of Secret Service and to field offices in Atlanta, Philadelphia, Indianapolis, Nashville, Washington, and Miami. (77) The Milteer threat was ignored by Secret Service personnel in planning the tripon toNovember who was notified Dallas. PRS 8 that Special Agent-in-Char^e the President would visit Bouck, Miami on November 18, told the committee that relevant PRS information would have been supplied to the agents conducting advance prepara- tions for the scheduled trip to Miami, (7^) but no effort was made to relay it to Special Agent Winston G. Lawson, who was responsible for preparations for the trip to Dallas,^ or to Forrest Sorrels, special agent-in-charge of the Dallas office. Nor were Sorrels or any Secret Service agent responsible for intelligence with respect to the Dallas trip informed of the Milteer threat before November 22, 1963.(5^) Following the assassination, Somersett again met with Milteer. Mil- teer commented that things had gone as he had predicted. Somersett asked if Milteer actually had known in advance of the assassination or had just been guessing. Milteer asserted that he had been certain be- forehand about the inevitability of the assassination. (5i ) Bouck and Inspector Thomas Kelley, who was assigned to rep- resent the Secret Service in the investigation of the Kennedy as- sassination, testified to the committee that threat information was transmitted from one region of the country to another if there was specific evidence it was relevant to the receiving region. (5^) The fact was, however, that two threats to assassinate President Kennedy with high-powered rifles, both of which occurred in early November 1963, were not relayed to the Dallas region. (3) Ins'pection of the, motorcade route. — During the Secret Service check of the Dallas motorcade route. Special Agent-in-Charge Sorrels commented that if someone wanted to assassinate the President, it could be done with a rifle from a high building. (^^) President 3 Lawson, on November 8, visited the PRS office in Washington to check geographical indexes. They revealed no listing of any individual or group that posed a potential danger to the President in the territory of the Secret Service regional office that included Dallas and Fort Worth. (79) 234 Kennedy liiniself had remarked he could be shot from a high build- ing and little could be done to stop it. (5^) But such comments were just speculation. Unless the Secret Service had a specific reason to sus- pect the occupants or activities in a certain building, it would not inspect it. (85) The committee found that at the time of the Dallas trip, there was not sufficient concern about the possibility of an attack from a high building to cause the agents responsible for trip planning to develop security precautions to minimize the risk. The Warren Commission commented that a building survey con- ducted under a "level of risk" criterion might well have included the Texas School Book Depository. (5^) Although the agent in the lead vehicle had some responsibility to scan the route for danger, (^7) this would have been woefully inadequate to protect against a concealed sniper. Tele^dsion films taken in Dallas on November 22, 1968 show foot patrolmen facing the motorcade but not the cinwd or the build- ings. (^) Although the conduct of the agents was without firm direction and evidenced a lack of preparedness, (i6^5) the committee found that many of the agents reacted in a positive, protective manner. Agent Clint Hill, assigned to protect the First Lady, reacted almost instantane- ously. (i{?^) Agent Thomas "Lem" Johns left Vice President Johnson's follow-up car in an effort to reach the Vice President's limousine, but he was left behind momentarily in Dealey Plaza as the procession sped away to Parkland Hospital. {107) Photographic analysis revealed that other agents were beginning to react approximately 1.6 seconds after the first shot. (iO<§) In reviewing the reactions of the agents, the committee also reex- amined the allegation that several had been out drinking the eve- ning before and the morning of the assassination. (7^5) Four of the nine agents alleged to have been involved were assigned to the motor- cade and had key responsibilities as membei-s oi the President s follow- up car. {110) The supervisor of the agents involved advised that each agent reported for duty on time, with full possession of his mental and physical capabilities and was entirely ready to perform his assigned duties. (///) Inspector Thomas Kelley, who was in charge of an evaluation of Secret Service performance in the assassination, testi- fied before the committee that an investigation of the drinking incident led to a conclusion that no agent violated any Secret Service rule.(ii^) In an effort to reach its own conclusion about the drinking incident, the committee reviewed film coverage of the agents' movements at the time of the shooting. The committee found nothing in the reactions of the agents that would contradict the testimony of the Secret Serv- ice officials. (/7^) 236 (h) The responsibility of the Secret Service to investigate the assas- sinatio-n loas teiTninated when the Federal Bureau of hwestiga- tio)i assumed prwuiry investigative responsiMlity . The committee found that the investigation by the Secret Service after the assassination was terminated prematurely when President Johnson ordered that the FBI assume primary investigative respon- sibility. (7i^) Although the initial investigative efforts of the Secret Service lacked coordination, individual field offices with information that might have been related to the assassination had started their own investigations and pursued them aggressively. How the Secret Service responded after the assassination is illus- trated bythe investigation conducted by the Chicago Secret Service office. After the assassination, the acting special agent-in-charge of the Chicago field office wrote an urgent report indicating he had received reliable information about "a group in the Chicago area who (sic) may have a connection with the JFK assassination. "(775) This report was based on information received after the assassination from a reliable informant who reported a conversation he had had on No- vember -21, 1963. (ii^) The informant, Thomas Mosley, reported that for some time he had been involved in negotiating the sale of illegal arms with a Cuban exile, an outspoken critic of President Kennedy named Homer S. Echevarria. (ii7) On November 21, Echevarria had said his group now had "plenty of money" and that they were prepared to proceed with the purchases "as soon as we [or they] take care of Kennedy." (775) After receiving the initial report, the Secret Service surveilled sub- sequent meetings between Mosley and Echevarria, (775) received reports from Mosley about the conversations, (7^^) and discussed the progress of the investigation with the local FBI office. (7^7) By December 3, 1963, a fuller picture of Echevarria was obtained (7^^) and reported to the Protective Research Section, (i^,^) By that date, it appeared that Echevarria was a member of the 30th of November (Cuban exile) Movement, (7^4) that an associate of his who had also spoken directly with Mosley about the arms sales was Juan Francisco Bianco-Fernandez, military director for the Cuban Student Revolu- tionary Directorate (DRE),(7^5) ■• and that the arms purchases were being financed through Paulino Sierra Martinez, a Cuban exile who had become a Chicago lawyer. (7^^) Mosley inferred from his con- versation with Echevarria and Blanco that Sierra's financial backers consisted in part of "hoodlum elements" who were "not restricted to Chicago." {127) The committee's investigation provided substantial corroboration for the Secret Service's concern about the Mosley allegations. The committee found tliat the 30th of November Movement was receiving financial backing through the Junta del Gobierno de Cuba en el Exilio (JGOE), a Chicago-based organization led by Sierra. JGCE was essentially a coalition of predominantly right-wing anti-Castro groups. (7^5) It had been formed in April 1963 and abolished abruptly in January 1964.(7^5) During its short life, JGCE apparently acquired enormous financial l)acking, secured at least in part from '^ As previously noted, the FBI bad learned that the Miami-based DRE had a representa- tive in New Orleans, Carlos Bringuler, who had contact with Oswald in the summer of 106.3 (see section I C 3 on anti-Castro Cuban exiles). 237 organized gambling interests in Las Vegas and Cleveland. {130) JGCE actively used its funds to purchase large quantities of weapons and to support its member groups in conducting military raids on Cuba.(iJi) The aflUiates of JGCE, in addition to the 30th of Novem- ber Movement, included Alpha 66, led by Antonio Veciana Blanch," and the MIRE, whose leader was the militant anti-Castro terrorist, Orlando Bosch Avila.(i^^) The Secret Service recognized the need to investigate the alleged plots by Cuban exile groups more fully, especially that of Echevarria's 30th of November group. (i^5) But when the progress of the investi- gation was discussed with the FBI, the FBI responded that the 30th of November group was not likely to have been involved in any illegal acts.(ic?^) ^ The Secret Service initially was reluctant to accept this representation in light of the evidence it had developed that indicated the group was in fact involved in illegal activities, (-?<^7) and there- fore began preparations to place an undercover agent in Echevarria's groups to investigate his activities more closely. (i55) On November 29, 1963, however. President Johnson created the Warren Commis- sion and gave the FBI primary investigative responsibility. (i) The committee concluded from its lengthy study of the roles of the FBI, Secret Service, CIA, and other Federal agencies that assisted the Warren Commission that the final determinations of who was respon- sible for President Kennedy's murder and whether there had been a conspiracy were based largely on the work of the FBI. (11) With an acute awareness of the significance of its finding, the committee con- cluded that the FBI's investigation of whether there had been a con- spiracy in President Kennedy's assassination was seriously flawed. The conspiracy aspects of the investigation were characterized by a 242 limited approach and an inadequate application and use of available I'esouroes. {IB) The committee concluded that the FBI's investigation into a coii- spiracy was deficient in the areas that the committee decided were most worthy of suspicion — organized crime, pro- and anti-Castro Cubans, and the possible associations of individuals from these areas with Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby. In those areas in particular, the committee found that the FBI's investigation was in all likelihood insufficient to have uncovered a conspiracy. Given the FBI's justifiable reputation as one of the most professional and respected criminal investigative agencies in the world, its effort in the Kennedy assassination was expected to be of the highest degree of thoroughness and inte^ity. Indeed, it was an effort of unparalleled magnitude in keeping with the gravity of the crime, resultmg in the assignment of more Bureau resources than for any criminal case in its history, (i^) In terms of hours worked, interviews conducted and tests performed, the FBI's response was, in fact, imexcelled. It was so wide-ranging that it could not be easily summarized, as could the FBI's investigation of the assassination in 1968 of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Over 80 Bureau personnel were sent to Dallas, over 25,000 interviews were conducted, and 2,300 reports, consisting of 26,400 pages, were prepared. (14-) The FBI collected and examined the physical evidence with an im- pressive array of scientific equipment and personnel. By means of unusually rapid compilation of test results, laboratory and field per- sonnel of the Bureau were able to trace elements of the physical evi- dence to Oswald, and a series of sophisticated techniques led to early identification of Oswald's rifle as the murder weapon. (i5) Then, using spectrographic, fingerprint, textile, and other analyses, the Bureau was able to assemble a substantial mass of evidence that led to the identi- fication ofOswald as a possible gunman. (75) Based on the committee's independent evaluation of the FBI's test results, the committee found that the FBI's performance in the investigation was at its best in the area of scientific analysis. Similarly, the FBI's ability to compile an abundance of disparate documentary evidence pertaining to Oswald's background and activities at the time of the assassination was highly commendable; it made full and efficient use of hundreds of FBI personnel. (77) On the other hand, a qualitative assessment of aspects of the inves- tigation raised some perplexing questions. From an appraisal of the structure of the operation, the committee detected weaknesses in both formulation and execution. The committee found evidence of orga- nizational fragmentation, (75) an allocation of duties among various divisions of the Bureau that considerably, if unintentionall^y, com- promised the quality of the effort, to investigate the possibility of a conspiracy (/'9).^ The assassinRtion investigation was divided between two main divi- sions of the FBI, the General Investigative Division and the Domestic »The former assifitant director, since deceased, who coordinated fhe FBI's conspiracy investigation himself characterized the effort In testimony before the Senate Select Com- mittee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intellij^ence Activities as rushed, chaotic, and shallow, despite the enormity of paperwork that was >?P"erated.(20) 243 Intelligence Division. A primary responsibility of the General In- vestigative Division (^7) was assembly of the basic facts of the assassi- nation by means of testing and analysis of physical evidence. (^^) Traditionally, the General Investigative Division handled FBI murder investigations, and it was the official in charge of the bank robbery desk in that Division who supervised the assassination investigation, since, according to the Bureau's manual of operations, jurisdiction for assaults on Federal officials was appropriately assigned to his desk. The committee's conclusion that conspiracy was a bliAd spot in the FBI's investigation was reflected in the observation of the assistant FBI director in charge of the General Investigative Division, who said that while the Division was charged with investigating who specifically fired the shot or shots that killed President Kennedy, whether persons other than Oswald were involved 'was an "ancillary matter" tnat was not part of his division's responsibility. (^<^) He also characterized the investigation by saying, "* * * we were in the posi- tion of standing on the comer with our pocket open, waiting for some- one to drop information into it, and we utilized what was fed to us, and disseminated it * * * to the Warren Commission." (^4) Within the General Investigative Division, the probe of Jack Euby was delegated to the Civil Eights Division on the theory that Ruby violated Oswald's civil rights by killing him, {£S) While the commit- tee, in its investigation, found that Ruby's links to various organized crime figures were contained in reports received by the FBI in the weeks following his shooting of Oswald, the Bureau was seriously delinquent in investigating the Ruby -underworld connections. (26) The committee established that the Bureau's own organized crime and Mafia specialists were not consulted or asked to participate to any significant degree. (27) The assistant director who was in charge of the organized crime division, the Special Investigative Division, told the committee, "They sure didn't come to me * * * We had no part in that that I can recall." (^5) The committee also determined that the Bureau's lack of interest in organized crime extended to its investiga- tion of Oswald. The Domestic Intelligence Division was responsible for the FBI's investigation it was assigned of Oswald°s activities, to consider associations, all questions and motivations, of a possible and foreign con- spiracy. (£9) The assistant director who ran this jphase of the investiga- tion, however, had been one of several FBI officials and agents wno were disciplined by Director Hoover following the assassination for what the Inspection Division determined to have been deficient per- formance inthe investigation of Oswald prior to the assassination. The disciplinary action was kept a Bureau secret. Not even the Warren Commission was informed of it. Within the Domestic Intelligence Division, the investigation of Oswald and a possible conspiracy was assigned to a team of agents from the Bureau's Soviet section because Oswald had been an avowed Marxist who had defected to the Soviet Union. (^^) While numerous specialists on Cuban affairs and exile activities were assigned to the Domestic Intelligence Division, the committee found that they were seldom consulted on the assassination or asked to participate in the investigation, despite the reported connections 244 between both Oswald and Ruby and individuals active in Cuban revo- lutionary activities, (.^i) Supervisors of Cuba-related activities at the Bureau in the early 1960's told the committee they were unaware of any investigation of the Cuban issue with respect to the assassination. Similarly, the committee found that neither the Domestic Intelligence Division nor FBI headquarters authorized an intelligence investiga- tion into possible foreign complicity in the assassination. (,S^) While the FBI Domestic Intelligence Division had some of the most sophisticated investigators and resources at its disposal, the commit- tee concurred with the conclusion of the Senate select committee when it stated in 1976: "Rather than addressing its investigation to all significant circumstances, including all possibilities of conspiracy, the FBI investigation focused narrowly on Lee Harvey Oswald." (^^) The committee further concluded that the critical early period of the FBI's investigation was conducted in an atmosphere of consider- able haste and pressure from Hoover to conclude the investigation in an unreasonably short period of time. (34) The committee also noted that Hoover's personal predisposition that Oswald had been a lone assassin affected the course of the investigation, adding to the momen- tum to conclude the investigation after limited consideration of pos- sible conspiratorial areas. While Hoover continued to press conspiracy leads, his apparent attitude was reflected in a telephone conversation with President Johnson on November 24, 1963, just hours after Oswald had been shot of death by Ruby. Hoover said : "The thing I am most concerned about * * * is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin." (.55) Two days later, on November 26, 1963, Hoover received a memorandum from an assistant director stating that, "* * * we must recognize that a matter of this magnitude cannot be fully investigated in a week's time."() The panel concludod. nevertheless, that the autopsy findinfrs were generally accurate. Dr. Baden testified that Dr. King died as a result of a single gunshot wound caused by a bullet that entered the right side of tlie face approximately an inch to the right and a half inch below the mouth. (7) The bullet fractured Dr. King's jaw. exited the lower part of the face and reentered the body in the neck area.() The autopsy panel con- cluded that the single bullet that struck Dr. King must have come from across Mulberiy Street,^ because Dr. King's body was facing in that direction and because a bullet coming from that direction would have traveled on a downward sloi)e. The i)anel ccmcliided, further, that the bullet was })robably fired from the area of the roominghouse at 4'2'il4 South Main Street, but the i)anel could not determine, from the medical evidence ahme, whether the shot was fired from the bathroom window on the second floor oi' fiom (he shrubbeiv below the window. (74)''' Because of the importance of determining as accurately as possible the location of the assassin, the conunittee retained Koogle and Poids Engineering, Inc. of Albu(|U(>ique, X. M(>x., to conduct engineering * See MLK Exhibit F-19 (crime scene diaprani). Hearinfts before the Select Coiiiniittee on Assassinations. U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress. 2d Session (Washington, D.C. : U.S. (Jovernnient Printing Office, 1979), vol. I, p. 77 (hereinafter HSCA-MLK Hearings). '•The panel received w;is asked eyewitness to concentrate testimony supporting oneach these as two specificlocation the firing areas because the committee of the assassin. 291 surveys at the scene of the assassination. The engineering consultant met the committee and committee medical panel members in Memphis in June 1978, and the firm proceeded to conduct an engineering survey, using sophisticated scientific equipment. (7.'J) Eyewitness testimony indicated that at the moment of the bullet's impact. Dr. King was standing on the motel balcony in front of room 306, conversing with associates in the courtyard beloAv. (/tf) The engi- neering survey was based on scientific measurements of the rear of the roominghouse from that position and of the probable posture of Dr. King's body at the instant of impact — that is, with his head forward, looking down into the parking area and with a slight forward bend at the waist. (i7) While the ccmsultant was unable to state with certainty the vertical angle of the trajectory, (75) the geometric data was consistent with both the bathroom window at the rear of the room- inghouse (7.^>) and shrubbery within the garden area at the rear of 418-42:21/4 South Main Street (i20) as possible locations for the assassin. Because the medical and engineering evidence was not conclusive as to the precise origin of the shot,(^i) the committee used the testimony of witnesses at the scene to determine the most likely origin. Charles Quitman Stephens, a roominghouse tenant who occupied room 6-B, maintained in a sworn affidavit given on June 13, 1968, that on two or three occasions during the afternoon of April 4, 1968, he "heard footsteps leaving room o-B and going past [his] room and into the common bathroom at the end of the hall.** '^ A second tenant, William Charles Anschutz, told FBI interviewers that during the afternoon of April 4, 1968, he made two attempts to use the bathroom and found it occupied on each occasion. He lecalled that Stephens told him, through the door of room 6-B, that the bathroom was being used by the new- tenant in o-B.{22) This information became significant in light of the uncontroverted evidence that Ray did, in fact, rent room 5-B on the afternoon of April 4. Xeither Anschutz nor Stephens could recall for the connnittee details of these bathrooms visits by the occupant of room o-B, but Stephens noted in a sworn statement that at the time of the assassination, he was seated at the kitchen table in room 6-B, when he heard a loud explosion that he recognized as a shot. After looking out the window toward the Lorraine ]\Iotel, he heard footsteps running in the hallway. He Avent to the door, opened it, looked out and observed a num with something under his arm turning the corner at the end of the liallway. Stephens was sure the individual had come from the bathroom ad- joining his apartment because of the loudness of the shot.(^J) Stephens' sobriety on the afternoon of April 4 was called into ques- tion by a number of sources, and the committee did not rely on his tes- timony for an eyewitness identification of the assassin. It believed that he was sober enough, however, to determine that a loud explosion had occurred nearby and that he saw a man fleeing down the hallway. {£^) Similarly, Anshutz heard a shot, opened his door and saw a man fleeing down the hallway from the direction of the bathroom. (^d) ^ Gracp Waldeu. who occiinied room (5-B as Stephens' common-law wife, pave a variety of conflictinsr st-'tements with respect to her observations immediately after the assassina- tion Since Afs. Is discussed in Wnlden's a separatetestin^ony section ofI ecMiiie the sn'~'ect this report. of disnt'^e See section II Aandb infra. caused controversy, it 292 Witnesses in the vioinit}' of the Lorraine, inoludinfj several officials of the Southern (^hristian I^eadership Conference (S(^LC) who were ;nvaitin^) The committee believed that the movement Jones perceived actually occurred several moments after the shot. If it was. in fact, a ])erson, it may have been a law enforceuient officei- responding to the shot. Other evidence, while not weighted heavily, was nonethidrss con- sistent witli the bathroom of the roominghouse as the likely firing lo- cation of the assassin. A slight indentation in a windowsill in the bathroom was originally thought ])y Memphis police to have been caused by a rifle ban-el. FBI analysis could not confirm that the uuir- der weapon was the cause of the indentation, nor could the committee. Tile committee's fii'earms panel conducted a microscopic review and chemical analysis of the windowsill, but it too could not confirm or ebminate the murder weapon or, in fact, any rifle or other object as the cause of the indentation. (->/) Similarly, scuff marks found in tlie bathtub could indicate that the as.sassin stood in the tub while taking aim through the bathroom window. The committee determined, in fact, that a clear shot at room 806 of the Lorraine could only have been made from the bathroom if the assassin was standing in the bathtub. The committee, however, was unable to eliminate the alternative possibility that these marks, apparently made by someone wearing shoes, were left by police officers attemiitiiiir to check possible shooting angles imr.iediately after the assassination. • Rpo MI>K Exhll.it V 4.-,4. VI HSr.\Mr>K Hcniinirs. 420 (a r.l.ohiprai.li of sovoial fiChC mpmt;prs point'iic toward tho rooniiiijrhoiisf from tlie balcony of tlio Lorrainf imincfliatt'ly followlriR Dr. Klnicr's assassination). 293 Although the scientific evidence did not independently establish the location of the assassin, when it was combined with witness testimony, it pointed stronoly to the rear of the roominghonse. In light of the mu- tually corroborative testimony of Stephens and Anschutz, and the absence of significant evidence of an alternative firing location, the committee found that the shot that killed Dr. King was fired from the bathroom window at the rear of the rooming-house at 4221/2 South Main Street. 3. ja:mes earl ray purchased the ripple that was used to shoot dr. king and transported it from birmingham, ala. to memphis, tenn., whe15e he rented a room at 42 2j^ south main street, and moments after the assassination, he dropped it near 42 4 south main street Dr. King was killed by a Remington-Peters, soft-point, metal- jacketed bullet fired from a high velocity .80-06 rifle. The committee determined that a rifle purchased by James Earl Ray on March 30, 19.68, in l^iruiingham. Ala., and which was found in front of Canipe's Anuisement Co., 424 South Main Street, moments after the assassina- tion, was the type of rifle that could have fired the bullet that killed Dr. King. From a combination of field investigation, scientific data, and ad- missions byRay, the connnittee was convinced that Ray purchased the rifle, transported it to the scene of the crime and abandoned it near the scene immediately after the shooting. First, the evidence is conclusive that Ray purchased a .30-06 caliber Remington Game- master slide action rifle, serial No. 461476, model 760, with a Redfield variable telescopic sight, serial No. Al73r)0, and Weaver sight mount. This rifle, sight, and mount were recovered bv police officers immedi- ately after the assassination and were later designated exhibit "Q2'' by "the FBI. committee publicRayhearing, repeatedly that admitted, as 1968, on March 29, he didhe under oath a at purchaspd ,248a caliber rifle and a telescopic sight at the Aeroiiiarine Supply Co. in Birmingham. Further, Ray admitted that the next day he exchanged the .248 caliber rifle for a more powerful .80-06 Remington Gauie- master.(.?^) That rifle was identified as the rifle found in front of Canipe's Amusement Co. on April 4, 1968. Ray's admission about the purchase and exchange was corroborated by the statements of XL L. Baker and Donald Wood, the Aeromarine employees who dealt with Ray on March 29 and 80. Wood, in fact, identified Ray as the man known to him as Harvey Lowmeyer who, on March 80, received the .80-06 rifle in exchange for the original .248 purchase, (o^^) Tn addition, tlie Aeromarine sales receipt reflects the initial piiichase and subsequent exchange by Lowmeyer, the alias Rav aduiitted usin.q: at the tiuie of the rifle purchase. (.74) The committee found significant Ray's use of an alias other than Eric S. Gait during a transaction that could be directly tied to the assassination. Ray had established identification as Eric S. Gait and used that name almost exclusively for 9 months preceding the assassi- nation. When he rented an apartment or a room, bought a car, secured a driver's license, took dance lessons, rented a safe deposit box, visited a doctor, attended bartending school, and subscribed to a locksmith 294 course, all everyday activities, he did so as Eric Starve Galt.(^o) On the other hand, in transactions directly linked to the assassination, and therefore the most incriminatinp;, Ray deviated from his estab- lished identity. He used the name Harvey Lowmeyer only for the purchase of the rifle; (SO) similarly, he used the name John AVillard only to rent the room at Bessie Brewer's roomin<>;house at 4221^ South Main Street, Memphis.^ Although Ray claimed to have taken a slow drive through Alabama and Mississippi from March 31 to April 4, authenticated documents and sworn testimony convinced the committee that Ray, in fact, re- turned to Atlanta and left there for ^lemphis no earlier than April 1 and possibly as late as April 3. Regardless, Ray admitted transporting the rifle from Birmingham to ]Memphis,(c^7) claiming that he gave it to Raoul at the New Rebel Motel on the evening of April 3, never to see it again. Thus the conunittee established that Ray bought a .30-06 Remington Gamemaster in Birmingham and took it to Memphis. This same rifle — with Ray's Main 424 South fingerprints on it— was Street moments afterfound on the sidewalk in front of the assassination. Ray also admitted renting room 5-B at Bessie Brewer's rooming- house, using the asname mittee, as well John in the "\Villard.(-5(S') original In interviews investigation, with the Mrs. Brewer com- recalled renting room 5-B to John Willard. She also noted that the tenant rejected the first room shown to him, one equipped witli light house- keeping facilities, saying he only wanted a sleeping room. Willard then accepted 5-B, Mrs. Brewer recalled, which was in the rear of the building near the bathroom and which offered a view of the front of the Lorraine ^iote\. (39) ^ A man matching the general desci-iption of Ray was also seen at the time he rented the room by Charles Stephens and by Bertie Reeves, another resident of the roominghouse.(4^) As noted previously, both Stephens and Anschutz saw a num carry- ing abundle that could have contained a rifle, fleeing down the hallway shortly after the shooting. Bernell Finley, who was shopping in Canipe's Amusement Co. at the time of the assassination, recalled hearing a sound like the backfiring of an automobile. A short time later he saw a man walking i)y the front of the store, heard a noise and saw a bundle in the entrancoway of tlie store. He then caught a glimpse of the profile of a man walking away in haste. (^Z) During his FBI interview, Finley described tlie man as a white male of average build wearing a dark suit. Shortly after he saw the man, Finley heard the screech of tires and saw a white Mustang pull away from tlie curb. {4£) 8 Ray tpstifiwl that ho iniidp those namo chniiirps l)prniisp ho know liis liivolvoniPiit fit eim- ninningstory Raonl withappears a person he knew IIonly at Sootion A 0 as RaoulThis infrn.) was oxr>lanation illegal. (A iscomplete analysis tinflpnninpd. of Ray's howovpr. by Ravs use of tho (Jalt alias at thp Now UpI ol MotPl in Mpmidiis on April :>.. IllfiM. whpip Iip planned to nippt Raonl and exchange the rifle, as well as by his admitted involvement in past criminal endeavors, such as smuKKlinK at the Canadian border, without similarly elaijorate precautionary measures. The committee believed Ray reverted to the Gait alias at the New Rebel because his stay there was not powerfully incriminating and to dis- associate himself further from the activities he had enj,'a};od in as liowmpypr and Willard in preparation for the assassination. comfortablerooii "While firinp.". I! offcrod since position, a view of thp would a shooter I.orr'inp haveMotol. it did to loan out not provide to the window a steady, aim at the motel. The window of the bathroom at the eiul of the hall, fronting on the rear of the Lorraine, did not prosPiit this problpni. Spp MI,K oxliibits F lit (crime scene). T IISCA- MLK liParluKs. hearings. 79. 77; F-20 (Bessie Brewer's roominfrhouse ; second floor). I HSCA-MLK 295 Guy Canipe, owner of the amusement company, told the committee he had no recollection of hearing- the sliot. He did remein])er hearing a thud at the front door and catching a glimpse of a dark-skinned white man passing the store. (4^^) In an earlier FBI interview, Canipe described the man as white, between 5 feet 10 inches and 6 feet tall, with a chunky build, wearing a dark suit and generally clean and neat in appearance. He also told the FBI tliat within moments of hearing the bundle drop, he saw a small white car pull away from the curb on Main Street. (44) Canipe did not recall this car (4-5) when he was interviewed by the committee. Julius Graham, another customer in Canipe's store, could not provide the committee with a description of the individual who dropped the bundle, but he did recall that a white Mustang passed the store heading north shortly after the bundle was dropped. (4^) The bundle dropped in front of Canipe's was recovered immediately afterward by Memphis police officers. It contained among other items two cans of Schlitz beer, the April 18 edition of the ^Memphis Com- mercial Appeal, a phistic bottle of aftershave lotion, a .30-06 rifle wdth a serial number matching that of the rifle purchased by Ray in Birmingham, ammunition, and a pair of binoculars. (47) The bundle also contained a portable radio with an identification number scratched off it. AVhen the FBI was able to decipher the number, it was revealed to The be Ray's M'ssouriin State committee, Penitentiaiy an effort inmate to evaluate the number. available(4^') fingerprint evidence in the case, retained a fingerprint expert, Vincent Scalice of Forensic Control Systems. Scalice examined latent fingerprints lifted from the rifle, the binoculars, a Schlitz beer can and the front page of the Memphis Commercial Appeal. All were found to be the prints of James Earl Ray. Because of other commitments, Scalice could not complete the fingerprint identification, so the committee retained Darrell D. Linville and Ray Holbrook, fingerprint specialists for the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department. They subse- quently identified Ray's prints on the telescopic sight on the rifle and on the bottle of aftershave lotion. No prints, either identifiable or un- identifiable, other than those identified as Ray's, were found on the rifle. (4.9) Having determined that Ray purchased the rifle, that his prints were on the rifle, that no other prints were on the rifle, and that a man matching the committee Ray'sturned description dropped evidence to the firearms the rifle inshortly after an effort the shot, to establish. if possible, that the Q2 rifle was the murder weapon. The committee retained a panel of five of the foremost firearms examiners in the Ignited States to review the ballistics evidence.^" A total of 257 man-hours were consumed by the firearms examination, which consisted of 81 comparisons of Q64, the bullet taken from Dr. King's body, with test-fired bullets, as well as exhaustive micro- scopic, visual, and chemical analyses. Despite this effort, the panel was i» Aside from the obvious importance of an accurate analysis of the firearms evidence, the committee noted that the firearms examination in the original FBI investigation was in- conclusive. The FBI found it was "* * * not possible to determine whether or not Qfi4 [the bullet removed from Dr. King's body] was actually fired from the Q2 rifle." forced to conclude that "the bullet, exhibit Q64, cannot be identified or eliminated as having been tired from the rifle, Q2.'' "(5(9) The panel, however, did make the toUowing positive determinations : 1. The Q64 bullet was a .30-06 cahber bullet of Remington- Peters manufacture, 2. The bullet was imprinted with six lands and six grooves and a right twist by the rifle from which it had been fired. 3. The Q2 rifle had general class characteristics of six lands and six grooves with a right twist. 4. The cartridge case (Q3) found in the Q2 rifle had been fired in the Q2 rifle. 5. The damage to Dr. King's clothing, wlien tested microscop- ically and chemically, revealed the presence of lead from a disinte- grating bullet and also revealed the absence of nitrites (the pres- ence of nitrites would have indicated a close-range discharge). 6. The damage to the clothing was consistent with the caliber and condition of the Q64 bullet. (Ji) While the firearms panel could not say conclusively that the rifle found in front of Canipe's, one with Ray's fingerprints on the stock and scope, fired the fatal shot, it did conclude that it was possible for the shot to have been fired from that rifle. When the panel's conclusions were combined with Ray's admissions, fingerprint evidence, and the testimony of other witnesses, there was ample evidence for the com- mittee to conclude that Ray had purchased the .30-06 rifle, transported it to Memphis, shot Dr. King and dropped the murder weapon in front of Canipe's Amusement Co. while fleeing from the scene of the crime. 4. IT IS HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT JAMES EARL RAY STALKED DR. KING FOR A PERIOD IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ASSASSINATION The committee considered allegations that Ray stalked Dr. King for a period of time preceding the assassination, and it developed evi- dence indicating a high probability that Ray did, in fact, pursue Dr. King from Los Angeles to Atlanta and ultimately to the Lorraine Motel in Memphis. In all likelihood, the stalking began about March 17, 1968, the day that Ray left Los Angeles and drove eastward. Ray's decision to leave California was not impulsive. In discussions with his acquaintances from a bartending school earlier in March 1968, he had mentioned his plans to travel east on two separate occasions. (5^) Moreover, Ray sub- mit ed apostal change of address card ^^ with a forwarding address of Atlanta, Ga., Dr. King's home city, before leaving Los Angeles. Ray, however, never conceded his intent to travel to Atlanta from Los Angeles. In an interview with Dan Rather of CBS in 1977, Ray flatly stated that he never knew he was going to Atlanta until he arrived in Birmingham, "* * * and there was no forwarding address [when I left Los Angeles] and, of course, that would be very damaging " It Is a rommon mlsunderRtandine that bullets can always be matcherl to enns. In fact. It Is not always possible to match bullets to cms. and no slornlficance should be attached to the failure. Indeed, the panel determined that the individual bullets that it fired from the Q2 rifle could not always be matched scientifically with the weapon, since the rifle apparently en<7r!ives inr-on'-'stent chnracteristics on successive rounds. See MLK firearms panel rer^ort. XIII HSCA-MLK hearings. "See MLK exhibit F-52 (postal change of address card). II HSCA-MLK hearings. 50-51. 297 against me." {53) Similarly, in his public hearing testimony, Ray emphatically denied filing a change of address in Los Angeles, although he did acknowledge the possibility that he mentioned Atlanta during a telephone conversation with an associate of Raoul.(54) When the committee confronted Ray with the change of address card that he had filed in Los Angeles on March 17, indicating a temporary change of address to General Delivery, Atlanta, until April 25, Ray admitted the card was his and that he must have filed it before his departure from Los Angeles. (55) Ray could not explain his statement to Rather that an intent to go to Atlanta was damaging. {56) Since Atlanta was the national headquarters of the SCLC, as well as Dr. King's home, the committee found Ray's anticipated travel to that city as the first significant indication of his interest in tracking the activities of Dr. King. Ray's probable stalking of Dr. King continued with his trip to Selma, Ala., following his departure from Los Angeles. Dr. King was in the Selma area on March 21. Ray admitted being in Selma on March 22 (a motel registration card for his Gait alias confirms his stay there), ^^ but his explanation for being there was not convincing. He claimed that while driving from New Orleans to Birmingham, al- legedly to meet Raoul, he got lost and had to spend the night in Selma. (57) The committee noted, however, that in 1968 there were two direct routes from New Orleans to Birmingham, and that Selma was on neither of them. It was situated in between the two routes, about 45 miles out of the way. The committee further determined that it would have been difficult for Ray to have become lost between New Orleans and Birmingham. The committee found Ray's activities following the purchase of the rifle relevant to the stalking theory. On March 28, the day after vio- lence cut short a Memphis march led by Dr. King, Ray purchased a .243 caliber rifle in Birmingham. (55) On March 30, he exchanged it for a .30-06 Remina:ton,(55) the rifle the committee concluded he used to assassinate Dr. King. Ray testified that between March 30 and April 3, he took a slow drive through Alabama and Mississippi, stopping at different motels each night, on his way to meet Raoul in Memphis. (^0) The committee could find no evidence, witness corroboration or documentation, to support this account.'* On the other hand, there was substantial evi- dence indicating that Ray returned to Atlanta following the rifle purchase. Thus, Ray's movements roughly paralleled those of Dr. King, who returned to Atlanta from Memphis on March 30. Except for a trip to Washington, D.C., on March 31, Dr. King remained in Atlanta until April 3, 1968, when he returned to Memphis. (^i) Ray adamantly denied that he returned to Atlanta before proceeding to Memphis. At a public hearing of the committee, he testified, "I knoAv 55."See MLK exhibit F-53 (Flamingo Motel registration card), II HSCA-MLK hearings, "During his public hearing testimony. James Earl Ray's brother. Jerry, asserted that records that would have shown James' stay at the Southern Motel in Mississippi on April 1, 1968, had been destroyed by the FBI. The committee explored Jerry Ray's allegation — it took testimony from the manager of the motel, and it reviewed registration cards from the motel for the merit. tion was without appropriate period. The committee determined that Jerry Ray's allega- 298 I didn't rotiirn to Atlanta. If I did, T will just take the responsibility for the King case here on TV."(^^) The committee reviewed two incidents, however, that compellintrly show that Ray did, in fact, return to Atlanta after purchasing the murder weapon in Birmingham. First, the committee established that, on March 81. Ray paid his Atlanta landlord, Jimmy Garner, for a second week's rent ; he wrote his name on an envelope and gave it to Gnrnei\(63) This payment was one of the 56 stipulations of material fact that Ray agreed to in his guilty plea. (^4) I" addition, a commit- tee interview with Garner confirmed the date of the payment. (6'5) "When was in Ray was Heconfronted error. suggestedwith thatGarner's the issuestatement, he claimed of his presence Garner in Atlanta could be cleared up by checking with the Piedmont Cleaners where he left his laundrv on March 25, 26 or 27 and picked it up on April 5, While Ray was correct about the date he retrieved the clothing, both the laundry receipts (^7) and the Piedmont Cleaners ledger, as well as the public testimony of a retired Piedmont employee, Annie Estelle Peters, proved that Ray left his laundry at Piedmont on April 1, 1968. (68) Ray's charge that the incriminating documents were somehow falsified was refuted by both the sworn public testimony of Mrs. Peters and the Piedmont ledger book. The committee observed that while Ray was in Atlanta on April 1, both the Atlanta Constitution and the Atlanta Journal published stories about the volatile situation in Memphis and Dr. King's inten- tion to return to the troubled city. (^,9) The committee believed that after learning from news accounts o;^ Dr. King's intention to return to Memphis, Ray left Atlanta and headed for Memphis himself. After arriving in Memphis on April 3, Ray checked into the New Rebel Motel, on the outskirts of the city. (7^) The next day he moved to a roominghouse adjacent to the Lorraine Motel. (7/) Rev. Samuel B. Kyles of Memphis, an associate of Dr. King, re- called that on April 3 he heard a radio broadcast reporting that Dr. King was staying at room 306 of the Lorraine. (7^) Among Ray's pos- sessions left in front of Canipe's. authoi-ities recovered a copy of the Memphis Commercial Appeal with a front page story about Dr. King, one that placed him at the Lorraine Motel for lunch on April 3.(7.^) Ray's fingerprint was found on the front page of the newspaper. (7^) With information that Dr. King was staying at the Lorraine avail- able to Ray. the transfer from the New Rebel Motel to Bessie Brewer's roominghouse takes on special significance. The rear of the rooming- house faces the Lorraine, offering an ideal vantage point for one who was stalking Dr. King and waiting for an opportunity to assassinate ' ' Ray(7-5) him. testified that he might have purchased the newspaper, but that he did not read it on April 4 and that he was not aware Dr. King was in Memphis. "I really wasn't aware that he was existing," (7^) he stated. In light of the high visibility of the sanitation worker's strike, Ray's natural sensitivity to the increased police activity because of his fugitive status, the radio and newspaper coverage of Dr. King's activities, and Ray's fingerprint on the April 4 edition of the Memphis 299 Commercial Appeal, the committee concluded that Ray's denial was not worthy of belief. The manner in which Ray selected his room at Bessie Brewer's roominghouse provided additional evidence of his intent to monitor Dr. King's movements. Room 8, the first room Ray was shown, was located toward the front (South Main Street) side of the building. It was across the hall from the office where Ray had approached Mrs. Brewer. It offered neither privacy nor the possibility of a view of the Lorraine Motel located to the rear of the building.'^ Ray rejected the room, telling ]\Irs. Brewer he wanted only a sleeping room and not an apartment. (77) The second room, 5-B, was located in another wing of the building, away from the office and toward the rear of the building. Further, its window offered the possibility of a direct view of the Lorraine. The committee found no evidence that Ray entered the room and examined the view from the window before accepting it. Nevertheless, the pri- vacy and its location at the rear of the building apparently made the room more acceptable to Ray. Ray's monitoring of Dr. King was also indicated by his purchase of a pair of binocidars after renting the room. Ray admitted pur- chasing binoculars on the afternoon of April 4, 1968.(75) This admis- sion was corroborated by a sales receipt from the York Arms Co., 162 South Main Street, Memphis, dated April 4, 1968; the statement of Ralph Carpenter, the sales clerk who sold the binoculars to Ray; (75) and Ray's fingerprint on the binoculars. The binoculars with the re- ceipt were found in the bundle of evidence outside Canipe's. Although inexpensive, they would have enabled Ray to keep a close watch on movement at the Lorraine Motel from the rear of the roominghouse. Ray could have observed the Lorraine either from room 5-B, by lean- ing slightly out of the window, or from the bathroom at the end of the hall. Examination of room .^-B immediately after the assassination revealed that a dresser had been pushed from in front of the window and that a chair had been moved up to the window, (<§<9) indicating that Ray had, in fact, used the window for surveillance of the Lorraine. Thus, there is compelling circumstantial evidence that from March 17, 1968, Ray tracked Dr. King's movements from Los Angeles eastward, and then followed him to Selma, Ala., Atlanta, Ga., and ulti- mately Memphis, Tenn., where he rented a room from which he could observe Dr. King and purchased a pair of binoculars to assist him in his observations. The committee concluded that these were activities performed by Ray in preparation for assassinating Dr. King. 5. JAMES EARL RAY FLED THE SCENE OF THE CRIME IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ASSASSINATION The connnittee concluded that James Earl Ray shot Dr. Kingfrom the bathroom window on the second floor of the nortli wing of Bessie Brewer's roominghouse, fled from the l)uilding carrying a bundle containing the weapon and other items, and dropped the bundle in the entranceway of Canipe's Amusement Co. The evidence further ^' See MLK Exhibit F-20 (diagram, second floor, Bessie Brewer's roominghouse) , I HSCA-MLK hearings, 79. 300 indicated that Ray then drove from the area in a small white car, heading north. Police radio broadcasts shortly after the assassination identified a white Mustang with a single white occupant as the car and suspect seen fleeing the scene.^*' After his flight from the immediate scene, the evidence established, moreover, that he drove for 11 hours to Atlanta, Ga., where he abandoned his automobile, picked up laundry, hastily packed some belongings at Garners roominghouse, and then fled north to Can- ada. (5i)^^ Ray's flight alone provided substantial corroboration for Ray's involvement in the assassination. Thus, the committee questioned him about it at length in interviews and during his appearance at a committee public hearing. Although Ray denied in his public testimony that he was at the roominghouse at the time the shot was fired, he admitted leaving Memphis in the Mustang shortly after 6 p.m. on April 4, 1968. He claimed that while returning from a service station shortly after 6 p.m., he saw a police roadblock near the roominghouse. (5^) He gave as a reason for leaving Memphis his instinctive fear of police and his concern that something had gone wrong with Raoul's gunrunning scheme. (^) Finally, Larce and Phillip McFall, coowners of the Texaco station in question, testified in public session that no white Mustang entered their station during the late afternoon of April 4, 1968. (7^7) " Lane's account of Ray's gas station alibi annears In a panerback edition of Name 'Zorro.' " See MLK Exhibit F-117, III HSCA-MLK Hearings, 518. The committee, therefore, found that there was no evidentiary sup- port for Ray's alibi. (b) Ray''s '•''Rdottl'''' story A character named Raoul had been the cornerstone of Ray's defense. It was Raoul who, according- to Ray, directed him at every incriminat- ing stage prior to the murder of Dr. King, from the purchase of the murder weapon in Birmingham, Ala. (ostensibly a sample to show prospective buyers in a gun-running scheme) to the rental of a room in Bessie Brewei-'s roominghouse (where the gun-running deal was to be negotiated). At Raoul's direction, Ray traveled to Memphis and purchased binoculars shortly before the assassination. AVithout Raoul, therefore, Ray would be left with no explanation for his highly in- criminatory behavior. The committee determined that much of Ray's Raoul story was '^awed. Ray was unable to produce witnesses who saw him and Raoul together at any time in their 9 months of association, and he had no explanation for the absence of Raoul's fingerprints on the murder weapon. Moreover, while Ray told the story of Raoul countless times over the years to lawyers, journalists, and congressional investigators, he was inconsistent on details as important as Raoul's physical de- scription. Even in Ray's sworn testimony before the committee, his answers to questions about Raoul were vague, incongruous, and evasive. Ultimately, the committee gave no credence to Ray's story of Raoul. Ray's resulting inability to explain his inculpatory behavior must stand as one of the strongest indications of his involvement in the assassination of Dr. King. (1) Conflicting descriptions of Raoul. — Ray's inability to give a complete and consistent description of Raoul was a strong indication of the invalidity of the story. Ray had ample opportunity to observe Raoul. Although he denied in sworn testimony before the committee spending a great deal of time with him, Ray did claim to have met with him from 12 to 15 times and to have engaged in 6 or 7 hours of conversation. (7^^) The first publicized description of Raoul appeared in an article by William Bradford Huie in the November 12, 1968, edition of Look magazine. In this article, Ray was quoted as describing Raoul as a "blond Latin." (i^J) Huie subsequently published a book, "He slew the Dreamer' that drew heavily on correspondence from Ray. In the book, Raoul ^yas described as a "red-haired French Canadian." (i^^) During his testimony, Ray explained this inconsistency by stating that he had never mentioned blond hair to Huie and that the second description was correct. (7{?5) In subsequent interviews, however, Ray gave descriptions of Raoul that diifered from the first two. In March 1977, Ray told CBS reporter Dan Rather that Raoul was an auburn-haired "Latin Span- ish." {106) By September 1977, in Ray's interview with Playboy maga- zine, Raoul had become a "sandy-haired Latin." {107) Ray asserted that Playboy erroneously printed the description just as he alleged Huie had done 10 years before. (76^5) (2) Absence of untnesses to corroborate RamiVs existence. — Sig- nificantly, Ray could not produce one witness to evStablish Raoul's exist- 306 ence, although his meetings with him were more tlian occasional, as this account shows : Ray stated that he first met Raoul in July 1967 at the Xeptune Bar in Montreal, (7ft9) and he continued to meet with him there "several more times.-' {110) On August 21, 1967, they smuggled contraband across the United States-Canadian border at Detroit. (777) On August 28, 29 and 30, 1967, they met at the Starlite Cafe in Birmingham, Ala., and later on August 30, they went to Ray's residence at Peter Cherpes' roominghouse.(77^) On October 7, 1967J they met at a motel in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, crossed the border into Texas, and then drove back into Mexico with some unidentified contraband. (77r?) Ray recalled sj^ending that night at the motel where he liad originally met Raoul. Ray claimed, however, that he did not know where Raoul stayed. (77^) The next morning they continued further into Mexico, past an interior customs point, and then parted company. (77-5) In mid-December, Ray met with Raoul in the LeBunny Lounge in Xew Orleans, (77^) and on March 23, 1968, they met again in the Starlite Cafe in Birming- ham. (777') That same day they traveled to Atlanta where Ray rented a room at Jimmy Garner's roominghouse.(77(§) Tliey ate dinner to- gether at a Peachtree Street diner and on the next day Raoul visited Ray in his room at Garner's ro<)mingh()use.(77,9) On March 29, after an absence from Atlanta, Raoul returned to Ray's room, and the two left together for Birmingham to purchase the rifle that was used in the assassination. Ra}' checked into the Travelodge Motel in Birming- ham. (7^r>') He could not remember whether Raoul accompanied him to Aeromarine Supply Co. or simply waited for him at the Trave- lodge. (7^7) In any event, they met at the Travelodge following the purchase of the rifle that was exchanged the next day. (7^^) On April 3, Ray met Raoul at the Xew Rebel Motel in Memphis and on April 4 at Jim's Grill. (7^.5) Together they went to the room Ray had rented in Bessie The Brewer's committeeroominghouse,(7^^) the last place located and interviewed Ray ever witnesses from saw the Raoul. three room'nghouses, Cherpes', tained he had met Raoul. Garner's and witnesses While these Brewer's, remembered where Ray seeing main- Ray, they did not recall seeing Ray with Raoul or with any other individual. Other witnesses who allegedly could corroborate Raoul's existence — for example, Raoul's telephone contact in Xew Orleans [125) or his smuggling companion in Xuevo Laredo — were impossible to locate because of the inadequacy of Ray's descriptions. lie could provide no names or addresses, and the smuggling accomplice was described only as Mexican with Indian-like features. (7^^) The committee conducted an extensive investigation of Ray's activi- ties during the preassassination period and yet uncovered no witnesses who would corrolxjrate the existence of Raoul. Ray, who could only gain by such a discovery, provided no identifying characteristics, names or addresses that might have assisted the committee. The ab- sence of corroborating witnesses was a strong indication that Ray fab- ricated the "Raoul" story. {c) Preasm^Himition transai\.ions The committee also found problems in Ray's account of crucial moments in his preassassination relationship with his alleged com- 307 panion. For example, there was overwhelming evidence to substantiate Ray's purchase of the murder weapon and the binoculars that were found in the bundle in front of Canipe's Amusement Co. and his rental of room 5-B at Bessie Brewer's Memphis roominghouse. Ray did not deny these crucial preassassination transactions, but he contended that he engaged in them at the direction of Raoul as part of a gunrunning scheme. (^^7) Each of these transactions was examined in minute detail, and no support was found for Ray's claims. (1) The rifle purchase. — In his correspondence with Huie, Ray wrote that while in Atlanta, Raoul gave him a two-part role in the gun- running operation. First, he w^as to buy a large bore deer rifle fitted with a scope ; second, he was to inquire about the price of some "cheap" foreign rifles. (7^5) According to this version, Raoul told Ray about the plan at Garner's roominghouse on the day after their arrival in Atlanta. (7^5) In a later interview with the committee, however, Ray stated that Raoul did not outline the gunrunning scheme until the morning they left Atlanta for Birmingham, 6 days after his arrival in the city. (7-5^) During his testimony before the committee, Ray re- verted to the account he had given Huie in 1968.(757) Whenever the plan was proposed, Ray said Raoul initially instructed him to make the weapon purchase in Atlanta. (7,?^) Ray suggested that since he had an Alabama driver's license in the name of Eric S. Gait as identification, it would be easier to buy the rifle in Birming- ham. Raoul agreed. (75-5) Ray's subsequent conduct, however, was in- consistent with this aspect of the Raoul story, for when he bought the rifle and ammunition in Birmingham, he did not use his established identity, Eric S. Gait, but rather a new alias, Harvey Lowmeyer, for which he had no documentation. When asked why he used the Low- meyer name, Ray replied that he thought it would be safer to buy the guns under a different name.(754) This explanation contradicted his stated reason for traveling to Birmingham, since he could have pur- chased the rifle in Atlanta under the Lowmeyer alias, thus avoiding a 250-mile drive. Once in Birmingham, Raoul and Ray decided to purchase the rifle at Aeromarine Supply Co. {135) Ray claimed that Raoul also in- structed him to look into military surplus rifles for possible sale in their gunrunning operation. Ray told the committee that he inquired about the surplus rifles at Aeromarine. (7.5-house. Their room was adjacent to 5-B, the one Ray admitted renting under the alias of John Willard. The committee also learned that Walden had a history of arrests and convictions, going back to 1942, for a variety of offenses, including public drunkenness and driv- ing while intoxicated. At a public witness, the committee hearing onwasWalden 's account told that Wayne andChastain, her reliability as a a Memphis newspaper reporter, was the first person to interview her after the assassination, that is, even before the police arrived on the scene. At that time, Walden described the man she had seen fleeing from the bathroom as short and wiry, with salt and pepper hair, wearing a colored plaid shirt and army jacket. (iJ5) During a committee inter- view, Chastain asserted that he had interviewed Grace Walden on the night of April 4 and that she had told him she had seen a man come out of the bathroom with "a military jacket with a box."(i5^) The committee's investigation revealed that Chastain's story is im- probable, ifnot an outright fabrication. First, the committee deter- mined that Memphis police were at the roominghouse within moments of the shooting (7^6*) and were therefore most likely the first to take statements from any residents of the roominghouse, including Wal- den. Second, the committee found it to be highly improbable that Chastain even spoke to Walden that firet evening, as the police had sealed oft' her portion of the roominghouse. Third, there is some ques- tion about whether Walden, admittedly bedridden that day, was able to see the bathroom door from her h^d.ilGl) Finally, no mention of Chastain's after interview appeared in any Memphis paper immediately the assassination. The committee's investigation did determine that Grace Walden had been interviewed numerous times, beginning immediately after the assassination, and had given several conflicting stories. 312 Shortly after the shooting, Walden was interviewed in her room by Lt. Glynn King and Capt. R. L. Williams of the Memphis police. She told them that she and her husband had spent most of the day in their room. The tenant of room 5-B had been running back and forth between 5-B and the bathroom, and, about 2 minutes before the shot was fired, he had returned to the bathroom. After the shot, the person in the bathroom ran down the hall toward the front of the building. She said she was sick, did not get out of bed that day and did not see the msin.(J62) She was interviewed again later that evening at Memphis police headquarters by a police lieutenant and an FBI agent and again on April revealed5 and that April 24 of at none by those FBI agents. The did interviews committee's investigation Walden claim to have seen anyone fleeing from the bathroom or running down the Robert Jensen, special agent in charge of the Memphis FBI field office in 1968, supervised the FBI's local investigation of the assassi- nation. He told the committee that Walden's statement to Memphis agents was to the effect that she saw nothing following the shot that killed Dr. King because she was in bed all day. He also stated that she "* * * was never requested by the FBI or by anyone to sign an affidavit identifying James Earl Ray as a man she observed exiting the bathroom following the shot.'' In addition, Jensen explained that she was never offered a reward of $100,000 or any amount to sign such an affidavit, and she was never threatened for failing to sign such an affidavit, (i^^) Thus, by April 25, 1968, Walden had said on numerous occasions that she did not see the man who exited the bathroom following the shot that killed Dr. King. In addition, a careful review by the com- mittee of journalistic coverage of the assassination revealed numerous references to statements by Stephens and Anschutz, while there was no mention of any account by Walden. In November 1968, however, Walden allegedly gave a statement to Ren fro Hays,^^ an investigator for Ray's original attorney, Arthur Hanes, Sr., that she had seen a man fleeing from the bathroom who fit the description attributed to her by Chastain. The substance of that statement appeared in the October 1969 and April 1977 issues of Saga magazine. Warden's statement to the committee on July 26, 1977, noted that she did recall seeing a man leave the bathroom, and though she could not describe him because he was moving rapidly, she was certain he was wh\te.( J6.5) Walden's most recent public statement concerning the events sur- roundin*! the assassination occurred on the August 15, 1978, edition of NBC television's "Today" show. She said, "Charlie picked James Earl Ray out. I don't think the man looked anything like him. In the first place I think he was a nigger." (/tf^) Because of the differences in Walden's statements about whether she saw anyone at all and, if so, whether the man she saw was white or Black, the committee found that her testimony was virtually useless. 21 The cnmiT'lfpp not^d thr\f Konfm TTnT-s «!nhiorp detailed analysis of the guilty nlea anpears as nart of an appendix to the miblie hearinRs. See staff report, "An Analysis of the Guilty Plea Entered by James Earl Rn^- : Crinnnal Court of Shelby County, Tenn., Mar. 10, 1969," XIII appendix to the HSCA- MLK hearings. 316 nation of Dr. King and voluntarily and understandingly entered his guilty plea : The Court. You are entering a plea of guilty to murder in the first degree as charged in the indictment as a compromise and settling your case on an agreed punishment of 99 years in the State penitentiary. Is that what you want to do ? Answer. Yes, I do. The Court. Is this what you want to do ? AxswER. Yes, sir. The Court. Do you understand that you are waiving which means you are giving up a formal trial by your plea of guilty although the laws of this State require the prosecution to pre- sent certain evidence to a jury in all cases on pleas of guilty to murder in the first degree by your plea of guilty you are also waiving [the court explains Kay's rights in great detail] * * * Has anything besides this sentence of 99 yeai-s in the penitentiary been promised to you to plead guilty? Has any- thing else been promised to you by anyone ? Answer. Xo, it has not. The Court. Has any pressure of any kind by anyone in any way been used on you to get you to plead guilty ? Answer. Xo, no one in any way. The Court. Are you pleading guilty to murder in the first degree in this case because you killed Dr. Martin Luther King under circumstances that would make you legally guilty of murder in the first degree under the law as explained to you by your lawyer ? Answer. Yes, legally yes. The Court. Is this plea of guilty to murder in the first de- gree with an agreed punishment of 99 years in the State peni- tentiary free, voluntarily and understandingly made and en- tered by you ? Answer. Yes, sir. The Court. Is this plea of guilty on your part the free act of your free will made with your full knowledge and under- standing ofits meaning and consequences ? Answer. Yes, sir. (188) " Within 3 days of the guilty plea, Ray recanted his admission and requested a new trial in a letter to Judge Battle dated March 13, 1969. (f80) Ray followed this letter with another dated March 26, 1969, that echoed the first, also directed to Judge Battle. (190) Judge Battle died on March 31, 1969. He had not taken any action on Ray's request for a new trial. (19J) Following Judge Battle's death, on April 7, 1969, Ray filed a formal petition for a new trial. The court denied the motion at the con- clusion of its hearing on Ray's petition on May 26, 1969.(75^) After exhausting his right of appeal under Tennessee law, Ray sought relief in the Federal courts by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On March 30, 1973, a Federal district court denied 23 A oomplPtP transcript of the cuHty plea proceedings appears as MLK Exhibit P-80, III HSCA-MLK hearings. 52. 317 Ray's request for relief, ruling that Ray's constitutional rights had not been demed.{193) Ray subsequently appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. That panel reversed the district court on January 29, 1974, finding that the lower court improperly denied Ray an evidentiary hearing before it ruled on his motion, (i^^) The State of Tennessee appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which refused to hear the case on June 3, 1974.(^5-5) The matter was returned to the district court, where an evidentiary hearing was held. On February 27, 1975, the district court ruled that Ray's constitu- tional rights had not been violated and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (196) Ray also appealed this decision, and on May 10, 1976, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that the evidence sustained a finding that Ray had voluntarily and knowingly pleaded guilty in State court to murder: Considering "all of the relevant circumstances" surround- ing Ray's plea * * * we agree with the district court that the plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly. As stated, Judge Battle very carefully questioned Ray as to the volun- tariness ofhis plea before it was accepted on March 10, 1969. Ray specifically denied at that time that anyone had pres- sured him to plead guilty * * *. (197) The court also noted that a February 18, 1969 letter, signed by Ray, authorizing Foreman to negotiate a guilty plea, supported the finding tliat the plea was voluntaiy ; that he had not been prejudiced by his contracts with writer William Bradford Huie ; that lie had not shown inadequate investigation by his counsel ; that he had failed to estab- lish that Foreman gave him incompetent advice in urging him to plead guilty ; and that he had not reasonably believed that he had no alter- native to a guilty plea. The court also rejected Ray's contention that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel by police surveillance, interception of mail and delivery of attorney-client communications to the prosecution, since he had been unable to demonstrate that these activities affected the preparation of his defense.^* The court con- cluded that Foreman's representation of Ray was "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." (198) Ray sought review of this decision in the U.S. Supreme Court. On December 13, 1976, the Supreme Court denied Ray's request for a writ oi cert' ovRvi. (199) Ray's immediate repudiation of his guilty plea started spe<*ulation that it had been part of an elaborate plot to silence Ray and protect conspirators in the assassination. Consequently, the committee con- ducted afull factual and legal investigation of the plea to determine whether it was voluntarily entered and legally sufficient, applying ap- propriate legal standards in its assessment. Ray had maintained that a number of conditions rendered liis guilty plea defective or involun- tary, (^{?^) including: Irreconcilable conflicts of interest involving his attorneys, Percy Foreman and Arthur Hanes, Sr. ; =1 The committee did review FBI files that clearly established that interception of Ray's mall had occurred. A detailed discussion of this matter is contained in the committee's evaluation of the performance of the FBI in the assassination investigation. See, infra, at sec. II E 2. 318 Inadequate investigation by Foreman, Ray's chief defense coun- sel at the time of the guilty plea ; Mental coercion exerted Ijy Foreman and the Federal Govern- ment to force Ray to plead guilty ; and Ray's belief that his guilty plea would not preclude his ability to secure a subsequent trial. The committee reviewed each of the claims made by Ray. (a) Irreco/ict'Jahle conficfs of interest of Foreman and Ilaries Initially in conjunction with Arthur Hanes, Sr., Ray's first at- torney, and then with Percy Foreman, Hanes' successor, Ray entered into contracts with William Bradford Huie for the literary rights to Ray's version of the assassination of Dr. King. Ray subsequently maintained that he signed these contracts only at the insistence of his attorneys, (^^i) The committee interviewed all parties to the contracts and reviewed information from the papers filed in Federal court in Ray V. Foreman -* and Ray v. RoseP The investigation revealed that Ray, Hanes, and Huie entered into the first three-party contract on July 8, 1968, just under a month after Ray's arrest in London and 2 weeks before he was returned to the United States. (^5) "* Rnu V. included defendants Foremnn Foreman, was a civil notion Hanes, and filofl Huie.by Ray Kay charged following themhis with sruiltv plea. Named violation of his constitutional riplits and sought to enjoin Huie's book, "He Slew the Dreamer." 2= Ray V. Rose was Ray's habeas corpus action. 3;si A further review of pertinent court documents indicated that the tinancial interest of Huie and Foreman in the literary contract was not enhanced by Kay's guilty plea. In Ray v. Rose^ all of the contract- ual obligations were subjected to judicial scrutiny. An examination of the contracts between Huie and the publishing houses that paid him to collect information and write about Eay showed that the value of Ray's story depreciated markedly once the guilty plea was entered, for it reduced public interest in the case. {210) Tliis finding suppoi-ted Foreman's claim that his only concern in urging Ray's guilty plea was saving his life and that the money he stood to gain from the literary contracts did not color his professional judgment. The committee's conclusions concerning the Hanes-Huie-Ray and Foreman-Huie-Ray literary agreements were consistent with the find- ings in Ray v. Rose. In that case, the court found there was no evidence whatsoever to support Ray's allegation that the conflicts of interest with his attorneys caused him to plead guilty involuntarily, (^ii) The court reached this conclusion despite its finding that the fee arrange- ment originally negotiated by Hanes was in apparent violation of the American Bar Association's code of professional responsibility and its finding that Foreman's fee, had it been collectable, was unreasonable. {U2) The committee found no evidence from its interviews, reviews of documents and other investigative methods to support Ray's claim that the contractual agreements resulted in prejudice to his defense. While a conflict of interest did exist between Ray and his attorneys, it did not materially affect the quality of the representation Ray re- ceived. In addition, Hanes had disclosed the conflict to Ray, and Fore- man warned Ray about such arrangements at the time he was hired. Thus, Ray was both a voluntary and intelligent party to the contracts. (h ) ForemmCs failure to investigate the case The committee reviewed, with the aid of the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, the judicial interpretations of the phrase "effective assistance of counsel," and applied these standards to the factual situation giving rise to Ray's claim that the assistance of coun- sel in the King case was ineffective. Ray became dissatisfied with the representation of his first attorney, Arthur Hanes, Sr., primarily as a result of the relationship Hanes had established with author William Bradford Huie. (^75) This dissatis- faction prompted Ray, through the efforts of his brothers, Jerry and John Ray, to contact Texas trial attorney Percy Foreman. On No- vember 10, 1968, 2 days before Ray's scheduled trial, Foreman replaced Hanes. {2H) Foreman succeeded in postponing the trial until March 3, 1969, to prepare a defense for Ray. {215) Ray alleged that Foreman's investigation was deficient and that he was consequently deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. (^/^) The committee examined the merits of this allegation. As with the conflict of interest issue, the committee referred to the court documents filed in Ray v. Rose and Ray v. Foreman. In addition, the committee interviewed Ray's defense attornevs, including Foreman, and inves- tigators who were in their employ. Foreman's investigation was exam- 320 ined in light of the legal standard required of counsel in a criminal case to determine if he was prepared to take the Kay case to trial. Foreman maintained that from the time he entered the case until the March 10, 1909, guilty plea, he devoted 80 to 90 percent of his time to Kay's defense, (^i/) He estimated that he spent between 30 and 75 hours in interviews Avith liay.(^7<9) He also said that he used eight senior law students from Memphis State University as investiga- tors, (^i^) Foreman, however, was vague about the duties of these students, (^i?(^) as well as other aspects of his investigation. He appar- ently did speak to Huie, Attorney Arthur Hanes, Sr., Hanes' inves- tigator Kenfro Hayes, and some potential witnesses, (^^i) After a full review, however, the committee concluded that Foreman did not con- duct a thorough and independent investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., on behalf of Kay. Foreman was unable to provide a list of witnesses he interviewed, (^^^) but the committee was able to conclude that many potential witnesses were never interviewed by Foreman or his associates. Stanton did not complete a canvass of witnesses by the time of the guilty plea,(^^J) and Foreman's student investigators apparently never conducted a single interview. (^^^) In fact, one of the student investigators interviewed by the commit- tee indicated that the students never did any investigating for Foreman. (^^5) The committee's review of Shelby County jail logs contradicted Foreman's claim of 30 to 75 hours of consultations with Ray.(^^^) These hourly activity logs kept by Ray's jailers indicated that Fore- man visited with Ray approximately 20 hours from the time he en- tered the case in November 1968 until the March 10, 1969, guilty plea. (227) According to the logs, Foreman spent an inordinately small amount of time with his client for a case of such magnitude. Foreman differed with the findings of the committee's review, and the committee found a possible explanation for the discrepancy : Secu- rity slackened as time progressed, and less accurate records may have been kept on Ray after initial interest in his case diminished. (^^^) Ray's recollection of the time Foreman spent with him, however, was Consistent with the hours shown in the jail logs. {22,9) Additionally, Arthur Hanes, Sr. told the committee that he at- tempted to make his files on Ray's case available to Foreman, but Fore- man only used a few^ of them. Hanes also noted that Foreman never fully questioned him about his personal knowledge of the case, even though Hanes had offered to help. (230) Although Foreman may be faulted for not conducting a more thor- ough independent inquiry before he advised Ray to plead guilty, he did have at his disposal the results of investigations by William Brad- ford Huie, Arthur Hanes, Sr. and Renfro Hayes, as well as those of an investigation conducted by the Shelby County Public Defender's Office. The scope of the combined defense inyestigations was substan- tial,(^J/) the public defender's probably being the most comnrehen- sive. Three investigators were assigned to the case and worked closely with Foreman. They interviewed numerous witnesses and followed up investigative leads, (^-5^) and they retraced the investigation done for Arthur Hanes, Sr. by Renfro Hayes. (Much of that work was later 321 found to be unreliable.) {233) The product of the public defender's work in Kay's defense filled between 10 and 12 files. (234,) The defense team uncovered and considered weaknesses in the State's case, (235) but when Foreman and co-counsels Hugh Stanton, Sr. and Hugh Stanton, Jr. discussed the evidence against Eay, they decided, even with the weaknesses, that the Goverimient's case could not be beaten. (^J^) Despite Ray's protestations, the committee con- cluded that his decision to plead guilty was based primarily upon Foreman's recitation of the State's case against him. (^57) Ray was unable to demonstrate any actual prejudice to his case, and the committee believed that the level of representation Ray received from his attorneys, including Foreman, satisfied the standard estab- lished to measure effective assistance of counsel in the sixth circuit in 1968. (c) Coercion hy Foreman and the Federal Government In his effort to repudiate his guilty plea, Ray maintained he had entered it against his will, under pressure from Foreman who mis- represented the facts to him and gave him bad advice. {238) While only Ray and Foreman were present at conversations out of which the plea arose, rendering much of what Ray alleged unverifiable, the commit- tee was able to establish certain facts from the record. On February 13, 1969, Foreman told Ray in a letter that if the case went to trial, there was a 100-percent chance he would be found guilty and a 99-percent chance he would get the death penalty. Foreman commented that it would be "one of the great accomplishments" of his career if he could save Ray's life with a negotiated plea.(^.?5) Then, in a letter prepared l)y Foreman for Ray's signature and dated February 18, 1969, Ray authorized Foreman to negotiate a guilty plea for a term of years. It was stated in this letter that Foreman and Ray agreed it would be impossible to dispute certain incriminating evidence and that they believed a trial ending in a guilty verdict would result in a 99-year sentence or the electric chair. (^4^) In its review of the district court's evidentiary hearing on Ray's petition for habeas corpus relief, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the lower court's reasons for its finding that Foreman had not induced the guilty plea. (^4-?) The court found that most of Ray's allegations regarding Fore- proof. man's Specifically, inducement ofthethecourt guilty pleathat found wereForeman not supported did not by the advise Ray, even if innocent, to plead guilty; that Foreman suggested to Ray that he would be better off financially with a guilty plea, but that this statement did not influence Ray in his decision ; that Foreman did not advise Ray to plead guilty because he would be pardoned by John J. Hooker, Jr., who would be the next Governor of Tennessee ; and that Foreman did not attempt to persuade Ray to plead guilty by telling him either that the prosecution was pre- pared to bribe a key witness against Ray, or that Foreman would exercise less than his best efforts if Ray insisted on a trial, or that Judge Battle would not allow him to change attorneys and that Foreman would not withdraw. The committee found no evidence that would warrant a different judgment. 322 At his March 10, 1969, hearing, Ray answered questions put to him by Judge Battle, not as an intimidated man, but as a defendant con- vinced that he could not withstand the State's case against him. Ray indicated at the hearing that "no one in any way" pressured him to plead guilty. (24^) As lor his quick repudiation ot that plea, the com- mittee found this to be consistent with Ray's pattern of behavior. It noted that in 1959, shortly after he was arrested for robbing a super- market, Ray made a statement to police admitting the crime. At the trial, however, Ray reversed his position, charging that his confession had been coerced by police brutality. (24^3) Ray also claimed that part of the coercion to gain his guilty plea was the "brutal" conditions in the Shelby County jail during his pretrial incarceration, which had an ill etiect on his physical condition. (^^4) In its investigation of conditions at the jail, the committee deter- mined that extraordinary measures were taken to safeguard Ray, as a result of the notoriety of the case. The precautions included : An en- tire cellblock to house Ray alone; steel tloors on the entrances to the cellblock; steel plate covers on all the windows in the cellblock; two guards to watch Ray on each of three daily shifts; two closed-circuit television cameras to monitor the cellblock; constant illumination of the cellblock; special food selection; microphone surveillance within the cellblock. (^4^) The committee determined that Dr. McCarthy DeMere was the person best qualified to comment on Ray's physical condition during his incarceration at the Shelby County jail and the possible effect of the special precautions. DeMere served as Ray's physician from the time of his return to Memphis from England on July 19, 1968, until he was taken to the Tennessee State Penitentiary following his guilty plea. DeMere testified on Ray's health and conditions of confinement at a 1974 evidentiary hearing on Ray's petition for habeas corpus relief, (^^tf) in an interview with the committee {2p') and in a com- mittee public hearing. (^-^6^) DeMere said Ray was in good health when he arrived and that it remained excellent during his stay at the jail. In fact, DeMere told the committee, Ray gained weight while he was in the jail. Although Ray complained at first to DeMere about the lights in his cell, he never complained of losing sleep. The only medical complaints he made during his stay in the Shelby County jail con- cerned occasional headaches and nosebleeds. The facilities that Ray occupied were comparable to a good motel suite and compared favorably to a first-grade suite in an ordinary hos- pital, according to DeMere. Additionally, DeMere told the committee he never saw Ray depressed and that he never exhibited any nervous tension. DeMere concluded that Ray was in better health when he left the Shelby County jail than when he entered it. Ray argued that another aspect of the coercion was harassment of his family by the Federal Government and Foreman to get him to plead guilty. He charged specifically : That the FBI threatened to have his father arrested and re- turned to a prison he had escaped from 40 yeai-s earlier ;(^j^.9) That the FBI burglarized the home of his sister, Carol Pepper; (^,50) 323 That his brother, John Kay, had been sentenced to 18 years for bank robbery, an excessive sentence compared to those of his codefendants ; {251 ) That Foreman told him that his brother, Jerry Eay, would be arrested and charged with conspiracy in the assassination if Ray did not plead guilty ; (^-5^) and That Foreman tried to induce members of Ray's family to con- vince him he should plead guilty. {253) The committee explored Ray's allegations concerning the FBI and Foreman. This task was complicated because Ray's word and that of members of his family provided the only support for his allegations. Given their probable bias, the committee was reluctant to accept such evidence without corroboration. The committee found no independent evidence to support Ray's con- tention that the FBI burglarized his sister's house. The committee also determined that John Ray had been incarcerated on the bank charge almost 114 years after James entered his guilty plea. (^-5^) Ray's brother, Jerry, was the original source of the story that the FBI threatened to rejail their father, and the committee was unable to substantiate this story. Ray's allegations concerning Foreman were equally difficult to con- firm. During an interview with the committee at the Brushy Mountain State Penitentiary, Petros, Tenn., Ray admitted that Foreman at no time said that the FBI had informed him of Jerry's imminent arrest, but Foreman had alluded to the possibility that he might be picked up. (^-55) No independent evidence was found to support the family's claim that Foreman tried to force them to induce Ray's plea. The committee could not find substantiation for any of Ray's charges that his guilty plea was coerced- — specifically, that his plea was in- duced by Foreman, that he was subjected to brutal conditions at the Shelby County jail, that his physical condition was permitted to de- teriorate or that members of his family were pressured and harassed. {d) Ray''s helief a guilty ])Jea would not jyreclude a ne,w trial Statements made by Ray both before and after his guilty plea raised questions about his understanding of the j^lea's finality. In an interview with the committee, Ray said his main purpose in entering the guilty plea was to get rid of Foreman. (^-5^) He looked upon the plea as a technicality, a way out of jail in Memphis. (^-57) According to Ray, the guilty plea served as a convenient, harmless alternative to going to trial with Foreman, whom he no longer trusted ; (^-55) going to trial with the public defender, whom he felt had neither the skill nor the resources to handle this major case ; {259) and going to trial unrepresented. (^^6^) Ray's background strongly indicated that he knew that the guilty plea would effectively extinguish all of his legal remedies. First, he had previous experience with the appellate court system, as a result of his unsuccessful appeal of a 1959 robbery conviction, (^^i) In addi- tion, he was fully apprised of the consequences of his guilty plea dur- ing the March 10, 1969, proceedings. The committee believed, therefore, that Ray's plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary and that constitutional requirem.ents were satisfied. The committee further concluded that the plea was a sig- nificant indication of Ray's guilt in the assassination of Dr. King. B. The CcniMrrrKE Believes, on the Basis of the Circumstantial Evidence Avaii^\ble to It, That There Is a Likelihood That Ja3hes Earl Ray Assassinated Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., as a Result of a Conspiracy As noted, the committee concluded that James Earl Ray was the assassin of Dr. King. Other aspects of the assassination remained to be examined. What was Ray's motive ? Was he assisted in any way ? Was there a conspiracy involved in Dr. King's death ? Several facts conditioned the thinking of law enforcement offi- cials and the American public since the day of the assassination : Dr. King was an important leader of the civil rights movement ; he was shot down in a southern city by a single shot from a high-powered rifle in the midst of a series of turbulent civil riglits demonstrations; only one assailant was seen fleeing the scene. To most, there would seem to be reason to believe, therefore, that a lone assassin, acting out of racial animosity, committed the assassination. 1. the FBI IN^^<:STIGATION Indeed, as the FBI's investigation in 19^88 progressed after that tragic day in April, the theory that Ray was a lone, racially motivated assassin gained plausibility. With the identification of Ray as the probable assassin, an extensive background investigation began. Mis- souri State Penitentiary inmates provided e\ndence indicating his dis- taste for association with Black inmates. Further evidence of racial incidents was developed in California and Mexico that reflected both a volatile temper and a deep-seated racial prejudice. Finally, in early interviews with the FBI, members of Ray's family — and pai-ticularly his brothers — exhibited strong strains of racism. Although he held open the possibility of cons])iracy. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's views had become clear by June 20, when he wrote a memorandum summarizing a discussion with Attorney General Ramsey Clark : I said I tliink Ray is a racist and detested Negroes and Martin Luther King and there is indication that prioi- to the Memphis situation, he had information about King speaking in other towns and then picked out Memphis. (/) Tliis view of the assassination is reflected in the work of some promi- nent authors who have written on the subject. (^) In addition, commit- tee interviews with FBI and Justice Depai-tment officials involved in the original investigation indicated a general consensus that Ray was a loner who was motivated in the assassination primarily by racial hatred. Finally, while a 1077 Justice Department Task Force pro- posed varving interpretations of Ray's ultimate motivation ; (^) ^ it, too, agreed that he acted alone in the assassination. iThe task force report, while noting in Ray "a strong racist attitude toward Blacks." concluded that his motive was a combination of "apparent hatred for the civil rights jiiovement : his possible yearning for recognition, and a desire for a potential quick profit." (325) 35& The committee recognized that despite the results of earlier inves- tigations, arespectable body of public opinion supported the theory that the King assassination was the product of a conspiracy. In addi- tion, the committee was faced with a variety of well-publicized con- spiracy allegations, most based on speculation and not founded on fact, and many of them inconsistent with one another. 2. THE COMMITTEE IN-\'ESTIGAT10N The committee approached the issue of conspiracy with a range of investigative techniques. Where applicable, the committee relied on the skills of scientific experts, (4) retaining panels in the fields of forensic pathology, firearms, fingerprint analysis, handwriting anal- ysis and polygraphy ; it also contracted with an engineering firm for a survey of the assassination scene. Finally, the committee undertook an extensive program of file reviews, field interviews, depositions and hearings. Where necessary, immunity grants were employed to compel the testimony of witnesses who claimed their privilege against self- incrimination. (a) Tran-saetiorud anah/sis A major undertaking in the field investigation was an examination of Ray's known transactions during the 14 months from his escape from the Missouri State Penitentiary in April 1967 to his arrest in London in June 1968. The committee closely examined each transac- tion for any indication that might lead to a finding of conspiracy on April 4, 1968. The committee traced every stej) of Kay's travels after his escape — to suburban Chicago, where he worked as a dishwasher; to the area of St. Louis, Mo., home of his brother, John Larry Kay; to Montreal and to a resort in the Laurentian Mountains, where he vacationed; to Birmingham, Ala., where he purchased an automobile; to Mexico and to Los Angeles, where he lived for 4 months until March 1968, except for a brief trip to New Orleans in December; and finally on his circuitous trip eastward, in mid-March 1968, a trip that ended with Canada. the assassination in Memphis and Kay's flight to Europe via (b) Ray's associates examAned The committee conducted a similar examination of Ra^^'s known or alleged associates, concentrating on those with whom he was actually or reportedly in contact during the 14-month pericxi. They included members of his family, especially his two brothers, John and Jerry ; the mysterious Raoul, Ray's alleged criminal associate; Charles and Rita Stein and Marie Martin, Ray's acquaintances in California; and several individuals alleged to have been associated with Ray. In addition to closely examining Ray and his associates in an effort to find indications of conspiracy, the committee considered a variety of conspiracy leads to see if any could l)e independently established as valid or connected to Ray. The committee also investigated a variety of extremist organizations, including the Ku Klux Klan and the Minutejuen, to determine if they were involved in the assassination or linked to Ray. Finally, the committee examined more than 20 specific conspiracy theories or allegations. Some were significant and received close attention ; the committee looked at others, however, that could be, and were, discredited by a routine check of facts. By and large, the committee's investigation of suspect organizations and its exhaustive check of the specific theories and miscellaneous al- legations produced negative results. In many cases these results were, in light of the mutually exclusive character of the allegations, pre- dictable. The committee was satisfied, however, that its effort was not wasted, for it provided a sound evidentiary basis for settling a variety of long-lingering questions and eliminating deep concerns.^ 3. INVESTIGATION OF RAT's MOTIVE Motive is, of course, an integral element of any murder. Its sig- nificance isreadily apparent in an examination of criminal trials, where the absence of convincing evidence of motive will often lead to an acquittal. Such evidence is not, at least legally, a necessary ele- ment of the prosecutor's proof. Nevertheless, many juries are simply unwilling to convict a defendant for such a crime without first re- ceiving a satisfactory explanation to the question, "Why?". In addition, the question of motive is intertwined in the issue of conspiracy. Several different, yet complementary, motives, if estab- lished, could be consistent with a single assassin theory. If, for exam- ple, Ray were found to possess a strain of virulent racism, a lone assassin theory would be viable. Similarly, if it was established that Ray were driven by a psychological need for recognition in the criminal community, his involvement in a notorious crime such as the assassination, without the help or urging of others, would likewise be understandable. Nevertheless, to the extent that a theory tied to Ray's racism or some other motive did not provide a satisfactory rationale, other explanations had to be sought. And with each additional expla- nation, its consistency with a lone assassin theory had to be tested anew. In its examination of the question of motive, the committee was aware that its ability ultimately to resolve this issue was necessarily limited. Ray consistently denied his involvement in Dr. King's murder. The committee, therefore, did not have access to the most probative evidence — Ray's own explanation for his conduct. In the absence of a confession, the committee was forced to rely on the testimony of others and on an analysis of Ray's conduct. This evidence was valu- able, but it was unsatisfactory for the purpose of understanding the complexities the issue of motive. of Ray's psyche, which might lead to firm conclusions on {a) Bay^s racial attitudes exmnined The committee's investigation of Ray's racial attitudes was exten- sive, in keeping with the significance of the issue. Ray, several family members, and a large number of Ray's associates were questioned on the subject. An effort was also made to explore the significance of cer- tain alleged incidents in his past that have been identified as showing strong racial animosity. 2 A discussion of the committee's investigation of private organizations and of miscel- laneo-s conspiracy allegations appears in section II C of ttiis report. The committee's dis- cussion of possible official complicity appears in section II D of this report. 328 It had been reported, for example, that while at Missouri State Penitentiary, Ray exhibited extreme hatred for Black prisoners and for Martin Luther King as well. (5) To verify this allegation, the com- mittee reviewed some 70 FBI inmate interviews, compiling a smaller list of inmates who had worked with Ray, celled near or with him, or who professed knowledge of his personal life and habits. The com- mittee then interviewed approximately 30 prison associates of Ray. (6') While some recalled that Ray had demonstrated anti-B'.ack feelings, the majority said he was not a racist. On balance, therefore, the committee viewed the inmate testimony as essentially inconclusive. It could not be relied on as proof that Ray harbored the kind of deep- seated, racial animosity that might, on its own, trigger the assassina- tion of Dr. King. The committee also closely examined the facts surrounding two incidents with alleged racial overtones that occurred within a year before the assassination. They occurred in Canada and Mexico. Wil- liam Bradford Huie, author of "He Slew the Dreamer," had written that a female companion of Ray in Canada in the summer of 1967 told him that Ray spoke disparagingly of Blacks during a dinner conversation. According to Huie, she said : I can't remember how the subject came up. But he said something like, "You got to live near niggers to know 'em." He meant that he had no patience with the racial views of people like me who don't "know niggers" and that all people who "know niggers" hate them. (7) Despite the assistance of the Canadian authorities, the woman, a Canadian citizen living in Canada in 1978, declined to be interviewed, so the committee was able only to review the files of the Royal Cana- dian Mounted Police (RCMP), which were attained by committee subpena from local authorities. During her R(^MP interview, the woman said Ray never indicated any hatred of Blacks and never men- tioned Dr. King in her presence. Once more, therefore, the commit- tee's evidence tended to pull in opposite directions. The second incident that had been cited to show Ray's racism oc- curred when he was in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, in October 1967. Manuela Aguirre Medrano who, using the professional name of Irma Morales, worked at a brothel named the Casa Susana, allegedly told in 1968 of an incident involving Ray, or "Gait," as he was calling him- self at the time. Gait reportedly arrived at the Casa Susana about 9 p.m. on a Sunday. He and Morales drank together. At a nearby table, there was a group that included four Blacks, sailors who worked on a private yacht. Morales said Gait became angered at the Blacks, one or more of whom were laughing noisily. He told Morales he hated Blacks, and he went over to their table and insulted one of them. Then, he went to his car, returned and stopped to berate the Blacks again. When he got back to his own table, he asked Morales to feel his pocket. She noted he was carrying a pistol. Gait said he intended to kill the Blacks. AVhen one of them came over to Gait's table to try to make peace. Gait muttered another insult. When the Blacks left, Gait appeared to want to go after them, but Morales told him it was about time for the police to pay a 10 p.m. visit. Gait said he wanted nothing to do with the 329 police. (5) This incident had since been reported in the writings of popular authors (5) and was often cited as support for the proposition that Eay harbored racial hatred toward Blacks. When investigated by the committee, the evidence was contradictory With the assistance of the Mexican authorities, the committee reinter- viewed Morales in Puerto Vallarta.(7^) Her recollection of her asso- ciation with Ray and of her period of employment at the Casa Susana seemed clear and exact; further, her memory on many subjects was corroborated by other evidence and testimony taken by the committee. Yet her description of the alleged incident varied significantly from the published reports. Morales explained that she and "Gait" had been seated in the club when a Black sailor from a nearby table of both Black and white sailors touched her as he was attempting to maneuver past them. She recalled thinking that the sailor was drunk, causing him to stumble as he passed her. He reached out and touched her, she explained, in an effort to break his fall. Morales added that the sailor was escorted out by another sailor and that Gait did become angry. Nevertheless, it was her opinion that Gait's anger was prompted by the sailor touching her, and not because of his race. She said further that Ray never men- tioned his feelings about Blacks to her. Indeed, she said that conver- sation had been quite limited because of the language barrier. The committee found that Morales was a reliable witness on this point, who was certain of her recollections of the Casa Susana incident. It would appear, therefore, that the racial overtones of this incident were seriously distorted, both in the original reports and in subsequent popularized versions of the event. (ii) While two of the most widely circulated stories of Ray's racism did not withstand careful scrutiny, the committee noted that a number of Ray's reported actions or statements did tend to manifest racist attitudes. In sworn testimony before the committee, Alexander An- thony Eist, a former member of Scotland Yard who had extensive contact with Ray during the first hours of his confinement in London, as well as during trips between prison and the extradition hearings, recalled specific examples of anti-Black sentiments expressed by Ray. {12) ^ In addition, Ray's interests in emigration to the white supremist nations of Rhodesia and South Africa, while probably just an effort to reach a country where English was spoken and where there might be sympathy for the assassination, could also be evidence of Ray's sup- port of the general notion of white supremacy. (7^) The committee saw a need to scrutinize closely the evidence bearing on Ray's racial attitudes. In light of the contradictory evidence, the committee was unwilling to conclude that deepseated hatred of Blacks 3 The committee conducted an investigation of Eist's background Eist had in beenancharged attemptwithto establish his reliability as a witness. It learned that in 1976, conspiracy to commit corruption and conspiracy to prevent the course of justice. In 1978, however, Eist was found not guilty on all counts in a directed verdict. (See MLK Exhibit P-1.S6. certifica+e of acquittal. IV HSCA-MLK Hearings, 28.) The committee further learned that Eist had given his accoiint of conversations with Ray to three other persons previously, a London newspaper reporter in 1968 (see MLK E.xtiibit F-131, Owen Sum- mers' statement, Nov. 2, 1978. IV HSCA-MLK Hearings, 46) and an American serviceman and his wife in 1977. (See MLK Exhibi*^s F-132, 13.S. statements of David and Connie Meurlnas, Nov. 2, 1978. IV HSCA-MLK Hearings. 49. 52.) The committee also noted that Eist was honorabl.v retired with full pension from Scotland Yard. (See MLK Exhibit F-137, certificate of retirement, IV HSCA-MLK Hearings, 12.) The committee determined that Eist had testified in good faith and to the best of his recollection. 330 was the sole or even the primary motivating factor in Ray's decision to murder Dr. King. While the committee was satisfied that Ray's lack of sympathy toward Blacks and the civil rights movement permitted him to undertake the assassination, it was equally convinced that the murder did not stem from racism alone. (&) Ego grati-fication as a motive The committee also examined the possibility that Ray assassinated Dr. King in an effort to gain recognition and gratification of his ego.* This psychological motive had chiefly been promoted by Huie in his book, "He Slew the Dreamer." (75) Huie supported this theory, in part, through an examination of Ray's activities in California in early 1968, prior to the assassination. He noted Ray's inability to secure legitimate employment; Ray's dancing lessons, indicative of a "fantasy" of "doing the rhumba in some South American country from which he could never be extradited ;"(i6') and his consultation of "no fewer than eight different psychiatrists, hypnotists, and scientologists, try- Huieing toconcluded find relief :from his depressions and feelings of inadequacy." (77) Ray didn't want to remain a nobody among prisoners all his life.toRay wanted wanted see his own to facemake thecolor in full "Topon Ten" * * * Ray his favorite TV show. Ray thought that attention and recognition would relieve his feelings of inadequacy and make him feel like somebody. (75) That the psychological motive could not be summarily dismissed was also evidenced by the testimony of Eist. Eist told the committee that during discussions with Ray pending his extradition, he had been able to establish a rapport with Ray and that Ray had expressed a feeling of pride for his act. In particular, Eist recalled Ray's interest in the publicity he would receive in the news media : * * * He was continuall}^ asking me how could he hit the headlines in the newspapers, and he kept wanting news of publicity. ******* * * * In fact, he said to me, when I told him it hadn't really made too much of an impact in the British press, that is, as far as he was concerned, he was telling me, you haven't seen anything yet. I will be in the headlines one of these days. He was quite proud of the fact that he was going to make the headlines. (7^*) The committee also interviewed a former inmate associate of Ray, George Ben p]dmondson, who characterized Ray as a man in need of substantial egotistical fulfillment and who recalled speculation among *The committee carefully considered assembling a panel of psychiatrists to explore why Ray murdered Dr. King, and in particular the theory that he did so out of a need for ego gratification. A list of prominent candidates was compiled, and interviews were con- ducted with the doctors. (Ih) A. clear majority raised oijjections to the pronosed project; the main objection was the probability that Ray would refu.se to cooperate. They also noted the current controversy over the validity of psychiatric examinations that are not based on extensive analysis of the subject himself. Based on this fidvice. as well as other considerations, the committee decided to forego the idea of a psychiatric panel. 331 Missouri State Penitentiary inmates that Ray killed Dr. King to gain a measure of self-importance. (^6>) Taken as a whole, however, the evidence that Ray was motivated in the assassination by a pressing need for recognition was not sub- stantial. Many of Ray's activities in Los Angeles, including his pur- chase of dance lessons, his enrollment in bartending school, and his employment of a professional psychiatrist and a hypnotist, may have merely manifested an effort to attain self-confidence. Similarly, the committee noted that there was an ego-satisfying dimension to Ray's purchase of a late-model sports car and his reported practice of regu- larly paying for drinks in a Los Angeles nightspot with $20 bills, (^i) To argue that Ray killed Dr. King to become somebody, however, necessarily must assume that Ray expected to be identified. The credible evidence did not support that possibility. While it has been argued that Ray dropped the bundle of evidence outside Canipe's Amusement Co. to insure his identification as the assassin, the com- mittee rejected this theory. Investigation at the crime scene revealed that at the time of the assassination, at least 13 members of the Mem- phis Police Department were at a fire station south of Bessie Brewer's roominghouse on South Main Street. (^^) Further, an official police car parked in the fire station parking lot protruded onto the sidewalk on the east side of South Main Street and would have been clearly visible to Ray as he fled south from the roominghouse. The conmiittee believed that Ray threw the bundle of evidence down in a moment of panic, probably triggered by his seeing police activity or the police vehicle.^ In addition, Ray used two new aliases during the period immediately preceding the assassination and went to a Los Angeles plastic surgeon. Both acts reflect a concerted effort to avoid identifica- tion as the assassin. The conunittee was, therefore, unwilling to con- clude that Ray's participation in the assassination resulted solely from a need for recognition and ego-fulfillment. (c) The prospect of financial reward Having found in neither race nor psychology adequate motivation for the assassination, the committee considered a third possibility: financial reward. The committee found substantial evidence that Ray might have been lured by the prospect of money. Once more, however, the evidence was not uncontroverted. First, while Ray had a background of financially motivated crime, none of it involved physical violence. (^J) From his military discharge in 1948 to the King assassination 20 years later. Ray had spent 14 years in prison. In 1949, he had been convicted of burglary in California and sentenced to 8 months. Returning to the Midwest after serving that term, he was arrested for robbery in 1952 and served 2 years. Shortly after his release, he was, in 1955, convicted for forging an endorsement on a money order and sentenced to 3 years at Leavenworth Federal Penitentiary. In 1959, he was arrested in the armed robbery of a St. Louis grocery store and was sentenced to 20 years at the Missouri State Penitentiary under the State's habitual offender law. He was serving 5 During a taped interview with the committee, Elst recaUed Ray admitting that he threw the gun away after seeing police activity. (Ill, MLK-HSCA hearings, 274.) 332 this term when he escaped from MSP, just short of a year before the assassination. Apart from Ray's criminal record, there was the question of Ray's general character! Here the committee found significant the opinions of Ray's brothers, John and Jerry, both given at the time Ray was named in the King assassination and in hearings before the connnittee. In an interview with the St. Louis Post-Dispatch (^4) the day fol- motive :lowing his brother's 1968 arrest, John Ray speculated on the possible If my brother did kill King he did it for a lot of money — he never did anything if it wasn't for money — and those who paid him wouldn't want him sitting in a courtroom telling everything he knows. In the committee's public hearings in November 1978, John Ray was asked if his statement w-as accurately recorded. He responded, "I expect so." (25) Similar indications of Ray's Avillingness to commit crimes, and pos- sibh" the assassination, for money were voiced by Ray s seeona brother, Jerry Ra}', around the time of the assassination. In a conversation with an acquaintance, Jerry's general response to a question concerning his brother's involvement in the assassination was : This is his business. I didn't ask him. If I was in his posi- tion and had 18 years to serve and someone offered me a lot of money to kill someone I didn't like anyhow and get me out of the country, I'd do it. (^6i) In other conversations with the same individual, (^7) Jerry stated that his brother had been paid a substantial sum for the assassination.® Jerry Ray was questioned during public hearings concerning these statements. While denying his brother's knowing involvement in a conspiracy, motive : his comments were illuminating to the search for Ray's It might have been true. I can't remember exactly what I said, but I have told other people. I said if he done it there had to be a lot of money involved because he wouldn't do it for hatred that or line is not his justofbecause he didn't like somebody, because work. (28) In a subsequent portion of his testimony, Jerry Ray described his initial feelings concerning the assassination : * * * before I knew anything about the murder, you know, before it happened, my kind of opinion was that he was in- volved some way; I didn't know if he was unknowingly in- volved or knowingly involved, but I knew there had to be a lot of money involved in it before he would get involved in anything like that. (^5) As in the earlier mentioned possibilities concerning motive, the evi- dence before the committee was not without contradictions. Ray's par- "In committee testimony, Jerry Ray denied knowledge of a payoff In the assassination. Moreover, it is unclear whether his statements to the female acquaintance reflected his perception of the triitli. speculation, or oiitrlpht fabrication. The committee believed, how- ever, that the statements were made as reported. 333 ticipation in a London bank robbery shortly before his arrest {30) and his impecunious condition at the time of his arrest were strong indi- cations that if the assassination were financially motivated, he did not receive a payoff. Further, despite a major effort by the committee, no evidence of a payoff' was uncovered. The committee noted, however, that contrary to popular impression, contract killings are not generally paid for in advance. Ray's failure to receive payment may have resulted from his panicky, unplanned flight abroad followinqj the assassina- tion. It is also possible that his coconspirators welshed on their pay- ment to him. Even though it could find no evidence of a payoff, the committee was convinced by Eay's lifetime pattern of crime for profit and by testimony about his general character that one explanation for the assassination probably lay in Ray's expectation of financial reward.^ (d) Conclusio7i on motive In conclusion, the committee's investigation of Ray's motive re- vealed that while Ray's general lack of sympathy for Blacks or the civil rights movement would have allowed him to commit the assassi- nation without qualms, his act did not stem from racism alone. The committee was convinced that while Ray's decision to assassinate Dr. King may have reflected a desire to participate in an important crime, his predominant motive lay in an expectation of monetary gain. This conclusion necessarily raised the possibility of conspiracy.^ 4. GENERAL INDICATIONS OF CONSPIRACY In its investigation of Ray's transactions and associates over the 14 months subsequent to his escape from Missouri State Penitentiary, the committee looked for associates during this period who had not pre- viously been connected to Ray; activities or transactions with these associates of a criminal nature or that might indicate complicity in the assassination itself; and activities and transactions with known asso- ciates that had not been previously known or fully understood and that might have led to the assassination. As a fugitive, Ray was on the move in 1967-68; he lived in second- rate motels and cheap roominghouses. During much of the period, he was observed to be a man alone, a man without friends or lasting associates. In Mexico, his companions were prostitutes and bartend- ers, (^i) In California, he was a regular visitor at the Sultan Room of the St. Francis Hotel, but he was normally alone unless conversing with employees of the bar. (5^) While some of Ray's activities, such as his enrollment in dancing and bartending school in Los Angeles, brought him into regular contact with others, a close investigation of these activities revealed that significant friendships or associations never developed. (.7.^) A large portion of the committee's evidence, therefore, provided no signs of association or of criminal involvement T Tlie committee considered and rejected the possibility tliat Ray's expectations of financial gain lay with the possibility of royalties, film rights and other forms of payment for his story. This thpory would necessarily assume a plan to be identified after the crime, a theory that the committee had previously rejected. «A detailed examination of several additional incidents examined by the committee during its motive investigation is included in a staff report entitled Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Supplemental Studies Pertaining to the Motive of James Earl Ray. XIII Appendix to the HSCA-MLK Hearings, p. 241. 334 with individuals beyond the innocent relationships identified in previous investigations of the assassination. (a) Transactions as evidence of associations Despite this (reneral picture of a lonely, uninvolved individual, the committee's invcstitration of three separate transactions provided defi- nite evidence of association — in some instances criminal — with other individuals. They wore Ray's activities in California on behalf of the American New Orleans Tnde])'endent Party:1967; in December his brief, and hisbut purchase possibly sinister, trip to of the murder weapon in Birmingham, Ala., at the end of March 1968. Much of the evidence of these transactions did not suggest a direct link to the assassination. It did convince the committee, however, that the gen- erally accepted image of Ray wandering aimlessly around the country until he reached a lonely decision to assassinate Dr. King was not a complete picture. Ray's rather abrupt involvement with recruiting activity on behalf of the American Independent Party in California, while not criminal in nature, strongly suggested association with others.^ Ray's life to this point had been, from all known indicators, apolitical. He was not a "joiner" or a "grassroots" volunteer. In addition, as a convicted felon and escaped convict, he could not expect to vote or to achieve a paid position in the California AIP. His recruitment of three individuals {3Jf.) totherefore, AIP, register instood su})port of Governor in stark contrast "Wallace of Alabama to a prior and the life of political inactivity. Further, Charles Stein, one of the three individuals re- cruited by Ray, recalled that Ray appeared familiar with the AIP headquarters, as well as with the registering procedures, (55) thus sug- gesting additional campaign activity not disclosed during the investi- gation. Standing alone. Ray's AIP activity raised the definite possi- bility of association with individuals unidentified during earlier investigations. Of similar interest was the evidence on Ray's abrupt trip to New- Orleans in December 1967. Ray's partner on the trip was California resident Charles Stein.'" Stein was going to New Orleans to pick up his sister's children. The purpose of Ray's trip could not be determined, although the committee found it likely that Ray met secretly with another associate in New Orleans. The secretive nature of that meeting w^as significant, if not sinister. Stein was certain when he testified before the committee in executive session (.:?7) that Ray had his own reason for the cross-country drive. He recalled that Ray told him about a place where he was to meet an associate or associates, and he said that once or twice en route to New Orleans, Ray stopped to make a telephone call. Stein speculated that in one of the calls, Ray "In Identifying the association of James Earl Ray with the American Independent Party and the I'resldential campaign of George Wallace, the committee did not mean to imply that either the party or Wallace had any relation to the events in Memj)his, As In all large movements or any nationwide campaign, not everyone in the movement or the campaign can be held responsible for the acts of all those In some way associated with it. "•The committee devoted a significant portion of its investigative resources to Stein. It was ultimately satisfied that his association with Ray was unrelated to the assassination, for four reasons: (1) pronounced personality differences between Ray and Stein: (2) evidencedenials sworn that they met only of criminal a day before involvement withtheRayNew; and Orleans trip; (.3) questioning (4) extensive Stein's emphatic and of friends and relatives of Stein In New Orleans and Los Angeles. (36) informed an associate of his arrival time. Further, Stein recounted how Ray told him, after they had been in New Orleans for part of a day, that he had seen Stein walking in the French Quarter with his son. Ray explained he had been drinking in a Canal Street bar at the time, and Stein figured Ray had been with someone or else he would have called to him. Stein also testified that Ray was ready to return to California the day after they arrived in New Orleans. His testimony and the willing- ness of Ray, an escaped prisoner, to drive several thousand miles, risking a random vehicle check, were additional reliable indications that Ray's purpose in going to New Orleans was to attend one brief but important meeting. (5<§)" The committee discovered sound indications that Ray was not alone, or at least not without someone to consult, when he purchased the murder weapon in Birmingham on March 29-30, 1968. First, the fact that he bought one rifle on the 29th, then exchanged it for another — the murder weapon — on the 30th, indicated the possibility of advice from an associate. In addition, Donald Wood, Jr., the clerk at Aero- marine Supply Co. where the rifle purchase and exchange took place, told the committee that while Ray was unaccompanied in his visits to the store, Ray said he had been advised by someone that the first rifle, a .243 caliber iRemington, was not the one he wanted. (4-/) In an FBI interview had been talkingdays after thebrother. to his assassination, (4^) Ray"Wood told recalled that Rayhe said the committee he got his advice on the rifle purchase from Raoul. {4S) The committee's investi- gation, however, provided no concrete evidence of the existence of a Raoul. ^^ The committee concluded that the circumstances surrounding the rifle purchase constituted significant signs of unwitting aid, if not knowing complicity, in the assassination itself." A final indication of criminal association between Ray and others in the period before and after the assassination arose from an analysis of Ray's spending patterns. (4-4) The connnittee estimated that Ray spent approximately $9,000 during his 14 months of freedom. That figure included $1,800 for lodging, $900 for food and drink, $400 for gasoline and $5,700 for miscellaneous purchases — his cars, dance les- sons, airline tickets, camera equipment, clothing, the rifle and so on. Except for 6 weeks as a dishwasher in a restaurant outside Chicago, for which he earned $664.34, Ray was unemployed over the 14 months. The committee concluded that the most likely source of his funding was criminal activity. In light of Ray's record of criminal ventures in combination with others, the committee felt that this criminal activity provided an additional indication of possible involvement with others. 11 The committee Anthony Charles De also receivedwhotliestated Carvelho, sworn that testimony of a Ray he brought New toOrleans friend ofMotel the Provincial Stein's, for a meeting with an unidentified individual on the day of Ray's arrival in New Orleans. (39) Despite the committee's general feeling that De Can'elho was an honest and sincere witness, there were serious problems with his testimony. First, on several points his account was inconsistent meeting with Orleans in New Stein's. did Second, De Car^'elho's not apnear in the statements concerning reports of liis a Provincial FBI interviews Motel conducted immediately following the assassination. (^0) In the absence of independent corroboration of a Provincial Motel meeting, the committee decided to discount De Carvelho's testimony. ^ See section II A of this report for discussion of Ray's "Raoul" story. sec.13 II TheA 3. committee's investigation of the rifle purchase is more thoroughly detailed in 336 Ray's explanation, which the committee rejected, was that he re- ceived a total of $7,750 from Raoiil for two smuggling: ventures at the Canadian and Mexican borders and for being available for future crimes, including the gunrunning operation which, Ray claimed, was the reason he went to Memphis. Thus, the committee's analysis of Ray's AIP recruiting in Cali- fornia, his abrupt trip to Xew iDrleans in December 1967, the Birming- ham rifle purchase shortly before the assassination, and his spending habits provided ample evidence, not OTily of associates, but of crimi- nal associations during the 14-month fugitive period. What had to be determined, therefore, was whether these associations could be linked to the assassination of Dr. King. 5. THE BROTHERS, JOHN AND JERRY RAT The committee viewed the likelihood of a financial motive in the assassination as one general indication of conspiracy. The finding, however, brought the committee no closer to identifying Ray's ac- complice (s). Similarly, while several of Ray's activities suggested his preassassination involvement with others, there was no innnediate evidence of their identity. The committee's investigation, therefore, necessarily focused on the assassin's known associates, including his brothers, Gerald William Ray and John Larry Ray. The committee's decision to direct its attention to the brothers re- flected a variety of considerations. Both had criminal backgrounds that included financially motivated crime. (4^) In addition, the com- mittee was struck by the substantial evidence turned up in the original investigation of Ray's contacts with one or another of the brothers throughout the preassassination period. In fact, the 1977 Justice Task Force criticized the FBI's original investigation for failing to investi- gate adequately the brothers' possible involvement with Ray both be- fore and after the assassination. (4^) Finally, on the assumption that there was a conspiracy, Ray's persistent refusals to identify his co- conspirators inthe years following the assassination would be most easily understood if his evidence implicated family members." Jerry Ray was born July 16, 1935, in Bowling Green, Mo., the fourth of nine Ray children and the third son. His criminal record shows convictions for grand larceny in 1954 and armed robbery in 1956, for which he served prison terms. His parole on the robbery conviction was to become final in August 1958, but he held up a gas station before it did, and lie was returned to Menard State Penitentiary in Chester, 111., where he served an additional 2 years. (4^) Following his release from Menard in I960, he worked at odd jobs in St. Louis and Chicago. In September 1964, he was hired as a night maintenance man at the Sportsman Country Club in Northbrook, 111., a job he held until the summer of 1968. (-0) John Ray was born February 14, 1933, in Alton, 111. His criminal record shows a conviction in 1953 for motor vehicle theft, for which " In 1970, Ray refused to provide Information to a Federal grand jury on the subject of conspiracy. While the terms of the proposed aRreement with the Justice Department were unclear. Kay's attorney understood that this assistance niijjht Ije rewarded tjy release from imprisonment and athat his attorney, were newhe identity, Ray's felt he did not stated reasons information have enough for not cooperating?, to satisfyaccordinp to the Justice Department ; he only had enough to get himself killed. (47) S37 he was sentenced to 5 to 10 years at Menard. (5^) During the years followino; his release from the penitentiary in February 1960, he worked as a bartender, as an employee of the Greyhound bus depot in Chicago, (5i) Chicago. and asIn a 1964 greenskeeper at "the and 1965, he White worked Pine for Golf brief Course periodsnear in Florida and in the Catskill Mountains of New York. He then traveled to New York City, where he collected unemployment, and to the Chicago area, where he worked at various country clubs before his re- turn to St. Louis in October 1966.(5^) John had no formal employ- ment in 1967, although he testified that he "believes" he was a painter then. (55) In January of 1968, he and his sister, Carol Pepper, opened and operated the Grapevine Tavern at 1982 Arsenal Street in St. Louis. (J^) (a) Evidence of Ray's contact with his bothers^ 19G7-68 Since their first FBI interviews shortly after the assassination, Jerry and John Ray attempted to minimize the extent of their con- tact with their brother during the 14-month period from his prison escape to his arrest in London. On April 19, 1968,(55) Jerry told the FBI he had last seen James in 1964, but over the years he conceded this statement was false. Both Jerry (56") and James (57) told the committee of at least three meetings following James' escape from Missouri State Penitentiary. Two occurred while James was working at the Indian Trails Restaurant in Winnetka, 111., from May 3 to June 24, 1967; the third came in August 1967 when James passed througli Chicago on his wav from Montreal to Birmingham and gave Jerry his 1962 Plymouth. Jerry Ray's testimony before the committee reflected at least "two or three" telephone conversations, the last coming during James' De- cember trip to New Orleans : The last time I talked to him was about four months, approximately four months before King got killed, and I thought he was calling from Texas; but later he told me it was New Mexico. * * * [T]he call was under 3 minutes and just a friendly talk, you know, asking how my old man was and asking about Carol and John and everybody because I was the only contact he had with the whole family. (5) the second was on a return trip after he quit his job in Winnetka, 111. Ray, in fact, told the committee the purpose for the second visit was "to see some of my relatives down there,'' although he added, "I never did see them." (67) Further, throughout his fugitive period — in loca- tions as varied as Montreal, TjOs Angeles and Birmingham — Ray talked of recent or intended contact with a brother. Finally, the com- mittee found significance in the fact that James and John — both largely apolitical from all accounts and, as convicted felons, unable to vote — began to campaign actively on behalf of the American Inde- the same pendent time.Party's "Wallace James, for President'' as noted, worked for campaign the AIP inat California, almost exactly and John was active in St. Ix)uis, Mo., where his Grapevine Tavern served as a distribution point for campaign literature. The conunittoe recognized that at the time of their initial interviews with authorities, John and Jeriy Ray could well have chosen to con- ceal contact with their brother, even if innocent, in an attempt to pro- tect him and avoid scrutiny during the assassination investigation. Another explanation, however, one that the committee deemed more credible, was that they were concerned with potential criminal liability stemming from contact with their brother. The committee found that the evidence established that John Ra;y had foreknowledge of his brother's escape from Missouri State Peni- tentiary. Itwas equally apparent that Ray was as-sisted by both Jerry and Joiin following his escape, making them potentially responsible as accessories after the fact to both James' escape and his interstate flight. "AUbough James Earl Ray did not know Lohmeyer, he used his name (spelllnjc it Lownieyer) when he purchased the murder weapon in Birmingham. 339 Finally, the committee received substantial evidence indicating that James and John were involved in the Alton bank robbery in East Alton, 111., on July 13, 1967. It was also shown that Jerry Ray was aware of their participation in this robbery and helped to distribute the proceeds of the crime to James during his fugitive period.^'' The evidence of Jerry Ray's actual involvement in that robbery was, on balance, insubstantial. (h ) Missouri State Penitentiary escaqje ^^ James Earl Ray escaped from Missouri State Penitentiary on April 23, 1967, concealed in a box of bread in the back of a delivery truck. An investigation in 1967 concluded that Ray had escaped in a bread box, probably aided by at least one fellow inmate who placed bread on top of \\\\Yi.{68) Nevertheless, Ray asserted for years that he had escaped without assistance by scaling a prison wall.(^P) Finally, in an interview with this committee in December 1977, Ray confirmed the accuracy of the official version. He admitted he left the prison in a delivery truck bound for a nearby prison farm and jumped out of the truck as it slowed for an intersection. Ray stated further that, while he planned the escape alone, he was assisted in executing the plan by two inmates. He refused to identify them.(76>) Jerry Ray has, over the years, admitted meeting with James on at least three occasions during the weeks immediately following his escape from Missouri State Penitentiary. (7i) On the last occasion, moreover, Jerry shared a room with James for one night in Chicago before putting his brother on a bus to Birmingham. (7^) His in- volvement in facilitating James' interstate flight, therefore, seemed clear. John Ray, on the other hand, consistently maintained that he did not even know of the escape until after the King assassination. The committee's investigation, however, produced substantial evidence to contradict John's assertion. Certainly the strongest single piece of evidence before the commit- tee indicating John Ray's foreknowledge of his brother's escape plans was found in the Missouri State Penitentiary visitor records. (7J) These records indicated nine visits by John during James' incarcera- tion. The last four occurred during the year prior to the escape — on July 10, 1966, November 13, 1966, December 20, 1966, and April 22, 1967. The final visit was of particular interest to the committee since it was made on the day before the escape. Given the relative sophisti- cation of James' escape plans and the need for inside assistance from fellow inmates to cover him with bread and to load the box on the truck, the committee believed that the escape had been planned by the time of John Ray's visit. It seemed reasonable, therefore, to assume that a discussion of the break occurred during their meeting. This assumption was supported, the committee found, by Ray's admitted trip to St. Louis, John's home city, within a week of his escape. (7^) During his testimony before the committee, John Ray was asked about the visits reflected in the prison records. His responses were ^« Both John and Jerry Ray denied any involvement with James in criminal activity, most notably his escape from prison and the bank robbery in Alton, 111. In light of the assassination in Memphis on April 4, 1968, these denials might well have represented an effort to avoid admitting an association that eventually matnrpfl into murder. " The committee also investigated the Missouri State Penitentiary escape for evidence of official complicity in the assassination. (See Section II D, infra.) 340 inherently incredible, excellent examples of the obstructionist posture John Ray assumed throughout the committee's investigation : Staff Couxsel. I have at this time introduced into the record MLK exhibit F-634, and I ask you whetlier this rec- ord accurately reflects the dates that you visited your brother, James Earl Ray, while he was incarcerated at the Missouri State Prison. Ray. I could not remember any dates. Chairman Stokes. Is the answer of the witness the fact that he does not recall those visits? Ray. Xo; I do not recall them. Chairman Stokes. Proceed * * *. Staff Counsel Mr. Ray, I am particularly concerned with the last visit that is reflected on that record. That is the visit on April 22, 1967. That was the day prior to the escape of your brother from ^lissouri State Prison. I ask you at this time, do you have any recollection of visit- ing your brother James the day preceding his escape from the State prison. Ray. I do not have no recollection of that. Staff Counsel. Do you have any reason to offer this com- mittee at this time as to why this record before you would not be accurate ? Ray. I did not say it wasn't accurate. I just said I don't recall visiting that certain day. (7-5) . John Ray subsequently offered one explanation for the April 22, 1967, entry on the records: * * * Jerry, my visiting pass, Jerry used it sometimes. I used it sometimes, and a guy named John Gawron, I believe, used it sometimes. (7^) After investigation, the committee rejected this explanation. The committee questioned both James and Jerry Ray about the possi- bility that someone posing as John visited the prison on April 22, 1967. James indicated in an interview that one of his brothers, and probably John, was the visitor: John or Jerry, I'm not too positive now which one it was. It was, I believe it was John. I'm not certain. (77) ^* Jerry Ray, when questioned on the same matter, did not recall using another's pass, and he denied emphatically visiting James the day prior to his escape : Ray. I positively didn't visit him. That is a positive. Staff Counsel. Do you know if your brother John vis- ited him on that day?* Ray. I don't know if John did. I know definitely I didn't. (7.9) " Diirlnc the same Interview, Ray Insisted thRt he did not tell the brother who visited him of his planned escape, since "that would have been llleKal." He continued : "I can't rempm^er nil what I to'd hini, but I mean thev all knew, toth Jerry and Jo'^n knew, that I was thinking about escaplncr. So. it wouldn't of been no reve'atlon if 1. \f I would of mpntlniied somethinp M^out escaninpr. But there was no pre-arranged deal where he would be outside waiting in front of the prison, and I'd jump out and jump In the car." (78) 341 The committee found other evidence of John Ray's knowledge of, and participation to author in, Ray's escape George McMillan and 5, on March subsequent 1973, Johnflight. In a toletter referred the account of James' escape by Gerold Frank, the author of "An Ameri- can Death": He [Frank] stated that Jimmy walked for days to get to St. Louis from Jefferson City when he escaped, when actu- ally he had a car, and I.D. waiting for him in Jefferson City * * * He also made a phone car [sic] to a certain party in St. Louis to come down, and fix his car. The person who went and help him, also is doin^ time now in a Federal prison for a charge that I expect is a frameup.(6'6') At the time he wrote the letter, John was serving time for a bank robbery conviction that he claimed was an FBI frameup.^^ John allegedly made a similar admission to a longtime criminal associate of the Ray brothers, Walter Rife, who was incarcerated with liim in Leavenworth during the early 1970's. In an unsworn interview with the committee, Rife stated that John told him that he had picked James up on a highway near Jefferson City following the escape. (5^) The committee, however, found Rife's credibility on other matters highly suspect, and it gave little weight to this evidence.^" Further evidence of John's willing assistance to James' flight was found in the fact that James left the Missouri State Penitentiary with a social security number in the name of John L. Rayns, a number and alias previously used by John Ray. (83) During a committee interview, James described the number as : * * * one of my brother's old social security numbers, John L. Rayns, I believe it was. I don't recall the social secu- rity number. I didn't have the card. I got the number off him. We interchanged these numbers all the time. He used them. I used them. So I used that social security number. (54) John Ray number : was questioned on James' possession of his social security Congressman FrrniAN. Now, my question is, did you, prior to James Earl Ray's escape from Missouri State Peni- tentiary, furnish James either with your social security card or your social security number ? Ray. Well, it is possible. Sometime I might have gave him a number. But it is also possible he might have had the number because he remembered probably that number. I did ^ not give him no social security card. I did not have one. (85) The evidence before the committee indicated John Ray had fore- knowledge ofhis brother's prison escape. The evidence included : the Missouri State Penitentiary visitor records; the testimony of James that a brother, he believed John, was his visitor; John's letter to au- thor George ^McMillan; John's alleged admission to Walter Rife; to ■^^McMillan, John Ray althoiiRh told the lie committee in executive did acknowledee session he was that he referrinc fahricated to himself whenthishe admission wrote of a "certain party" who had been imprisoned in a "fameup." (81) 20 See textual footnote, Section II-B 5(e). 342 James" admitted possession of John's old social security number at the time escape. the of his escape; and James' trip to the St. Louis area shortly after John's own denials — in particular, his claim that he first learned of tJie escape only when James had been named in the assassination — served to add to the force of the evidence.-' The connnittee found, therefore, that John Ray was involved with his brother James in the escape from Missouri State Penitentiary. (c) The Alton hank rohhery The committee devoted considerable eit'ort to an investigation of Ray s finances following his escape from ^lissouri State Penitentiary on the tlieory that Rays method of financing himself bore on the assassination. Indeed, the committee considered, but ultimately re- jected, the theory that his escape and travels were part of a single scheme that culminated in the assassination. The committee also con- sidered a variety of alternative sources of finances: payments from time to time from Raoul, as Ray claimed; from narcotic trafficking at Missouri State Penitentiary and during his fiight; and from the robbery of the Bank of Alton, Alton, 111., on J uly 18, 19(57.^' As has been noted, the committee, after due deliberation, rejected Ray's Raoul story. Further, the committee found it highly unlikely that Ray left Missouri State Penitentiary with a substantial amount of money. Inmates interviewed by the committee characterized him as a ''second-rate hustler" who engaged in bookmaking, narcotics and the sumggling of contraband, but who operated on a relatively small scale. (5^) The committee also found it improbable that Ray would have engaged in the menial labor of dishwashing, had he possessed a significant sum of money at the time of his escape. The committee received evidence supporting the possibility that Ray trafficked in marihuana during his stays in Mexico and California.^^ In addition to an assertion in Huie's "He Slew the Dreamer" that Ray left Mexico committee with witnesses identified "his Mustang loadedINIexico in both with marihuana," (5P) who and California the confirmed Ray's interest in, and occasional use of, marihuana. (.96^) One California witness, Ronald Dennino, provided swoni testimony indi- cating Ray's possession, on at least one occasion, of a kilo of mari- huana. (5/ ) Nevertheless, Dennino's evidence was hearsay, and when his alleged source of infoi'mation, Marie Martin, was questioned — also under oath — she denied knowledge of Ray's trafficking in substan- tial amounts of marihuana. {92) The committee was unable to locate evidence, beyond Dennino's tes- timony, indicating that Ray received substantial income from dealings "John Ray's testimony on the prison escape was given under a prant of immunity. Fnrf'f'r. tho statute of I'nntntions bnfl run on -'nv t>otentinl "ro pfifnis stemminT from liis foreknowledKe of and assistance in his brother's escape and flight. His false testimony in tliis area, therefore, did not stem from fear of subsequent prosecution. -2 Prior to the coinniif fee's investigation, tlie Alton l)anl{ rol>bery had heen investigated twice by tlie FP.I ^t the Mme of the crime and during tlie assassination investigation. The case remained ofBcially unsolved. -* Ray acknowledged discussing marihuana with some "hipfdes" and a bartender in Puerto Vallarta. Mexico. (S7) Nevertlieless, he hns denied, in a cliaracteristicaliy vague manner, any smuggling activity between Mexico and California : "St.aff anything smuggling Co'vsei,. from Were Mexico yo'i into, smuggling anvthing into Cilifornia? In particular? Were you "R.w. T'h. no, not t>articularly. I was thinking about it one time." (88) 343 in marihuana. Thus, while the committee did not foreclose the possi- bility that Ray supplemented his income through small-scale mari- huana trafficking, there was no evidence that it constituted a primary source of income during his fugitive period. On the other hand, the committee did obtain and analyze a substan- tial amount of evidence establishing the likelihood that James and John Ray robbed the Alton bank and that Jerry Ray, while probably not a participant in the robbery, was aware of his brothers' involve- ment and helped distribute funds from the robbery to James. The committee, therefoi-e, concluded that the Alton bank robbery was the most likely explanation for Ray's financial independence during his fugitive period. The Alton bank was held up by two masked gunmen at approxi- mately 1:30 p.m. on July 13, 1967. One was described as a middle-aged white male, 5 feet 10 inches tall, 150 to 160 pounds ; the other, a middle- aged white male, 5 feet 8 inches, 170 to 180 pounds. One was armed with a handgun, the other with a shotgun; both wore stocking masks and hats. Once inside the bank, the one with the shotgun stood guard, while the other collected $27,230 from behind the teller's counter. The two men then left the bank and walked westward to a nearby church parking lot. No further direct evidence was developed in the FBI's investigation of the robbery or in this committee's reexamination of the crime bearing on the manner, or the direction, of the robbers' flight from the immediate vicinity of the bank. At the time of the commit- tee's investigation, none of the stolen money had been recovered. (5J) Tlie committee first examined eyewitness and physical evidence bear- ing on the robbery. Because the bank robbers wore stocking masks, eyewitness descriptions were imprecise. Nevertheless, none of those that were given would eliminate the Ray brothers as suspects.^* More- over, the facts developed in the FBI's investigation — in particular, the apparent route of flight taken after the crime and the location of dis- carded evidence — provided some evidence of the involvement of James Earl Ray. Ray had been born in Alton on March 10, 1928. After spend- ing his early childhood elsewhere, he returned to Alton at the age of 16, joined a grandmother who ran a local roominghouse, and spent considerable time with his uncle, William Mayer, still a resident of the city in 1978. (^^) While much of his subsequent life was spent either in the military or in jail, Ray had returned to Alton for periods in 1948 and again in 1954. On August 21, 1959, he and an accomplice robbed an Alton supermarket of about $2,000.^^ Against this back- committeeground.determined. Ray's familiarity with the city of Alton was self-evident, the In the FBI's investigation of the Alton bank robbery, it was estab- lished that the shotgun and partially burned clothes used during the -* At the time of their original FBI interviews in April lf)68, John Rav was described as 5 feet 10 inches to 5 feet 11 inches tall, IfiO pounds, medium build ; and Jerrv Rav as 5 feet 9 inches tall, 178 pounds, medium-stocky build. James Earl Rav was described as .") feet ing his10 inches State Missouri tall. 165-174 pounds, Penitentiar.v medium escar^e build, in April 1967.on the wanted poster issued follow- " Ray's accomplice was arrested, whUe Ray got away. He was subsequently identified, however, and on Of'to'ier 27 l".5o vps !nflic<^pd <'or th's o'^ense K^' that time, however, he had been arrested for a supermarket holdup in St. Louis (for which he was later sentenced to 20 years at Missouri State Penitentiary). He was, therefore, never brought to trial for the Alton supermarket robbery. 344 robber}' were discarded in a wooded area near the National Cemetery in Alton. This area — a 3-niinute car ride from tlie bank — is situated at the end of a dead end street, indicating that the suspects were fa- miliar with the area around the cemetery and that the evidence drop was planned. (,9J) Further, the abandoned evidence was not found along the most direct route from the bank out of Alton, suggesting the robbers were confident they could elude capture without heading di- rectly out of town. These considerations, standing alone, suggested a fami'iiaritv Ray. with the In acldition, the Alton areaforsuch drop site the as that possessed incriminating by James evidence was Earl near the"^ liome in 1067 of Ray's uncle, William Mayer, and in the general vicinitv of former residences of Ray's mother and of Ray himself .2''- (,96') The committee next investigated the whereabouts of the Ray broth- ers on the day of the robbery, James liad quit his job at the Indian Trails Restaurant in Winnetka, 111., on June 24, 1967, approximately three weeks prior to the bank robbery. (.97) Before that time, while still in prison, he had decided to move to Canada, (-95) as he later in- dicated in interviews with the committee. But instead of heading straight for Canada, Ray made two trips in tlie opposite direction. He first went to Quincy, 111., where he stayed for approximate!}^ 12 days (.9.9) before returning to Chicago for 4 to 5 days. In Chicago, he picked up his last weekly paycheck from the Indian Trails. (7^^) Then, on July 10 or 11,-^ he drove to the St. Louis area, ostensibly to visit '•family members.'^ (101) Ray, however, told the committee he did not see any relatives, particularly not his brother John. In fact, Ray testi- fied, he did not oven know John's address, although, as noted, his brother was close enough to him to have visited him regularly in prison. (102) The committee found Ray's trip to the St, Louis area 3 days before the bank robbery especially interesting, not only because it strongly suggested a meeting with John, but also because Alton, 111., is only 20 miles noi-th of St. Louis. When Ray appeared before the committee in a public liearing, the committee pressed to learn why he had not visited his St. Louis relatives on his earlier trip to Quincy, which is far closer to St. Louis than Chicago, In addition, the committee sought a logical explanation as to why, once he did return to St. T^uis to see relatives, he did not see them. Ray's testimony on these points was crucial and, at the same time, characteristic of the evasive and illogi- cal nature of much of his testimony befoi-e the committee. His re- sponses are, therefore, quoted at length : Congressman Fithiax. * * * if j remember my Illinois map, Quincy is a lot closer to the East St. Louis area than Chicago, and you have 12 days where you were in Quincy. * * * Just for my own satisfaction, could you share with the committee why you didn't drop on over to East St. Louis and tiy to see your relatives in that 12-day period? ^'Thp committee recognized that this analysis, in and of Itself, could he apolled to any number of Alton residents. It was piven significance, nevertheless, as one of several componpiits of the circiims'nntial evidence l.earinp on the rob! er--. "This date was determined hy using Ray's estimates of a 12-day stay in Quincy and a 4- to 5-day stay in Chicago. 345 Ray. I have no particular reason. L always did like Quincy, 111. I have lived tliere quite a bit, and I did intend to see my aunt, but I didn't. Many people I know had since died, since I have been in prison. I think the only person I really knew, and I think probably saw me, and I talked to him several times, was a bar ownernamed Ted Crowley.-^ Other than that I can't think of anyone that knew me. I know I inquired about sev- eral people and they had died. Congressman Fithian. Here is my problem just in terms of logic. You were in the Chicago area and you decided to quit your job and you have already decided much earlier you are going to Canada, according to what you just told me, and then you quit your job and you go down 280 miles southwest to Quincy and spend 12 days there ? Ray. Yes, sir. Congressman Fithian. You go back to the Chicago area. Then on the very eve of your departure for Montreal, you make a tiip all the way down to the St. Louis area. I am hav- ing a little trouble with that just as a normal flow of move- ment. Could you help me out on that? Ray. No. That may have been a little illogical. I don't know. Of course I had been in jail 6 years. Sometimes you do things that are not exactly logical. (i()4) :i! 4: * * ^ Hfi 4^ Congressman Fithian. Did you then see your relatives in the East St. Louis area? Ray. No, I didn't. (i^5) ******* (^Congressman Fithiax. So anyway your testimony to the committee is after you decided to go to Canada, you traveled the opposite direction to St. Louis, East St. Louis, for about 300 miles, in order to visit relatives, but you didn't visit your relatives? Is that your testimony ? Ray. Well, I visited a close friend down tliere named Jack Gawron.-^ Knew him on the street. He knew all my relatives and I sent a message via him. I don't know if he delivered it or not.(i6'6') The committee found Ray's explanation for his trip to St. Louis in July 1967 inadequate. His presence in the vicinity of Alton at the time of the bank robbery was highly incriminating, albeit circumstantially, of his participation in the robbery. John Ray, of course, acknowledged that he was a St. Louis resident in July 1967; (76*7) Jerry was employed at the Sportsman's Club out- side Chicago. The Alton bank robbery occurred on a Thursday, which, according to Jerry, was his day off. {108) Assuming Jerry's recollec- ts In a sworn deposition, Ted Crowley stated that he knew James Earl Ray as a customer of his establishment — the Gem Tavern — in Quincy. He emphatically denied seeing Ray after his April 1! 67 escape from Missouri St te l'eir"tpi,tiarv. ( iO.i ) of -»the Gawron, Alton now bankdeceased, robbery. was He interviewed stated that by the FBI James Earl during the involved Rav was Bureau's in investigation the crime. Subsequent investigation by the FBI, however, undermined Gawron's credibility The com- cluBions mittee, on the therefore, did robbery. Alton not rely on Gawron's statements to the FBI in reaching its con- 346 tion in testimony to the committee was correct, his presence in Alton could not be discounted.-^" ]More important than familiarity with Alton and physical where- abouts, however, was the evidence bearing on the financial condition of James and John Ray during the period of the Alton bank robbery. At the time of his prison escape, Ray, according to his testimony, had about $250. {110) He got a job at the Indian Trails Restaurant in AVin- netka. 111., earning about $85 a week, so by the time he quit — on June 24, 1967 (/;/)— he had netted $664.34, giving him a total cash accumu- lation of about $915. During the same period, however, Ray purchased a 1959 Chrysler for $200. (//^) Although he apparently lived frugally, his living ex- penses placed a constant drain on his limited financial resources. Dur- ing the first week of July, in fact, Ray drove approximately .300 miles from Quincy. 111., to Chicago (77.?) to pick up his last paycheck of $77.53. His conduct was not that of a man of substantial means. In late July, Ray's pattern of frugality abruptly changed signif- icantlv. On Julv 14, the day after the Alton bank robbery, he bought a 1932 Plymouth for $210 at a dealership in East St. Louis, Ill.,(774) having sold his Chrysler for $45. He then drove to Montreal, where he placed a $150 deposit on an apartment on July 18 and bought $250 worth of clothes on July 19.(775) On July 30, he began a 1-week vaca- tion at Grav Rocks, a resort north of Montreal ; his bill came to %200S^{11G) Ray clearly had come into a substantial amount of money by mid- July, and it was evident that he received this income sometime after the first week in July, when he drove 300 miles from Quincy to Chicago to get a $77.53 paycheck. The Alton bank robbery, coming the day before his extensive spend- ing began, could have explained his new-found wealth. Ray, however, gave the committee a different story. He said he departed for Canada with $260 or $270,(777) and after 2 days in Montreal, he had almost exhausted his cash reserve — for food and lodging on the road, for the deposit on his apartment and for two visits to a $25 prostitute. (775) Ray's solution was to rob a Montreal brothel : That evening I returned to the aforementioned nightclub and, meeting the same girl, again accompanied her via taxi to her apartment. Inside her apartment I gave her another $25, but this time showed her the pistol Mr. Gawron had purchased for me, and told her I would go with her to wher- ever agersheintowas taking the opening the office money.I put "Wlientheshepistol aroused on the him. man- We moved back into the office wherein I asked him for the money. Taking out his wallet, lie offered me the small amount in it, approximately $5 or $10. "When I told him I wanted ^ In tpstimony beforp the committee. Jerry Ray was certain that his day off fell on Thursday. His recollection, however, was contradicted by his own lfl68 interview with the FBI. as well as the litOH st>tements of two ofTuials of tlie Snortsnians Cliih — all of wliich dpsifrnated Tiipsdav. not Thursday, as liis day off. f/0.9) The committee found the IftfiS statements more rpMa^'lp n-'P to thp dpstriiction of his cmploympnt records, however, th<» Iss'ie conld not be firmlv resolved. « See MLK exhibit F-362 (diagram of Ray's financial transactions during his fugitive period) V, HSCA-MLK hearings. 664. 347 the rest of the money he spoke about a cabinet nearby, and motioned to a container. Before leaving the office I had the manager lie on a bed and the girl remove her stockings and tie his hands and legs. I then had her get under the bed before departing. Later I found I had taken approximately $1,700 in mixed currency from the manager's office. (119) The committee's investigation of the story, tracing it back to its origin, revealed several problems. First, Huie had written in "He Slew the Dreamer" that Kay had told him initially of an $800 whorehouse robbery, then changed it to a $1,700 holdup of a Montreal food store. (120) ^^ In addition, Jerry Ray was reported to have told McMil- lan, the author, that James had fabricated the brothel robbery story. (7^i) Ray's story, moreover, was one that could not be easily confirmed or denied, since the manager of a brothel was not the type to report a robbery to police or cooperate with a congressional com- mittee.^^ Ray agreed on this point during his public testimony : Congressman Fithian. Mr. Ray, from your experience would you expect the owner of an illegal house of prostitu- tion to report a robbery like this to the police ? Ray. No * * * I would think usually prostitution and gam- bling houses take care of their own legal problems, (i^^) James Earl Ray was an experienced criminal, with an ability, evi- denced byhis April 1967 escape from Missouri State Penitentiary, to plan and execute criminal operations with some degree of sophistica- tion. Moreover, his decision to travel to Canada was not precipitous. It was a course of action he had apparently settled on while still in prison. The committee found it difficult to believe, therefore, that Ray lingered in the United States for 21/^ months, traveled to a strange city in Canada in a destitute condition, and then committed an armed robbery of a brothel manager. A more sensible course of action would have been for him to escape from prison, make contact with John in St. Louis, and take employment at some distant point while a suitable crime could be planned. After the crime, he would flee to Canada, M'here he could live undetected and supported by the proceeds of the crime. The committee found that Ray's financial transactions in July 1967 strongly pointed to his receipt of unexplained income — probably from crime — and that the Alton bank robbery was the most likely source. An examination of John Ray's travels and financial condition in 1967 was similarly revealing. His employment histoiy in the 1960's was sporadic. He held a variety of jobs and spent at least one period on collecting unemployment insurance. In 1967, while living in St. Louis, he was not a salaried employee, although in interviews with the FBI and the committee, he said he had worked as a painter. None- theless, John went to San Francisco in July 1967 Avith $3,000 in cash, (7^?) his stated purpose being to purchase a taveni in California or in Reno, Nev.(7^^) Mrs. Charles F. Terry, manager of an apart- 32 Ray's Arthur explanation Hanes, to the Sr., a phony committee story as a test,was that they fearing he fed were Hiiie and information leaking his first attorney, he gave them to the authorities (Ray testimony, I, HSCA-MLK hearings, 163). '"In fact, the committee was unable to locate the manager or the brothel. 348 ment on Sutter Street in San Francisco, told FBI ae^ents that he had resided in her building between July 23. 1967 (10 days after the Alton bank robbery) to August 15, 1967.(7^5) In testimony before the committee, John Ray conceded he made the trip to California with approximately $3,000 in his possession and that he intended to purchase a tavern. John claimed, however, that the money constituted "savings" and not proceeds from the Alton bank vohhery. (126) In light of John Ray's work history, the committee was highly skeptical of his claim tohave set aside $3,000 in "savings." His posses- sion of this sizable sum, together with his decision to leave the St. Louis area almost sinuiltaneously with James' trip north to Canada, provided additional circumstantial evidence of his participation in the Alton bank robbery and of a common plan by both Ray brothers to leave the St. Louis area immediately following the robbery. (1) Bank rohhery modus operandi analysis. — The committee also examined the conduct of the Ray brothers subsequent to the Alton bank robbery. It found volvement in five strong evidence bank robberies in 1969indicating and 1970 John Ray's the for which in- modus operandi (i^7) was substantially similar to that of the Alton bank robber}-.^* The evidence surrounding these robberies demonstrated several points. It undermines John's credibility, since he denied participation in each of them; it shows his character as a bank robber; and it demonstrates subsequent criminal activity by John that is similar to and consistent with his involvement in the Alton robbery. The committee obtained the following information on the bank robberies from FBI files and through its own investigation : At 10 :45 a.m. on October 17, 1969, the Farmers Bank of Liberty, 111., was robbed of $10,995 by two men wearing stockinor masks and hats, one carrying a shotgim, the other a revolver. The one with the shotgim stood guard, while his accomplice collected the money from behind the counter. The stocking masks and an automobile were abandoned near the crime scene after an attempt to burn them. (7^5) John Ray's involvement in the robbery of the Bank of Liberty, 111., was established through the sworn testimony of his accomplice, James Rogers, before the committee. (i^,9) AVhen confronted with this evidence, John Ray denied involvement in the robbery.^^ At 1 :05 p.m. on January 28, 1970, the Farmers & Traders State Bank of Meredosia, 111., was robbed of $5,038 by two men wearing stocking masks and hats, one carrying a sawed-off shotgun, the other a revolver. The one with the shotgun stood guard, while his accomplice collected the money from behind the conntei-. The stocking masks and cloth- ing were left in a wooded area. (7.^7) John Ray's involvement in this bank robbery was established through the sworn testimony of James Rogers, (7.?^) an accomplice, and by the unsworn statement of Ronald Goldenstein, a second accomplice during an interview with corn- s'Whiie James was In prison during the 1960-70 period and conld not have participated in the five bank rohheries, the committee did obtain proof that he committed a bank robbery in I,ondon shortly before his arrest on June 8, 1968. •^ John Ka" as-prtcrt tiiat since Jimies T'otrers va« on Federal paro'e at the time of his testimony before the committee, he probably would testify to anything. (i30) iiiittee investigators. (i5.5) Nevertheless, ,Tohn Ray denied involvement in the robbery. {ISJi) At 1 p.m. on June 11, 1970, the Laddonia State Bank of Laddonia, Mo., was robbed of $18,975 by two men wearing stocking masks and hats, one carrying a sawed-off shotgun, the other a revolver. The one with the shotgun stood guard, while his accomplice collected the money from behind the counter. The stocking masks and an auto- mobile were abandoned near the crime scene, and an attempt was ijiade to burn {\\^m..{135) John Ray's involvement in the robbery was established by the sworn testimony of two accomplices, James Rogers and Clarence Haynes.(i5^) Haynes was convicted of the robbery. John Rav, nevertheless, denied involvement in the robbery, (/^f 7) At 2 p.m. on July 29, 1970, the Bank of Hawthorne, Fla., was robbed of $4,514 by two men wearing stocking masks and hats, ea«h carrying a revolver. One of the men stood guard, while his accom- plice collected the money from a vault. The stocking masks were dis- carded following the robbery. (7r?5) John Ray's involvement in the crime was established by the sworn testimony of James Rogers, (ilM){).{I(J2) Kay then went to Bir- mingham. Ala. A week later, Raoul also arrived in that city. Raoul funtled the purchase of a $2,000 19(56 :\Iustang and gave Ray $500 for "living expenses'' and another $500 for camera equipment. (/fo') On August 30, Raoul departed, instructing Ray to "lay low'' and promis- ing to contact him later to discuss "the business at hand and the matter of travel documents.'' (/6'4) Between August 21, 1967, and August 30, 1967, then, Ray claimed to have received $4,500 from Raoul. Ray's purchase of a $2,000 car in Birmingham on August 30, 1967, was establislied independently; clearly he then had a substantial amount of money. His rental of a saiPe deposit box on August 28, 19^7. (16')) indicated, however, that ho had that money before the al- leged arrival of Raoul, since Rav, in public hearing tostimonv, said he did not mo:>t Raoul until that evening at the Starlite Ct\h\(Wfi) The committeo found it significant, therefore, that both James and Jerry Ray admitted meeting in Chicago between Ray's departure from Canada and his arrival in Birmingham several davs later. (/^z) Ray's Raoul fabrication, by which ho tried to explain his receipt of at least $4,500, embraced a known and uncontrovertod meeting with Jerry Ray. The committee believed, based on Ray's meeting with Jeriy on August 22, 1967 — followed by his rental of a safe dejiosit box on August 28. 1967, and his purchase of an expensive automobile on August 30, 1967 — that Ray received substantial amounts of money, not fr^m Raoul, but from Jerry. Further, the committee believed the most likely source of this money was the Alton bank robbery. Ray also claimed to have met with Raoul during his December 1967 visit to New Oi'leans.-'" According to Ray, an associate of Raoul told him by telephone in early December to travel from Los Angeles to New Orleans hi tor in the month to meet with Raoul. Ray said he made the trip with Charles Stein, met Raoul at the Le Bunny Lounge, dis- cus ed a gunrunning scheme planned for early May, and received $500 because he Avas "low on funds.'' (/^^) In addition to hearing Ray's account, the committee examined evi- dence supplied bv Mark O. Freeman, a clinical phychologist in Los Angeles whom Ray consulted in Xovember and December 1967, Dr. Freeman's records indicated that Ray's last appointment was at 10 a.m. on Docembor 14. the dav before ho departed for Xow Orleans. In an FBI interview. Dr. Freeman told '^>f a telephone call from Ray subse- quent to that appointment. The FBI report stated : The doctor recalled that Rav had telephone [sicl him at the office, after making the appointment for December 18, and *o A dptailed examination of the New Orleans trio appears In a staff report entitled "An Analysis of James Earl Ray's Trip to New Orleans. December 15-Deeember 21, 1967," XIII HSCA-MLK hearings 265. 358 told him he would be unable to come to the office for the ap- pointment ashe had received information from his brother, that the latter had "found a job for him in the Merchant Marine in New Orleans, La." The doctor is not sure of the date or time that Ray telephone [sic] to cancel his last ap- pointmebut nt ; feels sure that it was sometime after their 10 a.m. appointment on December 14 * * *.{169) Dr. Freeman's statement, together with his appointment records, provided clear evidence that Ray's trip to New Orleans was more impulsive than his Raoul story indicated and that Ray planned to meet a brother in New Orleans. This inference was strengthened by the statements of Sharon Rhodes, a Los Angeles dance school instruc- tor, both in her initial FBI interview (i/r^) and in a statement to the committee. (i7i) In the F'BI interview, she recalled a discussion with Ray following his New Orleans trip : She believes he was a southerner, and she recalled that pos- sibly the first or second week during January 1968, he did not attend dancing instruction, and upon his return, stated that he had visited a brother in the State of Louisiana. (i7^) In addition to the separate witness statements indicating Ray met with a brother in New Orleans, the committee obtained convincing evidence that he, in fact, received money on the trip. On the day of his return to Los Angeles, December '21, Ray paid $865, the balance of what he owed on the 50-hour dance course. Under his original agree- ment with the studio, he was obligated to pay only $50 a week. (i7^) James did not identify the brother in New Orleans during his con- versations with the California witnesses. The committee found it likely that Ray at least met with Jerry in New Orleans. Jerry was still employed admitted toatthethecommittee Sportsman's Club that he wentintoChicago St. Louis atfortheChristmas time, butthat he year.(i74) St. Louis and New Orleans are only 675 miles apart, so it was at least reasonably possible for Jerry and James to have met. Further, both James and Jerry Ray conceded to the committee that they talked by telephone during James' drive from Los Angeles to New Orleans. The committee was unable, however, to rule out the possibility that it was John Ray — then an unemployed painter living in St. Louis — who traveled to New Orleans to meet James. The com- mittee was also unable to determine fully the purpose of the New Orleans meeting. If, in fact, it was to receive only $500, that would not seem to justify the risks Ray took in driving several thousand miles on the open highway.*' The committee notecl that the assassination occurred '6^2 months after the New Orleans trip. While the possibility of a connection between the trip and the murder of Dr. King existed, the committee uncovered no direct evidence to that effect.*^ " A random vehicle check might well have resulted in his identification as an escapee from the Missouri State Penitentiary. ^- Two circumstances surrounding the New Orleans trip did provide support for a link between the the Newscheme guurunning Orleansfor trip the and first the timemurder. in New First, in Ray's Orleans. It wasaccount, Raoul according gunrunning, proposed to Ray, that brought him and Raoul to Memphis on the day before Dr. King's assassination. Second, there was Ray's abrupt activity on behalf of the American Independent Party on the moruinc of his de'>art '•e for ^ e- ■ OT-le"-s '' " 'o "^' " '<■ p o '■ ' '-v'donoe that individuals involved in the AIP moverpent in St. Louis en'^s'^pf' in a c"n«"'rpcy that may well have been linked to the events in New Orleans and subsequently Memphis. 354 (e) The hrothcrs and the ivfe purchase The final contact with a brother that James Earl Ray tried to con- ceal with his Raoul ruse was considered by the committee to have been bv far the most significant. It occurred in Birminoham, Ala., on March 29 and 30, 1968, just days before the assassination of Dr. King, and its purpose, the committee concluded, was a transaction that sug- gested the likelihood that a brother was involved in a conspiracy in the assassination. The transaction was the purchase of the murder weapon. Ray's testimony before the committee, (i7^) corroborated by a postal change of address that he mailed in Los Angeles, (77^) established that he departed Califoniia for the Southeastern United States on March 17, 1968, approximately 'lyo weeks prior to Dr. King's assassination.'^^ On at least three occasions during the weeks inunediately prior to his departure, Ray mentioned upcoming contact with a brother. On one of these accasions, moreover, he indicated a plan to meet that brother in Birmingham. One of Ray's closest friends in Los Angeles was Marie Martin, a waitress at the Sultan Room in the St. Francis Hotel, who had a casual relationship with him over a period of several months. In an interview with the FBI on May l-t, 1968, she reported that Ray, using the Gait alias, asked in late February if he could leave some barbells at her apartment. Martin * * * told Gait to leave the weights outside of the door [to her apartment]. Gait called her later the same day on the phone and she asked him for some money for taking care of the weights. Gait claimed he was broke, but said he would leave her ten dollars * * * Gait claimed he was wait- ing for some money from his brother. (777) In testimony to the committee, Martin repeated hei- recollection that Gait received money by mail from a brother : I took it for granted it was on a regular basis because it seemed every now and then he was waiting for an envelope. He asked me, "When vou pass the lobby, will you check my box?"(77<9) Martin's testimony provided the first indication of contact between Ray and a brother during a pei-iod proximate to the assassination. On March 2. during graduation ceremonies nt a bartending school Ray had attended in California, he Avas asked by the directoi- of the school. heardTomas I^au. bv Richard what he another (lonzalez. plannedstudent to do. atRav's response the school, and was over- reported to the FBI in an April 16 interview: "* * * Gait stated he was going to go to Biimingham. Ala., to visit his brother for about 2 weeks." (77.9) In a public hearing in August 1978, Ray told the com- mittee that he met Raoul in Bii-mingham on March 28, exactly 3 weeks after he reportedly made the statement to Lau.(7^^) Six days there- ♦"The committee received c'dence that Ray went throneh St. Louis on his way east. The source of the evidence Walter Rife, also said that Ray told him he "had a deal d(w-n there about some stuff to po into Cuba," conceivably a reference to the K'lnrnnnlnK onerafion. Riy never nfentioned a trin to St. Louis In addition, the committee found no evidence to corroborate the existence of a ^nrunning operation. (See Section II A). 355 after, he and Raoul returned to Birmingham to purchase the rifle that was used to kill Dr. King. {ISl) On March 9, Ray talked by telephone to Tomas Lau, who reported the conversation to the FBI following the assassination : Lautionrecalls on Marchthat2, approximately 1 week after contacted 1968, Gait telephonically Gait's gradua- him [Lau] at which time Lau advised him that he had a possible job opportunity for him as a bartender. Gait advised Lau that he was leaving town within 2 Aveeks for an undisclosed location to visit his brother and did not wish to take a job at this time. (i5^) Precisely he 2 weeks met Raoul later, according in Birmingham. The torifle Ray's testimony purchase to the6 committee, followed days later. More significant than the three allusions in California to a brother, however, was Ray's reference to a brother during the rifle purchase itself. On March 29, Ray went to the Aeromarine Supply Co. and bought a .243 caliber AVinchester, using the name Harvey Lowmeyer.** He later decided to exchange the rifle for another, a transaction that was described by Donald Wood, a clerk at Aeromarine, in a signed FBI interview on April 5, 1968 : It was, as best I recall, either later that afternoon or early the following Saturday morning when tliis individual called on the telephone and stated that he had had a conversation with his brother and decided that the gun he had purchased was not the gun he wanted and he requested whether he could exchange it for a Remington model 760, .30-06 caliber. (75^) Wood stated further that when Ray came to the store on Saturday, he told him that the Winchester was a big enough gun to bring down any deer in Alabama. *'He stated in an offhand manner that he wanted the .30-06 caliber gun because he was going to use it to hunt in Wis- consin." (i(S^) Ray's version of the rifle purchase again seemed to be an effort to disguise contact with a brother through the character of Raoul. Ray stated that he and Raoul traveled to Birmingham from Atlanta and that Raoul gave him over $700 to purchase a "large deer bore rifle.'' (i5J) He bought the rifle and brought it back to the motel. Raoul disapproved of the choice and told Ray to exchange it for one chosen from a brochure. Chairman Stokes. So, then, after you purchased the second rifle, at Raoul's direction, because he told you the first rifle was not adequate Ray. Yes, he pointed out in a brochure — I had a brochure with the second rifle. Chairman Stokes. OK. He sent you back to get the second rifle and That Rat. told is youcorrect. what kind to get, didn't he ? Chairman Stokes. And you did what he told you to do? Ray. Yes, sir. * * * i made a phone call to Aeromarine "See MLK exhibit F-35 (Aeromarine receipt of rifle purchase), II, HSCA-MLK hear- ings, 39. 1+3-112 0 356 Supply and I asked them about exchanging it and they said they could do it. (i56') Ray's use of the Harvey Lowmeyer alias also corrobated the possible involvement of a brother in the rifle purchase. Kay told the connnit- tee he got the name from a friend or criminal associate in Quincy, UL{187) Ray's last known visit to Quincy, however, had been in June and July of 1967, 9 months earlier. Further, the actual Hai-vey Lohmeyer *'' told the conunittee in an interview that while he knew John Ray and Jerry Ra}' from a period of overlapping prison terms at Menard State Penitentiary in Chester, III., in the late 1950's, he did not know James Earl Ray. (iimittPe reliable evidence. noted that certainofsta'»p>"ents (See discussion l)v Foreman guilty plea, at sec. wore at variance II supra.) The with ot'ier conunittee therefore, discounted his testimony concerning Jerry Ray's involvement in the rifle purchase. 357 The coininittee reviewed Jerry Ray's extensive testimony l>efore the committee, as well as his prior statements to members of the press, FBI agents, authors and a number of private citizens, and it found his testimony self-serving and generally unworthy of belief. For example, the connnittee obtained evidence from several sources who requested confidentiality that Jerry Ray believed parts of the Raoul story were untrue, yet he continued to insist to the connnittee that such a character existed. Further, Jerry Ray admitted to the connnittee that he gave a false description of Raoul in a New York City radio interview in 1977 ; {193) that he falsely denied that James ever mentioned Dr. King in their conversations during prison visits over the 10 years following the assassination ;(i54) and that he falsely claimed his brother was not a beer drinker.*' (7^6^) Jerry also admitted to the committee that he supplied McMillan, the author, with bank records he had falsi- fied. (7^') Finally, during his testimony, Jerry told the committee that he had located the Mississippi motel where James had stayed during a drive from Birmingham to Memphis that James claimed he made after the rifle purchase. Jerry added that he had talked to individuals who indi- cated that the FBI had destroyed the motel records that reflected this stay. When the committee investigated his charge, however, it found the motel records still intact ** and Jerry Ray's testimony an inten- tional distortion of the truth. (757) The committee found Jerry Ray's public hearing testimony, includ- ing his denial of involvement in the Birmingham rifle purchase, un- worthy ofbelief.*^ The connnittee was at pains to make a careful assessment of the evidence bearing on the rifle purchase. Xo less than four separate witnesses — Marie Martin, Richard Gonzalez, Tomas Lau, and Donald Wood — in separate interviews with authorities shortly after the assassination, provided evidence of Ray's receipt of money from, or contact with, a brother during the month preceding the rifle purchase. Wood's itself. testimony tied that brother directly into the rifle purchase Both Jerry and James asserted that James' reference to a brother was meant to conceal his involvement with Raoul. (i^^") The com- mittee's investigation produced no evidence to corroborate the existence of Raoul, so the proposed explanation was worthless. The committee believed that Ray's postassassination tale of Raoul was fabricated to conceal contacts with one or both brothers. The committee was, however, unable to establish the precise whereabouts of either John or Jerry for the period of the rifle purchase. John Ray stated in executive session that he was ojx'rating the Grapevine Tavern in St. Louis at the time,(i,95) and the committee while unwilling to credit John Ray's unsupported testimony, received no evidence that contra- "The committee believed Jerry lied on this matter to support James' allegation that beer cans with Ray's fingerprints found in the bundle of evidence had been "planted" by authorities. *8The records did uot, in fact, reflect Ray's stay at the motel. *° Authors Huie and McMillan had each alleged that Jerry Ray claimed to have re- ceived a telephone call from James the night before the assas'^ination in which James predicted that the "big nigger has had it." A discussion of this evidence is contained in a staff report entitled "Supplemental Studies Pertaining to the Motive of James Earl Ray," XIII HSCA-MLK hearings, par. 64. 358 dieted his assertion. Jerry Ray's working records were destroyed approximately G months before the conunittee contacted his employer, the Sportsman's Club near Chica The informant contact rcnort had not been disseminated bv the St. Louis FBI field office, so there had been no official investiuation of the information it contained. The VBl conducted intervifws in 107S with the two former special apents, since retired, who had handled the informant. It was determined that the failure to follow up on the information resulted from Inadvertence on the part of the agents who stated, in retrospect, that thev should have acted on the lead. The current leadershin of the P.ureau is to he commended for creating a climate within the Bureau where an Informant renort of this character could be forwarded to a congressional commiUce rather than ignored or destroved. 55 The committee subiii'iiafd B.MiIah KaulTmann. the widow of John Kauffmann. to apiiear in executive session. Hii liirht of her conviction <.n drig chav<'es in ]"fi7. Mr^. KaulTmann's testimony was regarded with some skepticism by the committee.) She confirmed that her late husband and Sutherland had been business associates and Wallace supporters. She also recalled that KaufTmann had taken Byers to Sutherland's homo on one occasion but that Sutherland was not home. (2/7) 361 To determine if Byers' story was credible, the committee initiated a full-scale investigation of Byers, Kauffmann, and Sutherland. Dozens of associates of each were interviewed or deposed, and several were called to testify in executive session. In addition, files of local. State and Federal agencies were reviewed. Although the investigation was hampered by the death of many of (lie principals, the conmiittee uncovered enough evidence to be con- vinced that the Byers allegation was essentially tnithful. There was in existence, in 1966 or 1967, a St. Louis conspiracy actively soliciting the assassination of Dr. King. The connnittee found that Byers was a log- ical target for solicitation in such a conspiracy, even though he testi- fied that he did not know why Kauffmann would have approached him. (218) The committee learned that Byers had a reputation, at the time of the offer, for associating with people known to have a propensity for violence. More specifically, his brother-in-law, John Paul Spica, had been convicted of the contract murder of a St. Louis businessman. (210) Kauffmann and Sutherland could well have been led to believe, the connnittee reasoned, that while Byers might not have been willing to undertake the murder himself, he could have established contact with people willing to accept the offer. Xevertholess, the committee sought further corroboration for Byers' account, realizing that his criminal record raised substantial doubts concerning his credibility. (^^6^) In addition, questions were raised by his failure to approach authorities with his information in 1968, Byers himself explained that he had not wanted to get involved in any way or attract a'^tention to his criminal activities. (^^7) He did say, how- ever, that he told two St. Louis attorneys, Lawrence Weenick ^^ and Murray Randall, about his meeting with Kauffmann and Sutherland. According to Byers, Weenick was told in 1974. Byers had two conver- sations with Randall, one in 1968 and the other in 1974.(222) Byers waived his attorney-client privilege with Weenick and Ran- dall, and they were interviewed by the committee. (^^-5) Their accounts to staff counsel and committee investigators essentially supported the testimony Byers had given in executive session. The two attorneys were then subpenaed to appear at a committee public hearing. Weenick testi- fied that in 1974 or 1975, while he was representing Byers in several civil matters, Byers told him he had been offered $50,000 by Kauffmann and Sutherland to murder Dr. Martin Luther King and that Byers gave him the impression that, while the offer was seriously made, he (Byers) never took it seriously. Weenick was pressed by the committee on his assessment of Byers' credibility. He replied : * * * Byers had absolutely no reason to tell me this at the time he told it to me, or any other time. Whether he made it up or not, I don't know. There was — there seems to be no credible reason why he would have made it up and told it to me and to Mr. Randall, and evidently to this other person who was an FBI informant. * * * * * * I can't say for certain that he is not lying, but I cer- tainly don't know what his motive would be for doing so. (224-) When Randall, who had since become a judge in the Court of Crimi- nal Corrections in St. Louis, learned he might be subpenaed to tes- 50 Weenick also represented Kauffmann in his 1967 drug case. 362 tify before the committee in public session, he attempted to avoid an appearance, arsruins: that his testimony would be of no vahie and expressing concern over tlie effect the publicity could have on his reelection to the bench. He complained to staff counsel. (^^.5) com- mittee investigators. C^^^) the chairman of the committee, (^^7) and another Member of Cono^ress. To support his position about the value of his testimony, he raised — for the first time with the committee — doubts he said he had about Byers' credibility. He offered the specula- tion that Byers might have concocted the story in 1973 and told it to a person he suspected of being an FBI informant to test his suspicion. According to Randall's theory, if the FBI subsequently contacted Byers about the King assassination, he would have his suspicions about the informant confirmed. (^^5) Nev^ertheless, Randall was called to testify, as was Weenick, at a public hearing on November 29. 1978. (^£9) He said he first met Byers in 1967 when Byers pled guilty to a stolen car charge. He next saw him when he assist^'d him in incorporating a business in 1968. He then stated to the committee that he had run into Byers at the courthouse in 1974. shortly before he left private practice to take the bench. Byers asked his advice on the procedures for claiming immunity in a grand jury investigation, saying he thought he might be questioned by Fed- eral authorities about his knowledge of a plot to assassinate Dr. King. Byers then told Randall a story that reflected in essential details Byers' testimony before the committee and the story Byers told Ween- ick. During his committee testimony. Randall said he did not remem- ber that Byers had told him of the King offer prior to the 1974 meet- m^.(230)^'' In response to questioning. Randall also repeated his spec- ulation about Byers and the informant, conceding it was only "specu- lation. ** * "my belief and opinion." (^J7) The committee accepted the basic outlines of Judge Randall's testi- mony. Indeed, he added valuable detail to the stoiy told by Byers. As such, his testimony contributed to the work of the committee. Never- theless, the committee found that Judge Randall's memory that only one conversation took place was in error. The committee also rejected Randall's speculation about Byers' possible effort to unmask an FBI informant. It believed that the theory was offered to undermine the witness' own testimony in order to discourage the committee from compelling his public appearance. ^^ In addition, the committee found Randall's speculation about layers' stoi-y to be implausible. Byers was a relatively sophisticated and experienced criminal, and he would have known such a ploy would not work. It would only have served to ex- pose him to an FBI investisration that he, with a long history of dealing in stolen property, Avould have wanted to avoid. The very significance of his information would have subjected him to increased scrutiny. The committee's chief investigator testified that , based on his ex- perience, Byers' more likely course of action would have been to dis- '"Dnrinc an par'ipr convprsatlon with tlio commUtoe, Randall rpcalled a 1968 meet- ing with Byers dnrinjj which Bvers'toVl him that some nrominent neon'e were Involved In Dr. Kinp's murder. Bvers also recalled a 1968 discussion with Randall ahout the offer for the assassination of Dr. King. ^ Jiidpe Randall's theory was undermined hy tlie likelihood of a 1968 conversation about the offer as well as hy tlie statement of a St. I,o"is police detective who told the co>'i- mittee that a St. Lonis Pf)st-Dispatch reporter had been lookinjr into a rumor in 1971 or 1972 o' Byers' invol'ement with a patent nttompv in t'-e Kini' pssassinafion. (2.?.? ) The committee was unable to contact the reporter, who had died in 1974. 363 continue dealing with the suspected informant. (^5^) Moreover, it was considered highly unlikely that the FBI would have approached Byers in such a way, since this would have risked makino; Byers aware of the role of the informant. The committee agreed with Weenick's testimony that Byers had no motive to lie about the offer. Unlike many sources of King death threats, who have fabricated information for publicity, Byers' conduct since 1967 has demonstrated a consistent unwillingness to get involved in the investigation of the King assassination. He did not volunteer his information to the committee; he refused to cooperate until he was subpenaed and granted immunity. The committee's conclusion that Byers' testimony of a serious con- spiracy tokill Dr. King in the St. Louis area was essentially truthful was independently substantiated by the sworn testimony of an unpaid informant for the Jefferson County, Mo., sherift''s office in 1967 and 1968. This witness spent 3 years thereafter with a State police agency. He requested anonymity, since he was concerned that his failure to take more vigorous action in 1968 with the information might damage his reputation, destroy his marriage and injure his career in private industry.^^ The committee decided, based on these considerations and a judgment that the witness w^as candid and forthcoming, to grant his request for anonymity and refer to him in this report as witness K.{234) As a sheriff's office informant, witness A spent much time at the Buff Acres, the motel operated by Kauffmann in Imperial, Mo. He had been asked to investigate numerous individuals who frequented the motel. He testified that Kauft'mann was accepting stolen property in exchange for room rent, running a prostitution ring out of the motel and dealing in drugs. He then recounted conversation he had heard at the motel regarding a standing offer to murder Dr. King : * * * there was a frequent remark whenever any more than two of the members got together, if they were hard up for money, somebodv would say, "Well, we can always make $20,000 or $30,000 for killing Martin Luther King,"' or, on another occasion, and quite frequently, "We can always make $20,000 or $30,000 if we kill the big nigger for John.'" Asked who John was, witness A replied, "John Kauffmann." (^55) The committee found certain elements of the Sutherland/Kauffmann conspiracy particularly interesting. First, it provided a source of funds that could explain the involvement of a financially motivated criminal such as Ray. The committee had noted that if in fact the Alton bank robbery involved three people — as circumstances seemed to indicate — James' expenditures in his fugitive period would have almost com- pletely exhausted his share of $9,077 by the time of the assassina- tion. (^.5(?) Even if a two-way split were assumed, his funds Avould have been substantially depleted. In either case, he would have been interested in a new source of income at about the time of the assassination. s» He stated that he frave the information to two officers he worked with but pursued it no further. When interviewed by the committee. Lt. Wally Ganzman i-aid he could not •"call the incident, but he did not deny that it occurred. The second officer had since died. 364 Second, the Sutlierland-Kaiitfinann conspiracy was located in the St. Louis area. Tlie principals lived there, and the oilers were made there — both Sutherland's olfer to Byers and the standing offer at Kauffmann's motel. James Earl Ray visited St. Louis at least twice during his fugitive period, and his brother John was a permanent resident. Given the circulation of the offer among the area's criminal elements, at least at the Buff" Acres Motel, it seemed entirely possible that word of the offer might reach the Ray family. (b) The backgrounds of Kauffmann ami Sutherlaml John Kauffmann was born April 7, 1904, and died April 1, 1974. (^J7) He was a lifelong St. Louis resident, involved in a variety of business activities, including the manufacture of gliders and real estate development. From the early 1960's to his death, he owned and resided at the Buff Acres Motel in Barnhardt, Mo. His widow, Beulah, still lived there in 1978. Kauffmann's criminal record (^Jt?) disclosed that he was arrested and convicted for the manufacture and sale of amphetamines in 1967.*"' The committee reviewed the files of the Federal drug case that led to Kauff- mann's arrest and conviction. {239) They revealed he had been operat- ing a legitimate drug company that marketed a cough mixture called Fixaco. Through the company, he was ordering amphetamine sulfate powder in bulk and making amphetamine pills from the powder. Kauffmann sold an estimated 1 million pills illegally to undercover Federal agents in 1967. Testimony given at Kauffmann's narcotics trial revealed a link be- tween his illegal drug operation and the Missouri State Penitentiary where James Earl Ray was incarcerated until his escape in April of 1967. (^46>) A Federaf informant indicated that some of the illegal contraband was delivered to the prison by one of Kauffmann's accom- plices. During an interview with the connnittee, one of Kauff- mann's codefendants disclosed that Kauffmann had arranged for an additional delivery to the Missouri State Penitentiary on the day of his arrest. (£4/) Kauffmann's crimes of violence. criminal record the Nevertheless, did committee not reflect learned a conviction for any that a Federal narcotics agent was ambushed and shot just after talking to an in- formant about Kauffmann. This incident occurred shortly after Kauff- mann's arrest, but following disclosure that the victim was a Federal airent who had worked undercover on the Kauffmann case.(^^^) Kauffmann also once told an undercover agent he had threatened a person who owed him money in order to scare him. {2^3) In addition, while the committee was unable to obtain information that would provide substantial details on Kauffmann's political atti- tudes, itdid establish that he was associated with John Sutherland in efforts to establish an American Party chapter in the St. Louis area in 1967-68. The American Party supported the candidacy of Governor George Wallace of Alabama. Examination of numerous American Party petitions filed with the Mis.-ouri Secretary of S'^ate for the 1968 Presidential election showed Kauffmann's signature as eithei- cii'culat- ing officer or as notary public. (£fO «• Kauffmann was free on an appeal bond at the time of Dr. King's assassination. 365 John Sutherland, a descendant of early colonists, was born in Charlottesville, Va., October 19, 1905. He died in 1970,(245) He was a 1926 graduate of Virginia Military Institute, with a degree in electrical engineering ; he received a bachelor of laws degree from City College of Law and Finance, St. Louis, 1931, and a master of laws degree from Benton College of Law. He held a commission in the U.S. Army Re- serve from 1926 to 1936, though he apparently never served on active duty. He was married in 1930 to Anna Lee of Atlanta." (^4^) Sutherland practiced patent law in St. Louis. He was a lifelong resident of the St. Louis area and had no criminal record. A number of associates of Sutherland were interviewed by the com- mittee. One characterized him as a "die-hard southerner" who "never let the Civil War die."(^47) Others described him as a "strong Wal- lace supporter," anti-Black, an "outspoken conservative," and opposed to civil rights, integration, and the Supreme Court. (^4^) There were several associates, however, who said that they could not conceive of Sutherland's involvement in an assassination plot. Sutherland belonged to a number of social and professional organi- zations, and he was active politically throughout his adult life. A segregationist or anticivil rights strain was apparent in many of these organizations. For example, information obtained from FBI St. Louis field office files indicated that Sutherland was the founder and chair- man of the steering committee of the first St. Louis Citizens' Council in 1964. (^^) The local group had ties to a parent organization in the deep South with stated principles of "States rights" and "racial in- Available tegrity." (^5^) information indicated that Sutherland withdrew from an active leadership role in the citizens' council after the first year of its existence. (^5i ) Gordon Baum, the field director of the St. Louis organization in 1978, stated during a committee inter\dew that, to his knowledge, Sutherland had ceased formal ties with the citizens coun- cil prior to 1967. (252) Other members, however, indicated that Suther- land's name was well known in citizens' council activities and that he had served as an adviser on the group's activities until his death in 1970.(253) Sutherland was associated with a second organization of interest to the committee, the Southern States Industrial Council (SSIC), head- quartered inTennessee. The SSIC was an organization of businessmen and industrial leaders, and its policies as of 1967 reflected opposition to the civil rights movement and a suspicion of Communist infiltration of the "Negro director of themovement."' association(^-54 and) Sutherland served asofa its was an associate regional 1968 president, Theodore Sensing. (^-55) The committee's examination of the council developed evidence that some of its members were unsympathetic to Dr. King. Sensing, for example, addressed the Daughters of the American Revolution in Washington on April 15, "1 John Sutherland's widow, Anna Lee Sutherland, confirmed in a committee interview that her husband had been extremely outspoken in his racial views and strongly anti-Black. She al>o confirmed including that her a Confederate flag. husband's den wasthat She volunteered decorated with had Sutherland Confederate paraphernalia, been an active member of the Southern States Industrial Council and at one time had inquired into possible membership in the National Siates Rights Party. Mrs. Sutherland said John Kauffmann had not been a close associate of her husband, and she disclaimed any knowledge of an offer to kill Dr. King or a discussion of such an offer. 366 1968, less than 2 weeks after the King a.ssassination. While Sensing called it a '"senseless, tragic crime'' and recommended that the killer "... be apprehended if possible, and brought to trial for nis crime,-' he also used the occasion to criticize Dr. King and those associated with him. He stated at one point, "It is not too nnich to say, in fact, that Martin Luther King, Jr., brought this crime upon himself." Holding Dr. King to account for his attitude toward civil disol^edience. Sensing speculated that the assassin, ". . . may well have said to himself, 'I think Martin Luther King should be killed. I realize there is a law against murder, but in this case, I think the law was unjust.' "(^5^) While this speech did not, of course, provide any evidence of complicity by members of SSIC in the assassination, it did give an indication of the political persuasion of Sutherland's associates. The committee was unable to identify the secret southern organiza- tion to which Sutherland referred as the source of payment when he allegedly made the offer to Byers. It did, however, establish that he belonged to at least two organizations with extreme segregationist leanings,^- Sutherland and it developed evidence of pronounced racial bias in himself. A committee investigation of Sutherland's financial condition re- vealed that he left an estate valued at more than $300,000.(^55) Based on this background investigation, the committee concluded that the two principals, Sutherland and Kautfmann, met the criteria for being serious conspirators : They had the motive, i.e., Sutherland's avowed social and po- litical attitudes, and Kauffmann's readiness to earn money legally or illegally ; They had the monetary means, either from Sutherland's own funds or from associates ; and They actively sought the opportunity to carry out a plot, as evidenced at least by their solicitation of Byers, (nil)frship restrictPil to Caucasians. It was the target of protest by St. Louis civil rights organizations for its restricted membership T)olicies. ( ^-IT ) <" Of the four connectives considered, the committee deemed the first three to be possible but less likely, while the fourth was regarded as possible and more likely. Consistent witli Its duty to be cautious in its evaluation of the evidence, tlie committee acknowledged that none of the four connectives could be firmly established. 367 inmates, on the other hand, indicated a much closer friendship between Spica and Ray tlian Spica admitted. (,^6'/) Spica also testified that he knew nothing of the offer to Byers by Sutherland and Kauffmann.(^^^) Byers testified during public hearings that he visited Spica regu- larly "^ until his conviction, in December 1967, on a Dyer Act charge (interstate transportation of stolen automobiles). Nevertheless, he stated emphatically that he did not discuss the Sutherland-Kauffmann offer with him. (^<5J) In light of Spica's incarceration at Missouri State Penitentiary until 1973, his only potential role in the assassination might have been as a conduit of information between Byers and Ray. The committee found no evidence to contradict the denials of both Spica and Byers that the Sutherland-Kauft'mann offer was discussed prior to the assassina- tion. Finally, the connnittee believed that active planning for the assassination of Dr. King did not begin until early March 1968, a period when Ray had discussions with California associates about his plans to travel east. Thus, if Ray did receive word of the Kauff- mann-Sutherland plot while still in Missouri State Penitentiary, it would have to be assumed that Ray stored it away for later consideration. The second possible connective developed by the committee was Dr. Hugh Maxey, a medical officer at the Missouri State Penitentiary. Committee interviews with relatives and associates of John Kauff- mann indicated that Kauffman and Maxey were associated for several years, (^tf^) Mrs. Kauffniann characterized it as a purely social rela- tionship, one that lasted from the early 1960's until Kauffmann was sentTheto committee Federal prison looked forintotheother sale reasons of amphetamines. (^6'<5) for an association between Maxey and Kauffmann. It was learned, for example, that Maxey assisted Kauffmann in obtaining the services of parolees in work re- lease programs. (^^^) In addition, the committee received allegations that Maxey was involved with Kauffmann in the distribution of am- phetamines inthe prison. {267) While the existence of an amphetamine problem at the prison was confirmed, the committee found no evidence to support the charge that Maxey was involved in illegal distribution. An examination of prison records established that Maxey had con- tact with James Farl Ray at the prison and, further, that Ray pushed a food cart in the prison hospital on occasion. (^6'5) Thus, an opportu- nity for significant contact between the two existed. Maxey, who was over 80 and of failing health when he was inter- viewed by the connnittee, denied his own involvement in illegal drug distribution. He characterized his relationship with Kauffmann as social and declined to discuss the association further. Finally, Maxey stated that he had contact with James Earl Ray only as a patient. He denied any knowledge of an offer to kill Dr. King circulating at the prison during his employment there. (^^P) The committee's investigation did not substantiate a Maxey connec- tive. The committee was unable to establish firmly any criminal ac- 6* B'-ers alle(rp(1 v'-'ts to Si)ica con'd not ^f substantia tpd hy thp rommittefV inve2. ) «'' John Ray denied under oath knowing John Sutherland, John Kauflfmnnn, or Russell Byers, and he stated that he never heard or participated in conversations at the Grape- vine of an offer to fund the assassination of Dr. King. (290) 371 7. CONCLUSION The committee concluded that there was a likelihood of conspiracy in the assassination of Dr. King. To summarize, several findings were central to the committee's conspiracy conclusion. First, James Earl Ray was the assassin of Dr. King, and Raoul, as described by Ray, did not exist. In reaching these conclusions, the committee rejected the possibility that James Earl Ray was an unwitting "fall guy" manipu- lated by others. The committee found, rather, that Ray acted with full knowledge of what he was doing in the murder of Dr. King. Second, an analysis of Ray's conduct before the assassination pro- vided compelling indications of conspiracy. Ray was not, in fact, a man without significant associations. His financing, in all likelihood supplied by the Alton bank robbery in July 1967, was strong evidence of significant criminal associations with his brothers during the pre- assassination period. Further, his campaign activities in California, viewed against the background of his 1967-68 fugitive status, his apolitical nature and his consistent refusal to admit the activities, also strongly suggested leans, too, involvement was significant. with others. The abrupt nature Ray's of histrip to New from departure Or- Los Angeles, the risks he took on the road, his receipt of money during the visit and the speedy termination of his mission all indicated Ray's involvement Avith others in an important meeting with a preplanned purpose. Third, the analysis of Ray's motive was crucial to the conspiracy conclusion. After examining Ray's behavior, his character and his ra- cial attitudes, the committee found it could not concur with any of the accepted explanations for Ray as a lone assassin. Historically, Ray was a financially motivated criminal. While unsympathetic to the civil rights movement, he did not manifest the type of virulent racism that might have motivated the assassination in the absence of other factors. While the committee recognized the presence of other possible motives — racism or psychological needs — it concluded that the expecta- tion of financial gain was Ray's primary motivation. The committee's finding on motive, therefore, carried conspiratorial implications. Just as significant in the committee's ultimate conclusions on con- spiracy was the evidence bearing on the complicity of the brothers, John and Jerry Ray. Three factors, negative in character, raised the possibility of the involvement of one or both brothers. First, despite an exhaustive and far-reaching field investigation, neither the committee nor previous investigators were able to identify significant associates of the assassin other than his brothers. The possi- bility of their involvement in the assassination was necessarily in- creased bythe absence of alternatives. Second, despite an offer of assistance from the Justice Department, Ray refused to provide credible evidence on the subject of conspiracy. His self-sacrificial posture was possibly explained as an effort to pro- tect his brothers. Third, the Ray brothers consistently attempted to conceal the true scope of their preassassination contact with each other. John and James denied any contact at all. This conduct could be explained 372 by a sense of family loyalty. Xevertheless, it also raised the possibility that pieassassination contact, if revealed, would lead to implication in a conspiracy. Additional positive factors ultimately convinced the conunittee of the likelihood of the involvement of one or both brothers in the assassination. James was. of course, a fugitive from Missouri State Penitentiary. Automatically, this should have led him to limit the duration of meetinos with his brothers. Xevertheless, substantial con- tact in a variety of forms apparently persisted throughout the pre- assassination ])eriod. Much of this contact, moreover, was criminal in nature. Both John and Jerry met with and assisted James during the months immediately followino- his escape from Missouri State Peniten- tiary. In addition, John clearly had foreknowledo:e of the escape plans and provided James with an alias and social security number for immediate use. More significantly, the committee found it hig:hly likely that John and James robbed the Bank of Alton in Alton, 111., on July 13, 1967. Jerry knew of the robbery and assisted in distributing the proceeds to James throughout his fugitive travels. There was evidence of the recei])t of money by James from a brother as late as February 1968. only weeks before the assassination. Further, the com- mittee concluded that James' trip to New Orleans in December 1967 could best be understood as a meeting with one or both of his brothers, with circumstantial evidence suggesting it was Jerry Ray. The pur- pose of that meeting, beyond the transfer of funds, could not be firmly establislied. but its sinister significance was clear. Finally, there was strong circumstantial evidence of the involvement of a brother in a consulting ca])acity during Ray's purchase of the nnirder weapon itself, although the evidence was insufficient to determine the identity of the brother or the nature of the contact. Xevertheless, the evidence with respect to Ray and his brothei*s con- tained one serious flaw : by itself, it provided no convincing explanation for their combination in a i)lot on Dr. King's life. The committee did receive strong exidence of ])ronounced racist attitudes in both John and Jerry. Yet. the co'mmittee believed it unlikely that James or his bi'others would have killed Dr. King solely for racial reasons. The de- velopment of additional evidence on a ciedible St. Louis-based plot, thei-efore, became a crucial element in the committee's conspiracy analysis. The committee found that there was substantial evidence to establish th<> existence of a St. Louis-based conspiracy to finance the assassina- tion of Dr. King. A seiious effort to solicit Russell Byers was made by Joim Sutlierland and John Kaufl'mann in late 1966 or early 1967, ap- j)aiently on behalf of a wider authority. In addition, knowledge of Kaurt'mann's role in the efl'oi-t to broker the assassination was circu- lated and fie(|uently mentioned at his Buff Acres Motel in 1967. Ac- cording to witness A, it was perceived as a standing offei-. The commit- tee frankly acknowledged that it was unable to uncover a direct link between the principals of the St. Louis conspiracy and James Earl Ray or his brothers. Theie was no direct evidence that the Sutherland of- fer was accepted by Ray. oi- a I'epresentative, ])rior to tlie assassination. In addition, despite an intensive effort, no evidence was found of a pay- off to Ray or a representative either before or aftei- the assassination. 373 Despite this, the committee believed that there was a likelihood that word of the standing offer on Dr. King's life reached James Earl Ray prior to the assassination. This conclusion w\as based on several con- siderations. John was a permanent resident of St. Louis from October Um\ forward. Ray himself was in the St. Louis area on at least two occasions during liis early fugitive period — once immediately after his escape, and agahi in July 1967 when he participated in the robbery of the Bank of Alton. It was possible that either John or James or both received word of the standing offer through criminal associates in the St. Louis area. It was more likely, however, that John Ray heard of the offer through AIP campaign activities in and around the Grapevine Tavern. Geoi-ge Wallace's Presidenial bid stirred up intense support in the Grapevine's neighborhood — the south St. Louis area. Race re- lations and tlie civil rights movement became subjects of daily, and in- creasingly polarized, debate. At the same time, Dr. King's efforts in the civil rights movement were expanding to encompass opposition to the Vietnam war and support for the economically oppressed — to cul- minate in a Poor People's Campaign in Washington. The committee found it reasonable to believe that with an increase in the intensity of the St. Louis AIP campaign effort, and the heightened visibility of Dr. King, discussion of the Sutherland offer could well have come to James Earl Ray's attention. This possibility was only strengthened by Suther- land's heavy involvement in the AIP effort in St. Louis. Kauffmann also did significant work with Sutherland on behalf of the party. In addition, the committee found at least two individuals who knew" Sutherland, Mere active in the AIP campaign, and who had been in the Grapevine Tavern. Finally, John Ray's tavern was used as a local dis- tribution point for AIP campaign literature and paraphernalia. It was in these campaign activities that the committee found the most likely connective between James Earl Ray and the St. Louis conspiracy. In sum, the committee believed that the w^eight of the evidence bearing on James and liis l)rothers, taken in combination with the evidence of the St. Louis-based conspiracy, established the likelihood of a conspiracy in the death of Dr. King. Because of a failure of the evidence, the committee's ultimate con- clusion must, however, be phrased in terms of alternatives. The com- mitiCe believed that the St. Louis conspiracy provided an explanation for tlie involvement of Ray and one or both brothers in the assassina- tion. The manner of their involvement could have taken one of two forms. James Elarl Ray may simply have l)een aware of the offer and acted Avith a general expectation of payment after the assassination; or he may have acted, not only with an awareness of the offer, but also after reaching a specific agreement, either directly or through one or both brothers, with Kauffmann or Sutherland. The legal consequences of the alternative possibilities are, of course, different. Without a spe- cific agreement with the Sutherland group, the conspiracy that even- tuated in Dr. King's death would extend only to Ray and his brother (s) ; with a specific agreement, the conspiracy would also en- compass Sutherland and his group. In the absence of additional evi- dence, the committee could not make a more definite statement. The comiuittee believed, nevertheless, that the evidence provided the likely outlines of conspiracy in the assassination of Dr. King. 374 It is unfortunate that this information was not developed in 1968, when it could have been pursued by law enforcement agencies equipped with tools not available to the committee and at a time when the principals It wereon still is a matter whichalive and witness' reasonable peoplememories were more differ, may legitimately precise.'" but the connnittee believed that the conspiracy that eventuated in Dr. King's death in 1968 could have been brought to justice in 1968. '0 John Kauflfmann was stiU alive in 1973 when the information of the St. Louis con- spiracy first came to the attention of the FBI. C. The Committee Believes, ox the Basis of the Evidexge Avail- able TO It, That No Private Okgaxizations or Ixdi\tduals, Other Thax Those Discussed ASSASSIXATIOX OF Dr. I'xder Sectiox B, Were Ixvol\'ed ix the KiXG Since the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., numerous conspiracy allegations have been advanced by authors, independent investigators, attorneys for James Earl Ray and Ray himself. The com- mittee examined these as well as others that were uncovered during a review of agency files or were otherwise brought to the committee's at- tention during the course of its investigation. Some of the leads merited exhaustive investigation. All were pursued until it was determined to the satisfaction of the committee that there was no link to the King assassination. 1. RIGHTWIXG extremist ORGAXIZATIOXS The committee investigated rightwing, segregationist, extremist groups and individuals to find out if their outspoken opposition to Dr. King and their demonstrated propensity for violence might have resulted in their involvement in the assassination. FBI files on the Minutemen, Ku Klux Klan, and other extremist organizations were examined, and while the committee found no evidence that these or- ganizations had anything to do with the assassination, the committee did discover conspiracy allegations that warranted additional field investigation beyond that performed in the original investigation. (a) The Minuternen ^ A review of FBI files on the Minutemen revealed a possible plot against Dr. King's life that had received some attention by law enforce- ment officials shortly before Dr. King's death. On January 15, 1968, Vincent DePalma, a close associate of Robert B. DePugh, the founder of the Minutemen. told a Denver agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) that he had defected from the ^Nlinute- men and wished to supply information. (7) DePalma revealed that there were 19 Minutemen strike teams across the United States as- signed to assassinate several prominent persons, including Dr. King, in the event DePugh was ever imprisoned. (^) According to DePalma, the Minutemen also planned to incite race riots in the summer of 1968. (-5) After it received this information from the ATP\ the FBI attempted unsuecessfull}- to locate DePalma, who had said he was moving to 1 Tlip MinutPmen orjranizatlon was fervently anti-Communist. In 1968, It believed that leftist infiltration of the Government had progressed to the extent that America could no longer fe saved bv thf iraditional j olitical process. Members were trained in ginTrilla war- fare techniques. Dr. King was viewed by the Minutemen as a Communist and an enemy of the American people. The committee found numerical estimates of Minutemen membership in 1968 to be unreliable. (375) 376 Oregon. (4) As for DePugli, ho disappeared in February 1968 follow- ing his indictment by a Federal grand jury in Seattle, Wash., for con- spiracy to commit bank robbery. The FBI made no further attempts to investigate the threat until shortly after Dr. King's assassination, when one of DePalma's Minutemen associates, Edward Baumgardner, told a reporter resembled that the Baumgardner DePalma.(5) artist's drawing was of the suspected interviewed assassin several times by the FBI. He said that he and DePalma were members of a Min- utemen strike team that had been formed at a training camp in Colorado during the summer of 1967. Baumgardner repeated the information that DePalma had provided ATF and said DePalma had been assigned the code name Willard. (James Earl Ray used the alias John Willard when renting a room in a roominghouse in Memphis on April 4, 1968.) (6^) DePalma was located by the FBI several days after Dr. King was killed. He again detailed information on the Minutemen strike teams that had targeted Dr. King and on Minutemen plans to precipitate race riots in the summer of 1968 as a means of facilitating a takeover of the (jovernment. Work records showed that DePalma was in Newport, R.I., on April 4, 1968. Information he furnished during 3 days of interviews was verified by several FBI offices. (7) DePugh and his chief associate in the Minutemen, Walter Peyson, remained fugitives until their cap- ture in July 1969. There w^as nothing in the FBI files to reflect they were ever interviewed regarding possible involvement of the Minute- men in the assassination of Dr. King. The committee found that the DePalma lead had not been fully investigated by the FBI, so it examined it anew. It found that De- Palma had been murdered in an unsolved gangland slaying in Janu- ary 1978 in Los Angeles. (^) The committee did locate and interview four persons who had attended the Colorado training camp in the summer of 1967. Both Jerry Brooks, (P) an associate of DePugh's for at least 12 years, and Mary Tollerton,(7^) DePugh's secretary until late 1967, denied knowing of any plot to kill Dr. King. Although Brooks told of other assassination plots by the Minutemen and of intelligence files on Dr. King and otlier "subversives," Tollerton claimed that these activities were not serious. Tollerton added that DePugh had trouble keeping the organization together in 1968 ^yhile avoiding capture, so he could not have been involved in Dr. King's assassination. Walter Peyson (//) and Robert DePugh, (7^) brought to Washington under subpena, testified under oath that they were not involved in any plot to kill Dr. King. They insisted that all dis- cussions ofassassination plots and strike teams were mere paper prop- aganda. (/J) Both Peyson and DePugh also explained that because DePalma and Baumgardner were believed to be infiltrators, they were often fed false information. (74) As a final investigative ste|), the committee compiled a list of all individuals associated with the Minutemen in the cities visited by James Earl Ray following his escape in April 1967 from Missouri State Penitentiary. This list was cross-checked against a list of known or possible Ray associates. The results were negative. 377 Based on the testimony it heard, interviews with the assistant U.S. attorney who prosecuted DePugli and Peyson in 1966 and ATF a<;ents who liad encountered DePugh, extensive file reviews and the Ray associates name check, the committee concluded there was insufficient evidence death. to indicate that the Minutemen were involved in Dr. King's (b) Kluti organizations A review of extensive FBI files on a number of Ku Klux Klan or- ganizations revealed approximately 25 Klan-related leads to potential conspiracies in the assassination of Dr. King. Four of them warranted the attention of the committee. 1. Information from a Mobile, Ala., FBI repoit indicated an in- formant had told the Bureau that Sidney Barnes " and several others had gone to Birmingham, Ala., in the fall of 1963 to kill Dr. King. {15) The FBI also learned that a secret meeting had been held in Birming- ham before the September 15, 1963, bombing of a Birmingham church that left four young Black girls dead. Barnes. William Potter Gale, Noah Jefi'erson Garden and John C. Crommelin attended this meet- ing, (i^) The li'BI had attempted to determine the whereabouts of the partici- pants in the 1963 Birmingham meeting during the week following Dr. King's assassination, (i/) The Bureau files reflected that the FBI ended its investigation of Barnes after it found no indication he was away from his home before or after the assassination. (i<§) When the committee ai^proached Barnes for an interview, he refused to cooperate. (A9) The committee, however, extensively interviewed an individual who was deeply involved in racial violence in the South in the mid-1960's and who was willing to provide the committee with detailed information. This person, who was considered very reliable by the committee, said he had met Barnes in 1963. He characterized Barnes as an independent rightwinger who, despite deep-seated racial animosity, had never been involved in violence. This source also told the committee he had been in contact with Barnes and Noah JeflPerson Garden during March and April 1968, and he recalled no indications of their participation in a conspiracy to kill Dr. King. {W) Additional interviews (^/) and file reviews by the committee failed to reveal evidence that would indicate Barnes was in any way involved in Dr. King's death. 2. In an interview with an agent of the Dallas FBI field office on April 22, 1968, Myrtis Ruth Hendricks, accompanied by Thomas McGee, maintained she had overheard discussions of a conspiracy to kill Dr. King.(^^) Hendricks said that while working as a waitress at John's Restaurant in Laurel, Miss., on April 2, 1968, she heard the owner, Deavours Nix, say he "had gotten a call on King.'' Nix was then head of intelligence and the grand director of the Klan Bureau of Tnvesticration for the White Knights of Ku Klux Klan of Missis- sippi (WKKKKOM) , the most violent Klan organization during 1967 -An extensive committee investigation resulted in no evidence of a direct link between Barnes and any specific Klan organizations. He did have close associates in Klan organiza- tions, however, including the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in Mississippi. 378 and 1968. Hendricks said that on April 3, 1968, she saw in Nix's office a rifle with a telescopic sight in a case, which two men put in a long box in the back of a 1964 maroon Dodge. Hendricks alleged that on the deathfollowing day, news before the Nix received a phoneon call was broadcast the announcing Dr. King's radio. Hendricks left Laurel shortly after Dr. King's death to join her boyfriend, Thomas McGee, in Texas.^ The Bureau had independently confirmed that John's Restaurant was a gathering place for known Klan members and that members had been there on April 8 and 4, 1968, Nevertheless, it found no coiTobora- tion of the Hendricks rifle story. The committee's review of FBI files concerning the White Knights' activities uncovered informant in- formation similar to the Hendricks allegation. In addition, state- ments fittributed to Samuel H. Bowers, the imperial wizard of the WKKKKOM, in John s Restaurant on April 5, 1968, raised the pos- sibility of his involvement in the assassination. (£,;?) As a result of this information and an indication that it was not developed further in the FBI investigation, the committee pursued the lead. Myrtis Hendricks denied the substance of her allegation when con- tacted bythe committee. (^4) While admitting that she had worked for Nix, she said she was afraid of her former boyfriend, Thomas McGee, but refused to elal>orate further. The committee's attempt to interview FBI informants who had furnished relevant information was unsuc- cessful. (^J) The informants were either unavailable or uncoopera- tive. (^6') Although the committee initially issued subpenas to Nix, Bowers and McGee, time and cost constraints prevented their appear- ance in executive session. (^7) The committee was, however, able to question at length a former member of the White Knights who had participated in racial violence in the 1960's. This witness, who was considered reliable and well- informed on the activities of the White Knights, could provide no in- formation toindicate that Bowers or any other member of the White Knights was involved in Dr. King's death. Further, he renuirked that it would not have been characteristic for members of the White Knights to leave Mississippi and go to an unfamiliar locale to commit the assassination. The committee concluded that in light of Hendricks' refusal to re- peat her original allegation and the absence of evidence of a connec- tion with James Earl Ray, the lead should be discounted. 3. On June 15, 1968, 1 week after Ray's arrest, n long-distnnce tele- phone operator in Racine, Wis., contacted the FBI with information she believed pertinent to the King assassination. She said she had placed calls for an unknown male caller on June 11, 1968, to three numbers in North Carolina. (^^) She added that in one call she over- heard a man who identified liimself as "Rol)ert'' ask for his money so he could leave the country immediately. (^,9) In a separate call, "Robert" referred to the Klan as the source of this money and said he feared that Ray would "spill his guts" when he got back in the country. (.5^) ^Tho committee noted that Laurel, Miss., the scene of these alleged activities, lies between New Orleans and Birmingham. James Earl Ray traveled between these two cities In March 1968. 379 The Bureau identified the subscribers to the three North Carolina telephone numbers as a used car dealer and his two brothers. {31 ) Local law enforcement officials told the Bureau that a third brother was involved with stolen cars and bad checks. {32) When interviewed by the Bureau, the two brothers had denied any knowledge of the telephone calls or their brother's activities, (i^?) The FBI found no connection between the subscribers to the numbers and any Klan organizations. No further attempts to pursue this lead were initiated by the Bureau. The committee decided to examine this allegation further, despite the FBI's conclusions in 1968. An attempt to locate the source of the information through tlie Wisconsin Telephone Co. revealed that the supposed operator had never been employed by that company. Based on tliis information, the committee conchided that the lead was not based on credible evidence and not worthy of further investigation. 4. The most significant Klan-related lead involved informant information that implied a financial relationship between Arthur Hanes, Sr., James Earl Eay's attorney in 1968, and Kobert Shel- ton, Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of America (UKA). This information indicated Shelton's Klan organization had con- tributed toEay's defense through his attorney and, further, that Shel- ton had made arrangements with Hanes to review the jury list for Eay's trial in order to identify potentially sympathetic jurors. While neither of these acts were illegal, cooperation between the leader of the UKA and Eay's attorney, if proven, would have raised the possibility of preassassination agreement between the UKA and Eay, especially in light of Eay's choice of Hanes as his attorney following his arrest. In January 1978, George Wilson, (,5^) a former midwestern leader of the UKA, told the committee that the UKA had contributed $10,000 to Hanes when he was representing Eay, under the pretense of paying for Hanes' legal representation of a group of North Carolina Klans- men.(->5) Wilson said this payment was mentioned in a speech al- legedly made at a Klan meeting by Furman Dean Williams, Grand Dragon of the South Carolina UKA. The statement was made in the presence of other persons whom Wilson also named. Two documents in the FBI file covering the murder of Dr. King indicated that two sources independently corroborated some of Wil- son's information. Source A alleged that Shelton advised that in August 1968 the de- fen e Avas in need of money for Eay's defense. Shelton inquiry whether Klan members would be willing to donate money for Eay's defense. Shelton added t^at he intended to review the jury list in Eay's case when it was available. {36) Source B learned that a UKA board meeting was held in 1969, and attended by Hanes and Melvin Sexton, the UKA secretary wdio han- dled Klan finances,^ among others. The meeting was convened to dis- cuss the Klan's national defen-e fund, a fund to assist members ar- rested while participating in Klan activities. Hanes' defense of klans- * Thp Ini^pr'al Po-^rd of tbp TTKA con^'istefl of thp na+ion«1 offippr« of f'P Klan. Ro^prt Shelton, who had begun serving a sentence for contempt of Congress in February 1969, was absent from the meeting. The contempt conviction resulted from Shelton's refusal to testify l)efore the House Un-American Activities Committee. 380 men in North Carolina for $12,500 was specifically mentioned. After Hanes left the meeting, Sexton allegedly commented on the King assassination and said he had a piece of paper for Hanes pertaining to the Ray case. («?7) The committee's file review also revealed documentation of a con- tact between Shelton and Hanes in June and August 1968 relating to legal assistance of Shelton by Hanes. The document did not, how- ever, specifically refer to Hanes' representation of Ray. (38) The com- mittee was unable to locate any FBI documents indicating that the Bureau attempted to interview Hanes, Shelton, Sexton or other prin- cipals concerning cooperation between the Klan and Hanes during Ray's trial. The committee's initial interest in Ray's choice of Hanes as his first attorney following his June 1968 arrest, combined with the FBI in- formant material, led to an extensive investigation by the committee to ascertain the nature of the Hanes-Shelton relationship. (,55) First, George Wilson was interviewed at length. (.^) Then, sources A and B were contacted by the FBI and, after giving consent, were inter- viewed by the committee. The committee found no indication of a motive to lie on the part of Wilson or either of the informants. Fur- ther, no financial remuneration was offered in return for information, and there was no sign of a personal vendetta against Hanes, Shelton, or Sexton. In addition, Shelton, (^7) Sexton, (-^) Hanes, (4) Stoner frequently ex- coriated Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and his campaign for racial in- tegration inthe South.^ After Dr. King's assassination, the FBI in- vestigated Stoner's activities on April 4, 1968.(5^) Once the FBI established that Stoner had been speaking at an NSRP rally in Merid- ian, Miss., on that day, it eliminated him as a suspect in Dr. King's murder. {53) Stoner became James Earl Ray's attorney in 1969, (5^) and he rep- resented John L. Ray (55) and Jerry W. Ray (5^) in separate criminal matters in 1970. In addition, Jerry Ray was employed as a bodyguard for Stoner in 1969. Based on Stoner's blatant racism and his relation- ship with the three Ray brothers, the committee decided further to ini^estigate his possible involvement in the assassination. The committee's review of FBI files on Stoner revealed that, in the late 1950's, Stoner was a suspect in a series of bombings directed against Black and Jewish targets throughout the South. (57) Al- though no charges had been brought at the time, Stoner was under indictment in 1978 for the 1958 bombing of a Birmingham church. {68) An undercover Birmingham police officpr who took part in the bomb- ing investigation said Stoner had a proven propensity for violence. {59) In testimony before the committee. Dr. Edward R. Fields, a close friend of Stoner and a leader of the NSRP, provided the committee with the names of other sesrregationists with violent backgrounds whom Stoner knew.(^^) In addition, Stoner, Dr. Fields, and several co- defendants were indicted in 196-S for obstruction of justice inconnec- tion with their efforts to thwart desegregation efforts in Birmingham, Ala.((?/) The case was dismissed in 1964 for deficiencies in the word- ing of the complaint. (5^) Stoner has been extremely active politically. In 1964, he was a can- didate for Vice President of the United States on the NSRP ticket, f^-^) He rnn unsuccessful camnnifrnp! "for (xovornnr of Georgia in 1970, (/?4) for Senator from Georgia in 1972 ((?5) and for Governor of Georfi:iain 1978. (^^) For a brief period in the 1960's, while Morris was active in the Klan, he also served as an informant to Federal, State and local law en- forcement officials. (P5) Although Morris readily admitted this ac- tivity, he explained that he had never been paid and that he had never provided original information to any law enforcement agency. (P^) Rather, Morris contended that he had been merely a conduit between agencies for information which the FBI, the Alabama attorney general and the Birmingham police obtained from their own independent sources. (.97) He claimed his underlying objective in acting as an in- formant was to ascertain the identities of actual informers in the I^lan organizations. (P5) Morris said he believed that Stoner had lodged the allegation to discredit him.(PP) He explained that he and an undercover Bir- mingham police detective had been regarded by the Alabama attorney general's office as key witnesses against Stoner in the 1958 bombing of the Bethel Baptist Church in Birmingham. (/(9^) The committee uncovered no evidence to support Stoner's allegation against Morris and concluded that Morris was not involved in the assassination of Dr. King. 2. CONSPIRACY ALLEGATIONS : MEMPHIS (a) Citizen' s hand radio hroadcast At approximately 6 :36 p.m. on April 4, 1968, an unidentified citi- zen's band radio operator in Memphis was heard broadcasting over channel 11. {101) He stated he was pursuing a white Mustang driven by the killer of Dr. King. The CB operator, contrary to lawful radio procedure, never identified himself. He announced that he was chas- ing the white Mustang east on Summer Avenue from Parkway Street at a high rate of speed and requested a land line to communicate to the police department, (i^^) The broadcast was made about 33 minutes after the first announcement over police radio that Dr. King had been shot. A Memphis CB operator, "William Herbert Austein, among others, heard the original broadcast. As he was driving through the inter- section of Jackson Avenue and Hollvwood Street, Austein halted a ^Memphis police cruiser driven by Lt, Rufus Bradshaw.(i6>) Additionally, an extensive background investigation of Montedonico failed to reveal incriminating evidence. (7^7) Indeed, the committee uncovered specific exculpatory evidence relating to Montedonico as the broadcaster, (i^^) and the committee's own con- sultants. Federal Communications Commission engineers, doubted that Montedonico was responsible for the hoax. (i^J) Ultimately, Mon- tedonico decided to cooperate w^ith the committee, and he denied under oath that he made the broadcast. (i^4) Additional possible suspects were identified and interviewed in the course of the committee's investigation of the CB broadcast. {125) The committee also made an effort to pinpoint the broadcast by identifying all operators who had overheard the broadcast and by obtaining techni- cal data concerning their location, their equipment and the strength of the signal they had received. (/^«5) The committee used FCC engi- neers in an attempt to identify the broadcaster. (7^7) As stated by the FCC in its report to the committee, (i^5) however, the interval of 10 years made virtually impossible a task that would have been difficult even in 1968. The committee, therefore, was unable to identify the broadcaster. The committee considered indications that the broadcast was a con- spiratorial act. For instance, the broadcaster asked for a land line relay to police headquarters, a request that shows he wanted the information to get to the police and suggests he had more than a hoax in mind. Further, the broadcaster attempted to lead police to the northern part of Memphis, while the most accessible route out of town from the vicinity of the Lorraine Motel was to the south, the direction the com- mittee believed James Earl Kay did indeed follow. Although its failure to identify the broadcaster prevented the com- mittee from determining definitively whether the broadcast was in any way linked conspiratorially to the assassination of Dr. King, several factors indicated it probably was not a conspiratorial act. The broad- cast came a full 35 minutes after the assassination, so it could not have assisted in the immediate flight of the assassin out of Memphis. A de- scription ofthe suspected assassin's white Mustang had been broadcast over the police radio at 6 :10, so a CB operator who had been monitor- ing police calls would have had the description of the automobile. More- over, the broadcaster did not use the best means of penetrating the po- lice network. He used channel 17, one of the lesser used CB frequencies. Consequently, while the identity of the CB operator remained undeter- mined, the committee found that the evidence was insufficient to con- clude that the ^Memphis CB broadcast was linked to a conspiratorial plot to kill Dr. King. {h) John McFerren The committee's review of Memphis FBI files revealed that John McFerren approached agents on April 8, 1968. with information con- cerning the assassination. (7^5) McFerren said that on the afternoon of April 4, 1968, while he was shopping at the Liberto, Liberto, and Latch Produce Store in Memphis, he overheard a "heavy set white male," later identified as Frank Liberto,^ the company's president, talk- ing on the telephone. (i5^) ^McFerren asserted that Liberto indicated that his brother in New Orleans, La., was going to pay $5,000 to some- one to kill a person on a balcony. (13 J) After hearing of Dr. King's death later that day and observing a sketch of the assassin in the news- paper the following day, he felt an individual that had been employed at Liberto, Liberto and Latch Produce during the last year might be the fugitive assassin. (7-5^) Based on McFerren's story, a writer, William Sartor, hypothesized that organized crime was responsible for the King assassination. In his investigation. Sartor attempted to con- nect Frank Liberto with organized crime figures in Memphis and New Orleans. (755) « In its 1968 investigation of McFerren's allegation, the FBI and Memphis Police Department interviewed Liberto and members of his family in New Orleans, and James W. Latch, vice president of Liberto, Liberto, and Latch Produce. All those interviewed denied any involvement in, or knowledge of. Dr. King's assassination. Both Frank Liberto and his business partner. Latch, however, admitted making disparaging remarks about Dr. King in the presence of their customers. (i5-^) Because Liberto lived in the Memphis area and because of reports that he had displayed pronounced racial bias, the committee determined that McFerren's story warranted additional investigation. It con- ducted extensive interviews of Liberto, (755) members of his family, {JS6) neighbors (757) and business associates, (755) in addition to checking the backgrounds of Liberto and his brother through the FBI and municipal police departments. Liberto and members of his family provided the committee essentially the same information they had given the FBI in 1968. Liberto stated under oath that, while on occasion he had made disparaging remarks concerning Dr. King, he did not recall making the April 4, 1968. statements attributed to him by McFerren. (75.9) Although an indirect link between Liberto's brother, Salvatore, and an associate of New Orleans organized crime figure Carlos Marcello was established, (7^) no evidence was found to sub- stantiate the claim that Frank Liberto or Carlos Marcello were in- volved in the assassination. In its attempt to evaluate McFerren's credibility, the committee interviewed local police and FBI agents who had received informa- tion from him. McFerren had a reputation for furnishing the officials with information that could not be substantiated. (7^7) The com- mittee noted, however, that this evaluation by law enforcement offi- cers may have been tainted by McFerren's work as a Black civil rights activist who frequently lodged complaints of police brutality. Extensive interviews of McFerren by the FBI in 1968 (7^) and the committee (14-3) revealed inconsistencies in his basic allegation that could not be reconciled. For instance, McFerren had told the original investigators, as well as the committee, that James Earl Ray had worked at the Liberto produce company before the assassination, ^Thp committee rpcelvpd additional allegations with respect to Frank Liberto from Morris Davis fsee Sec. IlcfS) fa) infra). » See text, infra, at subsection IIc(3) (a) for a discussion of Sartor's information. 387 either in the fall or early winter of 19Q7.(1U) McFerren also told members of the committee staff that at this time, Ray had "jungle rot" on his cheek and neck. {I4S) The committee, however, had no evidence of Ray's presence in Memphis during the period alleged by McFerren, and persons who had seen Ray during that period did not recall a similar skin disease. McFerren also claimed he had positively identified James Earl Ray to the FBI as the individual who worked at the produce company before the assassination, (i^^) An FBI memorandum concerning this incident revealed that McFerren eliminated all photographs (includ- ing one of Ray) of Bureau suspects that he reviewed. McFerren only claimed that Ray closely resembled the person who worked at the market after a picture of Ray was pointed out to him.(i^7) On the basis of witness denials, lack of corroborating evidence and McFerren's questionable credibility, the committee concluded that his allegation was without foundation and that there was no connection between his story and the assassination of Dr. King. 3. CONSPIRACY allegations: new ORLEANS^ (a) William /Sartor Writer William Sartor, in an unpublished manuscript, advanced the possibility, among other allegations, that organized crime partici- pated in Dr. King's assassination. The committee focused its attention on Sartor's contention that, in New Orleans in December 1967, James Earl Ray met with Charles Stein and three persons who were con- nected with organized crime and white supremacist groups. (.7-^) The meeting allegedly was held at either the Town & Country Motel, owned by New Orleans Mafia boss Carlos Marcello, or the Provincial Motel, where Ray stayed from December 17 to 19, 1967.(7^) Sartor, who died in 1971,(150) had provided no information about how he discovered that such a meeting occurred, and he wrote that he was not aware of the subject of the meeting. (757) In support of his speculation that this meeting was in some way linked to the assassina- tion of Dr. King, however. Sartor pointed to the following considerations : The proximity in time between the meeting and the assassina- tion; The occurrence of the meeting in a city Sartor described as a bastion of racist thinking ; The location of the meeting at either one of two hotels that Sartor suggested were guest houses for an underworld clientele; and Ray's statement to author William Bradford Huie that he left New Orleans with $2,500 cash and the promise of $12,000 more for doing one last big job in 2 to 3 months. (75^) Sartor wrote that Sam DiPianzza, Sol La Charta and Lucas DiUes were also at the meeting. DiPianzza and La Charta were described by Sartor as involved in organized crime, as well as avid racists. Dilles, »A staff report, An Analysis of James Earl Ray's Trip to New Orleans, December 15- 21, 1967, appears in XIII Apnendix to the HSCA-MLK hearings (hereinafter referred to as staff report: New Orleans trip). 388 also a racist, was allegedly connected with the late Leander Perez, Louisiana political boss and virulent segregationist. (75) After reviewing FBI files concerning the Powell brothers, the com- mittee conducted an extensive field investigation. It interviewed the FBI agent who first received this information (£5i ) and also made an effort to locate "Ralph" through interviews of associates of Arnold Ray Godfrey and of customers of Pete's Bar. (^-5^) In addition, a composite drawing of Ralph was released by the committee to na- tional news organizations; it did not lead to his identification.^^ The committee investigated several possible links between Ralph's offer to the Powells in Atlanta and John Sutherland's offer to Russell Byers in St. Louis, primarily because of their similarity and proximity in time.^^ Nevertheless, the committee found no evidence linking the two offers. The committee was unable to locate any witnesses to the alleged Ralph offer other than the Powell brothers. Thus, their credibility became a crucial issue. Both brothers had a history of alcohol abuse and a reputation for violence. (253) Annie Lois Campos, Leon Powell's former wife, testified in executive session that Leon told her about the offer in 1P73 or 1P74 when he was under the influence of alcohol. (^5^) In executive session testimony before the committee, Arnold Ray Godfrey flatly denied ever discussing the assassination with the Powells. (^55) Claude Powell resisted the committee's subpena, indi- cating he feared for his life, and subsequently pleaded guilty to con- tempt of Congress for his refusal to testify. As a result of Claude's refusal to cooperate and the absence of corroborating evidence to support the allegation, the committee was unable to investigate this allegation further. Although the committee concluded that the Powell brothers' story was credible, it was not able to uncover any evidence that would link it to the assassination of Dr. King. (c) Robert Byron Watson Robert Byron Watson maintained that on March 28, 1968, exactly 1 week before the assassination, he overheard a conversation con- cerning aplot to kill Dr. King in Memphis on April 4, 1968 in Magel- lan's Art Gallery in Atlanta, Ga. (257) Watson, then 14, worked at the gallery after school. (258) He identified those involved in the dis- cussion as Harold Eugene Purcell and Jerry Adams, co-owners of the gallery, as well as their associates, Lawrence Meier and Bayne "The committee noted that the composite wns released alonp with several unrelated photographs and another unrelated composite. Within days, Individuals In the photo- graphs were identified. No identication of either composite was made. " The Sutherland offer to Byers is discussed in sec. II B of this report. S. Culley, Several other persons were also present. {259) According to Watson, Jerry Adams emphasized that the date and time of the assassination attempt would be "exactly 1 week from then and about the same time of day." {260) Adams further said he had just learned King would be in Memphis. Purcell allegedly made reference to "fram- ing ajailbird," as in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. {261) Watson said he told his mother that afternoon where and when King was to be murdered but withheld the details from authorities until after the assassination. {262) Lawrence Meier allegedly con- fronted Watson after James Earl Ray's arrest and threatened him with violence if he talked about what he had overheard. {263) Watson outlined his allegation in numerous letters to the commit- tee. In order to evaluate Watson's credibility, as well ns his story, the committee reviewed all available documents on the allegation. Watson's allegation had been covered extensively in the Atlanta newspapers and was investigated by the Atlanta Police Department, but the police found no evidence to substantiate it. {26^) In its review of Atlanta police files, the committee noted that in 1970, Bernard Fensterwald, an attorney for James Earl Ray during his habeas corpus action, looked into Watson's allegation. Fenster- wald's investigator, Ken Smith, verified some aspects of the allega- tion but could not produce any reliable documentation to support key elements of the story. {265) Subsequently, Fensterwald com- missioned Cleve Backster, an established polygrapher, to examine Watson about the allegation. The results indicated Watson was 90-95 percent truthful. {266) The committee's review of the FBI's assassination investigation revealed that in April 1971, Watson admitted fabricating the Magel- lan Gallery story about a plot to kill Dr. King. {267) Watson made the story up because he believed someone at the Magellan Gallery had defrauded his mother of $50,000. (268) Watson told various accounts of the plot to the committee and to other sources. {269) He vacillated significantly on the time of day of the meeting, and, in November 1977, Watson revealed for the first time that the conspirators mentioned Ray's name. {270) Finally, the committee noted that Dr. King did not publicly an- nounce his decision to return to Memphis until March 29, {271) the day after Watson allegedly overheard the conversation. The committee concluded that Watson was an unreliable witness and that his story was false. 5. COXSPIRACY allegations: BIRMINGHAM (a) Morris Davis In early 1977, Morris Da\ns provided the committee with informa- tion tliat Frank Liberto, two members of the SCIvC and others were involved in a conspiracy to kill Dr. King. (272) Davis claimed that in 1907 or 1008. ho brraine acquainted with Dr. Gus J. Prosch, (273) a Birmingham. Ala., doctor who in 1970 was convir-tod for nossession of a large cache of illegal weapons and for income tax evasion. (27I^) According to Davis, he often met Prosch in early 1968 at the Gulas 397 Restaurant in Birmingham. During one of these meetings, Prosch allegedly introduced Davis to an associate, Frank Liberto. (275) Davis said he witnessed a meeting in Gulas' parking lot of Prosch and Liberto with Rev. Ralph D, Abernathy, a close friend of Dr. King, and Rev. Fred Shuttlesworth, also a friend of Dr. King. (276) A week later, Prosch and Liberto again met at the Gulas Restaurant, this time with a man introduced to Davis as Eric Gait. Davis also asserted that he saw a subsequent meeting of these persons at the res- taurant on March 29, 1968. (277) Davis maintained that on April 3, 1968, he met Prosch at the Gulas Restaurant and agreed to drive with him to the Aeromarine Supply Co. (Ray bought the weapon used to kill Dr. King at Aeromarine on March 30, 1968.) Prosch allegedly went in the store and returned 15 minutes later with a large wooden crate that he put in the trunk of the car.(^7'<5) They then drove back to the restaurant where, in the parking lot, Prosch opened tlie crate and showed Davis a rifle inside. (279) Davis claimed that Prosch told him that he and Liberto had accepted a contract from Abernathy and Shuttlesworth to kill Dr. King for $265,000 and that this weapon would be used in the killing. (280) Eric Gait, who had already purchased a similar rifle at Aero- marine, was to be the decoy. (^57) Gait was to meet Liberto in Detroit after the assassination and collect $25,000 as payment for his partici- pation inthe murder. (282) Davis told the committee that Prosch often used the name John Willard at the Gulas Restaurant to avoid being recognized as a doctor. (283) Davis also claimed that the Eric Gait he met was identi- cal to photographs he had seen of James Earl Ray. (^5^) Davis, who had a background of supplying reliable information to the Drug Enforcement Administration, told the committee he had approached the FBI several times with this information since 1970.(^55)" A review of the FBI file concerning the murder of Dr. King re- vealed aDecember 1976 interview with Davis during which he sup- plied similar information. In light of Davis' background and the serious nature of the allegation, the committee conducted a thorough investigation of his story. Davis and those persons named in his allegation were extensively interviewed bv the committee. During executive session testimony. Dr. Ralph B. Abernathy denied any knowledge of such a plot.(^<§^) Rev. Fred Shuttlesworth also said he knew of no such conspiracy to kill Dr. King. (^57) Frank Liberto stated under oath that he had never been to Gulas Restaurant in Birmingham and never had met Prosch, Abernathy, or Shuttles- worth. (^<§5) The committee questioned Donald Wood of the Aeromarine Supply Co. about Gus Prosch. f^^^) Wood recnlled that Prosch was a regular customer at Aeromarine from 1968 until 1970. When Prosch was ar- rested for possession of illeffal weapons, Wood pulled all invoices and receipts pertaining to Prosch's purchases, made copies of them and set them aside. (^P^) A review of these receipts by the committee in- dicated the purchase of two pistols on March 25, 1968, and a purchase and"Davis explained not released untilhe 1970. had been arrested and Imprisoned shortly after the assassination 398 of a semiautomatic rifle on April 5, 1968. There is no record of Prosch buying any ^veapons on April 3, 1968.(^57) AVood mentioned that a customer would use a large wooden crate only if buying more than one rifle. All single rifles were packed in cardboard boxes. The conmiittee then located and interviewed Prosch. (^P^) He denied involvement in any plot to kill Dr. King and denied knowing any of the persons connected with the allegation, including Davis. As a result of its investigation, the committee called into question Morris Davis' credibility. Further interviews with Davis revealed basic inconsistencies in his story fhat could not be reconciled. (^P5) Davis additionally claimed that various Government agencies and prominent individuals associated with Government scandals were in- volved inthe assassinations of President Kennedy and Dr. King.(^P4) Davis refused, however, to provide the committee with the source of this information. After a thorough field investigation, the committee was unable to corroborate Davis' allegation and found that his allegation was false. (h) Walter 31 add ox Walter and Virginia ^faddox owned and operated the South Birmingham Travelodge Motor Inn (295) when James Earl Ray reg- istered there as Eric Starvo Gait on March 29, 1968. When questioned by the committee concerning Ray and his alleged companion Raoul, Walter Maddox recalled that at approximately that time there were three men living at the motel, one of M'hom was called Raoul by his companions. (^5^) Maddox added that one of the men was named Billv Fisher and that they resided there for almost a year and that they left without paying $1,500 room rent. (297) " The committee reviewed the financial records of the motel in the Travelodge executive offices and found that Billy E. Fisher had stayed at this motel between May 1965 and February 1966. (^P^) Fisher was subsequently questioned by the committoo, and admitted that he and two companions. Jack Cunningham of Biloxi. Miss., and T^eroy Roell of Jackson. Miss., had spent considerable time at the Travelodge Motor Inn during this period. (299) Fisher said the three were attempt- ing to obtain financial backing in Birmingham to purchase a motel in Himtsville. A\si. (300) Leroy Roell. who in 1978 owned two Travelodge Inns in Jnckson, Miss., was questioned bv committee staff and confirmed Fisher's story. (.?^;) Roell stated lie had lost $30,000 in the venture and there- fore had a vivid recollection of it. (302) Although attempts to locate Jack Cunningham were unsuccessful, botli Fislier and Roell stated they assumed the Raoul referred to by Walter Maddox was actually Leroy 'Roq]].(303) Given this explana- tion and the 2- to 3-year difference between Roell's residence and Ray's stay there concluded at thewas motel, as evidencedbetween no connection by motel the records, the and three men committee James Earl Ray. « Thp committee noted that the person referred to as Raoul by Ray allegedly spent snhstant'al timp In Cnn"(1a. Moxlfo. and \f>n- Orleans, while Rav never Indicated he stayed in Birmingham for more than brief periods. The committee believed, nevertheless, that the lead warranted investigation. 3d9 6. CONSPIRACY ALLEGATIONS: LOUISVILLE (a) Clifton Baird A former Louisville, Ky., police officer, Clifton Baird, raised the possibility of FBI complicity in Dr. King's assassination. He testi- fied before the committee in 1977 that, on September 18, 1965, another Louisville police officer, Arlie Blair, offered him $500,000 to kill Dr. King. (^^4) Blair allegedly told Baird that an organization he be- longed to was willing to pay someone to assassinate Dr. l^mg.{305) Baird refused the offer. ( office, Special Agent Kobert Peters, Special Agent Warren L. Walsh (retired), and Special Agent-in-Charge Bernard C. Brown. Each testified who denied any knowledgesession, in executive of an stated oU'er tothat kill inDr.hisKing. {^25)Sergeant opinion Peters, Baker would not have concocted such a story even as a joke. {826) Since Baker had since died, it was difficult for the committee to determine Iris motive or whether he actually knew of an assassination conspiracy. Ketired Louisville police officer Vernon Austin, in a designated counsel statement, maintained that he did not know of such an offer but added that he believed Baker was capable of fabricating this information. {327} . The committee conducted a thorough background investigation of Clifton Baird, including a review of medical and criminal records. {S28) It concluded that Baird was highly credible. Results of athat technical evaluation with it was consistent of Baird's tape conducted those known to have been by the used FBI indicated in 1965. (329) The committee reviewed the personnel files and attendance records for all the officers allegedly involved. The documents indicated that all but two officers were on duty on September 19, 19Q6. (330) Both officers, however, testified that it was possible they came into the office on their designated day ofl. {331) Duncan's testimony supported a finding that the 1965 conversation did take place. It may be that someone hearing such an oifer, such as Baird did, would consider it serious. There was no evidence, however, to support a finding that an actual consi:)iracy existed or that the events in Louisville in September 1965 were in any way connected with the assassination in Memphis in April 1968. The committee con- cluded that both Duncan and 13aker purposefully circulated a rumor of an offer to kill Dr. King. Their conduct reflected, in the committee's view, an absence of professionalism. The committee found no evidence contrary to Duncan's statement that he acted alone and not at the direction of any FBI official or agent. (6) Charles Lee Bell Charles Lee Bell claimed in an interview with the committee that Albert Ridley and Bishop Eubanks Tucker allegedly told him in 1967 and 196^ that Louisville, Ky., was an alternate site for the assassination of Dr. King, if the attempt in Memphis failed. Ridley was to funnel Cuban money from a man named Cordova, an underworld figure, to Louisville police and to an FBI agent assigned to Louisville to insure that protection was withdrawn from Dr. King when he came to Louis- ville. (.5.5,?) Bell claimed that Bishop Tucker learned of the plot from Reverend A. D. King, Dr. King's brother, who in turn was told by a Black director of safety for the city of Louisville. (334) Bell told the committee that a number of persons, including Huey Newton and Stokely Carmichael, knew of the conspiracy, (^55) since 401 Black militants were receiving aid from the Cubans and wanted Dr. King killed because of his commitment to nonviolence. {3S6) Bell added that he had worked as an FBI informant for years (). The efforts of the Bureau against Dr. King, the security investigation as well as COTXTFLPRO, also anpenr as a case study. Id. at 81-183. For this reason, those programs will not be reviewed here except as necessary for back- ground or as they focus on the question of responsibility In the assassination. See alio infra sec. II D. (407) The Task Force concluded, however, that the evidence was over- wliehning that Ray was a lone assassin, and it found no evidence of FBI involvement. The question of FBI complicity lingered, nonetheless, and alleged deficiencies in the FBI assassination investigation raised the possibility of a coverup after tlie fact. Because of these persistent doubts and be- cause the committee questioned both the method and the reasoning be- hind the Justice Department's report, a decision was made to reexamine the question of involvement by the FBI in the assassination. Ultimately, the committee fomid no evidence that the FBI inten- tionally brought about the death of Dr. King. In reaching that con- clusion, itsought answers to specific questions that bore on FBI com- plicity : Did the counterintelligence program, initiated in August 1967 against the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and in March 1968 against Dr. King, result in Dr. King's staying at the Lorraine Motel in Memphis on April 4. 1968 ? Did the Bureau pay members of the Invaders, an organization of young Black activists in INfemphis, or act through its informants in the Invaders, to incite the violence on March 28 that led Dr. King to return to Memphis? Did the Bureau have foreknowledge of the assassination through surveillance, informants or other means, on which it did not act? Did the Bureau, through the use of an undercover agent or inform- ant, act with James Earl Ray in the assassination of Dr. King? The committee began its analysis with a review of the investigations by the Senate committee and the Justice Department. It then turned to the FBI files generated during both the agency's security investiga- tion 'and COINTELPRO ^ against Dr. King and the SCLC. "While tail and were the files reviewedin by invaluable the committee providing contained substantial an understanding de- of the nature and scope of the FBI's operations, certain decisions and actions were often ambiguous or unexplained. In addition, there were critical peri- ods of time for which documentation was either scarce or nonexistent. For these reasons, the committee chose to supplement its file review with extensive interviews of FBI field agents and headquarters per- 1 In October 1962, the FBI opened Its security Investigation of the SCIX!? and Its presi- dent, Dr. King. The Investigation was authorized by the Attorney General. The initial pur- posp of The SCLC. the committee Invps^ltratlnii was to with concurred ovrnjiine the wl>fit. if ;inv. Department 1977 Justice rommiin'st infliioncp pvistod study in its in ♦^be conclusion that no evidence existed that Dr. King was a Communist or ever was affiliated wltli the Communist Pnrt.v ; that thp SCT C under Dr. K'nc wne pver anvthine oMier than an organization devoted to civil rights; that Dr. King's alleged Communist advisors never "sold" Dr. King any course of action that could be identified as Communist ; and that the security investigation should have been terminated shortly after it commenced. Indeed, as the 1977 report noted, one adviser was not Influential and the other disassociated him- self from the party in 190."? "because it failed adequately to serve the civil rights movement." » COINTEL-type activities against Dr. King and the SCLC are best dated from December 196.3, although Dr. King was not formally targeted until March 1068. Their purpose was not only to cather information, but to use it to undermine Dr. King and his influence in the civil rights movement. Activities of this type with regard to Communist Party and wbitp batP irronps vcrp kno"n In a t^pupral vav to i-nrio's ."rivico-s; to tbp Prpsident and congrp'-slonal leaders, but their extension to the Socialist Workers Party, the Black Nationalists (that, according to the Bureau. lncl"dpd the SCLC and Dr. Kinrr) and the New Left was known only to the Bureau. The FBI's effort to discredit Dr. Klne and to undermine which was subjected the SCLC totouched pxtpnslveevery aspect surveillance. electronic of Dr. King'sReligious life. Including leadprs his and private life, institutions were contacted and leaks were made to the press. Members of Congress, White House officials, and other Washington leaders were contacted. 409 sonnel. These interviews were initially unsworn, but because of the gravity of the issues and the serious implications of the FBI's cam- paign to undermine Dr. King's stature as a civil rights leader, exten- sive testimony was taken under oath in executive session and in public hearings. With the exception of J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation; Clyde Tolson, his Associate Director; and William C. Sullivan, Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelli- gence Division, all of whom were deceased,^ FBI officials and agents whose testimony was considered essential to a thorough examination of the issue of FBI complicity were interviewed. (a) The Lorraine Motel issue The committee investigated the possibility that the FBI's COINTELPRO effort influenced Dr. King's decision to be in Memphis on April 4, 1968, and, more specifically, to stay at the Lorraine Motel. The committee determined that Dr. King had been designated as a man to be discredited as early as December 1963. (^) On August 25, 1967, FBI headquarters directed 22 field offices, including Memphis, to commence COINTELPRO activities against "Black Nationalist — Hate Groups." (^) The purpose of the directive, as reflected in sup- porting documents, was to expose, disrupt, misdirect or otherwise neutralize the activities of specified organizations, including the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Instructions were issued "that no opportunities be overlooked for counterintelli- gence action." (^) On March 4, 1968, a second memo was issued, expanding the COIN- TELPRO effort, to include 44 field offices and for the first time specifi- cally naming Dr. King. (5) Several goals of COINTELPRO were set out. One of them was to "[pjrevent the rise of a 'messiah' who could unify and electrify the militant black nationalist movement." The memo continued, Malcolm X might have been such a "messiah"; Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael, and Elijah Muhammad all aspire to this position * * * King could be a very real contender for this position should he abandon his supposed obedience to white, liberal doctrines (nonviolence) and em- brace Black Nationalism. (^) For the first time, specific reporting requirements were established, with the first response due from all offices within 30 days. Imagina- tion and initiative were stressed, although specific operations were to be approved by headquarters to avoid embarrassment to the Bureau. (7) The committee found no evidence of COINTELPRO initiatives against Dr. King or the SCLC from the Memphis field office in re- sponse to the ]\Iarch 4 memorandum. FBI files did reflect a March 14, 1968, response from the Memphis field office, (5) but it contained no reference to Dr. King or the SCLC. From the testimony of FBI pei*sonnel as well as that of members of the SCLC and the Invaders, the committee found that Dr. King's 'The committee frankly acknowledfied tliat Its Investiffation of the FBI was severely restricted by Its inability to put questions on the Bureau's campaign to discredit Dr. King to these three top officials, since they had been primarily responsible for it. 410 decision to return to Memphis and stay at the Lorraine Motel was not influenced by COIXTELPRO initiatives. ^Yh\\e it was apparent that the FBI learned informant withinof SCLC, Dr. King's tlieredecision was no toevidence return tothat Memphis from an the informant influenced the decision itself.* The testimony of Ralph Abemathy, Dr. King's close associate and successor as the leader of SCLC, established that Dr. King's decision to return to Memphis after the March 28 violence was a personal choice, made after some debate with his SCLC colleagues. It stemmed from Dr. King's desire to erase the effects of the highly publicized violence on the success of the upcoming Poor People's Campaign. (/^) The committee explored the possibility that a Marcli 20. 1068, FBI headquarters COINTELPRO initiative directed at Dr. King influ- enced his decision to stay at the Lorraine Motel when he returned to Memphis on April 3. (11) The headquarters memorandum from G. C. Moore, Chief of the Racial Intelligence Section, to William C. Sulli- van, Assistant Director in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Divi- sion, recommended release of a news item, which read in part : The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patron- ized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there after his hasty exit [from the demonstration of March 28]. Instead, King decided the plush Holiday Inn ISIotel. white-owned, op- erated, and almost exclusively white patronized was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers. The memo was initialed by Hoover, who indicated his approval, and by Sullivan and Moore. The notation, "handled 4/3/68," was written at tlie bottom. The committee was unable to determine the meaning of the notation.^ The committee received testimony which it credited, from Dr. Abernathy that Dr. King's normal practice was to stay at the Lorraine Motel when he was in Memphis and that his choice of the Lorraine on April 3 reflected this past practice. (7^) Given Dr. Abernathy's testimony, the committee was satisfied that the March 20 memorandum did not cause Dr. King to stay at the Lorraine. Tlie FBI's intent in drafting the memorandum, however, remained an open issue. If its purpose was to cause Dr. King to take a room at the Lorraine, its intent remained sinister, no matter what the reasons were for the choice of lodgings. On the other hand, if the purpose was to embarrass Dr. King, it was simply one of many COINTELPRO initiatives that had no connection with the assassi- nation. * Tho committee learned of the identity of the SCLC informant when he aclfnowledged his former status in a committee interview ; he was also asl .TiisHr.A Dpnar*^- ment for authorization to Implement electronic surveillance on Dr. King's SCLC head- """^'^^ '" Atlanta, (see e.j?., testimony of Ramsey Clark, Nov. 28, 1978. VII HSCA- MLK Hearings. 140.) 415 interviews also failed to indicate a contact between the Bureau and any individual who was also in contact with Kay from the time of his escape to the assassination. Based on this investigation, the committee found no evidence that Ray had contact either at Missouri State Penitentiary or during the fugitive period with any FBI agent or active FBI informant. In the absence of known contact between Ray and the FBI, either through an agent or an informant, the committee found no evidence that Ray acted with the FBI, either knowingly or unwittingly, in the assassination.^ (e) FBI surveillance files in the National Archives From the beginning of the committee's investigation, James Earl Ray had suggested that his innocence or the FBI's role in the assassi- nation of Dr. King might be revealed by an examination of FBI docu- ments and tape recordings that are sealed and stored in the National Archives as a result of a court order in Lee v. Kelley^ (38) In its effort to seek information from every possible source, the committee sought access to these materials. (,?P) Permission was obtained from the court for the committee to have access to the files deposited in the Archives. (40) The access sought and obtained was the minimum necessary to ascertain the relevancy of the material to the work of the committee. Every effort was made to minimize the invasion of the privacy asso- ciated with the review. A review was conducted in the latter part of December 1978 of an inventory of the materials, approximately 845 pages in length. Each entry in the inventory included the serial number of the document, the date it was written, the name of the individual who originated it, and the person to whom it was directed. In addition, a separate por- tion of the inventory cataloged the tapes that were produced during the various electronic surveillances that were conducted on Dr. King, written transcripts of some of those tapes, and handwritten logs and notes made by the agents who supervised the surveillance. While the entire inventory was examined, the portion relating to the actual tapes and transcriptions of the tapes was of particular interest. The committee's review determined that the earliest item in this cate- gory in the inventory was dated February 18 through 20, 1964. The latest entry was dated May 16, 1966. This information was compared with an internal FBI memorandum dated April 18, 1968, from Charles D. Brennan to William C. Sullivan. (^7) The purpose of the memo- randum was to identify all of the microphone and wiretap installa- tions that had been employed by the Bureau during the course of its security investigations of Dr. King and the SCLC.(-^^) While the memorandum indicated that the last electronic surveillance of Dr. King terminated on November 30, 1965, as opposed to the May 16, 8 The committee frankly acknowledged that contact between Ray and the Bureau could have been made indirectly through several Intermediaries. Nevertheless, since there was no reasonable way to investigate this theoretical possibility (absent a concrete lead), no investigation wns nnderta'.-en to explore it. » An action filed in 1977 by Bernard Lee, a former member of the executive board of SCLC. named f>s defen'lan'^s Clarence Keiley. wlio had >'ep'i Pirpr^t^r of tbe FRT. and other former FBI officials. In the suit. Lee sought to recover damages for alleged violations by the FBI of his civil rights through the use of illegal electronic surveillance In the 1960's. 416 1966, termination date ^° contained in the inventory, neither document indicated that electronic surveillance was directed at Dr. King after mid-1966. The committee's file review uncovered a memorandum, ap- parently issued for record purposes, from Atlanta Special Agent in Charge Joseph Ponder, dated June 23, 1966. {4S) It recounted a June 21, 1966, order from headquarters to remove an existing technical surveillance on SCLC headquarters. This would indicate that the technical surveillance of King through the SCLC tap continued at least until June 21, 1966, in Atlanta. These dates are consistent with information given to the Senate Select Committee to Study Govern- mental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities by the Bu- reau on July 21, 1975, in response to a request concerning electronic surveillance of Dr. King from January 1, 1960, until April 5, 1968. {44) The discrepancies existing between these various dates were not con- sidered significant by the committee. Former Attorney General Ram- sey Clark testified that, during the tenure, authorizations for electronic surveillance bj' the Bureau were severely curtailed. (4-5) The commit- tee's investigation revealed that during 1968 the Bureau tried un- suc es ful y tohave Clark authorize electronic surveillance of SCLC and Dr. King. (4^) The committee's investigation uncovered no evi- dence that the Bureau ever disregarded the Attorney General's refusal to authorize the requested surveillance. Given their distance in time from the assassination, it is extremely improbable, moreover, that the actual tapes, transcripts, and other materials underlying these inter- cepts would have information pertaining to the assassination. Because of the invasion of privacy that a review of the raw materials would have entailed, the committee decided it was not necessary to under- take one. It would have been ironic ind'^ed, if a committee, out of a con- cern for what happened to Dr. King, unnecessarily invaded his privacy. 2. MEMPHIS POLICE DEPARTMENT In its investigation of possible official complicity in the assassination, the committee considered allegations suggesting that the Memphis Police Department facilitated Dr. Kin.qf's murder." For example, there had been wide dissemination of a theory that a Black detective was removed from his post at a fire stntion adiacent to the Lorraine Motel so that he would not interfere with the assassination. (47) To resolve questions concerning the possible complicity of the MPD, the committee conducted extensive interviews with Memnhis police officials, officials of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and citizen witnesses ; it also took sworn testimony in depositions and hear- ings. Further, the committee reviewed the pertinent files of the MPD. the FBI, and the Department of Justice. "With main regard issues were toexplored possible : MPD complicity in the assassination, four Why was an MPD security detail assigned to Dr. King with- drawn on April 3, 1968 ? I'Thp May 16, 1066. date was established when the committee discovered a reference to a surveillance log for that date. Surveillance logs are normally created to provide an Index for an onirolng tap. " As director of fire and safety In Memphis In 1968, Frank C. HoUoman was respon- sible for the performance of the Memphis Police Department. Because of Holloman's ex- tensive background with the FBI. the actions of the Memphis Police Department had been viewed by some as additional evidence of FBI complicity in the assassination. 417 Why was Detective Edward Redditt removed from his observa- tion post at a fire station next to the Lorraine on April 4, 1968? Why where two Black firemen transferred from the same fire station shortly before the assassination ? Were the alleged deficiencies in the post assassination conduct of the MPD intentionally designed to facilitate the escape of the assassin ? (a) Withdraioal of the security detail On April 3, 1968, at approximately 10 :30 a.m., Dr. King arrived at the airport in Memphis where he was met by a four-man security detail ordered by Chief of Detectives W. P. Huston and led by Inspector Don H. Smith (since retired). (45) The purpose of the detail was to provide physical protection for Dr. King, and it was apparently pro- vided at the initiative of the Memphis Police Department because of the violence that had occurred during Dr. King's visit to Memphis the previous week. It did not appear to the committee that Dr. King or members of his party requested that the MPD provide security.^2(4^) At the airport, the security detail asked members of Dr. King's party what their schedule was to be during their stay in Memphis. Rev. James Lawson, a Memphis minister who had been instrumental in getting Dr. King to come to Memphis on March 28, responded that they had not made up their minds ; Inspector Smith testified that he inferred from Lawson's response that a security detail would not be welcome. (-5/) Mrs. Tarlese Matthews, a member of Dr. King's party, specifically told the police that a security detail had not been requested. Inspector Smith said he perceived that the detail was not welcome. {52) Detective Edward Redditt, who was at the airport, was also told that Dr. King's party did not want protection. The security detail followed Dr. King from the airport to the Lor- raine Motel, arriving at approximately 11 :20 a.m. At the request of Inspector Smith, another security unit, composed of an inspector and two additional Memphis police officers, arrived at the Lorraine to assist. (.5-5) Shortly after noon, the detail followed Dr. King to the Centenary Methodist Church, where it secured the front and rear en- trances. (54) As they were returning to the Lorraine at approximately 2:15 p.m., (5-5) Dr. King's party took side routes and avoided the main streets, giving Inspector Smith the impression, he testified, that Dr. King's party was trying to lose the detail. {56) Inspector Smith further testified that his belief that Dr. King and his party did not want the detail was reinforced by their refusal to t^ell police officers where they were going or how long they were to remain at a given sto]), and the security detail just had to "tag along." {67) At approximately 5 p.m.. Smith telephoned Chief of Detectives Huston and requested permission to remove the detail due to this apparent lack of cooperation, (55) According to Smith, Huston had a quick conference with "someone" while Smith held the phone, and he then granted the request. {59) According to Henry Lux, who subsequently became police chief and who had since retired, Huston's conference was with Police Chief i» The committee tried to determine If Dr. King wns provided protection by the MPD on earlier trins to Me'^inhis hut it oonld not resolve the qupstlon. (50) The committer de- cided, however, that this did not fundamentally affect Its assessment of the remoral of the detail on Apr. 3, 1968. 418 James MacDonald, now also retired. Lux stated tliat Huston told Mac- Donald that Smith's request was based on the failure of the King party to cooperate with the security detail. (^'^) While Lux told the com- mittee that Huston authorized Smith to secure the detail after receiv- ing permission from MacDonald, (^7) MacDonald stated he had no recollection of Huston's decision to remove the detail or of his request- ing ])ermission to do so. (^^) Having obtained permission from Huston, Smith testified, he with- drew the detail shortly after 5 p.m. Xo attempt was made to infoiTn anyone in Dr. King's paily that it was being pulled back.(^.?) Regardless of the attitude of Dr. King ana of members of his party toward the security detail, the committee believed that in light of Dr. King's prominence, the violence that attended the March 28 demon- stration, the tension in Memphis and the numerous threats that had been made detail on Dr. to have l^enKing's life, it was withdrawn. The higlily improper connnittee also for the security believed it im- proper for memlx'rs the withdrawal of theof detail. Dr. King's party not tonoted The conuuittee have that Ix^enFrank informed of Hollo- man, director of fire and safety in Memphis at the time, maintain- ing he had not been infoi-med of these decisions," concuri'ed in 1078 that they were wrong. (^4) The securityAll assassination. detail was removed the e\idence over 24 hours the committee ju'ior indicated obtained to Dr. King's that the detail was removed because of an evident sense of exasperation at what was perceived to be an uncoo})erative attitude on behalf of Dr. King's party. Its removal was not, the conuuittee found, a i)art of a conspiracy to strip Dr. King of his protection in oider to facilitate the assassination. (b) The removal of Detective Redditt In conjunction with its assessment of the withdrawal of Inspector Smith's secui-ity detail, the committee investigated the allegation that Detective Edwai-d Redditt, wlio had been assigned to a security detail near the I^ri-aine, was removed two hours prior to the assassination. The fact of Detective Redditt's April 4 r-emoval from his post at the firehouse across from the Tjoriaine Motel was uncontest(>d. The nature of the assignment that Redditt had on April 8 and 4, 1968 — whether it was security or surveillance — was central to an assessment of the significance of his removal. Redditt and his i)ar4) Other threats were made di- rectly to Redditt on April 3 and 4,(7^5) although it was unclear if these were brought to the attention of Redditt's supervisors by the time thev had ordered his removal. There was conflicting evidence as to the specific source of the threat that prompted the meetinj? that resulted in Redditt's removal. Tines testified that on April 4, Lt. E. H. Arkin told him that Philip Manuel, an investi.q-ator for the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the IT.S. Senate, had received information that someone was en route to Memphis to kill a police lieutenant. (7^i^) Arkin, however, believed he was called into the office by Tines and told of the threat. (J07) Tines believed he then discussed this with Chief McDonald and Fire and Safety Director Holloman.(/55) HoUoman testified he could not re- member who first told him of the threat on Redditt's ]iie.(J09) Arkin was sent to get Redditt and bring him back to headquarters. (77(9) As to who was present in the meeting at headquarters when Redditt was brought back, the testimony was conflicting. McDonald only re- membered Holloman, Redditt, and himself being there. (777) Tines re- called that Manuel and he were also present. (77^) Holloman remem- bered that an aa:ent of the Secret Seixice was there, (77.?) and Redditt recalled that Holloman introduced a perpon at the meeting as a repre- sentative ofthe Secret Service. (77^) 422 Redditt was informed at the meeting that there was a contract on his life, that he was being relieved from duty at the firehouse(775) and that he and his family were to be placed under police protection. (7/6') Holloman testified he believed the tlireat might have been passed to the Memphis mittee with thepolice Secretby Service, the Secret Service.revealed however, (777') A nocheck by the contact withcom- the Memphis Police Department that might have resulted in Redditt's be- ing relieved of his post. (/7<§) Holloman testified he was not informed of the substance of an internal MPD memorandum dated April 4, 1968, and titled "Information concerning assassination plot of possibly Det. Redditt.'' (77,9) The memorandum referred to Philip Manuel as transmitting information concerning a possible plot to kill a Negro lieutenant in Memphis. Holloman did not recall if he was aware of this threat when he made the decision to relieve Redditt, though he did not believe it was the basis for his decision. (7^^) Tines(7^7) and Arkin, {122) however, recalled that the threat relayed by Manuel was the basis for the decision to relieve Redditt. When interviewed by the committee, Manuel stated he had no inde- pendent recollection of the Redditt affair, but he did remember receiv- ing a call from his office in "Washington informing him that a confiden- tial source had stated a Black Tennessee policeman's life was in danger. He knew from reading files that Redditt's life had previously been threatened, and he therefore believed the threat was directed to Red- ditt. He so informed the Memphis Police Departuient. Tlie committee deposed Manuel's confidential source who stated that he |>ersonally told Manuel over the phone of tlie thi-eat, but he also infoi-med him that the target was a police sergeant in Knoxville. The source further said he did not leave messaffes in Washington, that he telephoned in- formation only to Manuel direct. (/^^) The committee believed, on the basis of Manuel's testimony, as well as that of Arkin and Tines, that Manuel believed the threat to be directed at Redditt and that some officials of the MPD believed this also, as confirmed in the April 4, 1968. memorandum from Tines to ]\rcDonald.(7^>>) The committee, therefore, concluded that this threat was the one that resulted in the meeting where the decision to transfer Redditt was made. The committee questioned Tines and Holloman about an internal MPD memorandum (7^^) from Arkin to Tines that indicated Arkin had received infonnation at 4 :1.5 p.m. on April 4. 1968, that the threat Manuel had passed along was directed at a Black sergeant in Knox- ville and not, as had first been repoi-fed, a Black lieutenant in Memphis. The memorandum stated the information had been incorrectly trans- man,mitted {128)fromthat Washington. Tines they did not maintained, receive {127) as prior this information did" Hollo- to the decision to remove Redditt. It appeared that this information was being, received by Arkin as Holloman was holding his meeting with Redditt. Redditt him.self, in a statement he gave on April 10, 1968, at police headquai-ters, stated Tines relieved him because of a threatening phone call Redditt received at the firehouse on the afternoon of April 4, 1968, another threat Redditt had received at the airport on Dr. King's arrival, and the reix>rt from the Justice Department in- 423 dicating his life was in danger. (129) It seems likely that Redditt would have discussed the other threats on his hfe in the meeting with Holloman concerning Redditt's removal from duty because of a specific threat.^* The committee believed that Redditt was removed because his superior perceived real danger to his safety. In addition, Richmond was not removed ; he remained at the firehouse surveillance post. The committee fomid that Redditt's removal was not part of any plot to facilitate the assassination of Dr. King. (c) The transfer of txoo Black firemen Two Black firemen, Floyd Newsum and Norvell E. Wallace, were transferred on April 3, 1968, from the firehouse where Redditt and Richmond were conducting a surveillance. It has been charged that their transfers were part of a conspiracy to facilitate the assassination and the assassin's escape. {130) Newsum stated that in April 1968, he was working the B shift at fire station No. 2 of the Memphis Fire Department and was assigned to a truck company that required a minimum of five men. B shift did not work the 24-hour period from 7 a.m., April 3, to 7 a.m., April 4, but it was scheduled to work the following 24-hour period. Conse- quently, Newsum would have been at the firehouse at the time of the assassination. {131) According to Newsum, sometime on the night of April 3, while he was at the Mason Temple rally where Dr. King spoke, a message was left with his daughter for him to call the fire station. Wlien he did at about 11 :30 p.m., he was told to report the following morning to company 31 in Frazier (North Memphis), not to fire station No. 2}^ {132) The transfer appeared to be uncalled for, since the company to which he was detailed already had the minimum number of men to operate, {133) while his regular company would be left one man short. Thus, Newsum's transfer meant that another man would have to be transferred to his former company. Newsum stated that he subsequently placed a telephone call to another member of his regular company and learned that such a transfer had in fact been made. {ISJi) An examination of Memphis Fire Department records supported New- sum with respect to his characterization of personnel transfers and personnel levels of the companies involved. {135) On April 3, 1968, Wallace was working the A shift at fire station No. 2, where he was assigned to a pumper company that required a min- imum force of ^VQ.{136) A shift had begun work at 7 a.m., April 3, and was to be relieved at 7 a.m., April 4. At approximately 10 p.m. on April 3, Wallace recalled, he was detailed to pumper company 33 at the Memphis Airport, where he was an extra man.(7=?7) Evidence obtained by the committee demonstrated that the trans- fers of Newsum and Wallace were prompted by a request from Red- ditt. Tines testified that Redditt or Arkin informed liim there was "a fireman or firemen" at the firehouse who Redditt believed would hinder " This likelihood was supported by Police Chief McDonald's memory that Redditt's transfer was the cumulative result of all the prior threats on his life. 15 See MLK exhibit F-19 (crime scene diagram), I HSCA-MLK hearings, 77. 424 the functioning of the surveillance post and that he was asked "if there was some way tliey could be moved." (/-A*?) Tines then called either Chief Hamilton or Williams of the fire department and re- quested they be transferred. (/5.9) Tines" testimony is corroborated by a memorandum he received from Redditt. Dat^d April 4, 1968, it referred to Newsum as being very sympathetic with the sanitation strike and possibly the cause of the threats he had received. (Z^^^) AVlien confronted by the committee with the memorandum. Redditt acknowledged that his request could have been the reason the firemen were transferred. (7^7) In an interview with the committee, Newsum acknowledged he had been very sympathetic with the strike, that his support for it was well known, and that he had in fact passed information to persons affiliated with the strike. (74^) He conceded that his reporting of information may have had something to do witli his transfer, (/.^-?) since such ac- tivity on his behalf would have jeopardized the surveillance post. Wliile Wallace did not have a history of specific activities that would account for his transfer, it appeared that his transfer was prompted by Redditt's request to Tines. Wallace's and Newsum's supervisor, James O. Barnett, recalled that the transfers were made because some- one in the police department Avas un com foi-t able with Black firemen sympathetic to the strike in the vicinity of the surveillance post. (744) The committee found that the transfers of Newsum and Wallace were made at the request of the Memphis Police Department out of a concern for the security of the surveillance post. Redditt himself was the person who initiated the request. The committee found that the transfers in no way facilitated the assassination or the escape of the assassin. The firemen obviously had no protective or surveillance responsibilities. Allegations that the trsuisfers were part of a con- spiracy to assassinate Dr. King were determined to be groundless.^^ (d) The po.'iUts.9a.<^smafion performfince of the Mrmphis police The committee also investigated the possibility that the postas- sassination conduct of the Memphis Police Department was indicative of an official effort to facilitate the escai)e of the assassin. When Dr. King was shot at approximately 6 p.m. on April 4, 1968, there were from 53 to 66 law enforcement officers within a mile of the Lorraine Motel. (7^5) Tncluded in this force were six "fact'' or tactical units, each consisting of three or four vehicles. The jMirpose of the tact units was to respond to any disorder or emergency.'' ( 746*) One of the units " Many of the aUecations of conspiracy the committee investigated were first raised l)y Mark Lane, the attorney who represented .Tames Earl Ray at the committee's public hear ings. As has been noted, the facts were often at variance with Lane's assertions. For example. Coy Dean Cowden did not see James Earl Ray at a service station at the time of the assassination (section II A G a). Further. (Jrace Waldeti was not hospitalized to prevent her from teslifyinR and presenting exculpatory information on behalf of Ray (section II A 6 c) : and the FBI did not lure Dr. King to the Ixirraine Motel for the purpose of setting lilni up for assassination (section IT D 1). Finally, the cnininittce found that Detective Edward Redditt was not relieved of his post to strip Dr. King of security, andIn FircnifMi Xcwsuiii and many instances, the W'allacf committeewerefound not traiisfcrnd ti> assure that Lane was willingtheto escape of anconspiracy advocate assassin. theories publicly without having checked the factual basis for them. In other instances. Lane proclaimed conspiracy based on little more than inference and Innuendo. Lane's conduct resulted in public misperceptlon about the assassination of Dr. King and must be condemned. '"The tact units had been patrolling the streets immediately surrounding the Lorraine until, in response to a reipiest from someone in Dr. King's party, they were ordered to pull back so as not to be visible from the Lorraine. (See MLK exhibit F-19.% affidavit of William O. Crumbv, IV, IISCA-MLK hearings, 270.) 425 (tact 10) Avas on a rest break at fire station 2 within 100 yards of the Lorraine Motel. (Z^^) Aside from the 12 officers in tact 10, there were two other officers in the immediate vicinity of the motel — Patrolman Richmond, in his observation post at fire station 2 and Marrell McCullongh, an under- cover officer who was in the Lorraine parking lot.(/4^) Despite the presence of so many law enforcement officers, James Earl Ray was able to assassinate Dr. King, gather his belongings and successfully flee the sc^ne without being ol>served by a single police- man. Ray's ability to avoid detection has led to speculation that there may have been official complicity in the assassination by Memphis of- ficials. This suspicion has even been voiced by members of the Memphis Police Department. (Z^^) Consequently, the committee closely scrutinized the actions of key law enforcement personnel following the shooting. The committee sought to determine : (1) what actually occurred following Dr. King's assassination; (2) whether this conduct constituted irregular or sub- standard performance on the part of the local law enforcement per- sonnel; and (3) if this conduct indicated official complicity in the murder of Dr. King. Ray was able to escape the scene without detection for two main reasons: All of the officers rushed tow^ard the Lorraine immediately after the shot, leaving South Main Street unsecured ; and there was, in fact, no contingency plan for units in case of trouble near the Lorraine. Right after Dr. King was shot, McCullough, who was stand- ing in the parking lot of the Lorraine, ran to Dr. King's side in an effort to render aid. (75^) Simultaneously, Richmond ran from his observation post to a telephone several feet away and placed a call to the intelligence section at police headquarters to inform them of the assassination. {151 ) Eleven membere of tact 10 had been on a rest break at the fire sta- tion for several minutes, (7-5^) while one member had remained in the lead patrol vehicle to monitor the radio. (755) Upon realizing Dr. King was shot, the 11 men in the firehouse hurriedly exited the build- ing and started to rush tow^ard the Lorraine. Most dropped over a 10- foot retaining wall at the rear of the fire station in their rush toward the Tx)rraine.(75^) Some of them then went to the balcony, while others continued north and then west back to South Main Street. {155) Tlie commander of the unit remained at tlie edge of the retaining wall for a few moments, from which he saw most of the men running to the Lorraine. He then returned to South Main Street where he moved iiorthward toward the room inghouse. (756") The other patrolman who ] ad not gone over the wall also remained at its edge for a few moments. He t]ien went to the lead patrol vehicle to radio news of the assassina- ' ion. (757) The lead patrol vehicle was parked adjacent to the firehouse. Upon realizing something had happened, the member of the unit who had stayed in the vehicle ran a short distance along the side of the fire- '^ouse. Ho then returned to the vehicle and radioed news of the shoot- ing to tlie police dispatcher. (/5<§) After he was joined by the member of the unit who had returned to the car, they pulled out and turned south on Main Street to get to the Lorraine. (755) 426 The focus of attention of all members of the Mem])his Police Depart- ment -^vas on the Lorraine. During this time. Ray apparentl^y exited the roominghonse on South Main, moved southward. dro])pod his bundle into the inset doorway of Canii)e's Anuisement Co., entered his white Mustang parked just south of Canipe's and sped northward on South Main. It seemed likely that Ray dropped the bundle with its incrim- inating evidence because he either observed the members of tact 10 departing the firehouse to rush to the Lorraine, or else because he spotted the lead tact 10 vehicle parked on the north side of the fire- house and protruding on the sidewalk. Ray's departure in the Mustang ai)parently ))receded the arrival on South Main of two officers from tact 10 by only a matter of seconds. The two approached the roominghouse on South Main from opposite directions after having first concentrated their attention on the Tjor- raine. (160) The failure of the units ])atrolling the general vicinity to have a contingency plan in case of trouble near the Lorraine also contrib- uted to Ray's ability to escape. The assassination took place at approx- imately 6:01 p.m. Although members of the Memphis Police Depart- ment were aware of the event almost immediately, it was not until approximately 6:03 i).m., after receiving confirmation, that the dis- patcher transmitted its occurrence over the air. (161) Immediately thereafter, patrol cars and units in the genei-al vicinity began moving toward the immediate area of the Lorraine. This activity, however, duplicated the individual actions of both the undercover policeman and the members of tact 10. Further, it was not until 6:06 p.m., almost 5 minutes after the assassination, that the dis]:)atcher ordered the two- block area around the Lorraine and the roominghouse sealed of(.(162) By this time, Ray had almost certainly left the vicinity of the Lorraine and was headed out of Memphis. Other questions about the ])erformance of the Memphis Police De- partment have been raised. They pertained to the extent of the MPD fugitive hcarch, the failure of the MPD to issue an all points bulletin for the white Mustang, and its failure to establish roadblocks on the major ailcries leading out of Memphis. At 6 :07 i).m., the disj)atcher was advised by a member of tact 10 that the murder weapon had been recovered in front of 424 South Main Street and that the suspect had run south on South Main. (7/9-?) At 6:08 p.m., the description of the suspect was broadcast as a young, well-dressed white male, and at 6:10 ]).m., the (lescri))tion of the sus- pected getaway car as a late model white Mustang was l)roadcast.(7^.^) Memphis Police Dei)artment records reflecting the actions of the I general ward cars and tact units with res))ect to the extent of the fugi- tive search conducted immediately following the assassination do not exist. The committee, however, was able to reconstruct a broad outline of these actions through an examination of the April 4, 1968, MPD radiotapes and a series of interviews with individuals involved. The transcript of the April 4, 1068. Memi)his Police Department radio transmissions inunediately following the assassination reflected that the general ward cars halted at least three white ]\rustangs,(/^-5) though it was impossible for the committee to ascertain the actual number of such vehicles halted. (7/?^) Nevertheless, field interviews 427 conducted by the committee revealed that none of the city's tact units engaged in a fugitive search following the assassination. (i^7) This meant that an approximate total of from 49 to 110 patrol vehicles and from 186 to 44:0 INIemphis law enforcement officers never responded to the 6:10 p.m. broadcast of the white Mustang. According to Mem- phis Police Department officials, the reason for the failure of the tact units to engage in the search was that their piimary concern was with the rioting, firebombing and looting that occurred throughout the city following news of the assassination. (7^5) This was corroborated in interviews with various members of miscellaneous tact units. (7^.9) The committee's investigation further revealed that, contrary to established Memphis Police Department procedures, roadblocks were not established on major arteries leaving INIemphis, and an all points bulletin (APB) for a white Mustang was never broadcast to the sur- rounding jurisdictions, including Arkansas, Mississippi, and Ala- bama. (77^) The committee's investigation revealed that, in all prob- ability Ray was already two to three blocks away from the rooming- house making his escape in the white IVIustang by the time the news of the assassination was broadcast at 6 :03 p.m. By 6 :06 p.m., when the two-block area around the crime scene had been sealed off, Ray could have been in Arkansas. By 6:10 p.m., when the description of the white Mustang was broadcast, Ray could have been halfway to the Mississippi State line. These time estimates are significant only if Ray did in fact drive to either Arkansas or Mississippi. Based on Ray's testimony to the com- mittee, (/'//) corroborated in part by the fact that he did abandon the Mustang in Atlanta, Ga., the following morning, it is probable that Ray did drive to the Mississippi State line following the assassina- tion. The route through Mississippi would have been the quickest to Atlanta. The failure of the dispatcher to alert the neighboring States, therefore, scene of themay have substantially facilitated Ray's flight from the assassination. According to the MPD officer who was in charge of communica- tions at the time of the assassination, it was his negligence that re- sulted inno APB broadcast and no roadblocks on major arteries. (77^) The officer stated that the loop lights had been switched to red to permit the passage througli town of emergency vehicles, and emer- gency radio silence had been maintained following news of the as- sassination. He stated, however, that a signal Y, calling for an APB and roadblocks, was never broadcast due to the immense volume of traffic and confusion in the aftermath of the assassination. Further, it was not his normal practice to issue an APB to Mississippi because of "a past history of noncooperation from that State." The committee found the performance of the Memphis Police De- partment deficient following the assassination in a number of respects. The absence of a contingency plan to seal off the area around the Lor- raine immediately was inexcusable, especially in light of the violence that had occurred during Dr. King's appearance in Memphis on March 28. Since the MPD was aware of numerous threats to Dr. King, it had good reason to expect trouble in the vicinity of the Lorraine, as the number of tactical units assigned to the area indicated. It would have only been logical, in the view of the committee, to have developed 428 a contingency plan for the use of these tactical units. Similarly, the failure to issue an all points bulletin or to block egress routes from the city was indefensible. Nevertheless, the committee found no evi- dence that the substandard performance of the Memphis police in the aftermath of the assassination was part of a conspiracy to facil- itate the assassination of Dr. King or the escape from Memphis of Jamas Earl Ray. The committee found, instead, that these defects resulted from inadequate supervision, lack of foresight and individ- ual negligence. They did not constitute complicity in the assassination. 3. MISSOURI STATE PENITENTIARY The committee also examined James Earl Ray's escape from the Missouri State Penitentiar\% which occurred on April 23, 1967.(775) The possibility of the involvement of prison authorities in the escape had been raised by critics, based on two separate sets of circumstances : (1) The release, shortly after Ray's escape, of a fugitive- wanted poster with incorrect fingerprints; (2) the apparent need for Ray to have secured inside assistance. The committee sought information from a variety of sources. First, it undertook a complete review of existing prison rex?ords, including vi.sitor cards, (i7^) financial records, (777) and the report of the prison's official investigation into the escape. (77t^) Second, extensive field interviews were held with key prison officials and former inmate or criminal associates of Ray, {179) Finally, sworn testimony was taken from members of the assassin's immediate family, as well as from Ray himself." Following the escape, prison officials issued a wanted poster to hundreds of law enforcement agencies throughout the country that had Ray's photograph and physical description on it. The fingerprints on the poster were, however, tliose of another escaped prisoner, (7^6?) leading to speculation that government authorities had sought to thwart Ray's apprehension and thus facilitate the assassination. The committee was informed by Hariy F. Lauf, the records officer at the prison, that the erroneous poster had been printed by inmates at ]\roberly Training Center for Men, a medium security institution at Moberly, lSlo.{lSl). Wlien the poster was ready for distribution, Lauf did not check the prints aSen/rify hire.<) and the investigations of Dr. King, the SCLC and the civil rights movement in general became its responsi- bility. The Eacial Intelligence Section also carried out the separate COINTELPRO campaign against so-called Black nationalist hate groups and their leaders, including the SCLC (the campaign was formally initiated in August 1967) (11) and Dr. King (formally initiated in March 1968 ).(i^) The Crime Records Division, the Bureau's principal point of contact with Congress and the news media, was the conduit for many of the COINTELPRO initiatives, includ- ing derogatory information on Dr. King, (ir?) FBI field offices also had an important role in the security investiga- tions as well as COINTELPRO. With respect to the security investi- gations, Atlanta was designated as the "office of origin," coordinating point for data obtained by all field offices on the SCLC and Dr. King. (14) With respect to COINTELPRO, field offices were asked to submit proposals on ways to implement the program. (U) Virtually all COINTELPRO proposals originated in the field offices and were promptly passed through the Bureau hierarchy for review and authorization. (76") The Department of Justice played a role in the security investi- gation, since it was necessary to obtain the Attorney General's ap- proval to tap telephones, (i7) but the Department had no role in COINTELPRO. Nevertheless, both the 1977 Justice Department Task Force and the Senate select committee found that the Department failed in its responsibility to supervise the FBI during the develop- ment of COINTELPRO operations, and the committee concurred in this judgment. The position of the FBI toward Dr. King and the SCLC cannot be understood apart from personalities. As noted. Dr. King was a social critic, and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was a man who strongly resented criticism of the Bureau from any source. The initial personal interest of Hoover in Dr. King is said to have originated with an article in The Nation in 1959 in which Dr. King commented on the scarcity of Black Federal agents, including FBI agents, (i^") This and subsequent criticisms of the FBI by Dr. King were undoubtedly one explanation for Hoover's intense animosity toward the civil rights leader. Examples of the Director's attitude appeared with frequency during the com- mittee's review of FBI files. In February 1962, James Bland, Chief of the Subversive Control Section, sent a memorandum to Assistant Di- rector Sullivan asking whether King should be warned about the suspected Communist background of one of his advisers. A copy of the memo was sent to Hoover who rejected the proposal, writing in the margin, "King is no good anyway." ^(19) In December 1963, Time announced its decision to name Dr. King "Man of the Year." Hoover wrote on a copy of the news release on the decision, "They had to dig deep in the garbage to come up with this one."(^6>) Hoover's resent- ment had apparently been compounded by remarks made by Dr. King in 1962 in Albany, Ga., criticizing the Bureau for its failure to pursue 3 The Bureau passed the Information to the Justice Department which, In turn, Informed Dr. King of the allegation. 434 aggressively civil rights violations in the South. In the opinion of several FBI agents questioned by the committee, the Albany statement was, from the Director's standpoint, the single most significant reason for the feud. (^7) one that came to a public climax in November 1964, when Hoover, in a press briefing, referred to Dr. King as "the most notorious liar" in the country. (22) In addition to Dr. King's criticism of the FBI, other factors were suggested to the committee to explain the Director's deep-seated hostility. They include "qualities of racism" in Hoover's charac- ter: (^-5) Dr. King's violation of the Director's strict, almost puri- tanical, standards for behavioi- by members of the clergy; (24) ^^^ Dr. King's philosophy of nonviolence, thought to stand at odds with the Director's personal belief in the ultinuite importance of power. (^5) In addition, it was suggested to the connnittee that Hoover, whose opposition to communism was unswerving, was convinced that Dr. King and his movement were susceptible to Comnnmist influence, (^^) even though a contrary assessment had been made by FBI experts. (1) Hoover's dislike for Dr. King. — The conunittee concluded, based on an exhaustive review of FBI files and on the sworn testi- mony of former FBI and Justice Department officials, that the cam- paign to discredit Dr. King, up to the time of his death and bevond, {27) continued as long as it did and as intensely as it did only be- cause of Hoover's deep personal dislike for Dr. King, Evidence ob- tained by the committee indicated that the allegation that Dr. King posed a threat to national security was merely a convenient rationaliza- tion used by the Director to justify his personal vendetta against the civil rights leader. For exami)le, in April 1062, the Atlanta "office of origin'' cluded (^5)there submitted to headquarters was no significant a report Communist on Dr.being influence King exerted that con- on him. {29) Nevertheless, Hoover ordered that Dr. King's name be added to section A of the reserve index.* {SO) And, by October 1062, a full- scale security investigation of Dr. King and the SCLC had begun, (r?^) The initiation of these investigations, however, can- not be attributed wholly to the personal animosity of Hoover. They also stemmed from a general concern by the FBI about Communist in- filtration ofthe civil rights movement that was prom])ted by influ- ential people, including Congressmen, who claimed that pending civil rights legislation Avas ins]>ired by a Communist conspiracy. The investigations that followed, on the other hand, revealed there was little l)asis in fact for this concern. {SS) In August 1068, the Domes- tic Intelligence Division completed a synopsis of the Commimist Party's effort to exploit the American Negro. (.?4) It concluded that while the party had expended enormous effoit and resources to influ- ence and conti'ol Black Americans, it had been largely unsuccess- ful, (.f.5) In sworn testimonv before the committee, agents from the Domestic Intelligence Division insisted that their conclusion of insig- nificant infiltration into the civil rights movement reflected their pro- fessional judgment then as well as in lOTfi. {SO) < As dpsrribpd by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations Wltli Respect to Intelligence Activities, the Index was for people who, the FBI believed, " * • * in a time of national emerpency [were] in a position to inflnence others apainst the national interest or were likely to fnrnlsh material financial aid to subversive elements due to their subversive associations and ideology." (.?/) 435 Director Hoover's reaction, reflected in notes appended to the synop- sis, was sharply critical : This memo reminds me vividly of those I received when Castro took over Cuba. You contended tlien that Castro and his cohorts were not Communists and not influenced by Com- munists. Time alone proved you wrong * * ^.{37) Hoover's irritation resulted in a sharp and immediate change in the position of the Domestic Intelligence Division. Reacting to Dr. King's famous "I Have a Dream" address, Svdlivan wrote in a memorandum to Assistant to the Director Alan Belmont : The Director is correct. We were completely wrong about believing the evidence was not sufficient to determine some years ago that Fidel Castro was not a Communist or mider Communist influence. In investigating and writing about communism and the American Negro, we had better remem- ber this and profit by the lesson it should teach. * * * Personally, J believe in the light of King's powerful demagogic speech yesterday he stands head and shoulders over all other Negro leaders put together when it comes to influencing great masses of Negroes. We must mark hini now, if we have not done so before, as the most dangerous Negro of the future in this Nation from the standpoint of communism, the Negro, and national security. (38) By the end of 1963, FBI files reflected a marked difference in the Bureau's approach toward Dr. King and the beginning of a campaign to discredit him. On December 23, 1963, a conference was held in Wash- ington, (-55) with members of the Atlanta field office and the headquar- ters Domestic Intelligence Division in attendance. A memorandum written by Sullivan the following day summarized the results of the meeting : Recognizing the delicacy of this entire situation because of the prominence of King, the primaiy purpose of the confer- ence was to explore how best to carry on one investigation to produce the desired results without embarrassment to the Bureau. Included in the discussion was a complete analysis of the avenues of approach aimed at neutralizing King as an effective Negro leader and develo]>ing evidence concerning King's continued dependence on Communists, for guidance and direction. (4-0) Less than 2 weeks later, the direction of the Bureau's developing course of action beer me clear. Assistant Director Sullivan authorized a proposal that the FBI consider promoting a new leader for the Black community who Avould alleviate the confusion expected once Dr. King had been "taken off his pedestal. "(//7) Hoover attached s note to Sullivan's memo : I am glad to see that light has finally, though dismally delaved, come to the DID. I strujigled for months to get over the fact that the Communists were taking over the racial it.(m movement but our experts here couldn't and wouldn't see 436 (2) Electronic surveillance of Dr. King. — From October 24, 1963, to June 21, 1966, (.f?) the FBI also eno:ao:ed in an extensive proo:ram of electronic surveillance of I)i-. Kinjif. The committee found it was conducted in a particularly abusive fashion. ¥\M at^ents who monitored the devices, although they were initially instructed to be especially alert for contacts between Dr. King and Communist connections, (^) exercised little discretion in deciding wdiat to overhear and record. Private and personal conversations were recorded, as were conver- sations between Dr. King and Government officials.^ In fact, the development of personal information that might be derogatory to Dr. King became a major objective of the surveillance effort. (4'^) The committee found that the Department of Justice shared respon- sibility for the surveillance, since it was initially authorized by Attor- ney General Robert F. Kennedy." (4/>) The nature of the Bureau's campaign against Dr. King is vividly illustrated by one incident. Shortly after Director Hoover's press conference in November 1964, in which he referred to Di'. King as the country's "most notorious liar,"(/J^) a package was mailed to Dr. King. It contained an anonymous diatribe against the civil riegan to consider microphone and technical surveillance (bugs and wiretaps) of John Ray and Carol Pejjper, Ray's brother and lister, at their homes and at the Grapevine Tavern, a St. Louis business they jointly owned and operated. The justification used in the authorization re- followsquest ^^: transmitted to the Justice Department on May 13 read as These installations could assist in the early a])prehension of the subject, which could possibly be instrumental in reduc- ing the stresses and tension placed on our national security subsequent to the death of Maitin Luther King, Jr. (7/4) The committee, after a thorough consideration of circumstances surrounding the surveillance request, was concerned about several aspects of the surveillance proposal. First, the national security justification seemed, at best, to have been insubstantial, since the rioting that had been triggered by Dr. King's assassination had subsided. In addition, it is clear that the requested electronic surveillance, if installed, would almost cei tainly have been judged illegal under 1968 constitutional standards. The purpose, stated explicitly in FBI memoiandums, was to surveil the family in hopes of apprehending Ray and not to gather evidence of the commis- sion of a crime by Carol Pepper or John Ray.(//.5) Moreover, as to Carol Pepper at least, there was no significant evidence in FBI files to indicate her involvement in any criminal activity. Absent a clear threat "In early 1968, Internal Department of .Tustice procedures required that electronic sur- veillance, whether by wiretap or bug, be submitted to the Attorney General for approval prior to installation. 447 to national security or probable cause as to the commission of a crime that might have justified an effort to secure a judicial warrant, no constitutional basis existed for the surveillance. Finally, a clear statu- tory basis for such surveillance did not become law until June 19, 1968. It is clear that the FBI recognized these legal difficulties. In an in- ternal FBI memorandum analyzing the legality of the proposed sur- veil ance, iis t stated : The worst that could happen [if the proposed electronic surveillance were implemented] * * * is that we illegally learn where the subject is located and thus are able to arrest him on that knowledge * * *, The Court would not allow the prose- cution to use as evidence any information obtained through the illegal surveillance but the illegal surveillance would not taint the use of any other evidence obtained either before or after and which was gotten in a legal manner. Nor, to repeat, would the illegality of the arrest alone resulting from where- abouts disclosed by unlawful surveillance, prevent the Court from trying the subject for the offense. ^"^ (//tf) The memorandum continued and w^arning : * * * that since this search and seizure is unconstitutional as to the Peppers, they have at least a theoretical cause of action for damages against those who installed the devices by trespass * * *. Moreover, in any such case the Go\'ernment of the United States should sureh^ be willing to pick up the tab for any judgment had against those who installed the micro- phones. (7i7) The initials of Assistant to the Director DeLoach and Associate Direc- tor Tolson appear on this memorandum. The committee found that the willingness of the FBI to prooeed with this investigative approach in the face of an internal legal analy- sis recognizing its unconstitutional nature reflected an absence of con- cern for the fundamental rights of the surveillance targets. In addition, the proposal was a clear indication either of the Bureau's failure to consider seriously the possibility of conspiratorial involvement by members of Ray's family, or of its reckless disregard for the damage that this investigative approach could have done to any later prosecu- tion of Ray's brothers. Assuming, as FBI officials clearly did, the illegality of the proposed electronic surveillance, any evidence of conspiracy intercepted by the tap would have been inadmissible against individuals with standing to contest that illegality ; in addition, the installation of an illegal tap or bug would have raised significant taint problems ^^ and seriously jeopardized the ability to use any subse- quently developed evidence in a later conspiracy prosecution. The problems that could have been created by the FBI's proposal never materialized. While Attornev General Clark had no recollection "This memorandum appears in full as MLK exhibit F-502, VIT HSCA-MLK hearings, p. 11. ■>' A problem arises when tlie defendant In a criminal prosecution argues that evidence is inadmissible against him because It was developed as a result of, or "through the exploitation of," prior Illegal conduct by the Oovernment. If this conduct can be shown, the evidence is said to he "tainted" and is inadmissible against the defendant. 448 of receiving or acting on the recjuest, it seems clear from the files and from interviews that the proposal sent to the Justice Department was neither authorized nor implemented. The FBI case agent for the assassination investigation in St. Tvouis field office, whicli had jurisdic- tion for the area of the proposed electronic surveillance, told commit- tee investigators he autliorized no electronic surveillance in the MUR- KIN investigation. He stated specifically there were no surreptitious entries into the Ray family residences or the Grapevine. (775) In addi- tion, the committee's review of the St. Louis field office files and of the FBI headquarters MURKIN files produced no evidence of implemen- tation of the electronic surveillance. In a June 11, 1968, memorandum to Attorney General Clark, Direc- tor Hoover withdrew the May 13 request for electronic surveillance in light of Ray's apprehension in London. (775) When questioned in public hearings, former Assistant to the Di- rector DeLoach stated that the opinion of the Division and the attorney who provided the legal analysis of the proposed electronic surveil- lance was ap])arently that this investigative step would have been illegal. (7^^) He also acknowledged that his initials appeared on that memorandum {121) and that he had reviewed the memorandum at the timQ. {122) When asked by staff counsel to explain this attempt by the FBI to use wliat was analyzed and recognized by FBI head- quarters as unconstitutional and illegal electronic surveillance in the assassination investigation, DeLoach responded : DeLoach. jVIy only answer * * * jg that I did not recall these memoranda. You have given me the opportunity of reviewing them. I recall none of the circumstances surround- ing them. The Department of Justice makes the legal deter- mination insofar as the FBI is concerned. The FBI was fol- lowing an investigative lead through the Department of Justice and the Department of Justice had the resj)onsibility of either accepting it or turning it down in accordance with the rules of the United States as understood by the Attorney General. Staff Couxsel. Would it be fair to conclude from these memos that the FBI in recommending this investigative step was willing to engage in what it recognized as a violation of constitutional rights of the Pep])ers and perhai)s of other peo- ple in order to achieve tlie investigative ends of the proposal ? DeLoacii. The conclusion I draw from it is the FBI was very seriously concerned about the national security of the United States by the incident I mentioned previously and the fervent desire to a])|)i'ehend tlie man res])ousible for the assassination of Dr. King. They followed an investigative lead to the Attorney General, and tlie Attoi'ney General would make a decision as to whether or not this would be oi-oduf- t\\cAl2S\ Efforts to secure precise infoiinatio)i on Ray's location from the family did not meet with immediato lesults. Nevertheless, in a May 9 interview in St. Louis, John Ray reported that James had mentioned an intention to leave the country if he escaped and that he had indi- 449 cated, on one occasion, admiration for Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith. (1^4) On May 10, based on the interview as well as on other independent evidence of Ray's interest in African coun- tries, (i^-5) FBI headquarters initiated a passport review in the Washington field office. (7^^) It was directed initially at the 2,100,000 applications that had been filed since April 1967, the month of Ray's escape from Missouri State Penitentiary. Washington requested Canadian authorities to review Canadian passports records. (i^7) (3) Ray arrested in London. — On June 1, a break occurred when a possible photographic match of Ray turned up in the Canadian pass- Sort of George Ramon Sneyd. RCMP officials determined from the [ennedy Travel Bureau in Toronto that "Sneyd" had purchased a Toronto-London-Toronto airlines ticket, with a scheduled departure of May 6, and return on May 21, 1908. Meanwhile the FBI ascertained through fingerprint comparisons that Ray and ''Sneyd" were, in fact, the same person, (i^^) One week laterj at 11:11 a.m. on June 8, 1968, Ray was arrested in Heathrow Airport in London. ic) The conspiracy investigation The conclusion reached by the Justice Department and the FBI fol- lowing their investigation was that James Earl Ray, acting alone, killed Martin Luther King, Jr. In interviews conducted and testimony taken by the committee, no dissent from this conclusion was voiced. Director Hoover's views on the question of conspiracy were clearly stated in a memorandum he wrote on June 20, 1968, summarizing a discussion with Attorney General Clark. At one point during the conversation. Hoover said, "* * * in Ray's case, we have not found a single angle that would indicate a conspiracy." Later in the discus- sion, he added his personal opinion that ''he [Ray] acted entirely alone," but then assured the Attorney General that "we are not clos- ing our minds that others might be associated with him and we have to run down every lead." {129) Clark, in an interview with the committee, indicated his agreement with Hoover's inclined to view views, adding that the assassination the Bureau was in conspiratorial termsprobably than he more was. As Clark explained, he believed instinctively that Dr. King's death was the act of an eccentric racist loner. He said he believed that Ray's reference to a brother with respect to the rifle exchange in Birming- ham the week before the assassination (a^ remai'k that was to provide the factual basis for a Federal conspiracy complaint filed in that city approximately 2 weeks after the assassination) was merely an ex- cuse created by the assassin on the spur of the moment, rather than sound evidence of conspiracy. (i.?6>) Clark characterized the evidence developed during the investiga- tion in the following manner : I don't recall any presentation of evidence as distinguished from the circumstances that ever implied direct involvement of another person, and simultaneously I believe I saw an enormous amount of evidence of the direct participation of a single person whose identity was fairly consistently estab- lished because I felt I should go on the facts available rather than the circumstances. (131 ) 450 Despite the ultimate conclusion of officials in both the Justice De- partment and the FBI that no conspiracy existed in the assassina- tion, FBI invest iofative files reflect throueing taken in light of President Nixon's reported plan "to take the position in a future press conference that the Federal Government was continuing to give intensive interest to the possibility of the existence of a conspiracy." (y^c^) Following some discussion, a decision was made to attempt an im- mediate interview of Ray. The Memphis field office contacted Shelby County District Attorney Phil N. Canale, Ray's attorney, Percy Fore- man,^* and Harr\^ Aveiy, Commissioner of the Tennessee Depaitment of Corrections. Foreman approved the interview of his client, (169) and neither Canale nor Avery raised objections. The interview itself was conducted by Memphis SAC Jensen. Au- thority for the FBI to conduct the interview was given by D. Robert Owen. {170) Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Justice De- partment's Civil Rights Division. In an interview with the committee, Owen recalled no consideration of the possibility of havins: a Depart- ment attorney present during the interview. Director Hoover gave specific instructions that results of the interview be given to him prior to dissemination to the Depai'tment.(777) Jensen's intei-\'iew with Ray lasted 50 minutes. It covered a variet}' of topics, including Ray's dissatisfaction with his attorneys, his plans to reopen his case, Charles Stephens, Charles Stein. "The FBI" tele- vision show, fingerprints on the rifle and Inspector Thomas Butler of Scotland Yard. Ray provided no evidence supporting the possibility of a conspiracy. (/7^) Ray was not accompanied by an attorney during the interview, nor was he informed specifically of his right to have a lawyer present; his right to terminate the interview at will ; his right to remain silent; to have the Government pay for a lawyer if he could not afford one; or the Government's ability to use his statements against him at a later date (Miranda rights). In an interview with the committee, Jensen "A revffw of the Mlnml fiold officp ^fPRKIX filps. for pynmplp. rovpals no IphcI spnt out Hanes. to from Washington or Memphis following Ray's mention of "Miami address" in his letter ** Ray was talflng steps at this time to replace Foreman with court-appointed attorneys to handle an appeal from his guilty plea. No attorney had yet been appointed. 459 confirmed that he did not advise Ray formally of his Miranda rights, explaining tliat surrounding circumstances, including Ray's exten- sive criminal record, indicated that he was aware of his rights with- out formal notification. Moreover, Jensen stated that the interview was not a hostile one, that he had called the guard to terminate the interview when Ray stated he wished to leave, and that he changed the subject matter of the interview when Ray refused to continue along a specific line. (i7-5) Accepting the accuracy of Jensen's recollection, the committee was disturbed by his failure to consider the implications of interviewing Ray without prior advice of his Miranda rights, as well as by the lack of concern for the defendant's constitutional rights as evidenced by this interview procedure. This interview of Ray was the first official effort to gain information on the possibility of conspiracy from the self-confessed assassin. The ability to use any of Ray's statements in a conspiracy case against him would have depended on the Govern- ment's ability to survive a motion to suppress the statements that would automatically be filed by a defense counsel. The committee recognized that many law enforcement officials be- lieved the administration of Miranda rights inhibit a person from freely divnlsring information he may possess. Jensen may well have believed that he would be able to establish a more productive rapport if he omitted the formal warnings. While this argument is not without merit, the committee believed that the fundamental protections de- signed to be achieved by the administration of Miranda warnings required that they be given to Ray in this case, regardless of competing strategic considerations. (774-) (e) Conchision The FBI's investigation of Dr. King's assassination exemplified, at times, the best of police work. Efforts first to identify and then to locate and apprehend Ray represented the work of thousands of agents on a national and international scale. In addition, close coordination was required with law enforcement authorities in Mexico, Canada, and Europe. At times the work was meticulous and tedious ; ultimately, the fugitive investigation only can be categorized a success. Tlie committee received testimony indicating that the major effort made by the Bureau in the investigation, apprehension, and prosecu- tion of Ray may well have reflected Director Hoover's concern that failure might be attributed to his well-publicized animosity for Dr. King. In executive session testimony before the committee, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark stated : I had the stroni-hing in its power to investigate this case quickly, effectively, and successfully, and it wasn't just losric. It was, I mean, mv total bein.^r told me that the thing Mr. Hoover really loved most, the Bureau, was on the line here, and that if they couldn't produce here where many would suspect their concei-n, that their failure would do more damage to them in the T^^i'^ds of the people than any other case thej' had worked on.(/7.5) 460 Similar sentiments were voiced by other officials from both the Justice Department and the FBI. (176) Ironically, this explanation for the best in the investigation may also explain the worst. The disturbing investigative "excesses" detailed above — including the proposal of illegal electronic surveillance, FBI participation in an ongoing process of mail interception at the Shelby County jail, and the failure to administer Miranda rights prior to Ray's post-guilty plea interview — may well also reflect the imix)rtance placed on the case by Director Hoover. While the com- mittee stresses that it had no direct evidence to this effect, it is clear that in all three incidents a priority was placed on investigative breaks with a sinuiltaneous tendency to overlook the constitutional rights of the parties involved. It seemed reasonable to assume that this reflected, at least in part, pressure from above. III. EECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS In 1968, the Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Vio- lence— the Eisenhower Commission — conducted an extensive study which dealt, in part, with assassination. Ilepoiis prepared for the Commission concluded that the level of assassination in America was high,(i) particularly in relation to other Western democracies and populous countries. (^) Indeed, nine U.S. Presidents, one in four, have been the targets of assassins (table 1), and four died as a result. (,^) In addition, between 1835 and 1968, 81 other public officials or candi- dates. Federal, State, and local, were assaulted, some fatally. (4) The Eisenhower Commission did not offer a definition of assassina- tion, although its basic elements were specified in papers prepared for the Commission. Assassination was seen as a murder whose target was a prominent political figure; there was a political motive for the murder; or the murder would have a political impact. (5) The exist- ence of any one of the three elements, it was pointed out, would qualify a murder as an assassination. The Eisenhower Commission also identified five broad categories of assassination. It noted that not all of them had historical prece- dents in the United States. (6) The categories were based on objectives: (1) assassination as a means by which one political elite re- places another without effecting systemic or idealogical change; (2) assassination whose purpose is to destroy the legitimacy of the ruling elite and to effect systemic or ideological change ; (3) assassination ordered by the ruling elite to counteract polit- ical challenge ; (4) assassination for propaganda purposes — to promote an ideology; and (5) assassination to satisfy the pathological needs of abnormal individuals acting under an ideological guise. The Eisenhower Commission found the typical assassination in the United States to be the act of a deranged, self-appointed savior. (7) In contrast to worldwide patterns, assassination by an organized poli- tical group was thought to be rare in this country. Only in the years immediately following the Civil War was assassination undertaken by organized groups to alter government through terror. Further, while the Commission identified as many as 11 public officials who had been targeted for assassination by organized criminal elements, it characterized the victims as low-level officeholders who had either threatened the criminal elements or had been involved with them. (8) The classic form of assassination, therefore, did not generally apply to the United States. (461) 462 TABLE 1.— ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST PRESIDENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES Assailant and professed Method of attack Activity of victim Year Victim or alleged reason and result at time of attack 1835 Andrew Jackson. Richard Lawrence; Pistol, misfired Washington, D.C. Attending funeral declared insane, said service in Capitol rotunda. Jackson was prevent- ing him from obtain- ing large sums of money. 1865 Abraham Lincoln. John W. Booth; loyalty Pistol, killed do. Attending theatrical to the Confederacy, performance Ford Theatre. in revenge for defeat, slavery issue. 1881 James Garfield. Charles Guiteau; dis- Passing through train gruntled office-seeker, station to go on vacation. supporter of opposite faction Party. of Republican 1901 William McKinley. Leon F. Czolgosz; an- do Buffalo, N.Y.... Standing in reception archist ideology. line at Pan-American 1912 Theodore Roosevelt John Schrank; declared Pistol, wounded... Milwaukee, Wis. Exposition. (candidate). insane, had vision Leavmg liverhotel to de- a campaign that McKinley wanted him to avenge his death. speech. 1933 Franklin D. Guiseppe Zangara; hated Pistol, bullets Miami, Fla Roosevelt (Presi rulers and capitalists. missed the Leaving after deliver- President. dent-elect). side ingPark. speech in Bay- 1950 Harry S.Truman.. Oscar Collazo and Automatic weapon, Washington, D.C. Inside Blair Mouse as Griseiio Torresola; prevented from assassins attempted shooting at to break in. Puerto Rican inde- President. pendence. 1963 John F. Kennedy. Lee H. Oswald; motive Rifle, killed Dallas, Tex unknown Taking cade part in motor- streets. through Dallas 1968 Robert F. Kennedy, Sirhan Sirhan; opposi- Pistol, killed Los Angeles, (candidate). tion to U.S. Mideast Calif. Leaving primary cam- paign headquarters policy. through hotel kitchen after delivering speech. Source: Task Force Report, Assassination and Political Violence (National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, October 1969). The legitimacy of achieving change by extralegal actions has long been a subject of debate among philosophers an(i political and legal scholars. (,9) Historically, illegitimate authorities have been over- thrown byforces acting outside the legal process, with the rationale being natural law, customs, or belief in the primacy of spiritual scrip- tures. In ancient Greece, for example, it was considered acceptable to murder usurpers. Likewise, medieval Christian thought acceptable assassination of usurpers, but not of oppressive tyrants, although that distinction eventually disappeared. During the Reformation and Counterreformation, the Jesuit theologian Mariana and the Scottish Calvinist Buchanan held assassination of a tyrant to be acceptable under certain circumstances. Tn recent history, the experience of Nazi Germany — and of this country, as well — in which certain groups have suffered indignities and inequities has served to raise the question once again. But, generally, arguments for justified assassination have applied only to cases of totalitarian rule, illegitimate leadership, or the unjust suppression of certain groups within a society, although many foremost thinkers accept no justification whatsoever for assassination. Tho Eisenhower Commission, nevertheless, asked the question: Had assassination become a part of political life in the United States? It noted that violence seemed interwoven with American history — ^the 463 fight for independence, the Indian wars, slavery and the secession of the South, agrarian reform, the emergence of organized labor, the civil rights movement and conflicts based on religious and ethnic, even poli- tical, grounds. (76>) The Commission also cited factors present at times of assassinations in other countries, (ii) finding them to be increas- ingly evident in the United States: The publication of extremist rhetoric and vilification of political leaders and Government institu- tions, rapid socioeconomic change, widespread belief that legitimate demands of Government are not being met, urban guerrilla warfare, social group confrontations, a belief in the efficacy of violence, all leading to a general atmosphere of violence. Since publication of the Eisenhower Commission's report in 1968, its concern has been underscored by a rash of assassinations or at- tempted assassinations : Governor George Wallace of Alabama in 1972, President Ford, twice, in 1975, California Congressman Leo Ryan and San Francisco Mayor George Moscone in 1978. These acts of assassi- nation, this committee noted, had a disturbing effect on society that goes beyond their immediate impact, which is the deplorable destruc- tion of human life. These results flow not just from the act of assassi- nation itself, but also from the responses it provokes from citizens and from government. The committee found that assassination is more than a deadly assault : It is an attack on the foundations of democracy — majority rule, due process of law, consensual decisionmaking, individual rights and liberties; It undermines the political system by deterring qualified people from seeking public office or exercising leadership ; It produces fear among the citizenry, a "siege mentality," and often leads to the creation of vigilante groups, civil disorder and other counterterrorist activities ; It results in a feeling that the President and other national leaders should be isolated for their protection ; It leads to demands that Government cut short conventional legal processes in bringing assassins to justice and for stronger measures to deal with violence, i.e., increased surveillance, security checks at public facilities, capital punishment and so on ; It exerts pressure on law enforcement agencies that can lead to abuse of authority. The committee also discovered that assassinations in the United States have seldom achieved the end of causing or preventing change. In fact, in many instances the opposite effect has occurred. Change that an act of assassination was designed to prevent has been hastened, and responsible citizens have been bound closer together in working to achieve objectives for the good of society. (/^) Tlie two-party system has been remarkably stnble, and the process for the transfer of the Presidency has been effective. Assassination in the ITnited States has, however, caused serious, destructive upheavals, such as the riots that followed the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Further, the committee recognized that an act of assassination may, in times of strife, result in fundamental change, and a recurrent pattern of such acts might, in time, undermine the social and political systems of the country. 464 The act of assassination and its tlireat demand response by both the citizenrj' and Government. Historically, this response has ranged from the imposition of totalitarian nile to capitulation to the demands of dissidents. In the United States, there has generally been a balanced response. Recognizing that grievances that lead to violence are often legitimate. Government has attempted to eliminate inequitable condi- tions, but it has also prosecuted those who have circumvented legal processes to achieve change. In addition, the Govemmont has sought legislative and administrative means to prevent recurring violence and to provide more protection for those who are threatened by it. The committee was acutely aware of the problem of insuring that civil liberties are preserved, while affording adequate protection to the institutions of democratic society and to public figures,^ It recog- nized the difficulty in finding a balance between liberty and order. In carrying out its mandate requiring it to address the question of legal and administrative responses to assassination, the committee was mindful of the need to Aveigh the costs that could accrue to indi- vidual privacy, group protest, legitimate dissent, political compe- tition and social change against the benefits of stronger protective measures. While the committee addressed itself to legal and administrative measures primarily, it was fully cognizant that they can account only partially for the solution to the problem of violence and assassination. It is equally important that society deal with the fundamentfJ prob- lems that underlie violence and that it always adhere to legal responses. As the Eisenhower Commission aptly observed : [IJf measures of control were this society's only response to violence, they would in the long run exacerbate the prob- lem. The pyramiding of control measures could turn us into a repressive society, where peace is kept primarily through official coercion rather than through willing obedience to law. That kind of society, where law is more feared than respected, where individual expression and movement are curtailed, is violent, too — and it nurtures within itself the seeds of its own violent destruction. (7^) The recommendations that follow are addressed to legislative and administrative issues as well as the conduct of congressional investiga- tions. They are presented in a logical order that does not reflect relative priorities : r. LEGISLATIVE RECX)>rMENDATIONS ON ISSUES INVOLVING THE PROHIBITION, PRE\T.NTIOX AND PROSECUTION OF ASSASSINATIONS AND FEDERALLY COGNIZABLE HOMICIDES (a) Prohibition and prevention 1. The Judid/iry Com/inittee sho^ild procPHs foi' early canMderation hy thf Honse legislation that '\rmiJd make the assa^ifiination, of a Clii^ef of State of any country, or his political equivalent^ a Federal offense. 1 At the request of Chairman Stokes, the American Civil Liberties Union submitted for tho coiimittpp's rpcord a oomTirflifiislvp anah'sis of the rommittee's rPCKmrnondations. See. Lft'islativp and Admlnlstrativp Rpform. Splpot CommlttPP on Assassinations. U.S. House of Rpnresentatlves. rt.jth Cong.. 2d sess., (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Print- ing Office. 1978). vol. I, p- 148 Pt seq. 465 if the- offender is an American citizen or acts on behalf of an American citizen^ or if the offender can he located in the United States. Evidence received by the committee indicated that the CIA, in conjunction with criminal elements in the United States, plotted the death of foreign leaders, (i^) These plots gave rise to widespread speculation that the death of President Kennedy may have been an act taken in retaliation. It was conceded by those involved in the plots that they were without moral justification. (75) Federal law today gives uneven protection to foreign leaders. While assassination is con- trary to executive order, (i^) it is criminal only under limited circum- stances. (77) Proposed legislation would make it criminal. (i5) Testi- mony before the committee supported that legislation. (7^) The com- mittee has no hesitancy in recommending that legislation be enacted embodying a prohibition against the assassination of a foreign leader by those subject to Federal criminal jurisdiction. 2. The Judiciary Committee shoidd process.^ for early consideration hy the House.) comprehensive legislation that loould codify., revise and reform the Federal laic of homicide., paying special attention to assas- sinations. The Judiciary GonKmittee should give appropriate attention to the related offenses of conspiracy., atteinpt., assault., and kidnapping in the context of assassinations. Suxyh legislation should he processed independently of the general proposals for the codification., revision or reform of the Federal crimAnal laio. The Judiciary Committee should address the following issues in considering the legislation: (a) Distinguishing hetween those persons who should receive the protection of Federal law hecause of the official positions they occupy and those persons loho should receive protection of Fed- eral law only in the 2}erformmiee of their official duties; (h) Extending the pi^otection of Federal laio to persons who occupy high judicial and executive positions^ including Justices of the Supreme Court and Cabinet officers; () and about situations where State law ought to control if the target of the assassin is the President. Because of these questions, the committee recommends careful attention to Federal and State issues in drafting comprehensive new legislation. (h) Considerable controversy surrounded the autopsy of President Kennedy. Questions arose over the removal of the body from Dallas, over the nature of the autopsy and the manner in which it was performed. No doubt exists that the President should receive in life the finest medical attention available. Similarly, in death, particularly by un- natural means, the President should receive the best attention by forensic pathologists. Arrangements must also be made to perform forensic autopsies in federally cognizable deaths. Curiously, no Federal statute explicitly designated who is to per- form such auto])sie.s, although authority to perform them in the case of the President's death mav be implied from 18 U.S.C. 1751(h). The committee recommends that any question not answered by existing law(^/) be cleared up in any new legislation. (i) When Public Law 89-141, the Presidential-Vice Presidential statute, was enacted in 1964, language was added to it in 18 U.S.C. 1751 (i) that authorizes the use, in the investigations, of the assistance of the "Anny, Navy, and Air Force, and statute, rule, or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding." Similar language appears in 18 IT.S.C. 351 (g), the Member of Congress statute. Tn all likelihood, (4^) this lan- guage was added to these two statutes to set aside the effect of 18 U.S.C. 1385, which makes it a crime to use the military as a "posse comitatus." Nevertheless, questions were raised before the committer, as to what extent this language might apply to recently passed legislation restrict- ing law enforcement access to certain kinds of Federal records. (4*^) Questions Avere also asked relating to who (4^) had to request the assistance and whether it had to be rendered. (4-5) The committee rec- ommends that attention be given to resolving these questions in the processincf of comprehensive new legislation. (j) T\Tien Public T^aw 89-141, the Presidential -Vice Presidential statute, was enacted in 1965, language was added to it in 18 U.S.C. 1751 (g) authorizing the offer of a reward, not to exceed $100,000, to be paid 469 for information given or services rendered in connection vfdth a viola- tion of the statute. This provision had the effect of raising from $25,000 the amount authorized for reward in general Federal criminal mat- ters. (^^) The policy question remains whether these amounts ade- quately reflect the full range of federally cognizable homicides, a ques- tion to be resolved in new legislation. (k) (1) Following the avssassination of President Kennedy, two issues arose with reference to the personal property of the alleged assassin. (^7) Was any of it subject to forfeiture as the instrumentali- ties of a crime ? Could any of it be condemned as of historical interest ? This second question also related to the personal property of the Presi- dent himself, as well as that of others in some way involved. Forfeiture proceedings were, in fact, initiated with respect to Lee Harvey Oswald's rifle. (4^) They were unsuccessful, since under the law at that time the rifle was not used to commit a Federal oflfense. (4^) A special statute. Public Law 89-318, was passed "for the acquisition and preservation by condemnation of evidence relative to the Presi- dent's assassination." {50) A variety of personal items have been held to have been validly transferred to the National Archives under the statute. (57) (m) The assassination of a public official or public figure naturally attracts a great deal of public attention that may be converted into revenue through personal appearances, books, movie rights, etc. Testi- mony before the committee demonstrated that this is what followed the assassination of Dr. King. {52) The committee, while it made no special study in this area, noted that legislation had been enacted at the State level to curb what may be fairly described as crass commercialization of macabre situations. (55) Such a provision should be considered in the drafting of any new com- prehensive legislation at the Federal level. (n) The committee heard testimony that it would be advisable to extend the protection of Federal threat legislation (54) and Federal zone of protection statutes (55) to individuals occupying offices other than the President. {56) Mindful that there may be significant differ- ences in the scope of protection required for these other officials, the committee recommends that consideration be given to these suggestions. 3. The apjyropnate committees of the House should process for early consideration hy the House charter legi-sJotion for the Central Intelli- gence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The convmittees should address the following issues in considering the charter legis- Icttion: {a) the proper foreign and domestic intelligence functions of the infelligen.ce and invesfigafive ageticies of the United States^ {h) the relationship hetween the doTnestic intelligence functions and the interference with the exercise of individuM constitutional rights^ {c) the delineation of proper law enforcement functions amd techniques including : (^) the use of informants amd electronic surveilla/nce^ (ii) guidelines to circumscribe the use of informants or electronic surveillance to gather intelligence on, or investi- gate, groups that in ay he exercising first amendment free- doms, and 470 (Hi) the pro'per respoTise of intelligence or investigative agencies where infoi'mation is developed that an informant has committed a crime. (d) guidelines to consider the circunuta^ices., if any., when an investigative agency or a- component of that agency should he disqualified from taking an active role in an investigation because of an appearance of impropriety groxmng out of a particular intelligence or investigative action^ {e) definitions of the legislative scope and extent of '■''sources and methods" and the ^'' informant pnvilege'''' as a rationale for the executive hranch xoithholding info7vnation in response to congres- sional or judicial irrocess or other demand for information., (/) institutio7ializing efforts to coordinate the gathering., shar- ing., and analysis of intelligence information., (g) insuring those agencies that pHmaHly gather intelligence perform their function so as to serve the needs of other agencies that primarily engage in physical protection., and (h) implementing mechanisms that would permit interagency tasking of particular functions. The committee did not conduct a general inquiry into the operations of the intelligence or law enforcement agencies. Xevertheless, its exami- nation of the performance of the agencies with respect to the deaths of President Kennedy and Dr. King afforded it a unique perspective from which to view their operations. In effect, the committee conducted case studies of the FBI and CIA, an experience that led the committee to make a number of recommendations. The most important single recommendation the committee can make in this regard is that the proposals for charter legislation be processed for early consideration by the House. Law enforcement without law is a contradiction in terms. Those who enforce our law must be able to look with confidence to a basic charter. Otherwise, their power will not be legitimate ; they will not know their duties, and they will not know their constraints. All too often the pressure of the moment will dictate their actions. Just as imi)ortant, there must be limitations on those who exercise power to protect those over whom the power is exercised. Free- dom is made possible by power limited by law. There are a variety of reasons for the abuses of power uncovered by the committee, partic- ularly the harassment of Dr. King. One may be clearly identified and must be remedied : It is the lack of basic charter legislation. In a so- ciety that prides itself on the mle of law, it is remarkable that so im- portant an area has been left lawless for so long. (a) Charter legislation must go to the root of the role that intel- ligence and law enforcement agencies play in a free society. It sliould clearly delineate the difference between the foreign and domestic roles of the agencies. Society must not permit the morals of war to become the routine policy of domestic agencies. Citizens at home must not be treated as enemies abroad. (b) Close attention must also be paid to the relation between intel- ligence functions and first amendment rights. The first amendment seeks to assure those out of power that they can still i^articipate in the shaping of policy. The cry for change must not be misunderstood as a call for violent revolution. Nowhere did the committee find this con- 471 fusion more clearly demonstrated than in the FBI's efforts to "neutral- ize" Dr. King in his efforts to secure social and economic justice. (c) Particular attention, too, must be paid to the proper role in law enforcement of such potentially abusive information-gathering tech- niques as informants, electronic surveillance, and the infiltration of groups. Abuses or misuses of these techniques characterized the work of the FBI in its investigation of Dr. King. Charter legislation offers a hope of assisting in the effort to control such abuses in the future. (d) Propriety — and the appearance of propriety — must be the hall- mark of the enforcement of law. Power alone is never sufficient to hold the allegiance of a people. Obedience to law is best secured not through a threat of sanctions but through respect for legitimate au- thority. Appearances, therefore, may sometimes be as important as underlying reality. The processes of justice must not only be just ; they must appear to be just. This issue was sharply delineated by the FBI's investigation not only of Dr. King, but of his assassination. Understandably, many people questioned whether an agency that undertook to discredit Dr. King could be relied upon to seek out his murderer. Existing guidelines promise that such campaigns to discredit will not occur again. (57) Nevertheless, it is possible to foresee that an individ- ual legitimately under investigation would be an assassination target. To what degree should the agency — or the investigators immediately involved in the investigation — be disqualified from conducting the as- sassination investigation ? It is a difficult issue, one that charter legisla- tion ought to address and, hopefully, resolve. (e) The intelligence and law enforcement agencies' relationship with Congress must also be spelled out. Individual citizens must be protected against those who would harm our society or violate the laws; they must also be protected against those whose job it is to protect our so- ciety and enforce the law. Yet, there is little an individual can do by himself. The courts and the Congress, therefore, play an important role in assuring effective performance and protecting civil liberties. Never- theless, inorder to act, the courts and the Congress must have access to information. One of the most delicate problems that faced the committee in exam- ining the CIA and the FBI had to do with access to restricted informa- tion, some of it classified to protect the national security, some that was confidential to protect the identity of informants. The CIA sought to rely on the National Security Act of 1947, section 102(a) to uphold its position :(-W) the Department of Justice cited the infoiTnant's priv- ilege. (55) "While the committee never conceded that either basis was leofally valid to withhold information from Congress, the committee was generallv able to negotiate with the agencies the necessary access. On one occasion, the committee voted a subpena for certoin materials, but a confrontation was avoided through compromise. Nevertheless, the committee recommends that charter legislation be applied to the security issue so there can he a fixed svstem for obtaining access and at the same time protecting confidentiality. (f) (g) (h) Finnlly. the committee noted that as lonj? as the functions of the various intelligence and law enforcement agencies are separated 472 between agencies and assigned to sections within agencies, there must be institutionalized efforts made to compensate for that separation.^ (b) Prosecution 1. The Judiciary Committee should consider the impact of the pro- visions oflaw dealing with third-party records, hail and speedy trial as it applies to hoth the investigation arid prosecution of federally cognisable homicides. Testimony before the committee raised questions about such recent legislation as that dealing with third-party records, (<50) bail {61) and speedy trial {62) as it might affect the investigation and prosecution of assassination cases or other federally cognizable homicides. Concern was expressed that such legislation might have unforeseen adverse consequences. The testimony indicated that recent third-party records legislation had made the acquisition of records in the course of investigation "more difficult tlian in the past." (^5) "fI]nformal access" had been largely ended. {6Ji.) The effect extended beyond the records covered in the legislation. Other holders of such records are apparently concerned and they are granting access onlv with "increasing difficulty" (^5) because of a fear of "personal liability." (^^) To the degree that some recent legislation recognized the special responsibilities of the Secret Service, it was supported. {67) As for speedy trial legislation, while testimony before the commit- tee was not explicit in its treatment of special problems that might arise in an assassination prosecution, the legislation was thought to be adequate. (^(9) Nevertheless, it was termed "hastily drawn," (^P) and it was observed that the "public would be outraged" (76>) if it inter- fered with the prosecution of an assassin. While the committee recognizes that it is not possible to draft legis- lation with all problems in mind, it is possible to review it periodically in terms of special problems, making modifications when thev are in order. Nevertheless, the committee agrees with FBI Director William Webster who advised that special rules can raise troublesome is- sues, (7/) and it would be preferable if special cases could be handled without radically altering the system. Declaring "martial law" is not ''acceptable ;" (7^) Webster stated : While it is a traumatic experience for anyone to live through the assassination of a President, it ought not to be the predi- cate for an investigative conduct which in essence is the dec- laration of martial law. I just simply do not believe that we ought to * * * suspend everything that was put in place to pro- tect the rights of citizens. {73) ' The committee also observed during Its examination of the aeencles that snbstantlal questions had been raised about the eflfect of laws atich as the Freedom of Information Act anrl the Privacy Act on the ability of the agencies to obtain necessary information. In addition, the committee noted the substantial costs imposed on the agencies for com- pllnncp with the laws. The committee also recognized the benefits of these laws. They may, for example, deter agencies from keeping files on individuals who are of no legitimate concern to the Govern- ment. In addition, the inform'>tlon that t'lese laws have brought to public attention was a significant factor in the creation of this committee. The commHtpp helipvod that nn nsspssmpnt of tb" Freedom of Tnformat'on and Privacy Acts, to Include an analysis of the cost of compliance with them, their effect on the quality and quantity of intelligence information available to the agencies and the benefits achieved by the laws, is warranted. 473 That such legislation ought to be reviewed, nonetheless, seems ap- propriate inthe opinion of the committee. 2. The Judiciary C(ynv)7iittee should examine recently passed special prosecutor legislation to determine if its provisions should he modified to extend them to Presidential assassinations and the circumstances^ if any^ under which they should he applicable to other federally cog- nizable homicides. Kecognizing the special problems associated with the investigation of possible improprieties by a President, Vice President and certain other officials, special prosecutor legislation was enacted in 1978. {'7If) Testimony before the committee considered the wisdom of extending the legislation to Presidential assassinations uniformly and to other federally cognizable homicides on a case-by-case basis. The point most often raised in favor of such legislation was the appearance of impro- priety in having the Attorney General, the new President's lawyer, conduct the investigation into the former President's death. (75) Generally, however, the witnesses who appeared before the commit- tee— high Government officials, for the most part — tended to prefer the established system that relies on Federal investigative and prose- cutive agencies that are in place, in the absence of specific questions about the suitability of the Attorney General or the Department of Justice. (7(?) Tlie committee recommends, nevertheless, as part of comprehensive legislation dealing with Federal homicides, that special prosecutor legislation be carefully considered. II. ADMINISTRATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EXECUTIVE The Department of Justice should reexamine its contingency plans for the handling of assassinations amd federally cognizahle homicides in light of the record and findings of the committee. Such am, examii- nation should consider the folloim'ng issues : A. Injuring that its response takes full ad/vantage of inter- amd intra-agency task forces and the strike force approach to investi- gations and prosecutions ; B. Insuring that its response takes full advantage of the ad- vances ofscience ami technolooy, and determining when it should secure independent panels of scientists to review or perform necessary scientific tasks, or secure qualified independent forensic pathologists to verform a forensic autopsy; C. Insuring that its fair trial/ free vress auidelines^ co^isistent loith an aJleaed oifender''s right to a fair triod^ allmo that informa- ti/m about the faets and circumstances surrounding an assassina- tion promMlv he made public, and promptly he corrected when e/t^onemis infoiviiatinn is mistakenh/ relrCased: and. D. Entering at the rurrent time info negotiations with repre- sentatives ofthe media to secure volumtary agreements provid- ing that photonraphs. audio tapes, television, tnnes and. related matters, made in and around the site of assassinations, he made available to the Govei-^ment hy consent immediately following an assassination. Testimonv before the committee indicated that manv of the lessons learned in the months after the tragic events in Dallas in 1963 have 474 been incorporated into the contingency plans of the various Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, there is much that can be learned for the future in reviewing the record of the past, particularly with the perspective that the passage of time affords. Four lessons stand out : The need to integrate investigative and pros- ecutive efforts ; to take advantage of the advances of science and tech- nology, particularly in such a fashion as its independence will not only exist, but be seen to exist; to insure that of^rnrn^^e infornnt^'^^^ -s im- mediately given out, consistent with any alleged assassin's ri^t to a fair trial ; and to obtain, as soon as possible and with as little difficulty as is possible, as much hard evidence as is possible. (A) One of the most troubling aspects of the investigations of the deaths of President Kennedy and Dr. King was the failure of Federal agencies to share and use information, and to bring to bear on prob- lems the array of talents, expertise and legal tools available. Even from the point of view that it was not reasonable to do everything, all that could have been done was not done. The need for a ta?k force approach was, according to testimony before the committee, a point well taken. (77) There should also be a requirement for the use of the strike force approach, with particular respect to conspiracy issues not settled by forensics and field interviews. (75) For the future, con- tingency plans should be written with flexibility in mind. (7.9) (B) The most significant new knowledge the committee was able to develop about events in Dallas on November 22, 1963, stemmed from the work of the committee's scientific panels. (In the case ol the assassination of Dr. King, to the regret of the committee, there was not as much scientific evidence that could be subjected to scientific analysis and thus cast new light on the assassination.) The lesson for the future is, therefore, very clear : The potential benefits of science in an investigation must be better realized. The committee noted that science was used to advantage in 1964 and 1968. Nevertheless, its recommendation is designed to insure that the promise of science and technology not be overlooked in the event of another tragedy. The committee also found reason to comment on the approach that is contemplated for scientific analysis in the future, particularly in the case of a Presidential assassination. The issue was raised before the committee of the use of nongovernmental experts to achieve not only the greatest degree of expertise, but also the ultimate in pro- priety. (SO) It was noted, for example, that in its major case operations plan the FBI contemplates using forensic pathologists from the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. (<9/) While not wishing to call into question the competency or the integrity of doctors associated with the institute, the committee posed this question : In a society in which liberty has traditionally depended on civilian control of the military, should not efficiency (5^) be set aside in favor of symbolism? (5-5) The committee thought it should. (C) The handling of public information in Dallas in November 1963 was criticizod bv tho "Worren Commission ^<9.^') -for rensons this com- mittee considered valid. Public comments by officials of the Depart- ment of Justice at the time of Dr. King's death also seemed to emanate without careful attention to a set of public information principles. The Department of Justice has guidelines for public information policy 475 in criminal cases, (55) which were being reviewed at the time this committee completed its investigation. (<§^) But since the impact of such policy pervades all of government, all interested individuals and agencies should participate in the review. (57) It seems important that one objective of this review would be to formulate a procedure for distinguishing between a routine case and one of urgent impor- tance. (55) Beyond that, the committee hopes the Department of Jus- tice's new guidelines will take into account the public information problems that have been exposed by its investigation. (D) While it is vitally important that the best scientific experts be retained in an assassination investigation, it is equally essential that they be given the best evidentiary' materials to examine. This committee demonstrated in its investigation, as did the Warren Com- mission in the case of the Kennedy assassination, that access to high quality materials is cn^cial. Thus, the committee sought the best ways to achieve such access. In testimony before the committee, it became clear that the best approach would be to make an immediate effort to negotiate agreements with various news organizations, so that right after an assassination law enforcement agencies can have access to the product of news coverage. (89) These news organizations are under- standably concerned with first amendment freedoms. At the same time, law enforcement must have the access. It would be im fortunate if a confrontation occurred over a search warrant or a subpena. So the time to act is now. Negotiations started at this time would be "very, very useful," (5(9) according to testimony before the committee. The process may turn out to be a "long, ongoing dialog which . . . ought to be underway." (5i) Because the witness from the Department of Justice who testified in this regard indicated the Department would favor discussions with the news media, (,9^) the committee is hopeful this recommendation wdll be acted upon forthwith. III. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS The founders of the American system divided the Goveirnment into three branches. The purpose of the separation of the branches was not to enhance efficiency but promote liberty. Each branch was to check the others. Together, they would govern the new Nation under the Constitution, realizing, it was honed, the promise of its nreamble. The balance of power between the executive and legislative branches has always been fluid, although the trend in modern times has been for tlie executive branch to be dominant. That trend was sharply reversed in 1974, principally because of Congress poAver to investigate the alle- gations of wrongdoing by the President. The exercise of the power to investigate, first in the Senate and then in the House, eventually led to the resignation of the President. Ironically, the power that may have done the most to return the Nation to the values of the Constitu- tion in 1974 was not explicitly recognized in the Constitution when it Avas drafted in 1787. Tlie investigative authority of Congress is not expressly written into the Constitution, but the precedent for that power is longstand- ing, both in theory and practice. The British Parliament and the Assemblies of the American colonies frequently exercised it.(9S) 476 Political scientists and parliamentarians have long argued that inher- ent in the power to make laws must be the power to investigate before they are enacted and later to see that they are carried out. In "Con- sideration on Representative Government," John Stuart Mill wrote that the legislature was best fitted, not for administration or lawmak- ing, but for the review of the public's business : * * * to watch and control the Government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers questionable; to censure them if found condemnable. (5^) In more modern times, Woodrow Wilson propounded a similar viewpoint in "Congressional Government": "Quite as important as legislating is vigilant oversight of administration." (55) He felt that a self-governing people discusses and interrogates its administration. For him, Congress power to inform was as important as its power to legislate. (P^) Congress was, he thought, the "eyes and voice" of the Nation. Like the British Parliament, Congress was, in the words of William Pitt the Elder, the "Grand Inquest of the Nation." (^) The power of Congress to investigate has been challenged a number of times, not only by the executive branch, but also by recalcitrant witnesses who were private citizens and others. The grounds for the challenges have been many, ranging from questions about Congress right to review the executive branch or private organizations and citi- zens, to doubts about various procedures committees have used in con- ducting investigations. Since the first congressional investigation in 1792 into the humiliating defeat of General St. Clair by a small band of Indians, in which the House asserted its right to call for persons and papers, (55) the basic power of the Congress to investigate has been acknowledged. The Supreme Court has always upheld that power, although recognizing that it was subject to certain limitations. At first. Congress attention focused on government itself. Subse- quently, however, the laws became broader. The first instance in which Congress requested that private citizens appear before it and provide documents was in 1827, when the Committee on Manufacturers was considering tariff legislation. (55) Since that tinje, in areas where business activities or behavior of private individuals are subject to congressional regulation. Congress power to investigate has always been recognized. The investigative charter of the committee was narrow — to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the deaths of President Ken- nedy and Dr. King, and, if necessary, to recommend appropriate meas- ures for the future. Nevertheless, because of the nature of the lives and the deaths of these two great men, the scope of what was per- tinent to the mandate of the committee was wide. In a real sense, it encompassed the history of the United States in a turbulent and vio- lent decade. Consequently, the appropriate limitations on the scope of a congressional investigation were ever in the minds of the commit- tee, particularly as that investigation touched on private groups or in- dividuals, raising, however indirectly, questions of their possible con- nection to the death of either man. How ironic it would have been had 477 the committee, a major concern of which was unlawful Government intrusion into the life of Dr. King, been reckless with the lives of others. Traditionally, two constitutional limits on the power of congres- sional inquiry have been raised to circumscribe congressional investi- gations. Assuming that the subject matter is itself one on which legis- lation may be enacted and the proper procedural steps have been fol- lowed, the first and fifth amendments have been the main shields raised to protect individual liberties, having as a consequence the effect of blocking the inquiry. The committee looked into the conduct of a variety of groups whose activities, however personally objectionable, were protected by the first amendment. In all situations, it was possible to conduct the inquiry without subjecting the groups to unnecessary publicity or to invade their privacy beyond that which was essential to a search for the truth. None of the subjects of the investigation felt it necessary to try to block the investigation by contemptuously resisting the com- mittee's processes or questioning. The committee also looked into the conduct of a variety of individ- uals whose activities were such that they could legitimately claim this privilege against self-incrimination. IVhile this area of the com- mittee's work is not the subject of a specific recommendation, a com- ment about it is appropriate. In 1970, Congress passed legislation changing the character of the immunity it could grant in compelling a witness' testimony over fifth amendment objections, (i^^) The use immunity concept, reflected in the provisions of the 1970 act,(/^/) respects comity between State and Federal jurisdictions, limits interference between congressional and executive functions, and does not disrupt administrative remedies of a civil character. For these reasons, the general reluctance that has traditionally accompanied immunity grants by congressional com- mittees isno longer applicable. If the grant is coordinated with the necessary executive officials and the testimony is safeguarded until it is suitable for release, grants of immunity can be made without causing objections. The 1970 act was first used in a more than token fashion in the Watergate hearings in the Senate; it was first used extensively by this committee. Indeed, it constituted a centerpiece in the committee's investigative strategy. The committee found the 1970 act to be a powerful tool in finding the truth. But, while the com- mittee recognized the essential application of the act in future investi- gations, itcautions that it must be used carefully. The promise of the act in uncovering the truth is only fulfilled by its power to compel reluctant witnesses to speak. A society that ranks individual privacy among its more precious values must recognize that a price is paid for attaining the truth. It may be necessary to pay that price in important matters, such as determining the truth in the deaths of two great lead- ers. Nevertheless, it ought to be paid only when necessary. In the course of the investigation, the committee learned a great deal about congressional investigations and came to certain conclu- sions about them. There are a variety of issues that ought to be addressed by one or more committees of the House to strengthen and increase the fairness of investigations in the future. 478 A. The appropri/ite committees of the House should consider amending the indes of the House to provide for a right to appointive counsel in investigative heaHngs where a xottiness is unable to provide counsel from private funds. A witness before a congressional committee has no general right to counsel, but the niles of the House recognize that witnesses may be accompanied by counsel at investigative hearings to advise them of their constitutional rights. (Z^?^) Nevertheless, there is no provision for paying for a counsel in the event a witness is unable to afford one. The committee, in its rules, (7(?5) made an effort to find a solution by arranging with the District of Columbia Bar Association to provide counsel on certain occasions. The arrangement worked well, and the committee believes that an amendment to the rules of the House incorporating such an arrangement should be considered by the ap- propriate committees. B. The apvropriate committees of the House should examine the rules of the House governing the conduct of counsel in legislative and investigative hearings and consider delineating guidelines for pro- fessional conduct and ethics, including guidelin.es to deal irith con- flicts ofinterest in the representation of multiple witnesses hefore a committee. The rules of the House provide that the chairman of a committee may punish breaches of decorum or professional ethics on the part of counsel by exclusion from the hearing. (7^4) This committee read this rule to deal with the ethical problems of multiple representation. Not all multiple representation presents a conflict of interest. Some conflicts that exist may be cured by full disclosure to the clients and informed consent. Nevertheless, disclosure and consent cannot cure all conflict. Those that touch on the integrity of the factfinding process may not be waived. Consequently, the committee did not follow a blanket rule ; it waited until a conflict was ripe on the record. It held a hearing to establish the conflict. It then appropriately dis- qualified the offending attorney, if disclosure and waiver did not con- stitute an adequate cure. The standard employed for disqualification was that of professional societies (lOi) and the courts. (106) Like the Watergate special prosecutor, (7i97) the committee must express its concern with the conduct of the bar that represented witnesses in its executive sessions. Too often, the lawyers seemed insensi- tive to their duty to their clients to represent tliem as individuals and not part of a group. It was necessary for the committee to dis- qualify more than one attorney to preserve the integrity of the com- mittee's processes. In addition, the committee experienced tactics on the part of several lawyers who represented individuals before the committee that can only be described as efforts to disnipt or o]:)struct the work of the committee as it labored to determine the trutli. There is a need for clearer guidance to investigative committees to deal with 479 these problems. The appropriate committee of the House should look into what, if anything, may be done to assure the integrity of Con- gress factfinding processes. C. The Judiciary Comtnittee shovM examine the adequacy of Fed- eral law as it provides for the production of Federal a7id State pris- oners hefore legislative or investigative committees under a torit of habeas corpus ad testificandum. On more than one occasion, the committee heard testimony from witnesses who were incarcerated. Usually, a subpena will guarantee the presence of a witness. Nevertheless, a subpena is unavailing when the witness is incarcerated. Then, a writ of habeas corpus ad testi- ficandum isusually employed. Such writs may be issued by Federal courts underobtained committee the current law. (i(?5) 20 such writs. During its tenure, (7^P) The the of language "Watergate current law, however, does not explicitly grant Federal courts the right to issue such writs in behalf of congressional committees. It is necessary to read the current statute in light of its extensive history to arrive at its proper meaning. (770) The committee was able to secure the writ it sought, but the process was not without difficulty, since the matter of jurisdiction had to be litigated. It would be helpful if clarifying amendments were added to present law if after careful study they are thought essential. D. The appropriate committee s of the House should examine and clarify the applicability to congressional subpenas of recently enacted legislative restrictions on access to records and other documents. During the course of its investigation, the committee sought access to or subpenaed numerous documents. In one instance, the committee's subpena was challenged. Usually, congressional sub- penas can only be resisted through the contempt process. The speech and debate clause of the Constitution precludes court litigation. (777) Nevertheless, it was argued that by virtue of an act of Congress, (77^) the speech and debate clause had been waived. Ultimately, the com- mittee thought it inappropriate to subject those involved to the con- tempt process, and it submitted the issue to the only couit that appar- ently had jurisdiction, the Probate Court of Shelby County, Tenn. The verdict of the court was favorable to the committee. The committee be- lieved that this result — Congress submitting its processes for review to a State court not of record — was an unintended consequence. The committee, therefore, recommends that the appropriate committee of the House undertake a survey of similar restrictive legislation to de- termine to what degree it was intended to apply to congressional process. A^Hiere necessary, clarifying legislation should be enacted to resolve ambiguous language. If such legislation is to be made applica- ble to congressional process, provisions should be made for a suitable forum in which to hear pertinent cases. 480 E. The appi'opriate coTrvmittees of the House should consider legis- lation that loould authorize the establishment of a legislative coun- sel to conduct litigation on behalf of committees of the House incident to the investigative or legislative activities and confer jurisdiction on the U.S. District Court for tJie District of Columbia to hear such la)w- suits. The committee found itself in court on a variety of occasions to se- cure immunity grants, to enforce its process, and, on occasion, to de- fend its work or to secure the assistance of the Department of justice. It was necessary to amend the committee's resolution to authorize these appearances in court, (i7pic sight on his rifle. Despite the fact that Oswald may have been more familiar with a Mannlicher-Carcano than anv of the committee's expert marksmen, his record as a rifleman makes it hard for me to accept that he was able to fire faster than the experts and still liit both President Kennedy and Governor Connally. It is even more difficult for me to believe that, having missed with liis first shot, as the committee finds, he did not take the time necessary to properly aim his sex^ond sliot. This becomes almost impossible to believe in that Oswald, by merely pointing the rifle from 165 feet, would have hiul to hit a tar.get that Avas moving at 11 miles an liour.^ It sliould be noted that the second shot referred to here struck both President Kennedv and Governor Connally. This is the foundation of the single-bullet theory. There is circumstantial evidence, however, that tends to indicate that Oswald did fire all three shots. Three cartridge cases were foimd on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depositorv, and ballistics evi- dence establishes that all three came from Oswald's rifle. In tbat there is no evidence to suggest that more than three shots came from the = The two committee staff members who participated In this test were the same two members who conducted the preliminary test, Deputy Chief Counsel Garv Cornwell and Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakcy. «r readily concede that this analysis is "finely tuned." We are conslderintr differences In tenths of a second. We are nslncr data, moreover, that, wliile it may be subjected to hiehly scientific analysis, was not initially ^fathered by precision instruments. Xevertheless. these are the facts we have to work with. ■'Theat test aimed firings in stationary March of this year, as well as the preliminary firings in 1978, were targets 485 Texas School Book Depository, the cartridge cases support the theory that Oswald fired both the first and second shots. The cartridge cases are not, however, conclusive proof that Oswald fired both of the first two shots. The ballistics evidence merely shows that the cartridge cases were fired in Oswald's rifle at some point in time ; there is no way to tell when they were in the rifle or when the bullets that they encased were fired. In other words, one of the car- tridge cases could have been from a bullet fired from Oswald's rifle a day, a week or a month earlier. That cartridge case could then have been ejected from the rifle before firing on November 22, 1963, or in some other way dropped on the floor. At first glance, it seems easier to believe that the three cartridge cases mean that Oswald fired all three shots than to believe the "ejection" theory. Nevertheless, as this requires me to accept that Oswald fired within 1.66 seconds, the "ejection" theory appears more likely than it does at first glance. Option two. — An unidentified person fired the first shot., and Oswald fired the second shot 1.66 seconds later.^ — There is one major problem with this option ; there is no other evidence of a second gunman in the Texas School Book Depository, which, according to the acoustical evi- dence, was the origin of both of the first two shots. This brings me to the first two of my recommendations for further study. First, a detailed photographic analysis should be made of the Bron- son film to determine whether it shows more than one figure in the sixth floor windows of the Texas School Book Depository.^ Second, further mathematical calculations should be performed on the data developed by the acoustical experts to determine more pre- cisely the location from which each of the first two shots was fired. The acoustical experts testified that they were able to pinpoint within a few feet the location of the gunman on the grassy knoll. They did so by a series of geometric computations based on the original data developed in the reenactment of the shooting. This more complete analysis was only undertaken for the third shot in a sequence of four. If a similarly fine-tuned analysis were conducted for the first two shots, it might be determined whether or not they both came from the same window. Option three. — Oswald p^ed hoth the first tioo shots and took longer than 1.66 seconds hetioeen the shots., giving himself adequate time to properly aim. — On its face, this option seems very attractive ; however, it means that the acoustical evidence is invalid, at least on this issue. The acoustical testimony before the committee is most renowned foi* the portion of it that indicates that a second gunman fired at the Presi - dent from the grassy knoll. The validity of this evidence has been widely debated in the short time since it was first presented to the com- mittee and the public, and I suspect that it will remain the subject of debate for years to come. The acoustical evidence came in two phases. The first time Dr. Barger testified, he indicated the time sequence between the shots but did not state any firm conclusion about the existence of a shot from the 8 I identify Oswald as firinc the spcond sliot. rather than the first, hecanse the second shot appears to be the one that hit the President and Governor Connally, and that bullet matches gun and Oswald's siin.but Oswald his, Of that course, thethe is in unidentified personspeculation. realm of pure could have been using Oswald's 8 The committee so recommends. Ill, IV, A. 486 grassy knoll.^° The reaction of the committee and the public was one of frustration with the indefinite conclusions with regard to existence of a shot from the grassy knoll, but the nature of the evidence itself and the expertise of the witness were generally accepted. I do not recall any challenges at that time to an "arcane" science. The second phase of the acoustics testimony was received quite dif- ferently. This time, Barger, Weiss, and Aschkenasy all testified that there was a 95-percent probability that a shot was fired from the grassy Knoll. ^^ This time the reaction of the public and committee members was much more skeptical. And rightly so, since this conclusion had much greater significance. When I first learned of the "new" acoustical evidence and before I heard the testimony, I was very doubtful that it would prove con- vincing. Nevertheless, after listening to the experts in closed session and going over the data which they presented, I found myself slowly coming to believe that they might be right. Realizing the significance of their conclusion, I determined to withhold belief until I had another chance, to question them, this time in open session. I spent a great deal of time preparing myself for the next round of questioning. I decided that the most useful role I could play would be to act as attorney for the opposition. I would look for the weaknesses in their theory so that I could better judge its strengths, its accuracy. I believe that I suc- ceeded in holding to my plan to be as tough with my questions and as difficult to convince as possible. Yet, after listening to the testimony, I was persuaded." I remain convinced that the preponderance of the evidence supports the finding of the committee that a gimman fired from the grassy knoll. Yet, I believe that further study of the acoustical evidence is neces- ossar\'. The acoustical evidence of a gimman on the grassy knoll has enormous significance for our Nation. This by itself makes real the idea of a conspiracy to kill the President. The data upon which the experts base their conclusion should, therefore, be reviewed by other noted experts in this field. If further study would resolve any linger- ing doubts as to the conclusion, failure to pursue the answers would be inexcusable. On the issue of a President's death we should not deal in shadows of suspet^ted truths when we might have light. Tn its report, the committee criticizes the Government for its failure in 1968-64 to diligently pursue the truth on the question of conspiracy; our Govern- ment should not make the same mistake today. Tn addition to the need for continued study of the "grassy knoll shot," further study of the acoustical evidence is necessary to answer the questions surrounding the first two shots. As discussed in option 3 above, the answer may be that the time sequence provided bv the acoustical evidence is invalid. This possibility should he- ex|)lored. Another explanation, discussed in option 2 above, is that the acous- tics' time shot the first sequence whileis correct, Oswald and firedthat the some unidentified second. Further gimman work onfired the acoustics data, as described previously, could conceivable prove the I'll .TFK 04. 101 (95 pprcpnt 2 shots; 60-70 npropnt 1^ shots: 50 porrpnt 4 shots). " V JFK 55R fWplss nnd Aschkpnasy) : 073-674 (Bnrepr). of "^T thpnM. tapptoo. andthat theT events am imorPsspd tv-lth thp It portrays oorro^oratlnn by the trt'-Pti to other scientific thp haslc evidence aiTthPntl--lty summarized In sec. I B of the committee's rpport. 487 existence of a second gunman in the Texas School Book Depository or elsewhere in the plaza. Therefore, I recommend that a general review of the acoustical evi- dence and all other scientific evidence bearing on these questions, be conducted by the National Science Foundation or some other appropri- ate body.^^ Specifically, I recommend that : 1. A photographic analysis of the Bronson film be conducted. 2. The detailed analysis that was done with regard to the third shot be done with regard to shots one, two, and four. 3. An attempt be made to ascertain the source of the carillon bell which appears on the dictabelt. 4. A thorough review of the tape be conducted in an effort to dis- cover whether shots might have originated from locations other than the grassy knoll and the Texas School Book Depository. 5. An analysis of the various other sounds (for example, the siren) be made to test the tape's authenticity.''* I agree with paragraph II. B. on its face which reads. The committee believes, on the basis of the circumstantial evidence available to it, that there is a likelihood that James Earl Ray assassinated Dr. Martin Luther King as a result of a conspiracy. After analyzing all the evidence, particularly the testimony of James Earl Ray, his demeanor and his actions prior to the crime, I am persuaded that he did not act alone in planning the death of Dr. King. Therefore, I agree with the committee's finding in this para- graph. I cannot, however, agree to all of the underlying commentary. Spe- cifical y,dissent I from any and all parts of the King section of the re- port which identify particular coconspirators. The evidence which the committee musters may suggest the outlines of a conspiracy, but, in my opinion, it falls short. After reviewing all the evidence, I am unable to say with any degree of certainty who conspired with James Earl Ray or under what plan they were acting. THE COMMITTEE RECX)MMENDATIONS I offer the following comment on paragraph III. B (1) which reads, The Judiciary Committee should consider the impact of the provisions of law dealing with third-party records, bail and speedy trial as it applies to both the investigation and pros- ecution offederally cognizable homicides. COMMENT The third-party record statutes were enacted to protect an in- dividual's right to privacy in a society which requires that in a variety 13 Tijp committee so recommends. III. IV. B. 1* After the committee's vote on Dec. 29. 1978. the committee received from Robert J. Groden. a photoeranhic con=nltant to the committee, a series of photos and film frames that purport to show H. B. McLain. the Dallas motorcvcle officer, in the place where the acoustics exnerts said he would be. I note that after his appearance before the committee, Mr. McLain publicly stated that his motorcycle was not the one with the stuck microphone. The material provided by Mr. Groden should be analyzed as the Zanruder film has been, e.g.. the frames numbered, the camera speed timed, et cetera. See V JFK 70.3-721. 488 of situations individuals divulge personal information and place that information in the hands of third parties and institutions. Indivi- duals must put aside their interests in privacy in order to share in many of the benefits of modern society, and to comply with Govern- ment regulation of certain activities. Witli increasingly sophisticated means of maintaining records, the threat of misuse has grown, and in the last decade the American public has become more aware of the ease with which individual rights of privacy may be violated by the keepers of the files and the seekers of information. In a series of statutes Congress has acted to protect the right of privacy from undue infringement. These statutes were not enacted in a void ; they were drafted to protect privacy rights, but other societal interests were recognized as well. Chief among these interests was the need for adequate law enforcement. Without exception the privacy acts adopted by Congress provide the means for law enforcement agencies to obtain information needed to conduct lawful prosecutions and investigations of criminal conduct. It may be true, as the testimony before this committee indicated, that informal access to third-party records has ended, that acquisition of records in the course of an investigation is more difficult than in the past, and that holders of third-party records are more reluctant to grant access because of potential civil liability for invasion of j)rivacy. If these results are in fact present, the privacy acts are working to protect those rights which they were intended to protect. "Informal access'' is a dangerous tool, and prior to the enactment of the privacy statutes it was grossly abused. The power to acquire records in the course of an "investigation" was so lil^erall}^ construed that the require- ment that tliere be an ongoing lawful investigation was for practical purj^oses nonexistent. And the irresponsible manner in which some third-party recordkeepers shared information with others showed little or no recognition of the rights of the indiA'iduals involved. There- fore, this affirmative testimonv on the "need" to reconsider the privacy acts is unpersuasive and is the same sort of testimony considered by the committees which recommended the adoption of the privacy acts. The testimony of the witnesses before this committee is most striking for its failure to identify anv unique problems that might arise in an assassination case or other federally cognizable homicide case which would justify a recommendation that the privacy acts be reexamined with a special eye to these crimes. I have carefully examined the Speedv Trial Act and am convinced that its provisions are drawn with adequate breadth to allow ample f ime for the prosecution to prenare its case in the event of an assassina- tion or other federally cognizable homicide, as well as to allow ample time for the Federal agencies to investigate any such crime. Under the act, in setting a date for trial, the court may consider the unique factors which might be ])resent in the event of an assassination. The witnesses who testified before this committee, while voicing some general complaints about the act. agreed that in the event of an assassination the act would Drovide the Government with adequate time to prepare for trial. Res])ondinfr to general comnlaints about the Speedv Trial Act is not properly within the scope of this committee's mandate, nor did this committee attempt to take testimony on whether 489 the Speedy Trial Act was in general a good thing. I do not believe that such gratuitous complaints are sufficient basis for recommending that the Speedy Trial Act be reevaluated, especially in light of the fact that witnesses, including the representative of the Department of Justice, found the act adequate to deal with an assassination. The Federal bail statutes were the subject of limited testimony and consideration b}^ this committee. They were considered only in an ef- fort to determine whether the unconstitutionality of the Federal death penalty, 18 U.S.C. 1111 et seq., would in effect classify Federal homi- cide as a noncapital crime for purposes of bail. I think it is appropriate for this committee to recommend that the Judiciary Committee ex- amine the bail statutes in considering the Federal death penalty. I do not feel any further recommendation on the bail statutes is warranted. All of the statutes in this section which the committee recommends be reconsidered are designed with a delicate balance in mind, the bal- ance between individual rights and the state's police power. Disturb- ing that balance can lead to disastrous results. While individual situa- tions must be considered in striking this balance, without clear and compelling justification new exceptions should not be made and the overall balance should not be shifted. Undoubtedly, assassination is a heinous crime and society demands that the perpetrators of such a crime be brought to justice, but we must not lose sight of other societal values in our eagerness to see justice done. Justice is never served when, in moving toward it, we blindly trample on rights which in calmer moments we earnestly fight to preserve. CONCLUDING REMARKS I would like to make some general comments regarding my service on this committee, and in doing so discuss an issue which deserves particu- lar attention. My service on the House Select Committee on Assassinations was a painful experience. For 2 years my colleagues and I listened to the cir- cumstances surrounding the death of two men : One, an inspired indi- vidual who gave this Nation a special understanding of the meaning and importance of freedom ; the other, a President who transferred his hope, his ideals, and his youth to a Nation growing old before its time. While they lived the shoulders of a Nation were sturdier, its back was stronger, and its heart a little greater. And although what they gave will remain with this country for all time, with their death we lost forever the glowing promise of their tomorrow. Thus, my service on the committee was a painful one. But hearing of the conduct that was engaged in by various agencies of our Govern- ment in the name of security, in the name of law enforcement, not only added to that pain, but caused me to feel shame and anger in a way in which I can only hope I will never feel again. The e\ndence before this committee on some of the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency consisted of story after storv of abusive practices. The FBI, an arm of our Government, engasred in what was tantamount to a private war against one individual — not a criminal, just a man who spoke out 490 against injustice. The FBI's conduct toward Dr. King not only dis- honors that agency, but dishonors each and every one of us. The CIA, an arm of our Government, locked Mr. Nosenko in a cell, a "vault" for 3 years. For 3 years this agency kept a man in solitary con- finement without resort to legal process and under conditions designed to break his mind and his spirit. In addition, the CIA made a number of efforts to kill the leader of a foreign nation and joined forces with organized crime so that they might better accomplish their goal. We must never permit these agencies to dishonor us in like manner again. This committee heard over and over again from both these agencies that the abuses of the past would never be repeated. Heartening as these assurances are, they are not enough. Now that these abuses have been publicly aired, we have a responsibility to do ever>i:hing we can to see to it that they are not repeated. Ignorance of the danger can never again be an excuse. The only means of fulfilling our responsibility to insure that the abuses which occurred in the 1960's do not oocur again is to pass legis- lation restricting the activities in which these agencies may lawfully engage. I, however, am not confident that charter legislation is enough. In addition, I think Congress should consider imposing crimin.?l lia- bility on officers and employees of these agencies who engage in wrong- ful activities which may now be technically outside the reach of crimi- nal statutes. These two agencies need the rule of law. The attitude that they were free to function outside or above the law allowed these abuses to occur. There must l)e no question that Congress intends for these agencies to operate within the law and that the American public demand that they do so. I believe that even today the attitude of being in some Ava v above the law lingers in these agencies. It was apparent in the CIA's choice of a witness to appear before this committee in a public hearing. The CIA sent someone Avho had an agreement with that agency not to speak about the primary sul)ject of this committee's work, Lee ITarvey Oswald. Upon what meat doth this, our Caesar, feed. That he is grown so great ? "Julius Caesar." William Shakespeare . Perhaps it is the meat of our indifference. If so, we can afford to be indifferent no longer. Separate Views of Hons. Samuel L. Devine and Robert W. Edgar Although seldom achieved, unanimity is often sought in reaching decisions in matters of controversy. Such is the case with the final report of the Select Committee on Assassinations. Members present in a rather hasty session on December 29, 1978, discussed a draft summary of findings and recommendations. Word- ing was changed and revised in some portions, and although most members were in agreement with most of the provisions, not all mem- bers present totally agreed with all of the findings and/or recom- mendations. It is the opinion of the undersigned that Chairman Louis Stokes, members of the select committee. Chief Counsel Robert Blakey and his staff did an outstanding job in an extremely difficult situation. Professionalism dominated the performance of the investigation and hearings, and the congressional mandate has been met with dignity and efficiency, free of political manipulation or personal grandstand- ing. The fact all members of the select committee do not totally agree with all of the conclusions should not be construed as any suggestion of dissention or conflict, but merely an indication of a respected legal maxim : "Reasonable minds can reach different conclusions from the same set of facts." Was there really a conspiracy to assassinate President John F. Kennedy in Dallas? This is the question that many people ask since the U.S. House Select Committee on Assassinations released its pre- liminary report stating the President "was probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy." The report raised nearly as many questions as it answered, and the public understandably wants to know what was the basis for the startling conclusion. The release of the full report offers informa- tion on this important point. How did the committee arrive at its conclusion pointing to a con- spiracy? A premature leak of technical evidence from acoustics ex- perts was overemphasized in the national media, although this evi- dence was only one facet of a very comprehensive investigation. As a result, the committee arranged a previously unscheduled pub- lic hearing at the 11th liour to clarifv the acoustical evidence. The testimony of acoustical experts was given such weight that most committee members were persuaded that a fourth shot was fired at Kennedy. This shot, actually the third in a sequence of four, apparently came from a "shooter" on the grassy knoll. Was there actually another "shooter" at another location, and did this person conspire with Lee Harvey Oswald? Evidence for this view rests on a tape recording made in the dis- patcher's radio room of the Dallas Police Department. (491) 492 An open microphone on a police radio inadvertently recorded the events during the time period immediately before, diirine:, and after the assassination. Experiments with this tape have produced varying conclusions. Althouirh acoustical study techniques are not new or novel, and were available at the time of the Warren Commission investigation, scientific advances permitted experts to separate noises, distinguish- ing the sound of a motorcycle from street noises. The acoustical ex- perts believed they could identify gunfire. The experts concluded there were four shots fired, and one of those did not come from the Texas School Book Depository where Lee Harvey Oswald was. The experts told the committee they were 95 percent certain — be- yond reasonable doubt — there was a second "shooter." Based on this evidence and testimony, a majority of the select committee concluded there was a "high probability of a conspiracy." This is a conclusion that must be rejected. First, standing alone, the opinion of acoustics experts that a third shot came from the grassy knoll is simply their opinion. Unless sup- ported by other evidence, it is not sufficient to establish conclusively there was indeed another shot, another shooter, or a conspiracy. Committee Chairman Louis Stokes, Democrat of Ohio, has said he felt this conclusion not share this view. was supported by "eye and ear witnesses." Some do The ear witnesses were people in the area to watch the Kennedy motorcade — and they disagreed about what they heard. Less than 12 percent said they heard shots from the grassy knoll. But over 27 percent said the shots came from the Texas School Book Depository. Another group (17 percent) of ear witnesses believed the shots came from still another building to the rear of the President's limousine. And nearly 40 percent simply did not know or could not tell. In short, the ear witnesses disagreed among themselves. Among the eyewitnesses, there was one who thought he saw a "puff of smoke" in the grassy knoll area. But, a "puff of smoke" is not necessarily evidence there was another shooter, particularly with smokeless powder generally used, or indeed a conspiracy. The acoustics experts are top men in their special field and there is no question as to their integrity or credibility. However, any expe- rienced trial lawyer would apply the same basic legal maxim : "Rea- sonable minds caii reach different conclusions from the same set of facts." Assuming for the sake of argument there was actually another "shooter." this would simply be circumstantial, not conclusive, evi- dence of a possible conspiracy. Apparently, the majority of the select committee dismissed the idea more than one person in the tens of thousands irathered in Dallas that day might have independently desired to kill the President. There is another reason to doubt the open-microphone evidence. Officer H. B. McLain of the Dallas Police Departnipnt was identified by the acoustics experts as being the oi)erator of a motorcvcle with an open mike to the left and rear of the President's limousine. 493 But, apparently the officer himself rejects the assumption, which led to the test and re-enactments. He asks a very simple, but important, question : "If it was my radio on my motorcycle, why did it not record the revving up at high speed plus my siren when we immediately took off for Parkland Hospital?" The investigation, testimony, and evidence established the facts that Lee Harvey Oswald fired at least three shots from his rifle, from the sixth-floor window of the book depository. It established the facts that two of these three shots hit the President, first in the lower neck, upper back, exiting from the front of the throat of the necktie knot. This bullet, the evidence shows, then struck Gov. John B. Connally, passing through his chest cavity from the rear, then emerging and entering his thigh and right wrist. Also, the investigation established the fact that the next shot hit the President in the right skull and brain area, resulting in nearly instantaneous death. There were important results in the investigation of the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., too. Here the possibility of a conspiracy is somewhat more plausible because of the direct evidence and testimony involving specific persons with plans or plots to kill King and thousands of dollars being sug- gested as a payoff. The committee concluded that James Earl Ray fired the fatal shot, with his rifle, from a roominghouse in Memphis and then escaped. His apprehension in London and apparent admissions to Inspector Eist of Scotland Yard, together with his decision to plead guilty, assisted the committee to draw this conclusion. However, evidence of a successful conspiracy to murder King is not conclusive. Plots, plans, and designs to commit murder, separate and apart from the actual murder, do not necessarily amount to a murder conspiracy. Although some members of the select committee felt a climate was created where the natural consequence of a U.S. Government agency's conduct may ultimatelv have resulted in the murder of King, the committee found no evidence, direct or indirect, that the FBI had any part, in, or engineered, this assassination. All members did not a.q-ree with all findings, conclusions, and rec- ommendations, but they did conscientiously seek answers to murders 10 and 15 years old. Anv further action in these matters should be nursued in the Justice Department, since the select committee has concluded its work. Samuel L. Devine. Robert W. Edgar. Dissenting Views bt Hon. Robert W. Edgar to the Final Report An Introduction It was 10 :oO p.m. on Friday, December 29, 1978, when I was faced with one of the most difficult decisions of my congressional career. Chairman Louis Stokes of Ohio challenged those of us on the Select Committee on Assassinations to come to grips with over 2 years of in- vestigative evidence and to decide on what we had found. The mood was somber and sobering, each member weighing months of delibera- tions. There were a number of imi)ortant questions to be answered : Did Lee Harvey Oswald act alone ? Was it possible for the second shot fired from the Texas Book Depository to pass cleanly through President Kennedy and Governor Connally in near perfect condition? Were there signs of involvement by the Russians, the Cubans, the under- world? What happened in the King case? Did James Earl Ray have help ? Who is the mysterious Raoul ? How did Ray finance himself dur- ing the period from April 23, 1967, when he escaped from the Missouri State Penitentiary until June 8. 1968, when he was captured in Eng- land? These and thousands of other important questions had been the subject matter of our committee's efforts. The select committee came into being in September 1976, in response to a perceived need in the Nation to look again into the deaths of Dr. Martin Luther King and President John F. Kennedy. At that time, it was clear that many people were dissatisfied with the investigations conducted by the Warren Commission and the FBI. The Gallup Poll revealed that over 80 percent of the American people believed that, despite the findings to the contrary, some kind of conspiracy lurked behind both deaths. A host of speculative and often bizarre theories had been promulgated in book and article form, and people calling themselves "assassinologists" had diligently kept alive their pet theories. Thus Congress, responding to continued interest and ])ressure from the American people for further investigation, established our controversial committee. Almost immediately, we fell into disfavor. Part of the problem was uncertainty about the leadership of the committee and our task. Congressman Tom Downing from Virginia, the first chairman, served only from October 1976 to early January 1977, when he retired. Then Representative Henry Gonzalez, an outspoken Congressman from Texas, became the chairman, and immediately came into conflict with the equally outspoken new chief counsel, Richard Sprague, from Phila- delphia. Congressman Gonzalez and Richard Sprague spent a good deal of time from January through March struggling over budgets and funding measures. Little time was spent in actual investigations. In March 1977 Representative Gonzalez resigned his chairmanship of the committee: Richard Sprague left shortly thereafter. I took Henry Gonzalez' place as a member of the committee. (494) Our first priority was to find a new chief counsel. We were able to secure the services, by June 1977, of Professor Robert Blakey of Cornell University, who had extensive experience in the Justice Department as well as some Capitol Hill experience working with the Senate. As a result of these early problems, the actual investigations did not start until July 1977. Mr. Blakey began work by reviewing the staff and making some immediate changes, and by trying to put together a com- plete investigative plan. We divided our staff into two separate groups : one focused primarily on the death of Dr. King, the other primarily on the death of President Kennedy. The 12 Members of the House who served on the committee separated into two task forces. The Dr. King task force was led by the Delegate from the District of Columbia, Walter Fauntroy. The task force look- ing into the death of President Kennedy was led by Congressman Richardson Preyer from North Carolina. In the fall of 1977 we began months of executive session hearings, receiving testimony privately in order to protect the rights of the individuals from whom we heard. In August 1978, after completing almost a year of executive session testimony, we opened the hearings to public scrutiny. James Earl Ray was brought in for a week of testimony. He and others were cross- examined regarding their involvement in Dr. King's death. In Sep- tember we had 27 days of hearings into all phases of the death of President Kennedy. In November, 2 days after the congressional elec- tions, the committee reviewed during 17 days of public sessions the events surrounding the death of Dr. Martin Luther King. Finally in December, a month before the committee was scheduled to go out of existence, we began considering in great detail what we had discovered. The vote that was to be taken on the evening of December 29 fol- lowed 2 weeks of extensive review by the committee of some last- minute information that was troubling to all of us. I voted "No" on the committee findings. I voted "No" on that evening after reviewing the evidence and the material very carefully. I voted "No" because I could not accept such a rapid change from the finding that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone to the new finding that there were two gunmen involved in a conspiracy. The following is a discussion of my reasons for this dissent. A. Was there a conspiracy f I agree with the December 13, 1978, first draft of our final report which states on page 64 : The committee finds that the available scientific evidence is insufficient to find that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. Up to that moment in the life of the committee, we were prepared to go to the American people with this conclusion. Only after the report of Mark R. Weiss and Ernest Aschkenasy, in the 11th hour of our investigation, was the majority persuaded to vote for two gunmen and a conspiracy. I respectfully dissented. The use of the term conspiracy does a disservice to the understand- ing of the American public. As was again noted in our draft report on page 51 : Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes defined con- spiracy as"a partnership in criminal purposes." A conspiracy 496 cannot be said to exist unless evidence is found from which such a partnership may be inferred. We found no evidence to suggest a conspiracy. We found no gunmen or evidence of a gunman. We found no gun, no shells, no impact of shots from the grassy knoll. We found no entry wounds from the front into any person, including President John Kennedy and Gov. John Connally. We found no bullets or fragments of bullets that did not belong to the Oswald weapon. And we found little, if any, evi- dence of partnership with Lee Harvey Oswald. Few credible ear-wit- ness accounts back up the marginal findings of our acoustics experts. According to the committee's own investigation of the statements taken from 178 persons in Dealey Plaza that were available to the Warren Commission, we found the following : Forty-nine of them (27.5 percent) believed the shots had come from the Texas School Book Depository; 21 (11.8 per- cent) believed the shots had come from the grassy Imoll ; 30 (16.9 percent) believed the shots had originated elsewhere; and 78 (43.8 percent) were unable to tell which direction the shots were fired from. Only four individuals believed shots had originated from both the grassy knoll and the Texas School Book Depository. (P. 32, draft final report of the House Select Committee on Assassinations.) One of the eyewitnesses referred to in the committee's final report as illustrative of those present in Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963, who believed a shot came from the grassy knoll was the late S. M. Hol- land, a signal supervisor for the Union Terminal Railroad. Holland was standing on top of the overpass above Elm Street, lookinc: down on Elm Street. The committee will quote from a deposition by Mr. Holland given to the Warren Commission on April 8, 1964, to sub- stantiate itstheory of a fourth shot. For the record, let me share part of S. M. Holland's affidavit taken shortly after the assassination : I am signal supervisor for the Union Terminal and I was inspecting signal and switches and stopped to watch the parade. I was standing on top of the triple underpass and the President's car was coming down Elm Street and when tbey got just about to the arcade T heard what I thought for the moment was a firecracker and he slumped over and T looked over toward the arcade and trees and saw a puff of smoke come from the trees and I heard three more shots after the first shot but that was the only puff of smoke I saw. I im- mediately ran around to where T could see behind the arcade and did not see anvone running from there. But the puff of smoke T saw definitelv came from behind the arcade through the trees. After the first shot the Secret Service man raised up in the seat with a machinegim and then dropped back down in the seat. And they immediatelv sped off. Everything is spinnini; in mv head and if T remember anvthing else later I will come back and tell Bill. (P. 387, "November 22, 1963: You Are the Jury," by David W. Belin, Esquire, affidavit by S.M.Holland.) 497 Notice the confusion of his account. First, he hears what he believes is a firecracker, then sees a "puff of smoke" coming from the trees, then tliree more shots. But he sees only one "puff of smoke" after the first shot, not the third. He runs around behind the arcade and sees no one. Notice also the reference to the Secret Service man rising up within the car itself with a machinegim. I doubt that we should place much ac- curacy on this witness.^ I saw little evidence of a conspiracy. I saw little evidence of a sec- ond shooter. And until further study of the acoustics work is under- taken, Iwill stand by my belief that Lee Harvey Oswald acted as the lone assassin. B. How accurate is the 95 percent or better prohahility of the alleged grassy knoll shot? I agree with the words of Dr. Marvin E. Wolfgang, professor of sociology and law, University of Pennsylvania, in his letter dated January 2, 1979: I think the works of Barger and of Weiss and Aschkenasy have been exciting from a scientific perspective. I hope their studies will be published in traditional scientific journals where they will receive the usual form of scrutiny. However, I think it is premature and inappropriate for a Federal group, like your committee, to make a major policy decision on the basis of their findings. I also agree with the words of Dr. Francis K. Davis, dean of science, Drexel University, in his letter dated January 8, 1979 : Lacking something like that [a scientific report] to look at critically, I certainly think that the 95 percent confidence claim is grossly exaggerated, and it would take considerably more scientific evidence to convince me and most other scien- tists that their conclusions were valid. As it is, T believe that their chi-square probability test indicates a 95 percent prob- ability that certain events on the tape could not occur by chance, but not that there is a 95 percent probability that a shot came from the gi-assy knoll. Probabilities are based on history. While the acoustics study is a scientifically derived body of data, there is little precedence as to how to contextualize the acoustics study. Further, the test firings in Dallas, which are the basis for the comparison study, failed to fully utilize all possible shot directions and/or locations. Many, many questions re- main, such as : (1 ) On what univei-se of data are the 95 percent probabilities based ? (2) How adequate were their consideration of temperature and tem- perature gradients in their findings ? (3) Could strong thermal gradients in Dealey Plaza markedly change the direction of sound waves? Even to the point of producing an acoustical mirage? (4) Was the same analysis done on shots 1, 2 and 4, that was done on apparent shot 3 ? For the comment of the committee on this observation, see IB reference No. 155. 498 (5) Should an echo pattern history be developed by looking at other locales and other positions in Dealey Plaza to establish the uniqueness of the pattern or apparent shot numlDer 3 ? (6) How certain are we of the identity of the other sounds on the tape ? The bell sound ? The sirens ? (7) Are we 95 percent confident that we have the right motorcycle in the right location at the right time ? (8) Could there have been more than one motorcycle police micro- phone receiving sounds at the same time and making an acoustical collage? (9) Was the December 13, 1978, report of Anthony J. Pellicano carefully reviewed prior to our December 29, 1978, finding? (10) Do we know enough to make our judgment on conspiracy accurate? To the last question, I say no. I call upon the Congress of the United States to immediately request a full and proper restudy of the acous- tics project. I suggest that this be the first step toward completing our investigation. This restudy must involve a full review of the work of James E. Barger, Mark R. Weiss, and Ernest Aschkenasy. After more analysis, we may be able to better judge what level of merit we should place on this piece of evidence. As indicated by Dr. Wolfgang: That a shot was made from the grassy knoll is not ruled out by any of the acoustical testimony. But neither is it confirmed by the testimony I have read or heard. (Letter to Congress- man Edgar, dated January 2, 1979.) C. Did %De r'ush to a cansphatorial conelnsio-nf I believe that exhibit "A" will clearly demonstrate a rush to con- spiratorial conclusions. You will note three sets of black letter findings. The first in column 1, was presented to the committee for its considera- tion on Monday, December 18, 1978 (the date of the draft was Decem- ber 13, 1978). it was on that Monday that we met in executive sossion to discuss our findings and come to our final conclusions. It was also that Monday when Weiss and Aschkenasy interrupted our session to share their final report. Less than 2 weeks later, on December 20. 1978, we met in public session to review the report finding. That evening at approximated fi p.m., we began to consider draft No. 2, dated Decem- ber 29, 1978, and found in column 2 of exhibit "A." The final released document appears in column 3. Note the changes within such a short span of time. I believe the Members of Congress did not have suJfRcient time or ex- pertise to ask the tough questions. T believe the committee failed to properly consider hoAv much weight to assign this evidence due to our own limitations of time and familiarity with the science. I believe we rushed to our conclusions and in doing so, overshadowed many im- portant contributions which other aspects of our investigation will have on historv. We did a great job up to the last moment, when in our focus on the acoustics, we failed to give proper weight to other findings of the investigation. In the King case : 499 D. Should James Earl Ray have been brought back before the cormrdt- tee for questioning in the area of conspiracy f Yes. One of the major holes left open in the final days of our investi- gation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King was our failure to bring James Earl Ray back before our panel in the November public session. Our final report will be filled with important information taken from hours of extensive private sessions with Mr. Ray at Brushy Moun- tain State Penitentiary in Tennessee. But, in August when he first appeared in public, we had implied strongly to him and his attorney, Mark Lane, that he would be given an additional opportunity to appear in public session to respond to questions in areas such as conspiracy and his activities after the assassination and before his capture in London. While I believe that James Earl Ray was the assassin of Dr. King, and while I agree that our committee did an extensive investigation into all aspects of the crime, and while I believe that our conclusions would not have been altered by whatever Mr. Ray would have shared in additional public session, I think we failed to give the American public full access to the key actor in what I believe was an assisted effort to kill Dr. King. E. Where do we go from, here? 1. 1 recommend that the Congress immediately order a full and de- tailed restudy of the acoustics work, perhaps through the National Science Foundation. Included in this restudy, a panel of scientific ex- perts with knowledge of acoustics should be employed to monitor the methodology used in the study to insure accuracy and determine the level of weight which should be given to this evidence. 2. I recommend an immediate meeting with the President and the Attorney General by all members of our committee to outline in detail our findings. 3. If after restudy, the science of acoustics is confirmed along the lines of Barger, Weiss, and Aschkenasy's report, I recommend the ap- pointment ofa special investigator to pursue the leads developed by our committee in the Kennedy case. 4. 1 recommend that the Justice Department immediately reopen its investigation into the death of Dr. Martin Luther King and focus on the possible St. Louis conspiracy and the possible involvement of others in this death. 5. I recommend that the appropriate committees of Congress which have jurisdiction over science and criminal justice, immediately begin to explore the value of acoustics as a forensic science and possible new tool in the criminal investigation field. 6. T recommend that the Congress weigh carefully the experience of fho House Select Committee on Assassinations in order to evaluate the pros and cons of the use of snecial committees for the purpose of crim- inal justice investigations. Do we have the tools to fully handle all legal rights? 500 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to acknowledge my appreciation to the following in- dividuals whose sacrifice of time and energies made a significant con- tribution tothis report : Dr. Francis K. Davis, Dean of Science, Drexel University, College of Science, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104 (215-895-2620). Dr. Arthur E. Lord, Jr., Professor of Physics, Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104. Dr. Marvin E. Wolfgang, Professor of Sociology and Law, Univer- sity of Pennsylvania, Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law, 3718 r^cust Walk CK, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104. Mr. Shanin Specter, 3417 Warden Drive, Philadelphia, Pa. 19129 (student at Haverford College in Haverford, Pa.) . David W. Belin, Esquire, Belin, Harris, Helmick & Lovrien, 2000 Financial Center, Des Moines, Iowa 50309 (515-243-7100) . 501 EXHIBIT A— (BLACK LETTER FINDINGS) Draft, Dec. 13, 1978, final report of the Final report of the Select Committee on Select Committee on Assassinations, Assassinations, U.S. House of Repre- U.S. House of Representatives, 95th sentatives, 95th Cong., 2d sess., Con ., 2d sess., vol. I, fmdings and summary of findings and recom- recommendations Draft findings, Dec. 29, 1978, 6 p.m. mendations, Dec. 29, 1978 (but released on Dec. 30, 1978) (2) (3) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS— TABLE OF FINDINGS I. Nature and scope of the investiga- tion. II. Findings of the Select Committee I. Findings of the Select Committee on !. Findings of the Select Committee on on Assassinations in the Assas- Assassinations in the Assassina- Assassinations in the Assassina- sination of President John F. tion of President John F. Kennedy. tion of President John F. Kennedy Kennedy. in Dallas, Tex., Nov. 22, 1963. A. Lee Harvey Oswald was the A. Lee Harvey Oswald fired 3 A. Lee Harvey Oswald fired 3 assassin of President shots at President John F. shots at President John F. Kennedy. Kennedy. The 2d and 3d Kennedy. The 2d and 3d shots struck the President. shots he Nred struck the The 3d shot killed the President. The 3d shot he President. fired killed the President. 1. President Kennedy 1. President Kennedy 1. President Kennedy was struck by 2 was struck by 2 was struck by 2 shots fired from rifle shots fired rifle shots fired behind the Presi- from his rear. fron behind him. dent. 2. The shots which 2. The shots that 2. The shots that struck struck President President Kennedy struck President Kennedy were Kennedy from his from behind him fired from the 6th rear were fired were fired from the floor window of from the 6th floor 6th floor window of the Texas School window of the the southeast Book Depository Texas School Book corner of the Texas Building. ing. Depository Build- School Book De- pository Building. 3. Lee Harvey Os- 3. Lee Harvey Oswald 3. Lee Harvey Oswald wald, on Nov. 22, owned the rifle owned the rifle that 1963, shortly be- that was used to was used to fire the fore the assassi- fire the shots from shots from the 6th nation, had ac- the 6th floor win- floor window of the cess to and was dow of the Texas southeast corner of present on the the Texas School School Book De- 6th floor of the pository Building. Book Depository Building. Texas School Book Depository Building. 4. Lee Harvey Oswald 4. Lee Harvey Oswald, 4. Lee Harvey Oswald, owned the rifle on Nov. 22, 1963, shortly before the from which the shortly before the assassination, tiad shots that killed assassination, had access to and was President Ken- access to and was present on the 6th nedy were fired. present on the 6th floor of the Texas floor of the Texas School Book De- School Book De- pository Building. pository Building. 5. Lee Harvey Os- 5. Leeother Harvey Oswald's actions tend 5. Leeother Harvey Oswald's actions tend wald's other ac- tions are more to support the consistent with a conclusion that he to support the con- finding that he killed Kennedy. President clusion that he as- shot President dent Kennedy.sassinated Presi- Kennedy than a finding that he did not shoot the President. There is insufficient evi- Acoustical evidence estab- B. Scientific acoustical evidence dence to find that there lishes ahigh probability establishes a high proba- was a conspiracy to as- that 2 gunmen, acting as bility that 2 gunmen fired sassinate President Ken- part of a conspiracy, fired at President John F. nedy. at President John F. Ken- Kennedy. Other scientific evidence does not preclude nedy; other scientific evidence does not pre- the possibility of 2 gunmen clude the possibility of 2 firing at the President. gunmen firing at the Scientific evidence negates President, but does negate some specific conspiracy some specific conspiracy allegations. allegations. 502 EXHIBIT A— (BLACK LETTER FINDINGS)— Continued Draft, Dec. 13, 1978, final report of the Final report of the Select Committee on Select Committee on Assassinations, Assassinations, U.S. House of Repre- U.S. House of Representatives, 95th sentatives, 95th Cong., 2d sess., Cong., 2d sess., vol. I, findings and summary of findings and recom- recommendations Draft findings, Dec. 29, 1978, 6 p.m. mendations, Dec. 29, 1978 (but released on Dec. 30, 1978) (1) (2) (3) C. The committee is unable, on C. The committee believes, on the basis of the available the basis of the evidence evidence, to identify the available to it, that Presi- dent John F. Kennedy was other gunman or the ex- tent of the conspiracy. probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy. The committee is unable to Identify the other gunman or the extent of the conspiracy. 2. The committee be- 1. The committee be- 1. The committee be- lieves, on the lieves, on the lieves, on the basis of the evi- basis of the avail- basis of dence available able evidence, that dence the availableevi- to to it, that the the Soviet Govern- it, that the Soviet Soviet Govern- Government was ment was not in- ment v/as not in- volved in the as- not involved In the volved inthe as- sas ination of assassination of sas ination of nedy. President Kennedy. President Ken- President nedy. Ken- 3. The committee be- 2. The committee be- The committee be- lieves, on the lieves, on the lieves, on the basis of the evi- basis of the avail- basis of dence available able evidence, that dence the availableevi- to to it, that the the Cuban Govern- it, that the Cuban Cuban Govern- ment was not in- Government was ment was not in- volved in the as- not involved in the volved inthe as- sas ination of assassination of sas ination of nedy. President Kennedy. President Ken- President nedy. Ken- 4. The committee be- The committee be- The committee be- lieves, on the lieves, on the lieves, on the basis basis of the evi- basis of the avail- of the evidence dence available able evidence, that available to it, that anti-Castro Cuban anti-Castro Cuban to it, that anti- Castro Cuban or- groups were not groups, as groups, ganizations were involved in the were not involved not involved in assassination of in the assassination the assassination nedy. President Ken- of President Ken- of President Ken- nedy. able evidence nedy, but does the avail- not preclude the possibility dividual thatmembers in- may involved.have been 5. Organized crime as an institution was The committee be- lieves, on the The committee be- not involved in lieves, on the basis basis of the avail- of the evidence the assassination able evidence, that available to it, that of President Ken- the national syndi- nedy. On the cate of organized the national syndi- cate of organized basis of the evi- crime was not in- crime, as a group, dence available volved in the as- sas ination of was not involved m to it, the com- nedy. the assassination of mittee isnotable President Kennedy, President Ken- to determine if but the available individual mem- evidence does not bers of it were involved in the preclude the pos- assassination. vidual sibility that members indi- included. may have been The Secret Service, 5. The Secret Service, The Secret Service, Federal Bureau Federal Bureau of Federal Bureau of of Investigation Investigation and Investigation and and Central In- Central Intelli- Central Intelligence telligence Agnecy gence Agency were were not involved not involved in the Agency were not in the assassina- assassination of involved in the as- tion of President nedy. sassination ofPres- ident Kennedy. Kennedy. President Ken- Dissent and Additional Remarks of Hon. Harold S. Sawyer to THE Final Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS As filed December 29, 1978 The summary of findings and recommendations of the Select Com- mittee on Assassinations having been set forth in summary outline form, this dissent follows the same form adopting the numerical and alphabetical paragraph designations of the report, to which a dissent and disagreement is intended to apply. I disagree with the following designated sections of the summary report : Kennedy (1) Paragraph IB. (2) Paragraph IC. (3) That portion of subparagraph IC3 which reads "but that the available evidence does not preclude the possibility that individual members may have been involved." (4) That portion of IC4 where it is stated on the fifth line "as a group" and its concluding clause "but that the available evidence does not preclude the possibility that individual members may have been involved." (5) That portion of subparagraph ID wherein said subparagraph states (a) "varying degrees of," (b) "President John F. Kennedy did not receive adequate protection." and (c) "The investigation into the possibility of conspiracy in the assassination was inadequate. The con- clusions ofthe investigations were arrived at in good faith, but pre- sented ina fashion that was too definitive." (6) That portion of subparagraph IDl wherein it states "The Secret Service was deficient in the performance of its duties." (7) Subparagi-aph IDl(a). (8) Subparagraph ID2. (9) Subparagraph IDS (c). (10) That portion of subparagraph ID5 in that it uses the phrase "varying degrees of." (11) Paragraph ID5(b). I agree, however, that information relat- ing to the attempted assassination of Premier Castro which could have been a relevant consideration was withheld from the Warren Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency. (12) Paragraph IDS (d). King d) Paragraph IIB. (2) Paragraph IIE2 insofar as it states "but failed to investisrate adequately the possibility of conspiracy in the assassination. The Fed- (503) 504 eral Bureau of Investigation manifested a lack of concern for consti- tutional rights in the manner in which it conducted parts of the in- vestigation." RECOMMEXDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (1) Section IV in its entirety. Attached hereto are additional remarks together with my originally submitted proposed findings and reconmiendations which I continue to urge. ADDITIONAL REMARKS Having dissented from the committee's apparent acceptance of the validity and reliability of the expert acoustical testimony presented to the committee and essentially those other portions of the findings and recommendations flowing directly from such acceptance, I find it incumbent to explain (or perhaps in this context "amplify" would be a more appropriate word ) the reasons for my disagreement. As a threshold premise, it should be noted that I believe it is impor- tant that despite the lapse of 15 years and at least two independent investigations, one by the Warren Commission and the other by this committee, which by any investigatory standards were exhaustive, no other evidence or even what might be termed a "scintilla" of evidence has been uncovered which would substantiate a conspiracy or which tends to negate the fact that Oswald operated alone. Those facts, which have been highly exploited by the cult of assassinologists and writers, namely errors and inadequacies in original autopsy testimony, the alleged invalidity of the "single-bullet" theory, the alleged "cropping" of the so-called backyard pictures, and the apparent backward motion of the President's head as shown in the Zapruder film, have been, in my opinion, totally discredited or explained beyond any reasonable doubt by evidence developed by this committee. There were a number of witnesses present in Dealey Plaza who believed that they heard one or more shots from the direction of the grassy knoll. There were a larger number who believed that all of the shots came from this School Book Depository, and there were others who just did not have an opinion as to the point of origin of the shots. One witness believed he saw a puff of smoke in the area of the grassy knoll. If it is borne in mind that none of these listeners were anticipat- ing a shot and in fact, few if any recognized the initial shot or shots as such, small weight can be given to those beliefs. This weight is further diminished by the echo potentials of Dealey Plaza, being ringed on three sides by tall buildings, and the wide divergence of beliefs ex- pressed bythose present. The so-called puff of smoke is in my opinion of little or no evidentiary value in that rifles using modem smokeless powder do not under normal conditions emit visible smoke puffs when lired. The committee is therefore in a position of being asked on the sole basis of the opinion of three experts, all of whom are presently of the same view and persuasion, to make the momentous decision to dis- regard everything else and conclude that a second gunman was situated on and fired at the President from the gi-assy knoll. This I do not find it possible to do. 505 The tape, or more properly, the dictabelt which is the basis of the expert acoustical testimony is now 15 years old, its chain of custody is less than certain and it has been played a wholly indeterminate number of times. To the unaided ear, the dictabelt appears to contain only the noise of a motorcycle, at one point the faint noise of sirens and at another the faint I'inging of chimes. Nowhere on it is there any noise or series of noises even suggesting gunfire. No acoustical expert has testified that even his trained ear had detected such. All of the acous- tical expert opinions are based upon the tape or print-out of a com- puter showing three groupings of oscilloscope-like stylus amplitude markings which remain after the filtering out of the motorcycle noise from the dictabelt. The acoustical experts acknowledged that because of the "cutoff point" of a radio transmitter, the full amplitude of loud sounds would not have been transmitted to and recorded on the dicta- belt. For this reason. Dr. James E. Barger, the committee's initial acoustical expert was unable to say with either certainty or any degree of conviction whatever, that the bursts of amplitude shown on the computer tape were in fact, either gunshots or even sounds similar to gunshots. Other difficulties also exist. The transmitter which was stuck on "open" position, the transmissions of which are recorded on the dicta- belt, were on Dallas police channel 1, whereas the entire motorcade, including of course all of its escorting police, were guarding and trans- mitting on the specially assigned Dallas police channel 2, so we must make the initial assumption in accepting the validity of the acoustdcal testimony, that the officer on whose motorcycle the transmitter was located was tuned to the wrong channel. In light of the known possi- bilities ofhuman error, thds would perhaps be acceptable if the trans- mission inquestion had occurred in the early stages of the motorcade. The transmission with which we are concerned, however, occurred vir- tually at its end and therefore one is required not only to accept the occurrence of such human error, but also its tenacious persistence throughout the entire motorcade during which time the officer on whose motorcycle it was located would for some reason have to remain oblivious to the fact that he was not receiving the rather continuous talk on the motorcade channel and also remain oblivious to the fact that he was receiving constant and totally extraneous communications whicL were continuously being sent over channel 1, the regular Dallas police channel. The officer who has been identified by the committee staff as the rider of the motorcycle on which the stuck transmitter was located has testified that he was in fact guarding the correct channel, namely channel 2, and denies that he was equipped with the stuck transmitter. The same officer, together with other police officials located near the Presidential limousine at the time the shots were fired in Dealey Plaza all agree that sirens were activated, and motorcycles and other vehicles were subjected to emergency acceleration within not more than a few seconds following the shots having been fired. No change in the rhythm or intensity of the motorcycle noise appears anywhere on the relevant dictabelt. There is no audible sound even resembling sirens until a full 2 minutes following the last of what is interpreted by the acoustical experts as the shots. When this faint noise of sirens first be- 506 comes audible, approximately 2 full minutes following the so-called shots, they seem to be approaching, cresting, and then receding. These several facts would, therefore, be more consistent with the transmitter being situated on a motorcycle located somewhere between Dealey Plaza and Parkland Hospital, which motorcycle would incidently have been properly guarding chaamel 1. As stated earlier, tlie dictabelt also contains the faint sound of chimes. Despite a search by our staff and despite a wide ranging check with others who were familiar with the Dealey Plaza area and en- virons 15 years ago, no chimes have been discovered or were found to have existed 15 years ago which were audible in Dealey Plaza. On the other hand, they located one set of knoA^ni chimes which were regularly used and did exist 15 years ago and do now exist in the area between Dealey Plaza and Parkland Hospital. It is also worthy of note that the police radio monitor or dispatcher within minutes following the shots having been fired in Dealey Plaza, called a squad car on police channel 1 and requested that the car go to an area lying between Dealey Plaza and Parkland Hospital and have a motorcycle officer in that vicinity turn off his transmitter which was stuck in the transmit position on channel 1 and was interfering with central police commimications on that channel. Laying aside the physical and circumstantial items of evidence al- luded to above, the testimony of the experts themselves is somewhat disturbing. When Dr. Barger first presented to the committee, in ex- ecutive session, the computer tape purporting to show three spaced amplitude bursts or groupings, he stated that he did not know whether or not these groupings rej^resented gimshots and explained the prob- lems of the volume cutoff point or limitations of transmitters. He ob- served that the third or last amplitude grouping on the tape sequence consumed approximately one and one-half again the time span of each of the earlier two which puzzled him, but on which he could not express an opinion whatever as to whether or not it represented the noise of two partially overlapping shots. He stated that to answer this question it would be necessary to locate the position of the motorcycle with the offending transmitter at the time of the shots. He stated tliat if this could be accomplislied, he could then specifically aaiswer the ques- tion as to whether tliis third burst represented one or two shots. On this basis, the committee authorized Dr. Barger to conduct live firing tests in Dealey Plaza. To accomplish this, live ammunition was fired from a Mannlicher-Carcano j-ifle from the sixth floor window of the Texas School Depository aimed at sandbags which approximated the position of the President at each of the three known shots. A series of microphones with recorders were spaced at intervals along the parade route as it entered and traversed Dealey Plaza. My next information on the results of these tests was when Dr. Barger, some months later, appeared before the committee in public testimony. He stated then that he thought the amplitude bursts shown on the tape wore gunshots ('but could not be rertain), and he thought there was a "50-50 chance" that the third and last burst was either one or two shots. Dr. Barger testified that through his firing tests he had satisfied himself that he had located the approximate position of the motorcycle; namely, 120 feet behind the President's limousine. I found 507 the uncertainty of his public testimony very disappointing and at vari- ance with what I had understood to be the assurance given by him in executive session. 1 felt impelled at that time to conmient on the rec- ord at that time that as a lawyer, I could not even commence a civil suit based on such vague testimony, let alone institute criminal proceedings. The committee, to my knowledge, received no further information on the acoustical evidence until during the closing weeks of the com- mittee's existence, Dr. Barger reappeared in conjunction with two colleagues from the faculty of Queens College, N.Y. ; Dr. Mark "WeisstwoandandDr.testified the Ernest Aschkenasy. that he and Dr. his Weiss acted had colleagues as spokesman accepted asfora "given" the motorcycle's location as established by Dr. Barger in his Dealey Plaza test. That such data taken together with the other raw data earlier developed by Dr. Barger was further developed with the use of simple mathematics ; namely, algebra and geometry. This exer- cise evolved from this same data, predicated on which Dr. Barger had been unable to arrive at any firm conclusion, a 95 percent or greater degree of certainty not only that the third amplitude burst constituted two separate noises but that they were in fact two shots, each from a high-power supersonic rifle, and that the first of the two was fired from a point on the grassy knoll from a point determined within plus or minus 10 feet. Dr. Bfire:er then, without reservation, endorsed these conclusions and stated that he concurred in them. All three experts appearing en banc stated in response to a question I asked that we would not be able to find a qualified acoustics expert who would dis- agree with either their conclusions or the degree of certainty of these conclusions. In weighing this testimony, laying aside questions of physical or circumstantial evidence alluded to earlier in these remarks, I find it very difficult to accept the fact that a gentleman of Dr. Barger's sci- entific qualifications would have appeared for public testimony with ample time to review and study the results of his tests in Dealey Plaza without having applied all of the techniques that a qualified acoustics expert would or could apply to all of the various data in his possession ; after all, at that time he was under oath giving what was then his final expert opinion on the matter. In his testimony. Dr. Weiss said that all of his mathematical compu- tations which resulted in his positive conclusions were predicated upon the position of the motorcycle with the stuck transmitter as determined by Dr. Barger in his tests in Dealey Plaza. Dr. Weiss when asked, however, as to whether all of his conclusions were then dependent upon the accuracv of this given location, stated that unless he were shown an exact replica of Dealey Plaza elsewhere in Dallas that his commutations had confirmed or independently ver- ified the correctness of Dr. Barger's motorcycle location. While I am acquainted with "bootstrap" scientific analytical pro- cedure, itwould a])pear to me that there are far too few, if any, estab- lished or verifiable facts in this entire acoustical scenario to permit the use of bootstrap analysis to determine or sufficiently verify a given predicate to permit even reasonable reliability of the conclusions. 508 As a committee, we were presented with the expert acoustical testi- mony which I have described by three experts who were all in agree- ment with each other, one of whom had somewhat inexplicably drasti- cally modified his earlier testimony to conform with that of the other two on the basis of merely an exercise in simple mathematics. The committee did not have the benefit of either a wholly independ- ent consultant knowledgeable in the science of acoustics or the testi- mony of a qualified acoustics expert who disagreed with the expert testimony and conclusions which were presented (which despite the statement of the acoustics witness that did appear, I cannot, from long experience, believe are not available or could not easily be found). Under the foregoing circumstances and giving due weight to both items of physical and circumstantial evidence which I deem to be contradictory to the expert opinions, and what I find to be a less than satisfactory series of presentations by Dr. Barger, and the unper- suasive conclusions of Dr. Weiss and his colleague from Queens Col- lege, I do not accept the acoustical testimony and the conclusions flowing from it. Instead, I remain persuaded of the accuracy of my earlier submitted proposed findings of facts and recommendations, a copy of which for reference I attach hereto. Harold S. Sawyer. Congress of the United States, House of Representatives, Washington^ D.C., Decemher 6, 1978. To : Hon. Louis Stokes, Chairman, Select Committee on Assassinations. From : Hon. Harold Sawyer. I am prepared to vote for the following findings of fact : Kennedy 1. Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin of President Kennedy, firing three shots from the sixth story window of the School Book Depository. The firet shot missed completely. The second shot (the inedia dubbed "pristine bullet") entered the President's back to the right of his spine and below the shoulder line and emerged at the center base of the neck, the same bullet continued to enter the right back of Governor Connally traveling his chest, shattering one rib and emerging approximately one inch below the right nipple, then shattering his right wrist and coming to rest beneath the skin of his right thigh. This was the bullet found on the stretcher used to trans- port Governor Connally at the hospital. This so-called single bullet theory has been conclusively established in my opinion by the testi- mony using still photographs taken at the scene showing the lateral positions and vertical elevation differential of the President and Governor Connally in the limousine. It also was established by the neutron analysis of the bullet frag- ments and the estimates of the velocity of the bullet at various points, including its estimated velocity when it struck Governor Connally's wrist, such velocity being substantially below its impact distortion level and very substantially above the velocity impact required to shatter bone. 509 The third bullet entered the rear top of the President's head and shattered the entire right hemisphere of the brain and skull and the sev-eral pieces of it were found in the limousine. No other shots were fired from any other place. The origin of the shots that struck the President were established conclusively by the reverse projection from the wounds developed by the NASA expert and the character- istics of the wounds, including the beveling in the skull wound, definitely established that both bullets struck from the upper right rear of the President. The Army film taken in 1948 of the goat shoot- ing episodes convincingly explained the rearward reaction of the President's head as seen in the Zapruder film and very convincingly demonstrates that it could not have been caused by the frontal impact of a bullet, and equally convincingly demonstrates that it was caused by the convulsion of upper dorsal musculature receiving false signals from an exploding brain. 2. Oswald acted alone. There is no evidence of any coconspirators. His trip to Mexico and visit to the Cuban and/or Soviet Embassies were not shown to have any significance vis-a-vis the assassination and the so-called "mystery man" photograph was merely the product of compounded mistakes. 3. Oswald was probably stopped by Officer Tippit because of suspi- cious demeanor and behavior to which an officer such as Tippit would be extremely sensitive. The probabilities are that at the time of his ap- prehension byTippit, Oswald was en route to the home of the person identified by the Dallas press as being the Communist defector or informant who through information provided by the FBI, had des- troyed the Communist Party in Texas, which story appeared on the same page as the story making reference to the New York lawyer who was defending Communists in New York and who Oswald requested be retained as his attorney immediately following his arrest, and which page also contained the announcement and description of the Presi- dent's projected visit to Dallas. The home of this informant was only two short blocks further up the street on which Oswald was proceeding when apprehended by Tippit. The fact that Oswald left his wedding ring in a teacup at the Payne home when he left on the morning of the assassination would be indicative of a total and determined suicidal effort. 4. Oswald's motive was a psychotically proportioned egomania and drive for recognition and importance. 5. As have beento made agencyknown performance, Oswald's to the Secret presence Service in Dallas and more should effective use should have been made of local police and/or screened volunteers in being present on the floors of such buildings as the School Book Depository and particularly in such areas as the so-called grassy knoll which was a perfect sniper location with ready escape routes. A further comment on agency performance is in order on the Yuri Nosenko (the KGB defector) episode. The taking into custody of Mr. Nosenko within the State of Virginia without resort to a court and only under the most tenuous color of authority was itself surprising. The then building of a special cell described as a "vault" by the CIA themselves and holding him there in solitary confinement subjected to 510 continuous mental, psychological, and actual physical torture for a period of over 3 years would have been absolutely unbelievable had not the CIA themselves together with its then Director, Richard Helms, fully and in horrible detail admitted it. Mr. Nosenko was paid off with a six-figure cash settlement and apparently a lifetime "consulting" stipend of about $35,000 per year all surreptitiously with taxpayers' funds, as opposed to either killing him or destroying his brain with a drug ministration which were alternatives that were considered. I believe there is a need for the availability of criminal prosecution to prevent this intolerable type conduct by agencies of the U.S. Government. King 1. James Earl Ray was the lone assassin of Martin Luther King, Jr. He stalked King for a number of days prior to the assassination. 2. James Earl Ray obtained his financing through participation by him in a series of bank robberies, the modus operandi of which and his presence at the times and places, are quite circumstantially per- suasive. Raoul was a fictitious character, and based on the sequence of numerous meetings, was used as a substitute identity to some degree for one or both of James' two brothers. 3. I do not accept as reliable the testimony of Byers with respect to the $50,000 offer for the killing of King. I feel this story was totally fabricated by Byers and when first used by him, some years after the assassination, was used to "smoke out" the identity of one of his as- sociates as an FBI informant. It had nothing to do with the assassination. 4. The motivation of James Earl Ray for the assassination was ra- cial hatred and bias reinforced and made respectable in his mind in part by the COINTEL program waged publicly (but covertly as to source) by the FBI against King. This, I believe, reinforced his per- ception that he would become a national hero with much of the power structure of the country and particularly the South, would serve a nominal length of time, if at all, and could reasonably expect handsome rewards of various kinds and from various sources in the future for his deed. 5. I believe that consciously or subconsciously, Ray deliberately dropped the plastic bag of evidence adjacent to the scene for the pur- pose of assuring his identification with the commission of the crime. 6. Ray's trips into Mexico involved smuggling and were unrelated to the assassination and he had no other assistance in the planning, execution, or escape from the assassination. 7. The testimony of the young man in executive session who claimed he had been hired to kill James Earl Ray is totally without credibility. 8. Ray's escape from prison was not planned or executed with the assassination of King in mind. 9. Ray obtained his Canadian passport by stealing the identification of Canadian citizens through a methodology he had probably heard described in prison and with the exercise of no more cunning and abil- ity than the ordinary criminal would be capable of. 511 10. The failure of the Memphis police to institute roadblocks and other shortcomings of which they have been accused were merely the probable foreseeable fallout of the much greater concern of destructive rioting and general civil disobedience that they were immediately faced with upon news of King's assassination in the city. 11. The behavior of the FBI throughout the extended preassassina- tion period vis-a-vis King was shocking and unbelievable for an agen- c}' of the U.S. Government, and I believe it lent its contribution to the twisted perception of James Earl Kay that he would become some- thing of a national or at least a regional hero if he carried out the dic- tate or inclinations of his racial hatred of King by an assassination. LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 1. I think any employee of any agency of the United States should be subject to conviction of a felony carrying a maximum term of 5 years and $10,000 fine if acting under the color of the authority of his position, he either orders, carries out, or participates in the carrying out of depriving any person within the United States of their freedom without due process of law. 2. I believe it should be made a Federal crime carrying a 5 year maximum sentence and a $10,000 fine for any member of an agency of the Federal Government to either order, carry out, or participate in the carrying out of any program designed to discredit, humiliate, or harass any person in the United States who is not a fugitive from justice. Appendix I. Staff of the Select Committee on Assassinations ADMINISTRATIVE ^ Chief counsel and staff director : G. Robert Blakey. Administrative assistant : Dawne C. Miller. Special counsel : I. Charles Mathews. Secretary : Joyce A. Larkin. Deputy chief counsel, legal office : James L. Wolf. Secretary : Caryl M. Emanuel. Deputy staff director and budget office : Thomas Howarth. Staff assistants : Elizabeth B. Norris and Anne P. Wilander. Chief clerk : Elizabeth Berning. Deputy chief clerk : Olive E. Wagner. Director of security : Robert C. Morrison. Assistant director of security : William H. Cross. Security assistants : Paul Golden and Lance W. Svendsen. Editorial chief : Richard N. Billings. Assistants : Paul A. Di Paolo, Robin D. Lindley, and Helen Whitney Watriss. Administrative clerical : Nancy P. Schultz and Beverly A. Smith. Printer : Larry Stickler. Assistant printer : George R. Stephens. FORMER ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL Chief counsel and staff director : Richard A. Sprague. Acting chief counsel and staff director : Alvin B. Lewis, Jr. Acting staff director : Thomas W. Lambeth. Deputy director/administration : E. M. Hutton, Jr. Assistant director : Richard J. Feeney. Deputy chief counsel : Stephen J. Fallis. Special counsel : Kenneth E, Brooten, Jr. Counsel/legal office : Jeffrey Facter and Jan R. Schlichtmann. Legal assistant : Sari Mordano. Chief clerk : Rebecca W. Martin. Deputy chief clerk : Marion H. Wills. Director of security : Francis J. Kelly. Office managers : Edyth H. Baish and Dorothy R. Tinajero, Chief researcher : Donovan Gay. Public information officer : Burton A. Chardak. Assistant public information Editor/historian officer : Antoinette "Ty" Roberts. : Linda M. Connor. Special assistant : Joan T. Thornell. Executive assistant : Vivian L. McPherson. staff not with the committee as of Dec. 1, 1978, are listed as "former.' (513) 514 Administrative clerical Oliver Champion, Kevin: Carol H. Amato, Sean Doyle, Dorothy Ginlia W. Kiihn,M.Billie "Rarrow, Gay Larson, Denise L. McCray, Cecelia T. INIorton, Mary E. C. Ponder, Patricia Lynn Price, Miriam Rudder, and Betty Lou Sisson. Summer interns: John J. Farmer, ,Jr., Charlotte Green, and Lisa Saunders. JOHN F. KENNEDY TASK FORCE Attorneys Deputy chief counsel : Gary T. Corn well. Assistant deputy chief counsel : Kenneth D. Klein. Senior staff counsel : S. Jonathan Blackmer, Surell Brady, Robert W. Genzman, Michael Goldsmith, Belford L. Lawson Til. Leodis C. Matthews, and Donald A. Purdy, Jr. Former deputy chief counsel : Robert K. Tanenbaum. Former counsel : Howard M. Gilbert, John W. Hornbeck, James E. McDonald, William K. Triplett, and Paul A. Zevnick. Research attorneys Research attorneys: Charles M. Berk, Jane Lind Downey, and Howard Shapiro. Investigators Chief investigator : Clifford A. Fenton, Jr. Staff investigators : Gaeton J. Fonzi, James P. Kelly, Albert Maxwell, and John J. Moriarty, Jr. Former investigators: Joseph J. Basteri, William Brown, Rol:>ert C. Buras, Jr., Martin J. Daly, Clarence J. Day, Lawrence J. Delsa, Albert Gonzales, Kenneth G. Grant, Harold Leap, and Harold A. Rose. Researchers Deputy chief researcher : Jacqueline Hess. Staff researchers: James Conzelman, Eileen G. Dinneen, Michael Ewing, T. Mark Flanagan, Jr., Dan L. Hardway, Margo E. Jackson, Edwin J. Lopez, Patricia M. Orr, Elizabeth J. Palmer, Johanna L. Smith, Leslie H. Wizelman, and Elizabeth A. Wolf. Former researchers: Colleen Poland, Margaret Chellie Mason, Ann Furnald Taylor, and Kevin Walsh. A dminis trative Office manager : Jane E. Godfrey. Clerical : Ida Jane Ross, Anne B. Misita, Rebecca A. Rife, and Con- stance C. Smith. Former clerical : Sheryl L. Bonifer, Alice E. J. Hamlin, Nancy S. Jenkins, Lillian B. John-son, and Rita LaVerna Morton. Document clerks : Cynthia S. Cooper and Beth Anne Lichtenfels. MARTIN LUTHER KING TASK FORCE A ttomeys Deputy chief counsel : Gene R. Johnson. Assistant deputy chief counsel : Peter G. Beeson. Senior staff counsel : Ronald Adrine, Jeremy R. Akers, Alan B. Haus- man, Kenneth S. McHargh, Mark Alan Speiser, and William A. Webb. 515 Former deputy chief counsel : Robert J. Lehner. Former assistant deputy chief counsel : Michael C. Eberhardt. Former staff counsel: Thomas M. Gannon, Cornish F. Hitchcock, Laura M. Holt, Joseph Kiel, Melvin Kreidman, Terry W. Lazin, Sheila Jackson Lee, and Robert C. Ozer. Research attorneys Research attorneys: Wendy S. Collins, Gale Lynn Oppenberg, and Thomas W. Sacco. Former research attorney : Dean B. Webb. Iwvestigators Chief investigator : Edward M. Evans. Staff investigators : Conrad E. Baetz, Jerome A. Cullings, Alfred S. Hack, Ernestine G. Johnson, Louis Parisi, and Mel Waxman. Former investigators : James H. Chenoweth, Frank L, Eccles, Dom- inick K. Giangrasso, Maurice Israel, Floyd Reeves, Elizabeth K. Selleck, Joseph A. Thomas, Robert J. Walker, and Richard C. Wrase. Researchers Deputy chief researcher : Gerald P. Hamilton. Staff researchers : Lisa M. Berlow, Mary Susan Grimes, Phoebe C. Orr, Barbara J. Robinson, and Brenda L. Welburn. Former researchers: Claire Brown, Judith R. Burford, Ralph C. Locke, Gina I. Resnick, Marlin Risinger, Merete Muff Rosen, and Mitchell A. Mars. A dministrative Office manager : Louis H. Hindle. Clerical : Beverly Jackson and Barbara L. Mosley. Former clerical : Yvonne Briggs, Marjorie Eagle, Diana N. Jones, Elizabeth A. Kilker, and Anne T. Strickland. Research document analyst : Elizabeth C. Feeley. Appendix II : Consultants to the Sei.ect Committee on Assassinations Photo analysis and enhancement Richard J. Blackwell, B.S., M.S., Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasa- dena, Calif. Thomas N. Canning, B.S., M.S., National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Moffett Field, Calif. David B. Eisendrath, B.A., Consultant in Technical and Scientific Photography, Brooklyn, X.Y. Robert J. Groden, freelance photographer, Hopelawn, N.J. William K. Hartmann, B.S., Al.S., Ph. D., Planetary Science Institute, Tucson, Ariz. Bobby R. Hunt, B.S., M.S., Ph.D., associate professor, University of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz. Ellis Kerley, B.S., M.S., Ph. D., chairman, Department of Anthropol- ogy, University of Maryland, College Park, Md. Sgt. Cecil Kirk, Mobile Crime Laboratory, Metropolitan Police De- partment, District of Columbia. C. S. McCamy, B.C.E., M.S., vice president, science and technology, Macbeth Division, Kollmorgen Corp., Newburgh, N.Y. Gerald M. McDonnel, M.D., Department of Radiology, the Hospital of the Good Samaritan, Los Angeles, Calif. Everett Merritt, retired scientist in Analytical Photogrammetry, Geodesy and Astrophysics, Ridge, Md. Paul G. Roetling, B.A., Ph. D., principal scientist. Image Processing Area, Xerox Corp., Rochester, N.Y. Frank Scott, B.S., M.S., the Perkin-Elmer Corp., West Redding, Conn. Robert H. Selzer, B.S., M.S., M.A., Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasa- dena, Calif. Bennett Sherman, B.S., M.S., Consultant on Optics and Allied Sci- ences, Elmhurst, N.Y. Philip N. Slater, B.S., Ph.D., professor, Optical Sciences, Univer- sity of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz. Clj^de C. Snow, B.S., M.C., Ph J)., chief, Physical Anthropology Divi- sion, Civil Aeromedical Institute, Federal Aviation Administration, Oklahoma City, Okla. Richard E. Sprague. B.S.E.E., National Commission on Electronic Funds Transfer, Washington, D.C. George W. Stroke, B.S., Ph.D., professor of Medical Biophysics and Electrical Sciences, State ITniversity of New York, Stony Brook, N.Y. Jack White, B.A., Witherspoon and Associates, Fort Worth, Tex. Organized crime Ralph F. Salerno, consultant and advisor on law enforcement and organized crime, Woodside, N.Y. (516) 517 Pathology Michael M. ^ ^ , , John I. Coe, M.D., medical examiner, Hennepin County, Minneapolis, Minn. Joseph H. Davis, M.D., district medical examiner, Miami, Fla. George S. Loquvan, M.D., director, Institute of Forensic Sciences, Oakland, Calif. Charles S. Petty, M.D., chief medical examiner, Dallas County, Dal- las, Tex. Earl F. Rose, M.D., LL.B., professor of pathology. University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa. Werner U. Spitz, M.D., chief medical examiner, County of Wayne, Detroit, Mich. Cyril H. Wecht, M.D., J.D., coroner, Allegheny County, Pittsburgh, Pa. James T. Weston, M.D., medical investigator and professor of path- ology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, N. Mex. Firearms John S. Bates, Jr., firearms examiner, New York State Police, Albany, N.Y. Donald E. Champagne, firearms examiner, Florida Department of Criminal Law Enforcement, Tallahassee, Fla. Monty C. Lutz, B.S., firearms examiner, State of Wisconsin, New Ber- lin, Wis. Andrew M. Newquist, firearms examiner, Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation, Des Moines, Iowa. Russell M. Wilhelm, firearms examiner, Maryland State Police, Bal- timore, Md. George R. Wilson, firearms examiner. Metropolitan Police Depart- ment, Washington, D.C. Medical illustrations Ida Dox, B.F.A., Geogetown University Schools of Medicine and Dentistry, Washington, D.C. Handwriting analysis Joseph P. McNally, B.S., M.S., examiner of questioned documents. Valley Cottage, N.Y. David ft. Purtell, Ph. B., examiner of questioned dociunents, Chicago, 111. Charles C. Scott, J.D., examiner of questioned documents, Kansas City, Mo. Fingerprint ancdysis Ray H. Holbrook, fingerprint specialist. Metropolitan Police Depart- ment, Washington, D.C. Darrell D. Linville, fingerprint specialist, Metropolitan Police Depart- ment, Washington, D.C. Vincent J. Scalice, president. Forensic Control Systems, Inc., New York, N.Y. Police procedures Charles H. Rogovin, B.A., LL.B., visiting professor of law. Temple University School of Law, Philadelphia, Pa. 518 Polygraph testing Richard O. Arther, B.S., M.A., A.C.P., Certified polygraphist, New York, N.Y. Warren D. Holmes, B.S., licensed polygraphist, Miami, Fla. Charles R. Jones, B.S., licensed polygraphist, Old Bridge, N.J. Benjamin F. Malinowski, licensed polygraphist. Savannah, Gra. Methodology Gerald Gordon, B.A., M.A., Ph. D., director, Centei- for Applied Social Science, Boston University, Boston, Mass. Neutron activation Vincent P. Guinn, A.B.. M.S., Ph. D., professor of radiochemistry, University of California, Irvine. Calif. Dentistry Lowell J. Levine, D.D.S., consultant to the chief medical examiner, New York, N.Y. Appendix III : Contractors for the Select Committee on Assassinations Photo analysis and enhancement The Aerospace Corp., Los Angeles, Calif. Drommer & Associates, Dallas, Tex. Ronald Francis, Ph. D., School of Photographic Sciences, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, N. Y. U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Department of the Interior, Reston, Va. Robert J. Groden, Slides, Unlimited, freelance photographer, Hope- lawn, N.J. Image Processing Institute, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, University of California, Los Alamos, N. Mex., Stanford Research Institute International, Menlo Park, Calif. Ac(yastical Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc., Cambridge, Mass. Mark R. Weiss, B.E.E., M.S. ; Ernest Aschkenasy, B.E.E., M.S., De- partment of Computer Sciences, Queens College of the City Uni- versity ofNew York, New York, N. Y. Richard L. Cole, B.A., M.A., Ph. D., department of political science; John P. Dirkse III, B.S., M.S., Ph.D., department of statistics, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. Simulated gum, test Police department, department of street and sanitation services, city of Dallas, Dallas, Tex. Engineering survey Koogle & Pouls Engineering, Inc., Albuquerque, N. Mex. Other Walter C. McCrane Associates, Inc., Chicago, 111. Clyde C. Snow, Ph. D., Federal Aviation Administration, Oklahoma City, Okla. (619) ■.D •^ \0 vO in VO Appendix IV. Statistical Data and vO Expendituees ro r^ r^ o> w5^ r^ O < H r. •< w W <«- V3 tn ■< 3H 0- OT PS O CO z H g W CO CM CO u CO w o t^ ^ ^ ■< o o m m 1 1 t vO v| -^ O '"' CM H H H (xj hJ txj r~- -a- (620) 521 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STATISTICAL DATA 1977 and 1978 95th CONGRESS 1977 Grand Total Number of Persons Traveling 620 1 .007 Number of Areas Visited 562 1 .463 Number of Man Days Traveled 2.876 4 .758 Number of Witnesses 335 Number of Consultants Under Contract 47 Number of Hearings and 170 Meetings Held 128 42 47 * Number of Interviews Conducted 4 3.524 .924 Number of Subpoenas Issued 542 Number of Immunity 165 Grants 160 * This number is accumulative - the 28 consultants used in 1977 were augmented by 19 more in 1978. 522 M Q M 0 w 5 H 2: i-i W < cn en (i, upS < en PU r^ z % r- o> 0 ^H hJ U fd H S H 0 H to V-^ S en s<: 0 " Q en P4 H 0 ^ ►J(da> Ix) H - •H •H 0) Co' TJ n pL. C M-l 0) Vj M H > 14-1 r-\ M 0 (U ^ > i^ 0 U G) 0) cd M Jj M ^ H ^ i z0) -H x» m S t-H 3 (0 )^ z a 523 to o I is M Q H W ^ § o <: M sw 00 CO ^ PL4 r^ ^o >►J ^ CTN M W K H O f^ H (-< o CO u H ^ U w 5 H >^ n •J to r 3 to 524 525 o\ r^ CT> ON r^ f^ r^ \D -vf ro <3- CO in CO a o ^ 8 ^ r^ —1 r~ 4J 527 -* (Ti f-H vO I— I -H «3- 4J •* Cn rH VO -;r o\ ^ -* --I m r-< ,-4 w oMz < H H o Z ^ ■< CO Cfl H z O w u I I I I I I I I I -* ro O O '-i 4J -a- CO o o ^ Oj-JCOOO-HCI-^^r-l^^— I I - 1-1 ,H| ^ cr> rf o —< m -a- —1 rt —< rt ^ ^ fO " r- (£: 1^ 5 4 - F'. g CO [d S 5 H s cc: U ^ <1 " CO J3 <• 0^ ^1 - 529 530 w CO M H H O w ^ o 1— 1 CO u -i 4-1 531 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS NUMBER OF STAFF FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 1977 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1978 1977 1978 1/1 73 i/1 114 2/1 73 2/1 115 3/1 73 3/1 115 A/1 64 r 4/1 117 5/1 63 5/1 116 6/1 59 6/1 118 7/1 72 7/1 118 8/1 84 8/1 94 9/1 93 9/1 87 10/1 103 10/1 86 11/1 111 11/1 86 12/1 114 12/1 83 43-112 0-79-35 532 Appendix V. Affirmative Action Program The committee made a successful effort to meet its affirmative ac- tion goals in the employment of minority members on its staff. Of the staff attorneys, for example, 11 of them, 35 percent of the total, were minority, including a special counsel, deputy chief counsel, two senior staff attorneys, six staff attorneys and a research attorney. Of 27 investigators, 11, or 41 percent, w^ere minority, including two chief investigators. Of 29 researchers, seven, or 24 percent, were minority, including one chief researcher and one deputy chief researcher. Of 34 administrative or clerical personnel, 11, or 32 percent, were minority. In summary, of 121 staff members employed during the period of July 1977 to January 1979, 30, or 33 percent, were minority. wasThenotcommittee's record considerable achieved without in the employment of minority effort. The personnel recruitment of 11 minority attorneys, for example, required 67 interviews and 8,000 miles of travel. The committee had to make these efforts because of a relatively small number of available minority attorneys who had the required experience, owdng in turn to the traditional educational dis- advantage of minority Americans.^ The committee experienced diffi- culty in identifying many minority attorneys with criminal investiga- tive backgrounds. In addition, many who had excellent credentials were reluctat to take a position of short duration and relatively low salary. 1 According to a review of Legal Eaucation in the United States, Fall 1977, published by the American Bar Association Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, out of a total law school enrollment of 118,557 for 1977-78, there were 1,945 Black Ameri- cans enrolled in approved law schools, or slijrhtly over 1 percent. However, Black enroll- ment in U.S. law schools has not kept pace with total enrollment. In 1972-73, when over- all enrollment was 101.664. Black enrollment was 1,907, and in 1969-70, when overall enrollment was 68,366, Black enrollment was 1,115. (533) Appendix VI. Enabling Resolutions House Calendar No. 468 "!.=- H. RES. 1540 [Report No. 94-1566] IN THE HOUSE OF KEPRESENTATIVES Septembeu 14,1976 '^ Mr. Gonzalez (for himself, Mr. Downing of Virginia, and Mr. Facntrot) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules September 15,1976 Ivcfcrrcd to the IIou^c Calendar and ordered to be printed RESOLUTION 1 Resolved, That there is herehy ereated a seleet conunit- 2 tee to l)e eoniposed of twelve Members of the House of Kep- 3 reseutativcs to be appointed hy the Speaker, one of whom 4 he shall designate as ehairinan. Any vaeancy occurring in 5 the meml)ersliip of the select connnittee shall be filled in the 6 same manner in which the oi-i<>inal appointment was made. 7 The select committee is authorized and directed to con- 8 duct a full and complete investigation and study of the cir- 9 cumstances surrounding the death of -John F. Kenned}^ and 10 the death of Martin Luther King, Junior, and of any others 11 the select committee shall determine. 12 For the purpose of carrying out this resolution the select V (534) 535 1 t'oniniittco, or any suhcoiinnittee thereof authorized hy the 2 select committee to hold hearings, is authorized to sit and 3 act during the present Congress at such times and places 4 within the United States, including any Commonwealth or 5 possession thereof, whether the House is in session, has re- 6 cessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, and to rc- 7 quire, by subpena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony 8 of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, 9 correspondence, memorandums, papers, and documents as it 10 deems necessary; except that neither the select committee 11 nor any suhconnnittee thereof may sit while the House is 12 meeting under the five-minute rule unless special leave to sit 13 shall have been obtained from the House. The chairman of 14 the select committee may establish such subcommittees of the 15 select committee as he considers appropriate. A majority of 16 the members of the select committee shall constitute a quorum 17 for the transaction of business, except that the select com- 18 mittee may designate a lesser number as a quorum for the 19 purpose of taking testimony. The select committee may em- 20 ploy and fix the compensation of such clerks, experts, con- 21 sultants, technicians, attorneys, investigators, and clerical and 22 stenographic assistants as it considei-^ necessary to carry out 23 the purposes of this resolution. The select connnittee niay re- 24 iniliurse the members of its staff for travel, subsistence, and 25 other necessary expenses incurred by them in the perform- 536 3 1 aiicc of the duties vested in the select committee, other than 2 expenses in connection with meetings of the sek'ct commit- 3 tee or any suhconnnittee thereof held in the District of 4 C'olunihia. Siihpenas may l)e issued under the signature of 5 the chairman of the select committee or any member of the 6 select committee designated b}' him, and may be served I)y 7 any person designated by such chairman or member. 8 The select conmiittee shall report to the House a.s soon 9 as practicable during the present Congress the results of its 10 investigation and study, together with such recommendations 11 as it deems advisa))le. Any such report which is made when 12 the House is not in session shall be filed w^th the Clerk of 13 the House. 537 94th Congress ) HOUSE OF REPKESENTATn'ES j Report 2d Session \ ) No. 94-1566 CREATING A SELECT COM]\JITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JUN- IOR, AND OF ANY OTHERS THE SELECT COMMIITTEE SHALL DETER- MINE September 15, 197G. — Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed Mr. Madden, from the Committee on Rules, submitted rhe folloAving REPORT [To accompany H. Res. 1540] The Committee on Rules, having had under consideration House Resolution 1540, by a record vote of 9 yeas, 4 nays, and 1 voting "pres- ent," report the same to the House with the reconnnendation that tlie resolution do pass. SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS H. Res. 1540 provides for a select committee to be composed of 12 members to be appointed by the Speaker. The select committee is directed to conduct a full and complete inAcstigation and study of the circumstances surrounding the death of John F. Kennedy and the death of Martin Luther King, Junior and of and others the select committee shall determine. 11. Res. 1540 provides that the select connnittee is authorized to sit and meet throughout the lemainder of the 94th Congress whether or not the House is in session and also provides that the select com- mittee shall have subpoena power. H. Res. 1540 provides that the Chairman of the select connnittee may establish such subcommittees as he considers appropriate and that the select committee may designate a lesser number than a major- ity as a quorum for the purpose of taking testimony. H. Res. 1540 provides that the select committee may employ and fix the compensation of such clerks, experts, consultants, technicians, attorneys, investigators, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it considers )iecessary to carry out tlie jnirposes of this resolution, that the select committee may reimburse its staff members for travel and other necessary expenses and that the select committee shall report to the House the results of its investigation and study together with such reconimendations as it deems advisable. 538 LEGISLATIVE IIISTOnY AND COMJIITIEE ACnON The Committee on Rules held one day of hearings on similar resolu- tions on Maith 31, 1976. The Committee ordered reported H. Res. 1540 by a record vote of 9 ayes and 4 nays and 1 '"present'' on Septem- ber 15,'1976. STATEMENT UNDER CLAUSE 2 AND CLAUSE 2(1) (3) (4) OF RULE XI OF TUB RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES A. O cei'slght statement The Committee made no special oversight findings on this resolution. Z> . Budget statement No budget statement is submitted. C. Estimate of the Congressional Budget Office Xo estimate or comparison was leceived from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office as referred to in subdivision (C) of Clause 2 (1) (3 ) of the House Rule XI. D. Oversight findings and recommendations of the Committee on Gov- ernment Operations No findings or recommendations of the Committee on Government Operations were received as referred to in subsection (d) of clause 2(1) (3) of House Rule XL 539 Funding House Calendar No.493 H. RES. 1557 94Tn CONGRESS 2d Session [Report No. 94^1685] IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Seftembkr 21, 1976 Mr. Downing of Virginia submitted tlie following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on House Administration - September 24, 1976 Reported with an amendment, referred to the House Calendar, and ordered to be printed [Stri'ke out all after the word "Resolved," and insert the part printed in italic] RESOLUTION 1 Besolved, ¥l«fct (offootivc 8optombor 4^ 1976) es- 2 ponscs ef investigations a«4 studies te he eonduotcd fey the rTtTTTTTTt; \JfJlllIllTl tVX^ T7TT XV!?r5tlHi3Tllllt(lVllP1 j tlVlyllfff cttS tt TrTTlUlt? TfT TTir 4 subGommittee, «et ie exceed $207,500, mcluding oxpendi 5 tures fef 4fee employment of investigatoi's, attorneys, ftfid 6 oleriefll ftftd other nsststnnts, ft«4 kur tfee procmcmcnt el 7 services of individudr consultants ef organizations thereof 9 A<4 ol 44)4^7 fw amended -|a ¥t8t€t 72a(i)), shftH fee pm4 10 ottt. of t4*e contingent fond of ^ Hoftse on vouchers author 12 mittee- ft«4 approved fey tfee Committee e« House Admin ■ V 540 ] ietrntion. ^^ te cxocctl $30,(X)Q ef 4be totftl nmount pre- T HIL il Ijy 11119 IT SUltlt'ltyll XtrttV ^T^ lICJvTt TTt TTTTtrTTTt^ TTTTr lilll ;i pomry e? intormittcnt scrvicctj el individual oonsiuUflnts ep L?l gUlllBttl/TlJll9 TTttrrTTTTT Utll SltritttJ tt7 SUfJtltTlI — T_f— 1 T f TTT I tit J -ii ^ f^ ialfttivc Reorganization Aefe el 1946, fts amended -f^ U.S.O. (J 72a (i) ) ; b«t tbis monetan^ limitation e« \he proeuremont 7 el s«<4* serviecH skffcH aet prevent ^ twe el mek funds ler Q ft-'ny Otucr till rn ortijCo purposo. 9 ^Ber 3t ^ p€«4 el ^ funds authorized fey tWs rcsolu I ^j XTT7TT nnrrrr tttt tc "ui ici: u it? tttt i a LFVinnLui \. ttt \_-\yii*nxtivii ittttt Tmrr II study m investigation el ofty subject wh4eh is feeing invest* 12 gated Iof tfee sftifte purpose fey ofty other oommittee el the "1 O XJ r\%mrty\ • ft-yifl 4-Kffc ^V\ n 1 •>»yv\ f\ v\ r\* 4-l-\ r\ Wj-\1 <->/-*<• I ^ j-viy^ yw-t < 4- <■ ^ j-t ftyi A QqflO- j^Q j.x^rU*3V • mm VI XT^ ^'iinri iiiuii ttt ttttt rrmTTvTv vttttttitttxxvt^ tttt j-looiato 14 sinations sfeott furnish the Committee en House Administra 15 ties information with respect te ofty study er investigation 16 intended te fee financed from suefe funds. 1'^ ^BBt ^ Funds authorized fey tfe+s resoUition sfefkU fee 18 expended pursuant te regulations estafelished fey the Gom 19 mtttcc e» House Administration m aceordanee with existing 20 IftWr 21 r/iai (effective September 17, 1976) expenses of im^esti/jn- 22 tions and studies to be conducted by the Select Committee on 23 Assassinations, acting as a lohole or by subcommittee, not to 24 exceed $150,000, including expenditures for the employment 541 3 1 of investigators, aiiorneys, and clerical and other assistants, 2 and for the procurement of services of individual consultants 3 or organizations thereof pursuant to section 202 (i) of the 4 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended (2 5 U.S.C. 72a(i) ), shall he paid out of the contingent fund of 6 the House on vouchers authorized by sucli committee, signed 7 by the chairman of such committee, and approved by the 8 Committee on House Administration. Not to exceed $30,000 9 of the total amount provided by this resolution may be used to 10 procure the temporary or intermittent services of individual 11 consultants or organizations thereof pursuant to section 202 12 (i) of the Legislative Beorganization Act of 1946, as 13 amended (2 U.S.C. 72a(i)) ; but this monetary limitation on ^^ the procurement of such services shall not prevent the use of 1^ such funds for any other authorized purpose. ■^" Sec. 2. No part of the funds authorized by this resolu- ^'^ tion shall be available for expenditure in connection with the ^^ study or investigation of any subject which is being investi- 19 gated for the same purpose by any other committee of the 20 House; and the chairman of the Select Committee on Assassi- 21 nations shall furnish the Committee on House Administration 22 information with respect to any study or investigation in- 23 tended to be financed from such funds. 542 4 1 Sec. 3. Funds authorized by this resolution shall l>e 2 expended pursuant to regulations established by the Coni- 3 mittee on House Administration in accordance with existing 4 law. 543 H. RES. 9 Or.Tii CONGRESS 1st Session IN TIIK irorSE OF EEPHESKXTATIVKS Jam Auv 4. lOTT Mr. AVrigiit submitted tlio followiiin- rc.solutii)u ; whicli \va= referred to the Coimiiittee on Kulos RESOLUTION 1 I'cwlved, That, ('(Tcclivo Jamiarv 1^ 1977, there is 2 hereh}' created a Select Committee on Assassinations to l)e 3 composed of twelve ^femhers and Delegates of the House of 4 Ecpresentatives to he appointed I)}- the Speaker, one of 5 Avhom he shall designate as chairman. Any vacancy occur- 6 ring in the meml)ership of the selecl c(»nimittee sh.ill he filled 7 in the same manner in which the original appointment was 8 made. 9 The select committee or a suhcommittee thereof is 10 authorized and directed to conduct a full and complete in- 11 vestigation and study of the circumstances surrounding the 12 assassination, murder, homicide, and death of President John V 544 1 r. Kennodv nnd the assassination, miirdor, homicide, and 2 death of ^lartin Luther King, Junior, and of an}- otlicr per- 3 sons the select committee shall determine in order to aseer- 4 tain whether the existing laws of the United Stales, in- 5 eluding hut not limited to laws relating to the safety and 6 protection of the President of the United States, assassi- 7 nations of the President of the United States, de])rivation 8 of civil rights, and conspiracies related thereto, as W(>11 as 9 the investigatory jurisdiction and capahility of agencies and 10 departments of the United States CJovernment, are adequate, 11 either in their provisions or in the manner of their enforce- 12 ment; and shall make reconmiendations to the House, if 13 the select committee deems it appropriate, for the amend- 14 ment of existing legislation or the enactment of new 15 legislation. 16 For the i)urpose of carrying out this resolution the select 1'? committee, or any suhcommittee thereof authorized by the 18 select committee to hold hearings, is authorized to sit and 19 act during the present Congress at such times and places 20 within the United States, including any Commonwealth 21 or possession thereof, or in any other country', whether the 22 House is in session, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold 23 such hearings, and to require, hy subpoena or otherwise, the 24 attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the produc- 25 tion of such books, records, correspondence, memorandums, 545 1 papers, and docunieiits as it deems neeessary; to take testi- 2 iiiony on oath anywhere within the I'nited States or in any 3 (tther e<)untiy and to authorize desig-nated counsel for the 4 select connnittce tt) obtain statements from any witness who 5 is placed under oath by an authority who is authorized to ad- 6 minister oaths in accordance with the applicable laws of the 7 I'liited States or of any State: except that neither the select 8 committee nor any subcommittee thereof may sit while the 9 House is reading a measure for amendment under the five- 10 minute rule unless special leave to sit shall have been ob- 11 tained from the House. The chairman of the select commit- 12 tee may establish such subcommittees of the select committee 13 as he considers appropriate. One-third of the Members of the 14 select committee shall constitute a quorum for the trans- it action of business as permitted by the rules of the House, 16 except that the select committee may designate a lesser 1'^ number as a quorum for the purpose of taking testimony, 15 but not less than two. The select committee may employ 19 and fix the compensation of such clerks, experts, consultants, 20 technicians, attorneys, investigators, and clerical and steno- 21 graphic assistants as it considers necessary to carry out the 22 ]>nrposes of this resolution. The select connnittee may reim- 23 l)urse the members of its stafif for travel, subsistence, and 24 other necessary expenses incurred by them in the perform- 25 ance of the duties vested in the select connnittee, other than 546 4 1 expenses in connection with meetings of the select commit- 2 tee or any siihconimittee tlioieof hold in the District of 3 Cohunbia. 4 Subpoenas may be authorized by the select committee, 5 or any subconnnittee thereof, or the chairman of the select 6 committee, and issued under the signature of the chairman 7 of the select connnittec or any member of the select commit- 8 tee designated by him. and may be served by any persons 9 designated by such chairman or member. 10 The select connnittee shall be considered a committee of 11 the House of Representatives for all purposes of law, iiu-lud- 12 ing but not limited to section 102 of the Revised Statutes of 13 the United States (2 U.S.C. 192) ; and sections ()0()2 and 14 6005 of title 18, United States Code, or any other Act of 15 Congress regulating the granting of imnnmity to witnesses. 16 The select committee shall adopt written rules govcrn- 17 ing its ]»rocedurcs, which rules shall not be inconsistent with 18 this resolution and the Rules of the House of Re])resentatives. 19 The select connnittee shall re[iort to the House as soon 20 as practicable during the present Congress the results of its 21 investigation and study, together with such recommendations 22 as it deems advisable. Any such report which is made when 23 the House is not in session shall be filed with the Clerk of 24 the House. 547 H. RES. 11 95TII CONGRESS 1st Skssion IN THE HOUSE OF EEPEE8EXTATIVES January 4, 1977 Mr. Thompson siibmitti'd tlie following resolution; which was considered and agreed to RESOLUTION 2 licsoh'fd, That (a) there shall be paid out of the con- 2 thigeut fund of the House of Kepiesentatives, in accord- 3 ance with subsection ())) , for the period beginning Janu- 4 ary ':), 1977, and ending at the ch)se of March 31, 1977, 5 such sums as may be necessary for the continuance of the Q same necessary projects, activities, operations, and services, rj by contract or otherwise (inchiding payment of staff salaries g for services performed) , and for the accomplishment of the g same necessary i)urposes, undertaken in calendar year 1976 IQ by each standing or select committee established in the Rules 11 of the House of Representatives. 12 (b) Each standing connnittee or select committee re- 13 ferred to in subsection (a) shall be entitled, for each month V 43-112 0-79-36 548 2 1 or portion of a moiitli occurring daring the i)eriod specified 2 in sul)section (a), to payments out of the contingent fund 3 of tlic Iluuse uf Eoprcscntatives in amounts equal to onc- 4 twelfth of the total amount authorized for use by the stand- .") ing committee or select conmiittee involved during calendar (i year 19TG. 7 Sec. 2. (a) In the case of any select committee of the 8 House of Kepresentativcs which — 9 (1) was estahhshed by resolution during the 10 Ninety-fourth Congress; 11 (2) did not complete the functions assigned to it by 12 such resolution, or any subsequent resolution, before the 13 close of the Ninety-fourth Congress; and 1^ (3) is reestablished by resolution during the 15 Ninety-fifth Congress before the close of March 31, IG 1977, to carry out functions substantially similar to func- 17 tions assigned to such select committee during the 18 Ninety-fourth Congress; 19 such select committee shall be entitled, for each month or 20 portion of a wonth occurring during the period beginning on 21 the effective date of the resolution reestablishing such select 22 committee and ending at the close of March 31, 1977, to 23 payments out of the contingent fund of the House of Rep- 21 resentatives, for the expenses and purposes specified in 549 3 1 siibset'tion (a) of the first section of this resohition, in 2 amounts equal to the greater of — 3 (A) one-twelfth of the amount determined under 4 subsection (b) ; or 5 (B) the total amount of expenditures made by the 6 select committee involved dm'ing December 197G; 7 except that the entitlement of such select committee for the 8 month during which such select committee is reestablished 9 shall be prorated based upon that portion of such month 10 during which such select committee is in existence, 11 (b) The amount which shall be the basis for an entitle- 12 ment under subsection (a) shall l)e the amount which bears 13 the same ratio to the total amount authorized for use by the 11 select committee involved during calendar year 1976 as 12 15 months bears to the number of months during which such IG select committee was in existence during such year. For 17 purposes of the preceding sentence, any portion of a month 18 in calendar year 1976 which is 15 days or more and during 19 which any such select committee was in existence shall be 20 considered to be a complete month. 21 Sec. 3. The entitlement of any standing committee or 22 select committee of the House of Representatives to pay- 23 ments out of the contingent fund of the House of Repre- 24 sentatives pursuant to the provisions of this resolution shall 550 4 1 cease to l)e effective on the elTective date of the primary 2 e.\])ense re^ohltioll adopted witli respect to the standing 3 connnittee or select connnittee involved. 4 Sec. 4. Funds authorized l)y this resoiuti(»n shall be 5 e.\i)ended puisuant to rej^uiations esta1)li>lied hy the Coni- f) mittee on House Administration in accordance with law. 551 H. Res. 222 In the House of Representatives, U, S., February 2, 1977. Resolved, That effective January 3, 1977, and until March 31, 1977, there is hereby created a Select Committee on Assassi- nations tobe composed of twelve Members and Delegates of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker, one of whom he shall designate as chairman. Any vacancy occurring in the membership of the select committee shall be filled in the same manner in which the original apj)ointment was made. The select committee or a subcommittee thereof is authorized and directed to conduct a full and complete investigation and study of the circumstances surrounding the assassination and death of President John F. Kennedy and the assassination and death of Martin Luther King, Junior, and of any other persons the select committee shall determine might be related to either death in order to ascertain (1) whether the existing laws of the United States, including but not limited to laws relating to the safety and protection of the President of the United States, assassinations of the President of the United States, depriva- tion of civil rights, and conspiracies related thereto, as well 552 as the investigatory jurisdiction and capability of agencies and departments of the United States Government, are adequate, cither in their provisions or in the manner of their enforcement; and (2) whether there was full disclosure and sharing of in- formation and evidence among agencies ^nd departments of the United States Government dui-ing the course of all prior investi- gations into those deaths ; and whether any evidence or informa- tion which was not in the possession of any agency or depart- ment of the United States Government investigating either death would have been of assistance to that agency or department, and why such information was not provided to or collected by the appropriate agency or department; and shall make recommenda- tions to the House, if the select committee deems it appropriate, for the amendment of existing legislation or the enactment of new legislation. For the purpose of carrying out this resolution the select committee, or any subcommittee thereof authorized by the select conmiittee to hold hearings, is authorized to sit and act durmg the present Congress at such times and places within the United States, including any Commonwealth or possession thereof, or in any other country, whether the House is in session, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, and to require, by sub- pena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such wit- nesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, 553 3 memoranda, papers, documents, tangible objects, and other things of any kind as it deems necessary ; to take testimony on oath any- where within the United States or in any other country and to authorize designated counsel for the select committee to obtain statements from any witness who is placed under oath by an authority who is authorized to administer oaths in accordance with the applicable laws of the United States or of any State ; except that neither the select committee nor any subcommittee thereof may sit while the House is reading a measure for amendment under the five-minute rule unless special leave to sit shall have been obtained from the House, The chairman of the select com- mittee may establish such subcommittees of the select committee as he considers appropriate. One-third of the members of the select committee shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business as permitted by the rules of the House, except that the select conmiittee may designate a lesser number as a quorum for the purpose of taking testimony, but not less than two. The select committee may employ and fix the compensation of such clerks, experts, consultants, technicians, attorneys, investiga- tors, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it considers necessary to carry out the purposes of this resolution. The select committee may reimburse the members of its staff for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of the duties vested in the select committee. 554 4 other than expenses m connection with meetings of the select committee or any subconunittee thereof, held in the District of Columbia. The procedure for the select committee or any subcommittee to authorize and issue a subpena shall be that provided for in clause 2(m) (2) (A) of rule XI of the Kules of the House of Representatives. Subpenas may be served l)y any persons desig- nated bythe chairman or any member. The select committee shall be considered a committee of the House of Representatives for all purposes of law, including but not limited to section 102 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192) ; and sections 6002 and 6005 of title 18, United States Code, or any other Act of Congress regulating the granting of inmaunity to witnesses, except that the select committee shall not be considered a standing committee of the House of Representatives for the purpose of Clause 6(a) and Clause 6(b) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Rep- resentatives. The select committee shall adopt the Rules of the House of Representatives as part of the rules governing its procedures. It shall adopt additional written rules governing its procedures, which rules shall not be inconsistent with this resolution or the Rules of the House of Representatives, and which rules shall be pubUc. 555 5 The select committee shall report to the TTouse as soon as practicable during the present Congress, but not later than March 31, 1977, the results of its investigation and study, to- gether with such recommendations as it deems advisable. Any such report which is made when the House is not in session shall be filed with the Clerk of the House. The provisions of H. Res. 11, Ninety-fifth Congress, shall apply to the select committee. Attest : Clerk. 556 H. Res. 433 In the House of Representatives, U. S„ March 30, 1977. Resolved, That the Select Committee* on' Assassinations (hereinafter referred to m this resolution as the "select commit- tee"), established by H. Res. 222, Ninety-fifth Congress,' adopted February 2, 1977, shall continue in operation for the duration of the Ninety-fifth Congress. iSEC. 2. The select committee shall report to the House as soon as practicable during the present Congress the results of its investigation and study, together with such recommenda- tions as it deems advisable. x\ny such report which is made when the House is not m session shall be filed with the Clerk of the House. Sec. 3. The provisions of H. Res. 222, Ninety-fifth Con- gress, adopted February 2, 1977, shall apply to the select com- mittee during the period of its operation under this resolution, except to the extent such provisions are inconsistent with any provision of this resolution. 567 2 Sec. 4. The provisions of clause 6(a) (3) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives shall apply to the select committee. Attest : , Ckrk. 558 House Calendar No. 79 95th congress 1st Session H. RES. 465 [Report No. 95-223] IX THE HOUSE OF KEPRESEXTATIVES Mar. II ;31,li)TT Mr. Stokes siil)mit(o(l llic follo\\iii<>; ivsolulion ; wliich was referred to tho Com- uiiltec on House Adininistratioii Aj'kil 26, 1077 Reported witli an amendment, referred to the House Calendar, and ordered to be printed [Strike out all after the word 'Rcxolved," and insert the part printed In italic] RESOLUTION 2 Besohrd, ^h(^ e^^W^ Jnnimrv St 4^^^ tfee oxponaos 2 el invofjtifflt+effi^ ft«4 f.^4i^ to be eoncliieted hy ^ Select 3 ^mmittf^ e« ABBaflsinatieRi^^ acting m a whole e¥ hf mih- 4 eommitt^f^ eet to exfee4 ■'"12, 706, 650, ineluding expenditureG 5 im ^ oniployiiiont ol investigators, attorne}^^, attd elerieal, 5 ftftd etlier assistants, a«4 hr ihe- proeurement ^ services ef 7 intUvifluftl consultants w organi/^ations thereof pursuant to g fjoetioH #02 (»)■ el 4ie Legislative Reorgani/atlen Act el g liMO, as amended -f# ^^tH:^ 72a (i), shftH Iw' p(ii4 ewt el 10 ^^ contingent f«ft4 el Utc Hettse en vouchees autlidnKcd 11 hf meh cemmittee, signed hy^ ihe chftirman el seclt cem- 12 mittec, ft«4 approved hy ^ Committee eft Heme Adminig V 559 TTrtttTTTTTT iTtTU tT7 V AL'V"tt rJpiT70, I UVf Vrt rrrtT TTTTTtT UlllUttllr TfTTT^ 2 vi4c4 fey Ais resolution may fee ftse4 te procure tfee tern 3 porary or HitermHk'tt^ services of individual consultants m vf* c^ctlil/^cll Ivllil TTm~v TtT TTTTITTrTTTTTC TT7 TTTITriTTTTT — v — » i I TTT TTTTT JJV il 5 islativc Reorganization Aet ef iM%y m amended -f5 U.S.C. 6 72a (i) ) ; fetrt tfeis monetary limitation ef tfee procurement 7 ef sttefe services sfeftll i^ei prevent ike use el suefe ^unds ler cLxi y wi'iiv 1 crrrrTTvrrTTTvTvT T7TrrT7vFT3T77 9 SbGt §7 ^e pai4 ©f ^ funds authorized fey th« resolu- _LV/ T/»T7n oIXIXlI TtTT tX V ctTlU KJlvT xv/x \^ ..a. i/v lHJ.lt lU l^ iTx TT^TTTTTTrTTTTTTTT TTTTTTT tTTTT 11 otudy ©r investigation of afty subject which is being invest!- X^ CmTTTTT TTTr 11 IV cTTTITtT TTTTrTTTTovT TTT" till I TTFnTrr TTtTTlTrTTiTTtrt^ TTT 1 11~ "I Q -t\ AII'lIP-* " ''•^^^ f n rv i^ n 01 vrvt n ti /\t f l-ir\ W/>l /-v/^f- ■ * /"^in fii i f f r^ n rxin \ c'T^nn _I.*J ^-"-Vf ixovj-y CrnTT TTiTJ vTTcxTTTnTTTT TTT TTITT kTvTtTTTC V^ v^iAixiii ti/w T7TT Xi 001*0 14 sinations shall furnish the Committee e« House Administra 15 tioft information with respect to any study ©r investigation -i-ti 1 Jiruntiu U TV trt? rtiiU/lUjUU llUlil allUit Ttrritrcrr KTISvTT TTT jCxIxJ vvJXVTI\7lrTZjCCTT\7TI ETXlXnTvTTT T7T^ TTrv7 rTTovTTTmTTTT (TnmT 18 expire immediately prior t© n©©n ©» Januar}'^ ^ 197^7 19 SeOj 4? Funds authorized fey this resolution shatt fee 20 expended pursuant t© regulations established fey the Com 21 flaittoe ©ft House Administration ift accordance with existing 23 That, effective January 3, 1977, the expenses of invcstiga- 24 tions and studies to be conducted by the Select Committee 25 on Assassinations, acting as a whole or by subcommittee, 560 3 1 7wt to exceed $2,514,400, including expenditures for the 2 employment of investujators, attorneys, and clerical, and 3 other alssistants, and for the procurement of services of in- 4 dividual consul fI, li)78, to payments out of the contingent fund Kj of the House of Eepresentatives, for the expenses and pur- 17 poses specified in subsection (a) of the first section of tliis 18 resolution, in amounts equal to — 19 (A) one-twelfth of the amount determined under 20 subsection (b) ; or 21 (B) the total amount of expenditures made by 22 the select committee involved during December 1977; 23 except that the entitlement of such select committee for 2i the niontli during which such select committee is restab- 565 3 1 lislicd slinll be prorated based upon that portion of siicli 2 month during which such select committee is in existence. 3 (b) The amount which shall be the basis for an entitle- 4 ment under subsection (a) shall be the amount which bears 5 the same ratio to the total amount authorized for use by the 6 select committee involved during the first session of the 7 Ninety-fifth Congress as twelve months bears to the number 8 of months during which such select committee was in exist- (j ence during such session. For purposes of the preceding sen- 10 tence, any portion of a month in calendar year 1977 which 11 is fifteen days or more and during which any such select 12 committee was in existence shall be considered to be a 13 complete month. 14 Sec. 3. The entitlement of any standing committee or 15 select committee of the House of Representatives to pay- 16 ments out of the contingent fund of the House of Eeprescnta- 17 tives pursuant to the provisions of this resolution shall cease 18 to be effective on the effective date of the primary expense 19 resolution adopted with respect to the standing committee or 20 select committee involved. 21 Sec. 4. Funds authorized by this resolution shall be 22 expended pursuant to regulations established by the Commit- 23 tee on House Administration in accordance with law. 566 95th congress 2d Session H. RES. 1276 IN THE HOUSE OE EEPRESENTATIVES Jri.Y 18, 1!)78 Mr. Stokks submitted tlie following resolution; which was referred to tire Com- mittee on House Administration RESOLUTION 1 liesolvcd, That for the further expenses of investigations 2 and studies to be conducted by the Select Committee on o Assassinations, acting as a whole or by subcommittee, not to 4 exceed $790,000, including expenditures for employment of 5 investigators, attorneys, and clerical, and other assistants, a shall he paid out of the contingent fund of the House on 7 vouchers authorized by such committee, signed l)y the cliair- 8 nian of such committee, and approved l)y the Committee on 9 House Administration. 10 Si:c. 2. No part of the funds authorized by this resolu- 11 tion shall be available for expenditure in connection with the 12 study or investigation of any subject which is l)eing inves- V 567 2 J tigated for the same purpose by any other coniinittee of the 2 House; and the chairman of the Select Committee on Assas- o shiations shall furnish the Committee on House Administra- 4 tion inforaiation with respect to any study or investigation 5 intended to be financed from such funds. 6 Sec. 3. The authorization granted by the resolution 7 shall expire immediately prior to noon on January ?>, J 979. 8 Sec. 4. Funds authorized by this resolution shall be 9 expended pursuant to regulations established by the (\)jn- 10 mittee on House Administration in accordanip with exisring 11 law. 568 House Calendar No. 250 95th congress 2d Session H. RES. 956 [Report No. 95-898] IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES January 19, 197S Mr. Stokes submitted the following resolution; ■\vliicli was referred to the Com- mittee on House Administration Fkbruary 23, 1978 Reported with an anicndinent, referred to the House Calendar, and ordered to be printed [Strike out all after "Rcsolval," ami insert the part printed in itall.:] RESOLUTION 1 Resolved, T-lmt, ctfcotivc Jtuiitaiy ^ 1978, tke cxpoiisca 2 el iiivcgtigationij a«4 studies te he condiiGtcd by tke Select 3 ( ■onimitk'o eft AsBat-ifjinationH, acting an tt \\hole ef hy- trttb- 4 eoniinittecs «et te exceed $1^,078,000, including expend! 5 tuFeij knr t4*e employment el investigators, attorneys, and 6 cleriotil and other aaaiatanta, ftftd lef the procurement el 7 iH'FviecH el hidividual eonsultantii ef organigations thereof 8 purijuant le see^ien 202 (i) el ihe Legialative Reorganization 9 Aet el 4^4^ ens amended -(^ U.S.C. 72a (i) ), sbfttt he paid 10 e«t el the contingent Itmd el t4*e House en vouchers Bo6t- 11 thorized hy s«eh committee, signed hy the chairman el such 12 committee, a-nd approved fey the Committee en House A4- V 569 2 1 ministration; Ket te ex«ee4 ^4-0^900 ei tke total timount 2 provided hy- tkis fe^tttion may be tised to prooiirc the tem- 3 porary 0¥ intermittent services ol individual consultants or 4 organizations thereof pursuant to section 202 (i) of the Leg- 5 islative Reorganization Aet of 1946, as amended -fS U.S.C. 6 72a (i) ) ; fettt this monetary limitation of ^ke procurement 8 any other authorized pui-poses. 9 ^€4- 2v ^ pfti=t of tlie funds authorized hy this resolu- 10 tioft shfth he available for expenditure in connection with the 11 study or investigation of any subject which is being invcsti- 12 gated for the same purpose hy a^iy other committee of the XO TTtTttcrtry ctttti tilt? Xjti I I'lT iri M 1 1 t t trrit? OvlUUU \jT7iiiirzlVli5 " Uli ii-i3k3Mt3~ 14 sinations shall furnish the Committee on House Admuiistra - 15 tion information vrith respect to any study e¥ investigation 1 f\ TM f PTl n O f\ ^^^ J\i\ TlY\f\ Tl/^/^/1 fyfirVl nn/^V* -PntA /In ±\J llltdlUv'Tt TTJ ttt? lllltllUJUVl TTTTTTI oTttTrT ITTTttTCJT 17 Sk^t St The authorization granted hy ike resolution 18 shaii expire immediately prior to noon on January &j 1979. 19 SeOt 47 ffunds authorized hy this resolution shall he 20 expended pursuant to regulations established hy ^ Com ^X iniiTC^ oil -1 1 oil 9B ^\-^nillll StFft tlOll tft ft^COl**^ fl/llC^ "Wirft OXlStlllff ^^ let W • 23 That, effective January 3, 1978, the expenses of investiga- 24 tions and studies to be conducted by the Select Committee on 25 Assassinations, acting as a whole or by subcommittee, not to 570 3 2 exceed $2,500,000, including expenditures for the employ- 2 ment of investigators, attorneys, and clerical and other as- 3 sistants, and for the procurement of services of individual 4 consultants or organizations thereof pursuant to section 5 202 (i) of the Legislative Feorganization Act of 1946, as Q amended (2 U.S.C. 72a(i)), shall he paid out of the con- rj tingent fund of the House on vouctiers authorized by such 8 committee, signed by the chairman of such committee, and 9 approved by the Committee on House Administration. Not to 10 exceed $132,000 of the total amount provided by this rcso- 11 lution maybe used to procure the temporary or intermittent 12 services of individual consultants or organizations thereof 13 pursuant to section 202 (i) of the Legislative Reorganization 14 Act of 1946, as amended (2 U.S.C 72a(i)) ; but thismone- 15 tary limitation of the procurement of such services shall not 16 prevent the use of such funds for any other authorized 17 purposes. 18 Sec. 2. Xo part of the funds authorized by this resolu- 19 tion shall be available for expenditure in connection with the 20 study or investigation of any subject which is being investi- 21 ijatcd for the same purpose by any other committee of the 22 House; and the chaii^man of the Select Committee on Assas- 23 sinations shall furnish the Committee on House Administra- 24 tion information with respect to any study or investigation 25 intended to he financed from such funds. 571 4 1 Sec. 3. The authorization (/ranted by the resolution 2 shall expire immediately prior to noon on January 3, 1979. 3 Sec. 4. Funds authorized by this resolution shall be 4 expended pursuant to regulations established by the Com- 5 mittee on House Administration in accordance with existing 6 law. Appendix VII : Ixdex for the IisTvestigation of the Assassination OF President John F. Kennedy A. PUBLIC HEARINGS OF THE COMMITTEE Date Volume/Page (1978) 1. Statements by members of the committea: Statement by Chairman Louis Stokes: Issues in the Investigation 9-6 1-1 Opening Statement by Representative Richardson Preyer 9-6 1-3 111-193 Statement of Chairman Louis Stokes Concerning the Cooperation Received by the 9-18 Committee on its Trip to Cuba. Statement by Representative Richardson Preyer Concerning Activities of the Central 9-22 Intelligence Agency. IV-251 V-486 Opening Remarks by Chairman Louis Stokes Concerning the Possibility of Conspiracy 9-25 IV-607 Special Acknowledgment by Chairman Louis Stokes to the Dallas Police Department 9-26 Statement by Chairman Louis Stokes Concerning the Hearings and Investigation 9-28 V-697 into the Assassination of President Kennedy. Closing Remarks by Chairman Louis Stokes ..- 12-29 1-61 2. Narrations by G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Staff Director: 1-141 President Kennedy's Decision To Visit Dallas 9-6 1-148 1-323 Testimony by Critics: Robert Groden 9-6 1-5 The Autopsy of President Kennedy _. 9-7 1-332 Analysis of the Kennedy X-Rays 9-7 1-375 1-381 Introduction of Capt. James J. Humes, M.D 9-7 Introduction of Dr. Cyril H. Wecht . . 9-7 1-442 Introduction of Dr. Charles S. Petty 9-8 1-489 Analysis of the Wound Ballistics Evidence 9-8 Analysis of the Forensic Firearms Evidence 9-8 Neutron Activation Analysis 9-8 Number of Shots: Startle Reaction Analysis 9-11 Acoustics Analysis 9-11 11-16 11-139 Bullet Trajectory Analysis . 9-12 11-205 Marina Oswald Porter 9-13/14 11-2 Authenticity of the Backyard Photographs 9-14 11-319 11-347 Other Analyses of the Backyard Photographs 9-14 11-348 Photographic Analysis . _ 9-14 11-436 Yuri Nosenko 9-15 Oswald: Cuba and Mexico City 9-18 Interview with President Fidel Castro . .. 9-19 111-195 Elena Garro Paz 9-19 111-285 Performance of the Secret Seivice 9-19 111-319 Investigation by the FBI 9-19 lll-l 111-457 The FBI's Performance in the Oswald Security Case Performance of the Warren Commission 9-20 _ 9-21 111-512 111-559 Performance of the CIA 9-22 Anthropological Analysis 9-25 IV-365 IV-386 Gunmen in Dealey Plaza: Photographic Analysis 9-25 The Umbrella Man 9-25 IV-429 IV-1 IV-469 Conspiracy Theories _ 9-26 V-240 Earl Ruby . 9-26 IV-539 V-1 V-499 Lewis J. McWillie 9-27 V-553 Jack Ruby Associates 9-27 V-617 Acoustics Analysis— Ihe Fourth Shot 12-29 Dallas Police Department Tape 12-29 Firing Time of a Mannlicher-Carcano Rifle 12-29 Closing Comments 12-29 V-301 3. Witnesses:' V-555 Aleman, Jos6 9-27 1-180 Aschkenasy, Ernest (vii) 12-29 111-126 Azcue Lopez, Eusebio 9-18 Baden, Dr. Michael (ii) 9-7 1-444 11-17 Barger, Dr. James E. (vll) 9-11 Bates, John S., Jr. (iii). 9-8 1-444 1-11 11-154 Canning, Thomas (i) 9-12 1-11 Champagne, Donald E. (iii) 9-8 Connally, Governor John B_.. 9-6 1-146 Connelly, Mrs. John B 9-6 111-561 Cooper, Senator John Sherman. 9-21 Dox, Ida 9-7 111-561 Ford, President Gerald R 9-21 111-513 Gale, James H _. 9-20 V-471 11-111 Green, Dr. David (vii) 9-11 Griffin, Judge BurtW. (xi).... 9-28 See footnote at end of table, p. 574. (573) 574 A. PUBLIC HEARINGS OF THE COMMITTEE-Continued Date Volume/Page (1978) 3. Witnesses:'— Continued Groden, Robert (i), 9-6 1-62 Guinn, Dr. Vincent P 9-8 1-491 Hart, John 9-15 11-487 Hartmann, Dr. William (I) 9-11 11-4 Helms, Richard M 9-22 IV-5 Hess, Jacqueline... 9-25 IV-454 Humes, Capt. James J., M.D. (II) 9-7 1-323 Hunt, Dr. Bob R. (i) 9-25 IV-387 Katienbach, Nicholas deB 9-21 111-642 Kelley, Insp. Thomas 9-19 111-323 Kirk, Sergeant Cecil W. (i) 9-14/15 11-349 9-25 IV-362 Levlne, Dr. Lowell (11) 9-7 1-149 Lutz, Monty C. (iii) 9-8 1-444 McCaghren, Paul 9-11 11-107 NlcCamy, Calvin S. (i) 9-7 9-12 1-149 11-142 9-14/15 11-349 McCloy, John J 9-21 111-599 McLain, H. B. (iii) 12-29 V-617 McNally, Joseph P 9-14 11-372 9-25 IV-254 McWillie, Lewis J 9-27 V-2 Malley, James R 9-20 111-462 Mirabal Diaz, Alfredo 9-18 lil-173 Newquist, Andrew M. (iii) 9-8 1-444 Petty, Dr. Charles S. (ii) 9-8 1-375 Porter, Marina Oswald (xviii) 9-13/14 11-206 Rankin, J. Lee (xi) 9-21 111-612 Revill, Capt. Jack 9-26 IV-568 Rowley. James J. 9-19 111-356 Ruby, Earl 9-26 IV-500 Salerno, Ralph (viii) 9-28 V-378 Snow, Dr. Clyde Collins (i) 9-25 IV-367 Sturdivan, Larry.. 9-8 1-383 Trafficante, Santos... 9-28 V-346 Wecht, Dr. Cyril H. (ii) 9-7 1-332 Weiss, Mark (viii) 12-29 V-555 White, Jack D. (i) 9-14 11-322 Witt, LouieSteven 9-25 IV-429 'Persons whose names are followed by a (i-xx) contributed to the scientific reports or gave depositions or other state- ments which are contained in the various staff reports. See the Index of Kennedy appendixes (or the locations of the referenced material. B. EXHIBITS'— JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS Exhibit Date Entered No. Volume/Page Description (1978) F-1* Deposition of Nosenko 5/30/78 6/19 F-2V. Visa application of Lee Harvey Oswald 12/29/59 6/20 F-3* Articles "New York Times" dated 9/5 59, Dateline Moscow 6/20 F-4* Medical Records of Lee Harvey Oswald, Russian Hospital 6/20 F-5' FBI Report of Yuri Nosenko dated 3/5/64 _ 6/20 1-39 F-6*. Transcript of Nosenko testimony to CIA dated 7/3/64 6/20 1-37 F-7» Tape Recording (2 reels) dated 7/3/64 and 7/27/64 6/20 F-8 Film of Motorcade 9/6 1-34 F-9 Map of Dallas showing motorcade route. F-lOA Aerial views of Dealey Plaza. Aerial views of Dealey Plaza. Photograph of President John F. Kennedy and Governor John B. Connally in 1-35 Fort Worth. 1-36 F-12. Photograph of President John F. Kennedy and Governor John B. Connally at the Dallas airport. 1-38 F-13 Photograph of President John F. Kennedy and Governor John B. Connally in the motorcade. 1-20 9/6 F-15 Aerial view of Dealey Plaza 1-182 F-16 Not used. 1-186 F-17 Article. "Kennedy to Visit Texas 11/21-22" Dallas Morning News 9/26/63.... F-19 List of materials examined by the doctors F-20 Drawing showing back entrance of wound of President John F. Kennedy See footnotes at end o( table, p. 583. 575 B. EXHIBITS-JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS-Continued Date Exhibit Entered No. Description (1978) Volume/Page F-21 __ Photograph of the back entrance wound 9/7 1-187 F-22 Photograph of portion of back wound photograph 9/7 |-188 F 23 Diagram of principle of abrasion collar— perpendicular entry 9/7 1-190 F-24 Diagram of principle of abrasion collar— angular entry 9/7 1-191 F-25 Piesident Kennedy's shirt - 9/7 1-193 F-26 President Kennedy's jacket 9/7 1-194 F-27 President Kennedy's tie 9/7 1-195 F-28 X-ray of path through back of Kennedy (#8 Ebersall) 9/7 1-196 F-29 X-ray of path through back of Kennedy (#9 Ebersall) 9/7 1-196 F-30 Photograph of X-ray of path of missile through back 9/7 1-197 F-31 Photograph of X-ray ot path of missile through back 9,7 1-198 F-32 Report of Dr. David 0. Davis, 8/23/78 9/7 1-200 F-33. Reportof Dr. G. iVI. IVicDonnel,8/4'78 9/7 1-204 F-34. Outside Contact Report with Dr. Norman Chase, 2/27/78, Hearings Of the Select 9/7 1-209 Committee jn Assassinations. F-35 Outside Contact Report with Dr. William B. Seaman, 2/27/78 9/7 (-212 F-36 Drawingof the neck woui.d of John F. Kennedy 9/7 1-215 F-37 Photograph of the neck wound of John F. Kennedy 9/7 1-215 F-38 Photograph of portion of the neck wound photograph 9/7 1-216 F-42 Autopsy Protocol Report... 9/7 1-218 F-43 Autopsy supplemental report, 12/6/63. 9/7 1-225 F-44 Autopsy descriptive sheet , 9/7 1-228 F-45._ Photographic enlargement of autopsy descriptive sheet . 9/7 1-217 F-46.. Photograph of drawing of path of bullet through John F. Kennedy's back 9/7 1-231 F-47 Warren Commission drawing of path through neck showing entry and exit 9/7 1-232 paths (CE 385). F-48 Drawing of back of John F. Kennedy's head, with ruler 9/7 1-234 F-49a Detail of cowlick area _ 9/7 1-235 F-49b Area of head .■'. 9/7 1-235 F-50. Photograph of wound in back of head 9/7 1-236 F-51 Photograph of brain tissue in back of head 9/7 1-237 F-52 Photographof lateral skull X-ray.. 9/7 1-239 F-53 Photograph of lateral skull X-ray enhancement 9/7 1-240 F-54.. ... Lateral skull X-ray 9/7 1-238 F-55 Photographof front skull X-ray.. 9/7 1-243 F-56 Photograph of front skull X-ray enhancement. 9/7 1-244 F-57 Front skull X-ray .... 9/7 1-242 F-58 Drawing of the front head wound 9/7 1-245 F-59 Photographof JFK's neck wound 9/7 1-246 F-60 Enlargement of the photograph of the head wound 9/7 1-247 F-61 Diagram of beveling 9/7 1-314 F-64 Photograph of X-ray of three skull fragments 9/7 1-249 F-65 Drawing of bullet path through head (intact view) 9/7 1-251 F-66 Photograph of drawing nf bullet path through head (exploded view) 9/7 1-252 F 67 Enlargement of Zapruder frame 312. 9/7 1-253 F-68 Warren Commission diagram of path of bullet through head (CE388) 9/7 1-255 F-70 Warren Commissinn testimony of Dr. Robert Shaw, 4/21/61 9/7 1-257 F-71 Interview of Dr. Shaw, 11/9/77, Hearings of the Select Committee on Assas- 9/7 1-272 sinations, with diagram. F-73 . Diagram of Connally body, front view P/7 1-295 F-74 GovernorConnally'sshirt(CE394), front and back 9/7 1,278-279 F-75 Governor Connelly's jacket (CE 393), front and back 9/7 1-280-281 F-76 . Photograph of Connally chest X-ray 9/7 1-283 F-77 Photograph of Connally chest X-ray 9/7 1-284 F-81 Diagram of Connally body— both sides showing bullet path through body 9/7 1-286 F-84 Photograph of right wrist X-ray 9/7 1-288 F-85 Photographof right wrist X-ray 9/7 1-289 F 88 _ Governor Connelly's trousers 9/7 1-291 F-89 "holograph of Connelly's thigh X-ray 9/7 1-292 F-90 Photograph of Connally thigh X-ray 9/7 1-293 F-95 Bullet found on Connelly's stretcher 9/7 1-297 F-96 Composite photograph of six rifles with similar characteristics to the Mann- 9/8 1-448 licher-Carcano. F-97.. ... Composite photogreph of six rifles, with identification 9/8 1-448 F-98 Composite of three photographs of cartiidge case found in TSBD, CE543 9/8 1-456 F-99 Composite of two photographs of CE543 and Panel Tests 1 and 3 9/8 1-457 F-lOO Composite of two photographs of Panel Tests 1, 2. 3 end 4 9/8 1-458 F-101 Composite if two photogrephs of CE141 end Penel Test #1 9'8 1-461 F 102 Composite of four photogrephs of various views of CE399 9/7 1-334 F-103 Composite of three photographs of various test-fired bullets and CE572 9/8 1-465 F-104 Composite of three photogrephs showing photomicrogreph of lend and groove 9/8 1-466 comparisons of CE399 and CE572 KIA. F-105 Composite of eight photograohs of CE567; CE569; CE840; CE842 and CE843... 9/8 1-47? F-106 Composite of two photographs— photomicrographs of lend and groove impres- 9/8 1-473 sions on CE567, 569 and 572 Kl-A and Kl-B. F-107 Photograph of Walker bullet-CE573 9/8 1-474 F-108 Composite of two photographs of Oswald's revolver— CE143 9/8 1-477 F-109 Composite of two photogrephs of CE594, Q74, Q77 and Panel Test #1— 9/8 1-478 photomicrograph of firing pin impressions. See footnotes at end of table, p. 583. 576 B EXHIBITS— JOHN P. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS— Continued Date Exhibit Entered No. Description (1978) Volume/Page 1-480 1-387 1-389 F-110 Jack Ruby's revolver 9/8 F-111 Photograph of bullet in flight, shov^ing N-w/ave 9/8 F-112 Composite of four photographs of Spark shadowgrapti of 30 caliber bullet in 9/8 1-390 air and gelatin. 1-396 F-113 Composite of two photographs of M-16 bullet exploding in gelatin 9/8 1-392 F-114 Composite of two photographs of M-193 bullet exploding in gelatin 9/8 F-115 Drag force formula... _ 9/8 F-116 Photograph of permanent cavities left in gelatin by 6.5 mm, 7.62 mm, and .257 9/8 1-397 caliber bullets. 1-102 F-117 Film of gelatin experiment 9/8 1-103 F-118 Drawing of the three views of bullets CE399 and two test bullets 9/8 Mil F-121 Composite of two photographs by Hughes, TSBD window 9/6 F-122 Photograph by Dillard, TSBD window 9/12 1-104 11-169 1-116 123 Composite of two photographs by Powell, TSBD 1-117 1-107 124 F- Photograph by Altgens of motorcade— Milteer in crowd allegation. 125 F- Composite of two photographs of J. A. Milteer 1-122 126 Photograph by Altgens, TSBD doorway 9/12 9/12 1-108 F- F- 127 Composite of four photographs of Oswald— Billy Lovelady 9/12 1-109 128 Photograph by Altgens, fire escape image 9/12 F- 9/12 9/6 1-114 129 F- Photograph of wall image by Moorman 9/19 1-119 9/6 IV-416 F- 9/6 1-130 F-130 Composite of four p"^ olographs of the umbrella man . 9/25 F-131 Composite of four photographs of the "3 tramps" 9/6 F-132 Composite of three photographs of Oswald— "two-Oswald" theory 9/12 11-148 F-133 Topographic survey map of Dealey Plaza 11-160 F-134 Zapruder frame 312 11-174 F-135 Photograph by Croft (161) of limousine and occupants 9/12 11-182 F-136 Composite of four photographs— Betzner and limousine 9/12 11-159 F-137 Diagram— location of head wounds in President Kennedy 9/12 11-166 F-138 Diagram— or bullet line of sight causing headfrom Zapruder's camera to John F. Kennedy/direction wound. 9/12 11-167 F-139. Diagram— line of head bullet causing sight wound. from Zapruder's camera to John F. Kennedy/slope of 11-177 F-140 Diagram— direction of bullet causing John F. Kennedy back-neck wound 11-163 F-141 Photograph of anthropological head based on Zapruder frame 312— likeness of 9/12 Kennedy. 9/12 11-177 F-142 Diagram— slope of bullet causing John F. Kennedy back-neck wound 9/12 11-183 F-143 Diagram— relative positions of Kennedy and Connally 9/12 11-189 F-144 Diagram— direction of single bullet theory trajectory 11-189 F-145 Diagram— slope of single bullet theory trajectory 9/12 11-161 1-68 F-146 Diagram— elements to determining trajectory of Kennedy to Connally bullets.. 11-159 F-147 . ., Diagram— location of head wounds in President Kennedy 9/12 9/12 9/6 F-148 Zapruder film— rotoscope copy IV-390 F-149 Diagram of computer scan of image 9/25 F-150 Composite of two photographs— example of computer contrast enhancement IV-393 F-151 Composite of two photographs— example of computer image deblurring 9/25 9/25 IV-396 F-152 ... Composite of two photographs— example of unsuccessful image deblurring... F-153 Composite 9/25 IV-399 ment). of two photographs by Dillard of TSBD (original and RIT enhance- 1-109, 9/25 lV-397 F-154 Composite of two photographs— SRI demonstration of autoradiographic image enhancement. 9/25. 9/25 9/6, 9/12, F-155 Photograph— full frame enlargement of Willis slide #5, motorcade 11-175, IV-417. V-509 12/29 9/25 IV-407 F-156 Composite of two photographs— SRI enhancement of Dillard photographs . IV-400 F-157 Composite of two photographs— Powell slide of TSBD (original and USC com- puter enhancement). 9/25 F-159 Diagram— Hughes film, motion analysis #1, changes in shape and position... IV-403 9/25 IV-403 F-159A Chart/graph— Hughes film, motion analysis #2, near beginning/near end F-160 Photograph— computer enhancement of Willis #5 IV-409 F-161 . . Photograph — Aerospace enhancement of segments of Nix film, wall image. . 9/25 IV-418 1-131, F-162 .. Photograph— USC enhancement of Nix film of classic gunman IV-412 F-163 Photograph— Aerospace enhancement of Nix film.- 9/25 9/6 IV^19 F-164 Photograph— LASL enhancement of Zapruder frame 413, head in bush 9/25 IV-414 F-166 Photograph- Oswald Marine photograph 9/25 IV-388 9/25 1-119, F-172 Composite of four photographs of three tramps— Tramp A, Vallee and Cars- IV-374 1-120, well. 9/25 F-173- Composite of two photographs— Sturgis and Tramp B 9/6 9/6 IV-375 F-174 Composite of three photographs of Tramp C, Hunt and Chrisman 9/25 IV-376 F-175 Hartman measurement chart— blur analysis 11-13 11-9 F-176 Scott measurement chart— frame to frame departure from smooth panning .. 9/25 9/11 F-177 Combined blur analysis chart 11-14 11-133 9/11 11-350 1-124 F-177A Acoustics overlay for F-177 F-178 Composite 9/11 and C). of seven photographs of prints and negatives examined (133 A, B 9/11 9/14 9/6 11-245 F-179 Composite of two photographs, CE133A and B 9/13 See f jot.iotes at end of table, p. 583. 577 B. EXHIBITS— JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS-Continued Date Exhibit Entered No. Description (1978) Volume/Page F-180 Photograph by Dee, print 133-C.. ... 9/13 11-246 F-182 Photographof the reverse sides of 133 A and B.___ ..9/14 11-352 F-183 Photograph— DeMohrenschildt original print 133 A front 9/13 11-245 F-184 Photograph— DeMohrenschildt original print 133 A reverse 9/13 11-245 F-185 Photograph— Stovall copy of 133A _ 9/14 11-357 F-187 Photograph of inside view of Oswald Imperial Reflex camera 9/14 11-362 F-188 Photograph— 133 B negative showing edge marks/scratches 9/14 11-367 F-189 Photograph— Oswald baby picture showing edge marks/scratches 9/14 11-370 F-190 Photograph— edge marks/scratches on picture of the Capitol 9/14 11-364 F-191 Photograph— RIT test camera edge marks/scratches 9/14 11-366 F-192 Composite of six photographs— 133A contact prints 9/15 11-403 F-193 Composite of six photographs— 133B contact prints. 9/15 11-404 F-194 Compositeof four photographs— line across Oswald's chin (2 parts) ..9/15 11-401 F-196 Compositeof four photographs— Stovall 133A and close-ups of the water mark. 9/15 11-399 F-197 Composite of four photographs— use .: ::^r enhancement #1 9/15 11-406 F-198 Composite of two photographs— use lomputr enhancement #2 9/15 11-406 F-203 Diagram of stereo view concept. 9/7 1-178 9/15 11-417 F-206 Photograph of the rifle display— comparison of identification marks 9/15 11-425 F-207 Photographof the rifle display— Archives rifle from five different perspectives.. 9/15 11-435 F-208 Photograph of the rifle display— Jack White exhibits a-g 9/6 1-127 F-209 Zapruder frame 139 9/6 1-69 F-210 Zapruder frame 154 9/6 1-69 F-211 Zapruder frame 160 9/6 1-71 F-212 Zapruder frame 158 9/6 1-70 F-213 Zapruder frame 159 9/6 1-70 F-214 Zapruder frame 162_ 9/6 1-71 F-215 Zapruder frame 165 9/6 1-72 F-216 Zapruder frame 166 9/6 1-72 F-217 Zapruder frame 169 9/6 1-73 F-218 Zapruder frame 175 9/6 1-73 F-219 Zapruder frame 178.. 9/6 1-74 F-220 Zapruder frame 180 9/6 1-74 F-221 Zapruder frame 183 9/6 1-75 F-222 Zapruder frame 186 9/6 1-75 F-223 Zapruder frame 187 9/6 1-76 9/12 11-186 F-224 Zapruder frame 188 9/6 1-76 F-225 Zapruder frame 189 9/6 9/11 1-77 11-6 F-226 Zapruder frame 190 9/6 9/11 1-77 11-7 9/11 11-7 F-227 Zapruder frame 191... 9/12 9/6 11-172 1-78 F-228 Zapruder frame 192 9/11 11-8 1-78 F-229 Zapruder frame 193 9/6 I ?d F-230 Zapruder frame 194 9/12 9/6 11-186 1-79 F-231 Zapruder frame 195. 9/6 1-80 F-232 Zapruder frame 196 9/6 1-80 9/12 11-187 F-233 Zapruder frame 197.. 9/12 1-81 F-234 Zapruder frame 198..... 9/12 1-81 F-235 Zapruder frame 199 9/12 1-82 F-236 Zapruder frame 200 9/6 1-82 F-237 Zapruder frame 201 9/12 9/6 11-187 1-83 F-238 Zapruder frame 202 9/6 1-83 F-239 Zapurder frame 203 9/6 1-84 F-240 Zapruder frame 204 9/6 1-84 9/12 11-188 F-241 Zapruder frame 205 9/12 1-85 F-242 Zapruder frame 206 9/12 1-85 F-243 Zapruder frame 221... 9/12 1-86 F-244 Zapruder frame 225 9/12 1-87 F-245 Zapruder frame 230 9/12 1-87 F-246 Zapruder frame 237 9/12 1-88 F-247 Zapruder frame 238.. 9/12 1-88 F-249 Zapruder frame 274 9/12 1-89 F-250 Zapruder frame 288 9/12 1-89 F-251 Zapruder frame 289 9/12 1-90 F-252 Zapruder frame 290 9/12 1-90 F-253 Zapruder frame 291.... 9/12 1-91 F-254 Zapruder frame 312 9/12 1-91 F-255 Zapruder frame 313.. 9/12 1-92 F-256 Zapruder frame 314 9/12 1-92 F-257 Zapruder frame 315 9/12 1-93 F-258. Zapruder frame 316 9/12 1-93 See footnotes at end of table, p. 583. 578 B. EXHIBITS— JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS— Continued Date Exhibit Entered No. (1978) 1-94 Volume/Page 1-95 1-94 9/6 1-95 F-259 Zapruder frame 317 F-260 Zapruder frame 318. 9/12 F-261 Zapruder frame 319 9/6 9/6 1-97 F-262 Zapruder frame 320 9/6 F-263 Zapruder frame 321 1-110 1-125 F-264 Zapruder frame 335 9/6 9/6 F-265 Zapruder frame 337 9/6 9/6 1-65 1-86 F-267 Nix frame— corresponds to Zapruder frame 313. IM13 F-270 Composite of two photographs of Oswald's chin.. 1-97 F-271 Composite of four photographs— RIT-nose shadow 9/15 F-272 Zapruder frame 222 9/6 1-444 F-273 Diagram of single bullet theory 9/6 1-445 F-274 Zapruder frame 413 9/6 9/8 F-275 Report of firearms panel to HSCA, four volumes 9/8 1-452 I-45M52 F-276 6.5mm Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, CE139 9/8 1-453 F-277A-C.. Cartridge case found on 6th floor, TSBD CE543 1-459 F-278 Cartridge case found on 6th floor, TSBD CE544 F-279 Cartridge case found on 6th floor. TSBD CE545 9/8 IV-454 1-463 F-280 4 Panel test cartridge cases— Mannlicher-Carcano, Western C.C 1-467 F-281 Unfired cart,idge-CE141 found in chamber of CE139 1-468 1-467 F-282 FBI test-fired bullets Kl-A and Kl-B, CE572 F-284 Bullet fragments found on front seat of Presidential limousine— CE567 1-468 F-285 Bullet fragments found on front seat of Presidential limousine— CE569 F-286 Bullet fragments recovered from under left jump seat— CE840.. 1-471 F-287 Bullet fragments recovered from Governor Connally's arm— CE842 F-288 Bullet fragments removed from Kennedy's brain— CE843 M69 1-474 F-289 Bullet removed from General Walker's residence— CE573 1-475 1-475 F-290 Oswald's revolver— CE143 ._. F-292 Four cartridge cases found at the scene of the lippit murder— CE594 F-293 4 Panel Test cartridges 1-150 1-335 F-294 Composite photograph— CE399, CE572, CE853 and CE856 1-151 F-295 Photograph— composite of eight X-rays— dental comparison #1 1-241 F-296 Photograph— composite of eight X-rays — dental comparison #2 1-328 F-297 Photograph of skull X-ray taken one year before assassination 1-414 F-302 Drawing of John F. Kennedy's brain 1-403 1-403 F-303 Momentum, velocity and energy equation for Mannlicher-Carcano bullet F-304 Film of tomato can shoot experiment 1-405 F-305 Film of skull shoot experiment 9/8 1-406 F-306 Composite of two photographs of skulls 1-416 F-307. ... Drawing wounds.of the rea-- view of John F. Kennedy's head and location of entry r-391 F-309 Film of goat shoot experiment 9/8 V-327 F-310 Photograph of bullet track in gelatin F-311 _ Transcript of HSCA interview of Jose Verdacia, 8/26/78 9/8 1-341 11-388 F-312 Affidavit of Tadeusz Sadowski, 9/12/78 9/27 1-153 F-320 Diagram illustrating position of occupants of the Presidential limousine 9/7 F-323 Report of Dr. LowellJ. Levine, D.D.S., 9/7/78 9/7 9/14 1-501 F-328 Two graphs showing antimony M99 1-503 F-329 Two graphs showing silver F-330 Chart of table values 1-506 1-558 F-331. Reportof Dr. Vincent P. Guinn, Neut on Activation Analysis, 9/8/78 1-459 F-332 Letter from Hoover to Rankin, 7/8/64.... F-333 Firearms panel test cartridge F-334 Diagram of triangulation principles (echo patterns) 11-24 F-335 Photograph of waveforms recorded with stuck microphone (DPD tape) 11-28 11-30 F-336A and B. F-337 Photographs of adaptive filtered waveforms recorded with stuck microphone (showing over 5 seconds between shots). Drawing of Dealey Plaza showing microphone locations for test ^•;/fV-646 11-49 F-338 Photograph of comparison test echo patterns showing Winchester vs. Norma 11-57 ammunition. 9/11 F-339 Photograph of test site from TSBD window F-340 Photograph of test site— Elm Street from north 11-52 11-52 F-341 Photograph of test site— Elm Street from south 9/11 11-53 F-342 Photograph of test site— rifleman in window., 9/11 11-53 F-344 Chart of the sequence of test shots— array 1.. 9/11 11-50 V-561 F-347 Chart of the test pattern for shot 2 (DPD tape) 11-62 F-349 Chart, test pattern for shot 8 9/11 F-351 Tape recordings of muzzle blast 11-116 11-116 P-352 Tape recordings of sound o* N wave F-353 Sound recordings of 'ifle shots in Plaza 11-88 F-355 Chart of energy spectrum of tape segment containing the bell sound 9/11 F-356 Chart of spectrograms from waveforms recorded from Channel 1 showing 9/11 11-32 11-34 heterodyne tones. 9/11 9/11 F-357 Chart with overlay showing loci of muzzle blast and shock waves 11-20 F-358 Aerial photograph of Dealey Plaza— 1978 11-55 V-502 F-359 Aerial photograph of Dealey Plaza— 1978 9/11 11-55 F-360 Chart— number of shots reported 11-122 9/11 9/11 12/29 See footnotes at end of table, p. 583. 9/11 579 B. EXHIBITS— JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS— Continued Date Entered Exhibit No. Description (1978) Volume/Page V-501 11-121 12/29 F-361 Aerial photograph of Dealey Plaza, 1972. 9/11 11-127 F-362 Chart of the reported origin of sound 9/11 11-114 F-363 Diagram showing shock wave 9/11 F-364 Chart— muzzle blast and shock waveforms for Mannlicher-Carcano and M-1 9/11 11-22 rifles. F-365 Graph— least squares fit to Channel 1 9/11 V-648 F-366 Graph— least squares fit to Channel 2 9/11 11-41 11-38 F-367 Chart of 15 best correlations 9/11 11-63 12/29 F-368 Chart of muzzle blasts and shock-waveforms transmitted by similar police 9/11 11-44 radio. F-369 Graph— level of transmitted wavefor.ns as a function of waveform level at the 9/11 11-46 microphone. 11-65 F-370 Chart of the correlation of best matches to determine motorcycle location 9/11 F-371 Chart of the panning or jiggle record of the Zapruder film— Scott technique 9/11 11-11 illustration. F-372 Chart of Scott example of Zapruder frames 139-208 9/11 11-11 F-373 Chart— full Scott panning or jiggle record of Zapruder film 9/11 11-12 11-170 F-376 Drawing of Kennedy's wound locati.n as deduced from the pathology panel's 9/12 report. F-377 Drawing— location of ii shjot wound of Connally in back 11-181 11-248 F-381 Oswald's Imperial Reflex camera 9/12 9/13 F-382 . Photograph— de Mohrenschildt print 133A-front 9/13 11-247 F-383 Photograph— de Mohrenschildt print 133A— back 11-247 F-386 Composite of six photographs of Oswald. __ 9/13 11-408 F-387 Photograph— 133A vanishing point 9/15 11-410 11-411 F-388 Photograph— 133B vanishing point F-389- Diagram— photographic effect of rifle tilt 9/15 11-427 F-390 Photograph— 133C Stovall original print 11-354 F-391 Photograph— three sections of overlays of CE133A and B 9/14 11-326 F-392 Photograph— full overlays of CE133A and B 11-329 9/14 11-330 F-393 Photograph— overlay of heads in CE 133A and B F-394 Photograph— four faces of Lee Harvey Oswald and two chin lines. 9/14 F-395 Photograph— side-by-side comparisons of 133A, B and C 9/14 11-332 9/14 11-334 F-396 Photograph — composite of four rifles 11-342 F-397 Photograph— de Mohrenschildt print showing edge marks 11-368 9/14 F-398 Phofograph—133A Stovall original print. 11-356 F-399. Index of materials viewed by questioned documents panel members. 9/14 IV-255 F-400 Oswald's fingerprint card— New Orjeans Police Department, August 1963. 9/14 11-379 F-401A Copy of Oswald's passport application, 6/24/63— front. 9/25 11-374 F-401B Copy of Oswald's passport application, 6/24/63— reverse 9/14 11-381 11-375 F-402A Copy of Oswald's self-questionnaire 9/14 11-382 F-402B Copy of Oswald's self-questionnaire F-402C Copy of Oswald's self-questionnaire 9/14 11-383 F-402D Copy of Oswald's self-questionnaire 11-384 F-403 Memorandum of Charles Thomas, with attachments, 7/25/69, and cover letter 9/14 111-288 to Stokes from Bennet, 9/20/78. 9/14 9/19 9/14 IV-435 F-404 Photograph of two men sitting on curb in Dealey Plaza IV-430 F-405 Black umbrella 9/25 F-406 Drawing— Cutler diagram of "The Piece" IV-437 V-365 F-407 Copy of Oswald's visa application, Warren Commission version 9/25 111-137 F-408 Copy of Oswald's visa application, from Cuba, 1978 9/25 111-129 9/18 F-409 Jack Anderson column, "Behind John F. Kennedy's Murder," The Washington V-325 Post, 9/7/76. V-349 V-347 F-410 Statement of the Cuban government re American gamblers 9/28 9/18 F-411 Immunity order for Santos Trafficante. F-412 F-413A Letter from Watson Clinic re Trafficante's health, 11/23/77... Memorandum for the record, 4/3/64, from Houston re Nosenko 9/27 9/28 IV-26 IV-27 F-413B Memorandum for Director of Security from Houston, 4/3/64, re parole status 9/22 9/28 of defectors. F-414 Report of Stewart Stout, 4/14/61 9/22 111-399 F-415 Report of Secret Service, 11/30/62 111-401 F-416 Report of Secret Service, 12/19/62 9/19 F-417 Report of Secret Service, 11/30/62 9/11 111-425 F-418 Report of Secret Service, 12/14/62... 9/19 111-433 F-419 Report of Secret Service re Quinlin Pino Machado, 11/29/63 111-436 9/19 9/19 111-361 F-420. Report of SA Robert J. Jamison, 11/12/63 F-421 Memorandum of SA William A. Patterson, 11/25/63 9/19 111-363 9/19 111-366 F-422 Report of Secret Service re iVlosley-Echevarria investigation, 12/9/63 F-423 Organization chart, Secret Service, 1964 9/19 111-371 F-424 Photograph of Rolanda Cubela 111-324 9/19 111-285 11-439 F-425 Staff report on Yuri Nosenko, HSCA 9/15/78 F-426 Results of Weschler test given to Nosenko 9/19 11-530 F-427 Portion of notes from Hart citing alternative actions, p. 23 9/15 11-536 F-428 Article by Comer Clark, "National Enquirer," 10/15/67 9/15 9/15 111-282 F-429A Photograph of Castro conference F-429B Tape of Castro interview 9/19 111-196 9/19 F-429C Transcript of Castro interview, 9/18/78 111-197 F-430 Photograph of Betty Serratos 9/19 9/19 111-125 See footnote at end of table, p. 583. 9/18 580 B. EXHIBITS— JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS— Continued Date Exhibit Entered Volume/Page Description (1978) F-431 Photograph of Ruben Duran 9/18 111-124 F-432 Photograph of Horatio Duran. 111-123 F-433 Photograph of Silvia D. Tirade V-166 F-434 Copy of page from Oswald's passport — - 111-138 F 136 Copy of sketch of Trescornia prison by Verdacia 9/18 9/18 111-5 F-437. Photograph of E. Azcue — 9/18 :!l-146 F-438 Composite of five photographs provided by Cubans re surveillance of apartment 111-318 house. 9/27 9/19 9/18 F-439 Tape of Silvia Duran Tirado interview F-440A Transcript of Silvia Duran Tirado interview F-440B. 1111-594 Diagram of Cuban Consulate, hand drawn by Duran 9/18 9/18 111-121 11-5 F-441 Memorandum from DeLoach to Moore, subject, assassination of the President, 9/21 12/12/63. 111-596 III-6 F-442 Memorandum from DeLoach, 12/17/63, subject, LHO-lnternal Security Presi- 9/21 dentlal Commission. i 11-566 F-443 Memorandum from Evans to Belmont 11/25/63, with attached memorandum 9/21 from Katzenbach to Moyers. F-446 Statement of Nosenko to Hearings of the Select Committee on Assassinations 9/22 IV-106 8/7/78, 3 p. F-447 Memorandum from Coleman and Slawson to Warren Commission re Nosenko, 9/21 111-634 111-656, 6/24/64. F-448 Memorandum from Hubert and Griffin to Willens re telephone records, 2/24/64, IV-540 9/21 9/26 F-449A, B, C. Three charts depicting monthly progress of the Warren Commission. . (2) (») F-450 ExcerptsofSomersett-Milteer conversation, 11/9/63 9/19 111-447 111-451 F-451 Secret Service— Principles of Protection of the President: January 4, 1954 9/19 F-452 Affidavits of Secret Service agents, 6/1/64 and 7/30/64 9/19 111-454 111-478 F-456 FBI functional organizational chart, 1964 9/20 111-468 F-457 Memorandum from Jenkins to President Lyndon B.Johnson, 11/24/63 "Mr. J. 9/20 Edgar Hoover said as follows:" 111-474 F-458 Memorandum from Evans to Belmont, 11/26/63 9/20 F-459 Excerpt from p. 34, Book V, Senate Report re Hoover memorandum of 11/29/63. 9/20 111-476 F-460 FBI memorandum to Tolson from Gale, 12/10/63 9/20 111-514 F-461. FBI memorandum to Tolson from Gale, 9/30/64 9/20 111-531 F-462 FBI memorandum from Donahue to Belmont, 11/22/63 9/21 111-665 F-463. FBI memorandum from Belmont to Tolson, 11/24/63 9/21 111-666 F-464 CIA memorandum to Chief, with/attached memorandum, 11/25/68, re using 9/21 111-571 Oswald. 111-668 F-465 FBI memorandum from Belmont to Sullivan, 11/25/63 9/21 111-670 F-466 FBI memorandum from DeLoach to Mohr, 11/25/63 9/21 111-573 F-467 Memorandum from Hoover to Department of State, 6/3/60, re Oswald impostor 9/21 theory. 111-672 F-471 FBI memorandum from Belmont to Tolson, 12/3/63 9/21 111-674 F-472 Letter from Katzenbach to Warren, 12/8/63 9/21 F-473 FBI memorandum from DeLoach to Mohr, 12/20/63 9/21 F-476 Organizational chart of the Warren Commission 9/21 111-677 111-611 F-477 Photograph of Warren Commission members 9/21 IV-260 111-611 F-478 Record of emergency data— Oswald 9/25 F-479 USMCen'istment contract, 10/24/56 9/25 IV-262 F-^79a USMC enlistment contract, 10/24/56 9/25 IV-263 F-480 USMC examination of Oswald, 10/24/56, 2 p 9/25 IV-264 IV-266 F-481 Oswald's loyalty certificate for Armed Services personnel 9/25 IV-269 F-482 USMC master fingerprints, 10/15/56 9/25 F-483 Oswald, miscellaneous information and index form 9/25 IV-271 F-484 Oswald, Security termination statement and index... 9/25 F-485 Notice of Obligated Service Discharge 9/25 111-159, IV-272 111-179, IV-273 IV-274 F-486 Passport #1733242 (copy) 9/25 IV-284 F-487 Selective Service registration form 9/25 IV-285 F-488 Declaration requesting revocation of U.S. citizenship (C.E. 244) 9/25 F-489 Account of interview with A. Mosby by Oswald. 11/15/59 9/25 IV-286 F-490A Script writing on Holland-American Line stationery 9/25 IV-287 IV-298 F-490B Script writing on Holland-American Line stationery 9/25 IV-302 F-491 Historical diary (CE24) 9/25 F-492 Affidavit of support to U.S. Embassy, 1/17/62 (CE775)... 9/25 IV-314 IV-315 F-493 Note from "AIek" to Marine and June, in Russian language 9/25 F-494 Letter to "The Worker" 9/25 IV-316 F-495 Application for rental of post office box, 3 p 9/25 IV- 319 F-496 Post office box rental application 9/25 IV-320 F-497 Letter to Fair Play for Cuba Committee 9/25 IV-321 F-498. Letter to Communist Party of USA, 8/28/63 9/25 IV-323 IV-326 F-499 Photoreproduction of page from hotel registry 9/25 IV-327 F-500 Letter to Russian Embassy (CE103) 9/25 IV-329 F-501 W-4form 9/25 IV-330 F-502 Letter to Russian Embassy, 11/9/63 9/25 IV-331 IV-332 F-503 Application for employment— L. Welding Co 9/25 F-504 Microfilm reproduction of rifle order— Klein's 9/25 See footnotes at end of table, p. 583. 581 B. EXHIBITS-JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS— Continued Date Entered Exhibit No. (1978) Volume/Page IV-333-336 IV-337 F-505A-D.. Photograph of four cards from Oswald's wallet 9/25 IV-338 F-506 "Dear Mr. Hunt" letter 9/25 IV-339 F-507 "AIek," writing in Russian 9/25 F-508 Speech (CE97) 9/25 IV-348-349 F-509. Postal money order to Klein's— front and reverse 9/25 IV-350 F-5I0 Walker note (in Russian) 9/25 F-512 Affidavit of Joseph H. Langosch, 9/14/78_. 9/22 IV-192 IV-212 F-513 FOIA 5-lA, 10/9/63, IN 36017 9/22 IV-213 F-514 Coleman memorandum,3/26/64 9/22 IV-215 F-515 Rocca note to Helms, 3/5/64 9/22 IV-216 F-516 FOIA 7-2, 10/10/63, DIR 74830.. _ 9/22 IV-219 F-517 FOIA 6-3, 10/10/63, DIR 74673 9/22 IV-181 F-518 Memorandum, undated, Comments of Luisa Calderon Carralero 9/22 IV-221 F-519 FOIA 680-290, memorandum, 5/5/64, re debriefing on Oswald's case^. 9/22 IV-162 F-520 Memorandum for Deputy Director for Plans, 5/11/64, FOIA 687-295, subject: 9/22 information on Lee Harvey Oswald, w/attachments. F-521 FOIA 739-319, memorandum, 6/19/64, with attachments 9/22 IV-224 IV-197 F-522 Handwritten notes— Project ZRRIFLE, with/attached memorandums 9/22 IV-206 F-523 Form 201— CIA Personality File request 12/9/60, FOIA 1-lb 9/22 IV-207 F-524 Letter to Blakey from Breckinridge, 9/19/78, with/attached memorandum of 9/22 2/20/64 re documents available in Oswald's 201 file, FOIA 563-810. IV-231 F-525 Memorandum from Stern to Rankin, 3/27/64 9/22 IV-209 IV-126 F-526 FOIA 435-173A, dispatch 12/12''63 9/22 F-527 Excerpts from letter. with cover 1967 CIA Inspector General's report re plotting against Castro, 9/22 IV-232 F-528 FOIA 657-831, memorandum for Deputy Director for Plans, 4/13/64 9/22 IV-14 F-529 Memorandum for Deputy Director for Plans, 7/8/64, Nosenko information on 9/22 Oswald. IV-236 F-530 Memorandum of conversation, 7/28/64, re use of Nosenko information in 9/22 Warren Commission report. IV-36 F-531 Five documents re Nosenko from Office of Security^ 9/22 IV-65 F-532 Seven documents re Nosenko, CIA 9/22 IV-240 F-533 Memorandum to Rankin, 7/31/64, re tourist visa application time, FOIA 781-341. 9/22 IV-187 F-534 State Department telegram from Moscow, 10/31/59. 9/22 F-536A Letter to Helms, 9/21/78, re testimony from Anthony Lapham, CIA 9/22 IV-6 IV-109 F-536B Letter to Helms, 9/21/78, re testimony from John D. Morrison, Jr., CIA 9/22 F-537 CIA response to Hearings of the Select Committee on Assassinations re inter- 9/22 IV-156 rogatories re Nosenko. IV-7 F-538 Excerpt from Church report on alleged assassination plots against foreign 9/22 leaders, p. 92. IV-153 IV-463 F-539 Excerpt from Church report, pp. 99-100 9/22 IV-464 F-541 Article, London "Sunday Times," 2/26/67 9/25 F-542 Letter from Hearings of the Select Committee on Assassinations to London 9/25 IV-464 "Sunday Times,''^ 4/25/78. F-543 Letter from London "Sunday Times" to Hearings of the Select Committee on 9/25 IV-455 Assassinations, 5/19/78. 544 Advertisement for movie "Executive Action" 9/25 V-382 IV-561 IV-563 545 546 Chartof Jack Ruby's toll calls, 1963.... Computer printout of toll calls 9/26 9/26 V-416 547A Map of U.S. with Apalachin meeting delegates 9/28 V-429 V-418 547B Map of U.S. with La Cosa Nostra families 9/28 V-435 548. Chart, organized crime family organization 9/28 V-435 550 Chart, seating arrangement at La Stella Restaurant 9/28 V-388 551 Chart— Organized Crime Indictments and Convictions 9/28 552 Graphs— organized crime program statistics 9/28 553 Affidavit from FBI Special Agent Kahoe 9/28 IV-516 554 Letter from Earl Ruby to HSCA re "Cuba" Alabama, 8/17/78 9/26 IV-513 555 BBC film clip re Jack's statement "No one will ever know. . ." (2 reels)) 9/26 IV-369 556 Composite of six photogiaphs of Oswald 9/25 55/ Composite of five photographs of Oswald, one of Lovelady 9/25 IV-369 IV-370 558 Diagram— shape, distance and size comparison 9/25 IV-372 559 Photograph o« motorcade with red circle— Altgens 9/25 IV-377 560 Composite of two photographs by Altgens and MHteer 9/25 IV-378 561 Composite of three photographs, one by Altgens and two by Milteer 9/25 562 Diagram of Altgens photograph— analysis of height.. 9/25 IV-378 563 Photograph of crowd on Houston Street, by Altgens 9/25 IV-379 IV-388 564 Composite of three photographs— height chart d'splay 9/25 IV-522 565 IRS audit case report of Earl Ruby. 1/8/64 (CE 2978).... 9'26 IV-575 567 Letter from Jones to Curry on security transfer of Oswald. 12/19/63. with at- 9/26 tached letter of 12/16/63. IV-574 568 Diagram of basement of the Dallas Police Department 9/26 IV-593 569 HSCA interview of Don Flusche, 6/7/78 9/26 V-152 572 Transcript of McWIIIIe deposition, 4/4/78 9/27 V-155 V-168 V-7 V-169 573 Report of FBI on McWillie Interview, 11/27/63 9/27 574 Report of FBI on interview of McWIIIIe, 6/9/64 9/27 575 Segment of ZoppI letter 9/27 V-174 V-190 576 HSCA interview of Tony Zoppi, 3/31/78 9/27 577 FBI interview report on Ruby, 12/25/63 „ 9/27 578 FBI interview report on S. J. Braun, 11/25/73 9/27 See footnotes at end of table, p. 583. 582 B. EXHIBITS— JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS— Continued Date Exhibit Entered Volume/Page No. Description (1978) V-191 V-192 V-195 F-579 FBI interview report on Jay Bishov, 11/25/63 9'27 F-580 FBI interview report on Jack Marcus, 12,2/63 9/27 V-196 V-197 F-581 Postcard from Ruby to Alice Nichols, 9/8/59 9/27 V 194 F-582 FBI interview report on Clarence A. Rector ll'30/63 9/27 V-206 F-583 Ruby's tourist cards— front. y-223 V 202 F-584 Ruby's tourist cards— reverse . V-199 9/27 F-585 FBI report re 'ack Ruby's bank osposit records, 11/29/63 _.. V-226 F 586 Report re Jack Ruby, potential criminal informant.. 9/27 9/27 F-587 FBI interview report on Meyer R. Panitz, 1/14/64 9/27 IV-546 f-58« Charles C. Scott letter to HSCA re Jack Ruby signature identification, 9/22/78 9/27 F-589 INS letter and documents to HSCA, 5/11/78 9/27 9/26 IV-548 F-590 Warren Commission memorandiirr from Hubert and Griffin to Willens, 4/4/64. 9/27 9/26 Warren Commission staff memorandum 'rom Hubert and Griffin, 5/14,/54, re IV-559 adequacy of Ruby investigation. F-592 Warren Commission staf memorandum to Hubert and Gritfin from Willens, 9/26 6/1/64, re adequacy of Ruby investigation. IV-560 IV-485 F-593 Warren Commission memorandum from Hubert and Griffin to Willens, 6/1/64.. 9/26 F-594 Film of Ruby shooting Oswald 9/26 IV-481 iV-482 F-595 Photograph of "Hands Off Cuba" literature 9/26 IV-481 lV-483 F-596 Photograph of Oswald distributing FPCC literature 9/26 F-597 Photograph of "The Crime Against Cuba" pamphlet, 544 Camp Street 9/26 lV-484 F-598 Map of Louisiana 9/26 V-241 V-314 r-599 Photograph of Davia Ferrie 9/26 V-308 '■-600 Sworn statement of CIA Support Chief, 9/25/78 9/27 F-601 ExcerptsofAleman interview by Gaeton Fonzi, HSCA staff, 3/12/77 9/27 V-317 F-«02 Article by George Crile III. The Mafia, the CIA and Castro." "the Washing- 9/27 V-437 ton Post," 5/16/76. f-603 HSCA staff memorandum, 3/14/77, from Purdy to Tanenbaum re Miami trip of 9/27 V-437 3/10/77. V-438 F-604 ELSUR— 1/31/62, Giancana Alex and Vogel 9/28 F 605 ELSUR— Januaiy 1962, Giancana and D'Arco 9/28 F-606 ELSUR— 2/27,'62. Ferraro and Godfrey 9/28 V-439 V 438 F-607 ELSUR— 1 15/63, Airtel, "^nglish 9/28 V 438 V-439 F-608 ELSUR— 1/31 63, LCN summary 9/28 V-440 F-609 NYPD Intelligence Bulletin 1*10, 6/7/63 9/28 V-440 F-«10 ELSUR-6/11/63, Stefaio Magaddino 9/28 F-611 ELSUR— 8/7/63, airtel, Alex. .9/28 V-441 F-612 ELSUR— 8/8/63, DiPalermo and Genovese 9/28 V-441 F-«13 ELSUR-10/15/63, Jacobson and Marcy . 9/28 V 440 V-442 »^-614 ELSU R-10, 24,63 Costello 9/28 V-442 f-S15 ELSUR— 1963, Trafficante .... 9/28 F-616 ELSUR— 1963, Palmisano and Petillo 9/28 VV-384 F-6I7 ELSUR— 1963, Bruno and Catena 9/28 F-618 ELSUR— 2,8/62, Bruno and Weisburg 9/28 443 V-445 F-619 Photograph of Santos Trafficante 9/28 V-446 F-620 ELSUR— 2/17,62, Bruno and M. and P. Maggio 9/28 V 445 V-446 F-621 FBI memorandum, 4,22 62, re Celano and Pierce _. 9/28 V-447 P 622 ELSUR— 5/2 62, Profaci, Clements and "Bob" 9/28 V-447 F-625 ELSUR— 10/23 62, Marcy, D'Arco and Representative Libonati. . 9/28 F-626 ELSUR— 1/17 '63, Patriarca, Angiulo and Limone 9/28 V-447 V-448 F-627.... ELSUR— 2/28/63, Giancana 9/28 F €28 ELSUR— 10/14/63, Giancana, English, Accardo and Blasi 9/28 V 448 F-629 ELSUR— 5/23/63, Stefano Magaddino 9/28 F-630 ELSUR— 10/31/63, Stefano and Peter Magaddino 9/28 V-449 V^48 V-449 F-631 Memorandum from Evans to Belmont. 5/22/63, re Valachi 9/28 V-449 F-632 ELSUR— 8/12/63, Lanza and Bruno . . 9/28 V-450 V-451 F-633 ELSUR— 9/17/63, iVlagaddino... _. 9/28 F-634 ELSUR— 9/27/63, J. S. LaRocca re Valachi 9/28 V-451 F-635 ELSUR (NYPD)--9/27/63, Masiello and DiLorenzo. 9/28 V-452 F-636 ELSUR— 9'28/63, Magaddino, Magaddino and Rangatore.... 9/28 V-452 V-452 F-637 ELSUR-10/1/63, Palmisano 9/28 F-638 LCN file- 10/9 and 10/16/63, Giancana 9/28 V-453 F S39 FBI teletype— 10/10/63, Giancana and English 9/28 F-640 LCN file— 10/25/63, Zerilli ,. 9/28 V-453 V-453 F-641 Autumn 1963, live informant information 9/28 V-504 F-642 Hoover to Senator McClellan, letter and call, 3/2/64 and 3/6/64 9/28 F-643 FBI intelligencebulletin, 3/11 64, Locicero 9/28 V-508 F-644 Testimony of Bobby W. Hargis, 4/8/64, Warren Commission 12/29 V-510 F-645 Statement Tex. of William Newman, 11/22/63, to Sheriff's Department, Dallas, 12/29 V-519 F-646 Testimony of Abraham Zapruder, 7/22/64, Warren Commission 12/29 V-527 V-537 F-€47 StatementofSA Paul E. Landis, Jr., 11/22/63 12,'29 V-539 F-648 StatementofS. M. Holland, 4/8/64, Warren Commission.... 12/29 V-543 F-649 Statement of R. G. Skelton, 11/22,63, Sheriffs Department, Dallas, Tex 12/29 F-650 Testimony of Royce G. Skelton, 4/8/64, Warren Commission 12/29 V-545 F-651 Statement of Virgie Rackley, 11/25/63, FBI 12/29 V-259 F-652 Testimony of Mrs. Donald Baker, 7/22/64, Warren Commission 12/29 V-294 F-653 Cuba book— Report of Cuban Government to HSCA... 9/27 V-507 F-654 Translation of Cuba book 9/27 F 661 Photograph— people on grassy knoll .. 12/29 V-694 V-563 F-666 Zapruder film with sound of four shots added 12/29 F-€67 Charts of waveforms from tape recording of the Dallas Police Department 12/29 See footnotes at end of table, p. 583. 583 B. EXHIBIT— JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS-Contlnued Date Exhibit Entered No. Description (1978) Volume/Page F-668 Photograph of motorcade on Main Street 12/29 V-626 F-669 Photograph of motorcade on Houston Street 12/29 V-626 F-670 Photograph of motorcade on Houston Street 12/29 V-627 F-671 Photograph of motorcade on Houston Street 12/29 V-627 F-672 Survey map of Dealey Plaza 12/29 V-562 F-673 Gun Digest, 1963 12/29 V-573 F-674 Photograph showing motorcycles at Parkland Hospital with clip holders on 12/29 V-633 windshield. F-675 Photograph showing motorcycles being driven down Elm Street 12/29 V-632 F-676 Photograph showing motorcycle and cars parked at emergency room, Park- 12/29 V-633 land Hospital. F-677 Photograph showing crowd, cars and motorcycles at emergency room, Park- 12/29 V-634 land Hospital. F-678 Photograph showing motorcycle and other cars parked at emergency room, 12/29 V-634 Parkland Hospital. F-679 Letter to Chief of Police Curry from Deputy Chief of Police Lundy, 11/21/63, 12/29 V-617 submitting plans for parade route. F-680 Report of Anthony J. Pellicano to Hearings of the Select Committee on Assassi- 12/29 V-652 nations on OPD tapes, 12/13/78. F-681. Composite of four photographs (F-668, F-669, F-670, F-671)._ 12/29 V-628 F-682. Photograph showing temperature above TSBD of 66° (Murray 1-19) 12/29 V-643 F-683 PhotographshowingtimeoverTSBDof 12:40 (Murray 1-15) 9/29 V-644 F-684 Two speeches by Fidel Castro. 9/18 111-159 F-685 Three articles by Jean Daniel 9/18 111-179 < Executive session testimony. These exhibits are printed in Volume XII . Appendix to the Hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, "Oswald in the Soviet Union: An Investigation of Yuri Nosenko," staff report. Numbers which do not appear were assigned to exhibits that were not used. 2See"Theon Warren Committee Commission" Assassinations. staff report, attachment B, volume XII, Appendix to the Hearings before the Select C. SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBITS-JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS Date entered Volume/ (1978) Page Letter from Ralph W. Yarborough to Congressman Richardson Preyer, 12/27/78 12/29 V-698 Letter and exhibits from Robert Groden 12/29 V~703 Memorandum from G. Robert Blakey to HSCA members, 2/22/79, re fine points of correla- 12/29 V-722 tion of tape to film. Article, "A Physicist Examines the Kennedy Assassination Film," Luis W. Alvarez.. 9/8 1-428 Photograph of black umbrella— open... 9/25 IV-444 Transcript of deposition of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, 8/4/78, Hearingsof theSelect Commit- 9/21 111-680 tee on Assassinations. 111-749 Letter to HSCA from Katzenbach re testimony, 9/25/78 9/21 D. APPENDICES TO THE JOHN F. KENNEDY PUBLIC HEARINGS Volume 1. Scientific Reports: (i) Report of the Photographic Evidence Panel VI (11) Report on the Medical Evidence and Related Issues Pertaining to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy ._ VII (ill) Report of the Firearms Panel VII (iv) A Study of the Acoustics Evidence Related to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. VIII (v) Report of the Polygraphy Panel on the Subject of the Analysis of Jack Ruby's Polygraph Examination . VIII (vi) Report of the Polygraphy Panel on the Subject of the Analysis of Yuri Nosenko's Polygraph Examination. VIII (vll) Report on the Subject of the Examination of the Handwriting and Fingerprint evidence in the investi- gation ofthe Assassination of John F. Kennedy VIII 2. Staff Reports: (viii) Organized Crime IX (ix) Anti-Castro Activists and Organizations and Lee Harvey Oswald in New Orleans X (x) The Evolution and Implications of the CIA-Sponsored Assassination Conspiracies Against Fidel Castro. X (xi)The Warren Commission.. XI (xii) Analysis of the Support Provided to the Warren Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency XI (xlll) Politics and Presidential Protection: The Motorcade XI (xiv) Possible Military Investigation of the Assassination XI (xv) Conspiracy Witnesses in Dealey Plaza XII (xvi) Oswald-Tlppit Associates XII (xvii) George de Mohrenschildt XII (xviil) Deposition of Marina Oswald Porter XII (xix)The Defector Study XII (xx) Oswald in the Soviet Union: An Investigation of Yuri Nosenko.. XII 3. Bibliographies: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: An Alphabetical Bibliography. XII Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: A Chronological Bibliography XII Appendix VIII : Index for the Investigation of the Assassination OF Dr. Martin Luther King. Jr. A. PUBLIC HEARINGS OF THE COMMITTEE Date Volume/Page (1978) 1-1 1. Statements by members of the committee: 1-2 Opening Statement by Chairman Louis Stokes 8-U 1-4 Opening Statement by Delegate Walter E. Fauntroy 8-14 Opening Statement by Representative Samuel L. Devlne 8-14 Opening Statement by Chairman Louis Stokes 11-9 Opening Statement by Delegate Walter E. Fauntroy 11-9 IV-1 Personal Remarks by Delegate Walter E. Fauntroy. 11-17 IV-3 VII-111 Statement Dr. King. by Chairman Louis Stokes Concernmg the FBI's Actions With Respect to 11-27 VI-1 VI 1-160 Remarks by Chairman Louis Stokes on the Matter of FBI Responsibility In Dr. 11-28 King's Death. VI 1-202 Statement tion. by Chairman Louis Stokes Concerning Evidence in a Conspiracy lnv'>stiga- 11-29 Closing Remarks by Chairman Louis Stokes „ l2-l VI 11-664 Closing Remarks by Delegate Walter E. Fauntroy 12-1 VI 11-666 1-75 Ml 2. Narrations by G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Staff Director: • The Civil Rights Movement and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr 8-14 The Autopsy of Dr. King 8-15 The Scene of the Crime (Gene Johnson, Deputy Chief Counsel) 8-16 Statements of James Earl Ray il-9 Scientific Analyses of the Evidence: Firearms. 11-9 IV-111 IV-77 IV-7 Possible Motives of James Earl Ray 11-10 IV-235 Police Protection of Dr. King in Memphis 11-10 V-65 Two Conspiracy Allegations 11-13 V-1 V-391 V-452 Ray's Guilty Plea 11-13 Grace Walden 11-14 V-521 Grace Walden Admission to the John Gaston Hospital ... . 11-14 V-570 Grace Walden: Commitment to Western State Mental Hospital 11-14 V-584 Grace Walden: Renfro Hays Interview? 11-14 V-612 Grace Walden: Mark Lane Interview 11-14 V-631 Grace Walden: Expert's Review of Her Medical Records and Treatment 11-14 V-655 Grace Walden: Statements by Her Co-Guardians... 11-14 Investigation of Ray's Finances 11-15 Possible Complicity by the FBI 11-17 VI-59 VI-407 Intelligence Activities for King's Trip to Memphis 11-20 The Invaders 11-20 VI-607 VI-444 Analysis of the Evidence Relating to FBI Complicity 11-27 Performance of the FBI 11-27 Performance of the Department of Justice 11-28 VII-117 VII-156 Investigative Techniques and Civil Rights 11-28 Vll-1 Conspiracy Allegations (Gene Johnson, Deputy Chief Counsel) 11-29 VII-173 Possible Complicity by lerry Ray 11-30 VI 1-311 1-10 Ray's Prison Escape and the Alton, Illinois, Bank Robbery (James Wolf, Deputy Chief Counsel). 12-1 1-43 VI 11-1 3. Witnesses: •• Abern^thy, Reverend Ralph David 8-14 Baden, V". Michael (vii) 8-15 Bates, Johns., Jr. (vii) 11-9 VI-128 IV-81 Brennan, Charles D 11-17 VI-509 V-334 VII-177, 245 Byers, Russell G 11-29 Cabbage, Charles Laverne 11-20 Canale, Phil N 11-13 V-605 Champagne, Donald E. (vii) 11-9 Clark, Ramsey.. 11-28 IV-81 VII-120 Cohen, Dr. Morris 11-14 Cooks, Stoney 11-17 V-371 VI-56 Cowden, Coy Dean 8-18 V-522 DeLoach, Cartha D 11-27 111-314 V-522 VII-18 DeMere, Dr. McCarthy 11-13 Drennon, C. Cleveland, Jr 11-14 Druff, Or. James R 11-14 Eist, Alexander U-9 IV-10 See footnotes at end of table, p. 585. (584) 585 A. PUBLIC HEARINGS OF THE COMMITTEE— Continued Date (1978) Volume/Page V-657 V-9 3. Witnesses:**— Continued Evans, Edward ._ 11-13 11-15 V-74 11-29 VI 1-247 Foreman, Percy.. _ 11-13 IV-236 Holloman, Frank C - 11-10 V-632 VI-586 Jensen, Robert G 11-21 Johnson, Ernestine 8-18 Lane, Mark. 11-14 111-346 VI-539 Lawrence, William H 11-21 Lutz, Monty C. (vii) 11-9 VI-413 IV-81 McCollough, Marrell.- 11-20 V-468 McFall, Larce E 8-18 111-350 McFall, Phillip 8-18 111-353 Moore, Or. David F 11-14 VI-361 Moore, George C 11-17 V-574 Murtaugh, Arthur L 11-17 VI-91 Neale, Dr. Jack C, III 11-14 Newquist, Andrew M. (vii) 11-9 IV-81 Peters, Annie Estelle 8-18 Phillips, Freddie 12-1 111-302 V-€32 Pollak, Stephen J 11-28 VII-163 VI 11-657 Ragsdale, Duncan 11-14 Randall, Judge Murray L 11-29 8-17 8-18 VII-204 Ray, James Earl (i-v) 8-16 1-87 Ray, Jerry 11-30 VII-318 111-13 Ray, John Larry.. 12-1 11-4 Redditt, Edward.. H-IO IV-202 VI-124 VIII-28 Rose, James J 11-17 V-445 VI-462 Smith, John B 11-20 Srygley, William L. 11-14 VI-445 Taylor, Calvin L, Jr 11-20 Tyson, Brady 11-17 Weenick, Lawrence.. 11-29 VI-6 VI 1-238 Wllhelm, Russell M 11-9 Wilson, George R. (vii) 11-9 IV-81 IV-81 Young, Andrew 11-17 VI-3 •Narrations were presented by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director, unless otherwise indicated. ♦•Persons whose names are followed by a letter contributed to scientific reports or gave depositions or other statements which are contained in the staff reports. See the index of King appendices for the locations of the referenced material. B. EXHIBITS*-MARTIN LUTHER KING PUBLIC HEARINGS Date Exhibit Volume/Page No. Description Entered (1978) 1-45 1-49 1-50 F-1 Drawing of neck wound of Dr. King before medical dissection F-2 Drawing of Dr. King's neck wound after medical dissection 8/15 1-51 F-3 Drawing of Dr. King's back prior to autopsy, showing where bullet lodged 8/15 1 47 F-4 Photograph of suit jacket worn by Dr. King at time of assassination 1-52 F-5 Photograph of shirt worn by Dr. King at time of assassination 8/15 1-53 F-6 Photograph of Dr. King's shirt showing bullet hole 815 8/15 1-54 F-7. Photograph of necktie worn by Dr. King at time of assassination 1-55 8/15 F-8 X-ray of Dr. King's spine showing bullet — - 1-57 1-61 F-9 X-ray of Dr. King's head and shoulder showing fragments 9/15 815 F-10. - Drawing of Dr. King's head and shoulders showing path of bullet 1-62 F-12 Two photographs of bullet removed from Dr. King 8/15 F-13 Photograph of bullet in three fragments F-14 (1) FBI interview of Lloyd lowers— introduced as exhibit by James Earl Ray; 1-104, 1-113 1-78 (2) statement of James Earl Ray and attached exhibits. 8/15 8/15 1-80 F-15A Photograph of roominghouse and surrounding buildings, 418-424 South 8/16 Main Street. 1-81 8/16 F-15B Photograph of Room 5-B of roominghouse - 1-82 F-15C Photograph of bathroom to balcony of Lorraine Motel 8/16 1-83 F-15D Photograph from balcony of Lorrame Motel to roominghouse — l-«4 F-15E Photograph of view, north to south, on South Main Street 8/16 8/16 F-15F Photograph 424 South ofMain bundle of evidence in front to Canipes' Amusement Company, Street. 1-76 8/16 F-16 Photograph showing aerial view of crime scene, Memphis, Tenn 11-110 1-79 1-77 F-17 Article, National Enquirer, 10/11/77 wK!! F-19 Drawing of crime scene, Memphis, Tenn V-187 F-20 HSCA diagram, second floor, roominghouse 1-360 F-20A Overlay of diagram, second floor, roominghouse 8/16 F-21 HSCA diagram, highway map. Southeast United States 1-116 8/16 11-56 F-23 Deposition of James Earl Ray, Ray v. Foreman, November 1969 F-24 Testimony of James Earl Ray, Evidentiary Hearing, Ray v. Rose F-25 Interview of James Earl Ray by Dan Rather, 3/9/77 8/17 See footnote at end of table, p. 592. 586 B. EXHIBITS— MARTIN LUTHER KING PUBLIC HEARINGS— Continued Date Entered Volume/Page Description (1978) F-35 Receipt from Aeromarine Supply Company( Birmingham, Ala 11-39 F-36 Letter from Ray to Jack Kershaw, 9/30/77, introduced by James Earl Ray. 11-20 F-42 Staff interview of James Garner, 1/23/78 8/17 F-46 Staff interview of Donald Wood,i, 11/8/77. 8/17 11-32 11-9 11-99 F-50 HSCA fingerprint analysis report. 8/17 F-51 Article, Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 3/18/68 8/17 11-46 8/17 11-50 F-52 Postal change of address card of James Earl Ray F-53 Registration card of James Earl Ray at Flamingo Motel, Selma, Ala., 3/22/68... 8/17 11-55 8/17 F-56 Article, Selma Times Journal, 3/21/68.... 8/17 11-58 11-65, 111-306 F-59 Receipt from Piedmont Laundry, Atlanta, Ga 11-70 F-60. Staff interview of Estelle Peters, 9/27/77 8/17 11-100 F-61 Front page, Memphis Commercial Appeal, 4/4/68 8/17 11-491 F-^6 Photograph of paper bag used in June 4, 1968, robbery of Trustee Savings Bank of Fulham, London, England. 8/17 8/17 F-77 Letter from James E. Ray to Hugh Stanton, Sr., 1/20/69 111-38 F-78 Letter from James E. Ray to Percy Foreman, 2/18/69 F-79 Proposed stipulations of material facts: State of Tennessee v. James Earl Ray. 8/18 111-17 F-80 Guilty plea proceedings. State of Tennessee v. James Earl Ray, 3/10/69 111-46 111-80 F-84 Letter from James E. Ray to Arthur Hanes, Sr., 10/3/68 F-92 Staff interview of Alexander Eist, 8/4/78 111-264 111-32 8/18 F-93 Letter from James Earl Ray to Birmingham Bar Association, 6/10/68 8/18 111-257 F-94 Letter from James Earl Ray to Arthur Hanes, Sr., 6/10/68 8/18 111-259 VI 1-397 F-96A Bank records of Carol Pepper 11/30 11-96 F-105_ Articles of 4/1/68 editions of Atlanta Journal and Atlanta Constitution 11-91 F-106 Page from ledger book. Piedmont Laundry, Atlanta, Ga 8/18 8/17 111-308 F-106a Original ledger book. Piedmont Laundry, Atlanta, Ga 8/17 F-113 Letter to James Earl Ray from Clarence F. Lyons, Jr., 7/11/78, introduced by 8'18 James Earl Ray. 8/18 F-114 Article, The Tennessean, 10/10/75, introduced by James Earl Ray 1111-11 11-9 111-12 8/18 F-115 Article, Knoxville Journal, July 1978, introduced by James Earl Ray 111-561 F-116 Materials transmitted by James Earl Ray to supplement his public hearing 8/18 testimony. 8/18 111-518 F-117 Excerpts from Code Name "Zorro" by Mark Lane and Dick Gregory 111-523 F-118 Interview of Coy Dean Cowden, 11/12/77, by Mark Lane 8/18 111-535 F-119 Affidavit of Coy Dean Cowden, 8/15/78 -... 8/18 111-540 F-120 Affidavit of Mrs. Catherine Collie Cowden Marshall, 8/14/78 IIM2 8/18 F-121 Two letters from Percy Foreman to James Earl Ray, 3/9/69 8/18 111-558 F-122 Letter from James Earl Ray to Jerry Ray, 12/23/68 11/9 111-44 F-124 Affidavit of Phillip McFall, 8/15/78 8/18 11/9 8/18 F-130 Staff interview of Thomas Smith, 8/11/78 IV-37 IV-46 8/18 11/9 11/9 F-131 Signed statement by Owen Summers, 11/2/78 IV-49 F-132 Signed statement by David Meuriner, 11/2/78 11/9 F-133 Signed statement of Connie Meuriner, 11/2/78... 11/9 IV-52 F-134 Signed confession of James Earl Ray, 10/11/59, to charge of armed robbery... F-135 Transcript of court proceedings. Circuit Court, City of St. Louis, in case of Mis- 11/9 IV-57 IV-63 souri V.James Earl Ray, 12/15/59. IV-28 F-136 Certificate of acquittal of Alexander Anthony Eist from the Crown Court, Mid- 11/9 lesex, England. F-137 Certificate of retirement of Alexander Anthony Eist 11/9 F-138 Metropolitan police pension-certificate of indentity— Alexander Anthony Eist.. IV-15 IV-12 11/10 Shelby County F-145 (Q2) evidence rifle Criminal Court Clerk. F-146 Two photographs of bolt locking lug and bolt of Q2 rifle... IV-86 11/10 N/A F-147 (Q64) evidence bullet 11/10 F-148 Two photographs: (1) 064 bullet; (2) fragments, Q54 bullet. IV-90 F-149 Four photographs of Q64 bullet 11/10 11/10 IV-92 F-150 One photograph comparing Q64 bullet and test-fired bullet.. IV-92 Shelby County F-151 (Q3) evidence cartridge case... 11/10 Criminal Court Clerk. F-152 Photograph of Q3 cartridge case 11/10 IV-96 F-153 Two photographs of breech face marks of Q3 cartridge case. U/IQ IV-97 F-154 Two photographs of chamber marks of Q3 cartridge case... 11/10 11/10 IV-98 F-155 Photograph of Q3 cartridge case headstamp IV-99 F-156 Photograph of four headstamps of Q3-Q12 cartridge cases... 11/10 F-157 Photo of windowsill and windowsill impression. 11/10 IV-105 F-158. Windowsill removed from bathroom of roominghouse 11/10 Shelby County Criminal Court Clerk. F-165 (1) Letter to Arthur Hanes from Friends of Rhodesian Independence, August 11/10 IV-114 1968, and enclosure; (2) typed letter from Gait to Orange County, Calif., Chapter of the Friends of Rhodesia. F-166 Excerpt of testimony of Marie Martin in executive session 11/10 IV-148 F-167 Royal Canadian Mounted Police interview, 10/25/68, of female acquaintance of James Earl Ray .- 11/10 IV-118 F-168 FBI interview of Bo DelMonte, 4/30/58 11/10 IV-122 F-169 FBI interview of James Morrison, 4/30/68 11/10 IV-123 F-170 Staff interview of Leonard Scott DelMonte, 2/10/78 IV-125 F-171 Staff interview of Dennis LeMaster, 3/10/78 11/10 IV-142 See footnote at end of table, p. 592. 587 B. EXHIBITS-MARTIN LUTHER KING PUBLIC HEARINGS— Continued Date Exhibit No. Entered (1978) Volume/Page Description F-172 FBI letterhead memorandum, 4/22/68, re Mexican investigation 11/10 IV-156 F-173 Transcript of taped interview with Irma Morales, 6/5/78, by committee staff. 11,10 IV-161 11/10 HSCA files, F-173A Tape of Morales interview National Archives. IV-189 F-174 Staff interview of Irma Morales, 6/5/78 11/10 11/10 IV-193 F-175 Photograph of Irma Morales F-180 Street map of Memphis depicting "Chase" reported by CB broadcast. 11/13 V-2 F-181 Page 170 of Code Name "Zorro" 11/13 V-5 F-182 Photograph talf Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.: A Comprehensive Alphabetical Bibliography.. XIII Appendix IX. Index for the Public Hearings of the Committee on Legislative and Administrative Reform Date Volume/Page (1978) A. Statements by Chairman Louis Stoltes: Opening Statement _ 12/11 1-1 Closing Remarliracy assassinateJohnson was Lincoln. Abraham a participant in, or had knowledge of, the (6) See generally, "A Thoxisand Days"; and Samuel Eliot Morison, Henry Steele Commager and William E. Leuchtenburg, "The Growth of the American Republic" (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), volumn II, chapter XXX (hereinafter "Growth of the American Republic"). (7) Id., "Growth of the American Republic," at p. 762. (8) "A Thousand Days," p. 635. (9) Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Robert Kennedy and His Times" (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1978), Chapter 13. (10) Id. at 278. (11) Id. at 281. (12) Ibid. (13) Much of this account of President Kennedy's trip to Texas is based on the testimony of Governor and Mrs. John B. Connally. See testimony of Governor and Mrs. John B. Connally, Sept. 6, 1978, Hearings Before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. I, pp. 11-60. (U) "A Thousand Days," p. 755. (i5) Id. at 98. References : Section A (1) Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 18-19 (hereinafter Warren Report). (2) Id. at S6-92. (S) Ibid. (4) Deposition of J. Lee Rankin, Aug. 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations hearing, pp. 75-78 (JFK Document 014027) (for a copy of the deposition, see "The Warren Commis.sion," staff report. Appendix to the Hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 9.")th Congress. 2d Session (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. XI (hereinafter WC report, — Api)endix to the HSCA-JFK hear- ings.—)). (5) Id. at 75. (6) Ibid. (7) Testimony of Robert Groden, Sept. 7, 1978, Hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), Volume I, p. 99 (hereinafter Groden testimony, — HSCA-JFK hearings, — ). (8) Ibid. (9) JFK Document 002498. (10) Report to the President by the Commission on Central Intelligence Activi- ties within the United States (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975). (11) 1 HSCA-JFK hearings. 145. (12) Testimony of Michael Baden. Sept. 7, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 185 (hereinafter Baden testimony). (13) Report of the Forensic Pathology Panel, in "Report on the Medical Evi- dence and Related Issues Pertaining to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy." rei)ort VII Appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings (hereinafter foren- sic pathology report). (1/,) Id. atl51fiF. (15) Report of Photographic Evidence Panel, VI Appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, para. 512-610 (hereinafter photographic evidence report). (16 1 Forensic pathology report, para. 181ff. (17) Photographic evidence report, para. 512-610. (18) See JFK Exhibit F-19, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 182, and forensic pa- thology report, para. 20;>-235. (19) Id., forensic pathology report, at 461-557. 599 (20) Testimony of Larry Sturdivan, Sept. 8, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 383ff. (21) Id. at 414-416. (22) JFK exhiibit F-309, 1 HSCA-JFK hearings, 416. (23) Forensic pathology report, para. 363-414. (24) Ibid. (25) Id. at 415-460. (26) Ibid. ; see also 364-376 and Addendum G. (27) Ibid. (28) Compare dissenting views of Dr. Cyril H. Wecht, id. at 558fE. (29) Warren Report, pp. 97-109. (30) Id. at 105. (31) Id. at 97. (32) Id. at 19. (S3) Testimony of Dr. Vincent P. Guinn, Sept. 8, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 491ff. (hereinafter Guinn testimony). There are differences in the count and weight of the materials examined by the FBI and Dr. Guinn. This is attributable to the character of tlie FBI tests and to the fact that the Bureau disposed of the samples examined after the tests. (34) Warren Report, pp. 79-81. (35) See, e.g., Mark Lane, "Rush to Judgment" (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966), p. 80. (36) Guinn testimony, p. 533. (37) Sturdivan testimony, pp. 407-412, 420-424; see also testimony of Dr. Cyril H. Wecht, Sept. 7, 1978, 1 HSCA-JFK hearings, 350-352 (hereinafter Wecht testimony ) . (38) Id., Sturdivan testimony, at 395. (39) Id., Sturdivan testimony, 407-412, 420-424, and Baden testimony, 298. (40) JFK exhibit F-331, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 533. (41) Ibid. (42) Photographic evidence report, para. 52ff. (43) Id. at 57-80. (44) Ibid. (45) Ibid. (.^6) Id.atl56ff. (//7) Id. at 95-103, inter alia. (48) Testimony of Dr. James Barger, Professor Mark Weiss and Ernest Aschkenasy, Dec. 29, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 6^5ff., 555ff., and 556ff. re- spectively (hereinafter Barger, Weiss, or Aschkenasy testimony). (49) See memorandum of Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey, V HSCA-JFK hearings. 723fe. (50) Report of Dr. William K. Hartmann and Dr. Frank Scott, in the photo- graphic evidence report, para. 92-103. (51 ) Warren Report, p. 18. (52) Ibid., pp. 18-19. (53) Forensic pathology report, para. 461fP. (54) Photographic evidence report, para. 110-168. (55) Testimony of Thomas Canning, Sept. 12, 1978, II HSCA-JFK hearings, 161. (56) Id. at 161-179. (57) Id. at 179-191. (58) Photographic evidence report, para. 127-168. (59) Ibid. (60) Id. at 272-287. (61) Ibid. (62) Id. at 247-251. (63) Id. at 257-271. (64) Id. at 247-251. (65) See letter of Charles Leontis (JFK document 014205). (66) JFK documents 014744 and 014833. (67) Testimony of Luke Mooney, hearings before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), vol. Ill, p. 284 (hereinafter Warren Hearings). (69) Ibid. (70) Id. at 287. 600 (71 ) Testimony of Eugene Boone, III Warren Hearings, 293. (72) Ibid. (75) Id. at 294. (7^) Report of the Firearms Panel, VII appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, para. 135-146 (hereinafter firearms report) ; Warrent Report, p. 85. (75) Id., firearms report, at 131-134. {76) Guinn testimony, p. 533. (77) Sylvia Meagher, "Accessories After the Fact" (New York : Vantage Books, 1967), pp. 95-100. (78) See e.g., testimony of Jack D. White, Sept. 14, 1978, II HSCA-JFK hear- ings, 322fif. (79) Photographic evidence report, para. 186fif. (80) Testimony of Calvin S. McCamy and Sgt. Cecil W. Kirk, Sept. 15, 1978, II HSCA-JFK hearings, 425-130 (hereinafter McCamy or Kirk testimony). (81) Warren Report, pp. 118-121. (82) Ibid. (83) Ibid. (84 ) Id. at 128-129, 130-131. (85) Id. at 125-126. {86) Id. at 122-124. (87) Id. at 129-137. (88) Id. at 136. (89) Meagher, "Accessories After the Fact," pp. 104-105, supra. (90) Id. at 120-127, 200-209. (91) JFK Exhibit F-399, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 255. (92) Ibid. (93) Report of Vincent J. Scalice, in the Report on the Subject of the Exami- nation of the Handwriting and Fingerprint Evidence in the Investigation of the Assassination of John F. Kennedy by the Questioned Documents Panel, VIII appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, para. 147fif. (hereinafter questioned doc- uments report). (94) Id. at 27. (95) I Warren Hearings, 117-118. (96) Warren Report, pp. 180-181. (97) Id. at 125-128. (98) Groden testimony, pp. 124ff. (99) Photographic evidence report, para. 347flf. (100) Id. at 366-376. (101) See, e.g., photographic evidence report, para. 439. (102) Id. at 377. (103) Id. at 196. 237. (104) JFK Exhibits F-396, F-207 and F-208 and related testimony, HSCA- JFK hearings, II-p. 342, II-p. 435 and I-p. 127 respectively. (105) Photographic evidence report, para. 196. (106) JFK Exhibits F-183, F-184 and F-312, II-p. 245, TI-p. 245 and II-i». 388 HSCA-JFK hearings respectively. (107) JFK Documents 001198 and 001197. (108) Photographic evidence report, para. 377. (109) Questioned documents report, para. 27. (110) Warren Report, pp. 137ff. (111) Id. at 143. (1J2) Testimony of Roy Truly. March 24. 1964. ITT Warren Hearings. 215. (113) See, e.g., testimony of Danny Arce, Bonnie Ray Williams, Charles Giv- ens, Billy Lovelady and Harold Norman, Warren Report, vol. VI, pp. 363-367, vol. Ill, pp. 161-184, vol. VI, pp. 345-356, vol. VI, pp. 336-341, and vol. Ill, p. 18&-198, respectively. (114) Questioned documents report, para. 147fif. (115) Interview of James Jarmen. Sept. 25, 1977, Hou.se Select Committee on Assas.sinations (JFK Document 003347) ; testimony James Jarmen, III War- ren hearings, 201. (116) See JFK exhibit F-126 and related Groden te.stimony, I HSCA-JFK hearings. 107 inter alia. (117) Warren Report, pp. 147-149. (118) J. Gary Shaw and Larry R. Harris, Cover-Up (publisher, J. Gary Shaw, Cleburne, Tex., 1976) , p. 39. 601 (IW) Photographic evidence report,, para. 759ff. (120) Interview of Billy Lovelady, May 9, 1973, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK document (X)91SS). (121) Testimony of Roy Truly and M. L. Baker, Mar. 24, 1964, and Mar. 25, 1964, III Warren hearings, 212-241, 242-270. (122) Testimony of Mrs. Robert A. Reid, Mar. 25, 1964, Til Warren hearings, 270-281. (123) The committee is not unaware of arguments to the contrary. See, e.g., P. D. Scott. P. L. Hoch and R. Stetler, eds., The Assassination : Dallas and Be- yond (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), pp. 93-100. The committee traveled to Dallas and toured the Texas State Book Depository building. During those visits, the times required to reach the second floor from both the street and the sixth floor were determined. The committee found that the testimony of Truly and Baker does not preclude a flnding that Oswald was on the sixth floor at the time the shots were fired. (124) Warren Report, p. 157. (125) Id. at 160, 163-165. (126) Id. at 165. (127) Id. at 176-180. (128) Firearms report, para. 198. (129 ) See, e.g., JFK Documents 006905, 003533 and 010905. (130) Warren Report, pp. 650-651. (131) Interview of Jack Ray Tatum, Feb. 1, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 006905). (132) Warren Report, pp. 176-180; testimony of James W. Bookhout, VII Warren hearings, 312. (133) Warren Report, p. 404. (134) See, e.g., Meagher, Accessories After the Fact, pp. 283-292, supra. (135) Firearms report, para. 149-150. (136) Neutron activation analysis report, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 528. (137) Testimony of Marina Oswald Porter, Sept. 13, 1978, II HSCA-JFK hear- ings; see also deposition of Marina Oswald Porter, XII appendix to the HSCA- JFK hearings. (138) Questioned documents report, para. 27. (139) JFK exhibit F-510, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 350. (140) Warren Report, p. 423 . (141) Id. at 375-^24. (142) Id. at 390-394. (143) Id. at 393. (144) Id. at 391-392. (145) Id. at 392. (146) Id. at 40«-412. (147) JFK exhibit F-178, II HSCA-JFK hearings, 350. (148) Warren Report, pp. 406-415. (149) Ibid. (150) Testimony of Carlos Bringnier, X Warren hearings, 35-36. (151) JFK staff reports. House Select Committee on Assassinations (classified JFK Documents 014972, 014973, 014974 and 014975). References : Section B (1) Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to J. Lee Rankin, June 10, 1964 (JFK Docu- ment 014512). (2) FBI interview of Samuel Pate, Mar. 10, 1964 (JFK Document 014513). (3) Letter from L. G. Kensta to J. Lee Rankin. July 17, 1964 (JFK Document 002892). (4) Outside contact report. Dr. James E. Barger, May 30, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 008926). (5) "Analysis of Recorded Sounds Relating to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc.. in "A Study of the Acoustics Evideu'-e Rplated to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," appendix to the hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Print- ins Office. 1979). Vol. VIII. sec. 1 (hereinafter BBN report. — appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, — ) . 602 (6) Id. at sec. 3. (7) Id. at Foreword. (8) Testimony of Paul MeCaghren, Sept. 11, 1978, hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives. 95th Cong. 2d sess. (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), Vol. II, p. 108 (here- inafter MeCaghren testimony. — HSCA-.TFK hearings, — ). (9) Id. at 109-110. (10) BBN report, sec. 4.1. (11) Id. at sec. 3. (12) Id. at sec. 3.3. (13) Id. at sec. 4. As explained in sec. 5.3 of the BBN report, the number of sequences tested may be listed at differing points in the committee's record as 4, 5, or 6, depending upon the stage of analysis the acoustical project was at (14) Ibid. An additional, less precise screening test was referred to in the hearings on the acoustical project. This screening test was to determine whether the number of impulses in each of the impulse sequences on the Dallas Police Department tape approximated the number of impulses in the expected echo pattern of Dealey Plaza. (15) Id. at sec. 5. (16) Ibid. (17) Ibid. (18) Id. at sec. 5.1, step 3. (19) Id. at sec. 5. (20) Testimony of Prof. Mark Weiss and Ernest Aschkenasy, Dec. 12. 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 556. (21) BBN report, sec. 5.2(3). (22) Ibid. (23) Id. at sec. 5.2(2). (24) Ibid. (25) Id. at sec. 5.2(1). (26) Testimony of Dr. James E. Barger, Dec. 29, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 649 (hereinafter Barger testimony, Dec. 29, 1978). (27) BBN report, sec. 5.1, step 3. (28) Id. at sec. 5.2(1). (29) Ibid. (30) Id. at sec. 5.1, step 5. (SI) Id. at sec. 5.1, steps 5 and 6. (32) Id. at section 5.1, step 6. A technical term for an "invalid match" is a "false alarm" : this term was used during the hearings on the acoustical project and in the BBN report. (33) Id. at .section 5.3. (34) Ibid. (35) Ibid. (36) Id. at section 5.4. (37) Ibid. During his Sept. 11, 1978, testimony before the committee, be- fore the probability estimate was refined for the BBN report, Barger estimated the probability that this would occur at random as 5 percent. Testimony of Dr. James E. Barger. Sept. 11, 1978, II HSCA-JFK hearings, 67 (hereinafter Barger testimony, Sept. 11. 1978). (38) BBN report, sec. 5.4. (39) Ibid. (J,0) Id. at sec. 1.4. (41) Barger testimony. Sept. 11. 1978, p. 94. (/f2) BBN report, sec, 1.4. (43) Ibid. (44) Ibid. (45) Wei.ss and Aschkenasv testimony, p. 556. (46) Id. at 559. (47) BBN report, section 1.5. (48) Weiss and Aschkenasy testimony, p. .'i66. (4.9) An Analvsis of Recorded Sounds Relatins: to the Assassination of Presi- dent John F. Kennedy, section 14. Professor Mark R. Weiss and Ernest Asch- kenasy, in "A Studv of the Acoustics Evidence Related to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," VIII appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings (here- inafter Weiss-Aschkena.sy report). 603 (50) Weiss and Aschkenasy testimony, pp. 55&-55i9. (51) Weiss- Aschkenasy report, section 4.14. (52) Weiss and Aschkenasy testimony, p. 605. (53) Id. at 568-569. (5i) Ibid. ; Weiss-Aschkenasy report, section 5.3. (55) Weiss and Aschkenasy testimony, pp. 581-582. (56) Id. at 556, 605. (57) BBN report, section 1.5. (58) Barger testimony, December 29, 1978, p. 684. (59) Id. at 681. (60) Weiss and Aschkenasy testimony, p. 586. (61 ) Barger testimony, December 29, 1978, p. 681. (62) Ibid. (63) Weiss and Aschkenasy testimony, p. 571. (64) Barger testimony, Dec. 29, 1978, pp. 680-681. (65) Id. at 681. (66) Id. at 682. (67) Interview of H. B. McLain, Sept. 26, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 002378) (hereinafter McLain interview), (68) Interview of Sergeant Jimmy Wayne Oourson, Sept. 26, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doctiment 002381) (hereinafter Courson interview) . (69) Capt. P. W. Laurence Exhibit, hearings before the President's Commis- sion on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Gov- ernment Printing Office, 1964), volume XX, p. 489 (hereinafter — Warren Hear- ings, — ). (70) Dallas Cinema Association film (JFK document 005011) . (71) Courson interview. (72) Dallas Cinema Association film (JFK document 005011). (73) JFK Exhibits F-668. 669, 670, 671, and 681, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 626, 627. and 628 respectively. (74) Letter from Robert Groden to Chairman Stokes, V HSCA-JFK hear- ings, 703. (75) Testimony of H. B. McLain, Dec. 29, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 625 (hereinafter McLain testimony) . (76) Id. at 629. (77) Id. at 630. (78) Ibid. (79) Id. at 637. (80) Id. at 630. (81) Id. at 635. (82) Daily assignment sheet for Solo Motors (JFK document 014391), V HSCA-JFK hearings, 721. (83) Groden letter, p. 704. As detailed on page 702, the committee did not rely on this photographic enhancement because it was completed after the commit- tee's final vote on the findings. (84) See. e.g., JFK exhibit F-680 (paper submitted by Anthony Pellicano), V HSCA-JFK hearings, 6.52. (85) See, e.g., transcript of CBS television interview of H. B. McLain with Eric Enberg, Jan. 4. 1979 (JFK document 014387). (86) See, e.g., JFK exhibit F-680 (paper submitted by Anthony Pellicano), V HSCA-JFK hearings, 652. (87) Ibid. (88) Transcript of November 22, 1963, channel 2 police transmissions (JFK document 006996). (89) Interview of Gerald D. Henslee, Aug. 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK document 013886). (90) McLain testimony, p. 630. (91) Transcript of CBS television interview of H. B. McLain with Eric Enberg, Jan. 4, 1979 (JFK document 014387) . (92) Barger testimony, Dec. 29, 1978, pp. 650-651; BBN report, section 5.4, (93) Weiss and Aschkenasy testimony, p. 592. (94) McLain testimony, p. 640. (95) BBN report, section 6.1. (96) Id. at section 2.1. 604 (97) See section I A of the Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations : Findings and Recommendations. (98) Report of the Photographic Evidence Panel, VI Appendix to the HSCA- JFK hearings, paragraphs 64 to 80 (hereinafter photographic evidence report). {99) BBN report, section 4.1. (100) Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to J. Lee Rankin, Feb. 3, 1964 (JFK Docu- ment 014514). (101) For a detailed memorandum on the process of synchronizing the tape to the film, see the memorandum of G. Robert Blakey, Feb. 22, 1979, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 723. (102) Report of the Forensic Pathology Panel, in "Report on the Medical Evi- dence and Related Issues Pertaining to the Report on the Assassination of Presi- dent John F. Kennedy," VII Appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, pars. 461 to 494 (hereinafter forensic pathology report). (103) JFK exhibit F-331, section 5 (neutron activation analysis report of Dr. Vincent P. Guinn) , I HSCA-JFK hearings, 506. (104) Ibid. (105) See section I A 3 of the Report of the Select Committee on Assas.sina- tions : Findings and Recommendations. (106) Dr. Baden acknowledged this extraordinarily remote possibility in dis- cussions with the staff (memorandum of Donald A. Purdy. Dec. 20, 197S. House Select Committee on Assassination.s (JFK Document 014996) ). He was prepared to respond to questions concerning this theoretical possibility during the Dec. 29, 1978. hearing, but because of the time spent on the acoustical evidence during that hearing. Dr. Baden's scheduled appearance before the committee was canceled. His opinion, and that of the forensic pathology panel, remains that there is no medical evidence that the President was struck by a bullet fired from the grassy knoll. (107) See Blakey memorandum, Feb. 22, 1979, p. 723. (108) Photographic evidence report, pars. 182-185. (109) Testimony of Governor John B. Connally, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 42. (110) Photographic evidence report, par. 68. (111) Id. at 70. (112) Id. at 71. (113) Id. at 72. 74-80. (114) Forensic pathology report; par, 487. (115) Photographic evidence report, par. 153. (116) Id. at 164-166. (117) Warren Report, p. 117. (118) missionTestimony of Robert ofA.President on the Assassination Frazier, John hearings before the(Washington. F. Kennedy President's D.C. Com- : U.S. Government Printing OflBce, 1964), vol. Ill, pp. 403-412 (hereinafter Frazier testimony, — Warren hearings. — ) . (119) Testimony of Monty C. Lutz. Sept. 8, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 484. (120) See memorandum of Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey, printed as an addendum to "A Study of the Acou.stics Evidence Related to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," VIII Appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings. (121) See section I A 3 of the "Report of the Select Committee on Assassina- tions Findings : and Recommendations." (123) Photographic evidence report, pars. 90, 98. (124) Te<;timony of Dr. William Hartmann, Sept. 11, 1978, II HSCA-JFK hearings, 137. (125) Photographic evidence report, pars. 10-38, 42. (126) Id. at 40. (127) Id. at 41. (128) Id. at 292. (129) Id. at 303-04. (ISO) Ibid. (131) Id. at 305. (132) Id. at 306. (133) Ibid.; and outside contact report with Bob Hunt, .Ian. 15, 1979, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 0147.36). (134) Photographic evidence report, pars. 321-322. (135) Id. at 324-327. (136) Id. at 328-329. 605 (157) Id. at 328-331. (158) Ibid. (139) Id. at 331. (140) Id. at 297-301. (141) Id. at 302. (142) Id. at 307-309. (14S) Id. at 315-317. (144) Id. at 251. (145) Id. at 282. (146) Id. at 283-285. (147) Id. at 286. (148) Id. at 287. (149) Id. at 288. (150) Ibid. (151) Id. at 263. (152) Id. at 265-266. (153) "Analysis of Earwitness Reports Relating to tlie Assassination of Pres- ident Kennedy," prepared by D. M. Green, consultant to Bolt Beranek and New- man Inc., VIII appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings (hereinafter BBN-Green report ) . (154) Ibid. (155) This possibility was also recognized by the Warren Commission in its discussion of the number of shots that were fired (Warren Report, p. 111). The testimony of Emmett Joseph Hudson may illustrate the diflSculty of finding facts based on the recollections of witnesses, especially those who have had the oppor- tunity to read about the events in newspapers or who may have been led to change their testimony by the manner in which they were questioned at the time of the assassination. Hudson was located in front of the stockade fence on the grassy knoll, in a position where he may have been expected to have heard distinctly any shot fired from the knoll. (See JFK exhibit F-129 I. HSCA-JFK hearings, 109). Hudson gave a sworn statement to the Sheriff's Department of Dallas County on November 22, 1963. He said he was in Dealey Plaza, sitting on the steps in front of the stockade fence, facing Elm Street, during the time of the assassina- tion. He heard three shots. They came "from behind and above me." (Emphasis added.) (XIX Warren hearings, 481.) Hudson's testimony would seem to mean "from behind the fence," and his statement has been so understood (J. Thompson, "Six Seconds in Dallas" (Berkeley, Calif.: Berkeley Medallion Books, 1976), appendix A, witness No. 75. Hudson gave a deposition to the Warren Commission on July 22, 1964 ; he told counsel the third "shot was coming from above and kind of behind." (VII Warren hearings, 560.) Counsel then asked: "You heard it come from sort of behind the motorcade and then above?" (Emphasis added.) Hudson answered, "Yes." (Ibid.) Later in the deposition, counsel returned to the question: "But you are quite sure in your own mind that the shots came from the rear of the President's car and above it: is that correct?" (Emphasis added.) Id. at 564. Hudson answered, "Yes." (Ibid.) Counsel then continued. "Did you have any idea that they might have come from the Texas School Book Depository build- ing?" (Ibid.) Hud.son answered, "Well, it sounded like it was high, you know, from above and kind of behind like — in other words, to the left." ( Ibid. ) Counsel asked, "And that would have fit in with the Texas School Book Depository, wouldn't it?" (Ibid.) Hudson replied, "Yes." (Ibid.) Hudson also indicated that he saw the second shot hit the Pre.sident in the hend "a little bit behind the ear and a little bit above the ear" on the right side. ( Id. at 560. ) According to his testimony, he was lying on the ground facing Elm when the third shot was fired. (Ibid.) He also felt that the first shot was fired shortly after the motorcade had turned off Houston onto Elm at about the first lightpost on Elm on the right (id. at 5.59) ; the second— that hit the President in the head — came a little later, near the second lightpost on Elm on the right (id. at 560) : and the third occurred at about the steps leading down to Elm Street that he was standing on (id. at 561). According to Hudson, the third shot must have hit the President in the neck. (Ibid. ) If the scientific evidence summarized in the text is correct. Hudson must be wrong in some aspects of his testimony. According to the .scientific evidence, the first shot missed, and it was fired shortly after the President's limousine turned onto Elm. The scientific evidence indicated, moreover, that the second shot hit 606 the President in the neck, not the head, when the limousine was between the first and second lightposts ; it also indicated the President was hit in the head not by the second, but by the fourth shot, at the point when the limousine was beween the third and fourth lightposts, just about where the steps are. According to JFK Exhibit F-129 (I HSCA-.TFK hearings, 109), a photograph taken around the moment of the tbird and fourth shots, Hudson is seen still standing, not lying down as he remembers. In summary, Hudson was wrong about which shots hit the President in the head and neck, the location of the limousine at each shot and his own body posi- tion at the time of the shooting. It may well be that Hudson's understanding of what happened was Influenced by the newspapers after he had given his November statement to the Sheriff's Department. At two points during the July deposition, he indicated in answers that he had read newspapers that said that the President had been hit twice (id. at 561) and that had carried Hudson's pictures in them (id. at 563). He may also have been led to alter his first statement by the way in which he was questioned by counsel, who gave him an interpretation of his prior statement to the Sheriff's Department and of his own testimony in the deposition that led him to testify in a fashion consistent with what was then generally well known : Oswald had fired three shots from the depository. When Hudson was contacted by the committee, he told his story in words virtually identical to those he had used in his deposition 15 years ago. He added, "Everything I told the Warren Commission was correct." (Outside contact report \vith Enimett Joseph Hudson. Feb. 3, 1979, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 014458).) Hudson, now 71, has heard for years about the controversy about a shot from the knoll ; he does not think that one was fired from behind the stockade fence. (Ibid.) Hudson himself also recognized the other key factor that affects most of the testimony of the witnesses in Dealey Plaza — he noted that "it was just such an exciting time. . . .", Warren hearings, VII, p. 465. In dissent. Congressman Edgar questions the testimony, quoted in the text, of S. M. Holland. He correctly noted that there are, as in the case of Hudson, differ- ences between what he told the Dallas County Sheriff's Department and the Warren Commission. He also notes that Holland said he saw a machinegun, using it as a basis to call into question Holland's credibility. In fact. Special Agent Ed Hickey had an AR-15. an automatic rifle, in the followup car, and he did have it raised ; Holland's testimony about the machinegun, therefore, can be corroborated (XVII Warren hearings. 735). A photograph of the gun is pub- lished in "The Torch Is Passed" (A.P. 1964) , p. 17. Congre-ssman Edgar also noted that Holland reported seeing a "puff of smoke" and questioned whether smoke could be .seen when "smokeless" powder is used, as it is in modern firearms. As it was explained by the firearms panel, modem weapons do in fact emit smoke when fired (I HSCA-JFK hearings, 485 (Sept. 8, 1978)). (156) Warren report, p. 110. (157) Ibid. (158) Id. at 111. (159) Id. at 19. (160) JFK Exhibit 644 (V HSCA-JFK hearings, 504). The committee did not attempt to interview Hargis because of his medical history. (161) Ibid. (162) JFK Exhibit 645 (V HSCA-JFK hearings. 508). Newman confirmed to the committee the accuracy of his statement to the Warren Commission. Outside contact report, William Eugene Newman, February 10, 1979, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (JFK document 014572). (163) JFK Exhibit 646 (V HSCA-JFK hearings, 510). (16>, ) JFK Exhil)it 647 (V HSCA-JFK bearings. 519) . Landis confirmed to the committee the arciiracy of his st^atement to the Wnrren Commission. Outside con- tact report with Paul Landis, February 17, 1979, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK document 014571). (165) Ibid. (166) JFK Exhibit 648 (V HSCA-JFK hearing.*;. 527) . See reference 155, supra. (167) Ibid. (168) Ibid. (169) BBN-Green report, section 4. 607 (170) Id. at section 5. (171) Ibid. (172) Id. at appendix A. (173) Id. at section 3.1. (17 J,) Ibid. (175) "Conspiracy Witnesses in Dealey Plaza," staff report, XII appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings. (176) Photographic evidence report, para. 539-560. (177) Id. at 612-613. (178) Id. at 617-618. (179) Id. at 673, 721-731. (180) Ibid. (181) During 1963-1964, Crisman was employed at Rainier Union High School in Rainier, Oreg. The committee obtained the affidavits of three teachers at that school, Marva Harris, Norma Chase, and Stanley Peerloom, that Orisman wa.« teaching school in Rainier on November 22, 1963 (JFK document 013925). (182) Deposition of E. Howard Hunt, Nov. 3, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 5-10 (JFK document 014506). (183) See Section I A 3 of the Report of the Select Committee on Assassina- tions :Findings and Recommendations ; photographic evidence report, para. 188- 197, 347-511. (18i) M. Eddowes, "The Oswald File" (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc.. 1977). (185) Photographic evidence report, para. 732-748, (186) Id. at 749-755. (187) Id. at 756-757. (188) Id. at 757. (189) Ibid. (190) Report on the subject of the examination of the handwriting and finger- print evidence in the investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, VIII appendix to the hearings. References : Section C (1 ) United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 610 (1910) . (2) See Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of Presi- dent Kennedy (Washington. D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), chapter VI. (3) Id. at 245-252. (4) Id. at 376. (5) Id. at 374. (6) Id. at 780. (7) Id. at 785. (8) Id. at 333-373. (9) Id. at 370-371. References : Section C 1 (1) See generally Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 655-658 (hereinafter Warren Report). (2) Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "Soviet-American Relations During the Kennedy Years," June 1. 1978, prepared for the House Se- lect Committee on Assassinations, pp. 2-6 (JFK Document 008899). (3) Id. at 9. (4) Ibid. (5) Warren Report, pp. 21-22, 254-280. (6) Id. at 255, 374 ; Commission exhibit (CE) 3138. (7) Id. at 254-280, and related Commission exhibits; see also testimony of Marina Oswald Porter, Sept. 13, 1978-Sept. 14, 1978, Hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. II, pp. 206-319 (hereinafter Porter testimony, — HSCA-JFK hearings,—) ; see also "Deposition of Marina Oswald Porter," staff report, appendix to the hear- ings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Represent- atives, 95th Congress. 2d session (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing 608 OflBce, 1970), vol. XII (hereinafter Porter deposition, — appendix to the HSCA- JFK hearings, — ). (8) Warren report, OE985, 986. (9) See generally "Oswald in the Soviet Union: An Investigation of Yuri Nosenko," staff report, XII appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings (hereinafter Nosenko report). (10) Ibid. (11) Ibid. (12) CE 24, 180-198, 294-295, 297-322. (13) CE 985, 986. (14) CE 984. (15) CE 985, 986. (16) Ibid. (The suspicious nature of the consistently illegible signatures was discussed in a memorandum of Warren Commission Counsel W. David Slawson to J. Lee Rankin, June 4, 1964.) (17) Nosenko report, sees. 3, 4. (18) Ibid. (19) Unpublished classified staff summary of review of CIA files on U.S. de- fectors toRussia. (20) Ibid. (21) Ibid. (22) Ibid. (25) Staff report on Yuri Nosenko, Sept. 15, 1978, II HSCA-JFK hearings, 443. (24) Id. at 449. (25) Ibid. (26) Ibid. (27) Ibid. (28) Id. at 460-^64. (29) Id. at 464. (30) See generally Nosenko report, sees. 3, 4, 7. (31) Undated memorandum of W. David Slawson, Warren Commission coun- sel 1964 ( ) , p. 84ff. ; executive session testimony of W. David Slawson. Nov. 15, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations Exhibit 22 (JFK Document 014668). (32) Deposition of J. Lee Rankin, Aug. 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 67-68, attachment G, para. 284, in "The Warren Commission," staff report, XI app. to the HSCA-JFK hearings. (33) See generally Nosenko report. (34) Id. at sec. 1. (35) Ibid. (36) Ibid. (37) Testimony of John Hart, Sept. 15, 1978, II HSCA-JFK hearings. 487: see also JFK exhibit F^27, II HSCA-JFK hearings, 536; Nosenko report, sec. 2. (38) Id., No.senko report at sec. 3. (39) Compare Nosenko report, sec. 3, with sees. 4, 7. (40) See generally Nosenko report, sec. 1. (41) Ibid. (42) Ibid. ; Porter testimony, p. 206. (43) JFK document 014873. References : Section C 2 (1) "Report on the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy" (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing OflSce, 1964), pp. 658- 659 (hereinafter Warren report). (2) Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "United States- Cuban Relations, 1959-64: An Analysis," May 1978 (JFK Document 010420), pp. 7-8 (hereinafter "United States-Cuban Relations, 1959-1964"). (3) Id. at 8. (4) Id. at 9-16. (5) Id. at 9. (6) Ibid. (7) Ibid. (8) Id. at 10. (9) Id. at 12. 609 (10) Ibid. (11) Id. at 17-25. (12) Id. at 20. (13) Id. at 33. (14) Ibid. (15) Ibid. (16) Id. at 35. (17) Id. at 36. (18) Id. at 39. (19) Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "A Selected Chro- mentnology013100). on Cuba and Castro, March 10, 1952-October 22, 1962," p. 29 (JFK Docu- (20) Id. at 30. (21) "United States-Cuban Relations, 1959-64," pp. 37ff. (22) Id. at 45, inter alia. (23) Id. at 48-49. (24) Id. at 52. (25) Id. at 53. (26) Id. at 54. (27) Ibid. (28) Ibid. (29) Ibid. (30) Id. at 72-74. (81) Id. at 70-71. (32) Id. at 71-72. (33) Id. at 72. (34) "Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States : John F. Kennedy" (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 872-877 (JFK document 013574). (35) Warren report, pp. 406-414. (36) Id. at 299-311. (37) Id. at 658-659, 374. (38) See, e.g., Washington Post article of Mar. 7, 1967 by Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson, "Castro Counter Plot," and Miami Herald article of Mar. 3, 1967 by Jack Anderson, "Did Plot by CIA to Kill Castro Backfire on United States?" (39) See "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, An Interim Report," Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Oi)erations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 1st sess., Nov. 20, 1975 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976) (S. Rept. 94-465) (hereinafter Senate interim report) ; and "The Investigation of the Assassination of Presi- dent John F. Kennedy : Performance of the Intelligence Agencies," book V, final report. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 23, 1976 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976) (S. Rept. 94-755) (hereinafter book V). (40) Senate interim report, pp. 71-180. (41) Id. at 86-90. (42) Id. at 74-85. (43) Book V, p. 68. (44) Ibid. (45) Ibid. (46) Ibid. (47) Ibid. (48) Id. at 2. (49) Ibid. (50) Comments on book V, SSC final report, CIA classified document, Au- gust 30, 1977, tab C (hereinafter T.F.R. ) . (51) Ibid. (52) "The Evolution and Implications of the CIA Sponsored Assassination Conspiracies Against Fidel Castro," staff report, app. to the hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. X. para. 54 (hereinafter CIA-Castro staff report, — appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, — ) . (53 ) 01 A-Castro staff report, para. 46. (54) Book V, pp. 6-7. 610 (55) T.F.R.,p. 10. (56) Warren report, pp. 308-309. (57) Book V, pp. 6-7. (58) T.F.R., tabB. (59) CIA-Castro staff report, par. 35ff. (60) See, e.g., T.F.R., tabs B, C, D. (61) T.F.R., tab B, p. 5. (62) T.F.R., tabD. (6S) T.F.R.,p. 10. (64) T.F.R., tab B, p. 8. (65) Ibid. (66) Ibid. (67) Ibid. (68) OIA-Castro staff report, pars. 58-61. (69) Id. at 63. (70) Id. at 54. (71) T.F.R., tab D, p. 4. (72) Ibid. See also 1967 CIA Inspector General's Report, p. 84 (hereinafter IGR). (73) Ibid. (74) T.F.R., tab D, p. 5. (75) IGR, pp. 89-95. (76) Id. at 85. (77) Id. at 86-87. (78) T.F.R., tab D, p. 11. (79) Ibid. (80) Id. at tab D, p. 12. (81) Id. at 13. (82) Id. at 16. (83) IGR, p. 93a. (84) CIA-Castro staff report, par. 64. (85) Id. at 65. (86) Id. at 64. (87) Transcript of conversations and interviews, trip to Cuba, Aug. 25, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (.JFK Document 012208). (88) Ibid. See also interview with President Fidel Castro, reprinted at III HSCA-JFK hearings. 239-240. (89) BookV, p. 68. (90) JFK Document 012208, ref. 87 supra. (91) CIA-Castro staff report, pars. 160-172. See also, generally, pars. SO-201. (92) Ibid. (93) Id. at 157-159. (94) Ibid. (95) Id. at 157-163. (96) Ibid. See also pars. 17-22, 30. See also Book V for details on the anti- Castro activities of Maheu. Roselli. Giancana, etc. (97) Id., CIA-Castro staff report, 17-19. (98) Ibid. (99) Id. at 20. (100) Id. at 21-22, 30. (101) Id. at 176-177. (102) Id. at 23-26, 176-177. (103) See, e.g., testimony of Ralph Salerno, Sept. 28, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hear- ings, 468. (104) See section C 4 and pp. xx of this section, C 2, supra, for details. (105) See .section C 3 for details. (106) Ibid. (107) The method of operation was to contact syndicate figures who had con- tacts in Cuba. See IGR, pp. 16-19. (108) T.F.R., tab C, p. 2. (109) Id. at 5. (110) Senate interim report, p. 104, fn. 1. (111) CIA classifipd file review: Robert Maheu, Office of Security file. (112) T.F.R., tab C, p. 20. (113) Book V, pp. 60-61. (114) Ibid. (115) Ibid. 611 (116) Unpublished staff report on the Nov. 22, 1963, Cubana flight. House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 4-5 (JFK Document 015047). (117) Ibid. (118) Ibid. (119) Book V, pp. 61ff. (120) Id. at 61-62. (121) Id. at 62. (122) Classified staff summary : The Cuban-American, House Select Commit- tee on Assassinations (Ed Lopez), (JFK Document 014858) (hereinafter Cuban-American) . (123) Id. at 2. (124) Ibid. (125) Ibid. (126) Id. at 3. (127) Id. at 4. (128) Ibid. (129) Id. at 5. (ISO) Id. at 4. (131) T.F.R., tab B, p. 16. (132) Cuban-American, p. 5. (133) Id. at 6. (m) Ibid. (135) Ibid. (186) Id. at 6-14 ; see also JFK Document 014519. (137) Cuban- American, p. 7. (138) Id. at 7-8. (139) Id. at 8. (UO) Id. at 9. (UD Ibid. (142) Id. at 10. (US) Ibid. (lU) Id. at 10-11. (145) T.F.R., tab B, pp. 16-17. (146) Deposition of Antulio Ramirez Ortiz, Nov. 15, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, pp. 14-16 (JFK Document 013095). (147) Id. at 16-29. (148) Antulio Ramirez Ortiz, Castro's Red Hot Hell (unpublished) (JFK Document 005134). (149) Executive session testimony, Antulio Ramirez Ortiz, Apr. 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 014674). (150) Id. at 26-27. (151) See JFK Documents 006940, 006975, 007000, 007077, 007078, 007079, 007080, 007132, 007136. 007278, and 007476. (152) JFK exhibit F-428 ; III HSCA-JFK hearings, 282. (153) Ibid. (154) JFK exhibits F-429B and F-429C, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 196, 197. (155) Id. at 274. (156) See, e.g., classified staff summary of Silvia Duran's statements (JFK Document 014862), pp. 9, 12; testimony of Eusebio Azcue, Sept. 18, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 133 ; and statements of Silvia Duran, JFK exhibit F-440a, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 6ff. (157) Comments by Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey, Sept. 19, 1978, III HSCA- JFK hearings, 283. (158) Ibid. (159) "Analysis of the Support Provided to the Warren Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency." staff report, XI appendix to the HSCA-JFK hear- ings (hereinafter CIA performance) . (160) JFK exhibit F-518, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 181. (161 ) Staff summary of Aug. 25, 1978 trip to Cuba, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 5 (JFK Document 014859). (162) Interrogatories of Anna Luisa Calderon Carralero, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (JFK Document 014421). (163) See, generally. JFK Documents 014974 and 014975. (164) See JFK exhibit F-403, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 300. (165) Unpublished staff report, Mexico City, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 52-53 (JFK Document 014856). 43-112 0-79-1+0 612 (166) Interview of Horacio Duran Navarro. June 5, 1978. Ilouge Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (JFK Document 011683) ; interview of Lydia Duran, June 5, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK document 011681) ; interview of Ruben Duran Navarro, June 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 011680) ; interview of Betty Serratos. June 6. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 014413), inter alia. A summary of the investigative efforts relating to Oswald's trip to Mexico is contained in the classified staff report of Dan Hardway and Ed Lopez (JFK Documents 014974 and 014975) . (167) JFK exhibit F-403. Ill HSCA-JFK hearings, 300. (168) See JFK exhibit 440a, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 69 and Azcue testimony, 136. (169) Id. at 24-25, 112. (170) Azcue testimony, pp. 135-139. (171) Id. at 95-96. (172) Id. at 59. (173) Unpublished staff report on Elena Garro de Paz, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 47 (JFK Document 014856) . (174) Id. at 49-52. (175) JFK Document 014975, supra, p. 420; Duran statements. III HSCA-JFK hearings, 100. (176) Id., JFK Document 014975, p. 421; Duran statements, III HSCA-JFK hearings, at 106-107. (^77) Ibid., JFK Document 014975, p. 421 ; staff summary of Mexico City trip, Aug. 7, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 3, 7, 8. 10 (JFK Document 012210). (178) The details of the committee's investigation of Oswald's trip to Mexico City are contained in a 300-page classified staff report, "Lee Harvey Oswald * * * and Mexico City," prepared by HSCA staff Dan Hardway and Ed Lopez (JFK Documents 014974 and 014975). (179) JFK exhibit F-414, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 399. (180) JFK exhibit F-^19, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 361; memoranda, FBI Miami field ofl^ce, CD 770. (181) Testimony of Secret Service Inspector Thomas J. Kelley, Sept. 19, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 343. (182) JFK exhibits F^15, 416, 417 and 418, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 401, 425, 433 and 436 respectively. (183) Narration of Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 319. (184) Azcue testimony, pp. 126-178. (185) JFK exhibit F-429C, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 212-213. (186) Id. at 214-215. (187) Id. at 216-217. (188) Id. at221ff. (189) Id. at 222. (190) See JFK exhibit F-6S5, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 179, and "TTnited States-Cuban Relations, 1959-1964." p. 72. (191) JFK exhibit F-429C, supra, pp. 22^-224. (192) Id. at 224-225. (193) See sec. D 5 of this report. (194) See sec. D3 of this report. (^9.5) "Anti-Castro Organizations and Activists and Lee Harvey Oswald In New Orleans," staff report, X appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, para. 109 (hereinafter anti-Castro organizations). (196) Id. at 110. (197) Tape of interview with the defector, Dec. 13, 1978, House Select Commit- tee on Afflassinations (JFK Document 015049). (198) T.F.R., Tab B, p. 9. (199) See executive session testimony of Richard M. Helms, Aug. 9, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, and public session testimony of Richard M. Helms, September 22, 1978, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, for further accounts of Helms' relationship with the Warren Commission. See generally CIA perform- ance, par. 47-68; as explained in .sec. D. while Richard Helms and other CIA oflScials may not have overtly diverted the investigation, this does not mean they fully acknowlerlged all details to the Warren Commission that might have been pertinent to the investigation. (200) See generally ref. 191 in sec. C 3 anti-Castro organizations, pars. 205-388. 613 References : Section C 3 (i) "Anti-Castro Activists and Organizations and Lee Harvey Oswald in New Orleans," staff report, appendix to the liearings before tlie Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95tli Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. X, par. 23 (hereinafter Anti- Catsro Cuban report, — appendix to the hearings, — ) . (2) Id. at &4-60, 460-^63. (3) Id. at 12. U) Id. at 13. (5) Id. at 15. (6) Id.atlTfE. (7) Ibid. (8) Id. at 18ff. (9) Id. at 21. (10) Id. at 23. (11) See generally Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "United States-Cuban Relations, 1959-64: Analysis," May 1978, pp. 17ff. (JFK Document 010426) (hereinafter United States-Cuban Relations). (12) Id. at 20. (13) Anti-Castro Cuban report, pars. 25-26. (i4) Id. at 27. (15) Ibid. (i6) Id. at 28. (17) Id. at 29. (18) Id. at 28. (19) Ibid. (20) Ibid. (21) Id. at 30. (22) E. Howard Hunt, "Give Us This Day" (New York: Popular Library), pp. 22()-221 (hereinafter Hunt, "Give Us This Day"; see generally Haynes Johnson, "The Bay of Pigs," (New York: W. W. Norton, 1964) ; and Miami Herald, Dec. 30, 1962. (23) Ibid. (24) Ibid. (25) Hunt, "Give Us This Day," p. 221. (26) Anti-Castro Cuban report, par. 31. (27) Id. at 33-42. (28) Ibid. (29) Ibid. (30) Ibid. (31) Id. at 43. (32) Id. at 44-45. (S3) "United States-Cuban Relations," pp. 54-55. (34) Id. at 46-47. (35) Ibid. (36) Id. at 48. (37) Tape recording of a meeting of anti-Castro Cubans in Dallas, Tex., Oct. 1, 1963 (JFK Document 010210). (38) Ibid. (39) Ibid.; upon listening to the tape, it is apparent that the statements by Castellanos — "we're waiting for Kennedy" and "we're going to see him * * * to give him the works" — which comes just after Castellanos relates an unsuccess- ful effort to have a parade or march in downtown Dallas to promote the cause of the anti-Castro Cubans, is only a proposal to demonstrate against President Kennedy during his trip to Dallas. After reviewing the entire tape, the staff concluded that Castellanos' statements were not meant as a threat of physical vio- lence against the President. (40) Anti-Castro Cuban report, pars. 59ff. (41) Ibid. (42) Ibid. (43) U.S. Secret Service, blank letterhead memorandum, Nov. 27, 1963, Secret Service 2-1-611.0, p. 1 (JFK Document 007601). (44) Id. at 3. (45) Ibid. (^6) Ibid. 614 (47) U.S. Secret Service report, Dec. 3, 1963, file CO-2-34,000, Chicago field office, p. 1 ; U.S. Secret Service report, Dec. 19. 1963. file No. CO-2-34,104. pp. 1-6; U.S. Secret Service report, Dec. 13, 1963, file No. CO-2-34,030. pp. 1-3. (.}8) U.S. Secret Service report. Nov. 27. 1963, file 2-1-611.0, Chicago field oflSce, p. 2 (JFK Document 007601 ) . (49) U.S. Secret Service report, Dec. 3, 1963, Chicago field office, file CO-2- 34,030. p. 4. (50) The Secret Service continued the investigation despite the FBI's opinion that the group was not involved in illegal activity. U.S. Secret Service report, Dec. 3, 1963, Chicago field office, file CO-2-34,030. (51) Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington. D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. ix (here- inafter Warren report) . (52) Deposition of James J. Rowley, Aug. 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 23, 38, 39 (JFK Document 014240). (53) Id. at 26-29, 38. 39. (54) U.S. Secret Service report, Dec. 19, 1963. file CO-2-34,104, p. 7. (55) Letter to James B. Rhoads, Archivist of the United States, from J. Edgar Hoover, FBI, Dec. 28, 1970, Bureau 62-109060-6979. This letter states: "A review of this material indicates it pertained to a matter investigated by the U.S. Secret Service. No investigation was conducted by the FBI with respect to the allegations concerning Echevarria." (56) Anti-Castro Cuban report, pars. 347-348. (57) See generally material on the Junta del Gobierno de Cuba en el Exilio in the anti-Castro Cuban report, pars. 342-388. (58) Ibid. (59) Id. at 351, 365. (60 ) See generally Warren report, pp. 321-325. ( 61 ) Anti-Castro Cuban report, pars. 129ff. (62) Id. at 114. (6S) Id. at 131. (64) Id. at 181, 131. (65) Id. at 114. (66) Id. at 115. (67) Id. at 142. (68) Ibid. (69) Ibid. (70) Id. at 146. (77) Id. at 152. (72) Id. at 129. (75) Id. at 194, 202, 203. (74) Id. at 171 ff. (75) Id. at 172-173. (76) Ibid. (77) Id. at 181-183. (78) Id. at 184. (79) Anti-Castro Cuban report, pars. 173-192. (80) Id. at 177, 186-192. (81) Id. at 197. (82) Ibid. (85) Ibid. (84) Id. at 186-190. (85) Id. at 195. (86) Id. at 196. (87) Id. at 198. (88) Id. at 200-201. (89) Ibid. (90) Ibid. (91) Id. at 64. (92) Id. at 94ff. (95) Id. at 95-96. (94) Id. at 64-65. (95) Ibid. (96) Ibid. (97) Ibid. 615 (98) Id. at 64. (99) Ibid. (100) Ibid. (101) Id. at 65. (102) Id. at 93. (103) Id. at 65. (104) Ibid. (105) Id. at 66. (106) Id. at 67-68. (107) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to J. Edgar Hoover, July 24, 1964 (JFK Docu- ment 002442). Rankin asked Hoover to have the Bureau interview Silvia Odio's sister, Annie Laurie Odio, to investigate this matter further. (108) Id. at 2. (109) Memorandum from J. Wesley Liebeler to Howard P. Willens, Warren Commission, Sept. 14, 1964, pp. 4-6 (JFK Document 002539) (hereinafter Liebeler- Willens memorandum) . (110) Warren report, p. 323. (111) Liebeler- Willens memorandum, p. 5. (112) Ibid. (113) Liebeler-Willens memorandum, pp. 4-6. (114) Id. at 6. (115) Hearings before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing OflSce, 1964), volume 26, p. 595 (hereinafter Warren hearings). (116) Ibid. (117) Ibid. (118) Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to J. Lee Rankin, Nov. 9, 1964, Warren Commission exhibit (CE) 1553 (JFK Document 002448). (119) The report was completed and sent to President Johnson on Sept. 24, 1964 (Warren report, p. v) . (120) Anti-Castro Cuban report, par. 68. (121 ) Id. at 71c. (122) Ibid. (123) Ibid. (124) Ibid. (125) Id. at 68. (126) Id.at85ff. (127) Id. at85a£e. (128) Id. at 103. (129) Memorandum to W. David Slawson from Burt W. Griffin, Apr. 16, 1964 (JFK Document 002969). Dr. Einspruch stated that "she is given to exaggeration but that all the basic facts which she provides are true" and that "he had great faith in Miss Odio's story of having met Lee Harvey Oswald." (130) Memorandum to file from Gaeton Fonzi,, June 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 009368). (131) Id. at 1-2. (132) An ti -Castro Cuban report, pars. 74, 75. (133) Summary of the testimony of Leon Brown, May 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 008343). Leon Brown appeared before the committee on Nov. 16, 1977. (134) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 107-109. (135) Id. at 109. (136) Id. at 110. (137) Ibid. (138) Ibid. (139) Warren Report, p. 730. (140) This evidence consists of statements to the committee and the Warren Commission by Silvia Odio regarding when Oswald allegedly visited her and other statements and evidence establishing Oswald's location at certain times (see Warren Report, pp. 323-24, for more details). While the committee agreed that Oswald would have had to have traveled by private transportation if he had visited Odio on the 25th, 26th or 27th, the committee did not agree with the Warren Commission conclusion that the evidence was "persuasive" that Oswald did not visit Odio at the time she said he did. (141 ) Warren Report, p. 377. 616 (142) Id. at 402-404, 713-725. (US) Id. at 725. dU) Id. at 726. {145) Id. at 728-729. (U6) Id. at 406-412, 728, 729. (14T) Id. at 407. (148) Ibid. (149) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 220. (150) Id. at 218. (151) Ibid. (152) Warren Report, p. 408. (153) Id. at 726. (154) Id. at 727. (155) Id. at 728. (156) X Warren hearings, 34-35. (157) Id. at 37. - (158) Warren Report, p. 728. (159) Testimony of Carlos Bringuier, April 7, 1964, X Warren hearings, 34-36 ; deposition of Carlos Bringuier, May 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assas- sinations, p.61 (JFK Document 009084) (hereinafter Bringuier deposition). (160) Ibid. (161 ) Warren Report, p. 729 ; Bringuier deposition, pp. 61-62. (162) X Warren hearings, 37. (163) Ibid. (164) Warren Report, pp. 728-729. (165) Ibid. (166) Id. at 729. (167) Ibid. (168) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 226-230. (169) Ibid. (170) Ibid. (171) Ibid. (172) Warren Report, p. 729. (173) Id. at 39-42. (174) Ibid. (175) Ibid. (176) Id. at 729. (177) Ibid. (178) X Warren hearings, 44. (179) Warren Report, p. 730. (180) CIA chronology on Lee Harvey Oswald, p. 126 A. & B. (181) Id. at 120, 126a. (182) Deposition of Reeves Morgan, Apr. 19, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 008501) (hereinafter Morgan deposition). (183) Id. at 10-12. (184) Outside contact report with Frances Fruge, Dec. 19, 1978 (JFK Docu- ment 015044). (185) Bernard Fensterwald. "Coincidence or Conspiracy," 1st ed. (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 1977) , pp. 297-298, 451-457. (186) Memorandum from Patricia Orr re Clinton. Feb. 3, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 005003). (187) Deposition of Henry Earl Palmer, May 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 4. 5 (JFK Document 008499) (hereinafteer Palmer deposi- tion). (188) Deposition of Bobbie Dedon, May 19. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 4^5 (JFK Document 008498). (189) Palmer deposition, pp. 10-13. (190) Id. at 11 ; affidavit of Corrie Collins, Nov. 7, 1978, House Select Commit- tee on Assassinations, pp. 2-3 (JFK Document 013007). (191) Ibid.; testimony of .Tohn Manchester. Mar. 14. 1978. House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, p. 12 (JFK Document 008503) ; deposition of William Dunn, Apr. 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 12 (JFK Document 008497) (192) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 448. (193) Id. at 432. (194) Id. at 448. 617 (195) FBI interview of Jack Martin, No. 89-69, Nov. 25, 1963. (196) Ibid. (197) Ibid. (198) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 428-438. (iSS) Id. at429ff. (200) Ibid. (201) Id. at 439-447. (202) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 441; immunized testimony of Carlos Marcello, Jan. 11, 1978, pp. 58-63. (203) Id. at 430. (204) Id. at 431. (205) Ibid. (206) Testimony of Guy Banister, Aug. 5, 1963, FAA grievance hearing, p. 840 (JFK Document 014904) . (207) Id. at 218. ^ (208) Id. at 218fE. (209) Ibid. (210) Id. at 224. (211) Id. at 225. (212) Id. at226flE. (213) Id. at 431. (214) Ibid. (215) Id.at418flf. (216) Id. at 451; FBI document, interview of G. Wray Gill, Nov. 27, 1963, New Orleans field office. No. 89-69, p. 2. (217) FBI interview of G. Wray Gill, Nov. 27, 1963, New Orleans field office, file No. 89-69. (218) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 450£f. (219) FBI interview of David Ferrie, Bureau No. 89-69, Nov. 26, 1963, p. 7. (220) Ibid. (221) Id. at 8. (222) Ibid. (223) Ibid. (224) Ibid. (225) FBI interview of David Ferrie, Bureau No. 89-69, Nov. 27, 1963, pp. 1-2. (226) FBI interview of David Ferrie, Bureau No. 89-69, Nov. 26, 1963, p. 3. (227) Ibid. (228) Ibid. (229) Id. at 9. (230) U.S. Secret Service report. New Orleans, Dec. 13, 1963, file CO-2-34,030, p. 5 (JFK Document 003840). (231) Id.atl. (232) Id. at 5. (2SS) FBI document, Nov. 25, 1963, New Orleans office, No. 89-69, interview of Jack Martin. (234) Id. at 5. (255) Bringuier deposition ; deposition of Carlos Quiroga, May 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 009394) ; deposition of Luis Rabel, May 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Docu- ment 009080). (236) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 491. (237) Outside contact report with Delphine Roberts. Sept. 1, 1978 (JFK Document 011196). (238) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 503ff. (239) Id. at504ff. (240) Id. at 505. (241) Ibid. (242) Ibid. (243) Deposition of Adrian T. Alba, May 5, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 19 (JFK Document 009964) (hereinafter Alba deposition) ; see also interview of Jack Mancuso, Jan. 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (hereinafter Mancuso interview). Mancuso recognized a photograph of Oswald as someone who frequented his premises, Mancuso's Restaurant. 618 (2U) Alba deposition, p. 52; he remembered that Banister frequented Man- cuso's. Mancuso frequented interview ; he recognized Banister and Ferrie as persons that his restaurant. (245) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 488. (246) "The Persecution of Clay Shaw," Look magazine, Aug. 29, 1969. References : Section C 4 (i) Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington. D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 333 (hereinafter cited as Warren report). (2) Id. at 333-365. (S) Id. at 374. (4) Id. at 357. (5) Id. at 796-797, 370-371. (6) Id. at 359-365. (7) Ibid. (8) Id. at 369-371, 801-802. (9) Id. at 370-371, 801. (10) Id. at 370-371. (11) Id. at 790. (12) Ibid. (13) Id. at 801. (14) Id. at 373. (15) "Organized Crime: Staff and Consultant Reports," appendix to the hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Repre- sentatives. 95th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Print- ipg Office, 1979), vol. IX, para. 603-655 (hereinafter HSCA report on organized crime, — appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, — ). (16) Ibid. (17) Ibid. (18) Ibid. (19) Warren report, pp. 792-793. (20) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 620ff. (21) Ibid. (22) Ibid. (23) Warren report, pp. 792-793. (2.'i) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 620ff. (25) Id. at 1195-1270. (26) Id. at 1244-1268. (27) Ibid. (28) Ibid. (29) Id. at 1208-1209. (30) Id. at 1210 ff. (31) Ibid. (32) Ibid. (33) Id. at 1244-1268. (34) Id. at 829-830. (35) Id. at 1153-1176. (56) Id. at 656-793, 1153-1176. (37) Ibid. (38) Testimony of Lewis McWillie, Sept. 27, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 2ff. (39) Warren report, pp. 801-802. (40) Id. at vol. XXII, p. 859, Commission Exhibits 1442, 1443. (41 ) HSCA .staff report on organized crime, para. 665-704. (42) Id. at721ff. (43) Id. at 737-738. (44) Ibid. (45) Ibid. (46) See FBI memorandum Nov. 6, 1959 on Ruby as a PCI, JFK Document 003040; executive session testimony of Charles W. Flynn, Nov. 16, 1977 (JFK Document 014669). (//7) HSCA report on organized crime, pp. 737-738. (48) Testimony of Jack Ruby, June 7, 1964, V Warren hearings, 202 (herein- after Ruby testimony). 619 (49) See HSCA report on organized crime, para. 741. (50) Ibid. (51) Ibid. (52) Ibid. (53) Id. at 665-676. (54) Id. at 741ff. inter alia. (55) Ibid. ; Ruby testimony, pp. 205-208. (56) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 678. (57) Id. at 743ff, 1105-1152. (58) Ibid. (59 ) Warren report, p. 369. (60) Ibid. (61 ) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 1144^-1152. (62) Id. at 663. (63) "The Evolution and Implications of the CIA-Sponsored Assassination Conspiracies Against Fidel Castro," staff report, X appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings. (64) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 685-712, inter alia. (65) Id. at 685. (66) Outside contact report with Judge Burt W. Griffin, Sept, 27, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 015111) . (67) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 710-712, 724-725. (68) Ibid. (69) Ibid. (70) Ibid. (71) Ibid. (72) Ibid. (73) Id. at 695-696, 704. (7^) Ibid. (75) Ibid. (76) Ibid. (77) Id. at 724. (78) Ibid. (79) Testimony of Santos Trafficante, Sept. 28, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 371. (80) Id. at 370. (81) Testimony of Ralph Salerno, Sept. 28, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 430 (hereinafter Salerno testimony). (82) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 794-830; narration on Ruby tele- phone calls, Sept. 26, 1976. IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 49&-499. (83) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 1341fl and 794-830. (84 ) Id. at 887-907, 794-830. (85) Ibid. (86) Ibid. (87) Ibid.; see also pars. 1153-1176. (88) Ibid. (89) Ibid. ; see also pars. 1195-1270. (90) Id. at 829-830. (91) Id. at 831-864, 794-830; see also, Sept. 26, 1978, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 49^-499. (92) Id. at 833-834. (93) Ibid. (94) Id. at 844-857. (95) Id. at 863. (96) Ibid. (97) Id. at 1356. (98) Id. at 1358. (99) Id. atl359ff. (100) Ibid. (101) Id. at 822-823. (102) Id. at 827-828. (103) Ibid. (104) Id. at 818-821. (105) Ibid. (106) Ibid. 620 (107) Id. at 954-958. (108) Id. at 960-961. (109) Id. at 958. (110) Id. at 859. (111) Id. at 499-602. (112) Id. at 499-^13, 516-522. (US) Id.at523fif. (114) Id. at 525. (115) Id. at 523-602. (116) Ibid. (117) Id. at526fif. (118) Id. at 597. (119) Id. at 523ff. and 581-582. (120) Ibid. (121) Ibid. (122) Ibid. (123) Ibid. (124) Ibid. (125) Id. at 1367. (126) Id. at 599-600. (127) Id. at 547-566, 1367, inter alia. (128) Id. at 583-588. (129) Id. at 1367. (150) Id. at 547-566. (151) Ibid. (152) Id. at 558-559. (ISS) Ibid. (154) Ruby testimony, pp. 188-189. (155) Id. at 205. (156) Id. at 181-213. (157) Newsweek, March 27, 1967. (158) Ibid. (139) Warren report, pp. 336-337; XV Warren hearings, 71-96. (140) Ibid. (141) Interview of Burt W. Griffin, Nov. 20, 1978, House Select Committee on Assas-sination.s ; statement of Burt W. Griffin, prepared for Seth Kantor, "Who Was Jack Ruby?" (New York : Everest House, 1978), pp. 201-202. (142) "Report of the Polygraphy Panel on the Subje-^t of the Analysis of Jack Ruby's Polygraph Examination," VIII appendix to the HSCA-JFK hear- ings (hereinafter polygraphy panel report). (143) Warren Report, pp. 807-816. (144) Id-. XIV Warren hearings, 584, 598 (testimony of Special Agent Herndon). (145) Polygraphy panel report. (146) Ibid. (147) See, e.g.. JFK Document 00.5089, 007359. 010450, 004770, 007421. and 01.5112. (148) Ibid. (149) Ibid. (150) Ibid. (151) Ibid. (152) Interview of Earl Ruby, Jan. 2, 1979, House Select Committee on Assassinations. (153) Ibid. (154) Interview of Irwin S. Weiner, Jan. 2, 1979, House Select Committee on Assassinations. (155) Salerno testimony, p. 385. (156) ronsnlfanf's report on organized crime (hereinafter Salerno report), in "Organized Crime : Staff and Consultant Reports," para. 14-17. (157) Salerno testimony, p. 385. (158) Ibid. (159) Id. at 386. (160) Ibid. (161) See generally Salerno report, para. 30. (162) Salerno testimony, pp. 386-426, 437-453. 621 (163) Task Force Report: Organized Crime, 1967, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 1-3. (164) Salerno testimony, pp. 434r-i36. (165) Salerno report, para. 84. (166) Id. at 85-115, 154-176. (167) Salerno testimony, pp. 415-416. (168) Salerno report, para. 12. (169) Id. at 13. (170) Id. at 85, 154-176. (171) Id. at 248. (172) Id. at 186-201. (173) Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, 88th Congress, 1st sess., Sept. 25 to Oct. 9, 1963, p. 23. (17i) Salerno report, pars. 186-201. (175) Ibid. (176) Id. at 247. (i77) Id. at 186-201. (178) Ibid. (179) Ibid. (180 ) See generally Salerno testimony, pp. 463-464. (181) Ibid. (182) Ibid. (183) Ibid. (184) Salerno report, para. 203-224. (185) Ibid. (186) Ibid. (187) Ibid. (188) Id. at 232-245. (189) Ibid. (190) Id. at 225-231. (191) Ibid. (192) Id. at 246. (193) Ibid. (19i) Ibid. (195) Ibid. (196) Ibid. (197) Ibid. (198) Ibid. (199) Id. at 247. (200) Id. at 248. (201) Ibid. (202) Ibid. (203) Ibid. (204) Ibid. (205) Id. at 250; for a review of legal issues relating to electronic surveillance programs during that period, see hearings of the National Commission for the Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Sur- veillance, (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), Volume 2, pp. 1637-1646. (206) Salerno testimony, pp. 428-429. (207) Id. at 427. (208) Salerno report, pars. 76, 251fif. (209) Ibid. (210) Id. at 118-176. (211) Id. at 157 (JFK Exhibit F-622, Sept. 28, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 446). (212) Id. at 161 (JFK Exhibit F-629, Sept. 28, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 448). (213) Id. at 177. (214) Id. at 118-176. (215) JFK Exhibit 618. Sept. 28. 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 443. (216) Cf. Salerno testimony, p. 458. (217) Ibid. 622 (218) Id. at 448 (JFK Exhibit F-63D) . (219) Ibid. (220) Id. at 177-178. (221) See ref. 205, supra, pp. 1596-1636 for a detailed discussion of the nature of conversations recorded by electronic surveillance programs. The Commission provided a detailed overview of the structure, operation, and violent crimes of a well-known La Cosa Nostra family, as disclosed through an electronic surveil- lance program. (222) Salerno testimony, p. 454. (223) Ibid. (224 ) Salerno report, para. 166-176. (225) Ibid. (226) Id. at 170. (227) Id. at 169. (228) Id. at 170. (229) Id. at 174. (250) Id. at 178, 247, 294-295. (231) Id. at 251-285. (232) Salerno testimony, pp. 454-455. (233) Ibid. (234 ) Salerno report, para. 139-153. (235) Ibid. (256) Ibid. (257) Id. at 262. (258) Id. at 255-256, 266-269. (259) Ibid. ; see also. para. 135. (240) Salerno testimony, pp. 454-455. (241 ) Salerno report, para. 269. (242 ) Salerno testimony, 454-456. (2.^5) Ibid. (244 ) Id. at 31^3, 257-258. (245) Ibid. (246) Ibid. (247) Ibid. (248) Id. at 252-255. (249) Arthur M. Schlesinger, .Tr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1978), pp. 615-616; interview with former Labor Depart- ment oflBcial, July 4, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doc- ument 010423). (250) Ibid. (251) "The Warren Commission," staff report, XI Appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, para. 277, inter alia. (252) Id. at 283. (253) Ibid.; see also para. 284; interview with J. Lee Rankin. Nov. 20, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 013218). (254) Executive session testimony of Burt W. GriflSn, Nov. 17, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, XI Appendix to the HSCA-JFK Hearings, para. 283. (255) Deposition of Courtney Evans, Sept. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 014003). (256) Ibid. (2.57) Ibid. (258) Interview of Al Staffekl. Aug. 28, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 011096) deposition of Al Staffeld, Sept. 7, 1978 (JFK Document 01-^929) . (25.9) Salerno report, para. 173. (260) Ibid. (26i) Id. at 281-284. (262) Id. at 28S-294. inter alia. (265) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 300-427. (264) Id. at 428ff. 817-821. (265) Id. at 333-369. (266) Ibid. (267) Id. at 345; see also, immunized testimony of Carlos Marcello, .Ian. 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 37-38, 5.5-77. 623 (268) Id. at 431^97; see also, "Anti-Castro Activists and Organizations and Lee Harvey Oswald in New Orleans" ; staff report, X Appendix to the HSCA- JFK hearings (hereinafter anti-Castro Cuban report) . (269) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 431-443. (270) Ibid. (271) Id. at 442. (272) Id. at 491-497. (273) Id. at 431-440 ; 817-821 ; see also IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 498. (27 i) Id. at 457-490. (275) Id. at 461 ; see also, Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 489-516. (276) Id. at 464. (277) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 390. (278) Immunized testimony of Carlos Marcello, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Jan. 11, 1978, pp. 64-65. (279) Anti-Castro Cuban report, para. 460ff. (280) Warren Report, p. 292. (281) Ibid., HSCA report on organized crime, pars. 817-821, 908-923. (282) Ibid., HSCA report on organized crime; see also interview with Ovid Demans', Oct. 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Docu- ment 012587) ; FBI interview with Joseph Civello, Jan. 14, 1964, FBI file No. 92-2824-101. (283 ) Id., HSCA report on organized crime, at 908-923. (28^) Id. at 370-418. (285) Ibid. (286) Ibid. (287) Id. at 376-389. (288) Ibid. (289) Ibid. (290) Ibid. (291) Id. at 390-398. (292) Ibid. (293) Id. at 331, 416-^18. (294) Id. at 288. (295) Id. at 338-341. (296) Interview with Al S^^affeld, Aug. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 011096). (297) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 321-322. (298) Ibid. (299) Id. at 284 ; see also Salerno testimony, p. 381fe. (300) Salerno testimony, pp. 415, 419. (301) "The Evolution and Implications of the CIA-Sponsored Assassination Conspiracy Against Fidel Castro," staff report, X appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings. (302) Ibid. (303) Testimony of Santos Trafflcante, Sept. 28, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 357ff. (304) Id. at 363-364. (305) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 656-737. (306) Ibid. ; see also para. 1153-1176. (307) Id. at 721-725, 737-738. (308) Id. at 741. (309) Id. at 1054-1104, 1320-1340, 924-970. (310) Id. at 724-725, inter alia. (311) Ibid. (312) JFK Exhibit F-601. interview of Jase Aleman, Mar. 12, 1977, V HSCA- JFK hearings, 314. (313) Ibid. (314) JFK Exhibit F-602, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 311. (315) JFK Exhibit F-601. see ref. 312, supra. (316) JFK Exhibit F-602, see ref. 314, supra. (3i7) JFK Exhibit F-603, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 317. (318) Ibid. (319) Ibid. (320) Testimony of Jose Aleman, Sept. 27, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 301- 324. 624 (321) Testimony of Santos Trafficante, Sept. 28, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 373-377. (322) Ibid. (323) Ibid. (324) See JFK document 012007. (325) Salerno report, par. 85-176. (826) Ibid. (327) Id. at 288. (328) Salerno testimony, p. 386. (329) Ibid. (330) HSCA staff review of FBI files on Edward G. Partin (JFK document 012218). (331) Ibid. (332) Ibid. (333) Ibid. (33J,) Ibid. (335) Interview of Edward Grady Partin, July 20, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (JFK document 011314) (hereinafter Partin interview). (336) Ibid. (337) See ref. 330. supra. (338) Ibid. (339) Ibid. (340) Ibid. (341) Ibid. (342) Partin interview ; HSCA staff review of FBI files on Edward G. Partin, supra. (343) Ibid. (344) Ibid. (345) Benjamin C. Bradlee, Conversations with Kennedy (New York: Pocket Books. 1976), pp. 125-126. (346) Ibid. (347) Interviews of Walter Sheridan, July 10, 1978 and Aug. 24, 1978 (JFK documents 009777 and 010991) ; interview of former Labor Department oflScial, July 4, 1978 (JFK document 010423). (348) Ibid. (349) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 794-831; IV HSCA-JFK hear- ings. 497-499. (350) Ibid. ; see also, HSCA report on organized crime, para. 887-907. (351 ) Id., HSCA report on organized crime, at 814-816, 822-828. (352) Interview with Walter Sheridan, Oct. 26, 1978 (JFK Dociiment 012184). (353) "The Warren Commission," staff report, XI appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, para. 277 ; HSCA report on organized crime, 79^795. (354) Memorandum from Warren Commission General Counsel J. Lee Rankin to Deputy Director Richard M. Helms, March 12. 1964, "Jack Ruby, Activities and Associates." (355) HSCA report on organized crime, para. 1267; interviews with Allen Dorfman. July 14, 1978 and July 19, 1978 (JFK Documents 009918 and 010043.) (356) Hou.se Select Committee on Assassinations staff review of FBI and Justice Department files on Frank Chavez: interview with Walter Sheridan, Jnlv 10. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 009777). (357) Ibid. (358) Playboy Magazine, December 1975, pp. 83, 96. References : Section C 5a (i) Testimony of John B. Connally, Sept. 6, 1978, hearings before the Select Committee on A.ssassinations, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. I, p. 11 (hereinafter Connally testi- mony. — HSCA-JFK hearings, — ) ; see "Politics and President! il Protection: The Motorcade." staff report, appendix to the hearings before the Select Commit- tee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 9."»th Congress, 2d ses.slon (Washington. D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), volume XI. par. 12 (hereinafter staff report. The Motorcade), — appendix to the HSCA-JFK hear- ings, — . 625 (2) Id., Connally testimony, at 14-18; id., staff report. The Motorcade, at 13. (3) Id., staff report, The Motorcade, at 4. (4) Deposition of Jerry Bruno, Aug. 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 27 (JFK Document 014025) (hereinafter Bruno deposition) ; testimony of Kenneth P. O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, hearings before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing OflBce, 1965), vol. 7, p. 443 (hereinafter O'Donnell testi- mony, — Warren Hearings, — ) ; see staff report, The Motorcade, par. 4. (5) Connally testimony, 28; see staff report. The Motorcade, para. 4. (6) Staff summary of interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 10 (JFK Document 010696) ; see staff report, The Motorcade, para. 4. (7) See Connally testimony, p. 28. (8) Bruno deposition, p. 31. (5) Id. at 39-42 ; see staff report, The Motorcade, para. 34. (10) Testimony of Forrest V. Sorrels, May 7, 1964, VII Warren hearings, pp. 334-335 (hereinafter Sorrels testimony). See Bruno deposition, p. 35. (11) Id., Bruno deposition, at 31-32; Jerry Bruno diary entries, Oct. 31, 1963, p. 7 (JFK Document 011337) ; O'Donnell testimony, p. 443. (12) See Connally testimony, p. 51 ; see also Brxmo deposition, p. 49. (13) Ibid., Bruno deposition, p. 49 ; see Sorrels testimony, p. 337 ; see also Con- nally testimony. (14) O'Donnell testimony, p. 443; Jerry Bruno diary entries, supra ref. 11, p. 9 ; interview of Winston G. Lawson, Apr. 21, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 5 (JFK Document 007066) ; see staff report. The Motorcade, pars. 45-46. (15) Deposition of Bill Moyers, Aug. 16, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 23 (JFK Document 014018) ; deposition of Elizabeth F. Harris, Aug. 16, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 14 (JFK Docu- ment 013152). (16) Id., deposition of Elizabeth F. Harris, at 28. (17) Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 2 (here- inafter Warren report) . (18) See staff report, The Motorcade, para. 46, 48, 52, 58. (19) See e.g., preliminary special Dallas report No. 3 (interview with Lee Harvey Oswald by Captain Will Fritz), Nov. 29, 1963, p. 7 (JFK Docu- ment 013921) ; testimony of Joseph M. Smith, July 23, 1964, VII Warren hearings, 535 ; testimony of D. V. Harkness, Apr. 9, 1964, VI Warren hearings, 312. (20) See e.g., testimony of Ronald B. Fischer, Apr. 1, 1964, VI Warren hear- ings, 196 ; testimony of Seymour Weitzman, VII Warren hearings, p. 106. (21) See e.g., J. G. Shaw and L. Harris, "Cover-up — The Government Con- spiracy To Conceal the Facts about the Public Execution of John Kennedy" (pri- vately published, 1976) , pp. 98-99 (22) See, e.g., interview of Seymour Weitzman, July 25, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document 006646) ; interview of D. V. Harkness, Feb. 7, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document 005884) ; outside contact report with. Ronald Fischer, July 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 010560). (23) Interview of Thomas I^m Johns, Aug. 8, 1978, House Select Commit- tee on Assassinations, pp. 2-3 (JFK Document 010695) . (24) Interview of Forrest V. Sorrels, Mar. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 4-5 (JFK Document 007062) . (25) See e.g., interview of Seymour Weitzman, July 25, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document 006646) ; interview of D. V. Harkness, Feb. 7, 1978. p. 1, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 005884) ; outside contact report with Ronald Fischer, July 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 010560). (26) CE 768, IV Warren hearings. 320. 322. 346. (27) Testimony of Joseph M. Smith, VII. Warren hearings, p. 535; see inter- view of Joseph M. Smith. Feb. 8, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassi- nations (JFK Document 005886). (28) Outside contact report with James P. Hosty, Nov. 8, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 006291'). (29) Deposition of Frank Leslie EllsAvorth, Jr., July 25. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 91-92 (JFK Document 010903) . 626 (30) Executive session testimony of Robert E. Jones, Apr. 20, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-25 (JFK Classified Document 014t)43). (31) Letter froon Department of Defense to House Select Committee on As- sassinations, June 22, 19(8, p. 6 (JFK Document 009383) . References : Section C 5b (i) "Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy," (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Oflice, 1964), p. 327 (hereinafter Warren report). (2) See FBI retrieval, preliminary draft of afladavits (JFK Document 011943). (3) Warren report, p. 327. (4) R. S. Anson, "They've Killed the President— The Search for the Murders of John F. Kennedy" (New York: Bantam Books, 1975), pp. 42, 48, 154-156, 165- 166, 180-189 ; P. D. Scott, P. L. Hoch, and R. Stetler, eds., "The Assassination : Dallas and Beyond" (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), pp. 466-468. (5) "The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies," Book V, Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D.C: U.S. Gov- ernment Printing Office, 1976), pp. 95-97 (hereinafter Book V). (6) Harold Feldman, "Oswald and the FBI," The Nation, Jan. 27, 1964, p. 86; Joseph C. Goulden, "Ruby Posed As TV Cameraman's Helper to Get at Oswald," The Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 8, 1968, p. 22, col. 1 ; Lonnie Hudkins, "Oswald Rumored As Informant for U.S.," Houston Post, Jan. 1, 1964, p. 1. (7) Interview of Alonzo Hudkins, Mar. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 007998). (8) Ibid. ; interview of Joseph Goulden, Mar. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 006452) . (9) Warren report, p. 327. (10) W^arren (11) Executive Commission Document 205. session testimony of a special agent of the FBI, Nov. 9, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 101 (classified JFK Document 014666). (12) Id. at 119-128, 137-138. (13) Id. at 107, 120-121. (IJf) Executive .session testimony of a special agent of the FBI, Nov, 10, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 8, 16 (JFK Classified Docu- ment 014637). (15) Id. at 26, 32. (16) Warren Commission Document 205. (17) Ibid. (18) Ibid.; executive session testimony of a special agent of the FBI, ref. 14, p. 19. (19) Id. at 23. (20) Warren Commission Document 205. (21) FBI report to the House Select Committee on Assassinations re inquiry concerning page 696 of FBI Dallas Division report of special agent of the FBI, dated Dec. 23, 1963. July 12, 1978, pp. 9, 16 (JFK Document 010154) (page 696 of Warren Commission Document 205 corresponded with page 25 of the note hook report contained therein) . (22) Ibid. (23) Id. at 10-11. (24) Id. at 11-12. (25) Id. at 16-17. (26) Id. at 18-39. (27) Hosty deposition, p. 5. (28) Id. at 7. (29) Id. at 34. (50) Ibid. (31) Id. at 34-35. (32) Ibid. (33) Id. at 36. (54) Id. at 37-38. 627 (35) Commission exhibit 823, hearings of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Print- ing Office, 1964) (hereinafter 17 Warren hearings, 728) ; vol. 17, CE 824, Warren hearings 736 (exhibit 824) ; vol. 26, p. 143 (exhibit 2758). (36) Administrative coversheets to 1962 FBI field report (JFK Document 006032). (57) Interview of John Fain, June 25, 1978, House Select Committee on Assas- sinations (JFK Document 009973) (hereinafter Fain interview) . (38) See CE 825 XVII Warren hearings, 741-752. (55 ) Fain interview. (40) Interview of B. Tom Carter, Dec. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 013542). (41) Fain interview. (42) Interview of Arnold J. Brown, Dec. 20, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 013922). (43) Interview of Harry G. Maynor. Mar. 5, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 006901) (hereinafter Maynor interview) ; see ref. 38 supra. (44) Interview of Milton Kaack, Dec. 7, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 013674). (45) CE 826, XVII Warren hearings, 758-762. (46) Deposition of William S. Walter, Mar. 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 3-6, 55-58 (JFK Document 006847) (hereinafter Walter deposition). (47) See ref. 38 supra. {48) Interview of John L. Quigley, Mar. 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 009914). (49) Walter deposition, pp. 7-9. (50) Ibid. (51) Id. at 25-26. (52) Id. at 30-36. (53) Id., exhibits 85-86. (54) Id., exhibit 84. (55) Id. at 38. (56) Outside contact report with Sharon Covert, Mar. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 006032) . (57) Maynor interview. (58) Deposition of Orest Pena, June 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 5 (JFK Document 010136) (hereinafter Pena deposition). (59) Id. at pp. 11-13, 16-18. (60) Id. at 10, 18-20. (61) Executive session testimony of Warren C. deBrueys, May 31. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 28-30 (JFK Classified Document 014716). (62) Id. at 8-9. (65) Id. at 32-33. (64) Id. at 68-69. (65) Pena deposition, pp. 9-10. 12. 15-16, 21-22, 27-28. (66) Deposition of Adrian Alba, May 5, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 5 (JFK Document 009964) (hereinafter Alba deposition). (67) Id. at 10-12, 20-30. (68) Testimony of Adrian Alba, Apr. 6, 1964, X Warren hearings, pp. 219-229. (69) Alba deposition, pp. 21, 24-25. (70) Interview of Adrian Alba, Feb. 14, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (JFK Document 005961). (71) FBI memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Mr. Mohr, Apr. 30, 1964, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 013858). (72) Interview of Will Hayden Griffin, Mar. 14, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document 009916) (hereinafter Griffin interview). (75) See ref . 38 supra. (74) Interview of J. Gordon Shanklin, June 26, 1978, House Select Commit- tee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 009746) (hereinafter Shanklin interview). (75) Hosty deposition, pp. 6-9, 34, 54, 61-65. (76) Ibid. (77) Id. at 64-65. (7,S) Shanklin interview, p. 4. (79) Interview of Will Hayden Griffin, Dec. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 013543). (SO) Book V. (81) Id. at 96. (82) Id. at 97 ; Hosty deposition, p. 45. (83) Shanklin interview, book V. (84) Hosty deposition, pp. 43-50. (85) Ibid. Refebences : Section C 5c (1) Testimony of John A. McCone, May 14, 1964, hearings before the Presi- dent's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), vol. 5, pp. 120-121 (hereinafter Warren hearings). (2) Testimony of Richard M. Helms, May 14, 1964, hearings before the Presi- dent's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), vol. 5, pp. 120-121 (hereinafter Warren bearings). (3) See, e.g., classified deposition of CIA employee, June 27, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 29, 32 (JFK Classified Document 014863) ; classified deposition of CIA employee, May 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 31-34 (JFK Clas.sified Document 014731) ; classified deposition of CIA employee, Oct. 5, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassina- tions, p. 156 (JFK Classified Document 014720) ; but see also classified deposi- tion of CIA employee, June 29, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Classified Document 014725) ; and classified deposition of CIA employee, July 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 209-210 (JFK Classified Document 014718) . (4) See letter from Chairman Louis Stokes to Adm. Stansfield Turner, Jan. 27, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 004889). (.1) Letter from Acting Director Frank C. Carlucci to the House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, Mar. 23, 1978 (JFK Document 006837). (6) Classified staff summary of interviews with J. Maury and D. Murphy, June 14, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Classified Docu- ment 014844). (7) Classified staff summary of interviews with Soviet Rus.sia Division CIA personnel, Dec. 22, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Docu- ment 014845). (8) Ibid. (0) Ibid. (10) Ibid. (11) Executive session testimony of James Wilcott, Mar. 22, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 6-8 (JFK Classified Document 014672). (12) Id. at 11-13. (13) Ibid. (14) Id. at 8-12. (15) Id. at 13-19. (16) Id. at 38-39. (17) Id. at 13. (18) Clas.sified staff summary re the Wilcott allegation, Nov. 1, 1978, House Select Committee on As.sassinations, p. 6 (JFK Classified Document 014843). (19) Ibid. (20) Id. at 6-7. (21) Ibid. (22) Id. at 6. (23) Id. at 4-7. (24) Ibid. (25) Ibid. (26) Testimony of Richard M. Helms, Sept. 22, 1978, Hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Print- ing Office, 1979), vol. IV, pp. 185-188 (hereinafter Helms testimony, — HSCA-JFK hearings, — ) ; .see JFK exhibit F-.^)23, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 206. (27) Classified deposition of a CIA employee. June 27, 1978, Hou.se Select Com- mittee on As.sassinations, p. 5 (JFK Cla.ssified Document 014863). (28) Ibid. 629 (29) Select House See classified Committee staffonsummary re opening Assassinations of Oswald's (Classified JFK 201Document file, Dec. 014839) 15, 1978, ; classified deposition of CIA employee, June 27, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 48 (Classified JFK Document 014863) . (30) Helms testimony, pp. 189-191. (31) CE 910, XVIII Warren hearings, 115. (32) Classified staff summary re opening of Oswald's 201 file, supra ref. 29, pp. 1-3 ; see CB 917-918, XVIII Warren hearings, 115-116. (33) Ibid.; Classified deposition of a CIA employee, July 27, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 48 (JFK Classified Document 014863) ; Helms testimony, p. 186. (34) See text accompanying ref. 26, supra. (35) Classified staff summary re opening of Oswald's 201 file, supra ref. 29, p. 8; CIA classified summary responding to HSCA requests for explanations, Mar. 20, 1979, p. 4226 (JFK Classified Document 015018) . (36) Id. at 14. (37) Id. at 15. (38) See CE 931-933. XVIII Warren hearings, 131-135. (39) See JFK exhibit F-523, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 206. (40) Classified staff summary re opening of Oswald's 201 file, supra ref. 29, p. 17 ; deposition of CIA employee. May 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assas- sinations (JFK Classified Document 014731) ; classified staff interview of CIA employee. Mar. 31, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Classi- fied Document 000077) . (41) Classified staff summary re opening of Oswald's 201 file, supra ref. 29, p. 19. (42) Id. at 21. (43) Id. at pp. 21-23. (44) See JFK exhibit F-523, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 406. (45) See, e.g., classified deposition of a CIA employee, July 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 109-112 (JFK Classified Document 014718). (46) See, e.g. Helms testimony, pp. 188-189. (47) Classified staff summary re 201 opening sheet "AG," Dec. 10, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Classified Document 014836) ; CIA classified summary responding to HSCA requests for explanations, Mar. 20, 1979 (JFK Classified Document 015018). (48) Classified deposition of a CIA employee, Oct. 10, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, pp. 15-18 (JFK Classified Document 014717) . (49) Ibid. (50) Ibid. (51 ) JFK exhibit F-523, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 406. (52) Classified deposition of a CIA employee, May 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 50-51 (JFK Classified Document 014731). (53) Classified deposition of a CIA employee, June 27, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 81-83 (JFK Classified Document 014863). (54) See JFK exhibit F-524, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 207. (55) Ibid. (56) Ibid. (57) Classified CIA summary responding to HSCA request for explanations, Mar. 20, 1979, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Classified Docu- ment 015018). (58) Classified deposition of a CIA employee. Oct. 10, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, p. 48 (JFK Classified Document 014717). (59) Ibid. (60) Id. at 46-47. (61) Id. at 45-47. (62) See JFK exhibit F-522, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 197; ref. 30 supra. (63) Helms testimony, p. 189; see "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," an Interim Repott of the Select Committee to Study Govern- mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, 94th Cong.. 1st sess. (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 83. (64) Warren Commission Document 871. (65) Ibid.; see Report to the President by the Commission on Central Intelli- gence Activities within the United States (Washington. D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1975), pp. 209-210 (hereinafter Rockefeller Commission Report). 630 (66) Interview of Monica Kramer, Feb. 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document OOHSSl ) ; interview of Rita Newman. Feb. 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Uocument 014431). (67) CIA FOIA Document No. 614-261, p. 1 ; classified staff summary re Minsk photograph, Nov. 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (JFK Classified Document 014840) . (68) Id.. Minsk photograph, at 7-12. (69) Ibid. (70) Ibid. (7/) Classified staff summary re HT-Lingual program, Dec. 1, 1978, House Select Committee on Assas.sinations, p. 1 (JFK Classified Document 001438) ; see letter from George Bush to Subcommittee on Government Information and Operations, Aug. 10, 1976. (72) Ibid.; see Central Intelligence Exemption in the Privacy Act of 1974, Mar. 15, 1975, June 25, 1975, hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, 94th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975), p. 153. (73) Classified staff summary re HT-Lingnal program, supra ref. 71, pp. 12-13. (74) Classified deposition of a CIA employee. July 20, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on As.sassinations, p. 40 (JFK Classified Document 014735). (75) Cla.ssified staff summary re HT-Lingual index cards, .Tan. 15, 1979, Hou.se Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Cla.ssified Document 014848). (76) Ibid. (77) Id. at 1-2. (78) Ibid. (79) Ibid. ; classified deposition of a CIA employee, July 18, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassination, p. 24 (JFK Classified Document 014718). (80) Classified deposition of a CIA employee. Oct. 10. 1978, Hou.se Select Com- mittee on iVssassinations, p. 20 (JFK Cla.ssified Document 014717). (81) Classified staff summary re HT-Lingual index cards, supra ref. 75, pp. 2-3. (82) Id. at 3; see classified CIA .summary responding to HSCA requests for explanations, Mar. 20, 1979, pp. 4218-4219 (JFK Classified Document 015018). (83) Rockefeller Commission Report, p. 2. (8.'f) Classified staff .summary re HT-Lingual index cards, supra ref. 75, pp. 5-7. (85) Id. at 6: see classified CIA summary responding to HSCA requests for explanations, Mar. 20. 1979, pp. 4218-4219 (JFK Classified Document 015018). (86) Ibid. (87) Ibid. (88) See ref. 1 .supra. (89) See. e.g.. Rockefeller Commission Report, pp. 209-210. (90) See R. S. Anson. "They've Killefl The President — The Search for the Mur- derers of John F. Kennedy" (New York : Bantam Books. 1975). pp. 172-173; .see, generallv. CIA FOIA Documeni 961-927AG. (91) See JFK Exhibit F-526. IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 209. (.92) Classified staff summary re CIA Oswald memorandun), Dec. 13, 1978, House Select (\)mmitlee on Assassinations (JFK Classified Document 014847) ; classified staff summary re ab.sence of Oswald debriefing by CIA, Jan. 22, 1979, House Select Committee on Assa.ssinations (JFK Classified Document 014841). (.9.3) Ibid. (9//) Cla.ssified staff summary re ab.sence of Oswald debriefing by CIA, supra ref. 92. (95) Classified staff summary of interviews with Soviet Russia division CIA personnel, supra ref. 7. (.96) Cla.ssified staff summarv re absence of Oswald debriefing by CIA. supra ref.92, p. 13. (.97) Id. at 13-14. (.98) Ibid. (.9.9) Id. at 16; see classified CIA summary resjmnding to HSCA reqiie.sts for explanations, Mar. 20, 1979, pp. 4196-4198 (JFK Classified Document 015018). (100) Cla.ssified staff summary re absence of Oswald debriefing by CIA. supra ref. 92, pp. 17-23. (101) See Warren Report, pp. 434-440. (102) CE908, 910, 917. XVIIT Warren hearings. 98, 10.5. 115. 631 (103) CE931, XVIII Wari-eii hearings, (lOi) CE932, XVIII Warren hearings, 134. (105) CE971, XVIII Warren hearings, 368. (106) CE252, XVIII Warren liearings, 706. (lOl) CE935, XVIII Warren hearings, 138, and CE909, p. 104. (108) Ibid. (109) CE823 and 824, XVII Warren hearings, 7^9, 736. (110) Letter from Robert L. Keuch, Department of Justice, to House Select Committee on Assassinations, Mar. 10. 1978 (JFK Document 006235). (111) Letter from Robert L. Keuch, Department of Justice, to House Select Committee on Assassinations, May 9, 1978 (JFK Document 008^1). (112) CE 2677, XXVI Warren hearings, 32. (113) Warren Report, p. 258; see also OE946, XVIII Warren liearings, 162. (114) Interview of Lewis Hopkins, Oct. 25, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 012886). (115) Ibid. (116) Ibid. (117) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Richard M. Helms, May 25, 1964 (JFK Document 003782) ; see generally CE2676, XXVI Warren hearings, 32. (118) Ibid. (119)Committee Select Classified onstaff summary re p.Oswald's Assassinations, Soviet visa, 3 (JFK Classified Dec. 20,014742). Document 1978, House (120) Ibid., p. 4. (121) Ibid., pp. 4-5. (122) Ibid. (123) Warren Report, p. 691. (124) See R. Anson, supra ref. 90, pp. 135-137; Bernard H. Fensterwald, "As- sas ination of JFK — By Coincidence or Conspiracy?" (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 1977), pp. .566-567; P. D. Scott, P. L. Hoch, R. Stetler, eds., "The Assassinations: Dallas and Beyond" (New York: Vintage Books, 1976) (hereinafter "The Assassination"). (125) Deposition of John A. McVickar, May 5, 1978, Home Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 18-19 (JFK Document 008487). (126) Id. at 3-4, 22. (127) Executive session testimony of Priscilla Johnson McMillan, Apr. 20, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 10-17 (JFK Classified Document 014676). (128) Id. at 16. (129) Id. at 16-18. (130) Id. at 8-9, 61-62, 83-89. (131) Id. (exhibit 95). (132) Id. at 83-89. (133) Id. at 31-34. (134) Classified summary of interviews with Soviet Russia division CIA per- sonnel, supra ref. 7. (135) Deposition of Richard E. Snyder, June 1. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 18-19 (JFK Document 009264) ; CE909, 914 and 919, XVIII Warren hearings, 100-117. (136) See, e.g., ref. 107 and accompanying text supra. (137) See, e.g.. Bernard H. Fensterwald, supra ref. 112, pp. 221-222; M. Can- field and A. Weberman, "Coup d'Etat in America — The CIA and the Assassina- tion of John F. Kennedy" (New York : The Third Press, 1975), p. 25. (138) Deposition of Richard E. Snyder, supra ref. 123, pp. 5-7, 11-13. (139) Id. at 13, 53-54. (140) Letters from the HSCA to Scott Breckinridge, CIA, June 8, 1978 and July 6, 1978 (JFK Classified Document 014971). (141) CIA FOIA Document 210-623, CE528. (142) Classified CIA summary responding to HSCA requests for explanations. Mar. 20, 1979, pp. 4200-4207 (JFK Classified Document 015018). (143) Outside contact report with William Vance, Jan. 9, 1979, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 014140). (144) Interview with Dennis Flynn, June 16, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 009534). (145) Interview of Dr. Alexis II. Davison, Jan. 10, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (JFK Document 004686). 632 (146) CE18, 1 Warreu hearings, 50. (141) CE994, XVIII Warreu hearings. G16. il-'i8) See. e.g.. Bernard H. Fensterwaid. supra ref. 112, pp. 219-221. (14'j) Davison interview, supra ref. 132; see also interview of Mrs. Hal (Natalia Aleliseevua) Davison, Jan. 10, 1978, House Select Committee on Assas- sinations (JFK Document 004685). (150) Davison interview, supra ref. 132. (J51) Ibid. (1.52) Ibid. (153) Ibid. (lo'i) Classified staff summary of interviews with Soviet Rus.sia division CIA personnel, supra ref. 7. (155) For a detailed discussion of George de Mohrenschildt and his relation- ship to Oswald, see "George de Mohrenschildt," staff report, appendix to the hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government I'riuting Ofiice, 1979), vol. XII, par. 3 (hereinafter de Mohrenschildt report — api)endix to the HSCA-JFK hearings. No. — ). (156) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Apr. 23, 1964, IX Warren hear- ings, 235. (157) Ibid. (158) Ibid. (159) See. e.g., Bernard H. Fensterwaid, supra ref. 112. p. 212-214. (160) Interview of James W. Moore, Mar. 14, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 014893) ; see ref. 65 and accompanying text supra. (161) De Mohrenschildt report, para. 33-34. (162) Id. at 35-36. (163) De Mohren.schildt testimony, supra ref. 143, p. 212. (164) Outside contact report with Roger Gabrielson, CIA, Feb. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on A.ssassinations (JFK Document 014969). (165) De Mohrenschildt report, para. 44-45. (166) Id. at 46-51. (161) Warren Commission Document 75, p. 588. (168) Ibid.; deposition of William G. Gaudet, June 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 13, 20 (JFK Document 010347) (hereinafter Gaudet deixjsition ) . (169) Warren Report, pp. 299-311. (110) Warren Commission Document 75, p. 588. (111) CE2123, XXIV Warren hearings, 663-691. (172) Gaudet deposition pp. 7-8. (173) Id. at 9. (17 Jf) CIA memorandum for Special Assistant to Deputy Director of Opera- tions, subject : William George Gaudet, reference : CIA review staff memoran- dum 78-0110 dated Jan. 20, 1976 requesting information on William George Gaudet. (115) Gaudet deposition, pp. 21-22. (116) Id. at 10-13. (117) Id. at 11-12. (178) Id. at 13-14. (179) See R. Anson, supra ref. 90, pp. 156-159; The Assassinations, supra ref. 112. p. 474. (180) Folson Exhibit 1, XIX Warren hearings, 665; see also CE 1961, XXIII Warren hearings, 795-796. (181) Testimony of John E. Donovan, May 5. 1964, VIII Warren hearings, 298. (182) Outside contact report, file review of Department of Defense files of Robert Royee Augg, Richard Call, Nelson Delgado, John E. Donovan and Zack Stout, Dec. 1, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 01.3677). (183) CE 1385, XXII Warren hearings, J05 ; see^also CE 2682, XXVI Warren hearings. 41. . * * ' . (18J,) mittee onDer>artment Assassinations of Defense ,'unit diaries, (JFK Document 013485)Dec.'j^. . 1978, House Select Com- (185) Id. at 183, 184. 633 (186) Letter and attachments from Department of Defense to House Select Committee on Assassinations, June 22, 1978, p. 20 (JFK Document 009383). {187) Folson Exhibit 1, XIX Warren hearings, 658, 704. (188) Unit diaries, supra ref. 187, pp. 351, 356. (189) Folsom Exhibit 1, XIX Warren hearings, 668. {190) Warren report, p. 684. {191) CE 918, XVIII Warren hearings, 116. {192) CE 196, XXIII Warren hearings, 797. See also unit diaries, supra ref. 187. {193) Folsom Exhibit 1, XIX AVarren hearings, 724-727. (19^) CE 1114, XXII Warren bearings, 79. {195) Letter and enclosures from Department of Defense to the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Mar. 28, 1978, p. 2 (JFK Document 006729). {196) Folsom Exhibit 1, XIX Warren hearings, 723-741. {197) Id. at 724-727. {198) Id. at 728-733. {199) Letter and attachments from American Red Cross to the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Dec. 8, 1978 (JFK Document 013586). (200) Id. at 23. {201) Id. at 21-23. (202) Ibid. {203) Folsom Exhibit 1, XIX Warren hearings, 740, 743. {204) Id. at 727. {205) Id. at 723-727. (206) Outside contact report with Colonel William A. Cloman, Jr., Aug. 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 013595) ; outside contact report with Lt. Gen. Charles H. Hayes, Dec. 10, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 013593). (207) Outside contact report with Lt. Col. B. J. Kozak, Aug. 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 013594). {208) Executive session testimony of Col. Robert E. Jones, Apr. 20, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 18-19, 42 (JFK classified docu- ment 014677). {209) See R. Auson, supra ref. 90, pp. 283-285 ; P. L. Hoch, "Army Intelligence, A. J. Hidell, and the FBI," Oct. 8, 1977 (JFK Document 002538). {210) Testimony of Col. Robert E. Jones, supra ref. 211, pp. 6-7. (211) Id. at 8. {212) Id. at 8, 11. {213) Id. at 8-9. {214) Id. at 19. {215) Id. at 17. {216) Id. at 17-18. {217) Id. at 18-19, 42. {218) Id. at 20, 42. {219) Id. at 10, 21. {220) Id. at 25, 34-37, 49-50. {221) Id. at 10, 50. {222) Id. at 20-21, 24. {223) Id. at 19-20. {224) Id. at 21. {225) Id. at 22-24. {226) Letter and attachments from Department of Defense to the House Select Committee on Assassinations, July 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assas- sinations (JFK Document 010247) ; JFK classified document 000103. {227) Letter from Department of Defense to the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Sept. 13, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 011964). {228) Letter and attachments from Department of Defense to the House Select Committee on Assassinations, June 22, 1978. House Select Committee on Assas- sinations (JFK Document 009383) . {229) Ibid. {230) Classified staff study: Lee Harvey Oswald, the CIA and Mexico City, Dec. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 72-81, 124-183 (JFK classified documents 014972-014975). {231) Ibid, for extensive detail. (232) Ibid. 634 References : Section D 1 (i) Xeal, Harry Edward, The Storj- of the Secret Service (New York: Grosset and Duulap, 1971), p. 15 (hereuiafter Neal, Secret Service). (2) Id. at 18-19. (3) Id. at 17. (.'/) Id. at 20. (5) Id. at 22. (6) Id. at 22-23. (7) Id. at 23. (8) Id. at 23-24. (9) Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "The Authority of the Secret Service To Protect the President," Mar. 29, 1978, pp. 1-2 (JFK Docu- ment 006845). (10) Neal, Secret Service, p. 24. {11) Ibid. (12) Ibid. (13) Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "Presidential Pro- tection and tlie Secret Service," Oct. 27, 1976, p. 2 (JFK Document 004157). (14) Neal. Secret Service, pp. 24-25. (15) Id. at 25. (16) Id. at 70. (17) Id. at 80-82. (18) Manchester, William, The Death of a President, (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 37 (hereinafter, Manchester, The Death * * *). (19) Id. at 35, 37, 131. (20) Id. at 121. (21) Manchester, The Death * * *. (22) Letter from Chief of Secret Service James J. Rowley to J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel, Warren Commission, June 9, 1964, i). 2 (contained in JFK Document 012719, title of cover document : U.S. Secret Service — Protective In- formation Guidelines. (23) Id. at 2. (24) Executive session testimony of Robert I. Bouck, Nov. 16, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 7-33 (JFK Document 014669). (25) See ref. 22, supra. (26) See Manchester, "The Death * * *," p. 36. For the extent of the Secret Service's reliance on the Dallas I'olice Department for manpower, see Lawrence Exhibit, hearings before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), volume 20, pp. 489-496 (hereinafter — Warren bearings, — ). For an as.sessment of manpower availability in relation to security needs, see testimony of Perdue W. Lawrence, July 24. 19(H, VII Warren hearings, 583-584, 585. (27) U.S. Department of the Treasury Order 173-3, October 29. 1965 (Washing- ton, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965) (JFK Document 014978) ; see also ref. 24, supra, for Bouck's statements on 1963 PRS procedures for analyzing and disseminating threat data. (28) Secret Service case files, June 5, 1978 (JFK Document 008894) ; see also Secret Service file re plot to kidnap Caroline Kennedy, May 10, 1978 (JFK Docu- ment 008219). (2,9) Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 463, 465 (hereinafter Warren report). (30) Id. at 443, 461, 464. (31) Id. at 445-446, 465. (32) Id. at 463. 465. (33) Id. at 447, 466. (34) Id. at 449. (35) Id. at 461, 443. (36) Secret Service files review. Mar. 24. 1978 (JFK Document 006852). (37) Secret Service case file summaries, June 5, 1978 (JFK Document 008894). (38) T'npubli.shed staff report on Secret Servi<-e files, Oct. 19, 1978, House Select Committee on Assa.ssinations (JFK Document 014588). (39) Commission Exhibit CE 767. XVII Warren hearings, 593; CE 768, p. 601. 635 (40) Secret Service final survey report, Dec. 11, lt>63, p. 7 (JFK Document 006183) . (41) Secret Service supplemental sur\'ey report, Mar. 29, 1963, pp. 1, 2 (JFK Document 014457). (42) Secret Service supplemental survey report, Nov. 5, 1963, p. 1 (JFK Docu- ment 004867). (48) JFK Exhibit F-450, II HSCA-JFK hearings, 447 ; Secret Service supple- mental report, Dec. 30, 1963, pp. 1-6 (JFK Document 006183) ; see also Secret Service memoranda of Nov. 12, 1963 and Nov. 14, 1963, Miami field oflice (JFK Document 008814). (44) For the article written by the Miami journalist, see Christensen, Dan, "JFK, King: The Dade County Links," in Miami magazine, September 1976, p. 25 (JFK Document 0033(30). Christensen could not document his assertion therein that a planned motorcade was canceled, other than to say that "many people" believed that a cancellation had taken place ; see outside contact report with Dan Christensen, Feb. 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 004434). Persons cited by Christensen as sources for corrobora- tion of his version of the cancellation did not recall that his version was correct ; see outside contact report with the Honorable Seymour Gelber, Feb. 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document (X)5533) ; outside contact report with Attorney Richard Gerstein, Feb. 2, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assas.sinations (JFK Document 013458) ; interview of Miami field oflSce Special Agent Talmadge Bailey, Mar. 1, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 5-7 (JFK Document 009385) ; and interview of Miami field office Special Agent Robert J. Jamison, Feb. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 007063) . (45) Secret Service master file on threat subject Thomas Arthur Vallee (JFK Document 009581) ; Secret Service master file on Joseph A. Milteer (JFK Docu- ment 008814). (46) Interview of Secret Service Special Agent David Grant, Mar. 1, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document 005890). (47) Interview of Presidential Appointments Secretary Pierre Salinger, May 30, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document 009690). (48) Black. Edwin, "The Plot to Kill JFK in Chicago, Nov. 2, 1963," Chicago Independent, November 1975, pp. 7-8 (JFK Document 013589) . (49) Secret Service master file on Thomas Arthur Vallee, memorandum of Nov. 6, 1963, p. 2 (JFK Document 008581). (50) Interview of 1963 Secret Service Special Agent Edward Tucker, Jan. 19, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (JFK Document 004828). (51) Interview of Chicago Police Officer Lawrence Coffey, Jan. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 004831) . (52) See attachment to interview of Chicago Police Department, executive assistant to superintendent of police, Richard Brzcek. 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, entitled "Arrest Report, Chicago Police Depart- ment" (JFK Document 004824). (53) Secret Service master file on Thomas Arthur Vallee, memorandum of Nov. 6. 1963 by Special Agent Thomas D. Strong, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 008581). (54) Id. at 1. (55) Id. at 1 ; see also interview of former Chicago Police Officer Lawrence Coffey, Jan. 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Docu- ment 004831). (56) Interview of former Chicago Police Officer Lawrence Coffey, Jan. 25, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 004831). (57) See ref. 42, supra. (58) For indication of receipt by PRS, see deposition of Secret Service Chief James Rowley, Aug. 24, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Book II, pp. 8, 64 (JFK Document 014026) ; a report from a field office addressed to the Office of the Chief would be delivered either to PRS or to the Office of the Head of Protective Operations, Ed Wiley. For a copy of the Nov. 6, 1963 memo- randum of Chicago field office Special Agent Strong, see ref. 55, supra ; it con- cerned the Service's final preassas.sination contact with Vallee and was addressed to the Office of the Chief. For indication of nonreceipt by the agents coordinating preparations in Dallas, see testimony of Forrest Sorrels, VII "Warren hearings. 636 338-339; see also interview of SAIC, Dallas Field Office. Forrest V. Sorrels, Mar. 15, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (JFK Document 007062) ; and interview of Secret Service Special Agent Winston G. Lawson, Jan. 31. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (JFK Document 007066). (59) Letter of Nov. 27, 1963 from ASAIC Maurice G. Martineau, Chicago, to Chief, Secret Service, in Secret Service master file on Thomas Arthur Vallee (JFK Document 008581). (60) Secret Service report. Columbus. Ohio field office. Dec. 2, 1968 p. 2, in Secret Service master file on Thomas Arthur Vallee (JFK Document 008581). (61) Interview of former Chicago Field Office Special Agent Abraham W. Bolden, Jan. 19, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 2-6 (JFK Document 004825). (62) Id. at 3-4. (63) Id. at 4. (64) Id. at 3. (65) Interviews of Chicago field ofiice ASAIC Maurice G. Martineau. Feb. 1, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 008483) ; and Chicago Special Agent Conrad Cross, Apr. 14, 1978 (JFK Document 009370) ; James S. GriflSths, Feb. 1, 1978 (JFK Document 005892) ; (5ary McLeod, May 4, 1978 (JFK Document 007995) ; Robert Motto, Dec. 30, 1977 (JFK Document 008482) ; Joseph Noonan, Apr. 13, 1978 (JFK Document 009377) ; J. Lloyd Stocks, Apr. 12, 1978 (JFK Docunu-nt 009372) ; and Edward Tucker, Jan. 19, 1978 (JFK Document 004828). Hou.se Selei-t Committee on Assassinations .staff also inter- viewed White House Detail Advance Agent David Grant (see ref. 46. supra), who coordinated securitj* preparations in advance of the President's .scheduled Nov. 2, 19(53 trip to Chicago. None of these agents provided any corroltoration of Bolden's tion team. version of the Secret Service investigation of an alleged assassina- (66) Interview of Special Agent Robert Motto, Dec. 30, 1977, p. 2 (JFK Docu- ment 008482). (67) Interview of former Special Agent Abraham W. Bolden, Jan. 19, 1978, House Select Committee on Assa.ssinations, pp. 1-7 (JFK Document 004825). (68) Id. at 5. (69) The Honorable Seymour Gelber, "Diary of a Southern Pro.secutor" (un- published manuscript), pp. 414-415, 427^28 (hereinafter Gelber, Diary) ; see also the preface of this document, entitled "Summary" (JFK Document 002826). (70) Interview of former Miami Police OflScer Charles H. Sapp. February 25, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 00M19) ; .see also interview of former Miami field office SAIC John Marshall, February 2, 1978, House Select Committee on A.s.sas.sinations, p. 1 (JFK Document 007063) ; and Secret Service report, Miami field oflSce, Novemlier 12, 1963, p. 1 (JFK Docu- ment 008814). (71) Id., Gelber, "Diary," at 426-427. (72) Interview of former Miami SAIC John Mar.shall. February 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (JFK Document 007063). (73) Secret Service report. Miami field oflice, Noveml>er 12, 1903, p. 2 (JFK Document 008814). (74) Secret Service report. Miami field oflice, November 26, 1963, p. 2 (JFK Document 008814). (75) Ibid. (76) Ibid. (77) Id. at 1-2. (7^) Secret Service final survey report, Miami field oflSce, December 30. 1963, p. 7 (JFK Document 006183). (7.9) Interview of Special Agent Winston G. Law.son. January 31. 1978, House Select Committee on Assas.sinations. pp. 4. 9 (JFK Document 007066) ; .see aLso testimony of Winston G. Law.son, April 23, 1964. IV Warren hearings. .321 (herein- after Lawson testimony) ; see aLso interview of former SAIC, Dallas, Forrest V. Sorrels, March 15, 1978. House Select Committee on A.s.sassinations, p. 3 (JFK Document 007062) ; and testimony of Forrest V. Sorrels, VII Warren hearing.s, 338-339. (80) Gelber, "Diary," p. 433. (81) See ref. 79, .supra, to Winston G. Lawson. 637 (82) See ref. 24, supra, pp. 32, 58; see also deposition of Thomas Kelley, August 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 5, 54-56, 59-60, 64-65, 71-75 (JFK Document 014586). (83) Testimony of Forrest V. Sorrels, Apr. 7, 1964, VII Warren hearings, 338. (84) Manchester, "The Death . . ." p. 121 ; see also testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, VII Warren hearings, 456. (85) Warren Report, pp. 447, 448. There is a discrepancy between Dallas Field Office SAIC Forrest \. Sorrels' 1963 protective policy toward traditionally used, publicly known parade routes and the policy of Secret Service Chief Rowley on that subject as set forth on p. 447 of the report. Sorrels testified before the Warren Commission that Main Street in Dallas was always used for parades (VII, AVar- ren hearings, 337), yet Rowley stated to the Commission that, under such cir- cumstances, extra caution was required in inspecting and securing buildings along the route. (86) Id. at 448. (57) Lawson testimony, pp. 327, 330. (88) Warren Report, p. 448, note 173. (89) Lawson testimony, p. 328; testimony of Perdue W. Lawrence, July 24, 1964, VII Warren hearings, .580; see also statement of Perdue W. Lawrence to House Select Committee on Assassinations, Nov. 4, 1977, pp. 2-3 (JFK Document 003102). (90) Outside contact report with Mrs. Ina Davidson, Aug. 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 010677) ; see also outside contact report re Ms. Mary Vallee, Mar. 9, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document 014490). (91) Outside contact reiwrt with Leonora Reddehase, Apr. 14, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 007494). (92) One or more representatives from each of the committee staff specialized investigative groups was consulted. None of Milteer's associates was identified by staff members as an associate of Jack Ruby, Lee Harvey Oswald or any of their associates. (93) Memorandum of conversation between Bernard Fensterwald and Bill Somersett, June 5, 1978, p. 1 (JFK Document 014488). (.97/) JFK Exhibit F-121, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 116. (95) Testimony of Clyde Snow, .Tuly 25, 1978, HSCA-JFK hearings, IV 379-382. (96) Abraham Zapruder film, for example, c. frames 160-313, JFK Exhibits F-211 to F-255. I HSCA-JFK hearings, 71-92 ; Orville Nix film, for example. JFK Exhibit F-267, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 110, and JFK Document 011265 ; and James Altgens photograph, JFK Exhibit F-559, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 372. (.97) U.S. Secret Service School, "Principles of Protection of the President and Foreign Dignitaries" (training manual in outline form) (publisher not stated, 1954), p. 48 on chauffeurs, especially (2) (a) ; pp. 51-53 on mounting and dismounting moving automobiles; pp. 53-57 on general requirements relating to protection in automobiles, especially p. 55, section (12) on the lead car (JFK Document 006730). (98) Unpublished staff report on the Secret Service training facility at Belts- ville, Md., Sept. 29. 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (JFK Document 012S88). HSCA staff ob.served current members of the White House and Vice Presidential details react protectively in a variety of simulated attack situations. The task difficulty, degree of physical danger to the agents during the simultations, and realism of the 1978 training contrasts sharply with the "on-the-job" training which was standard in 1963 ; see also interview of Winston G. Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, III 2 HSCA-JFK p. (JFK Document hearings. 00"066) 395. ; and testimony of James J. Rowley, Sept. 19, 1978, (.9.9) T.-stimony of Roy H. Kellerman, Mar. 9, 1964, II Warren Hearings, 104. For the standard applicable in 1963, see U.S. Secret Service School, "Prin- ciples of Protection of the President and Foreign Dignitaries" (training manual in outline form) (publisher not stated, 1954), p. 98 at (g). Shielding a protectee measure. agent's body during gunfire attacks is described as a "last resort" with an (100) Testimony of Secret Service Inspector Thomas Kelley, Sept. 19, 1978, III HSCA-JTK hearings, 328; see also Lawson testimony, p. 321. 638 (101) Interview of William R. Greer, Feb. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 2, 8 (JFK Document 014059) ; see also testimony of Thomas Kelley, Sept. 9, 1978, III HSCA-.TFK Hearings, 328. (102) Interview of William R. Greer. Feb. 28. 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 5 (JFK Document 0140.">9) ; see also I'.S. Secret Service, "Principles of Protection of the President and Other Dignitaries" (training manual in outline form) (publisher not stated. 19r>4), p. r>0 at (2) (a) : "The Driver of the President's car should be alert for dangers and be able to take instant action when instructed or otherwise made aware of an emergency." (JFK Document 006730). (lOS) Report No. 3947, Analysis of Recorded Sounds Relating to the As- sassination of President John F. Kennedy. Bolt Reranek and Newman Inc., Appendix to the Hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations. U.S. House of Representatives. 95th Congress. 2d Session (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office. 1979. vol. VIII (hereinafter BBN report, — appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, — ). (104) Testimony of Clinton J. Hill, Mar. 9, 1964, II Warren Hearings. 136- 137 ; see also Lawson testimony, p. 338. (105) Warren Report, p. 445. The Warren Commission emphasized the lack of adequate definition, within the Secret Service, of the functions and responsi- bilities of the advance agents who arrive at the Presidential destination days or weeks beforehand in order to coordinate all protective aspects of the Presi- dential trip. Too much discretion was left to the individual advance agent, whose superiors ordinarily gave him only general instructions and no checklist. (106) Testimony of Clinton J. Hill. :Mar. 9, 1064, II Warren Hearingis, 138-140. (107) Interview of Thomas Lem Johns, Aug. 8. 1978. House Select Commit- tee on A.s.sassinations. pp. 2. 3 (JFK Document 010695). (108) JFK Exhibit F-5.59. IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 372; see also statement of Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey at testimony of James J. Rowley, Sept. 19, 1978. Ill HSCA-JFK hearings, 397. (109) Warren Report, p. 450. (110) Ibid. (111) Ibid. (112) Testimony of Thomas J. Kelley, Sept. 1978. Ill HSCA-JFK hear- ings, 327, 328. (IIS) See refs. 96 and 108. supra. (114) Testimony of former Secret Service Chief James Rowley. Sept. 19. 1978, III HSCA-JFK Hearings, p. 392. (115) Letter to ASAIC (Chicago). Maurice G. Martineau to Deputy Chief Paul Paterni, Nov. 27, 1963, p. 1 (JFK Document 007601 ). (116) Secret Service memorandum, Chicago Field Office, Dec. 3, 1963, p. 1 (JFK Document 003668). (117) Id. at 1, 2. (118) Id. at 1, 2. (119) Id. at 4. (120) Id. at 4-5, 6. (121) Id. at 2, 3, 4, 7. (122) Id. at 2-3. (123) Id. at 8 (distribution list, bottom left). (121,) Id. at 3. (125) Secret Service memorandum. Miami Field Office. Dec. 13. 1963. pp. 1-3 (JFK Document 003842); see also deposition of Edward Tucker. July 18, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 38-39 (JFK Document 010902) . (126) Secret Service memorandum, Chicago Field Office, Dec. 3, 1963, p. 7 (JFK Document 00.3668). (127) Id. at 6. A later phase of the Secret Service's investigation of Paulino Sierra is recorded in Secret Service memorandum. Chicago Field Office. Dec. 19. 1963, p. 5 (JFK Document 008429). (128) See. generally, "Anti-Castro Organizations and Activities and Lee Har- vey Oswald in New Orleans," staff report, X Appendix to the HSCA-JFK hear- ings, para. 342-388. (129) Id. at 350. (130) Id. at 351, 365. (131) Id. at 376. (132) Id. at 379. 639 {133) Secret Service memorandum, Chicago Field Office, Dec. 3, 1963, p. 7 (JFK Document 003368). (134) Id. at 4. (135) Letter from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to Hon. James B. Rlioads, Dec. 28, 1970, pp. 1-2 (FBI-JFK File 109060, section 1744 at 697?)). (136) Ibid.; see al.so deposition of Chicago Field Office SA Edward Tucker, Aug. 22, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 42-43 (JFK Docu- ment 010902) . (137) Secret Service memorandum, Chicago Field Office, Dec. 3, 1963, p. 5 (JFK Document 003668). (138) Secret Service memorandum, Chicago Field Office, Dec. 19, 1963, p. 6 (JFK Document 008429) ; see also deposition of Joseph Noonan, July 14, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 21-23 (JFK Document 013260). (139) Testimony of James Rowley, Sept. 19, 1978, III HSCA-JFK Hearings, 392 (140) Ibid. (Ul) Id. at 329. (142) Id. at 353. References : Section D 2 (1) Staff analysis of FBI file on the investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, House Select Committee on Assassinations ; "The Warren Commission," staff report, XI appendix to the hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. XI, par. 4-21, 201-203 (hereinafter W. C. report). (2) Ibid. (3) Staff analysis of Warren Commission records, documents, hearings and exhibits. House Select Committee on Assassinations ; WC report, para. 1-21. (4) Testimony of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Sept. 21, 1978, hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, (1979), vol., pp. 644-645. (5) Ibid. References : Section D 3 (J) Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "The History of the Federal Bureau of Investigation," prepared for the committee. (2) Ibid. (3) Ibid. (4) Ibid. (5) Ibid. (6) Ibid. (7) Ibid. (8) Ibid. (9) Ibid. (10) Staff analysis of FBI file on the investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, House Select Committee on Assassinations (herein- after FBI-JFK assassination file) ; staff analysis of Warren Commission records, documents, hearings, and exhibits, House Select Committee on Assassinations ; "The Warren Commission," staff report, appendix to the hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Con- gress, 2d session (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), volume XI, para. 44-70. 11.3-277 (hereinafter WC report, — appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, — ). (11) Ibid. (12) Ibid., FBI-JFK assassination file; staff analysis of testimony before the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities by FBI supervisors of the investigation of the Kennedy assassination, House Select Committee on Assassinations (hereinafter FBI supervisors testimony) ; WC report, para. 113-277. (13) FBI-JFK assassination file; testimony of James Malley, September 20, 1978. hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C: U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office, 1979), volume III, pp. 462-512 (hereinafter Malley testi- money ; — HSCA-JFK hearings, — ) . 640 m) Ibid., FBI-JFK assassination file. {15) Ibid. (16) Ibid. (17) Ilnd. (18) FBI .supervisors te.stimony ; Malley testimony, pi). ■462-.512. (19) Ibid. (20) S''nate Sel'^ct Committee on Intelligence .'rvi.sors testimony. (26) Ibid. (27) Interview of former Assistant FBI Director Courtney Evans, August 24, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations ; deposition of former A.s.sistant FBI Director Courtney Evans, September 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations. (28) Ibid. (2.9) FBI-JFK as.sassinatlon file ; FBI supervisors testimony. (30) Ibid. (SI) Ibid., FBI-JFK assassination file; "The Investigation of the As.sassina- tlon of President John F. Kennedy : Performance of the Intelligence Agencies," book V, Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Re- spect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Congress. 2d session (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 32-43 (hereinafter book V). (32) Ibid. (33) Id. at 6. (S/f) FBI-JFK assassination file ; WC report, para. 113-227 ; Malley testimony, pp. 466-476. (35) Ibid. (36) Ibid. (37) Ibid. (38) Ibid. (39) FBI-JFK assassinati(m file: WC report, para. ia3-20.'). (/fO) Staff analysis of the activities of FBI Special Agent James P. Hosty in connection with the investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald. House Select Commit- tee on Assassinations; deposition of James P. Hosty, August 25, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations ; book V, pp. 95-97. (J,l) Ibid. (/,2) Ibid. (/,3) Ibid. C/ff) Deposition of J. Lee Rankin. Aug. 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assas.sinations ; for a copy of the deposition, see "The Warren Commission." staff report. XI appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, 54. (//.5) Testimony of former FBI In.spector James Gale, September 20, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings. 513-557 : FBI-JFK a.ssassination file ; book V, pp. 53-56. 87-93. (J,6) Ibid. (//7) Ibid. (J,8) Ibid. (Jt9) FBI-JFK assassination file. (50) "The Evolution and Implications of CIA-Sponsored As.sassinatlon Con- 80-86. spiracies Against Fidel Castro,'' X appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings. (51) "B. Carlos Marcello" in "Organized Crime : Staff and Consultant Reports," IX appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings. (52) Ibid. 641 References : Section D 4 (1) For a detailed history of the CIA and an explanation of the development of its organizational structure, see "Supplementary Detailed Staff Report on Foreign and Military Intelligence," book IV, "Final Report of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities," 94th Congress, 2d session. Senate Rept. No. 94-755 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976). (2) AValter Trohan, "Donovan Proposes Super Spy System for Post War JNew Deal," Washington Times Herald, Feb. 19, 1945. (3) Testimony of Allen Dulles, Apr. 25, 1947, hearings before the committee on S. 758, National Defense Establishment (Unification of Armed Services), Senate Committee on Armed Services, 80th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 525-527. (i) Report to the President by the Commission on Central Intelligence Activi- ties within the United States (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1975). (5) Letter from Acting Director Frank C. Carlucci to House Select Committee on Assassinations, Mar. 23, 1978 (JFK Document 096837). (6) Letter from Chairman Louis Stokes to Admiral Stansfield Turner, DCI, Jan. 27, 1978 (JFK Document 004889). (7) Classified staff study, "Lee Harvey Oswald, the CIA and Mexico City," Dec. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 122-150 (JFK Docu- ments 014972-75) (hereinafter "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City") ; see executive session testimony of CIA employee, Apr. 13, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 103-107 (JFK Classified Document 014739A) ; see generally deposition of CIA employee, Apr. 28, 1978, p. 33 (JFK Classified Document 014733) ; deposition of CIA employee, May 16, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 35 (JFK Classified Document 014728) ; deposition of CIA employee. May 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 28 (JFK Classified Document 014730). (8) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City," pp. 115-122; see deposition of CIA employee. May 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 33-34 (JFK Classified Document 014730) ; deposition of CIA employee, Apr. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 84-89 (JFK Classified Document 014732) ; deposition of CIA employee, Apr. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 46 (JFK Classified Document 014733). (9) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City," pp. 142-143, 160-161; see deposition of CIA employee, Apr. 19, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 29 (JFK Classified Document 014737) ; deposition of a CIA employee, May 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 78-79 (JFK Classified Document 014731) ; deposition of a CIA employee, Apr. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Classified Document 014733) ; deposition of a CIA em- ployee. May 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 37 (JFK Classified Document 014730) . (10) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City," pp. 124-177. (11) Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 304 (hereinafter Warren report) ; see P. D. Scott, P. L. Hoch and R. Stetler, eds., "The Assassination: Dallas and Beyond" (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), p. 452 (12) "LHO, CIA and Mexico City," p. 137. (13) Id. at 137-141. (i4) Letterhead memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, FBI, to James J. Row- ley, Secret Service, Nov. 23, 1963 (JFK Classified Document 000169). (15) FBI materials delivered to the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Nov. 30, 1978 (JFK Classified Document 000169). (16) Interview of J. Gordon Shanklin. June 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 009746). (17) Interview of John Fain, June 25. 1078, House Select Committee on Assassi- nations (JFK Document 009973) ; outside contact report with James P. Hosty, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 015035) ; interview of Arnold J. Brown, Dec. 20, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 013922) ; interview of B. Tom Carter, Dec. 6. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 013542). 642 (18) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City." pp. 180-184. (19) Testimony of Eusebio Azcue Loix»z, Sept. 18, 1978, hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, !).")th Congress, 2d Session (Washing- ton, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 197!>), volume III. pp. 127-139 (here- inafter Lopez testimony, — HSCA-JFK hearings, — ; see interviews of Eusebio Azcue Lopez, April 1, 1978, Aug. 25, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassina- tions (JFK Document 007005). (20 ) JFK Exhibit F^40A, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 25. 69-70, 102-105. (21) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City," pp. 206-234. (22) Id. at 246-247. (23) Ibid. ; see JFK Exhibit F-440A, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 49-50. (2i) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City." pp. 76-78, 240-247. (25) JFK Exhibit F-138, III HSCA-JFK Hearings, 317-319. (26) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City," pp. 93-114. (27) Ibid. (28) III HSCA-JFK hearings, 24-25, 112. (29) Id. at 69-70. (30) Id. at 33. (31) Testimony of Alfredo Mirabal Diaz, Sept. 18, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 173-175. (32) Lopez testimony, p. 134. (33) Testimony of .Joseph P. McNally, Sept. 25, 1978, IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 352-353. (34) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City," pp. 73-79. (35) Executive session testimony of Richard M. Helms. Aug. 9, 1978, pp. 10. 17-18 (JFK Classified Document 014719) ; .see generally testimony of Richard M. Helms. Sept. 22, 1978. IV HSCA-JFK hearings, 9-12 (hereinafter Helms testimony ) . (36) "The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies." Book V, Final Report of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelli- gence Activities, 94th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D.C. : IT.S. Government Printing OflSce, 1976), pp. 67-76 (hereinafter Book V). (37) "Analysis of the Support Provided to the Warren Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency." Appendix to the Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Assassinations ( Wa.shington. D.C: U.S. Government Printing OflBce, 1979), volume XI, pars. 3-11 (hereinafter CIA support of Warren Com- mission. — Appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings. — ). (38) Id. at 24-28. (39) Id. at 28-32. (40) Id. at 40-43. (41) Id. at 60; see also para. 44-45. (42) Id. at 49, 57-59. (43) Id. at .56 ; Helms testimony, p. 12 ; see Book V, p. 70. (44) <^'IA support of Warren Commission, para. 63; but see Helms testimony, 121-177. (45) Book V, pp. 6-7. (46) Id. at 7. (.^7) CIA support of Warren Commission, para. 133-162. (48) Id. at 69-132. (49) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City," pp. 178-183. (50) CIA support of Warren Commission, para. 88-109. (51) Id. at 107-108. (52) Id. at 109. (53) See ref. 12 and accompanying text, supra. (54) Ibid. (55) "LHO, the CIA and Mexico City," p. 179; .see CIA support of Warren Commission, para. 122-123. (56) Id. CIA support of Warren Commission, at 127-132. (57) Id. at 116-117. (58) Id. at 119. (59) See ref. 6 and accompanying text, supra. (60) CIA .support of Warren Commission, para. 112-115. 643 References : D 5 (i) "Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy" (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. ix (hereinafter Warren report). (2) Id. atx-xi. (3) Ibid. (4) "The Warren Commission," staff report, appendix to the hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), volume XI, para. 113-276 (hereinafter WC report, — appendix to the HSCA-JFK hearings, — ). (5) Ibid. (6) Id. at 113-187. (7) Id. at 113-276. (8) Ibid. (9) Id. at 113-187. (10) WC report, para. 113-276; staff analysis of Warren Commission records, documents, hearings and exhibits. House Select Committee on Assassinations (hereinafter analysis of Warren Commission records). (11) WC report, para. 1-112. (12) Ibid. • (13) Ibid. iU) Ibid. (15) WC report, para. 265-277. (16) Ibid. (17) Analysis of Warren Commission records, para. 1-112. (18) Ibid. (19) Analysis of Warren Commission records; "The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy : Performance of the Intelligence Agencies," Book V, Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976) (hereinafter Book V) ; WC report, para. 1-112. (20) Id., WC report at 265-277. (21) Ibid. (22) Id. at 271. (23) Id. at 277. (24) Staff analysis of Warren Commission records ; id., WC report, at 1-277. (25) Ibid. (26) Testimony of Burt W. Griffin, Sept. 28, 1978, hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Of- fice, 1979), Volume V, p. 478 (hereinafter Griffin testimony, — HSCA-JFK hearings, — ). (27) WC report, para. 44-70 ; Griffin testimony, p. 478. (28) Id., Griffin testimony, at 478. (29) Staff analysis of Warren Commission records. (30) Ibid. (31) Warren report, p. 18. (32) Id. at 24. II. Findings in the Assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. References : Introduction (i) See generally Cougressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "The Civil Rights Movement in the United States: 1955-1970." MLK project No. 1, April 12, 1978, prepared for the House Select Committee on Assassinations. (2) See generally Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "Civil Rights Violence in the United States : 1619-1966," MLK project No. 10, July 7, 1978, prepared for the House Select Committee on Assassinations. (3) This account of the last month and the last hours of Dr. King's life is, in large part, based on surveys of FBI files and testimony of v^ntnesses, particularly the public testimony of Dr. King's close friend and associate. Dr. Ralph David Abernathy. See testimony of Dr. Ralph D. Abernathy, Aug. 14, 1978, hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations. U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing OflSce, 1979), volume I, pp. 10-39 (hereinafter Abernathy testimony, — HSCA-MLK hearings, — ). See also executive session testimony of Dr. Ralph D. Aber- nathy, May 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 230246) ; executive session testimony of Rev. Samuel B. Kyles, May 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 230247) ; staff sum- mary of interview with .Tames Lawson, Mar. 15. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 200038) ; staff summary of interview with Mar- rell McCollough, Mar. 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 200306) ; and staff summary of interview with Rev. Bernard Lee, May 7, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 090007). (4) See generally Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "Sta- tistics on United States Participation in the Vietnam Conflict." Aug. 15, 1972. (5) See generally David L. Lewis, King: A Critical Biographv (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc.. 1970). pp. 358-.364. (6) Id. at 358. (7) Id. at 363. (8) Carl Greenberg, "Dr. King Asks Johnson Defeat, May Back Another Democrat — Head SCLC Says Both McCarthy and Kennedy Are Competent Men With Good Civil Rights Record," Los Angeles Times, Mar. 17, 1968, p. A3. (9) Ibid. (10) See generally Richard N. Billings and John Greenya, Power to the Public Worker (Washington D.C: Robert B. Luce, Inc., 1974), chapter 9, "A Strike for Recognition As a Man." pp. 171-204. (11) See Thomas BeVier, "King Disappointed in March — He'll Try Again Next Week." Memphis (Tenn.) Commercial Appeal. Mar. 30. 1968. p. Al. According to this article, Dr. King announced at his Mar. 29, 1968, press con- ference in Memphis that he would return there the following week. He said, "Wewould he are going to have not lead a massive a violent march. nonviolent demonstration . . ." and promised References : Section A (1) Executive session testimony of Dr. Ralph D. Abernathy, May 23, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. .59-62 (MLK Document 230-246). (2) Testimony of Dr. Ralph D. Abernathy. Aug. 14. 1978, hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations. TLS. House of Representatives, 95th Con- gress, 2d session (Washington. D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. I, p. 20 (hereinafter Abernathy testimony. — HSCA-MLK hearings, — ). (3) Testimony of Dr. Michael Baden, Aug. 15, 1978, I HSCA-MLK hearings, 48, 49, 54, 62 (hereinafter Baden testimony). See also "Report on the Subject of the Assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. by the Forensic (645) 646 Pathology Panel." appendix to the hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d session (Wash- ington, B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1079). XIII, para. 13, 29 (herein- after autopsy panel report, — appendix to the IISCA-MLK hearings, — ). (4) Id., Baden testimony, at 44, US; id., autopsy panel report, at 30. (5) Id., Baden testimony, at 68. (6) Id. at 60. (7) Id. at 46, 57-59. See also autopsy panel report, at 81. (8) Id., Baden testimony, at 46, 57; id., autopsy panel report, at 81. (9) Id., Baden te.stimony, at 57-58; id., autopsy panel report, at 84. (10) Id., Baden testimony, at 48, 52, 60; id., autopsy panel report, at 81, 85, 88. (11) See, e.g., Baden te.stimony, id. at 59. (12) See, e.g., testimony of Marrell McCollough, Nov. 20, 1978, VI HSCA-MLK hearings (hereinafter McCollough testimony). (13) Baden testimony, pp. 47, 59. See also autopsy panel report, p. 128. (14) Id.. Baden testimony, at 59; id., autopsy panel report, at 128. (15) See generally "Report on the Subject of a Civil Engineering Survey of the Scene of the Assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.," XIII appendix to the HSCA-MLK hearings (hereinafter engineering panel report). (16) See, e.g., McCollough testimony, pp. 418-19. (17) Engineering panel report, i>ara. 22. (18) Ibid. (19) Ibid. (20) Ibid. (21) Affidavit of Charles Quitman Stephens, June 13, 1968 (MLK document 080011). (22) FBI interview of William Anschutz. Apr. 7, 1968 (MLK document 170141). (23) Designated counsel .statement of Charles Q. Stephens, Apr. 14, 1978, House Select Committee on Assas.sinations (MLK document 210178). (24) See generally "Charles Q. Stephens: Controversial Eyewitness to the As.sassination," after Stephens staffstaff reiwrt). report, XIV appendix to the IISCA-MLK hearings (herein- (25) Interview of Willie Anschutz, July 22. 1977. House Select Committee on Assas.sinations, pp. 7-8 (MLK document 110009). (26) McCollough testimony, p. 420. (27) Interview of Rev. Jesse Jackson by ABC News, Apr. 4, 1968, pp. 4-5 (MLK document 100062). Interview of Ben Branch by the sanitation strike archival project, Aug. 15, 1968, p. 21 (MLK document 010031). (28) Designated counsel statement of Solomon Jones, Jr., June 23, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 270251). (25) Ibid. (30) Ibid. (31) "Report on the Subject of the Examination of Firearm-Related Evidence in the Investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King. .Tr. by the Firearms Panel," XIII appendix to the HSCA-MLK hearings, par. 138 (hereinafter firearms panel report). (32) Testimony of James Earl Ray, Aug. 16, 1978, I HSCA-MLK hearings, 352 (hereinafter Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978). (33) Interview of Donald Wood, Mar. 10, 1977. H()use Select Committee on Assas.sinations (MLK document 070038). (34) MLK exhibit F-35. II HSCA-MLK hearings, 239. See also testimony of James Earl Ray. Aug. 17, 1978, II HSCA-MLK hearings, 40 (hereinafter Ray testimony, Aug. 18, 1978). (35) Ray testimony, Aug. 17, 1978, pp. 103-104. (.56) Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978. p. 352; .see also Ray testimony, Aug. 17, 1978. p. 40. (37) Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978, p. 101; see also Rav testimonv, Aug. 17, 1978, pp. 61-64. (38) Ray testimony, Aug. 16. 1978, p. 102. (39) Interview of Bessie Brewer, Aug. 11. 1977. House Select Committee on Assa.s.sinations, pp. 3-4 (MLK Document 120012). (//O) Se(> ref. 23. supra, designated coun.sel statement of Charles Q. Stei)hens. pp. 55-57 ; interview of Bertie Reeves bv the Shelby Countv Public Defender's Office, Feb. 11, 1969 (MLK Document 030115). 647 (41) Interview of Bernell Finley, July 21, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 110492). (42) FBI interview of Bernell Finley, Apr. 10, 1968 (MLK Document 170141). (43) Interview of Guy Warren Canipe, Jr., May 11, 1977, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (MLK Document 030156). (44) FBI interview of Guy Warren Canipe, Jr., Apr. 10, 1968 (MLK Docu- ment 170141). (45) See ref. 43 supra, interview of Canipe. (46) Interview of Julius Leroy Graham III, Jan. 31, 1978, House Select Com- mittee oil, Assassinations (MLK Document 300052). (.^7) Report of laboratory, FBI headquarters to Memphis, Apr. 17, 1968, FBI headquarters Murkin file 44-38861 — unrecorded serial. (48) Ibid.NSee also Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978, p. 92 (where Ray admitted having a radio when he escaped from prison ) . (49) See generally "Report on the Subject of Questioned Handwriting Related to the Assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.," XIII appendix to the HSCA- MLK hearings (hereinafter handwriting report). (50) Firearms panel report, para. 108. (51) Id. at 130 (52) See FBI interview with Thomas Lau, Apr. 15, 1968, Los Angeles Murkin file 44-1574 ; FBI interview with Richard Gonzales, Apr. 16, 1968, Los Angeles Murkin file 44-1574. (53) See MLK exhibit F-25 (interview of James Earl Ray by Dan Rather, Mar. 9, 1977), I HSCA-MLK hearings, 303. (54) Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978, p. 99; see also Ray testimony, Aug. 17, 1978, p. 49. (55) See MLK exhibit F-52 (change of address card) , II HSCA-MLK hearings, pp. 50-51. See also Ray testimony, pp. 49-51. (56) Ray testimony, Aug. 17, 1978, p. 53. (57) Id. at 55, 61. (58) Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978, pp. 100, 352. (59) Id. at 352 ; see also Ray testimony. Aug. 17, 1978, p. 61. (60) Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978, p. 101. See also Ray testimony, Aug. 17, 1978, pp. 62-63. (61) See ref. 3, supra executive session testimony of Dr. Ralph D. Abernathy, May 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 230246), pp. 51-63. (62) Ray testimony, Aug. 17, 19'58, p. 61. (64) See stipulation No. 30 of MLK exhibit F-79 (proposed stipulation as to material facts in State of Tennessee v. James Earl Ray), III HSCA-MLK hear- ings, 49. (65) MLK exhibit F-42 (interview of James Garner, Jan. 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations), II HSCA-MLK hearings, 20. Garner could not recall the date of payment, but stated that it was on Sunday, 1 week from the day Ray registered. Ray registered at Garner's on Mar. 23, 1968. (66) Ray testimony, Aug. 17, 1978, pp. 64-65. (67) MLK exhibit F-.59 (laundry receipt, Piedmont Laundry), II HSCA-MLK hearings, 65. (68) Testimony of Annie Estelle Peters. Aug. 18, 1978, III HSCA-MLK hear- ings, 302-307, 508-512. See also MLK exhibit F-106A (Piedmont Laundry ledger book). III HSCA-MLK hearings, 308fif. (69) MLK exhibit F-105 (Apr. 1. 1968 articles in Atlanta Journal and Atlanta Constitution), II HSCA-MLK hearings, 9&-97. (70) Ray testimony. Aug. 16. 1978, p. 101. (71) Id. at 102, 354. See also Ray testimony, Aug. 17, 1978, p. 101. (72) Executive session testimony of Samuel B. Kyles, May 11, 1978, II HSCA- MLK hearings, 55-56. (73) See MLK exhibit F-61 (Commercial Appeal), II HSCA-MLK hearings, 100. See also Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978, p. 355. (74) See "Report on the Subject of the Analysis of Fingerprint Evidence Related to the Assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.," by the fingerprint panel, XIII Appendix to the HSCA-MLK hearings, para. 14 (hereinafter finger- print panel report). (75) See MLK exhibit F-15C (view of Lorraine Motel from bathroom window at rear of Bessie Brewer's roominghouse), I HSCA-MLK hearings, 81. 648 (76) Ray testimony. Aug. 17, 1078, p. 101. (77) See ref. 39, supra, interview of Bessie Brewer. (78) Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978. p. 105. (79) Interview of Ralph Carpenter, Oct. 7. 1977. House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 140131). {SO) See MLK exhibit F-15B (photograph of inside of room 5-B), I HSCA- MLK hearings, 80. (81) Ray aretestimony. testimony Aug. 16, corroborated by 1978. pp. 106-107. extrinsic evidence.TheFirst, general the outlines of Ray's FBI located the Mustang in the parking lot of the Capitol Homes housing project in Atlanta. Second, records at Piedmont Laundry show Ray picked up laundry on April 5, 1968. The conunittee found no records to establish how Ray traveled from Atlanta to Canada ; nevertheless, he did check into an apartment in Toronto on April 8, 1968 — 4 days after the assassination. (82) Id. at 106; see also Ray testimony. Aug. 17, 1978. pp. 106-107. (83) Ray testimony, Aug. 17. 1978. pp. 106-107. (84) Ray testimony. Aug. 16, 1978. p. 106. (85) Interview of James Earl Ray, March 28, 1977, IX api)endix to the HSCA- MLK hearings. 79-80 (hereinafter Rav interview, March 28, 1977). (86) Id. at 60-84. (87) Ray testimony. Aug. 16. 1978. pp. 106-107. (88) Rav interview. March 28. 1977, pp. 92-93. (89) Id. at 118. (90) Ray testimony. Aug. 17. 1978. p. lOL (91) Ray interview. March 28, 1977. pp. 7S. 79. (92) Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978, p. 106. See also Ray testimony, Aug. 17, 1978. pp. 106-107. (93) Ray testimony. Aug. 16, 1978. p. 164. (94) William Bradford Huie. "He Slew the Dreamer" (New York: DeLacorte Press. Inc., 1968) (hereinafter Huie. "He Slew the Dreamer"). (95) Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978, p. 35L (96) Id. at 164. (97) Ray testimony, Aug. 17, 1978, p. 108. (98) Testimonv of Gov Dean Cowden. Aug. 18, 197S. Ill HSCA-MLK hearings. 533. (99) Ibid. (100) Testimony of Ernestine Johnson. Aug. 18, 1978, III HSCA-MLK hear- ings, ,547-549. (101) Testimony of Larce McFall, Aug. 18, 1978, III HSCA-MLK hearings. 5.52. (102) Ray testimony. Aug. 16, 1978, p. 356. (103) William Bradford Huie, "The Story of James Earl Ray and the Plot to Assassinate Martin Luther King," Look, Nov. 12, 1968, p. 104. (104) Huie. "He Sh>w the Dreamer," p. 37. ( 105) Ray testimony. Aug. 16. 1978. p. 358. (10G\ See MLK exhibit F-25. I HSCA-MLK hearing.s. 235 (interview of James Earl Ray by Dan Rather, Mar. 9. 1977.) (107) "Playboy Interview: James Earl Ray," Playboy, September 1977, p. 78 (MLK document 2303.56). (108) Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978, p. 358. (lOfn Id. at 94. (110) Id. at 95. (111) Ibid. (112) Id. at !»(). It was not clear from Ray's testimony whether Raoul entered Cherpe.s' boardinghou.se or merelv left Rav outside. (113) Id. at 97-98. (114) Interview of James Earl Ray. May 3. 1977. X app. to the HSCA- MLK hearings, 117 (hereinafter Ray interview, May 3, 1977). (115) Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978, pp. 97-98. (116) Id. at 99. (117) See generally Ray testimony. Aug. 16, 1978. p. 100. Ray has told the committee in interviews that he met Raoul at the Starlite the day after a stop in Selma, Ala. A registration card at the Flamingo Motel in Selma establishes that Ray was there at least on the night of Mar. 22, 1968. (See MLK exhibit F-53, II HSCA-MLK hearing!?. 55.) 649 (118) Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978, p. 100. (119) Ibid. {120) Ibid. (121) See "Compilation of the Statements of James Earl Ray," staff report in III appendix to the HSCA-MLK hearings, p. 218 (ref. 10) (hereinafter staff report on Ray statements). (122) Ray testimony, Aug. 17, 1978, p. 13. {123) Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978, pp. 101, 102. {124) Id. at 102. (125) Ray told the committee in interviews and testimony that he received three separate telephone numbers from Raoul. See, e.g., Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978, p. 98. Often, by his story, Ray did not talk directly to Raoul, but rather to a middleman. See, e.g., Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978, p. 99. {126) Staff report on Ray statements, p. 192. (127) Ray testimony, Aug. 17, 1978, p. 30. {128) "The 20,000 Words," XII app. to the HSCA-MDK hearings (here- inafter "20,000 Words") . {129) Ibid. {ISO) Interview with James Earl Ray, Apr. 29, 1977, X appendix to the HSOA- MLK hearings, 135 (hereinafter Ray interview, Apr. 29, 1977) . {131 ) Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978, p. 100. {132) Ray interview, Apr. 29, 1977, pp. 135-137. {133) Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978, p. 100. {134) Ray interview, Apr. 29, 1977, pp. 150-154. {135) Id. at 144-14 .'3. {136) Ray testimony, Aug. 17, 1978, p. 30. {137) Affidavit of U. L. Baker, Nov. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 270234) (hereinafter Baker affidavit). {138) Ray testimony, Aug. 17, 1978, p. 30. {139) Baker affidavit; interview of Donald F. Wood, Nov. 8, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 150062) . {140) See MLK exhibit F-35 (Aeromarine sales receipt), II HSCA-MLK hear- ings, 39. {141 ) Ray testimony Aug. 17, 1978, p. 40 . {142) Ray interview, May 3, 1977, pp. 67-68. {I43) Interview with James Earl Ray, Sept. 29, 1977, X appendix to the HSCA-MLK hearings, 145. {144) Ibid. {I45) Fingerprint report, para. 21. {146) Ray testimony, Aug. 17, 1978, pp. 12-14. {147) Ibid. {148) Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978, p. 101. {149) Ibid. {150) Id. at 101-102. {151 ) Ray testimony, Aug. 17, 1978, p. 44. {152) Ray testimony, Aug. 16, 1978, p. 105. (153) Ibid. {154) FBI interview of Ralph Carpenter, Apr. 25, 1968 (MLK Document 040055). {155) Interview with Ralph Carpenter, Oct. 7, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 140131). {156) See ref. 23, supra, designated counsel statement of Charles Stephens. (157) Interview of Willie Anschutz, July 7, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 110009). (158) Testimony of Duncan Ragsdale, Nov. 14, 1978, V HSCA-MLK hearings, 250. {159) Interview with Wayne Chastain, Oct. 6, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 190167). {160) See text, infra, at II. D for discussion of the response of the Memphis Police Department immediately following the assassination. {161 ) See MLK exhibit F-319 (affidavit of John Jacobs, Nov. 6, 1978) , V HSCA- MLK hearings, 434. (162) See MLK exhibits F-311 (affidavit of Glynn King, Nov. 3, 1978), V HSCA-MLK hearings, 401, and F-312 (affidavit of Tommy Smith, Nov. 3, 1978), V HSCA-MLK hearings, 404. 650 {16S) See MLK exhibit F-312 (affidavit of Tommy Smith, Nov. 3, 1978), V HSCA-MLK hearings 404; F-313 (affidavit of J. D. Music, Nov. 3, 1978), V HSCA-MLK hearings 408; F-314 (affidavit of C. F. Busch, Nov. 7, 1978), V HSrA-MLK hearings. 412; F-315 (affidavit of John Bauer, Nov. 13, 1978), V HSCA-MLK hearings, 417; and F-316 (affidavit of Stephen M. Darlington, Nov. 3. 1978). V HSCA-MLK hearings. 421. (164) Narration of G. Robert Blakey. V HSCA-MLK hearings. 444. (165) Interview of Grace E. Walden, July 26. 1077. House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 120134). See also MLK exhibit F-336. V HSCA- MLK hearings, 581. (166) MLK exhibit F-340 (interview of Grace Walden by NBC for "Today" show, Aug. 15, 1978) , V HSCA-MLK hearings, 622. (167) Testimony of William L. Srygly, Nov. 14, 1978, V HSCA-MLK hearings, 56-57. (168) Testimony of Dr. David F. Moore, Nov. 14, 1977, V HSCA-MLK hearings, 102. (169) Ibid. See also MLK exhibits F-321 (affidavit of James Simpson, Nov. 3, 1978), V HSCA-MLK hearings. 454; F-322 (affidavit of Michael J. Dougherty, Nov. 3, 1978), V HSCA-MLK hearings, 457; F-323 (affidavit of George Willis, Nov. 3, 1978) , V HSCA-MLK hearings, 461. (170) See MLK exhibits F-321 (affidavit of James Simpson, Nov. 3, 1978). V HSCA-MLK hearings, 454; F-322 (affidavit of Michael J. Dougherty, Nov. 3, 1978), V HSCA-MLK hearings, 457; F-323 (affidavit of George Willis, Nov. 3, 1978) , V HSCA-MLK hearings, 461. (171 ) Testimony of Dr. David E. Moore, Nov. 14, 1978, V HSCA-MLK hearings, 110 (hereinafter Moore testimony ) . (172) Ibid. See also MLK exhibit F-339 (report of Dr. Roger Peele, M.D.), V HSCA-MLK hearings, 613. (173) Moore testimony, p. 114. (174) See MLK exhibit F-327 (affidavit of Dr. Sidney D. Vick. Nov. 7, 1978), V HSCA-MLK hearings, 516. (175) Ibid. (176) Testimony of C. Cleveland Drennon, Jr., Nov. 14, 1978, V HSCA-MLK hearings. 138. (177) Testimony of Dr. James H. DruflT, Nov. 14, 1978, V HSCA-MLK hearings, 164-165. See also testimony of Dr. Jack C. Neale. Nov. 14, 1978, V HSCA-MLK hearings, 186-187, and testimony of Dr. Morris Cohen, Nov. 14, 1978, V HSCA- MLK hearings. 219-220. (178) See generallv testimony of Drs. Druff. Neale, and Cohen, supra, at ref. 177. (179) Ibid. (180) See MLK exhibit F-339 (report of Dr. Roger Peale), V HSCA-MLK hearings, 613. (181) Transcript of guilty plea proceedings, Shelby County Criminal Court, Mar. 10, 1969 (MLK Document 010063) (hereinafter transcript of guilty plea proceedings). (182) Testimony of Phil N. Canale, Nov, 13, 1978, V HSCA-MLK hearings, 132-134 (hereinafter Canale testimony). (183) Testimony of Hugh Stanton, Jr., Oct. 23, 1074, Ray v. Rose, p. 223 (MLK Document 010005). (184) Tennessee Code Annotated Section 3^2405. (185) Transcript of guilty plea proceedings. (186) Ibid. (187) See MLK exhibit F-79 (proposed stipulation as to material facts), III HSCA-MLK hearings, 46. See also MLK Document 110106. (188) Transcript of guilty plea proceedings. (189) Letter from James Earl Ray to Judge W. Preston Battle, Mar. 13, 1969 (MLK Document 030102). (190) Letter from James Earl Ray to Judge W. Preston Battle, Mar. 26, 1969 (MLK Document 030102 ) . (191) Court ruling on Ray's motion for new trial (MLK Document 030165). (192) Ibid. (193) Memorandum decision, Ray v. Rose, 373 F. Supp. 687 (1973) . (194) Ray V. R08e, 491 F. 2d 285 (1974) . (195) Ray V.Rose, 417 V.S. 936 (19^74). 651 (196) Memorandum decision, Ray v. Rose, 392 F. Supp. 601 (1975). (197) Ray v. Rose, 535 F. 2d 966. (198) Ibid. (199) Ray v. Rose, 429 U.S. 1026 (1976). (200) See generally petitioner's memorandum of points and authorities ; memo- randum of facts, Ray v. Rose, Dec. 4, 1972 (MLK Document 110309). (201) Deposition of James Earl Ray, Nov. 22, 1969, Ray v. Foreman (MLK Document 030197). (202) Deposition of Arthur Hanes, Sr., Nov. 7, 1969, Ray v. Foreman, pp. 20- 24 (MLK Document 080055). See also Huie-Ray-Hanes contract, July 8, 1968 (MLK Document 110116) (hereinafter Hanes deposition). (203) Id., Hanes deposition, at 5. See also Huie, He Slew the Dreamer, p. 186. (204) Id., Hanes deposition. Id., Huie, He Sletv the Dreamer, at 193. (205) See, e.g., interview of Arthur Hanes, Sr., May 9, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 210373 ) . (206) Deposition of James Earl Ray, Nov. 22, 1969, Ray v. Foreman (MLK Document 030197). (207) Deposition of Percy Foreman, Nov. 11, 1969, Ray v. Foreman, pp. 11-12 (MLK Document 010050). (208) Id. at 12-13. (209) Foreman testimony, pp. 95, 96. (210) Ray v. Rose, Feb. 27, 1975, 392 F. Supp. 601 (1975). (211) Ibid. (212) Ibid. (213) Testimony of James Earl Ray, Oct. 29, 1974, Ray v. Rose (MLK Docu- ment 010042). (214) Foreman testimony, pp. 84-86. (215) Transcript of court proceedings, Shelby County Criminal Court, Nov. 12, 1968 (MLK Document 010009). 1972(216) (MLKPetitioner's Document memorandum 110309). of points and authorities, Ray v. Rose, Dec. 4, (217) Interview of Percy Foreman, Apr. 13, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 25 (MLK Document 080006). (218) Foreman testimony, p. 90. (219) Deposition of Percy Foreman, Apr. 3, 1974, Ray v. Rose, pp. 72-82 (MLK Document 020031). (220) Ibid. See also Foreman testimony, pp. 89-90. (221) Deposition of Percy Foreman, Apr. 3, 1974, Ray v. Rose, pp. 44-45 (MLK Document 020031 ) . See also deposition of Percy Foreman, Nov. 11, 1969, Ray v. Foreman, p. 29 (MLK Document 010050) . See also interview of Arthur Hanes, Sr., May 9, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 7-8 (MLK Docu- ment 210373). (222) Foreman testimony, pp. 89-90 See also deposition of Percy Foreman, Apr. 3, 1974, Ray v. Rose, pp. 76-78 (MLK Document 020031). (223) Testimony of Hugh Stanton, Jr., Ray v. Rose, Oct. 23, 1974, p. 283 (MLK Document 010005). (224) Outside contact report with Thomas E. Smith, Dec. 8, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 280079). (225) Ibid. (226) Foreman testimony, p. 90. (227) Shelby County Jail logs, July 19, 1968 through Mar. 10, 1969 (MLK Documents 110160, 110161. 110296, 110325, and 110326). (228) Testimony of Dr. McCarthy DeMere, Nov. 13, 1978, V HSCA-MLK hear- ings, 166-167. (229) Deposition of James Earl Ray, Nov. 22, 1969, Ray v. Foreman, p. 54 (MLK Document 030168). (230) Interview of Arthur Hanes, Sr., May 9, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 7-8 (MLK Document 210373) . (231 ) See review of prior investigations by Judge McCrae in Ray v. Rose, 392 F. Supp. 601 (1975), p. 26 (MLK Document 260030) ; see also Foreman testimony, pp. 89-91 ; and testimony of Hugh Stanton, Jr., Ray v. Rose, Oct. 23, 1974, pp. 259- 289 (MLK Document 010005) ; and deposition of William Bradford Huie, Sept 20 1974, Ray v. Rose, pp. 23, 70, 78 ( MLK Document 170154) . (232) Testimony of Hugh Stanton, Jr., Oct. 23, 1974, Ray v. Rose, pp. 259-289 (MLK Document 010005). 652 {23S) Id. at 304. (234) Id. at 242. 310-311. {2S5) Id. at 245. (256) Habeas corpus testimony of Hugh Stanton. Jr., Oct. 23, 1974, pp. 259- 289 ( MLK Document 010005 ) . (237) According to Hugh Stanton, Jr.'s testimony at the habeas corpus pro- ceedings. Foreman had a working knowledge of the case that "amazed" him. It was thorough enough for Foreman to have dictated a 75-page working paper from which the public defender's investigators worked. The record of the habeas corpus proceeding would indicate that although the combined investigation was by no means complete, enough had been learned that Foreman was in a position to make a powerful case for a guilty plea by the time he approached Ray about the pos- sibilitv. Stanton testimony, Ray v. Rose, Oct. 3, 1974, p. 259 (MLK Document 010005). (238) Petitioner's memorandum of fact. Rai/ v. Rnse (MLK Document 110309). (239) MLK exhibit F-262, V HSCA-MLK hearings. 91. (240) MLK exhibit F-78. Ill HSCA-MLK hearings. 17. (2J,1 ) Ray v. Rose, 535 F. 2d 966 (6th Cir. 1976) . (2^2) Transcript of guilty plea proceedings. (2.'i3) State of Missouri v. James Earl Ray, court of the city of St. Louis for criminal cases, circuit court cause 1427-H (MLK Document 280211). (2U) Petitioner's memorandum of facts. Ray v. Rose, pp. 40-41 (MLK Docu- ment 110309). (2ji5) Testimony of Billv .T. Smith. Oct. 22. 1974. Ray v. Rose, pp. 41-92 (MLK Document 010006) , and pp. 103-104 (MLK Document 010007) . (2. ',6) Testimony of Dr. McCarthy DeMere. Oct. 23. 1974, Ray v. Rose, p. 205 (MLK Document 010005) . (247) Interview of Dr. McCarthy DeMere, .July 19, 1978, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (MLK Document 230381). (248) Dr. McCarthy DeMere testimony, Nov. 13, 1978, V HSCA-MLK hearings. 161-179. (249) Rav interview, Sept. 29, 1977, p. 55. (250) Id. at 54. (251) Ibid. (252) Id. at 56. (25S) Petitioner's memorandum of points and authorities, memorandum of facts, Ray v. Rose, Dec. 4. 1972, pp. 42-43 (MLK Document 110309). (254) FBI identification record of John Larry Ray. No. 368 725A (MLK Docu- ment 240087). (255) Rav interview, Sept. 29, 1977, pp. 56-57. (256) Id. at 68. (2.57) Id. at 65; see also tef?timony of .lames Earl Ray, Oct. 29. 1974, Ray v. Rose, p. 864 (MLK Document 010039) . (258) Testimony of James Earl Ray, Oct. 29, 1974, 72a?/ v. Rose, p. 854 (MLK Document 010039). (2.59) Ibid. (260) Ibid. (261) Missouri court records, State v. Ray, cau.se 1427-H (MLK Document 280311) ; see also testimony of James Earl Ray, Oct. 29, 1974, Ray v. Rose, pp. 916-918 (MLK Document 010042). References : Section B (/) FBI memorandum, Hoover to Tolson. DeLoach. Rosen. Bishop. Sullivan, June 20. 1968 : FBI headquarters Murkin file, serial No. 44-3.SS61-4660. (2) See, e.g., George McMillan, The Makinf/ of an Assassin (Boston-Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1976, 1st ed.). (3) "Report of the Department of J\istice Task Force to Review tlie FBI Martin Luther King. Jr.. Security and Assassination Investigations." Jan. 11. 1977 (Washington. D.C. : I'.S. Oovernnient Printing Oflice. 1977), p. 97. C'/) See volume XITI, appendix to the hearings licfore the Select Committee on Assassinations. U.S. FTousc of Reiirosentatives. n5th Cong.. 2d ."^ess. (Wash- ington. D.C: U.S. Covernment Printing Office. 1979) (hereinafter TTSCA-MLK hearings), for the committee's .science reports on the King investigation. 653 (5) See, e.g., ref. 2, supra, pp. 202-209 ; see also "Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Supplemental Studies Pertaining to the Motive of James Earl Ray," staff report, XIII appendix to the HSCA-MLK hearings (liereinafter staff report: Motive). (6') Staff summary of interview of Leslie Allen Achter, June 9, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 180031) ; staff summary of interview of Bercia Lee Barbarick, July 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 230308) ; staff summary of interview of Gene Raymond Barnes, November 2, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 150060) ; staff summary of interview of Julius Maui'ice Block, August 20, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 260299) ; staff summary of interview of Frank Boedeker, June 8, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 180036) ; staff summary of interview of James Thomas Bond, Aug. 1, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 240151) ; staff summary of interview of James Wilson Brown, July 27, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 240282) ; staff summary of interview of Floyd Edward Cain, July 13, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 240153) ; staff summary of interview of Donald Garfield Cox, July 13, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 230309) ; staff summary of interview of Thomas B. Crews, July 13, 1978, House Select Committee on A.ssassinations (MLK Document 230307) ; staff summary of interview of Ray- mond Louis Curtis, November 30, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassina- tions (MLK Document 220133) ; staff summary of interview of Louis Raymond Dowda, August 22, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 240374) ; staff summary of interview of George Ben Edmondson, October 31, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 260219) ; staff summary of interview of Larry Foster, June 9, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 180029) . Staff summary of interview of Ernest "Cadillac" Franklin, June 8, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 100097) ; staff summary of interview of Benjamin Goodin, former prison civilian chef, June 10, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 100098) ; staff summary of interview of Joe Hegwood, June 10, 1977, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 180032) ; staff summary of interview of John Kenneth Hurtt, November 10, 1977, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (MLK Document 18C082) ; staff summary of inter- view of Paul Alvin Gail, Jr., Sept. 24, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassina- tions (MLK Document 300149) ; staff summary of interview of Eric Lafe Lar- son, July 14, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 240156) ; staff summary of interview of Cecil Clayton Lillibridge, November 22, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 170320) ; staff summary of interview of Joseph J. Maloney, November 10, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 180184) ; staff summary of interview of Raymond Louis Menard, July 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 240157) ; staff summary of interview of Michael Moore, June 9, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 180033) ; staff summary of interview of Raymond Patrick, June 9, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 180038) ; staff summary of interview of Robert L. Powell, November 21, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 170321) ; staff summary of interview of Jack Romprey, June 9, 1977. House Select Committee on Assassina- tions (MLK Document 180035) ; MLK Exhibit F-640 (staff summary of inter- view of Walter Terry Rife, May 2, 1978, VIII HSCA-MLK Hearings, 64) ; staff summary of interview of James Stidham. June 10, 1977, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (MLK Document 100094) ; .staff summary of interview of Ronald Terry, June 9, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations ( MLK Document 180037) ; staff summary of interview of Kenneth Lee Wade, Septem- ber 4, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 2.50123). (7) William Bradford Huie, He Slew the Dreamer (New York: Delacorte Press, 1970, 3d ed. ) , p. 45. (8) FBI Document, Mexico City Legat, Non-Prosecutive Summary, p. 14, received from Shelby County, Tenn., Attorney General's office by House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 040063) . (9) See, e.g., ref. 2, supra, pp. 269-270; Gerold Frank, An American Death (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc.. 1972, 1st ed.), pp. 304-305. 654 (10) See MLK Exhibit F-173 (staff interview of Manuela Aquirre-Medrano — aka Irma Morales — June 5, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations), IV HSCA-MLK Hearings, 161. (11) Compare pp. 260-270. ref. 2 .supra and pp. 304-305, ref. 9 supra. {12) Testimony of Alexander Eist. November 9, 1978, IV HSCA-MLK hear- ings, 21-22 (hereinafter Eist testimony). (/.?) See "Dr. Martin Luther King. .Ir. Supplemental Studies Pertaining to the Motive of James Earl Ray," staff rei>ort, XIII appendix to the HSCA-MLK hearings for a more detailed study of Ray's interest in African countries. (14) Staff memorandum on phone contact with Dr. David Abrahamson, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 300148) ; staff memo- randum on phone contact with Dr. Park Dietz, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 300147) ; staff memorandum on phone contact with Dr. Lawrence Freedman, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 300146) ; staff memorandum on phone contact with Dr. Seymour Halleck, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 300144) ; staff memorandum on phone contact with Dr. Irving Harris. House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (MLK Document 300145) ; staff memorandum on Jan. 19, 1978 contact with Dr. Zigmund Lebensohn, House Select Committee on A.ssas- sinations (MLK Document 300143) ; staff memorandum on phone contact with Dr. Irwin Perr, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 300142) ; staff memorandum on phone contact with Dr. Jonas Rappeport, House Select Committee on Assas.sinations (MLK Document 300141) ; staff memo- randum on phone contact with Dr. David Rothstein, Hou.se Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 300140) ; staff memorandum on phone contact with Dr. Robert Sadoff, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Docu- ment 300139) : staff memorandum on phone contact with Dr. Andy Watson, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 300128). (15) See pp. 83-84, 91, ref. 7 supra : see also ref. 3, p. 97 (recognizing the pos- sibility that Ray killed Dr. King, in part, out of a "yearning for recognition"). (16) See p. 83, ref. 7 supra. (17) Id. at 84. (18) Id. at 91. (19) Eist testimony, pp. 21-22. (20) Staff .summary of interview of George Ben Edmundson. October 31, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 260219). (21) Immunized executive session testimony of Marie Martin Levy, April 5, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 29-34. (22) See section II D for a detailed examination of the postas.sassination activities of the Memphis Police Department. (23) FBI identification record of James Earl Ray, No. 306 443A. (2J,) MLK Exhibit F-642 (St. Louis Post-Dispatch Interview), VIII HSCA- MLK hearings, 589. (25) Testimony of John Ray. December 1, 1978 VIII HSCA-MLK hearings, 119 (hf'reinafter John Rav testimony). (26) MLK exhibit F-606 (FBI airtel. June 11. 1968). VII HSCA-MLK hearings, 457. (27) Ibid. (28) Testimony of Jerry Ray. November 30. 1978. VII HSCA-MLK hearings. 98-99 (hereinafter Jerry Ray testimony). (23) Id. at 101. (30) But .see James Earl Ray testimony, August 17, 1978, II HSCA-MLK hearings. 480ff (Ray's denial of involvement). (5/) See MLK exhibit F-173 (staff interview of Irma Morales. June 5, 1978. IV HSCA-MLK hearings, 161) : see also staff summary of interview of Luis Alberto Garcia, June 2. 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 260118) ; staff summary of interview of Oscar Mendiola. June 3. 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinatitms (MLK Document 260123) ; staff sum- mary f)f interview of Rodimiro Vizcarra de Je.sus. June 4. 1978, IIou.se Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 260149) ; staff summary of inter- view of Manuela Aguirer. June .5. 1978. Hou.se Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 250135). (32) See pp. 109-111. ref. 21 supra: see also immunized executive session testimony of Marie Martin Levy, ref. 21, supra, p. 167. 655 (33) FBI interview of Sharon Rlioads, Lau, Apr. 16, 1978, pp. 117-120 (MLK Docu- ment 040062) ; FBI interview of Tomas Apr. 15, 1968, Los Angeles Murkin Report, pp. 131-133 (MLK Document 040053) ; staff summary of interviewp. of2 Sharon Rhoads, Nov. 17, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, (MLK Document 160107) ; staff summary of interview of Tomas Lau, Nov. 14, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (MLK Document 160152). (34) See immunized executive session testimony of Marie Martin Levy, ref. 21, supra, pp. 143-158; immunized executive session testimony of Charles J. Stein,tiveApr. 4, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 81-95 ; execu- session testimony of Rita Stein, Apr. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 9-15 ; see also affidavits for registration for Mimi De Grasse (Marie Martin Levy). Rita Rosas (Rita Stein). Charles J. Stein. Dec. 15. 1967. (MLK Document 160266). (35) Staff summary of interview with Charles Stein, Jan. 23, 1978- Jan. 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 190402). (36) See, e.g., staff summary of interview of Mickey Medina, Feb. 17. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 190288) ; staff sum- mary of interview of Felix Valdez. Feb. 14, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 180389) ; staff summary of interview of Clara Stann, Feb. 15, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Docu- ment 180387) ; staff summary of interview of Theresa Stone, Feb. 13. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 180386) ; staff summary of interview of Charles De Carvelho, June 17. 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 130079) ; deposition of Charles De Carvelho, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 100261). REFEaiENCES : Section C (/) Report of the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Special Agent William Booth, Feb. 15. 1968 ; FBI headquarters Vincent DePalma file. (2) Ibid. (3) Ibid. (Jf) FBI airtel from Director to Denver, Feb. 6, 1968, FBI headquarters Vincent DePalma file. (5) FBI airtel from Springfield to Chicago, Apr. 6, 1968, FBI headquarters Murkin file 44-38841-562. (6) See, e.g., airtel from SAC, Kansas City, to Director, Apr. 7, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file, 44-38861-171. (7) See, e.g., FBI airtel from Little Rock to Director, et al., Apr. 10, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file 44-38861-361. (8) Outside contact report with Dan Senf, May 16, 1978, House Select Commit- tee on Assassinations (MLK Document 210341). (9) Staff summary of interview with Jerry Milton Brooks, June 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 220467). (10) Interview of Mary ToUerton. May 25. 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (MLK Document 220444). (11) Executive session testimony of Walter Peyson. June 8. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 81, 89, 108 (hereinafter Peyson testimony). (12) Executive session testimony of Robert DePugh, June 8, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 55-56 (hereinafter DePugh testimony). (13) Peyson testimony, pp. 95-96; id., DePugh testimony, at 52, 67. (U) Id., Peyson testimony, at SO; id., DePugh testimony, at 54. (15) FBI airtel from Birmingham to Director, Apr. 15, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file 44-38861-1203. (16) Ibid. (17) Ibid. (18) FBI airtel from Mobile to Director, Aug. 7, 1968, FBI headquarters file 157-9586-616. (19) Barnes not only refused to comment at that interview but further stated that if he were subpenaed to testify in regard to this matter, he would still decline to give the committee any information ; staff summary of interview with Sidney Barnes, May 9, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (MLK Document 210292) . (20) Staff summary of interview of confidential source, Apr. 27, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 21010i) ; staff summary of 656 interview of confidential source, May 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK) Document 230010). (21) See, e.g., staff summary of interview of Admiral John Crommelin, Oct. 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 260315). (22) FBI teletype from Dallas to Director, Memphis, Jackson, Apr. 23, 1968, FBI headiiuarters MIRKIX file 44-8SS(!l -1S35. (23) See, generally, FBI headquarters files 157-165— serials 13, 23; FBI head- quarters file 157-164 — serial 13 ; Jackson, Miss., Field Oflice file 157-9586— serial 502. (24) Staff summary of interview of Myrtis Ruth Hendricks, June 24, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 230041). (25) Letter from House Select Committee on As.^assinations to Attorney Gen- eral Griffin Bell, July 17, 1978 (MLK Doc-ument 310123). (26) Letter from FBI to House Select Committee on Assassinations, Aug. 14, 1978 (MLK Document 240280). (27) Telegrams from House Select Committee on Assassinations to Nix, Bowers and McGee, July 7, 1978 (MLK Document 230105). (28) FBI headquarters MURKIN file 44-38861-497. The Bureau identified the subscribers of the three phone numbers to which the calls from Wisconsin were made : 704-758-2908— Earl Hall Used Cars, Earl Hall, owner, i^enoir, N.C., 101 Molehill Drive ; 704-758-4930— Paul Ellison Sanders, Radcliff Rd., Lenoir, N.C., vice president, Sanders Management Co., 704-75S-2100 — Samuel J. Sanders, Cotrell Hill Road, Lenoir, N.C. (29) Ibid. The caller allegedlv identified himself as "Robert" during the call to 704-754-4930. (30 ) Ibid. The caller allegedly had this conversation when .speaking to unknown male at 7O4-75S-210O. (31) Seeref. 28, supra. (32) FBI airtel from Charlotte to Director, June 17, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file 44-38861-i669. (33) FBI airtel from Milwaukee to Director. June 27, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file 44-38861-4949. (34) The name George Wilson was used as an alias by this individual in his initial contact with the House Select Committee on Assassinations in January 1977. Although the committee subsequently learned his true identity, the name Wilson will be used throughout to preserve the confidentiality of the source. (35) Staff memorandum from James Chenoweth to file, January 10, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations re : telephone call from George Wilson (MLK document 290050). (36) FBI letterhead memorandum, July 27. 1969, FBI headquarters file 157- 370-66-482. (37) FBI headquarters file, serial 157-370-4-575. (38) See FBI airtel from SAC Birmingham to Director, Aug. 20. 1968, FBI headquarters file 157-370-4-640; FBI airtel from SAC Birmingham to Director, Sept. 4, 1968, FBI headquarters file 157-370-4-699 ; FBI airtel from Birmingham to Director, FBI headquarters MT^RKIN file 44-3,S861 -4936. (39) The committee's interest in Ray's choice of Arthur Hanes as his first attorney was based on Hanes' previous defense of the individuals charged with the murder of Viola Liuzzo. These individuals were meml)ers of the TTKA. It seemed reasonable to assume that Ray's choice of Hanes was influenced by the attorney's reputation re.snlting from the Liuzzo case ; Ray claimed, however, that his onlv knowledge of Hanes was that he had been ma.vor of Birmingham. See interview of .Tames Earl Ray, Sept. 29, 1977, XI appendix to the HSCA-MLK bearings, pp. 416--417, 421. (40) Staff summary of interview with George Wilson, Apr. 27, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MT^K Document 290051). (///) Executive se.ssion testimony of Robert H. Shelton. June 7, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations. (42) Executive session testimony of Melvin A. Sexton, June 6. 1978, IIou.se Select Committee on Assassinations. (4S) Executive session testimony of Arthur Hanes, Sr.. June 7. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations. (44) Executive session testimony of Furman Dean Williams, June 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations. (45) Executive .session testimony of James Rober.son Jones, June 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations. 657 (46) Id. at 20-21; executive session testimony of Furman Dean Williams, June 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. lG-17. (//7) Executive session testimony of Arthur Hanes, Sr., June 7, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 54^56; executive session testimony of Robert H. Shelton, May 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 33-38; executive session testimony of Melvin Sexton, June 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 23-24. U8) Executive session testimony of Arthur Hanes, Sr., June 7, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 35 ; executive session testimony of Melvin A. Sexton, June 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 14-29. (49) Bill Montgomery, '"The Mystery of J.B.," Atlanta Journal, Oct. 12, 1977, p. 16-A. ; "Atlanta Lawyer to Defend Plot Suspect," Atlanta Journal, May 18, 1961. {50} FBI report, February 15, 1967, FBI headquarters National States Rights file 105-66233-1867, p. 5 ; immunized executive session testimony of J. B. Stoner, March 8, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 6-9 (hereinafter Stoner testimony, March 8, 1978) ; immunized executive session testimony of Edward R. Fields, March 19, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 200 (hereinafter Fields testimony, March 19, 1978) . Note. — While FBI reports, such as the one cited above, and many newspaper reports credit Stoner with being one of the founders of the NSRP, Stoner him- self claims he was not involved in the United White Party, the predecessor of the NSRP, nor was he one of the fomiders of NSRP. (51) FBI report, July 26, 1964, FBI headquarters J. B. Stoner file 157-97-97. (52) FBI report, April 8, 1968, FBI headquarters NSRP file 105-66233-2082. (53) Ibid. (54) Interview with James Earl Ray, Sept. 29, 1977, XI appendix to the HSCA-MLK hearings, 46-47, 53-54. (55) "Stoner Is Lawyer for Ray's Brother," Atlanta Constitution, Novem- ber 3, 1970, p. 15A; news file on John Ray, October 21, 1977 (MLK document 140039) ; "Ray's Brother Sentenced," New York Times, April 24, 1971 (MLK document 140039). (56) Immunized executive session testimony of J. B. Stoner, April 19, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 114 (hereinafter Stoner testi- mony, April 19, 1978) ; see also "Ray Is Arraigned in Private Session," Atlanta Constitution, July 28, 1970. (57) FBI report, FBI headquarters J. B. Stoner file, 174-425-1 ; FBI report, FBI headquarters, Christian Anti-Jewish Party file 65-15743, serials 104r-195. (58) David Morrison and Steven Holmes, "Stoner Indicted in Bombing," Atlanta Constitution, Sept. 27, 1977, pp. lA, 12A. (59) Interview with Thomas Cook, January 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (MLK document 170278). (60) Immunized executive session testimony of Edward R. Fields, April 19, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 184-186 (hereinafter Fields testimony, April 19, 1978) . (61) Indictment in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Alabama, Docket No. CR 63-316 (MLK document 290002). (62) FBI report, prosecutive summary report, March 26, 1964, FBI head- quarters J.B. Stoner file 157-1604. (63) "Rights Party Nominates Atlantan," Atlanta Constitution, Mar. 2, 1964: •'States Rights Slate Lists Kasper, Atlantan," Atlanta Journal, Mar. 2, 1964. (64) Phil Galley, "J. B. Stoner Studies Foreign Policy," Atlanta Constitution. Nov. 9, 1971. (65) Bill Montgomery, "Mystery of J. B.," Atlanta Journal, Oct. 12, 1977, p. Al ; Ron Casey, "Stoner Says FBI, Jews Are Enemies," Birmingham News, Nov. 28, 1977, pp. 1-6; Ken Willis, "Stoner Funds Under Probe," Atlanta Consti- tution, Aug. 24, 1973 ; "Stoner Announces Senate Candidacy," Atlanta Journal. July 6, 1971. (66) Stoner ran for Governor of Georgia and lost in the primary on Aug. 8, 1978 with only 5.47 percent of the vote, Washington Star, Aug. 9, 1978, pp. Al, AlO. (67) FBI report, June 27, 1968, FBI headquarters NSRP file, 105-66233-2127 ; see also, Stoner testimony, Apr. 19, 1978, p. 117 ; interview of James Earl Ray, Sept. 29, 1977, XI appendix to the HSCA-MLK hearings, 46-47, 41-55 (herein- after Ray interview, Sept. 29, 1977). 658 (68) Jefif Cohen and Dave Lifton, "A Man He Calls Raoul," New Times, Apr. 1, 1977, p. 32. Note. — Harry Avery, Commissioner of Corrections for the State of Tennessee in March 1969. claimed that in his official positicm he grot to know James Earl Ray and Jerrj- Ray. Avery claims that while driving Jerry Ray to a meeting, Jerry told him that he (Jerry) was to meet with Stoner and that Stoner had been assassination. the "onr" (implying The Jerry's and was committee James" not atable least) attorney for this to substantiate 2 years claim.before (69) See interview of Harry Avery, Dec. 3, 1976, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 12 (MLK document 040007) ; interview of Harry Avery, June 14, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 29 (MI^K document 1(XX)51) ; memorandum to Governor Ellington from W. E. Hopton re: interview of Avery by Hopton, May 20, 1969. pp. 1, 4 ( MLK document 200472) . (70) Staff comparison of Stoner and James Earl Ray activities from Apr. 23, 1967 to June 8, 1968, taken from FBI files (MLK document 2S0212) ; see also Stoner testimony, Apr. 19, 1978. p. 117; Fields testimony, Apr. 19, 1978, pp. 187- 188 ; also Ray inter\'iew, Sept. 29, 1977. pp. 4&-47, 51-55. (71) Letter "To Whom It May Concern From EkJward R. Fields, re: James Earl Ray Case, June 14, 1968" (MLK document 270062). (72) Ray interview, Sept. 29, 1977, pp. 51-53. (75) Ray interview, Sept. 29, 1977, pp. 51-53; letter from James Earl Ray to J. B. Stoner, Aug. 9, 1968, re: representation in libel matter (MLK document 110108) ; "Commotion Vowed in Ray Civil Suits," Atlanta Journal, Mar. 26. 1969. (74) Ray interview, Sept. 29. 1977, pp. 70-71; "A Retrial for Ray Asked in Memphis by New Lawyers," New York Times. Apr. 8. 1969, p. 14. (75) Bynum Shaw, "Are You Sure Who Killefl Mai-tin Luther King," Esquire magazine, March 1972, p. 116; Robert John.son, "James Earl Ray's Chief Defense Lawyer Claims U.S. Government Agents Killed Martin Luther King." National Enquirer, vol. 44, No. 7, Oct. 19, 1969. (76) Stoner testimony, Mar. 8. 1978, p. 76; immunized executive session testimony of J. B. Stoner, Mar. 9, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 2-^31 ; Stoner testimony, Apr. 19. 1978, pp. 9&-104. ( 77 ) Stoner testimony. Mar. 8. 1978. pp. 137-170. (78) Ray executed a waiver for Arthur Hanes. Jr., but later tried to withdraw it. See also the following waivers of attorney -client privilege executed by James Earl Ray : Mar. 7, 1977 (MLK document 029005) ; Nov. 14, 1977 (MLK document 190100) ; Mar. 27, 1977 (MLK document 070074) ; May 3, 1977 (MLK document 090004) ; May 23, 1977 (MLK document 110328) ; June 22. 1977 (MLK document 130045). (75) Waiver of attorney-client privilege executed by James Earl Ray, May 23, 1977 (MLK document 110328). (80) Immunized executive session testimony of J. B. Stoner, Mar. 8, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 4.5-49. (81) Id. at 45. (82) Id. at 48. (83) Id. at 46. (8J,) Id. at 47-^8. (85) Immunized executive session testimony of J. R. Stoner. Mar. 9. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 41-42. (86) Id. at 46, 77 ; Stoner testimony. Mar. 8, 1978, p. 48. (87) Interview of A.sa Carter. Apr. 6, 1978, Hou.se Select Committee on Assas- sinations, p2. (MLK document 200136). (88) Ibid. (89) Executive .session testimony of William H. Morris, Mar. 10, 1978, House Select Committee on AssassinatioiLs. pp. 6-9. (90) Id. at 33-55. (91) Id. at 11. 12. (92) Report on the Federated Ku Klux Klan, Inc.. Feb. 20, 1962, FBI head- quarters file 157-166-39. (93) Ibid. (94) Executive .session testimony of William H. Morris, Mar. 10. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 40-42. (95) Id. at 12. (96) Id. at 12-13. (.97) Id. at 12-13. 659 (98) Id. at 23. (99) Id. at 27. (100) Id. at 27, 45. (101) MempMs Police Department homicide report, supplement No. 85, Apr. 13, 1968 (MLK document 030203). (102) Id. at 1754-44. (108) Ibid. (104) Ibid. (105) Ibid. (106) Ibid. (i07) Id. at 1760. [108) Ibid. (i09) Ibid. ; see also staff summary of interview of B. J. Smith, July 26, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 120097 ) ; staff sum- mary of interview of W. C. Hughes, Nov. 17, 1977 (MLK document 160044) ; staff summary of interview of J. H. Jones, Nov. 16, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 160045). {110) Memphis Police Department homicide report, supplement 85, Apr. 13, 1968 (MLK document 030203). (111) Ibid. (112) Ibid. (113) FBI airtel, July 29, 1968, to Director, from SAC Memphis re: CB trans- mission on Apr. 4, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file 44-38861-5094. (114) Ibid. (115) Staff summary of interview of B. J. Smith, July 26, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 120097) ; staff summary of inter- view of W. C. Hughes, Nov. 17, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 160014) ; and staff summary of interview of J. H. Jones, Nov. 16, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 160045). (116) See road map of Memphis, Tenn. (MLK document 290024). (117) See Memphis Police Department homicide report, supplement 85, Apr. 13, 1968 (MLK document 030203) ; FBI airtel, July 29, 1968, to Director from SAC Memphis re : CB transmission on Apr. 4, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file 44-38861^095. (118) See, e.g., staff summary of interviews of Lt. J. D. Hamby, Dec. 6, 1977 (MLK document 140256) ; Dec. 7, 1977 (MLK document 160260) ; and Dec. 8, 1977 (MLK document 160261). (119) Interview of James Raines, Aug. 29, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 120095 ) . (120) Staff summaries of interviews of Carroll S. Carroll on July 27, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK docimient 120094) ; Dec. 6, 1977 (MLK document 160253) ; Dec. 7, 1977 (MLK document 160259) ; and Dec. 8, 1977 (MLK document 160265). See also working paper, re: Citizen's Band radio broadcast — review of ledgers received from Carroll S. Carroll, May 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 290028) ; staff sum- mary of interviews of Capt. J. P. Marby, Dec. 7, 1977 (MLK document 160250) ; and interview of J. D. Hamby, Dec. 8, 1977, House Select Committee on Assas- sinations (MLK document 160261). (121) Staff summary of interview of Neal Talley, Jr., Dec. 1, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 160143) ; staff summary of interview of Jon C. Hellen, Dec. 1, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassina- tions (MLK document 170046) ; staff summary of interview of James A. Wallace, Jr., Dec. 7, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 160249) ; staff summary of interview of Michael J. Cimbalo, Dec. 5, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 160201) ; staff summary of interview of Timothy R. Higgins, Dec. 5, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 290030) ; staff summary of interview of Brother Adrian Powers and Brother Stephen O. Malley. Nov. 11, 1977, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (MLK document 160142). (122) Affidavit of Douglas P. Cross, July 8. 1976 (MLK document 290025) ; aflidavit of James Stanton, July 9, 1976 (MLK document 290020) ; staff sum- mary of interview of Douglas P. Cross, Dec. 4, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 160316) ; staff summary of interview of James Stanton, Nov. 29, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK docu- ment 170044). 1+3-112 0-79 660 (123) FCC report, May 17, 1978 (MLK document 210454) ; see also outside contact report of Frank Rose. Apr. 12. 1978. Hou.se Select Committee on Assas- sinations (MLK document 210285). (124) Designated coun.sel statement of Edward L. Montedonico, Jr., p. 33 (MLK document 290023). (125) Staff summary of interviews of Robert E. Ferguson, Nov. 16, 1977, House Select Committee on Assa-ssinations (MLK document 160140) and Jan. 10, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 290029) ; see also staff summary of interview of Michael Welting, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 170336) . (126) Staff summary of interview of Carroll S. Carroll, July 27, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 120095) ; Dec. 6, 1977 (MLK document 160253) ; Dec. 7, 1977 (MLK document 160259) ; and Dec. 8, 1977 (MLK document 160265) ; staff .summary of interview of James E. Bethune, Dec. 2, 1977. House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 160167) ; staff summary of interviews of William H. Austin. Nov. 15, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 160046) and (MLK document 170313) ; staff .summary of interviews of Robert H. McCarty, Nov. 15, 1977, House Select Committee on A.ssassinations (MLK document 160209), and Jan. 19, 1978 (MLK document 170243) ; interview of Lt. Rufus Wesley Bradshaw, Nov. 8, 1977, Hou.se Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 170012) ; interview of Capt. James W. Strauser, Nov. 16, 1977, House Select Committee on As.sassina- tions (MLK document 100041) ; inteniew of James Roberts, Dee. 1. 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 160125) ; interview of Rhea W. Ferguson, Nov. 29, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 160120) ; staff summary of interview of Cranmer Boyce, Nov. 29, 1977 (MLK document 160123) ; staff summarj- of interview of Elmer L. Brown- ing, Nov. 30, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 160121) ; staff summary of interview of L. H. Daniel, Nov. 29, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 160122) ; staff summary of inter- view of Vaugan Dow, Nov. 30, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 160124). See also analytical chart (MLK document 290031). (127) Outside contact report with Angelo Ditty, May 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 210038). (128 ) FCC report. May 17, 1978 (MIvK document 210454 ) . (129) FBI memorandum, Apr. 20, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file 44-38861-1816. (^30) Ibid. (ISl) Ibid. (132) Ibid. (133) Notes of author William Sartor (MLK document 010072). (134) See generally FBI letterhead memorandum. Nov. 21, 1968 (MLK docu- ment 040082) with attachments : FBI Memphis office interview of Frank Liberto, Apr. 19, 1968; FBI New Orleans office interview of Anthony Liberto, Apr. 22, 1968: FBI New Orleans office interview of Mrs. Emma Liberto, Apr. 22. 1968; FBI New Orleans office interview of Vincent Liberto, Apr. 22, 1968: FBI New Orleans office interview of Salvatore Liberto. Apr. 23. 1968; and FBI Memphis office interview of James William Latch. Apr. 19, 1968. (135) Affidavit of Frank Liberto, June 28. 1978 (MLK document 280063). (136) See, e.g., staff summary of interview of Vincent Liberto, June 7. 1977, Hou.se Select Committee on Assassinations (I\IIK document 1.30081) ; staff sum- mary of interview of Salvatore Liberto, June 7, 1977, House Selwt Committee on A.ssa.ssinations (MLK document 130088) ; staff summary of interview of Ida Mae Verbeek. June 7, 1977, House Select Committee on Assas.sinations (MLK docu- ment 130080). (137) Staff summary of inteniew of Ernest Tyler. Apr. 10, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 200^04) : staff summary of inter- view of Linda Cooper, Apr. 6. 1978. House Select Committee on Assa.ssinations (MLK document 260145) ; staff summary of interview of Dorothy Conaley, Apr. 5, 1978, House Select Committee on Assas.sinations (MLK document 260143) ; staff summary of interview of Mrs. John Walker. Apr. 5. 1978. House Select Committee on A.ssassinations (MLK document 260142). (138) Staff summary of interview of James William Latch, Feb. 10, 1978, House Select Committee on A.s.sassinations (MLK document 180.396) ; staff sum- mary of interview of Amelia Louis Cnasco. Apr. 5. 1978, House Select Committee 661 on Assassinations (MLK document 200426) ; staff summary of interview of Buddy Mims, May 22, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 210545) ; staff summary of interview of Mary Frances Stampley, Apr. 8, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 260144). (139) Affidavit of Frank Liberto, June 28, 1973 (MLK document 280063). (140) Staff memorandum to Lehner from Akers and Johnson, Sept. 13, 1977, re : contacts with New Orleans Police Department, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. &-7 (MLK document 290039). (i^i) Staff summary of interview of Inspector N. E. Zachary (retired), June 1, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 130086) . (142) FBI Memphis Office interviews of John McFerren, Apr. 8, 1968 and Apr. 18, 1968 (MLK document 040082 ) . (143) Staff summaries of interviews of John McFerren, Mar. 12, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 260200) ; May 10, 1977 (MLK document 090150) ; and Feb. 9, 1978 (MLK document 190043) ; see also affidavit of John McFerren, June 22, 1978, House Select Committee on Assas- sinations (MLK document 220549). (144) FBI memorandum, Apr. 20, 1968, Director to Attorney General, FBI headquarters MURKIX file, serial 44-38861-1816; see also staff summary of interview of John McFerren, Mar. 12, 1977, House Select Committee on Assas- sinations (MLK document 260200). (145) Interview of John McFerren, Mar. 12, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 260200). {U6) Ibid. {l.'fj) FBI Memphis Office interview of John McFerren, Apr. 18, 1968 (MLK document 040082). (148) Notes of author William Sartor (MLK document 110334). {149) Ibid. (150) Report of autopsy performed on William Sartor by Hillcrest Baptist Hospital, Waco, Tex. (MLK document 110001). (151 ) Manuscript of William Sartor ( MLK document 110334 ) . (152) Ibid. (153) Ibid. (154) Ibid. (155) Staff summary of interview of Sam DiPiazza, May 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 210503). (156) Interview of Dr. Lucas DiLeo. Feb. 22, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 260205). (157) Outside contact report with Mr. Acosta, Oct. 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 260261). (158) Interview of Charles Stein, Jan. 23. 1968, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 17 (MLK document 190402). (159) Immunized executive session testimony of Carlos Marcello, Jan. 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 27-28. (160) Deposition of Carlton Pecot, Feb. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK document 190263). (161) Id. at 16. (162) FBI memorandum. Nov. 21, 1968, FBI Memphis MURKIN file 44-1987. (163) FBI teletype, Los Angeles field office to Memphis and New Orleans field offices, Feb. 5, 1969, FBI headquarters Murkin file serial 44-38861-5540, (164) FBI teletype, New Orleans field office to Director, E^I, Memphis and Los Angeles field offices, Feb. 6, 1969. FBI headquarters MURKIN file, serial 44-38861-5539. (165) FBI teletype, Los Angeles field office to Memphis and New Orleans field offices. Feb. 5, 1969, FBI headquarters MURKIN file, serial 44-38861-5540. (166) FBI teletype. New Orleans field office to Director, FBI, Memphis and Los Angeles field offices, Feb. 6, 1969. FBI headquarters MITRKTN file, serial 44-38861-5539. (167) Ibid. (168) FBI LHM, Los Angeles field office to Director, FBI, Memphis and New Orleans field offices, Feb. 13, 1969, FBI headquarters Murkin file, .serial 44- 38861-5558. (169) Civil rights violation— Raoul V. Esquivel, Oct. 8, 1969, FBI file 44-2401. 662 (170) Louisiana Department of Public Safety, division of State police, attend- ance and leave records (MLK document 16002<.)) : see also deposition of Raoul Esquivel, Jan. 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 7-8 (MLK document 1002G5). (777) Interview of James Earl Ray. Xov. 14, 1!)77, XI appendix to HSCA-JFK Hearings, 159 ; see also William Bradford Huie, "He Slew the Dreamer" (New York- Dehuorte Press, 1970. 1st ed.). p. 37; supplemental deposition of James Earl Ray, Hay v. Foreman. Nov. 22. 19(59, pp. 13-14 (MLK document 030316) ; interview of James Earl Ray, Apr. 14. 1977, IX appendix to the HSCA-MLK hear- ings, pp. 68, 69, 143. (172) Notes of George M. Millan, May 30, 1972, interview with Jerry Ray, pp. 3-1 (MLK document 070096). (173) Id., June 27, 1972 interview with Jerry Ray, at 10. (i74) Ibid. (175) Id., Julv 12, 1975 interview with Jerry Ray, at 2. Ibid.at 3.' (176) Id. (/77 (178) Ibid. (179) Outside contact report with George McMillan, Dec. 8, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (MLK Document 160168) . (180) Ibid. ; see also interview of George McMillan, Mar. 5, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (MLK Document 190554). (181) Kent Courtney advi.sed that on or about Mar. 20, 1969, he met with Jerry Ray in New Orleans" Lafayette Park. Interview of Kent Courtney, Dec. 12, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (MLK Document 170282). Staff investigators also uncovered a registration card for Jerry Ryan at the Tamanaca Motel in New Orleans for Jan. 20, 1975. Jerry Ray has admittedly used the alias "Jerry Ryan" on numerous occasions. The signature on the regis- tration card is strikingly similar to that of Jerry Ray. See also interview of Lillie Kalon, Dec. 12. 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (MLK Document 190111). (182) Outside contact report with Dave Millesink, Jan. 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 170221). (183) Letter from the FBI to the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Feb. 2, 1978 (MLK Document 180262). (184) Deposition of Reynard Rochon, Jan. 26, 1978, House Select Committee on A.s.sassinations, p. 17 (MLK Document 190264). (185) Id. at 6. (186) Id. at 16. (187) It was not until Ray's interview with CBS reporter Dan Rather that he first claimed that when he departed from Birmingham he was unaware that thi.s next meeting place with Raoul was to be in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. Dan Rather interview of James Earl Ray for the CBS program, "Who's Who," Mar. 3, 1977, p. 16 (MLK Document 070077). (188) Ibid. (189) Ibid. (190) Interview of James Earl Ray. Apr. 14, 1977, IX appendix to the HSCA- MLK hearings, pp. 135-138. (191) Ibid. ( 192 ) Ibid., p. 157 ; see also interview of James Earl Ray, Sept. 29, 1977, XI appendix to the HSCA-MLK hearings, p. 193. (193) Interview with James Earl Ray, Apr. 14, 1977, IX appendix to the HSCA-MLK hearings, p. 136 ; also interview of James Earl Ray, Sept. 29, 1977, XI appendix to the HSCA-MLK hearings, pp. 194-196. (19 J,) Ibid. (195) Ibid. (196) Interview of James Earl Ray. Sept. 29, 1977, XI appendix to the HSCA- MLK liearings, pp. 196-198; also Ray interview. Apr. ^4, 1977. IX appendix to the HSCA-MLK hearings, p. 137. (197) Deposition of Herman A. Thompson, Dec. 9, 1977, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, pp. 6, 12 (MLK Document 170001). (198) Id. at 8. (199) Id. at 5, 7, 8. (200) Id. at 16. 663 {201) Id. at 8, 9. (202) Id. at 19. {203) FBI airtel from Buffalo to Director, June 14, 1968, FBI headquarters MUBKIN file 44-38861-4541. {20 If) Ibid.; FBI memorandum from Rosen to DeLoach, June 14, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file 44-38861-4544. {205) FBI airtel from New Orleans to Director, no date, FBI headquarters MURKIN file 44-38861-4542. {206) Ibid. {201) See staff summaries of interviews of Andre Salwyn, Feb. 6, 1978 (MLK Document 180162), Mar. 14, 1978 (MLK Document 190482). Mar. 15, 1978 (MLK Document 190481) and Mar. 30, 1978 (MLK Document 200027), House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations. {208) See staff summaries of interviews of Earl MacRae, Mar. 14, 1978 (MLK Document 190435) and Mar. 16, 1978 (MLK Document 190436), House Select Committee on Assassinations. {209) RCMP reports suppUed by Shelby County district attorney's office, Aug. 31, 1978, pp. 2305-2310 (MLK Document 310108). {210) Staff memorandum from Wendy S. Collins to Michael C. Eberhardt, Mar. 22, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 310115). {211) Staff summary of interview of Earl MacRae, Mar. 14, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (MLK Document 190435) . {212) RCMP reports supplied by Shelby County district attorney's office, pp. 2305-2310 (MLK Document 310108). {213) Outside contact report with Andre Salwyn, Feb. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 310116). {21J^) RCMP reports supplied by Shelby County district attorney's office, pp. 2305-2310 (MLK Document 310108). {.215) Both Joseph Oster and Angelina Lorio, Kimble's former wife, told committee staff that Kimble used counterfeit medical degrees and other fake documents in order to work at a hospital, avoid the draft and secure controlled drugs. Staff summary of interview of Joseph Oster, Apr. 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 250282) ; staff summary of interview of Angelina Lorio, Apr. 30, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassi- nations, pp. 1-2 (MLK Document 210158). Kimble was arrested on July 26, 1967 for false imi>ersonation of a State policeman, aggravated assault and illegal pos- session of weapons (see files for Joseph Oster, MLK Document 210233). See also New Orleans FBI field office report, Jan. 12, 1966, Document 157-4403-L ; state- ment of Jules Rico Kimble to New Orleans district attorney, Oct. 10, 1967 (MLK Document 250260). {216) Staff summary of interview of Joseph Oster, Apr. 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 250282) ; see also files of Joseph Oster (MLK Document 210233). {211) Staff summary of interview of Angelina Lorio, Apr. 30, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 210158) . {218) Staff summary of interview of Jules Rico Kimble, May 3, 1978, House Selev^-t Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 210393). {219) Ibid. {220) Interview with James Earl Ray by the CBC, 1977, pp. 47^9 (MLK Document 130001). {221) Rosenson was prosecuted in Federal court for violation of 18 U.S.C. 1407 — traveling outside the United States without registering as a convicted felon, U.8. v. Randolph Erwin Rosenson, Crim. Doc. 38256, filed .Tan. 14. 1966. divi.sion 6, U.S. District Court, E.D. of Louisiana (MLK Document 140057). {222) Executive session testimony of Randy Rosenson, Nov. 29, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 26. {223) Id. at 18-20, 113-115. {224) Id. at 71, 155-159. {225) Bank records, Birmingham Trust National Bank (MLK Document 150147). {226) Executive session testimony of Randy Rosenson, Nov. 29, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 79-80. {221) Charles Stein F^I identification sheet (MLK Document 170236) ; Rosenson FBI identification sheet (MLK Executive Session Exhibit 14). 664 (228) Outside contact report with George Pittman, Jan. 25, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 170315) ; see also staff inter- view of Charles Stein, Mar. 22. 197S, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-3 (MLK Document 190402). (229) Executive session testimony of Randy Ro.senson, Apr. 29, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 29, 31, 42-43, 106, 112, 116, 117, 120, 125, 126. (230) Staff summary of interview of David Rosen, Oct. 22, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 140270) : staff summary of interview of I'eggy Rosenson, Oct. 13, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassi- nations (MLK Document 140266) ; staff summary of interview of Bill Warner, Oct. 18, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 140280) ; outside contact report with George Pittman, Jan. 25, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 170315) ; and outside contact report with John Phillips, Feb. 2, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassina- tions (MLK Document 180049). (231) Staff summary of interview of Edna Mathews Lancaster, Sept. 27, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 210560) (herein- after Lancaster interview, Sept. 27, 1977). {232) Staff memorandum from Chief Investigator Edward M. Evans to file. Aug. 12, 1977, re Edna Lancaster, pp. 1, 3 (MLK Document 290022) . (233) Id. at 3. (23Jf) FBI memorandum, May 16, 1968, to SAC Atlanta from SA Joseph G. Shea, FBI headquarters MURKIN file 44-38861-2386. (235) Ibid. (236) Staff summary of interview of Charlie Harrison Lancaster. Sejit. 28, 1977, House Select Committee (m Assassinations (MLK Document 190164). (237) Sunmiary of staff interview of Malcom Pittman, Sept. 20, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 190165) ; staff summary of interview of J. W. McCrickard, Sept. 20, 1977. Hou.se Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 190165). (2.?S) Staff memorandum from Chief Investigator to file. Aug. 12, 1977. Hou.s<» Select Committee on Assa.ssinations (^ILK Document 290022). (239) Interview of Victor Lancaster, Sept. 29. 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 190163). (2.'iO) Executive session testinhony of Leon Powell. Feb. 9. 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations. (2.'fl) Id. at 11. 12. (2/,2) Id. at 14. (2J,3) Id. at 14, 15. (2U) Id. at 15. (245) Id. at 6. (2J,6) Id. at 17. (2/,7) FBI report, MURKIN file, sec. 8(;, Serial 44-38861-6069. (2/,8) Ibid. (2.',9) Ibid. (250) FBI memorandum to Gallagher from Peelman. Apr. 2, 1976, FBI head- quarters >n'RKIX file, 44-38861-6115. (251) Interview. FBI Agent Thomas J. Wilson. Feb. 24. 1978, House Select Committee on Assa.ssinations (MLK Document 190012). (2.52) Staff summary of interview of Lii>by Smith, Apr. 17. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (^ILK Document 200.346) ; staff summary of inter- view of Woodie P. Mobley. Mar. 31. 1978. House Select Committee on Assassi- nations (MLK Document 200.3.36) ; staff summary of interview, Diane Brand. Apr. 14, 1978, House Select fV)mniittee on Assassinations (MLK Document 200425) ; staff .summary of interview of Clarence Wesley Pit(s, Apr. 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 2(X>-}25 : staff sum- mary of interview. William L. Smith. .\pr. 17. 197S. House Select Committee on Assa.ssinations (MLK Document 2(¥).3.32). (253) FBI identification sheet. Leon Powell (MLK Document 210494) ; FBI identification sheet. Claude Powell (MLK Document 210495) ; obtained from Atlanta Police Department. Jan. 26. 1978. <25.',) Executive session testimony of Annie Lois Campo.s, Feb. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 6-9; see also staff summary of interview. Annie Lois Campos. .Tan. 20. 1978. House Select Committee on Assa.ssinations (MLK Document 180008). 665 (255) Executive session testimony of Arnold Ray Godfrey, Feb. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 27-28. .^^ttt-t^ * (256-) Contempt citation resolution for Claude Powell, Jr. (MLK Document •>004b0) On Oct. 11, 1978, Claude Powell. Jr., was arraigned and pled guilty to charges of contempt of Congress. On Nov. 21, 1978, Claude Powell, Jr., appeared in Atlanta for sentencing, at wbich time his case was had continued until an unde- termined date in December 1978 ; no final disposition been made as of that (25? ) Written statement of Robert Byron Watson, received May 5, 1977 from Atlanta Police Department, p. 2 (MLK Document 090005) . (258) Ibid. (259) Ibid. (260) Ibid. (261) Ibid. (262) Id. at 3. (263) IbM. . ^ (264 ) Report, Atlanta Police Department, re : Robert Byron Watson, received May 5, 1977, p. 4 of introduction (MLK Document 090006). (265) Id. at 19. (266) Id. at 20. (267) See FBI memorandum, Memphis Field Office, MURKIN file No. 44- 1987-777. (268) Ibid. {269) See, e.g., taped session of interview and polygraph examination ol Robert Byron Watson on July 21, 1971 (MLK Document 150190). (270) Interview of Robert Byron Watson, Nov. 21, 1977, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (MLK Document 150189) . (271) Thomas Bevier, "King Disappointed in March — He'll Try Again Next Week," Memphis Commercial Appeal, Mar. 30, 1968, p. A-1. (272) Interview of Morris Davis, April 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 2-3 (MLK Document 290052) (liereinafter Davis interview, April 1977) ; see also interview of David Lifton re : information on Morris Davis provided to Lifton by William Bradford Huie, Mar. 9, 1977, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (MLK Document 070035) . (273) Davis interview, April 1977, p. 1. (27^) Newspaper articles received from the Birmingham Police Department, Mar. 17, 1977 (MLK Document 070043) . (275) Davis interview, April 1977, p. 6. (276) Id. at 2. (277) Id. at 6. (278) Id. at 1-2. (275) Id. at 2. {280) Ibid. {281) Id. at 3-4. {282) Id. at 4. {283) Id. at 5. {284) Id. ate. {285) Id. at 10. {286) Executive session testimony of Rev. Ralph D. Abernathy, May 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 118-120. (287) Staff summary of interview of Fred Shuttlesworth, Mar. 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 200026). {288) Affidavit of Frank Liberto, June 28, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 280063). {289) Interview of Donald Wood, Mar. 10, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (MLK Document 070038). {290) Staff memorandum to Robert Lehner from Evans and Gannon re: Gus Prosch/Donald Wood, Mar. 15, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 070159) . {291) Firearms transactions, records and office invoices from Aeromarine Supply Co., A-1, for Dr. Gus Prosch from Jan. 20, 1968 through June 9, 1970 ( MLK Document 260141 ) . {292) Staff notes of interview with Gus Joseph Prosch, Aug. 31, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 290049). {293) Staff notes of interview with Morris Davis, July 27, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 290048) ; staff memorandum to Robert Lehner and Edward Evans from Hack and Walker, re : Trip to Birming- ham concerning Morris Davis. Oct. 18, 1077. House Select Committee on Assassi- nations, pp. 2-3 ( MLK Document 140121). i29-i) Staff notes of interview with Morris Davis. .July 27, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 40-41 (MLK Document 290048). {295) Staff summary of interview of Walter Maddox, Dec. 6, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 160206). (296) Ibid. (297) Ibid. {298) Outside contact reports with executive oflBces of Travelodge, Inc., Dec. 5, 1977. Dec. 6, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Documents 160092, 160094) ; correspondence from Travelodge to Congressman Stokes, re: reiK)rt on hotel charges, Dec. 22. 1977 (MLK Document 170009). {299) Staff summary of interview of Billy Fisher, Jan. 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (MLK Document 180334). {300) Ibid. {301) Outside contact report with Leroy Roell, Feb. 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (MLK Document 220377). (302) Ibid. (303) Staff summary of interview of Billy E. Fisher. Jan. 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (MLK Document 180334) ; outside contact report with Leroy Roell, Feb. 23. 1978, House S(>lect Committee on Assassina- tions, p.1, (MLK Document 220377). (30Jf) Executive session testimony of Clifton Baird, Nov. 30, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 41-42. (305) Id. at 42-43. (806) Id. at 42. (307) Id. at 23-30. (308) Id. at 46-49; Baird explained to the staff that he had begim taping conversations between himself and other members of the police department as he believed some oflBcers suspected him of the attempted bombing of OflScer Brent Hardin's automobile in December 1964. He stated that he recorded Blair's initial offer on Sept. 18, 1965, but later lost the recording. (309) Executive session testimony of Arlie Blair, Dec. 1, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 15, 16, 39. (310) Id. at 5. 20, 28, 29, 30. (311) Executive .se.ssion testimony of Clifton Baird, Nov. 30, 1977, House Select Committee on As.sassinations, pp. 24-25. (312) Executive .session testimony of James Bibb, Dec. 1, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 160, 164-165; executive session testimf)ny of Priest Fry, Dec. 1, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 182- 184; executive .session testimony of Robert Gregory, Dec. 1. 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 197 ; executive session testimony of Brent Hardin, Dec. 1. 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 106-112, 125, 126; designated counsel statement of Herman Mitchell, Dec. 22, 1077, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 8-10 (MLK Document 190259) . (313) Executive session testimony of William Duncan, Nov. 30, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 91-108. (31/,) Id. at 94. (315) Id. at 94-108. (316) Id. at 97, 98, 100-104. (317) Id. at 111-112. (318) Id. at 112. (319) Id. at 109, 110, 111. (320) Id. at 10.5-108. (321) Id. at 94-108. (322) Interview of William Duncan, Nov. 21, 1977. House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1^ (MLK Document 160081 ) . (323) Executive se.ssion testimony of William Duncan, Nov. 30, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 104. (324) Interview of William Duncan. Nov. 27. 1977, House Select Committee on As.sassinations, p. 3 (MLK Document 160081). (325) Executive session testimony of Robert Peters, Dec. 1, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 149-154 ; designated counsel statement of War- 667 ten L. Walsh, Dec. 22, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 31-32 (MLK Document 190257) ; interview of SCA Bernard C. Brown, Nov. 22, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1, 2 (MLK Document 160089). ,{326) Executive session testimony of Robert Peters, Dec. 1, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 137. (327) Designated counsel statement of Vernon Austin, Dec. 22, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 8-9, 14^19 (MLK Document 190258). (328) Medical records of Clifton Baird, Apr. 25, 1977, six pages (MLK Docu- ment 240342) ; police and medical records of Clifton Baird, Apr. 17, 1977 (MLK Document 240351). {329) FBI memorandum from W. D. Campbell to Mr. Cochran, June 7, 1977, FBI headquarters MURKIN file 44-38861-6235. (330) Louisville, Ky., Police Department duty records, Sept. 18, 19, and 20, 1965, for police oflScers Austin, Baird, Bibb, Blair, Fry, Gregory and Hardin, 33 pages (MLK Document 210239, exhibits C-J) . (331) Executive session testimony of Priest Fry, Dec. 1, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 187-188 ; executive session testimony of Robert Gregory, Dec. 1, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 199-200. (332) Staff summary of interview of Charles Lee Bell, Oct. 11, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 140082) (hereinafter Bell interview) ; interview of Charles Lee Bell, Oct. 17, 1977, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (MLK Document 140140) (hereinafter Bell taped inter- view) ;statement of Charles Lee Bell to House Select Committee on Assassina- tions, received Oct. 11, 1977, pp. 19-20 (MLK Document 210221) (hereinafter Bell statement). (833) Bell taped interview. (334) Bell statement, pp. 2, 9, 18-20. (835) Bell taped interview. (836) Ibid ; see also Bell interview, p. 2. (337) Bell interview, p. 3 ; Bell statement, pp. 4-23. (338) Bell interview, p. 3. (339) Id. at 1-2. (3^0) Bell statement, pp. 1-2. (341) Bell interview ; Bell taped interview. (342) Bell statement. (343) Interview of A. Wilson Edwards, Dec. 29, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (MLK Document 170077). (344) Id. at 1-2. (345) Outside contact report (with Thomas Kitchens), Oct. 30, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 270020). (346) Ibid. (347) Outside contact report (with Ella Greathouse, Glen Greathouse and Leroy Greathouse), Oct. 4, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 260032). (348) Staff summary of interview of Delano E. Walker, Nov. 11, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (MLK Document 170335). (349) Ibid. (350) Ibid. (351) Id. at 3. (352) Ibid. (353) Ibid. (354) Letter from Dr. C. W. Chastain to Warren Hinckle, Ramparts magazine, San Francisco, Calif., June 12, 1968 (MLK Document 290016). (355) Outside contact report with Dr. C. W. Chastain, Oct. 26, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 290015). (356) Ibid. (357) Ibid. (358) Interview of Delano E. Walker, Nov. 11, 1977, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, pp. 1-4 (MLK Document 170335). (359) Interview of Ruth Ann Walker, Nov. 11, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-3 (MLK Document 180188). (360) Interview of Delano E. Walker. Nov. 11, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 170335). (361) Interview of Ruth Ann Walker, Nov. 11, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (MLK Document 180188). (362) Id. at 1-2. [863) Id. at 2; see also interview of Delano E. Walker, Nov. 11, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 170335). {S64) Interview of Ruth Ann "Walker. Nov. 11. 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (MLK Document 1S018S) . (565) Somersett died of a heart attack on May 7, 1970. Certificate of death. North Carolina Board of Health, Office of Vital Statistics (MLK Document 110292). (366) FBI headquarters, Somersett file, vol. 3, FBI memorandum, Miami SAC to Director. Jan. 5, 1902 : vol. 3. FBI memorandum. Director to Miami SAC, May 14, 1963 ; vol. 3, FBI memorandum. Director to Field, Jan. 23. 1904 ; vol. 1, FBI memorandum. Oct. 22. 1969: vol. 3, FBI airtel, Miami SAC to Director, Oct. 29, 1969; vol. 1. FBI memorandum, SAC Miami to Director, Jan. 8. 1964; see also interview of Judge Seymour Gelher, Mar. 22, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 200085). (367) Dan Christensen, "King Assassination: FBI Ignored Its Miami In- former," Miami magazine, October 1976. p. 31 (MLK Document 030179). (368) Id. at 31. (369 ) Ibid. : see also FBI documents, supra, ref. 2. (370) FBI headquarters, Somersett file, vol. 3, FBI memorandum, Rosen to Belmont, Nov. 13, 1961 (recommending discontinuation of Somersett as a racial informant) ; vol. 3. FBI airtel. SAC Miami to Director. Jan. 5. 1962 (noting that Somersett was no longer a paid informant). (37^) Memorandum report, F.S. Secret Service. Trea.sury Department, Dec. 5, 1969, file No. CO-2-43,860 : memorandum report, U.S. Secret Service, Treasury Department, Mar. 9, 1968, file No. CO-2-43,860. (372) Memorandum report, IT.S. Secret Service. Treasury Department. Dec. 5, 1969, file No. CO-2^3,860. (373) Deposition of Charles Sapp, Apr. 25, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 46-47 (MLK Document 210230). (37.^) Intra-office memorandum, Miami Police Department, from Lt. Charles H. Sapp to Col. Walter E. Headley, Apr. 25, 1968 ( MLK Document 030180) . (37.5) Deposition of Charles Sapp, Apr. 25, 1978, Hou.se Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 53-55 (MLK Document 210230) ; see also Dan Christensen, "King Assassination : FBI Ignored Its Miami Informer," Miami magazine, October 1976, p. 31 (MLK Document 030179). (376) Intra-office memorandum. Miami Police Department, from Lt. Charles H. Sapp to Col. Walter E. Headley. Apr. 7, 1968 (MLK Document 290006). (377) Ibid. (378) Ibid. (379) Interview of Charles Sapp, July 27, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 240021). (380) Depo.sition of Everett Kay, Apr. 26, 1978, House Select Committee on A.s.sa.s.sinations, pp. 54-60 (MLK Document 210227) ; deposition of Haywood Swilley. Apr. 26. 1978. House Sele<-t Committee on Assassinations, pp. .3.3-38 (MLK Document 210228) ; interview of Lockheart Gracey, Mar. 24. 1978. House Select Committee on As.sassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 200084). (381) See .statements of Kay. Swilley, Oracey. supra, ref. .380. (382) Outside contact report with Paul Long. Fel). 17. 1977. House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, (MLK Document 110490) ; outside contact report with Stan Weinbrecht. Mar. 8, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 190206) ; letter from Stan Weinl)recht to House Select Committee on Assassinations, Apr. 5. 1978 (MLK Document 200063) : outside contact report with James E. Smith, May 5. 1978, House Select Committee on A.s.sassinations (MLK Document 210135) ; outside contact report (with the Library of Congress), Mar. 9, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 190204). (383) Interview of Otis Humphrey Moore, Mar. 7, 1977, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, pp. 7-8 (MLK Document 070031) (hereinafter Moore interview). (384) Id. at 10. (385) Id. at 8-9. (386) Id. at 11, 14. (387) Id. at 11. (388) Id. at 11. (389) Ibid. 669 (390) Letter from Otis Moore to House Select Committee on Assassinations, with attachments, Feb. 3, 1977 (MLK Document 060004). {391 ) Moore interview, pp. 2, 4, 12, 17. {392) Letters from Wilson F. Colberg and Senator Edward F. Kennedy, dated Mar. 3, 1978 and Nov. 30, 1977, respectively, to House Select Committee on Assas- sinations (MLK Document 190106). {393) Ibid. ; see also letter from Otis Moore to the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Feb. 3, 1977 (MLK Document 060004). {394) Letter from Otis Moore to the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Feb. 3, 1977 (MLK Document 060004). {395) FBI report, Jan. 28, 1977, MURKIN file. Bureau No. 44^38861-6178. It should he be noted was and had been also under that this report medical carerefers for a tonervous a statement disorder.by Moore's wife that {396) Summary of interview of Myron Billett, Dec. 21, 1977, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, p. 1 (MLK Document 180065) . {397) Id. at 2. {398) Ibid. {399) Ibid. {JfOO) Id. at 3. See also letter from Myron Billett to House Select Committee on Assassinations, Apr. 9, 1978 (MLK Document 210254). {401 ) Ibid., Myron Billett letter. {402) Interview of Myron Billett, Dec. 2, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (MLK Document 180065). See also request of the House Select Committee on Assassinations to the FBI, dated Jan. 24, 1978 (MLK Doc- ument 170274 ) ; request of the House Select Coniniittee on Assassinations to CIA and CIA compliance. May 19, 1978 (MLK Document 210423) ; FBI response to House Select Committee on Assassinations request, Oct. 20, 1978 (MLK Docu- ment 260347) ; outside contact report with J. Aldhizer, Sept. 29, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 260048) . {403) staff summary of interview of Myron Billett, Dec. 21, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (MLK Document 180065) . {404) Billett's credibility was also undermined by an extensive criminal record, which included convictions for armed robbery, manslaughter, grand larceny, and forgery. References : Section D {1) Report of the Department of Justice Task Force to Review the FBI Martin Luther King, Jr. Security and Assassination Investigations, Jan. 11, 1977, p. 141. (2) MLK Exhibit F-438A (FBI memorandum from William C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, Dec. 24, 1963), hearings before the Select Committee on Assassina- tions, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. VI, p. 156 (hereinafter — HSCA-MLK hearings, — ). (3) MLK Exhibit F-451A (FBI memorandum from Detroit to SAC, Albany, Aug. 25, 1967), VI HSCA-MLK Hearings, 298. (4) Ibid. (5) MLK Exhibit F-451B (FBI airtel from Detroit to SAC, Albany, Mar. 4, 1968), VI HSCA-MLK Hearings, 301. (6) Ibid. (7) Ibid. (8) MLK Exhibit F^59 (FBI memorandum from SAC, Memphis to Director, Mar. 14, 1968) , VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 522. (9) Interview of FBI informant, Apr. 4, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 200035). {10) Testimony of Dr. Ralph Albernathy, Aug. 14, 1978, I HSCA-MLK hear- ings, 18 (hereinafter Abernathy testimony) ; see also "King Disappointed in March — He'll Try Again Next Week" Memphis, (Tenn.) Commercial Appeal, Mar. 30. 1968. p. Al. {ID MLK Exhibit F-451C (FBI memorandum from G. C. Moore, Chief, Racial Intelligence Section, to William C. Sullivan, Assistant Director, Domestic Intel- ligence Division. Mar. 29, 1968), VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 307. {12) Abernathy testimony, p. 32. {13) Chief Comisel's notes, May 17, 1978, Re: FBI's Black organizing project/ invaders informant files (MLK Document 300003). 670 iH) Interview of FBI informant. Nov. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 290041). It should be noted that at the in- formant's request, the committee has agreed not to disclose his identity in this report. (15) Ibid. (16) Testimony of Marrell McCollough. Nov. 20, 1978, VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 417 (hereinafter McCollough testimony). (/7) Testimony of William Lawrence, Nov. 21, 1978. VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 547 (hereinafter Lawrence testimony). (18) MLK Exhibit F-lo.") (FBI interview of Marr.?ll McCollough, Apr. 11, 1968). VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 422. (19) McCollough testimony, p. 4.33. (20) See Lawrence testimony, pp. 541. 54(>-548. (21) FBI teletype to Director from Memphis. Tenn., Mar. 28, 1968. (22) Lawrence testimony, p. 547. (23) MLK Exhibit F-456 (FBI memorandum to Director from SAC, Memphis, Tenn., Mar. 29, 1968), p. 4, VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 470. (2^) Lawrence testimony, p. 549. (25) Executive session testimony of Howell Lowe. May 24. 1978, House Select Committee on As.';assinations, pp. 11-13. (26) FBI memorandum from William ('. Sullivan to Cartha Delx)ach, Mar. 20, 1968, re: MLK's march on Washington. Bureau file No. 157-106670-415. (21) Executive session testimony of Howell Lowe, ref. 25, supra, pp. 115-118. (28) See, e.g., Lawrence testimony, Nov. 21, 1978. p. 546. (29) FBI airtel to Director from SAC Mobile. Mar. 25, 1968, re: racial intelli- gence, Bureau No. 100-448006-^3. (30) FBI airtel from Director to SAC. Mobil?. Ala., Apr. 2. 1988, re: counter- intelligence program — Washington spring project. Bureau No. 100-448006-63. (31) Letter from G. Rol)ert Blakey to GriflRn B. Bell. June 20, 1978, re: Ray associates list ( MLK Document 220442 ) . (32) Letter from Director, FBI, to House S?lect Committee on Assassinations, Aug. 10, 1978 (MLK Document 240222). (33) Interview of [name deleted], Oct. 13. 1978. Hou.'ie Select Committee in Assas.sinations (MLK Document 260219). (34) Id. at 5. (35) Id. at 2. (36) Id. at 3-4. (37) The .seven agents and their 1968 FBI office assignments, as identified from FBI reports, were: Thomas Weaver, .Tefferson City. Mo.; Arthur Woods, Spring- field, 111. ; Roliert Haines, Alton, 111. : Cletis Bidewell. St. Louis, Mo. ; Robert Pevahouse, Des Plaines. 111. ; Mac Oliver, Quincy, 111. ; and Joseph Kissiah, who served as ca.se agent and of the office of origin. Kansiis City, ^lo. An eighth agent. Rowan Ayers from the Jeffer.son City. Mo., office of the FTil, was similarly iden- tified but is now deceased. The following MLK documents reflect the interviews of the seven agents listed above : staff summary of interview of Thomas Weaver, July 28. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 250083) ; staff .summary of intervi?w of Arthur Woods, Sept. 1, 1978, House Se- lect Committee on As.sassinations (MLK Document 2.W084) ; staff summary of interview of Robert Haines, Aug. 29. 1978, House Select (^)mmittee on Assassina- tions (MLK Document 250085) : staff summary of interview of Cletis Bidewell, Aug. 31, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 250086) ; staff summary of interview of Robert Pevahouse, Aug. 28. 1078, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 250087) : staff summary of interview of Joe Ki.ssiah. July 28, 197H. Hou.se Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 250088) ; and staff summary of interview of Mac Oliver, Sept. i, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 2.50082). (.78) Bernard S. Lee. Rf'LC v. f'lnrriwr M. Kcllry rf. nh. civil action No. 76- 1185, U.S. District Court for District of Columbia, memorandum opinion and order. Jan. .31, 1977. pp. 3^ (MLK Document 270135). (55) Ler v. Kellcy. motion for the Cnited States to intervene as party defend- ant. Nov. 10, 1978 (MLK Document 2701.35) . (.)(?) Lee. V. Kclley. order. Nov. 14. 1978 (MLK Document 270135). (Jfl) MLK Exhibit F-442A (FBI memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, As.sistant Director, Domestic Intelligence Division, Apr. 18, 1968), VI HSCA-MLK Hearings, 181. 671 (42) Ibid. (43) FBI memoraiulum from SxVC, Atlanta to file, Jiine 23, 1966, Bureau No. 100-6670E-106. Letter from the FBI to the tSeuate Select Committee to Study Govern- (44) mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, July 21, 1975. (45) Testimony of Ramsey Clark, Nov. 28, 1978, VII HSCA-MLK Hearings, 128 (hereinafter Clark testimony). (46) Id. at 130. Mark pp. (/,7) 1978), Lane and Dick Gregory, Code Name "Zorro" (New York: Pocket Books, 151-157 (hereinafter Zorro). (48) Executive session testimony of Donald H. Smith, Mar. 21, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 13, 20 (hereinafter Smith executive ses- sion testimony). {4S) Testimony of Frank C. Holloman, Nov. 10, 1978, IV HSCA-MLK Hear- ings, 253 (hereinafter Holloman testimony) ; interview of James MacDonald, Feb. 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 200333). (50) Compare statement of former Chief of Police Henry Lux that the normal practice was to give Dr. King security (staff interview of Henry Lux, June 22, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, MLK Document 290045) (here- inafter Lux interview), with testimony of Inspector Smith that he did not ever recall providing security for Dr. King previously ( Smith executive session tes- timony. Mar. 21, 1978, p. 12) and statement of Lieutenant Arkin that no previous security was ever provided Dr. King because he always said he did not want it (interview of Lieutenant Arkin, Dec. 15, 1976, House Select Committee on Assas- sinations, p11 . (MLK Document 040017) ) . (51) Smith executive session testimony. Mar. 21, 1978, pp. 15-16. (52) Id. at 19; See also "Civil Disorders; Memphis, Tenn. Feb. 12-Apr. 16, 1968," a report prepared for Frank Holloman, director of fire and police, by Lieutenant Arkin (MLK Document 030198). Portions of this report appear as MLK exhibit F-186, IV HSCA-MLK hearings, 246. (53) MLK Exhibit F-187 (Apr. 5, 1988, memorandum from Smith to Huston), IV HSCA-MLK hearings, 257. (54) Ibid. .(55) Ibid. (56) Smith executive session testimony, Mar. 21, 1978, p. 26. (57) Id. at 20-27. (58) Id. at 26-27. (59) Id. at 27. (60) Lux interview-, p. 3. (61) Ibid. (62) Interview of James MacDonald, Feb. 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 2-3, (MLK Document 200333) . (63) Smith executive session testimony. Mar. 21, 1978, p. 28. (64) Holloman testimony, pp. 263, 264. Holloman stated he was unaware of the withdrawal of the detail until informed of it by the committee in 1978 ( Holloman testimony, p. 263 ) . The committee noted that retired Chief of Police Henry Lux said Holloman was not considted when the decision to withdraw the detail was transmitted by Huston to Smith (Lux interview). (65) Interview of W. B. Richmond, Mar. 7, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 7 (MLK Document 190430) (hereinafter Richmond interview) ; testimony of Edward Redditt, Nov. 10, 1978, IV HSCA-MLK hearings, 202 (hereinafter Redditt testimony). (66) Executive session testimony of Graydon P. Tines, Mar. 21, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 100 (hereinafter Tines executive session testimony ) . (67) Executive session testimony of Edward Redditt, Mar. 22, 1978, House Select Committee on Assas.sinations, p. 24 (hereinafter Redditt executive session testimony). (68) Id. at 33; Redditt testimony, p. 204; see also MLK exhibit F-229 (MPD internal memorandum, Apr. 4, 1968, from Redditt to Tines), IV HSCA-MLK hearings. 207. (69) Redditt executive session testimonv, p. 34. (70) Id. at 40. (71) Id. at 41. (72) Ibid. 672 (73) Tines executive session testimony, p. 100. (7^) Mempliis Police Department supplementary homicide report, July 22, 1968, p. 1525 (MLK Document 030203). (75) Richmond interview, pp. 7-9. (76) Smith executive session testimony, p. 29. (77) Redditt executive session testimony, p. 25. (7S) MLK exhibit F-229 (AIPD internal memorandum, Apr. 4, 1908, from Redditt to Tines), IV HSCA-MLK hearings, 207. (79) Memphis Police Department memorandum from Tines to Routt, July 17, 1968, re security and surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King from time he arrived in Memphis on Apr. 3, 1968, until he was assassinated on the evening of Apr. 4, 1968 (MLK executive session exhibit No. 56) . (SO) Redditt executive session testimony, p. 26. (81) Id. at 27-29. (82) Id. at 24. (83) Id. at 42. (84) Tines executive session testimony, p. 102. (85) Richmond interview, p. 9. (86) Redditt testimony, pp. 224-225. (87) Id. at 205, 225. (88) Id. at 205. (89) Statement of Edward Redditt given at central police headquarters on Apr. 10, 1968 (MLK executive session exhibit No. 70) . (90) Redditt executive session testmony. pp. 179-1S(). Portions of this testi- mony appear at MLK exhibit F-1H3, IV HSCA-MLK hearings, 211. (91 ) Redditt testimony, p. 218. (92) Id. at 217-218. (93) Ibid. (94) Zorro. p. 157. (95) Redditt executive session testimony, p. 148. (96) Id. at 150-151. (97) Richmond interview, p. 20. (98) Tines executive session testimony, pp. 116-117. (99) Redditt executive session testimony, p. 152. (100) Id. at 181, 182. (101) Redditt testimony, p. 232. (102) Ibid. (103) Id. at 233. (104) Memphis Police Department memorandum from Redditt to Tines. Mar. 8. 1968, re "Threats from Rosetta Miller FC, administrative a.ssistant, U.S. Civil Rights Commission" (MLK executive session exhibit No. 67). (105) See e.g., MLK exhibit F-229 (memorandum from Redditt to Tines. Apr. 4, 1968 re "Surveil'ance of Martin Luther King. Jr.. and Related Activi- ties"), IV HSCA-MLK hearings. 207. (106) Tines executive session testimony, p. 108. (107) Interview of Lieutenant Arkin. Dec. 15. 1976. House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 23 (MLK Document 040017) (hereinafter Arkin interview). (108) Tines executive session testimony, p. 108. (109) Holloman testimony, p. 266. (110) Arkin interview, p. 23. (///) Interview of James MacDonald. Feb. 23. 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (MLK Document 200333). (JJ2) Tines executive ses.sion testimony, pp. 112-113. (113) Holloman testimony, p. 267. ( ////) Redditt executive session testimony, p. 80. (115) Redditt testimony, p. 209. (116) Holloman testimony, p. 267. (117) Id. at 266. (118) Outside contact report with Robert Coff Feb. 4. 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Do-nmeiit 1S0379). (119) Holloman testimony, p. 270: MLK exhibit F 189 (MPD memorandum from Tines to MacDonald. Apr. 4, 1968). IV HSCA-^'LK heanngs, 268. (120) Holloman testimony, p. 270. (121) Tines executive .session testimonv. pp. 110-112. (122) Arkin interview, p. 21. 673 (123) Interviews of I'liil Manuel, Nov. 23, 1976 and Mar. 18, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Documents 290044 and 070147). (12^) Deposition of conlidential source, Apr. 3, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 32-38 (MLK Document 280104). (125) MLK exhibit F-189, IV HSCA-MLK tohearings, 268. Although the memo- randum discussing Manuel was addressed MacDonald, MacDonald had no memory of Manuel or any threat Manuel transmitted. MacDonald recalls Red- ditt's transfer as being the cumulative result of prior threats directed against Kedditt and his family. Interview of MacDonald, Feb. 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (MLK Document 200333). (126) MLK exhibit F-190 (Memphis Police Department memorandum from Arkin to Tines, Apr. 4, 1968), IV HSCA-MLK hearings, 269. (127) Tines executive session testimony, p. 115. (128) Holloman testimony, Nov. 10, 1978, pp. 270-271. (129) Statement of Edward Redditt given at central police headquarters on Apr. 10, 1968 (MLK executive session exhibit No. 70) , p. 1. (130) Zorro. pp. 144-150. (131) Interview of Floyd Newsum, Dec. 13, 1976, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 2-3 (MLK Document (>J0012) (hereinafter Newsum interview). (132) Id. at 8. (133) See Memphis Fire Department strength reports (MLK Document 290040). (134) Newsum interview, pp. 5-6. (135) Memphis Fire Department strength reports (MLK Document 290040). (136) Interview of Norvell E. Wallace, Dec. 17, 1976, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 6 (MLK Document 040020). (137) Memphis Fire Department strength reports (MLK Document 290040). ( 138) Tines executive session testimony, p. 118. (139) Ibid. (140) Memphis Police Department memorandum, Redditt to Tines, Apr. 4, 1968 (MLK executive session exhibit No. 68) , p. 2. (141) Redditt testimony, pp. 230-231. (142) Newsum interview, pp. 9, 11. (143) Id. at 9. (144) Interview of James O. Barnett, Feb. 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 200427). (145) The estimate, taken from MPD files, includes a MFD undercover officer, Marrell McCollough, who was present at the Lorraine at the time of the assassi- nation, and TACT unit 11, composed of 12 to 16 oflicers, which was actually locatedhave may a few beenyards in the beyond area abutmile's radius. noIt records for which excludes remain routine inward the cars MPD.which The estimate actually reflects the location of most officers at 6:08 p.m., when the news of the shooting was broadcast, rather than their locations at 6:01, when Dr. King was shot. See also MLK exhibit F-1S6 (MPD report from Arkin to Holloman), IV HSCA-MLK hearings. 246. (146) Holloman testimony, p. 278. (147) MLK exhibit F-194 (affidavit of Judson Ghormley), IV HSCA-MLK hearings. 285. (148) Testimony of Marrell McCollough, Nov. 20. 1978, VI HSCA-MLK hear- ings. 418-419 (hereinafter McCollough testimony). (149) See e.g., staff interview of P. M. Jowers, July 28, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (MLK Document 120104) and staff interview of Stephen B. Scott. Julv 29. 1977. House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 5 (MLK Document 110486). (150) McCollough testimony, p. 419. (151) Richmond interview, p. 16. (152) MLK exhibit F-194 (affidavit of Judson Ghormley), IV HSCA-MLK hearings, 285. (153) Memphis Police Department supplementary homicide report, supple- ment No. 27, p. 1 (MLK Document 030203). The substance of the report, which dealt with the activities of all members of TACT 10, was corroborated in inter- views with the staff. See also staff interview of Emmett Douglas, Aug. 24, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 120112). 674 (154) Memphis Police Department supplementary homicide report, supple- ment No. 27, p. 1 (MLK Document 03(t203). See also MF.K Exhibit F-194 (affidavit of Judson Ghormley), IV HSCA-MLK hearings, 285; interview of Barney G. Wright, Aug. 14, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (MLK Document 12(X)18). (155) Interview of Vernon Dollahite, Aug. 15, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (MLK Document 120101 ). (156) MLK exhibit F-194 (affidavit of Judson (!li:>rmley ), IV HSCA-MLK hearings, 285. (157) Interview of Barney G. Wright, Aug. 14, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (MLK Document 1201 IS). (loS) Memphis Police Department supplementary homicide report, supple- ment Xo. 27. p. 2 (MLK Document 030i03). (159) Ibid. ; interview of Barney G. Wright, Aug. 14, 1977, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, pp. 5-8 (MIvK Dociunent 120018). {160) MLK exhil)it F-194 (affidavit of .ludson Ghormley). IV HS'^A-MLK hearings, 285; interview of Vernon Dollahite, Aug. 15. 1977. House Selev-t Com- mittee on Assassinations. i)p. 2-3 (MLK Document 120101). (161) MLK exhibit F-195 (affidavit of Frank Kallahf^r. with attached tran- scripts of April 4, 1968, Memphis police radio broadcasts). IV HSCA-MLK hearings, 287. (162) Ibid. (163) Ibid. (16Jt) Ibid. (165) Ibid. (166) Ibid.; see also affidavit of E. Winslow Chapman, June 7. 1978 (MLK Document 2204 7G). (167) See, e.g., MLK exhibit F-193 (affidavit of W. O. Crumby), IV IISCA- MLK hearings. 279; see also interview of Clyde S. Bounds. July 29. 1977, House Select Committee on A.s,sassinations (MLK Document 120102) (herein- after Bounds interview) ; interview of Stephen B. Scott, July 29. 1977. p. 1. House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 11018(!) : interview of Henry Lux. June 22. 197f?. House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 290045) (hereinafter Lux interview). (168) Frank Ilolloman, former director of fire and safety, stated that after the rioting starte. 4. (175) During .Tames Earl Ray's incarceration jit Missouri State Penitentiary, Jefferson City, Mo., he made two unsuccessful es(iip<>s, one in 1961 and the other in 1966. (See James Earl Ray's Missouri State Penitentiary records: Nov. 19, 1961. interoffice communication on attempted escape of Ray ; March 13, 1966, interoffice communication on attempted escaped of inmate Ray (MLK Document 060018). (176) Missouri State Penitentiary visitation records (MLK Document 240176) . (777) James Earl Ray's Missouri State Penitentiary records: bank account rec-ords from March 22, 1960 to July 14. 1967 (MLK Document 060018). (178) James Earl Ray's Missouri State Penitentiary records: reports on e.scape investigations (MLK Document 060018). (179) See. generally. FBI and House Select Committee on A.ssassinations interviews with former inmate associates of Ray and Missouri State pri.son officials. 2 vols., approximately 1.30 interviews as iJVimmarized in MLK Docu- ment 280061. (180) Staff report on contents of Ray's Missouri State Penitentiary records, .Tune 11. 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 8-9 (MLK Docu- ment 100038) . 675 (181) Letter from Harry F. Lauf to House Select Committee ou Assassina- tions, June 17, 1977 ( MLK Document 100071) . (182) Ibid. (183) Ibid. (ISJf) Letter from Harry F. liauf to House Select Ck)mmittee on Assassina- tions, January 26, 1978 (MLK Document 170324). (185) Interview of James Earl Ray, Dec. 2, 197/, House Select Commit- tee on Assassinations, XI Appendix to the HSCA-MLK Hearings, pp. 8-10. (186) Ibid. (187) James Earl Ray's Missouri State Penitentiary records: reports on escape investigation (MLK I)o,cument 060018) ; interview of Major Bernard J. Poiry, June 12, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Docu- ment 180034) ; interview of Dantou Steele, June 12, 1977, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (MLK Document 100095) ; interview of former Warden Harold Rudolfo Swenson, June 7, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassina- tions (MLK Document 230037). (188) Staff summary of interview of Raymond Patrick, June 9, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (MLK Document 180038) ; staff summary of interview of Robert L. Powell, Nov. 21, 1977, House Select on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 180032) ; staff summary of interview of Jack Romprey, June 9, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (MLK Document 180035) ; staff summary of interview of Michael Moore, June 9, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (MLK Document 180033) ; staff summary of interview of James Stidham, June 10, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (MLK Document 100094) ; interview of Ernest Franklin, June 8, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-3 (MLK Document 100097) ; staff summary of Joseph J. Maloney, Nov. 10, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 180184) ; staff summary of interview of John Kenneth Hurtt, Nov. 10, 19'77, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 180082) ; staff summary of interview of Robert L. Powell, Nov. 21, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (MLK Document 170321). (189) James from communication Earl Capt. Ray's Donald MissouriWyrick, State Penitentiary June 19, 1968records: interoflBce (MLK Document 060018) ; FBI Kansas City 302 S.A. report, June 14, 1968, interview of Danton Steele on May 27, 1968, p. 29 (MLK Document 040058) ; staff summary of inter- view of Capt. Danton Steele, June 12, 1977, House Select Committee on Assas- sinations, p.2 (MLK Document 100095) ; staff summary of interview of Maj. Bernard J. Poiry, June 12, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (MLK Document 180034). (190) Staff summary of interview of James Stidham, June 10. 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (MLK Document 100094). (191) Staff memorandum from I^ee and Chenoweth to Lehner re "probable method used to escape from Missouri State Penitentiary," June 24, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 5 (MLK Document 190393). (192) Staff summary of interview of Frank Guinan, July 13, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (MLK Document 300001) . (193) Interview of James Earl Ray, Dec. 2, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, XII Appendix to the HSCA-MLK hearings, p. 27. (19^) Staff summary of interview of James Stidham, June 10, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (MLK Document 100004). (195) FBI interview of Donald Garfield Cox, June 5. 1968; reported by S.A. Harold Dobson in St. Louis MT'RKIN report. June 25. 1968; see also staff sum- mary of interview of Joseph J. Maloney, House Select Committee on Assassina- tions, p.3 (MLK Dor-ument 180184). (196) Staff summary of interview of Capt. Danton Steele, June 12, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (MLK Document 100095) ; staff summary of interview of former Warden Harold Rudolfo Swenson, June 7, 1977. House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 230037) . (197) James Earl Ray's Missouri State Penitentiary records: interoflSce com- munication, Apr. 23, 1967 re inmate Ray missing at 5 p.m. count ; memorandum, Aug. 16, 1967, re escape of Ray (MLK Document 060018) . (198) Outside contact report with Lt. William R. Turner, Oct. 16, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (MLK Document 280090). U3-112 0-79-144 676 (199) James Earl Ray's Missouri State Penitentiary records: interoflSce com- munication. May 4, 1967, re supplement to escape investigation reiK)rt of May 3, 1967 (MLK Document 160018). The failure of various prison employees to perform their duties properly resulted in administrative action against them, although none were terminated. Top oflBcials at the prison further concluded it would not be justifiable to take action against any inmates who had helped Ray. Staff memorandum from Lee and Chenoweth to Lehner re "probable method used to escape from Missouri State Penitentiary," June 24, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 8 (MLK Document 190393). References : Section E (/ I See final report of Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Opera- tions with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Congress, 2d session (Washing- ton, D.O. : U.S. Government Printing OflSce, 1976), book III, p. 4 (hereinafter book III, Senate Intelligence Committee). (2) Id. at 13. (3) Testimony of Dr. Ralph Abernathy, Aug. 14, 1978, hearings before the Se- lect Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. I, p. 12 ( hereinafter Abernathy te.stimony — HSCA-MLK hearings — ). {^) FBI memorandum from Director to Atlanta, Sept. 20, 1947, re: Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Bureau No. l(K)-438794-Xl. (5) Department of Justice memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Robert Murphy to Assistant Attorney General J. S. Pottinger, Mar. 31, 1976, p. 8 (MLK Document 120023) . (6) Id. at 11. (7) Testimony of Charles Brennan, Nov. 17, 1978, VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 129 (hereinafter Brennan testimony). (8) MLK exhibit F-435 (FBI investigative branch organizational chart — circa 1968) , VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 83. (9) Testimony of George C. Moore, Nov. 17, 1978, VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 363 (hereinafter Moore testimony) . (10) Executive session testimony of Charles D. Brennan, June 21, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 7. (11) MLK exhibit F-451-A (FBI memorandum to SAC, Albany, from Direc- tor, Aug. 25, 1967), VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 298. (12) MLK exhibit F--451-B (FBI airtel to SAC, Albany, from Director, Mar. 4, 1968), VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 301. (13) Executive session testimony of Thomas E. Bishop, June 21, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. (5-7. (///) Executive session testimony of Alan G. Sentinella, May 25, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 26. (15) MLK exhibit F-451-A (FBI memorandum to SAC, Albany, from Director, Aug. 25, 1967), VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 298. (16) Moore testimony, pp. 366-367. (17) See refs. 47, 48 and 49, and text, infra, for discussion of Department of Justice authorization procedures for various forms of electronic surveillance. (18) FBI memorandum from M. A. Jones to Cartha Del^ach, Feb. 7, 1961, re: article in The Nation for Feb. 4, 1961, by Martin Luther King, Jr., unrecorded headquarter serials. (19) FBI memorandum from Bland to Sullivan, Feb. 3, 1962, FBI headquar- ters file 100-372450-135. (20) Washington Capital News Service teletype, Dec. 29, 1963, FBI head- quarters file 94-3-i-l 1-752. (21) See, for example, executive session testimony of Cartha DeLoach, Julv 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 12-18, 41-45, and testimony of Arthur Murtagh, Nov. 17, 1978, VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 91-96 (hereinafter Murtagh testimony). (22) "J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI." Newsweek. Dec. 7, 1964, p. 22. (23) Testimony of Ramsey Clark, Nov. 28, 1978, VII HSCA-MLK hearings, 74 (hereinafter Clark testimony). (2J,) Ibid. (25) Ibid. 677 (26) FBI memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, Aug. 23, 1963, re: Communist Party, USA Negro question, FBI lieadquarters file l(K)-3-116-253X. (27) See, e.g., FBI memorandum from M. A. Jones to Bishop, Mar. 18, 1969, re : Martin Luther King's birthday, FBI headquarters file 100-06670-3586. (28) Executive session testimony of Alan G. Sentinella, May 25, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 26-27. {29) FBI memorandum from Atlanta to Director, Apr. 25, 1962, FBI head- quarters file 100-5586, 1-5-16670. (30) FBI memorandum from Director to Atlanta, May 11, 1902, MLK security file 100-6670- (obliterated). (31) Book III, Senate Intelligence Committee, p. 87. (32) FBI memorandum from Director to SAC, Atlanta, Oct. 23, 1962, FBI headquarters file 100-438794- (illegible serial). (33) Executive session testimony of Alan G. Sentinella, May 25, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 47-50. (34) FBI memorandum from Baumgardner to Sullivan, Aug. 23, 1963, re: CPUSA-Negro question, FBI headquarters file 100-3-1 16-253X. (35) Ibid. (3()) See, e.g., Brennan testimony, p. 154. See also staff summary of intervievp with David Ryan, July 13, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK document 230316). (37) FBI memorandum from Baumgardner to Sullivan, Aug. 23, 1963, re: CPUSA-Negro question, FBI head(iuarters file 100-3-116-253X. (38) FBI memorandum from Sullivan to Belmont, Aug. 30, 1963, re: CPUSA- Negro question, FBI headquarters file 100-3-116-253X. (39) FBI memorandum from Sullivan to Belmont, Dec. 24, 1963, re: CPUSA- Negro question, CIRM (illegible serial). (W) Ibid. (Jfl) FBI memorandum from Sullivan to Belmont. Jan. 8, 1964, FBI head- (luarters file 77-56944-19. ' (J,2) Id. at 3. (/i3) See MLK Exhibit F-442A (FBI memorandum to Sullivan from Bureau, Apr. 18, 1968, indicating electronic surveillance on Dr. King and SCLC until November 1965), VI HSGA-MLK hearings, 181. See also section II D of this report, refs. 38—44, and text, supra, for discussion of committee review of FBI electronic surveillance materials at National Archives. (44) Brennan testimony, p. 225. (45) See FBI memorandum, Mar. 4, 1964, from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, CPUSA-Negro question (serial illegible). (46) FBI memorandum from C. A. Evans to Alan Belmont, July 16, 1963, Communist influence in racial matters, FBI headquarters file 166-3-116 (illegi- ble) ;see also FBI memorandum from C. A. Evans to Alan Belmont, Oct. 10, 1963, security matter, unrecorded serial. (^7) Memorandum from TT.S. Attorney General Brownell to the Director, FBI, re: microphone surveillance, May 20, 1954. (48) Book III, Senate Intelligence Committee, p. 123. (49) See MLK Exhibit F-442A (FBI memorandum to Sullivan from Brennan, Apr. 18, 1968), VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 181. (50) Testimony of Cartha D. DeLoach, Nov. 27, 1978, VII HSCA-MLK Hear- ings, 24 (hereinafter DeLoach testimony). (51) Book III, Senate Intelligence Committee, pp. 158-161. (52) Id. at 180. (53) Id. at 159. (54) Id. at 158-161. (55) See generally Book III, Senate Intelligence Committee, pp. 158-161. See also deposition of Seymour F. Phillips, Sept. 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 43. (56) See, e.g., MLK exhibit F-446A (FBI memorandum from F. J. Baimigard- ner to William C. Sullivan, Feb. 1, 1965), VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 254; MLK Exhibit F-446E (FBI memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, Dec. 12, 1964), VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 261 : MLK exhibit F-447A (FBI memo- randum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, Mar. 4, 1964) . VI HSCA- MLK hearings, 268; MLK exhibit F-447 (FBI memorandum from F. J. Baum- gardner to William C. Sullivan, Dec. 29, 1964). 678 (57) See, e.g., MLK exhibit F-i44A (FBI memorandum from F. J. Baum- gardner to William C. Sullivan. Oct. 27. 1966). VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 239; MLK exhibit F-444C (FBI memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan. Xov. 3. 1966) , VI HSCA-MLK hearings. 249. (58) MLK exhibit F-451A (FBI memorandum to SAC, Albany from Director. Aug. 25, 1967), VI HSCA-MLK hearing.^, 298; MLK exhibit F-451B (FBI airtel to SAC Albany from P'rector. Mar. 4. 196K), VI HSCA-MLK lioariiigs. 301. (59) FBI memorandum from William C. Sullivan to A. II. Belmont. Xov. 22, 1964, re : Communism and the Negro movement — a current analysis, FBI head- quarters file 100-442569-504. (60) FBI memorandum from C. D. Brennan to William C. Sullivan. Apr. 10, 1967. re : Communist influence in racial matters (illegible serial). (61) FBI memorandum. Mar. 11, 1968, from G. C. Moore to William C. Sullivan. Martin Luther King, .Tr., security matter, FBI headquarters file 100-106670-3526. (62) See MLK exhibit F-446 A through G (dissemination to religious leaders, VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 254, 256, 257, 259, 263, 265 respectively: F-447 A through D (interference with awards), VI HSCA-MLK hearings, 268, 270, 272, 27." respectively hearings. 277, 279,; F-449 A through 281, 283. E (interference with funding), VI HSCA-MLK 285 respectively. (63) See iH^K exhibits F-444A through F-444D (dissemination to friendly media sources). VI HSCA-MLK hearings. 2.*i9. 247. 249. 251 respectively. (64) Executive session testimony of Thomas E. Bishop. ,Iune 21. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 25-29. (65) "FBI Tried to Hide Ties with Globe-Democrat." St. Louis Tost-Dispatch. Dec. 1, 1977, p. 1-A. (66) Ibid. (67) FBI memorandum from SAC St. Louis to Director. FBI. May 28, 1968, re- COINTELPRO-New Left, FBI headquarters file 100-448698-42. (68) FBI letter from Director to SAC, St. Louis, Oct. 18. 1968; re: COINTEL PRO-New I,eft, FBI headquarters file 100-449698-42-7. (69) Staff summary of interview with Denny Walsh, Mar. 5. 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 310096). (70) See MLK Exhibit F-521. from Moore to Sullivan (FBI memorandum. Mar. 28. 1968), VII HSCA-MLK hearings, 108. (yi) Ibid. See also staff summary of interview with Patrick Buchanan, Mar. 5, 1979, House Select Committee on Assassinations (MLK Document 310095) ; staff summary of interview with G. Duncan Bauman. Feb. 28. 1979, House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations (MLK Document 300223). (72) Ibid. (73) Ibid. (T4) See MLK exhibit F-520 ("The Real Martin Luther King," St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Mar. .30-31, 1968. p. C-2), VII HSCA-MLK hearings. 106. (7.5) Executive session testimony of Thomas E. Bishop, .Tune 21. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 43-44. (76) See, e.g., testimony of .Tames Earl Ray, Aug. 17. 1978, III HSCA-MLK hearings, 98. (77) Tetter from .Tohn L. Ray to George McMillan, May 28, 1972 (MLK Document 290033) . (78) Book III, Senate Intelligence Committee, p. 9. (7.9) Id. at 48. (80) Ibid. (81) The divisions, in numerical order, were: (1) identification: (2) training: (3) administrative: (4) files and communications; (5) domestic intelligence: (6) general investigative ; (7) laboratory: (8) crime records ; (9) special investi- gative; (10) inspection. (82) The text of 18 TJ.S.C. section 241 is as foHows : Conspiracy against rights of citizens : If two or more persons consi)ire to injure, oppre.ss. threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or hiws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the .same : or If two or more per.sons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured * * * * (83) See staff summary of interview with Stephen .T. Pollak. .Tune 29. 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 2.50279) . 679 (84) Testimouv of Stephen J. Pollak, Nov. 28, 1978, VII HSCA-MLK hearings, 142. (85) FBI memorandum, Rosen to DeLoach, May 2, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-2946. (86) Executive session testimony of Robert Jensen, July 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 14. (S7) Staff summary of interview with Cartha DeLoach, June 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 230174). (88) Clark testimony, p. 11. (89) Id. at 12. See also memorandum, Stephen J. Pollak to Director, FBI, Apr. 14, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-109. PoUak's mem- orandum read, in its entirety, as follows : "I have been advised by telephone that Dr. Martin Luther King was this date shot and wounded by an unidentified jjerson or persons in Memphis, Tennessee, where he travelled to lead a demonstration march scheduled for April 8, 1968. "Please conduct a full investigation into a possible violation of 18 U.S.C. 241 and keep me currently advised of all developments." (90) See, e.g., staff summary of interview with Robert Jensen, June 20, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (MLK Document 190108). (91) Staff summary of interview with Richard E. Long, June 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (MLK Document 260327). (92) FBI memorandum, McGowan to Rosen, Apr. 4, 1968; FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-327. (93) Staff summary of interview with Clem McGowan, June 13, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 3—4 (MLK Document 220469). (94) FBI memorandum, Rosen to DeLoach, Apr. 6, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-329. (95) FBI memorandum, Rosen to DeLoach, Apr. 5, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-177. (.9^) FBI memorandum, Rosen to DeLoach, Apr. 6, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 41-38861-329. (97) FBI teletype. Director to all continental offices, Apr. 8, 1968, FBI head- quarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-158. (98) FBI memorandum, Rosen to DeLoach, Apr. 12, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-1113. (99) FBI memorandum, Rosen to DeLoach, Apr. 18, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 41-^8861-1367. (100) FBI teletype, Director to all SAC's, Apr. 18, 1969, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-1271. (101) FBI memorandum, C. L. Trotter to Mohr, Sept. 2, 1969, FBI headquar- ters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-5818. (102) Ibid. (103) Ibid. (104) Much of the public concern is based on the erroneous impression that fingerprint identification is an entirely computerized process. In fact, while com- puters are of great assistance in many aspects of the comparison process (for example in searching a large number of records for prints of a specific tyi>e or characteristic), the actual comparison of a latent print with known set of prints is still done manually. (105) FBI memorandum, Rosen to DeLoach, Apr. 19, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-4046 (insert attached). (106) FBI memorandum, Rosen to DeLoach, Apr. 19, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-1727. (107) FBI teletype, Director to all SAC's, Apr. 19, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-1396. (108) FBI memorandum, Jones to Bishop, Apr. 19, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-1938. (109) FBI memorandum, Jones to Bishop, Apr. 25, 1968. FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-2584. (110) See, e.g., FBI teletype. Director to all SAC's, Apr. 27, 1968, FBI Miami Field Office MURKIN file No. 44-18.54-614. (111) See, e.g., FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-2324 (summariz- ing 1 month's investigation in the Atlanta Field Office). (112) FBI teletype. Director to SAC's Chicago, Kansas City, St. Louis, Spring- field, May 1, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-2622. 680 (113) See, e.g., stafif summary of interview with Ramsey Clark, June 21, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (MLK Document 220473). {114) FBI memorandum. Director to Attorney General, May 13, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861 -3r)09. (115) Ibid. (116) FBI memorandum, J. J. Casper to Mohr, May 10, 1968. FBI headciuarters MURKIN file No. 44-^8841-3763. {117) Ibid. {118) Staff summary of interview with Harold Dobson, June 28, 1978, pp. 2-3 (MLK Document 230396) . {119) FBI memorandum. Director to Attorney General, June 11, 1968, cap- tioned "Electronic Surveillance", FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861- (nonrecorded serial). {120) DeLoach testimony, p. 78. {121) Ibid. {122) Id. at 79. {123) Id. at 81. {124) FBI interview with John Larry Ray, May 9, 1968, St. Louis Field Office MURKIN file No. 44-775. {125) See, e.g., memorandum, Rosen to DeLoach. May 10. 1968, FBI headquar- ters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-3510. {126) FBI memorandum, Rosen to DeLoach, May 10. 198S, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-3510. {127) Correspondence, Director to Ottawa Legat. May 11, 1068, FBI Memphis Field Ofl5ce MURKIN file No. 44-1987. Sub. 1^75. {128) FBI teletype, Director to SAC's Memphis. Buffalo, and Legat Ottawa. June 5, 1968. FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861^725. {129) FBI memorandum. Hoover to Tolson, DeLoach. Rosen. Bi.shop, Sullivan, June 20, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-4660, p. 5. {130) Staff summary of interview with Ramsey Clark, June 21, 1978, p. 3 (MLK Document 220473). See also Clark testimony, pp. 16-19, Ray's statement to the Aeromarine clerk and his purpo.se in discussing filing the Birmingham complaint charging Rav with conspiracy to interfere with Dr. King's civil rights. {131) Id. at 18. {132) FBI teletvpe. Director ^to all SAC's, Apr. 26. 1968. FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-2288. {133) FBI memorandum, McGowan to Rosen, June 18, 196«, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-4578. {134) See, e.g., FBI airtel. SAC, Memphis to SAC, New Orleans. Mar. 5. 1969, FBI Memphis Field Oflice MURKIN file No. 44-1987-Sub. M-423. {135) See, e.g., FBI teletype. Charlotte to Director, Apr. 29, 1968, FBI head- quarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-2747. {136) FBI memorandum. Rosen to DeLoach, Aug. 26, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-5120. {137) FBI memorandum, Branigan to Sullivan, June 14, 1968, FBI headquar- ters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-4682. {138) The FBI did, on one occasion, request that the Department consider issuing a grand jury subpena as one possible means of .securing the notes of the author William Bradford Huie. For a discussion of the Department's respon.se to this proposal, .see "An Analysis of the A.s.sassination Investigation of the Depart- ment of .lustice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation." staff report, XIII Appendix to the HSCA-MLK hearing.s. (139) DeLoach testimony, p. 51. {140) Id. at5(>-5L {141) Id. at 51. {142) Id. at 52. {143) Clark testimony, p. ,53. {144) Article. New York Times. June 20, 1968. p. 23 (incorporating text of President's statement in signing title III into law). {145) See, e.g., 114 Cong. Record 162J>-98 (June 6, 1968, remarks of Pollak). (146) Clark testimony, Nov. 28, 1978, VII HSCA-IMLK hearings, p. 43. (147) FBI airtel, Director to SAC, Memphis, Aug. 14. 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-5073. (148) FBI interview with Mrs. Marguerita Welch, Apr. 24, 1968, FBI Chicago MURKIN file No. 44-1114. 681 (149) FBI airtel, SAC, New Orleans to Director, Mar. 18, 1969, FBI headquar- ters MURiaN file No. 44-38861-5661. (150) Ibid. (151) FBI airtel. Director to SAC's, New Orleans and Memphis, Mar. 26, 1969, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-5661. {151a) Executive session testimony of witness A, Dec. 13, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 6-8. (152) Testimony of Capt. Billie J. Smith, evidentiary hearing on defense motion to modify conditions of confinement, Sept. 30, 1978 (MLK Document 110337). {153) FBI teletype, Memphis to Director, Sept. 30, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-5209. {154) See, e.g., memorandum, SAC, Memphis, to Director, Oct. 11, 1968, and attached communications, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-5235; memorandum, SAC, Memphis, to Director, Oct. 14, 1968, and attached communi- cations, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-5242; FBI airtel, SAC, Memphis, to Director, Oct. 24, 1968, and attached communications, FBI head- quarters MURKIxX file No. 44-38861-5327. {155) FBI airtel, SAC, Memphis, to Director, Oct. 24, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-5327. {156) See staff summary of interview with Robert Jensen, June 20, 1978 (MLK Document 190108) ; see also executive session testimony of Robert Jensen, July 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 47-49. {157) Executive session testimony of Robert Jensen, July 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 50-51. {158) Staff .summary of interview with William Morris, Nov. 21, 1978 (MLK Document 270327). (159) Executive session testimony of Robert Jensen, July 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 51. (160) Id. at 55. (161) Ibid. (162) Id. at 54. (163) Ibid, at p. 54; Cartha DeLoach had no recollection of any activity in Memphis which might have intruded. upon Ray's attorney /client privilege. (Staff interview with C. DeLoach, June 26, 1978 (MLK Document 230174). Alex Rosen, Assistant Director of the General Investigative Division, did not recall seeing either the Sept. 30, 1968, Memphis airtel detailing Battle's order, or the three letters which followed in apparent contravention of the order. He recognized his initials on the Oct. 31, 1968 headquarters directive to Memphis, but had no inde- pendent recollection of the situation that had triggered the directive. Staff in- terview with Aex Rosen. June 28. 1978 (MLK Document 210237). Finally, neither Attorney General Clark (executive session testimony of Ram- sey Clark, July 19, 1978, at pp. 89-92) nor Shelby County District Attorney Canale knew of any activity constituting an infringement on Ray's attorney/ client privilege. (164) Ibid. (165) FBI airtel. Director to SAC, Memphis, Oct. 31, 1968, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-5310. (166) FBI memorandum, Rosen to DeLoach, Mar. 11, 1969, p. 1, FBI headquar- ters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-5612. (167) Memorandum, Rosen to DeLoach, Mar. 11, 1969, FBI headquarters MUR- KIN file, serial 44-38861-5612. (168) FBI airtel, SAC. Houston, to SAC, Memphis, Mar. 12, 1969, FBI Mem- phis MURKIN file No. 44-1987-Sub. M-447. (169) FBI memorandum, Rosen to DeLoach, Mar. 12, 1969, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-5639. (170) FBI memorandum, Rosen to DeLoach, Mar. 13, 1969, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-5615. (171) FBI teletype, Memphis to Director, Mar. 13, 1969, FBI headquarters MURKIN file No. 44-38861-5622. (172) Staff summary of interview with Robert Jensen. Oct. 8. 1978 (MLK Document 260328) . (173) See, generally, DeLoach testimony, pp. 29-31. (174) Executive session testimony of Ramsey Clark, July 19, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 63. 682 {175) See, e.g., staff summary of interview with Wilbur Martindale (former Chief of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Unit), June 15, 1978 (MLK Document 220471) ; staff summary of interview with Fred Vinson, Jr. (former Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division. Department of Justice) , June 30, 1078 (MLK Document 230183) ; staff summary of interview with Stephen J. Pollak (former Assistant Attorney General of Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice), June 30, 1978 (MLK Document 250279). III. Re(X>mmendations of the Committee (1) "Assassination and Political Violence," a report to the National Commis- sion on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office, 1969), vol. 8, p. 45 (hereinafter Assassination Report). (2) Id. at 124. (S) "To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquility," final report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. xxiii (hereinafter A'iolence Com- mission Report) . (4) Assassination Report, p. 10. (5) Id. at 1. (6) Id. at 2-5. (7) Violence Commission Report, p. 125. (8) Assassination Report, p. 11. (.9) See generally Charles H. Whittier, Congressional Research Service, Li- brary of Congress, "Assassination in Theory and Practice : A Historical Survey of the Religious and Philosophical Background of the Doctrine of Tyrannicide," Apr. 12, 1978 (JFK Document 007559). (10) Violence Commission Report, pp. 2-16. (11) Id. at 127-28. (12) See generally R. Rothman, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "The Social and Political Implications of the Assassinations of John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr." (MLK Document 260029) . (13) Violence Commission Report, p. xix. (1^) See testimony of Richard M. Helms. Sept. 22, 1978, hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Con- gress, 2d session (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. IV, pp. 118-161 (hereinafter Helms testimony, — HSCA-JFK hearings, — ) ; testimony of Santos TraflScante, Jr., Sept 27, 1978, V HSCA-JFK hearings, 357-364. (15) Id., Helms testimony at 180-81. (16) Executive Order 12036, sec. 2.305 (Jan. 24. 1978). (17) As enacted by Public Law 92-539 in 1972, 18 U.S.C. § 1116 extended the protection of Federal law to foreign officials or guests in the Ignited States. Public Law 94-467, enacted in 1976, broadens that protection to include an "internation- ally protected person," defined to include a Chief of State whenever he was "in a country other than his own." Even though the offender might be subject to Fed- eral criminal jurisdiction, if the assas.sination occurred in the Chief of State's own country, it would not fall within the scope of the statute. (18) S. 1437, 15th Congess, 1st session § 1202 (1977) . (19) Testimony of Benjamin R. Civiletti, "Legislative and Administrative Reform," hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress. 2d session (Washington. D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979) , vol. I, pp. 112-136 (hereinafter Reform) . (20) See generally Murl Larkin. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "Federal Homicide: Public Figures," May 15, 1978 (JFK Document 008417) (hereinafter Larkin). (21) If the President had been killed as a result of a conspiracy, it would have violated 18 U.S.C. § 372 ; if the murder had occurred within the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States, it would have violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(b), 1112(b). Other statutes that might have been involved include 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242. (22) Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 455 (hereinafter Warren Report). (23) 18 U.S.C. §1114. (24) Warren Report, pp. 455-56. (683) 684 (25) Larkin, pp. 10-11. (26) Soo, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §1114. (27) S. 1437, 95th Congress, 1st session § 1601(e) (2) (A) (1977). (28) {29) Testimony Id. at 31. of "William Webster, Reform, p. 4. (SO) Tt>.stimony of Benjamin Civiletti, Reform, pp. 134-35. {31) Testimony of William Webster, Reform, p. 31. {32) See Larkin, pp. 15-19. {S3) Testimony of Stuart Knight, Reform, p. 108; testimony of William Webster, Reform, p. 32. Ci.'i ) Testimony of Benjamin Civiletti, Reform, p. 128. {35) 1(1. at 112, 122, 129-30. {3)1) Warren Report, pp. 455-56. (57) Testimony of Benjamin Civiletti, Reform, p. 126; testimony of William Webster, Reform, p. 25. {3S) Testimony of Stuart Knight, Reform, p. 97. {39) See also testimony of Stuart Kinght, Reform, p. 97; testimony of Wil- liam Webster, Reform, p. 25. (40) Testimony of Stuart Knight, Reform, p. 97 (should be presumption of exercise) ; testimony of Benjamin Civiletti, Reform, p. 132 (should be auto- niatic) ; testimony of William Webster. Reform, p. 25 (automatic). (41) Testimony of William Webster, Reform, p. 22; .see Kent M. Ronhoude, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "Disposition of the Re- Document mains of 015785) "N'ictims . of Federally Cognizable Homicides," Dec. 18, 1978 (JFK (42) Te.stimony of Benjamin Civiletti, Reform, p. 133; testimony of William Webster. Reform, p. 7. (43) Testimony of William Web.ster, Reform, p. 28 (concern expressed over possible extension of language) . (/,//) Testimony of Stuart Knight. Reform, p. 105 (Director of FBI) ; testi- mony of William Webster, Reform, p. 25 (Attorney General). (45) Testimony of Stuart Knight. Reform, p. 106. (4«) 18U.S.C. §2509. (47) See generally Kent M. Ronhoude, Congressional Research Service, Li- brary of Congress, "Government Acquisition of Evidence Pertaining to the As- sas ination ofPresident Kennedy and Related Matters," Dec. 11, 1978. {JfS) TJniicd States v. One 6.5 mm MannUchcr-Carcnno Military Rifle, 250 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Tex. 1966). revUJ. Kinq v. Vnited Statea, 364 F. 2d 235 (5th Cir. 1966). See King v. Vnited State's; 292 F. Supp. 767 (D. Colo. 1968). (49) See 15 U.S.C. 905(b) for the relevant statute then in effect. The relevant statute today is 18 U.S.C. § 924(d). (50) See Porter v. United States, 335 F. Supp. 498 (N.D. Tex. 1971) rcv'd, Porter v. United States, 473 F. 2d 1329 (5th 1973) (entitled to realized value related to a.ssassination). (5J) Xirhols V. United States, 325 F. Supp. 130 (D. Kans. 1971). ojfrf 460 F. 2d 671 aoth Cir. 1972). See testimony of Benjamin Civiletti. Reform, pp. 145-146 (need for general legislation). (52) Testimony of Percy Foreman. Nov. 13. 1978, V HSCA-MLK hearings. 297-298. (53) See generally Nancy Lee Jones, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "Constitutional Analysis of a New York Statute Requiring Funds Received by Alleged Criminals for Certain Purposes to be Given to Their Victims." Sept. 8, 1977. (54) 18 U.S.C. § 871. (55) 18 U.S.C. §1752. (56) Testimony of Stuart Knight. Reform, pp. 96-97. (57) Testimony of William Webster, Reform, p. 12. On the other hand, testi- mony before the committee raised (juestions that these guidelines might be too restrictive. 'I'e.stimony of Stuart Knight. Reform, pp. 93-94 (too restrictive) ; testimony <»f William Webster. Reform, p. 11 (tigbt. but "one of the assumed ri.sks that we take in a free society") ; testimony of Benjamin Civiletti. Reform, pp. 119-120 (quality if not quantity is sufficient). (58) .50 U.S.C. § 403(d) (3). See Heine v. Rous. 399 F. 2d 785 (4th e